G.R. No. L-59329 July 19, 1985 EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner, vs. THE HON.

JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON. CEFERINO S. CARREON, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents. RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. it alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs. On March 25, 1985, before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues raised, the petitioner through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition. The petitioner alleged: 1. Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation has already sold its radio broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its equipment; 2. Respondent National Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness to grant to the said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to operate the said radio station and to approve the sale of the radio transmitter of said station DYRE; 3. In view of the foregoing, petitioner has no longer any interest in said case, and the new owner, Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further. The case, therefore, has become moot and academic. However, for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasijudicial functions, the Court issues the following guidelines: (1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 1 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed. (2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849). (3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent, In hisConstitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the test (Primicias v. Fugoso [80 Phil. 71], American Bible Society v. City of Manila[101 Phil. 386], Cabansag v. Fernandez [102 Phil. 152], Vera v. Arca [28 SCRA 351], Navarro v. Villegas [31 SCRA 931], Imbong v. Ferrer [35 SCRA 28], Badoy v. Commission on Elections [35 SCRA 285], People v. Ferrer [48 SCRA 382], and the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189]. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553]. (4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.

Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out. Similar considerations apply in the area of national security. The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos, Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance. (5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling. The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection. (6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already stressing that. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. (7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the case having become moot and academic, the petitioner's motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition is hereby GRANTED. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur in the result (the case having become moot and academic). Aquino, J., took no part.

[G.R. No. 126466. January 14, 1999]

ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO, respondents. DECISION "The question is not so much as who was aimed at as who was hit." (Pound, J., in Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merill Co., 228 N.Y. 58 [1920]). BELLOSILLO, J.: PERPETUALLY HAGRIDDEN as the public is about losing one of the most basic yet oft hotly contested freedoms of man, the issue of the right of free expression bestirs and presents itself time and again, in cyclic occurrence, to inveigle, nay, challenge the courts to re-survey its ever shifting terrain, explore and furrow its heretofore uncharted moors and valleys and finally redefine the metes and bounds of its controversial domain. This, prominently, is one such case. Perhaps, never in jurisprudential history has any freedom of man undergone radical doctrinal metamorphoses than his right to freely and openly express his views. Blackstone's pontifical comment that "where blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are punished by English law . . . the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means infringed or violated," found kindred expression [1] in the landmark opinion of England's Star Chamber in the Libelis Famosis case in 1603. That case established two major propositions in the prosecution of defamatory remarks: first, that libel against a public person is a greater offense than one directed against an ordinary man, and second, that it is immaterial that the libel be true. Until republicanism caught fire in early America, the view from the top on libel was no less dismal. Even the venerable Justice Holmes appeared to waffle as he swayed from the concept of criminal libel liability under the clear and present danger rule, to the other end of the spectrum in defense of the constitutionally protected status of unpopular opinion in free society. Viewed in modern times and the current revolution in information and communication technology, libel principles formulated at one time or another have waxed and waned through the years in the constant ebb and flow of judicial review. At the very least, these principles have lost much of their flavor, drowned and swamped as they have been by the ceaseless cacophony and din of thought and discourse emanating from just about every source and direction, aided no less by an increasingly powerful and irrepressible mass media. Public discourse, laments Knight, has been devalued by its utter commonality; and we agree, for its logical effect is to benumb thought and sensibility on what may be considered as criminal illegitimate encroachments on the right of persons to enjoy a good, honorable and reputable name. This may explain the imperceptible demise of criminal prosecutions for libel and the trend to rely instead on indemnity suits to repair any damage on one's reputation. In this petition for review, we are asked to reverse the Court of Appeals in "Francisco Wenceslao v. Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven ," CAG.R. No. 40496, holding on 25 March 1996 that petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are solidarily liable for damages for writing and publishing certain articles claimed to be derogatory and offensive to private respondent Francisco Wenceslao. Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star, a daily newspaper. At the time the complaint was filed, petitioner Borjal was its President while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher and Chairman of its Editorial Board. Among the regular writers of The Philippine Star is Borjal who runs the column Jaywalker. Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil engineer, businessman, business consultant and journalist by profession. In 1988 he served as a technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman of the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy. During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private respondent, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such as government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or [2] participants. On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference. Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles of petitioner together with the dates [3] they were published 31 May 1989

Another self-proclaimed hero of the EDSA Revolution goes around organizing seminars and conferences for a huge fee. This is a simple ploy coated in jazzy letterheads and slick prose. The hero has the gall to solicit fees from anybody with bucks to spare. Recently, in his usual straightforward style, Transportation Secretary Rainerio Ray Reyes, asked that his name be stricken off from the letterheads the hero has been using to implement one of his pet seminars. Reyes said: I would like to reiterate my request that you delete my name. Note that Ray Reyes is an honest man who would confront anybody eyeball to eyeball without blinking. 9 June 1989 Another questionable portion of the so-called conference is its unauthorized use of the names of President Aquino and Secretary Ray Reyes. The conference program being circulated claims that President Aquino and Reyes will be main speakers in the conference. Yet, the word is that Cory and Reyes have not accepted the invitation to appear in this confab. Ray Reyes even says that the conference should be unmasked as a moneymaking gimmick. 19 June 1989 x x x some 3,000 fund solicitation letters were sent by the organizer to every Tom, Dick and Harry and to almost all government agencies. And the letterheads carried the names of Reyes and Periquet. Agrarian Reform Secretary on leave Philip Juico received one, but he decided to find out from Reyes himself what the project was all about. Ray Reyes, in effect, advised Juico to put the fund solicitation letter in the waste basket. Now, if the 3,000 persons and agencies approached by the organizer shelled out 1,000 each, thats easily P3 million to a project that seems so unsophisticated. But note that one garment company gave P100,000, after which the Garments Regulatory Board headed by Trade and Industry Undersecretary Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was approached by the organizer to expedite the garment license application of the P100,000 donor. 21 June 1989 A 'conference organizer' associated with shady deals seems to have a lot of trash tucked inside his closet. The Jaywalker continues to receive information about the mans dubious deals. His notoriety, according to reliable sources, has reached the Premier Guest House where his name is spoken like dung. xxx The first information says that the 'organizer' tried to mulct half a million pesos from a garment producer and exporter who was being investigated for violation of the rules of the Garments, Textile, Embroidery and Apparel Board. The 'organizer' told the garment exporter that the case could be fixed for a sum of P500,000.00. The organizer got the shock of his life when the exporter told him: 'If I have that amount, I will hire the best lawyers, not you.' The organizer left in a huff, his thick face very pale. xxx Friends in government and the private sector have promised the Jaywalker more 'dope' on the 'organizer.' It seems that he was not only indiscreet; he even failed to cover his tracks. You will be hearing more of the 'organizers' exploits from this corner soon. 22 June 1989 The scheming 'organizer' we have been writing about seems to have been spreading his wings too far. A congressional source has informed the Jaywalker that the schemer once worked for a congressman from the North as some sort of a consultant on economic affairs. The first thing the organizer did was to initiate hearings and round-the-table discussions with people from the business, export and -- his favorite -- the garments sector. xxx The 'organizers' principal gamely went along, thinking that his 'consultant' had nothing but the good of these sectors in mi nd. It was only later that he realized that the 'consultant' was acting with a burst of energy 'in aid of extortion.' The 'consultant' was fired. xxx There seems to be no end to what a man could do to pursue his dubious ways. He has tried to operate under a guise of a well-meaning reformist. He has intellectual pretensions - and sometimes he succeeds in getting his thoughts in the inside pages of some newspapers, with the aid of some naive newspaper people. He has been turning out a lot of funny-looking advice on investments, export growth, and the like. xxx

A cabinet secretary has one big wish. He is hoping for a broad power to ban crooks and influence-peddlers from entering the premises of his department. But the Cabinet man might not get his wish. There is one 'organizer' who, even if physically banned, can still concoct ways of doing his thing. Without a tinge of remorse, the 'organizer' could fill up his letterheads with names of Cabinet members, congressmen, and reputable people from the private sector to shore up his shady reputation and cover up his notoriety. 3 July 1989 A supposed conference on transportation was a big failure. The attendance was very poor and the few who participated in the affair were mostly leaders of jeepney drivers groups. None of the government officials involved in regulating public transportation was there. The big names in the industry also did not participate. With such a poor attendance, one wonders why the conference organizers went ahead with the affair and tried so hard to convince 3,000 companies and individuals to contribute to the affair. xxx The conference was doomed from the start. It was bound to fail. The personalities who count in the field of transportation refused to attend the affair or withdrew their support after finding out the background of the organizer of the conference. How could a conference on transportation succeed without the participation of the big names in the industry and government policy-makers? Private respondent reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine Star insisting that he was the organizer alluded to in petitioner [4] Borjals columns. In a subsequent letter to The Philippine Star, private respondent refuted the matters contained in petitioner Borjals columns and openly challenged him in this manner To test if Borjal has the guts to back up his holier than thou attitude, I am prepared to relinquish this position in case it is found that I have misappropriated even one peso of FNCLT money. On the other hand, if I can prove that Borjal has used his column as a hammer to get [5] clients for his PR Firm, AA Borjal Associates, he should resign from the STAR and never again write a column. Is it a deal? Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Press Club (NPC) against petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct. He [6] accused petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm, AA Borjal Associates. In turn, petitioner Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent not only to protect his name and honor but also to refute the claim [7] that he was using his column for character assassination. Apparently not satisfied with his complaint with the NPC, private respondent filed a criminal case for libel against petitioners Borjal and Soliven, among others. However, in a Resolution dated 7 August 1990, the Assistant Prosecutor handling the case dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The dismissal was sustained by the Department of Justice and later by the Office of the President. On 31 October 1990 private respondent instituted against petitioners a civil action for damages based on libel subject of the instant case. In their answer, petitioners interposed compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees and costs. After due consideration, the trial court decided in favor of private respondent Wenceslao and ordered petitioners Borjal and Soliven to indemnify private respondent P1,000,000.00 for actual and compensatory damages, in addition to P200,000.00 for moral damages, P100,000.00 for exemplary damages, P200,000.00 for attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo but reduced the amount of the monetary award to P110,000.00 actual damages, P200,000.00 moral damages and P75,000.00 attorney's fees plus costs. In a 20-page Decision promulgated 25 March 1996, the appellate court ruled inter alia that private respondent was sufficiently identifiable, although not named, in the questioned articles; that private respondent was in fact defamed by petitioner Borjal by describing him variously as a "self-proclaimed hero," "a conference organizer associated with shady deals who has a lot of trash tucked inside his closet," "thick face," and "a person with dubious ways;" that petitioners claim of privilege communication was unavailing since the privileged character of the articles was lost by their publication in a newspaper of general circulation; that petitioner could have performed his office as a newspaperman without necessarily transgressing the rights of Wenceslao by calling the attention of the government offices concerned to examine the authority by which Wenceslao acted, warning the public against contributing to a conference that, according to his perception, lacked the univocal indorsement of the responsible government officials, or simply informing the public of the letters Wenceslao wrote and the favors he requested or demanded; and, that when he imputed dishonesty, falsehood and misrepresentation, shamelessness and intellectual pretentions to Wenceslao, petitioner Borjal crossed the thin but clear line that separated fair comment from actionable defamation. Private respondent manifested his desire to appeal that portion of the appellate courts decision which reduced the amount of damages awarded him by filing with this Court a Petition for Extension of Time to File Petition and a Motion for Suspension of Time to File [9] Petition. However, in a Resolution dated 27 May 1996, the Second Division denied both motions: the first, for being premature, and the second, for being a wrong remedy. On 20 November 1996 when the First Division consolidated and transferred the present case to the Second Division, there was no longer any case thereat with which to consolidate this case since G.R. No. 124396 had already been disposed of by the Second Division almost six (6) months earlier. On their part, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution of 12 September 1996. Hence the instant petition for review. The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in ruling that private respondent
[8]

Wenceslao was sufficiently identified by petitioner Borjal in the questioned articles; (b) in refusing to accord serious consideration to the findings of the Department of Justice and the Office of the President that private respondent Wenceslao was not sufficiently identified in the questioned articles, this notwithstanding that the degree of proof required in a preliminary investigation is merely prima facie evidence which is significantly less than the preponderance of evidence required in civil cases; (c) in ruling that the subject articles do not constitute qualifiedly privileged communication; (d) in refusing to apply the "public official doctrine" laid down in New York Times v. Sullivan; (e) in ruling that the questioned articles lost their privileged character because of their publication in a newspaper of general circulation; (f) in ruling that private respondent has a valid cause of action for libel against petitioners although he failed to prove actual malice on their part, and that the prosecutors of the City of Manila, the Department of Justice, and eventually, the Office of the President, had already resolved that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the existence of libel; and, (g) assuming arguendo that Borjal should be held liable, in adjudging petitioner Soliven solidarily liable with him. Thus, petitioners pray for the reversal of the appellate courts ruling, the dismissal of the complaint against them for lack of merit, and the award of damages on their counterclaim. The petition is impressed with merit. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that [10] at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. In ruling for private respondent, the Court of Appeals found that Borjal's column writings sufficiently identified Wenceslao as the "conference organizer." It cited the First National Conference on Land Transportation, the letterheads used listing different telephone numbers, the donation of P100,000.00 from Juliano Lim and the reference to the "organizer of the conference" - the very same appellation employed in all the column items - as having sufficiently established the identity of private respondent Wenceslao for those who knew about the FNCLT who were present at its inception, and who had pledged their assistance to it. We hold otherwise. These conclusions are at variance with the evidence at hand. The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private respondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. The first of theJaywalker articles which appeared in the 31 May 1989 issue of The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that private respondent was the person referred to therein. Surely, as observed by petitioners, there were millions of "heroes" of the EDSA Revolution and anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an "organizer of seminars and conferences." As a matter of fact, in his 9 June 1989 column petitioner Borjal wrote about the "so-called First National Conference on Land [11] [12] Transportation whose principal organizers are not specified" (italics supplied). Neither did the FNCLT letterheads disclose the identity of the conference organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was described as [13] [14] [15] Executive Director and Spokesman and not as a conference organizer. The printout and tentative program of the conference were devoid of any indication of Wenceslao as organizer. The printout which contained an article entitled "Who Organized the NCLT?" did not even mention private respondent's name, while the tentative program only denominated private respondent as "Vice Chairman and Executive Director," and not as organizer. No less than private respondent himself admitted that the FNCLT had several organizers and that he was only a part of the organization, thus I would like to clarify for the record that I was only a part of the organization. I was invited then because I was the head of the technical panel of [16] the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy that took care of congressional hearings. Significantly, private respondent himself entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's columns. The former even called up [17] columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to in the subject articles. His letter to the editor published in the 4 June 1989 issue of The Philippine Star even showed private respondent Wenceslao's uncertainty Although he used a subterfuge, I was almost certain that Art Borjal referred to the First National Conference on Land Transportation (June 29-30) [18] and me in the second paragraph of his May 31 column x x x Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. It is well to note that the revelation of the identity of the person alluded to came not from petitioner Borjal but from private respondent himself when he supplied the information through his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor. Had private respondent not revealed that he was the "organizer" of the FNCLT referred to in the Borjal articles, the public would have remained in blissful ignorance of his identity. It is therefore clear that on the element of identifiability alone the case falls. The above disquisitions notwithstanding, and on the assumption arguendo that private respondent has been sufficiently identified as the subject of Borjal's disputed comments, we now proceed to resolve the other issues and pass upon the pertinent findings of the courts a quo. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth assigned errors all revolve around the primary question of whether the disputed articles constitute privileged communications as to exempt the author from liability. The trial court ruled that petitioner Borjal cannot hide behind the proposition that his articles are privileged in character under the provisions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code which state Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and, 2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. Respondent court explained that the writings in question did not fall under any of the exceptions described in the above-quoted article since these were neither "private communications" nor "fair and true report x x x without any comments or remarks." But this is incorrect. A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks." Indisputably, petitioner Borjals questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its [19] genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as [20] 1918, in United States v. Caete, this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. As held in Elizalde v. Gutierrez [22] v. Court of Appeals [21]

and reiterated in Santos

To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection of public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule that privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. This closely adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-determination and eschews the strictly [23] libertarian view that it is protective solely of self- expression which, in the words of Yale Sterling Professor Owen Fiss, makes its appeal to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political culture. It is therefore clear that the restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on the penal provision exempting from liability only private communications and fair and true report without comments or remarks defeats, rather than promotes, the objective of the rule on privileged communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress the healthy effloresence of public debate and opinion as shining linchpins of truly democratic societies. To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be [24] inferred from the facts. There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. In his testimony, private respondent spelled out the objectives of the conference thus x x x x The principal conference objective is to come up with a draft of an Omnibus Bill that will embody a long term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress in its next regular session in July. Since last January, the National Conference on Land Transportation (NCLT), the [25] conference secretariat, has been enlisting support from all sectors to ensure the success of the project. Private respondent likewise testified that the FNCLT was raising funds through solicitation from the public Q: Now, in this first letter, you have attached a budget and it says here that in this seminar of the First National Conference on Land Transportation, you will need around One million eight hundred fifteen thousand pesos, is that right? A: That was the budget estimate, sir. Q: How do you intend as executive officer, to raise this fund of your seminar? A: Well, from sponsors such as government agencies and private sectors or organizations as well as individual transport firms and from [26] individual delegates/participants. The declared objective of the conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. An organization such as the FNCLT aiming to reinvent and

reshape the transportation laws of the country and seeking to source its funds for the project from the public at large cannot dissociate itself from the public character of its mission. As such, it cannot but invite close scrutiny by the media obliged to inform the public of the legitimacy of the purpose of the activity and of the qualifications and integrity of the personalities behind it. This in effect is the strong message in New York Times v. Sullivan which the appellate court failed to consider or, for that matter, to heed. It insisted that private respondent was not, properly speaking, a "public offical" nor a "public figure," which is why the defamatory imputations against him had nothing to do with his task of organizing the FNCLT. New York Times v. Sullivan was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in the 1960s at the height of the bloody rioting in the American South over racial segregation. The then City Commissioner L. B. Sullivan of Montgomery, Alabama, sued New York Times for publishing a paid political advertisement espousing racial equality and describing police atrocities committed against students inside a college campus. As commissioner having charge over police actions Sullivan felt that he was sufficiently identified in the ad as the perpetrator of the outrage; consequently, he sued New York Times on the basis of what he believed were libelous utterances against him. The U. S. Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. ruled against Sullivan holding that honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated from libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The raison d'etre for the New York Times doctrine was that to require critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would lead to self-censorship, since would-be critics would be deterred from voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because of doubt whether it could be proved or because of fear of the expense of having to [28] prove it. In the present case, we deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of the New York Times ruling. At any rate, we have also [29] defined "public figure" in Ayers Production Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong as x x x x a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has become a public personage. He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously, to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Great Exalted Ruler of the lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person. The FNCLT was an undertaking infused with public interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the government and the private sector, and organized by top government officials and prominent businessmen. For this reason, it attracted media mileage and drew public attention not only to the conference itself but to the personalities behind as well. As its Executive Director and spokesman, private respondent consequently assumed the status of a public figure. But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied in the FNCLT, would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The publics primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, eff ect and significance [30] of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. A reading of the imputations of petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily bore upon the latter's official conduct and his moral and mental fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The nature and functions of his position which included solicitation of funds, dissemination of information about the FNCLT in order to generate interest in the conference, and the management and coordination of the various activities of the conference demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and competence. These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the very public character of the conference itself. Concededly, petitioner Borjal may have gone overboard in the language employed describing the "organizer of the conference." One is tempted to wonder if it was by some mischievous gambit that he would also dare test the limits of the "wild blue yonder" of free speech in this jurisdiction. But no matter how intemperate or deprecatory the utterances appear to be, the privilege is not to be defeated nor rendered inutile for, as succinctly expressed by Mr. Justice Brennan in New York Times v. Sullivan, "[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on the government and public [31] officials. The Court of Appeals concluded that since malice is always presumed in the publication of defamatory matters in the absence of proof to the contrary, the question of privilege is immaterial. We reject this postulate. While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a communication [32] destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent Wenceslao herein. He must [33] bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct.
[27]

Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an [34] [35] [36] intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. It is the essence of the crime of libel. In the milieu obtaining, can it be reasonably inferred that in writing and publishing the articles in question petitioner Borjal acted with malice? Primarily, private respondent failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioner was animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, or that the articles were written and published without good motives or justifiable ends. On the other hand, we find petitioner Borjal to have acted in good faith. Moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded to expose and denounce what he perceived to be a public deception. Surely, we cannot begrudge him for that. Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that petitioner Borjal has violated that right in this case nor abused his press freedom. Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that [37] they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. "Reckless disregard of what is false or not" means that the defendant [38] [39] entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, or that he possesses a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity. The articles subject of the instant case can hardly be said to have been written with knowledge that these are false or in reckless disregard of what is false or not. This is not to say however that the very serious allegations of petitioner Borjal assumed by private respondent to be directed against him are true. But we nevertheless find these at least to have been based on reasonable grounds formed after the columnist conducted several personal interviews and after considering the varied documentary evidence provided him by his sources. Thus, the following are supported by documentary evidence: (a) that private respondent requested Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then head of the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB), to expedite the processing and release of the import approval and certificate of availability of a garment firm in exchange for the monetary contribution of Juliano Lim, which necessitated a reply from the office of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo explaining the procedure of the GTEB in [40] processing applications and clarifying that all applicants were treated equally; (b) that Antonio Periquet was designated Chairman of the [41] Executive Committee of the FNCLT notwithstanding that he had previously declined the offer; and, (c) that despite the fact that then President Aquino and her Secretary of Transportation Rainerio Reyes declined the invitation to be guest speakers in the conference, their names were still [42] included in the printout of the FNCLT. Added to these are the admissions of private respondent that: (a) he assisted Juliano Lim in his application [43] for a quota allocation with the GTEB in exchange for monetary contributions to the FNCLT; (b) he included the name of then Secretary of Transportation Rainerio Reyes in the promotional materials of the conference notwithstanding the latter's refusal to lend his name to and [44] [45] participate in the FNCLT; and, (c) he used different letterheads and telephone numbers. Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as [46] [47] critical agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel we held A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community. To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrine requires that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the person making the libelous statement. At any rate, it may be salutary for private respondent to ponder upon the advice of Mr. Justice Malcolm expressed in U.S. v. Bustos, that "the interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound may be assuaged by the balm of a clear conscience. A public official must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts. The foregoing disposition renders the second and seventh assigned errors moot and academic, hence, we find no necessity to pass upon them. We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind media practitioners of the high ethical standards attached to and demanded by their noble profession. The danger of an unbridled irrational exercise of the right of free speech and press, that is, in utter contempt of the rights of others and in willful disregard of the cumbrous responsibilities inherent in it, is the eventual self-destruction of the right and the regression of human society into a veritable Hobbesian state of nature where life is short, nasty and brutish. Therefore, to recognize that there can be no absolute "unrestraint" in speech is to truly comprehend the quintessence of freedom in the marketplace of social thought and action, genuine freedom being that which is limned by the freedom of others. If there is freedom of the press, ought there not also be freedom from the press? It is in this sense that self-regulation as distinguished from self-censorshipbecomes the ideal mean for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has warned, [49] "[W]ithout x x x a lively sense of responsibility, a free press may readily become a powerful instrument of injustice." Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to diminish nor constrict that space in which expression freely flourishes and operates. For we have always strongly maintained, as we do now, that freedom of expression is man's birthright - constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role of the press to act as its "defensor fidei" in a democratic society such as ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind
[48]

that the press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the [50] ordinary citizen. On petitioners counterclaim for damages, we find the evidence too meager to sustain any award. Indeed, private respondent cannot be said to have instituted the present suit in abuse of the legal processes and with hostility to the press; or that he acted maliciously, wantonly, oppressively, fraudulently and for the sole purpose of harassing petitioners, thereby entitling the latter to damages. On the contrary, private respondent acted within his rights to protect his honor from what he perceived to be malicious imputations against him. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victim to damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, nor should counsels fees be awarded e very time [51] a party wins a suit. For, concluding with the wisdom in Warren v. Pulitzer Publishing Co.
[52]

Every man has a right to discuss matters of public interest. A clergyman with his flock, an admiral with his fleet, a general with his army, a judge with his jury, we are, all of us, the subject of public discussion. The view of our court has been thus stated: It is only in despotisms that one must speak sub rosa, or in whispers, with bated breath, around the corner, or in the dark on a subject touching the common welfare. It is the brightest jewel in the crown of the law to speak and maintain the golden mean between defamation, on one hand, and a healthy and robust right of free public discussion, on the other. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 25 March 1996 and its Resolution of 12 September 1996 denying reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the complaint for damages against petitioners is DISMISSED. Petitioners counterclaim for damages is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED. Puno, Martinez, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 141994. January 17, 2005]

FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., petitioner, vs. AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, (AMEC-BCCM) and ANGELITA F. AGO, respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This petition for review assails the 4 January 1999 Decision and 26 January 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. [3] 40151. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the 14 December 1992 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 8236. The Court of Appeals held Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. and its broadcasters Hermogenes Alegre and Carmelo Rima liable for libel and ordered them to solidarily pay Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
[1] [2]

The Antecedents
[4] [5]

Expos is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo Mel Rima (Rima) and Hermogenes Jun Alegre (Alegre). Expos is aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. (FBNI). Expos is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay [6] municipalities and other Bicol areas. In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts [7] were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago (Ago), as Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990. Quoted are portions of the allegedly libelous broadcasts: JUN ALEGRE: Let us begin with the less burdensome: if you have children taking medical course at AMEC-BCCM, advise them to pass all subjects because if they fail in any subject they will repeat their year level, taking up all subjects including those they have passed already . Several students had approached me stating that they had consulted with the DECS which told them that there is no such regulation. If [there] is no such regulation why is AMEC doing the same? xxx Second: Earlier AMEC students in Physical Therapy had complained that the course is not recognized by DECS. xxx Third: Students are required to take and pay for the subject even if the subject does not have an instructor - such greed for money on the part of AMECs administration. Take the subject Anatomy: students would pay for the subject upon enrolment because it is offered by the school. However there would be no instructor for such subject. Students would be informed that course would be moved to a later date because the school is still searching for the appropriate instructor. xxx It is a public knowledge that the Ago Medical and Educational Center has survived and has been surviving for the past few years since its inception because of funds support from foreign foundations. If you will take a look at the AMEC premises youll find out that the names of the buildings there are foreign soundings. There is a McDonald Hall. Why not Jose Rizal or Bonifacio Hall? That is a very concrete and undeniable evidence that the support of foreign foundations for AMEC is substantial, isnt it? With the report which is the basis of the expose in DZRC today, it would be very easy for detractors and enemies of the Ago family to stop the flow of support of foreign foundations who assist the medical school on the basis of the latters purpose. But if the purpose of the institution (AMEC) is to deceive students at cross purpose with its reason for being it is possible for [8] these foreign foundations to lift or suspend their donations temporarily. xxx On the other hand, the administrators of AMEC-BCCM, AMEC Science High School and the AMEC-Institute of Mass Communication in their effort to minimize expenses in terms of salary are absorbing or continues to accept rejects. For example how many teachers in AMEC are former

teachers of Aquinas University but were removed because of immorality? Does it mean that the present administration of AMEC have the total definite moral foundation from catholic administrator of Aquinas University. I will prove to you my friends, that AMEC is a dumping ground, garbage, not merely of moral and physical misfits. Probably they only qualify in terms of intellect. The Dean of Student Affairs of AMEC is Justita Lola, as the family name implies. She is too old to work, being an old woman. Is the AMEC administration exploiting the very [e]nterprising or compromising and undemanding Lola? Could it be that AMEC is just patiently making use of Dean Justita Lola were if she is very old. As in atmospheric situation zero visibility the plane cannot land, meaning she is very old, low pay follows. By the way, Dean Justita Lola is also the chairman of the committee on scholarship in AMEC. She had retired from Bicol University a long time ago but AMEC has patiently made use of her. xxx MEL RIMA: xxx My friends based on the expose, AMEC is a dumping ground for moral and physically misfit people. What does this mean? Immoral and physically misfits as teachers. May I say Im sorry to Dean Justita Lola. But this is the truth. The truth is this, that your are no longer fit to teach. You are too old. As an aviation, your case is zero visibility. Dont insist. xxx Why did AMEC still absorb her as a teacher, a dean, and chairman of the scholarship committee at that. The reason is practical cost saving in salaries, because an old person is not fastidious, so long as she has money to buy the ingredient of beetle juice. The elderly can get by thats why she (Lola) was taken in as Dean. xxx xxx On our end our task is to attend to the interests of students. It is likely that the students would be influenced by evil. When they become members of society outside of campus will be liabilities rather than assets. What do you expect from a doctor who while studying at AMEC is so much burdened with unreasonable imposition? What do you expect from a student who aside from peculiar problems because not all students [9] are rich in their struggle to improve their social status are even more burdened with false regulations. xxx (Emphasis supplied) The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the supposed exposs, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious imputations, and as such, destroyed plaintiffs (AMEC and Ago) reputation. AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. On 18 June 1990, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, through Atty. Rozil Lozares, filed an Answer alleging that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true. FBNI, Rima and Alegre claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report the goings -on in AMEC, [which is] an institution imbued with public interest. Thereafter, trial ensued. During the presentation of the evidence for the defense, Atty. Edmundo Cea, collaborating counsel of Atty. Lozares, [11] filed a Motion to Dismiss on FBNIs behalf. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Consequently, FBNI filed a separate Answer claiming that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI claimed that before hiring a broadcaster, the broadcaster should (1) file an application; (2) be interviewed; and (3) undergo an apprenticeship and training program after passing the interview. FBNI likewise claimed that it always reminds its broadcasters to observe truth, fairness and objectivity i n their broadcasts and to refrain from using libelous and indecent language. Moreover, FBNI requires all broadcasters to pass theKapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) accreditation test and to secure a KBP permit. On 14 December 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The trial court held that the broadcasts are libelous per se. The trial court rejected the broadcasters claim that their utterances were the result of straight reporting because it had no factual basis. The broadcasters did not even verify their reports before airing them to show good faith. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. In absolving Rima from the charge, the trial court ruled that Rimas only participation was when he agreed with Alegres expo s. The trial court found Rimas statement within the bounds of freedom of speech, expression, and of the press. The dispositive portion o f the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds for the plaintiff. Considering the degree of damages caused by the controversial utterances, which are not found by this court to be really very serious and damaging, and there being no showing that indeed the enrollment of plaintiff school dropped, defendants Hermogenes Jun Alegre, Jr. and Filipinas Broadcasting Network (owner of the radio station DZRC), are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay plaintiff Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM) the amount of P300,000.00 moral damages, plus P30,000.00 reimbursement of attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
[13] [12] [10]

(Emphasis supplied)

Both parties, namely, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, on one hand, and AMEC and Ago, on the other, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification. The appellate court made Rima solidarily liable w ith FBNI and Alegre. The appellate court denied Agos claim for damages and attorneys fees because the broadcasts were directed against AMEC, and not against her. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that broadcaster Mel Rima is SOLIDARILY ADJUDGED liable with FBN[I] and Hermo[g]enes Alegre. SO ORDERED.
[14]

FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its 26 January 2000 Resolution. Hence, FBNI filed this petition.
[15]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts ruling that the questioned broadcasts are libelous per se and that FBNI, Rima and Alegre failed to overcome the legal presumption of malice. The Court of Appeals found Rima and Alegres clai m that they were actuated by their moral and social duty to inform the public of the students gripes as insufficient to justify the utterance of the defamatory remarks. Finding no factual basis for the imputations against AMECs administrators, the Court of Appeals ruled that the broadcasts were made with reckless disregard as to whether they were true or false. The appellate court pointed out that FBNI, Rima and Alegre failed to present in court any of the students who allegedly complained against AMEC. Rima and Alegre merely gave a single name when asked to identify the students. According to the Court of Appeals, these circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of the broadcasters claim that they were impelled by their moral and social duty to inform the public about the students gripes. The Court of Appeals found Rima also liable for libel since he remarked that (1) AMEC -BCCM is a dumping ground for morally and physically misfit teachers; (2) AMEC obtained the services of Dean Justita Lola to minimize expenses on its employees salaries; and (3) AMEC burdened the [16] students with unreasonable imposition and false regulations. The Court of Appeals held that FBNI failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees for allowing Rima and Alegre to make the radio broadcasts without the proper KBP accreditation. The Court of Appeals denied Agos claim for damages and attorneys fees because the libelous remarks were directed against AMEC, and not against her. The Court of Appeals adjudged FBNI, Rima and Alegre solidarily liable to pay AMEC moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.

Issues

FBNI raises the following issues for resolution: I. II. III. IV. WHETHER THE BROADCASTS ARE LIBELOUS; WHETHER AMEC IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES; WHETHER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IS PROPER; and WHETHER FBNI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH RIMA AND ALEGRE FOR PAYMENT OF MORAL DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT.

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition. This is a civil action for damages as a result of the allegedly defamatory remarks of Rima and Alegre against AMEC. While AMEC did not point out clearly the legal basis for its complaint, a reading of the complaint reveals that AMECs cause of action is based on Articles 30 and 33 of [18] the Civil Code. Article 30 authorizes a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a criminal offense. On the other hand, Article [19] 33 particularly provides that the injured party may bring a separate civil action for damages in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. [20] [21] [22] AMEC also invokes Article 19 of the Civil Code to justify its claim for damages. AMEC cites Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code to hold FBNI solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre.
[17]

I. Whether the broadcasts are libelous

[23]

A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act or omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is [24] dead. There is no question that the broadcasts were made public and imputed to AMEC defects or circumstances tending to cause it dishonor, discredit and contempt. Rima and Alegres remarks such as greed for money on the part of AMECs administrators; AMEC is a dumping groun d, garbage of xxx moral and physical misfits; and AMEC students who graduate will be liabilities rather than assets of the so ciety are libelous per se. Taken as a whole, the broadcasts suggest that AMEC is a money-making institution where physically and morally unfit teachers abound. However, FBNI contends that the broadcasts are not malicious. FBNI claims that Rima and Alegre were plainly impelled by their civic duty to air the students gripes. FBNI alleges that there is no evidence that ill will or spite motivated Rima and Alegre in making the broadcasts. FBNI further points out that Rima and Alegre exerted efforts to obtain AMECs side and gave Ago the opportunity to defend AMEC and its administrators. FBNI concludes that since there is no malice, there is no libel. FBNIs contentions are untenable. Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious. Rima and Alegre failed to show adequately their good intention and justifiable motive in airing the supposed gripes of the students. As hosts of a documentary or public affairs program, Rima and Alegre should have presented the [26] [27] public issues free from inaccurate and misleading information. Hearing the students alleged complaints a month before the expos, they had sufficient time to verify their sources and information. However, Rima and Alegre hardly made a thorough investigation of the students alleged gripes. Neither did they inquire about nor confirm the purported irregularities in AMEC from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Alegre testified that he merely went to AMEC to verify his report from an alleged AMEC official who refused to disclose any information. Alegre simply relied on the words of the students because they were ma ny and not because there is proof that what they are saying is [28] true. This plainly shows Rima and Alegres reckless disregard of whether their report was true or not. Contrary to FBNIs claim, the broadcasts were not the result of straight reporting. Significantly, some courts in the Unite d States apply the privilege of neutral reportage in libel cases involving matters of public interest or public fig ures. Under this privilege, a republisher who accurately and disinterestedly reports certain defamatory statements made against public figures is shielded from liability, regardless of the [29] republishers subjective awareness of the truth or falsity of the accusation. Rima and Alegre cannot invoke the privilege of neutral reportage because unfounded comments abound in the broadcasts. Moreover, there is no existing controversy involving AMEC when the broadcasts were made. The privilege of neutral reportage applies where the defamed person is a public figure who is involved in an existing controversy, and a [30] party to that controversy makes the defamatory statement. However, FBNI argues vigorously that malice in law does not apply to this case. Citing Borjal v. Court of Appeals, FBNI contends that the broadcasts fall within the coverage of qualifiedly privileged communications for being commentaries on matters of public in terest. Such being the case, AMEC should prove malice in fact or actual malice. Since AMEC allegedly failed to prove actual malice, there is no libel. FBNIs reliance on Borjal is misplaced. In Borjal, the Court elucidated on the doctrine of fair comment, thus: [F]air commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the [32] facts. (Emphasis supplied) True, AMEC is a private learning institution whose business of educating students is genuinely imbued with public interest. The welfare of the youth in general and AMECs students in particular is a matter which the public has the right to know. Thus, similar to the newspaper articles in Borjal, the subject broadcasts dealt with matters of public interest. However, unlike in Borjal, the questioned broadcasts are not based on established facts. The record supports the following findings of the trial court: xxx Although defendants claim that they were motivated by consistent reports of students and parents against plaintiff, yet, defendants have not presented in court, nor even gave name of a single student who made the complaint to them, much less present written complaint or petition to that effect. To accept this defense of defendants is too dangerous because it could easily give license to the media to malign people and establishments based on flimsy excuses that there were reports to them although they could not satisfactorily establish it. Such laxity would encourage careless and irresponsible broadcasting which is inimical to public interests. Secondly, there is reason to believe that defendant radio broadcasters, contrary to the mandates of their duties, did not verify and analyze the truth of the reports before they aired it, in order to prove that they are in good faith.
[31] [25]

Alegre contended that plaintiff school had no permit and is not accredited to offer Physical Therapy courses. Yet, plaintiff produced a certificate coming from DECS that as of Sept. 22, 1987 or more than 2 years before the controversial broadcast, accreditation to offer Physical Therapy course had already been given the plaintiff, which certificate is signed by no less than the Secretary of Education and Culture herself, Lourdes R. Quisumbing (Exh. C-rebuttal). Defendants could have easily known this were they careful enough to verify. And yet, defendants were very categorical and sounded too positive when they made the erroneous report that plaintiff had no permit to offer Physical Therapy courses which they were offering. The allegation that plaintiff was getting tremendous aids from foreign foundations like Mcdonald Foundation prove not to be true also. The truth is there is no Mcdonald Foundation existing. Although a big building of plaintiff school was given the name Mcdonald building, that was only in order to honor the first missionary in Bicol of plaintiffs religion, as explained by Dr. Lita Ago. Contrary to the claim of defendants over the air, not a single centavo appears to be received by plaintiff school from the aforementioned McDonald Foundation which does not exist. Defendants did not even also bother to prove their claim, though denied by Dra. Ago, that when medical students fail in one subject, they are made to repeat all the other subject[s], even those they have already passed, nor their claim that the school charges laboratory fees even if there are no laboratories in the school. No evidence was presented to prove the bases for these claims, at least in order to give semblance of good faith. As for the allegation that plaintiff is the dumping ground for misfits, and immoral teachers, defendant[s] singled out Dean Justita Lola who is said to be so old, with zero visibility already. Dean Lola testified in court last Jan. 21, 1991, and was found to be 75 years old. xxx Even older people prove to be effective teachers like Supreme Court Justices who are still very much in demand as law professors in their late years. Counsel for defendants is past 75 but is found by this court to be still very sharp and effective. So is plaintiffs counsel. Dr. Lola was observed by this court not to be physically decrepit yet, nor mentally infirmed, but is still alert and docile. The contention that plaintiffs graduates become liabilities rather than assets of our society is a mere conclusion. Being from the place himself, this court is aware that majority of the medical graduates of plaintiffs pass the board examination easily and become prosperous and responsible [33] professionals. Had the comments been an expression of opinion based on established facts, it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as [34] long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. However, the comments of Rima and Alegre were not backed up by facts. Therefore, the broadcasts are not privileged and remain libelous per se. The broadcasts also violate the Radio Code Code provides:
[35]

of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas, Ink. (Radio Code). Item I(B) of the Radio

B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PUBLIC ISSUES AND COMMENTARIES 1. 4. xxx Public affairs program shall present public issues free from personal bias, prejudice and inaccurate and misleading information. x x x Furthermore, the station shall strive to present balanced discussion of issues. x x x.

xxx 7. The station shall be responsible at all times in the supervision of public affairs, public issues and commentary programs so that they conform to the provisions and standards of this code. It shall be the responsibility of the newscaster, commentator, host and announcer to protect public interest, general welfare and [36] good order in the presentation of public affairs and public issues. (Emphasis supplied)

8.

The broadcasts fail to meet the standards prescribed in the Radio Code, which lays down the code of ethical conduct governing practitioners in the radio broadcast industry. The Radio Code is a voluntary code of conduct imposed by the radio broadcast industry on its own members. The Radio Code is a public warranty by the radio broadcast industry that radio broadcast practitioners are subject to a code by which their conduct are measured for lapses, liability and sanctions. The public has a right to expect and demand that radio broadcast practitioners live up to the code of conduct of their profession, just like other professionals. A professional code of conduct provides the standards for determining whether a person has acted justly, honestly and with [37] good faith in the exercise of his rights and performance of his duties as required by Article 19 of the Civil Code. A professional code of conduct also provides the standards for determining whether a person who willfully causes loss or injury to another has acted in a manner contrary to [38] morals or good customs under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

II. Whether AMEC is entitled to moral damages

[39]

FBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a corporation.

A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such [40] sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et [41] al. to justify the award of moral damages. However, the Courts statement in Mambulao that a corporation may have a good reputation which, [42] if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages is an obiter dictum. Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and [44] claim for moral damages. Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of [46] character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce [47] evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages. However, we find the award of P300,000 moral damages unreasonable. The record shows that even though the broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage to its reputation. Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages from P300,000 to P150,000.
[45] [43]

III. Whether the award of attorneys fees is proper

FBNI contends that since AMEC is not entitled to moral damages, there is no basis for the award of attorneys fees. FBNI adds that the [48] instant case does not fall under the enumeration in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The award of attorneys fees is not proper because AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily its claim for attorneys fees. AMEC did not adduce evidence to warrant the award of attorneys fees. Moreover, both the trial and appellate courts failed to explicitly state in their respective [49] [50] decisions the rationale for the award of attorneys fees. In Inter-Asia Investment Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that: [I]t is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court must explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for [51] the award of attorneys fees. (Emphasis supplied) While it mentioned about the award of attorneys fees by stating that it lies within the discretion of the court a nd depends upon the circumstances of each case, the Court of Appeals failed to point out any circumstance to justify the award. IV. Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit

FBNI contends that it is not solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for the payment of damages and attorneys fees because it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI maintains that its broadcasters, including Rima and Alegre, undergo a very regimented process before they are allowed to go on air. Those who apply for broadcaster are subjected to interviews, examinations and an apprenticeship program. FBNI further argues that Alegres age and lack o f training are irrelevant to his competence as a broadcaster. FBNI points out that the minor deficiencies in the KBP accreditation of Rima and Alegre do not in any way prove that FBNI did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising them. Rimas accreditation lapsed due to his non-payment of the KBP annual fees while Alegres accreditation card was delayed allegedly for reasons attributable to the KBP Manila Office. FBNI claims that membership in the KBP is merely voluntary and not required by any law or government regulation. FBNIs arguments do not persuade us. The basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
[52]

approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. of the Civil Code.

[53]

Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its cause of action against FBNI on Articles 2176 and 2180

As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay for damages arising from the libelous broadcasts. As stated by the Court of Appeals, recovery for defamatory statements published by radio or television may be had from the owner of the station, a [54] licensee, the operator of the station, or a person who procures, or participates in, the making of the defamatory statements. An employer and employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the employee within the course and scope of his or her employment, at least when [55] the employer authorizes or ratifies the defamation. In this case, Rima and Alegre were clearly performing their official duties as hosts of FBNIs radio program Expos when they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged nor proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope of their work at that time. There was likewise no showing that FBNI did not authorize and ratify the defamatory broadcasts. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI merely showed that it exercised diligence in the selection of its broadcasters without introducing any evidence to prove that it observed the same diligence in the supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not show how it exercised diligence in supervising its broadcasters. FBNIs alleged constant reminder to its broadcasters to observe truth, fairness and objectivity and to refrain from using li belous and indecent language is not enough to prove due diligence in the supervision of its broadcasters. Adequate training of the broadcasters on the industrys code of conduct, sufficient information on libel laws, and continuous evaluation of the broadcasters performance are but a few of the many ways of showing diligence in the supervision of broadcasters. FBNI claims that it has taken all the precaution in the selection of Rima and Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in mind their qualifications. However, no clear and convincing evidence shows that Rima and Alegre underwent FBNIs regimented process of application. Fu rthermore, FBNI [56] admits that Rima and Alegre had deficiencies in their KBP accreditation, which is one of FBNIs requirements before it hires a broadcaster. Significantly, membership in the KBP, while voluntary, indicates the broadcasters strong commitment to observe the broadcast industrys rules and regulations. Clearly, these circumstances show FBNIs lack of diligence in selecting and supervising Rima and Alegre. Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay damages together with Rima and Alegre. WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of 4 January 1999 and Resolution of 26 January 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40151 with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is reduced from P300,000 to P150,000 and the award of attorneys fees is deleted. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989 LEO PITA doing business under the name and style of PINOY PLAYBOY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON BAGATSING, and NARCISO CABRERA, respondents. William C. Arceno for petitioner. Casibang, Perello and De Dios for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.: The petitioner, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, a "men's magazine", seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, rejecting his appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, dismissing his complaint for injunctive relief. He invokes, in particular, the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures of the Constitution, as well as its prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law. There is no controversy as to the facts. We quote: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per seobscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. By order dated December 8, 1 983 the Court set the hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction on December 14,1983 and ordered the defendants to show cause not later than December 13, 1983 why the writ prayed for should not be granted. On December 12, 1983, plaintiff filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order. against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction in view of Mayor Bagatsing's pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut Campaign. The Court granted the temporary restraining order on December 14, 1983. In his Answer and Opposition filed on December 27,1983 defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence reading materials on December 1 and 3, 1983, but claimed that the said materials were voluntarily surrendered by the vendors to the police authorities, and that the said confiscation and seizure was (sic) undertaken pursuant to P.D. No. 960, as amended by P.D. No. 969, which amended Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. In opposing the plaintiffs application for a writ of preliminary injunction, defendant pointed out that in that anti- smut campaign conducted on December 1 and 3, 1983, the materials confiscated belonged to the magazine stand owners and peddlers who voluntarily surrendered their reading materials, and that the plaintiffs establishment was not raided. The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer. On January 5,1984, plaintiff filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, raising the issue as to "whether or not the defendants and/or their agents can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiffs magazine before any judicial finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not". The restraining order issued on December 14,1983 having lapsed on January 3,1984, the plaintiff filed an urgent motion for issuance of another restraining order, which was opposed by defendant on the ground that issuance of a second restraining order would violate the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 11, 1983, providing for the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which provides that a temporary restraining order shall be effective only for twenty days from date of its issuance.
1

On January 9, 1984 defendant filed his Comment and/or Rejoinder Memorandum in support of his opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or not". On January 16, 1984, the Court issued an order granting plaintiffs motion to be given three days "to file a reply to defendants' opposition dated January 9, 1984, serving a copy thereof to the counsel for the defendants, who may file a rejoinder within the same period from receipt, after which the issue of Preliminary Injunction shall be resolved". Plaintiff's supplemental Memorandum was filed on January 18, 1984. Defendant filed his Comment on plaintiff s supplemental Memorandum on January 20, 1984, and plaintiff filed his "Reply-Memorandum" to defendants' Comment on January 25, 1984. On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary 2 injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal upon the grounds, among other things, as follows: We cannot quarrel with the basic postulate suggested by appellant that seizure of allegedly obscene publications or materials deserves close scrutiny because of the constitutional guarantee protecting the right to express oneself in print (Sec. 9, Art. IV), and the protection afforded by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure (Sec. 3, Art.IV). It must be equally conceded, however, that freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications (Sec. I , Art. 201, Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No. 969). Also well settled is the rule that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes certain exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or seizure, (People vs. Malesugui 63 Phil. 22) or search is an incident to an arrest, (People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169; 3 Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637) or is conducted in a vehicle or movable structure (See Papa vs. Magno, 22 SCRA 857). The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following errors: 1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene. 2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of 4 petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction. The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being asked to pronounce what "obscene" means or what makes for an obscene 5 or pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the test, in determining the existence of obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and 6 into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." "Another test," so Kottinger further declares, "is that which 7 shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. " Kottinger hastened to say, however, that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or 8 indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate 9 sense of the community reached by it." Yet Kottinger, in its effort to arrive at a "conclusive" definition, succeeded merely in generalizing a problem that has grown increasingly complex over the years. Precisely, the question is: When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities? And obviously, it is to beg the question to say that a piece of literature has a corrupting influence because it is obscene, and viceversa. Apparently, Kottinger was aware of its own uncertainty because in the same breath, it would leave the final say to a hypothetical "community standard" whatever that is and that the question must supposedly be judged from case to case. About three decades later, this Court promulgated People v. Go Pin, 10 a prosecution under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Go Pin, was also even hazier: ...We agree with counsel for appellant in part. If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibit and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the

supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the 11 ill and perverting effects of these pictures. xxx xxx xxx As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done to say, 12 indeed, that if "the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes," the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. It was People v. Padan y Alova , however, that introduced to Philippine jurisprudence the "redeeming" element that should accompany the work, to save it from a valid prosecution. We quote: ...We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still or moving pictures of women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux vivants. But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but 14 lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. ... Padan y Alova, like Go Pin, however, raised more questions than answers. For one thing, if the exhibition was attended by "artists and persons 15 interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes," could the same legitimately lay claim to "art"? For another, suppose that the exhibition was so presented that "connoisseurs of [art], and painters and sculptors might find 16 inspiration," in it, would it cease to be a case of obscenity? Padan y Alova, like Go Pin also leaves too much latitude for judicial arbitrament, which has permitted an ad lib of Ideas and "two-cents worths" among judges as to what is obscene and what is art. In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, the Court, following trends in the United States, adopted the test: "Whether to the average 18 person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." KalawKatigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather than isolated passages, which were central toKottinger (although both cases are agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers. It is significant that in the United States, constitutional law on obscenity continues to journey from development to development, which, states one 19 authoritative commentator (with ample sarcasm), has been as "unstable as it is unintelligible." Memoirs v. Massachusettes, another development.
20 17 13

a 1966 decision, which characterized obscenity as one "utterly without any redeeming social value,"

21

marked yet

The latest word, however, is Miller v. California, which expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether 24 the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." (A year later, the American Supreme Court decided Hamling v. United States which repeated Miller, and Jenkins v. Georgia, yet another reiteration of Miller. Jenkins, curiously, acquitted the producers of the motion picture, Carnal Knowledge, in the absence of "genitals" portrayed on screen, although the film highlighted contemporary American sexuality.) The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to 27 recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem . Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society. And "[t]here is little likelihood," says Tribe, "that this development has reached a state of rest, or that it will ever do so until the Court recognizes that obscene speech is speech nonetheless, although it is subject as in all speech to regulation in the interests 28 of [society as a whole] but not in the interest of a uniform vision of how human sexuality should be regarded and portrayed."
25 26

22

23

In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wideranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties yet their works are considered important 29 literature today. Goya's La Maja desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but now adorns the world's most prestigious museums. But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it. What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and has not been, an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. We share Tribe's disappointment over the discouraging trend in American decisional law on obscenity as well as his pessimism on whether or not an "acceptable" solution is in sight. In the final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic than rushing to a "perfect" definition of "obscenity", if that is possible, as evolving standards for proper police conduct faced with the problem, which, after all, is the plaint specifically raised in the petition. However, this much we have to say. Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference and 30 31 action. But, so we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, "the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse 32 action ... lies on the. . . authorit[ies]." "There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger ." "It is essential for the validity of ... previous restraint or censorship that the ... authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or 34 safety may require." "To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test."
35 33

The above disposition must not, however, be taken as a neat effort to arrive at a solution-so only we may arrive at one-but rather as a serious attempt to put the question in its proper perspective, that is, as a genuine constitutional issue. It is also significant that in his petition, the petitioner asserts constitutional issues, mainly, due process and illegal search and seizure. As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process. The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The Court of Appeals has no "quarrel that ... freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from 36 pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals." Neither do we. But it brings us back to square one: were the "literature" so confiscated "pornographic"? That we have laws punishing the author, publisher and sellers of obscence publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised Penal 37 Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No. 969)," is also fine, but the question, again, is: Has the petitioner been found guilty under the statute? The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. 38 In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, We defined police power as "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal 39 liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare ." Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically. Significantly, the Decrees themselves lay down procedures for implementation. We quote: Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. The disposition of the literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof (Art. 201), RPC as amended) shall be governed by the following rules: (a) Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the Government to be destroyed.

(b) Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures, paintings or other materials and articles involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 (referring to Art. 201) hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary. (c) The person aggrieved by the forfeiture action of the Chief of Constabulary may, within fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy of the decision, appeal the matter to the Secretary of National Defense for review. The decision of the Secretary of National Defense shall be final and unappealable. (Sec. 2, PD No, 960 as amended by PD No. 969.) Sec. 4. Additional Penalties. Additional penalties shall be imposed as follows: 1. In case the offender is a government official or employee who allows the violations of Section I hereof, the penalty as provided herein shall be imposed in the maximum period and, in addition, the accessory penalties provided for in the Revised 40 Penal Code, as amended, shall likewise be imposed . Under the Constitution, on the other hand: SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. 43 In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, We counter-minded the orders of the Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the premises of We Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila dailies, by reason of a defective warrant. We have greater reason here to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a political case, because, and as we have indicated, speech is speech, whether political or "obscene". The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide: SEC. 12. Search without warrant of personarrested. A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous 44 weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code. We reject outright the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility 45 46 because there had been no warrant," and that "violation of penal law [must] be punished." For starters, there is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished". Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very complaint of the petitioner. We make this resume. 1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order; 2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; 3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion. 4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for; 5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code; 6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed "obscene".

These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power under the 47 48 Civil Code" or the Revised Penal code . WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It appearing, however, that the magazines subject of the search and seizure ave been destroyed, the Court declines to grant affirmative relief. To that extent, the case is moot and academic. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa and Feliciano, JJ., concur in the result. Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

[G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005]

MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB), petitioner, vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN LEGARDA, respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, filed by petitioner Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) against ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) and former Senator Loren Legarda, [1] [2] respondents, assailing the (a) Decision dated November 18, 1997, and (b) Order dated August 26, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-93-16052. The facts are undisputed. On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of the television (TV) program The Inside Story produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Womens University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Aven ue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode. The showing of The Inside Story caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and [3] the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-complaints with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female students. Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that respondents (1) did not submit The Inside Story to petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited the same without its permission, [4] [5] [6] [7] thus, violating Section 7 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1986 and Section 3, Chapter III and Section 7, Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and [8] Regulations. In their answer, respondents explained that the The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio -political editorial, the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press . Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents. On February 5, 1993, after hearing and submission of the parties memoranda, the MTRCB Investigating Committee rendered a Dec ision, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the aforementioned premises, the respondents are ordered to pay the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for nonsubmission of the program, subject of this case for review and approval of the MTRCB. Heretofore, all subsequent programs of the The Inside Story and all other programs of the ABS-CBN Channel 2 of the same category shall be [10] submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing; otherwise the Board will act accordingly. On appeal, the Office of Atty. Henrietta S. Mendez, Chairman of the MTRCB, issued a Decision dated March 12, 1993 affirming the above [11] [12] ruling of its Investigating Committee. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated April 14, 1993. Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, Quezon City. It seeks to: (1) declare [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] as unconstitutional Sections 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 4, 7, and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7, and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules [22] and Regulations; (2) (in the alternative) exclude the The Inside Story from the coverage of the above cited provisions; and (3) annul and set aside the MTRCB Decision dated March 12, 1993 and Resolution dated April 14, 1993. Respondents averred that the above-cited provisions constitute prior restraint on respondents exercise of freedom of expression and of the press, and, therefore, unconstituti onal. Furthermore, the above cited provisions do not apply to the The Inside Story because it falls under the category of public affairs program, news documentary, or socio-political editorials governed by standards similar to those governing newspapers. On November 18, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision
[23] [9]

in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the assailed Decision and Resolution of MTRCB dated March 12, 1993; 2. DECLARING AND DECREEING that Sections 3 (b), (c), and (d), 4, 7, and 11 of P.D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7, 28 (a) of its Implementing Rules do not cover the TV Program The Inside Story and other similar programs, they being public affairs programs which can be equated to newspapers; and

3. MAKING PERMANENT the Injunction against Respondents or all persons acting in their behalf. SO ORDERED. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all television programs, including public affairs programs, news documentaries, or socio-political editorials, are subject to petitioners power of review under Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this [25] Courts ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals; second, television programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former; third, petitioners power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to prior restraint; and fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not violate respondents constitutional freedom of expression and of the press. Respondents take the opposite stance. The issue for our resolution is whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the The Inside Story prior to its exhibition or broadcast by television. The petition is impressed with merit. The present controversy brings into focus the provisions of Section 3 of P. D. No. 1986, partly reproduced as follows: SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties: x x x x x x
[24]

b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs, including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution, for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for export. c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited to: x x x d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end and that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be imported, exported, produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television; x x x x x x.

Vis-a-vis the foregoing provisions, our task is to decide whether or not petitioner has the power to review the television program The Inside [26] Story. The task is not Herculean because it merely resurrects this Court En Bancs ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals. There, the Iglesia ni Cristo sought exception from petitioners review power contending that the term television programs under Sec. 3 (b) does not [27] include religious programs which are protected under Section 5, Article III of the Constitution. This Court, through Justice Reynato Puno, categorically ruled that P.D. No. 1986 gives petitioner the power to screen, review and examine all television programs, emphasizing the phrase all television programs, thus: The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all television programs. By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of x x x television programs x x x. The law also directs the Board to apply contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard to determine those which are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime. Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, [28] unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it. Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere debemos. Thus, when the law says all [29] television programs, the word all covers all television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. The principle [30] assumes that the legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word or expression.

It then follows that since The Inside Story is a television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review. Here, respondents sought exemption from the coverage of the term television programs on the ground that the The Inside Story is a [31] public affairs program, news documentary and socio -political editorial protected under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. Albeit, [32] respondents basis is not freedom of religion, as in Iglesia ni Cristo, but freedom of expression and of the press, the ruling inIglesia ni Cristo applies squarely to the instant issue. It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x. Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristos religious program from petitioners review power. Respondents claim that the showing of The Inside Story is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story which, according to respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status. The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels. Thus: SEC. 7. Unauthorized showing or exhibition. It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or cause to be exhibited in any moviehouse, theatre, or public place or by television within the Philippines any motion picture, television program or publicity material, including trailers, and stills for lobby displays in connection with motion pictures, not duly authorized by the owner or his assignee and passed by the BOARD; or to print or cause to be printed on any motion picture to be exhibited in any theater or public place or by television a label or notice showing the same to have been officially passed by the BOARD when the same has not been previously authorized, except motion pictures, television programs or publicity material imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and newsreels . Still in a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents contend that the The Inside Story falls under the category of newsreels. Their contention is unpersuasive. P. D. No. 1986 does not define newsreels. Websters dictionary defines newsreels as short motion picture films portraying or dealing with [33] current events. A glance at actual samples of newsreels shows that they are mostly reenactments of events that had already happened. Some concrete examples are those of Dziga Vertovs Russian Kino-Pravda newsreel series (Kino-Pravda means literally film-truth, a term that was later [34] translated literally into the French cinema verite) and Frank Capras Why We Fight series. Apparently, newsreels are straight presentation of [35] events. They are depiction of actualities. Correspondingly, the MTRCB Rules and Regulations implementing P. D. No. 1986 define newsreels as straight news reporting, as distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered [36] newsreels. Clearly, the The Inside Story cannot be considered a newsreel. It is more of a public affairs program which is described as a variety [37] of news treatment; a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions. Certainly, such kind of program is within petitioners review power. It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB has authority to review The Inside Story. Clearly, we are not called upon to determine whether petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution providing that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of oppression or the press. Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program. Neither did it cancel respondents permit. Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to submit to petitioner The Inside Story for its review and approval. Therefore, we need not resolve whether certain provisions of P. D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB Rules and Regulations specified by respondents contravene the Constitution. Consequently, we cannot sustain the RTCs ruling that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional. It is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case [38] itself. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Decision dated November 18, 1997 and Order dated August 26, 2002 are hereby REVERSED. The Decision dated March 12, 1993 of petitioner MTRCB is AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Sanidad v Comelec Political Law Amendment to the Constitution On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendumplebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the con vening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution. HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.

In Re: Emil Facts: Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the Manila Standard. He describes himself as a columnist, who incidentally happens to be a lawyer,, had been writing about alleged improperties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months (from about October, 1992 to March, 1993). Other journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At the same time, anonymous communications were being extensively circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the courts. And all these were being repeatedly and insistently adverted to by certain sectors of society. Events Directly Giving Rise to the Proceeding at Bar.

The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-called controversial case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority. In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and one or two other newspapers published, on January 28, 1993, a report of the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. This gentleman, it appears, had been commissioned by one of the parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), to examine and analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain if the decision had been written, in whole or in part, by the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the Gutierrez decision looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDTs counsel, Thus, he speaks of the Magnificent Seven, by merely referring to undisclosed regional trial court judges in Makati; the Magnificent Seven in the Supreme Court, as some undesignated justices who supposedly vote as one; the Dirty Dozen, as unidentified tri al judges in Makati and three other cities. He adverts to an anonymous group of justices and judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a party; and six unnamed justices of this Court who reportedly spent a prepaid vacation in Hong Kong with their families. The Chief Justice issued an administrative order Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary, to investigate the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the public utility, denying the allegations in Jurados column. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are true. HELD: Jurados actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual acc uracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them, he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the Golden Rule and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection. The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of abuse of rights, one of the most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of law. Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials. Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from becoming judges. The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.