Philosophical Review

Berkeley's Master Argument Author(s): Andre Gallois Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan., 1974), pp. 55-69 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183873 . Accessed: 04/04/2014 12:36
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BERKELEY'S

MASTER ARGUMENT

the following Philonous, famous argumentoccurs which I shall referto as the master argument.

IN

THE first dialogueof the Three Dialogues between Hylasand

combination of qualities,or any sensibleobject whatever, to exist withoutthe mind, then I will grantit actually to be so." Hylas: "If it comesto thatthe pointwill soon be decided.What more easy to conceiveof a treeor a house existing by itself, independent of,and unperceived by any mindwhatsoever? I do at thismoment conceivethemexisting afterthat manner." Philonous:"How say you Hylas, can you see a thingwhichis at the same timeunseen?" Hylas: "No, thatwere a contradiction." Philonous: "Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thingwhichis unconceived ?" Hylas: "It is." Philonous:"The treeor housetherefore whichyou think ofis conceived by you." Hylas: "How should it be otherwise?" Philonous: "And what is conceived by you is surelyin the mind." Hylas: "Withoutquestion,that which is conceivedis in the mind." Philonous: "How then came you to say, you conceiveda house or tree existing independent, and out of all mindswhatsoever?" Hylas: "That I own was an oversight."' Berkeley in the person of Philonous appears to attach considerable weightto thisargument.It is introducedwith the words "But to pass by all that hath hithertobeen said, and reckon it for nothing I am content to put the whole on this issue." A like declaration precedes a similar argument in the Principles, which indicates that what, for this reason, I have called the "master argument" deserves more than the cursory attention that is usually given to it. As it is presented in the Dialogues the master argument seems
1

Philonous: ". . . If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or

Three Dialoguesbetween Hylas and Philonous, T. E. Jessop edition,p. 200.

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ANDRE GALLOIS

singularlyweak. It is temptingto dismissit on the grounds that Berkeleycommitsthefallacyofmovingfrom"necessarilywhatever is conceived is conceived" to "whatever is conceived is so necessarily." This charge can be restated in more detail as follows: Hylas does not content himself with the bare assertion that something might exist unconceived by anyone, but proceeds to give examples, "a tree or a house" which he conceived of existing "after that manner." Now the crucial step in the argument appears to be this. Any example of an unconceived object which Hylas cites in order to establishhis claim that such objects might, or indeed do, existis automaticallydeprived of that status by the very fact of Hylas' citing it as such. Let us grant forthe moment that the propositionthat some unconceived object exists can be justifiablyassertedonly if it is possible to mentionparticular examples of unconceived objects. Further let us grant that mentioningan object entails conceivingit. Conceding this much in no way tells against the logical possibilityof there being an unconceived object. At most we have no justificationforbelieving that such objects do exist,which does not by itself tell against believing that theymight.Philonous has gone no way toward showingthat the possibilityof somethingexistingunconceived is ruled out. Still the masterargumentwould be important,to say the least, if it demonstratedan epistemological restriction to thingswhich are in the mind in some strongersense than simply being the object of some mental state. Berkeleyappears, however,to give no reason forthinking that Philonous' claim "And what is conceived by you is surelyin the mind" is not either tautological or false. Another weakness of the Dialoguesversion of the master argument is that Berkeley conflatesthinkingof or about something with thinkingthat somethingis the case. Hylas contends that he can conceive' of a tree existing "independently of. . . any mind whatsoever." On the one hand, if conceiving of an object having a certain propertycannot be safelyidentifiedwith thinkingthat an object ofthat kind has that property, thenthe masterargument fails to get off the ground. It would then be open to Hylas to maintain that, though he may not be able to conceive of trees existing independent of the mind, this is compatible with him thinkingthat there are such. On the other hand, if conceiving of
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an object having a propertycan be equated in the argumentwith thinkingthat objects of that kind have that property, then we can provisionallyoutline the masterargumentas follows.Let p be the propositionthat thereare treesunconceived by anyone. Then the desired conclusion is: It is not possible thatp. That is: (A)
(i)

(possibly p)

which is supposed to follow from: (3x) (x believes p) entails'p. (2) Hylas believes p.

p). (3) (3x) (x believes

As we have seen, this fails to establish (A) unless Berkeley is allowed the furtherunargued-for premise: possibly p entails (possibly (3x) (x believes p & p)). In any case, several crucial steps are clearly missingfromthe argument.Without some filling in, what reason is there to accept (i) ? It is at thispoint that the distinctionbetween thinking that and thinkingabout becomes important,for only the latter cognitive state can take a non-propositionalobject. Put another way, if I say that I am thinkingabout a tree, then, if asked, I should be able to produce an identifyingdescription of the tree about which I claim to be thinking-for example, the tallesttreein my garden. On the otherhand, I could perfectly well thinkthat there is a tree which, say, no one has ever perceived withoutcommiting myselfto producing on demand an identifying description of a particular unperceived tree. Philonous persuades Hylas that thereis somethingwhich is the object of Hylas's thoughtwhich Hylas thinksis not the object of any thought. Which-gives us step (i) since it implies that what Hylas thinks is false. Hylas might have replied that the only admission he is forcedto make is that he thinksthat thereis a tree which no one is thinkingabout, from which it does not follow that any tree is the object of Hylas's thought.That is, Philonous moves illegitimately from: Hylas thinks that (ix) (+x. no one is about to thinking x) (3x) (axe Hylas is thinkingabout X).2
2 Not to mention the factthatthe latterclaim has existential which import the former lacks.

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Berkeley'sconfusionof thinkingthat with thinkingof or about is understandablein the lightof his rejectionof abstractideas. All for Berkeleyabout anythingwe can be said to perceive thinking involves having ideas of objects with determinate properties. Sometimeshe appears to identify the ideas which accompany, or even constitute, with the objects of thought,treatingthe thinking, formeras if they instantiatedpropertieslike color and extension. At any rate, since thoughtabout a class of objects, for Berkeley, implies imaging a member of that class with determinatecharacit is natural for him to conflate thinkingof something teristics, with thinkingthat somethingis the case. In order to thinkabout a class, we must contemplate an object which functions as a of that class, of which we could produce an identirepresentative fyingdescription,since it has determinatecharacteristics. Together with Berkeley'sconflationof ideas and their objects, thereis a corresponding assimilationof having ideas to perceiving, where imaging is treated as a kind of self-inducedperception. Berkeley'sfailureto distinguish clearly between ideas and their objects on the one hand, and imaging and perceiving on the other,is particularlyevidentin the Principles versionof the master argument: But say you, surelythereis nothing easier than to imaginetrees,for instancein a park, or books in a closet,and no one by to perceive them.I answer, you may do so, thereis no difficulty in it, but what is all this,I beseechyou, morethanframing in yourmindcertainideas which you call books and trees,and at the same time omitting to frame theidea ofany one thatmay perceive ? But do not you yourself perceiveor thinkof themall the while? This therefore is nothingto the purpose:it onlyshowsyou have the powerof imagingor framing ideas in yourmind: but it doth not show thatyou can conceivethem unconceived or unthought existing of,whichis a manifest repugnancy.3 Berkeleyheld the view that words denote ideas,4 and that ifwe are not to be misled by language we must attend to the ideas correspondingto the words we are using. Any idea we attemptto "frame," correspondingto an expressionlike "unperceived tree"
3The Principlesof Human Knowledge,T. E. Jessop edition, sec. 23, p. 50. 4Which is not, of course, their only function or a function of all words.

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has then to satisfy two incompatible requirements.It has to serve as the denotation of the expressionin question, and so must be unperceived. It must also be introspected-that is, perceived-by any person claiming to have such an idea. Grantingall that can be said against both versionsof the master argument,we mightquestion whetherthe foregoing criticisms are really as damaging as theyappear. While it is true that the argument requires considerable reformulationif it is to be at all persuasive, one is left with the persistentfeeling that Berkeley's central point so far has been missed. Though conceiving of, conceivingthat,imaging,and perceivingare distinguishable, they may turn out to be conceptually related in such a way that the master argumentretains much of its force. One of the most puzzling featuresof the Dialoguesversionof the master argument is that, even if valid, it is difficult to see what support it lends to Berkeley's central thesis that whatever is perceivable is perceived. One explanation we have already consideredis that Berkeley treatsconceivingas a species of perceiving. There is, however, another more interestingalternative. In the rest of this paper I shall tryto elaborate on the thoughtthat the Dialoguesand Principles versionsof the masterargumentcannot be properly understood in isolation from one another. I wish to suggest that the central point that emerges from both these argumentstaken togetherreflects on the conditionsfor ascribing the possessionof a particular concept namely, the concept of a perceivable. An individual mustsatisfy a numberofdiversecriteriabeforehe can be said to be in possession of a concept. One in particular concerns us here, a criterionthat has played a prominentrole in the history of philosophy which may be called the imagistic criterion.It can be stated simplyenough. In order forsomeone to have the concept of thingsof a certain kind, he must be able to image thingsof that kind. The same thing applies to the concept of an event, action, process,and so forth.' Some philosophershave talked as though concepts and images could be identified, but, of course, one need not take that view to see imaging as a necessarycomponent in conceptualizing. There are difficulties enough, however,with the thesisthat the capacity
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ANDRE GALLOIS

to image goes hand in hand with conceptual capacities. For one thing,an analysis of what it is to have a concept in termsof the at least ifit is allowed that abilityto image has an air ofcircularity, imaging itselfinvolves the exerciseof concepts. Be that as it may, the ability to image appropriatelyappears to be neithera necescondition for having a concept. It is not a sary nor a sufficient necessary condition, for an individual may have little or no capacity forimaging withoutin any way limitinghis capacity to think. Also, there seems to be a contingent limitation on the capacity of human beings generally to image certain things. A well-knownexample is that of the chilagon. It is not a sufficient conditionsince a given image may, as it were, do dutyfordistinct concepts,where possessionof the one does not imply possessionof the other. An image of Brigitte Bardot could serve equally well as an image of a woman or an image of a filmstar. All these objections against an imagistictheoryof what it is to have a concept are familiarenough, but thereremains a relation between imaging and the ascription of concepts which is worth exploring.If we say that someone has a concept of a certain kind, then one requirementhe must meet is that ifhe images at all with respect to anythingto which that concept applies, he must image correctly.One way of elucidating the force of this demand is to focus on the ways of describingwhat we can be said to image. I may image any one of a number of thingsifrequested to image, say, the Empire State Building, and may describe what I am ways. For example, I might imaging in a variety of different content myselfwith, say, the description"the tallest building in New York" or, more noncommittally, as just "a building in New York" or still more noncommittallyas "something oblong and grey." One thing I could not say without calling into question either my linguisticcompetence or my possessionof the concept of a building is that I am imaging somethingwith fourlegs and a head. We can then thinkof a concept as collectingtogethera class of images associated with it and, by a natural extension,the same concepts collecting together the same images. Of course, this illustrationof the point I wish to make about the relation of imaging and conceptualizingcould equally well be construedas a point about the way in which the sense of an expressiondepends
6o

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BERKELEr'S

MASTER ARGUMENT

on the truthconditionsof sentencesin which it figures.They are distinct,however, and putting the matter in terms of imaging rather than truthconditionswill serve, I believe, to get a firmer grasp on what Berkeleymight be saying. We are now in a position to resume discussion of the master argumentand see, in the lightof what has been said above about conceptualizing and imaging, how Berkeley might have sidebetween thinking stepped the objection that he failsto distinguish that, thinking about, and imaging. If someone claims that a propertycould be instantiated,then it seems reasonable to insist that he should be prepared to replace the initial variable in the descriptionso open sentence "x is s" with a definiteor indefinite that a closed sentencewhich could be trueobtains. In otherwords, a kind or kindsofthingswhich,though he should be able to specify not be, could be b.So in the passage quoted theymay contingently fromthe Dialogues,even had Hylas not done so in mentioninga tree and a house, Philonous would have been justifiedin asking Hylas to elaborate on his claim that somethingmightexistunperceived by mentioningthe sortsof thingsthat could so exist. Further,if Hylas thinksthat a b mightexist unperceived-say, a table-then it followsthat Hylas has the concept of an unperceived b; and if he has this concept then he can image appropriately with respect to it. This last step is important,forit bridges the gap between thinkingthat somethingperceivable mightexist unperceived and imaging an unperceivedperceivable. If it can be taken, then the complaint that one need not produce an identifyingdescriptionof an unperceived tree or house which one is currently imaging loses itsforce.It is true that one need not image a tree,stillless the treein one's neighbor'sgarden, while thinking that there is such a tree. The suggestionis rather that one must have the capacity, perhaps unrealized, to image a tree in order to entertainthis thought. So far nothing has been said about the necessary connection between being perceived and being perceivable which Berkeley wishesto argue for.It is now time to introduceinto the discussion Berkeley's test for necessary connections between properties. upon we discoversuch necessaryconnectionsby reflecting Briefly, our capacity to image something having one property while
6i

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ANDRE GALLOIS

lacking another.One major argumentthat Berkeleybringsagainst is thatit is inconceivable quality distinction the primary-secondary that anythingcould have extensionwithoutcolor, forin imaging factoimaging it as having some somethingas extended we are ipso color. This is not the place to launch into an elaborate defenseof the ofnecessity.(Some would deny imagisticcriterion much-criticized being necessarproperties thatit makes sense to talk about distinct ily connected at all and perhaps rely on a criterionrelated to an in termsoflinguisticconventionor stipulation analysisof necessity which is, I think,even less defensiblethan an imagisticcriterion.) It is appropriate, however, to say something here about the is based upon plausibilityof the thesisthat knowledgeof necessity imagination. of our powers of the limits about we discover what the view that of The major, and to many conclusive, criticism necessaryconnectionsare revealed by the powers of imagination is one we have already noted in another context-namely, that limited. It may be true,though such powers may be contingently is necessarcertainlyit is open to question,that because something ily not the case we cannot imagine it being the case, but the as it were, puts converseis not true.An imagistictestfornecessity, the cart beforethe horse. A good deal more space than I can devote here would be required to develop a really adequate reply to thispoint. I can at least indicate the outline of a reply, however. In brief,hypothesizing a necessaryconnectionbecause of a general failureto image thingsof a certainsortmay turnout to be the best explanation for such failure. Of course, this can amount to no more than a plea withoutelucidating fortoleranceforan imagistictestfornecessity in some detail what is meant by "best explanation" in thiscontext. I do not, however,propose to engage in that task here, since I am not out to establish the validity of the master argument,but only its considerable plausibility in the light of some assumptions themselvesnot implausible. It is now time to returnto the master argument and spell out these background assumptions. Whenever one can be said to image, one can be said to image a potential experience and moreoveran experience which is potentiallyone's own. One way
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of making clearer this rathervague statementabout the relation between imaging and experiencingis as follows. Suppose that I am asked to image the table in the next room and describe what I am imaging. A typical descriptionmight be: a table with an oval brown top, white legs, and so forth.Now the list of features of the imaged table (which of course need not be construed as featuresof a mental picture) could equally well count as a list of featuresof what one perceives when one perceives a table. This bringsout the connectionbetween imaging and perceiving.In the case of visual imagerythe contentof an image is limited to what can be taken in at a glance. In thisway visual images can be said to reproduce visual experiencesthat one mighthave (which is not to say that they are a kind of self-inducedvisual experience). Consequently,imaging an x and imaging oneselfperceivingan x are not separable tasks.It makes perfectly good sense to talk about revisingmy imagery that is, replacing one image with anotherso that if the table contingently has some featureone can image it at one time having that feature,and at another as lacking that feature.I may image a table at one time as brown, at another as red. Puttingit, then, in termsof the featuresthat we can be said to image somethingas having: if I image the following,a table perceived by me, is there any featureof the object of my state of imaging which I can delete so that I am leftwith an image of a table but not an image of a table perceived by me? It is fairly clear that there is no such feature. If this is so then we can reconstructthe master argument as follows: Hylas thinksthat possibly (3x) (x is perceivable and x is unperceived). (2) If what Hylas thinksis true, then the concepts beingthe and being the object of possible object of some perception someperception do not necessarily apply to the verysame things. (3) In order to sustain the claim that somethingcould be both perceivable and unperceived, it must be possible to have an image of a perceivable which is not an image of somethingperceived.
(i)

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([s] follows from [2] in conjunction with an imagistic criterionof necessity,the demand that Hylas be in a position to mention the kind of thing that could be both perceivable and unperceived, and finally,that he can image appropriately something of this kind if he is to qualify as having the concept of an unperceived perceivable).
embodiedin (3) and (4) Hylas cannotmeet the condition
his failure in this respect is not the result of a contingent limitation of Hylas's powers of imaging.

The desired conclusion that nothing could be both perceivable and unperceived follows. of the master argument is not That the above reconstruction unfaithfulto Berkeley is, I submit, indicated in the following passage fromthe Principles: and motionfrom when we attemptto abstractextension So likewise, we presently all other qualities, and considerthem by themselves, All of which lose sightof them,and run into great extravagancies. it is supposedthat extension, first depend on a two foldabstraction: fromall othersensiblequalitiesand forexample,may be abstracted its being from ofextension may be abstracted thatthe entity secondly perceived.5 Now it may be that in this passage Berkeleyis attemptingno more than to remindthe reader of his earlier argumentsconcerning the primary-secondaryquality distinction, abstract ideas, and the esse est percipiprinciple. I think it is more plausible, however, to suppose that he is doing more than this: that is, pointing to a connection between these arguments.Just as we cannot image somethingas extended and colorless,so we cannot image somethingas extended and unperceived.We could say that though we cannot image an unperceived perceivable we may still have an abstract idea of it were it not, Berkeleywould reply,for the incoherence, or, at least, obscurityof this notion. This last remarkmakes it look as though the plausibilityof the master argument is contingent upon the success of Berkeley's
5 Principles, sec.

99, p. 85.
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attack on abstract ideas. Now certainlyBerkeleyseemed to think that this is in fact the case. Then the master argumentwould be open to the criticismthat Berkeley's rejection of abstract ideas resultsfromconfusing a concept with an image, a criticism which I think would be misplaced. It would be misplaced because, as I have tried to show, this step in the argumentcan be restatedas a point about the relation between concepts and images and does not depend on identifying them. Can we accept the validityof the masterargumentin itspresent form? Certainly it would be difficult to accept and would have been difficult for Berkeleyto have accepted, for we can equally derive fromit a solipsisticconclusion for there is no distinctive featurewhich an experienceis imaged as having when one images it as potentiallyone's own. This is one way ofintroducing what, it seemsto me, is the central flaw in the master argument. That is to regard being the object of some perception as a featurethat somethingcould be imaged as having, and to conclude that since nothingcould be imaged as lacking this feature,then necessarilyif anythingis perceivable it is perceived. What is wrongwith thismove is that one cannot talk about imaging somethingas perceived in the same way that one can talk about imaging somethingas brown. "Is perceived" is not a predicate that could figurein any descriptionof what one is imaging. So any talk of, as it were, abstracting the associated propertyfromthe contentof one's imageryis inappropriate. It would be unsatisfactory to leave the matter here without saying somethingabout why being perceived is not an imageable featurein the way in which being brown is. If my interpretation of the master argumentis correct,it turnson two points: that we cannot discriminatebetween imaging a potential perception of something and imaging something potentially perceivable, and that thereis no difference in the contentof one's imagerybetween a imaging potential perceptionof somethingand imaging oneself in that perceptual state. If there were a differencebetween imaging a perceptual experience and imaging oneselfhaving that perceptual experience, then the master argument would fail. At mostwe could derive fromit the ratherunexcitingconclusion that whatever is perceivable is perceivable. In order to image some65

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ANDRE GALLOIS

thingperceivable we mustimage it as perceivable-that is, as the object of a possible perceptual experience-rather than as perceived-that is, as the object of someone's perceptual experience; namely, our own. In recent discussionson the subject of the ascriptionof mental states,it has been pointed out6that one could not ascribe a present mental state to oneselfon the basis of a distinctivecharacteristic of that state which marksit, so to speak, as one's own. In order to do so one would have to be in the mental state in question and so be in a position to recognize it as one's own. In the light of this remarkit is hardlysurprising that to image a perceptual state is to image being in that perceptual state. It is not that in imaging a perceptual state it is impossible to abstract from the content of one's imagerythat featurewhich makes the perceptual state one's own, but rather that it makes no sense to talk about any mental state having such a feature. It may seem fromthe last few remarksthat I am in danger of confusinga feature of an object of a perceptual state-namely, being the object of a perceptual state-with a feature of a perceptual state-namely, being someone's perceptual state. This, however,is not so. Rather my argumentis that if we wish to talk about the propertyof being perceived as an imageable feature, then we can do so only if there is some distinctivecontent to an image of a perceived object. How could there be any such distinctivecontentto one's imagery? As we have seen, the claim that to image somethingthat could be perceived is to image it as the object of a perceptual state can be interpretedin a more or less innocuous way. Interpretedone way, all this amounts to is that in imaging an object one is imaging it as having those propertieswhich could be mentionedin a descriptionof what one perceivesif one perceivesthat object. Interpretedin anotherway, it becomes the more exciting thesisthat, included in the content of one's imagery, and necessarily so, is some feature which indicatesthat the object is the object ofsomeone's perceptual state.
6 See: Shoemaker, SelfKnowledge andSelfIdentity, (Ithaca, 1963); J. Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge, i966); P. F. Strawson, TiheBoundsof Sense

(London, I 966).

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My suggestionis then that the only candidate forthis role would be a featurewhich an individual's perceptual states must have in common in order forhim to count7 them as his perceptual states. If this is correct, the question then is can there be any such ? feature Giving a negative answer to this question leaves open the alternatives.Eitherit is not possibleforsomeone imaging following a potential experience to discriminateon the bases of the content of his imagery (what featureshe images the experience as having) between imaging that experienceas his own and just imaging that experience,because ifwe image an experiencewe mustimage it as having that feature which makes it someone's experience, or because it is simply inappropriate to talk about imaging experiences as having some featurein virtueof which theyare owned. If one opts forthe first alternative,then since imaging something that could be perceived amounts to imaging the kinds of experiences one would have in perceivingit, the conclusionofthe master argumentwould be difficult to reject. Not to mention a stronger conclusion.On the otherhand, ifone opts forthe second solipsistic alternative, then the master argument loses its force, for its plausibility,as we have seen, depends on the acceptability of an imagistic criterionof necessity,and such a criterionapplies only to imaged features. Ironically, Berkeleychose the first alternative and gave in the the central reason forchoosing the second. Principles8 It will perhapsbe said, thatwe want a sense (as somehave imagined) properto know substances withal,which if we had, we mightknow To thisI answer,that in case we our own soul, as we do a triangle. had a new sense bestowedupon us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations of ideas of sense.But I believeno body will say,
The phrase "in order for him to count" is crucial here. There may be a characteristic which all my mental states must share, in order to count as mine: e.g., if what is often referred to as a no-ownership theory is correct, that they all stand in a determinate causal relationship to states of a particular body. The point, however, is that it could not be on the basis of recognizing that a given mental state has this characteristic that I recognize that it is mine. 8 Principles, sec. I36, pp. I03-I04. 67

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that what he means by the termssoul and substance,is only some infer, that all We may therefore particularsortof idea or sensation. our faculties to think reasonable is not more it duly considered, things or active in thattheydo notfurnish us withan idea ofspirit defective, not than it would be ifwe shouldblame themfor substance, thinking a round square. being able to comprehend What I thinkBerkeleyis pointingto here is that no matterwhat features our experiences have, we could not recognize an experience as our own in virtueof recognizingthat it has some feature, for in order to effectthe latter recognitionwith respect to any given experience we must be in a position to recognize that we have it. In particular, we could not ascribe experiences to ourselves in virtue of standing in some relation to an experience of would arise forthe ourselves,forthe same problem of ascribability latter. In the light of this considerationit is no surprisethat imaging in termsof the contentofwhat an experienceis not distinguishable is imaged from imaging oneself having that experience. How content,since iftherewere we could therebe any such distinctive could on that basis ascribe experiences to ourselves in a way in which we cannot? If this analysis of the basic flawof the masterargumentis substantiallycorrect,then the argumentamounts to somewhat more than the trivial sophism it is oftenmade out to be. Berkeleywas obtaining philosophical mileage from an unclarity about the conditions for the self ascription of experiences which was unresolved,I believe, until Kant's discussionof these issues in the Critique. It must seem to many that my discussionof Berkeleyhas been rather anachronistic: framedin termsthat he would never have used. To those who feel this way I offerthe followingdefense.A to expressa point ofcentralimportance philosopherin attempting to him might have been able to do so with greatersuccess had developed at a later point in the history concepts and distinctions of philosophy been available to him at that time. For those who followthereis always the risk,utilizingsuch concepts and distincto state them with greater his views in an effort tions,of distorting I forceand clarity.It is a riskwhich thinkought to be taken when 68

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with an argumentwhich is at once suggestive,puzzconfronted importance to the philosopher in question and, obvious ling, of on the surface at least, lacking in plausibility. Such is the case, I would say, with Berkeley'smaster argument.
ANDRE GALLOIS

ofFlorida University

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