Tools of Autocracy

Vitali Silitski
Journal of Democracy, Volume 20, Number 2, April 2009, pp. 42-46 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/jod.0.0067
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TOOLS OF AUTOCRACY
Viicli Siliis|i
Vitali Silitski is director oj the Belarusian /nstitute jor Strategic Stud-
ies. He has been a visiting jellow at the Center on Democracy, Devel-
opment, and the Rule oj Law at Stanjord University (2006-2007), and
a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment jor
Democracy (2004-2005).
Controversy may continue to rage about how and why the Russian po-
litical system has reached its current state, but it is not hard to say what
that state is. Much of the confusion about the proper definition to at-
tach to Russia`s regime and those resembling it arises from a lingering
tendency to see otherwise-authoritarian systems that offer a degree of
multiparty electoral competition as diminished forms of democracy.
Arguably a flawed democracy in the 1990s, Russia took a distinctly
authoritarian turn under President Vladimir Putin from 2000 to 2008.
The country now lives under a faade democracy that barely conceals
the political and administrative dominance of a self-interested bureau-
cratic corporation. This corporation is not immune to factional squab-
bles and internal games over power and wealth, but its basic instinct for
self-preservation has been enough to keep it relatively unified.
The current regime fits the classic definition of authoritarianism,
which places more emphasis on what the system lacks than on what it
has. Thus Russia today displays all the facets of 'limited . . . political
pluralism,
1
including a system of formal multiparty electoral competi-
tion that for most of the last decade has been deprived of unpredictabil-
ity. Incumbents have no reason to sweat on election night, even if they
must work hard between elections in order to make sure that no serious
challengers can emerge. Hence, Russia`s authoritarianism can no longer
be regarded as competitive.
2

Russia`s autocracy is also typical to the extent that it does not rely
upon an 'elaborate and guiding ideology, but is heavily grounded in
'distinctive mentalities,
3
meaning a specific political culture that justi-
1ournal oj Democracy \olume 20, Number 2 April 2009
2009 National Endowment jor Democracy and The 1ohns Hopkins University Press
ReadIng RussIa
43 \itali Silitski
fies strong centralized authority through the use of extensive references
to history, faith, and identity. Likewise, it does not rely upon broad or
intense political mobilization, except in selected instances, as when the
Kremlin recruited youth groups such as Nashi for a time as part of a
strategy to prevent any Russian replay of Ukraine`s 2004 Orange Revo-
lution. (Authorities easily demobilized Nashi later.)
As is the case with most other contemporary autocratic regimes,
Russia`s rulers claim that their country is a democracy. In dealing with
opponents, today`s autocracies tend to avoid wholesale force and open
repression, preferring instead to rule via manufactured consent. The
manufacture of consent involves three major tools. The first is 'politi-
cal technology, which is shorthand for information and propaganda
campaigns aimed at discrediting and destroying opponents before they
even enter the political contest. The Russian elite truly pioneered the
application of political technology, and worked to spread it widely in
the post-Soviet arena. In the minds of those who run the Kremlin, this is
nothing to be ashamed of: They simply cannot imagine a political sys-
tem working differently. In their view, the spontaneity that one seems to
observe in Western democracies is a product of the same elite consensus
and fixing, through which outsiders are marginalized. Western rhetoric
about democracy and the rule of law is spurned as a cynical attempt to
open up political space for outsiders who enjoy foreign backing.
The second tool is a more concrete form of preemption.
4
Like regimes
elsewhere in the post-Soviet space such as those of Azerbaijan, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan, the Russian regime routinely attacks potential oppo-
nents with more than just rhetoric and propaganda. In the mid-2000s,
with a strong economy and the approval ratings to go with it, the Kremlin
began implementing measures not only to discredit and demoralize the
opposition with hostile propaganda, but also to strip it of anything like a
level playing field and, when necessary, to remove it physically from the
scene. This last goal may be pursued by simply disqualifying opposition
figures from running for office, but also by jailing them, forcing them
into exile, or even, in extreme cases, murdering them. Quick to shut
down opponents in politics as well as in business and the bureaucracy,
Putin`s Kremlin also freely twists election rules and party legislation so
that no one of whom it does not approve can even enter the contest for
power. Today, the Kremlin enjoys a free hand to appoint both the ruling
party and the opposition.
The third tool is-or was-the steady flow of material benefits for
citizens, which the regime financed with once-abundant petrodollars.
To complement this, the regime also allowed individuals a wide zone of
social autonomy in which state officials did not interfere.
While the authoritarian nature of Russia`s regime is beyond question,
it is somewhat more difficult to define precisely what kind of authori-
tarianism it is. On the one hand, nearly unlimited presidential authority,
44 1ournal oj Democracy
embedded in formal rules and supported by myriad informal practices,
points to the personalistic nature of the Kremlin`s rule. On the other,
Russia is definitely not a primitive sultanistic dictatorship governed by
rulers` whims and court intrigues. The government in Russia manages a
unique and diverse country though a vast and complex bureaucracy, and
regime stability depends upon the rulers`
ability to incorporate and make strategic
deals with a multitude of powerful sub-
jects.
History shows, however, that person-
alistic rule, as the name suggests, relies
in the end upon the personality and re-
solve of the ruler. Putin`s personality
had a definitive impact on the new class
of beneficiaries and powerful subjects
that emerged in the 2000s, largely rep-
resenting the law-enforcement agencies.
At the same time, the real constraints on the president`s absolute power
came not from internal factors (powerful political competitors or strong
democratic institutions), but rather from considerations of Russia`s in-
ternational prestige. As long as the pursuit of Russian greatness required
formal acceptance by the 'gentlemen`s club of democratic powers, the
Kremlin`s ruler could not be seen as stooping to the level of a crude
autocrat.
Accordingly, when Putin reached the end of his second consecutive
term in the presidency, rather than stay on (which would have required
altering the constitution), he observed the niceties of presidential succes-
sion and became prime minister instead. With this shift, the system came
to resemble the Soviet-era collective leadership, in which a nominal head
of state cohabited with a supreme party leader and premier. The combina-
tion of a formally powerful presidency (albeit one now filled by a figure-
head) with a prime minister who is the de facto ruler and maintains a huge
clientele in the state bureaucracy, the ruling party, and parliament must be
considered a token of unconsolidated authoritarianism-and the potential
for instability is inherent in this gap between formal and informal rules.
Of all the things that could expose this gap and fuel splits within the
elite, the question of presidential succession is the foremost. In order to
bolster regime stability as much as possible, Putin moved while presi-
dent to block any channel through which political protest could lead to a
change of government. Further efforts at such 'institutional tightening
may still come, perhaps in the form of extended terms of office for both
the president and parliament. The rise of a strong civic force demanding
democratic reform remains a possibility, but a very distant one. This is
due to both strategic factors (the regime`s repertoire of fine-tuned pre-
emption techniques) and structural ones: Even in the more liberal days
The very conditions
that make for authori-
tarian stability in good
times might make
protests less predictable
and harder to control
when things go bad.
45 \itali Silitski
of Yeltsin, there was hardly a nationwide civil society capable of setting
the political agenda for the entire country, and no genuinely nationwide
party aside from the Communists.
Although Russia`s system is well barricaded, might it still be vulner-
able to spontaneous protests from below-the kind that can flare up
once citizens begin to understand that the provider-state will not be able
to maintain its implicit contract with them? The very conditions that
make for authoritarian stability in good times might make such pro-
tests less predictable and harder to control when things go bad. Such
conditions include the marginalization of large parts of society, social
polarization, widespread disengagement from public life, and the preva-
lence of 'low-intensity citizenship. The authorities` panicky reaction to
pensioners` protests following the clumsy abolition of social benefits in
January 2005 highlighted the extent to which a deficit of feedback from
'real society (as opposed to handpicked 'representative bodies) had
opened up on Putin`s watch. Although the regime may take comfort in
reflecting that there is no framework of institutions or unifying ideology
to give shape and direction to the public`s more protest-prone moods,
the possibility of 'contagion effects leading to nationwide upheavals
cannot be ruled out.
If out-of-system protests do spring up, the institution of alternation
in power may turn into a source of real problems for the status quo. At
some point, the figurehead president, unwilling to take all the blame
for the country`s woes, could start using his sweeping decree powers.
If President Dmitri Medvedev ever felt pushed to take such a course, it
could deal a fatal blow to Putin`s 'parallel presidency and pave the way
for a major elite reshuffling and a new round of struggle over spoils.
The absence of ideology as a driving factor in Russian foreign (and
domestic) policy means that the Kremlin will have no rationale for engag-
ing in a full-scale confrontation with the West. Yet two aspects of Rus-
sia`s political regime will continue to affect the country`s foreign policy.
The first is the regime`s deep-seated suspicion of the value-based agenda
of the West toward Russia and its 'near abroad. This distrust will lead
the Kremlin to carry on with its attempts to drive U.S. and EU political
and economic influence out of the post-Soviet space, even if such efforts
harm Russia`s own economic interests. The regime is prepared to tolerate
such financial losses, for it sees Western influence in the Russian 'near
abroad as a threat to the status quo within Russia itself. Moreover, the
current regime`s inability to propose a credible long-term development
strategy beyond reinvesting energy-export profits will drive the Krem-
lin to use its foreign policy to keep the 'oil paradigm going. Russia, in
other words, will be keenly interested in anything that keeps energy prices
from falling, with ominous implications regarding Moscow`s behavior in
such sensitive regions as Central Asia, the western portions of the former
USSR, Iran, and the rest of the Middle East.
46 1ournal oj Democracy
NOTES
1. Juan J. Linz, 'An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain, in Erik Allardt and
Stein Rokkan, eds., Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (New York: Free Press,
1970), 255.
2. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way define competitive authoritarian regimes as ones
which, while falling short of democracy, 'also fall short of full-scale authoritarianism. Al-
though incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes may routinely manipulate formal
democratic rules, they are unable to eliminate them or reduce them to a mere faade. . . .
As a result, even though democratic institutions may be badly flawed, both authoritarian
incumbents and their opponents must take them seriously. Steven Levitsky and Lucan
A. Way, 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, 1ournal oj Democracy 13 (April
2002): 53-54.
3. Linz, 'An Authoritarian Regime, 255.
4. See Vitali Silitski, 'Contagion Deterred: Preemptive Authoritarianism in the Former
Soviet Union (The Case of Belarus), CDDRL Working Paper No. 66, June 2006. Avail-
able at http://iis-db.stanjord.edu/pubs/21152/Silitski_No_66.pdj.