Moral Relativism:

What It Is, and Why You Probably Don't Really Believe It Dr. Robert Noggle
Assistant Professor of Philosophy Central Michigan University Disclaimer: These notes are intended to supplement to my PHL 118 and PHL 218-L courses. Because those courses do not deal with meta-ethics, these remar s ma e certain simpli!ications that are not appropriate !or a more detailed study o! the su"#ect.

THE PR B!EM

" M R#! DI$#%REEME&T

People$s opinions a"out morality di!!er. %ome people "elie&e that a"ortion is immoral. 'thers "elie&e that a"ortion is a morally le(itimate choice. %ome people "elie&e that no war can e&er "e #ust. 'thers "elie&e that at least some wars are #ust. %ome people "elie&e that we must ne&er lie. 'thers "elie&e that sometimes lies are morally #usti!ied. %ome people "elie&e that it is immoral to eat animals. 'thers "elie&e that there is nothin( wron( with eatin( animals. )oral disa(reements are common and !amiliar. *hat do such disa(reements tell us+ How should we deal with them+ *hat should we do when we ha&e to deal with people whose moral opinions di!!er !rom ours+ There are three main ways to cope with moral con!lict and disa(reement: moral do(matism, moral relati&ism, and moral reasonin(.

M R#! D %M#TI$M
'ne option is to simply shout out our opinions more and more loudly, or to resort to other antiintellectual tactics. %ome people simply assume that they ha&e the correct moral opinions and re!use to consider the possi"ility that they mi(ht "e wron(. This attitude is called ,do(matism., Do(matism is the holdin( o! a "elie! without "ein( willin( to discuss it, or to o!!er any reasons to support it, or to consider any opposin( &iewpoint. People who hold an opinion do(matically o!ten assume that their opinion is so o"&iously true that they do not need any reasons !or it. Hence, a do(matist will typically re!use to (i&e any reasons or rational ar(uments to support the do(matic opinion. This is not the way rational persons should "eha&e o! course, "ut it does happen -as anyone who has seen the .erry %prin(er %how can attest/.

M R#! RE!#TI'I$M
0nother way to deal with the pro"lem o! moral disa(reement is to adopt some sort o! moral relati&ism. )oral relati&ism is the claim that what is moral !or a person really is #ust whate&er she or her culture "elie&es. That is, moral relati&ism is the theory that moral truth is relati&e to the indi&idual or to society.-1/
-Technically, the term ,moral relati&ism, actually re!ers to the doctrine that moral truth is relati&e to the society or culture. ,)oral -or ethical/ su"#ecti&ism, actually re!ers to the doctrine that moral truth is relati&e to the indi&idual. These technicalities will not a!!ect what 1 say here, so 1 will #ust use ,moral relati&ism, to co&er "oth./

)oral relati&ism is more than #ust the claim that people$s and societies$ moral "elie!s di!!er. That claim is o"&iously true: mem"ers o! some societies "elie&e -or ha&e "elie&ed/ that poly(amy, sla&ery, in!anticide, !emale circumcision, canni"alism, and so on are moral. 0nd clearly indi&idual moral opinions do di!!er as well. %o it is true that moral "elie!s di!!er !rom culture to culture and person to person. But this claim, in and o! itsel!, is not moral relati&ism. *hat moral relati&ism adds is the claim that e&ery society$s -or e&ery indi&idual$s/ moral "elie!s 023 T243. 3&eryone a(rees that moral "elie!s di!!er. *hat moral relati&ism says is that all o! these di!!erin( moral "elie!s 023 T243. It is absolutely crucial to keep moral relativism separate from the true but unsurprising observation that people an societies have ifferent moral beliefs! an that everyone thinks that their o"n beliefs are true. )oral relati&ism does not #ust say that people$s and cultures$ moral "elie!s di!!er5 it (oes on to say that all o! these di!!erin( moral "elie!s are true. )oral relati&ism is the doctrine that moral truths -and not #ust moral B3L136%/ &ary !rom person to person and culture to culture. 1n other words, moral relati&ism is the doctrine that claims that each person$s or culture$s moral "elie!s are true. -%omewhat con!usin(ly, .udith Boss uses the term ,sociolo(ical relati&ism, to re!er to the claim that moral B3L136% &ary !rom culture to culture. 0 more common term !or this is ,cultural relati&ism., 3&en more con!usin(ly, sometimes social scientists us the term ,moral relati&ism, when they really mean #ust the claim that moral B3L136% &ary !rom culture to culture. This is a H473 mista e, since the claim that moral "elie!s &ary !rom culture to culture is 8329 D166323:T !rom the claim that moral T24TH &aries !rom culture to culture./ By the way, we should :3832 use phrases li e ,true !or me, or ,true !or you., These phrases are am"i(uous5 that is, they can mean two 8329 D166323:T thin(s. 1! you say that each person$s moral "elie!s are ,true !or her,, then you mi(ht mean #ust that each person "elie&es her own moral "elie!s. That is true, o! course -i! 1 don$t "elie&e somethin(, then it is not my "elie!;/, "ut it is not moral relati&ism. 'n the other hand, you mi(ht mean that each person$s moral "elie!s really are true. The pro"lem with sayin( ,true !or her, or ,true !or me, is that these phrases do not ma e clear what you mean.

THE #PPE#!

" M R#! RE!#TI'I$M

0t !irst, moral relati&ism may seem li e an attracti&e position. 0!ter all, e&eryone is entitled to

her own opinion, and relati&ism seems li e a way o! respectin( e&eryone$s opinion. 2elati&ism says, in e!!ect, that each person$s opinion is ri(ht !or that person. This position may sound li e a sensi"le way to deal with the pro"lem o! moral disa(reement, !or it (i&es us a way to ,li&e and let li&e, with those whose moral opinions di!!er !rom ours. *e mi(ht also "e drawn to relati&ism out o! humility: *ho am 1 to claim that someone else$s opinion is wron(+ *e mi(ht thin that relati&ism is a (ood way to a&oid ha&in( to "e so presumptuous as to ta e a stand on the accepta"ility o! other people$s "elie!s. These themes appear in three o! the most common ar(uments !or moral relati&ism. #he Diversity Argument$ This one is popular amon( anthropolo(ists and other social scientists, as well as some li"erals. There are a num"er o! ways that this ar(ument can "e !ormulated, "ut in its most "asic !orm, it comes down to this: Premise: 3ach culture or society has its own distincti&e &iews a"out ri(ht and wron(. -1n other words, there is a (reat di&ersity o! ideas a"out what is moral and what is immoral./-1/ <onclusion: There!ore, each culture$s morality is ri(ht !or that culture. 1n other words, each culture$s morality is correct. This ar(ument, "y the way, is most o!ten used to de!end the &ersion o! relati&ism that claims that morality is relati&e to a culture or society -rather than the indi&idual/. The pro"lem with the ar(ument is that the conclusion does not !ollow !rom the premise. -The !ancy word !or a conclusion that does not !ollow !rom the premise is ,non se=uitur.,/ That is, the premise does not P2'83 the conclusion. The reason that the premise does not pro&e the conclusion is that the mere !act o! disa(reement or di&ersity o! opinion a"out somethin( does not pro&e that e&eryone$s opinion is correct. To see this, consider the !ollowin(. 'nce upon a time, there was considera"le disa(reement a"out what the stars are. %ome "elie&ed they were (ods. %ome thou(ht they were camp!ires o! people li&in( in the s y. 0 &ery !ew suspected that they mi(ht "e other suns. :ow, the !act that there was disa(reement did not ma e e&eryone$s "elie! correct. There is #ust one true "elie! a"out stars, namely that they li e the sun. The lesson here is that the mere !act that people disa(ree a"out somethin( does not mean that e&eryone is ri(ht. 0nd that is why the di&ersity ar(ument !or moral relati&ism !ails. The !act that di!!erent cultures, societies, or indi&iduals mi(ht ha&e di!!erent moral "elie!s does not pro&e that e&ery moral "elie! is true. #he %umility Argument$ %ome people accept moral relati&ism "ecause they thin that they are not in a position to tell others that their moral "elie!s are !alse. That is, they reason li e this: Premise: 1t is not my place to tell other people that their moral "elie!s are !alse

<onclusion: There!ore e&eryone$s moral "elie!s are true. The pro"lem here a(ain is that this is a non se=uitur. The premise does not pro&e the conclusion. .ust "ecause 1 am una"le or unwillin( to tell someone that their moral "elie!s are !alse, that does not mean that e&eryone$s moral "elie!s are true. To see this more clearly, consider an analo(ous case: 1 am not an astronomer. There!ore it is not my place to tell someone that their "elie! a"out which star is closest to the sun is !alse. But o! course that does not mean that e&eryone$s "elie!s a"out which star is closest to the sun are true. 1! you don$t watch The %impsons, then you are pro"a"ly not in a position to tell me what the name o! Homer$s "oss is. But that does not mean that e&eryone$s "elie!s a"out the name o! Homer$s "oss are e=ually correct. Homer$s "oss is named )r. Burns, and i! someone thin s it is somethin( else, then they are #ust wron(. The lesson we learn here is that the mere !act that you do not !eel =uali!ied to, or do not want to, say whether someone$s "elie!s are true does not mean that e&eryone$s "elie!s are automatically true. That is why the ar(ument !rom humility to moral relati&ism is a "ad ar(ument. #he #oleration&Respect Argument$ )any people accept moral relati&ism "ecause they "elie&e that adoptin( moral relati&ism is the only way to tolerate and respect di!!erent opinions a"out what is ri(ht and wron(. *antin( to respect people$s ri(hts to their opinions, and wantin( to tolerate di!!erent ways o! li!e are "oth wonder!ul thin(s. 1ndeed, they are two ideas that are at the !oundation o! a !ree society. Howe&er, usin( them to ar(ue !or moral relati&ism is a mista e. To see why, loo at how the ar(ument (oes: Premise: *e should tolerate di!!erences o! opinion, and respect people$s ri(hts to ha&e their own opinions. <onclusion: There!ore, e&eryone$s opinions are correct. Here a(ain, we ha&e a non se=uitur. The !act that we should tolerate di!!erences o! opinion, that we respect people$s ri(hts to ha&e their own opinions, does not mean that e&ery opinion is true. 6or e>ample, you ha&e the ri(ht to "elie&e that 2?2@A. :e&ertheless, that "elie! is still !alse. The !act that you ha&e the ri(ht to "elie&e it does not ma e it true. 1t would "e ridiculous !or someone to ar(ue that a math teacher should not count that wron( "ecause, a!ter all, a person has the ri(ht to her own "elie!s. The lesson we learn !rom this is that the mere !act that you ha&e a ri(ht to your own "elie!s does not ma e those "elie!s true. This is what ma es the ar(ument !rom toleration to moral relati&ism a "ad ar(ument.

PR B!EM$ WITH M R#! RE!#TI'I$M

Despite its popular appeal, moral relati&ism su!!ers !rom se&eral closely related pro"lems. These pro"lems are serious enou(h to ma e most philosophers thin that moral relati&ism--at least in its simplest !orm--is a dead end.-1/ 9et many people continue to at least say that they accept some &ersion o! moral relati&ism,

pro"a"ly "ecause they don$t really understand what moral relati&ism is and what its implications are. '. Inconsistencies 'ne pro"lem with the doctrine o! moral relati&ism--pro"a"ly the most serious pro"lem--is that it leads to inconsistencies. %ome moral "elie!s apply only to onesel!: 6or e>ample, 1 may "elie&e that the "est ind o! li!e is one that in&ol&es the =uest !or nowled(e. 9ou may "elie&e that the "est ind o! li!e in&ol&es ma in( a positi&e chan(e in society. :ow it is easy to see how "oth "elie!s could "e true at the same time: )ay"e the "est li!e !or me is one in which 1 pursue nowled(e, and the "est li!e !or you is the one that in&ol&es ma in( a positi&e chan(e in society. 2elati&ism seems per!ectly plausi"le here, since it seems that =uestions li e: what is the "est way to li&e+ are =uestions !or which the answers mi(ht &ary !rom person to person. The trou"le with moral relati&ism, thou(h, is that not all o! our moral "elie!s are li e this. <onsider the !ollowin(. Lisa "elie&es: ,1t is wron( to steal., Bart "elie&es: ,1t is 'B to steal., :ow, suppose that Bart steals !rom Lisa. Has Bart done anythin( wron(+ *ell, !rom Lisa$s point o! &iew, yes he has. But !rom Bart$s point o! &iew, he has not. :ow i! relati&ism is true, then "oth Lisa and Bart are correct. -2emem"er that relati&ism is more than #ust the claim that Lisa and Bart "oth B3L1383 their "elie!s5 it is the claim that "oth o! them ha&e <'223<T "elie!s./ How can that "e+ 1t would seem that Bart$s action was "oth wron( and ri(ht at the same time; That is a contradiction. <ontradictory statements can :3832 "e true at the same time. But moral relati&ism seems to imply that contradictory moral statements are true at the same time. This means that there is somethin( wron( with moral relati&ism. Here$s another way to ma e the same "asic point: 1! moral relati&ism is true, then there is no set o! rules or standards that (o&ern interpersonal relations, since each person has her own set o! rules or standards. %o i! moral relati&ism is true, then there are no moral rules that apply to e&eryone. There are only rules that apply to each person$s own actions. 1n e!!ect, this means that there is no morality at all. )orality is normally thou(ht o! as a set o! rules that (o&erns how we should interact with each other. But i! moral relati&ism is true, then there is no one set o! rules that (o&erns how we should interact with each other5 instead, there di!!erent rules !or each person. To see why this is a pro"lem, ima(ine that you were tryin( to play a (ame with se&eral persons, "ut each person was playin( accordin( to her own set o! rules. 1ma(ine that you are playin( po er and someone shouts out ,71:;, throws down her cards, and "e(ins sweepin( the money in the pot o&er to her. How could you o"#ect, since a!ter all, her rules are &alid !or her+ 1! each person has her own rules, then social li!e would "e li e this: there would "e no common set o! rules that we were all supposed to play "y.

(. Unacceptable Conse)uences The other main pro"lem with moral relati&ism is that it has some rather odd--and to most people unaccepta"le--implications. 6or e>ample, i! moral relati&ism is true, then no one is e&er wron( a"out what is moral or immoral. 1! e&eryone$s opinion -or e&eryone$s culture/ is correct, then i! 1 or my culture thin s that it is 'B to set "a"ies on !ire !or entertainment, then when 1 do that, 1 am not actin( immorally. :ow, pay &ery close attention to what 1 say: 1! moral relati&ism is true, then i! .oe "elie&es that settin( "a"ies on !ire is morally 'B, then his "elie! is automatically correct. 1t is not #ust that he "elie&es that settin( "a"ies on !ire is moral, "ut it really is moral !or him to do this. 1! you "elie&e in moral relati&ism, then you must "elie&e that .oe acts morally when he does this. -2emem"er that relati&ism means not only that he is moral in his own eyes, "ut that he really does act morally./ This is a (eneral point a"out moral relati&ism. 1! you "elie&e in moral relati&ism, you must also "elie&e that the naCis acted morally when they committed (enocide -not #ust that they thou(ht they were doin( the ri(ht thin(, "ut that they really were doin( the ri(ht thin(/. 9ou must also "elie&e the same thin( !or sla&e-holders, serial illers, canni"als, or anyone else who does somethin( cruel "ut "elie&es that it is the ri(ht thin( to do. 1n !act, i! moral relati&ism is true, then a person can ne&er ma e a mista e a"out what is moral or immoral, since it is only her own "elie!s that determine what is moral or immoral. 1! moral relati&ism is true, then Hitler$s moral "elie!s are not mista en. -The same applies to the moral "elie!s o! Pol Pot, the sla&e-holders in the 0merican ante-"ellum south, and any other really "ad person you can thin o!./ )any people !ind this idea so a"surd and repulsi&e that it is enou(h to con&ince them that somethin( is irrepara"ly de!ecti&e a"out the doctrine o! moral relati&ism. This pro"lem can hit home in a &ery direct way. 1! moral relati&ism is true, and i! someone does somethin( you do not li e "ut that they thin is morally 'B, then you cannot really claim that a person has done anythin( wron( or un!air or immoral. 6or e>ample, i! moral relati&ism is true, then i! your pro! thin s that it is 'B to (i&e you an 6 "ecause sDhe doesn$t li e your shoes, then there is nothin( un!air or immoral a"out his or her doin( that. 9ou may not li e it, "ut that is all you can say a"out it. %o lon( as your pro! thin s that it is morally ri(ht to (i&e you an 6 "ecause sDhe doesn$t li e your shoes, then, accordin( to moral relati&ism, it really is ri(ht !or your pro! to do this. 1! you try to tell him or her that sDhe is actin( wron(ly, all sDhe has to do is to say ,1 "elie&e that 1 am actin( morally, and accordin( to moral relati&ism 1 am automatically correct., 1! moral relati&ism is true, then i! someone does somethin( "ad to you -li e (i&e you an 6 !or no reason/, then you cannot protest that she has done somethin( wron(. -2emem"er, moral relati&ism means that each person$s moral "elie!s really are correct./ *hen push comes to sho&e, most o! us thin that there are thin(s that people should and should not do, re(ardless o! their opinions a"out the matter. *hen someone does somethin( "ad to you, most o! us thin that it ma es sense to protest that it is wron( !or them to do whate&er they are doin(.

THE PRI(E

" M R#! RE!#TI'I$M

1n short, relati&ism loo s li e a (ood way to deal with the !act o! moral disa(reement. 1 suspect that this is part o! its appeal and e>plains why a lot o! people "elie&e it. But relati&ism has strin(s attached. 1n order to a&oid ha&in( to thin our way throu(h complicated moral issues, we end up

(i&in( up the claim that some thin(s really are moral and that some thin(s really are immoral. 2elati&ism o! this sort is a way to hide !rom the need to thin a"out moral issues. 0doptin( moral relati&ism as a means o! (ettin( out o! the di!!icult #o" o! thin in( a"out morality is not #ust an intellectual cop-out. 1t also commits us to a lot o! thin(s that most o! us do not "elie&e. These implications are a sort o! price we must pay i! we "uy into moral relati&ism. 0nd it is a pretty he!ty price. 1! you accept moral relati&ism, then you ha&e to accept that 0LL morality is relati&e to the indi&idual or the society o! which she is a mem"er. That may sound ri(ht, "ut consider the !ollowin( statements:

It is immoral to set babies on fire for entertainment, and if someone disagrees with this, then they are simply mistaken. It is immoral to enslave other persons, and if someone disagrees with this, then they are simply mistaken. It is immoral to kill an innocent person, and if someone disagrees with this, then they are mistaken. It is good to help other people who are in distress, and if someone disagrees with this, then they are mistaken. It is good to be kind to people, and if someone disagrees with this, then they are mistaken. It is wrong for people to meddle in the affairs of a culture that it does not understand; this is true regardless of whether the meddlers believe it or not. Each person has the right to make her own decisions about how to live, so long as she does not bother anyone else, and this is true regardless of whether people believe it. It is unfair for professors to assign grades at random, and if someone disagrees with this, then they are mistaken. 1! you "elie&e any o! these thin(s--or anythin( li e them--then you are not a moral relati&ist. 1n short, i! you "elie&e that there are any truths a"out morality that are true e&en i! someone does not "elie&e them, then you are not a moral relati&ist.

M R#! RE#$ &I&%

*e "e(an with the pro"lem o! moral disa(reement, and we ha&e loo ed at two ways to deal with it. )oral do(matism simply claims that one$s own "elie!s are ri(ht and re!uses to discuss the matter !urther. )oral relati&ism declares that e&eryone is ri(ht. :either o! these seem li e &ery (ood approaches to dealin( with morality. %o what are we to do+ 0 third option is to reason a"out morality. To do this is to accept that your own moral opinions mi(ht "e wron(, and it is also to accept that some answers to moral =uestions mi(ht "e "etter than others. There may e&en "e correct and incorrect answers to moral =uestions. %o let us assume that at least some o! our own moral opinions could "e wron(, and accept that there is such a thin( as a "etter or worse answer to a moral =uestion. To assume this is to assume that moral =uestions are li e any other =uestions: =uestions that ha&e answers which we may "e a"le to !ind "y care!ul reasonin(.

#PPE&DI): ( MM & $E&$E T *EEP I& MI&D

*e$&e co&ered a lot o! (round here, and done it pretty =uic ly. 0s a ind o! summary, 1 want to lea&e you with a series o! thin(s to eep in mind. These thin(s should help you a&oid ma in( some o! the mista es people new to moral reasonin( commonly ma e. +, What -eo-le do is not the same as .hat they should do, 3thics is concerned with what people should do and what ou(ht to "e. The !act that people speed does not mean that they should speed. The !act that people litter does not mean that they ou(ht to litter. The !act that people do not always help each other does not mean that they ha&e no moral o"li(ation to help each other. The !act that someone does somethin( does not "y itsel! mean that she ou(ht to do it. There is a di!!erence "etween what people do and what they should do. The su"#ect matter o! this course is morality, which his the study o! what people should do. 1! you want to now what people actually do, then you need a course on sociolo(y or history or psycholo(y. 3thics is not the study o! what people actually do. 1t is the study o! what people should do. /, The 0a1t that someone thin2s or believes that somethin3 is true does not ma2e it true, The !act that 1 "elie&e that 1 am (oin( to win the lottery does not mean that 1 will win the lottery. The !act that sla&e-holders or naCis "elie&ed that their actions were moral does not mean that they were correct. 4, The 0a1t that -eo-le disa3ree about somethin3 does not mean that everyone is 1orre1t, or that .hat ea1h -erson believes is true, There was a time when people disa(reed a"out the shape o! the earth. This did not mean that e&eryone was correct. 1! it did, then the world would ha&e to ha&e "een "oth !lat and round at the same time, which is impossi"le. %imilarly, the !act that people disa(ree a"out what is moral does not pro&e that there each person$s moral "elie!s are true. 5, The 0a1t that .e do not 2no. the ans.er to some 6uestion does not mean that there is no ans.er,

There was a time when no one new that the earth mo&es around the sun. But it was still true that the earth mo&es around the sun, e&en thou(h no one new it. Truth is di!!erent !rom "elie!, and it is di!!erent !rom nowled(e. %omethin( can "e true e&en i! no one nows or "elie&es it. %imilarly, there is a correct answer to the =uestion: ,How many stars are in the )il y *ay+, *e do not now the answer to this =uestion, "ut there really is an answer. 7, The -hrases 8true 0or me8 or 8true 0or them8 are e9tremely misleadin3 be1ause they are ambi3uous, &ever use these -hases, #l.ays ma2e it 1lear .hether you are tal2in3 about .hat really is true or .hether you are tal2in3 about .hat someone believes is true, :, You 1an res-e1t a -erson's belie0s, and her ri3ht to her o.n o-inions .ithout believin3 that her o-inions are true, )em"ers o! the 6irst :ations cultures o! the Paci!ic :orthwest "elie&ed that the sun was put in the s y "y a 2a&en who stole it !rom a power!ul "ein(. 1 respect the culture !rom which this story comes -1 !ind their stories and their art "eauti!ul and !ascinatin(/, and 1 respect the people to whom this culture "elon(s. But that does not mean that 1 ha&e to "elie&e that the sun really was put in the s y "y a 2a&en. %imilarly, we can respect a person$s ri(ht to their own opinions without thin in( that those opinions are true. *e can respect the ri(hts o! the neo-naCis to "elie&e their idiotic world-&iew without "elie&in( that their e&il "elie!s are correct. Toleration does not mean that we ha&e to a(ree with the people whom we tolerate. ,1 may not a(ree with what you say, "ut 1$ll de!end to the death your ri(ht to say it., The !irst part o! this is #ust as important as the second. ;, There 1an be more than one 1orre1t ans.er .ithout every ans.er bein3 1orre1t, There is more than one (ood way to "uilt a house, "ut not e&ery way to "uild a house is (ood. %imilarly, there mi(ht "e more than one correct answer to some moral =uestion, "ut that does not ma e e&ery answer correct.

&otes
1. Philosophers usually distin(uish two !orms o! moral relati&ism. %u"#ecti&e moral relati&ism -or o!ten #ust ,moral su"#ecti&ism,/ is the doctrine that moral truth is relati&e to each person. That is, you ha&e your moral truth, and 1 ha&e mine, and each truth is true !or that person. )oral relati&ism proper -which is sometimes called con&entional moral relati&ism or e&en cultural moral relati&ism/ is the doctrine that moral truth is relati&e to each particular culture./ *hen 1 tal a"out relati&ism, 1 will include "oth the su"#ecti&ist !orm and the con&entionalist !orm, since what 1 ha&e to say will apply e=ually to "oth &ersions. 1n !act, 1 will run the two terms to(ether. 6or some purposes, it is important to eep them separate, !or our purposes you can i(nore the distinction i! you want. 1. )y topic here is what you mi(ht call ,nai&e, or ,simple, moral relati&ism. 1t is the ind o! moral relati&ism that is the most common and the most pernicious. 1t is the ind o! moral

relati&ism that one must put aside i! one is to thin clearly a"out morality. Howe&er, there are other, more sophisticated &ersions o! moral relati&ism which we will not discuss. Those !orms o! moral relati&ism attempt to eep some o! the "asic ideas o! the simple !orms o! relati&ism, "ut they also attempt to (et around some o! the more serious pro"lems with simple relati&ism. 1n particular, most sophisticated !orms o! moral relati&ism claim that moral reasonin( and moral theoriCin( are appropriate. -1! you ha&e trou"le seein( how a theory that says that moral truth is made up "y indi&iduals or societies could also claim at the same time that it ma es sense to reason a"out morality, then you can "e(in to see why these theories are &ery complicated./ These more sophisticated !orms o! relati&ism would "e discussed in courses that deal with somethin( called meta-ethics. %ince we are dealin( with moral theories here, all we need to tal a"out is the ind o! moral relati&ism that poses a challen(e to moral theory. %o, !ortunately, we only ha&e to discuss the simpler !orms o! relati&ism. But 1 do want to at least mention the !act that there are other !orms o! relati&ism that some philosophers -not me/ actually do hold. Hardly any philosophers hold the simple !orms o! relati&ism, and "y the time you !inish readin( this, 1 hope you can see why. 1. %ometimes this premise is stated as somethin( li e ,3ach culture has its own morality., That is not the "est way to state this premise, since it is am"i(uous "etween ,3ach culture has its own moral B3L136%, and ,3ach culture$s morality is T243.,