Cusipag Statutory Construction Doctrines

Statutory Construction Doctrines

(Based on the Agpalo Book) __________________________________________________________________________ Construction, defined Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law, where that intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the ambiguity in its language or of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. (Caltex v. Palomar) Plain Meaning Rule/Verba Legis Where the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verbal egis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. Legislative intent/Ratio Legis A statute must be read according to its spirit and intent, and where legislative intent apparently conflicts with the letter of the law, the former prevails over the latter. (Tanada v. Cuenco) The principle that what is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute itself although it is not within its letter applies only when there is ambiguity in the language employed in the law. Where the law is clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of the law is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit. (Tanada v. Cuenco) Dura Lex Sed Lex Valid in part, void in part The principle requires that the statute should be applied regardless of whether it is unwise, hard or harsh. If the law is clear and free from doubt, it is the sworn duty of the court to apply it without fear or favor, to follow its mandate, and not to tamper with it. (Go v. Anti-Chinese League of the Phils.) Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. (Barrameda v. Moir) The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. (JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. v. NLRC) Review of law in its entirety and intendment must be given effect its

The legislative meaning is to be extracted from the statute as a whole. Its clauses are not to be segregated, but every part of a statute is to be construed with reference to every other part and every word and phrase in connection with its context. (Tamayo v. Gsell) Wisdom/Practicality of Law Courts do not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice, or expediency of legislation, for it is not within their province to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern. Hence, as long as laws do not violate the Constitution, the courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. (Quintos v. Lacson) Executive/Administrative Interpretation The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction that no authorities need be cited to support it. (In re Allen)

Cusipag Statutory Construction Doctrines intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. (Lindasan v. Commission on Elections) Law does not distinguish, Courts should not distinguish The principle that where the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts do so, assumes that the legislature made no qualification in the use of a general word or expression. The courts may distinguish when there are facts or circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification, for in such case, the courts merely give effect to the legislative intent. (Social Security System v. City of Bacolod) Mandatory/Directory/Prohibiture Whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory depends on its effect. If no substantial rights depend on it and no injury can result from ignoring it; and the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same results obtained, then the statute will generally be regarded as directory; but if not, it will be mandatory. (Miller v. Lakewood Housing Co.) Expressio unius est exclusion alterius One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. (Espiritu v. Cipriano) Another variation of the rules is the canon that a general expression followed by exceptions therefrom implies that those which do not fall under the exceptions come within the scope of the general expression. (Villanueva v. City of Iloilo) Still another variation of the rule is the axiom that the expression of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed, even though all would have been implied had none been expressed. (Empire Insurance Co. v. Rufino) Ejusdem generis The general rule is that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to restricted to, persons, things or cases akin resembling, or of the same king or class those specifically mentioned. (Go Tiaco Hermanos v. Union Insurance Society Canton) be to, as y of

Exceptions: Enumeration has no distinguishable common characteristics and enumeration of the particular and specific words is exhaustive. Where a statute uses a general word, followed by an enumeration of specific words embraced within the general word merely as examples, the enumeration does not thereby restrict the meaning of the general word, but should include all others of the same class although not enumerated therein. (Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs) Statement of Individual Legislator Thus, where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, that meaning which was put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted. (Arenas v. City of San Carlos) Where the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, courts will not inquire into the motives which influence the legislature, or individual members, in voting for its passage; nor indeed as to the intention of the draftsman, or the legislators, so far as it has not been expressed in the act. To read into the law the supposed intention of the legislators, where there is no ambiguity in it, would be to supply something that does not appear in the act. (Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusements Board) Noscitur a sociis A word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.) And/or The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated. (People v. Martin) The term or has sometimes been held to mean and, when the spirit or context of the law so

Cusipag Statutory Construction Doctrines warrants. Elections) (Gonzales v. Commission on The exclude-the-first and include-the-last day rule governs the computation of a period. (Cervantes v. Auditor General) If by applying the rule that the first day shall be excluded and the last day included in the computation of a period within which an act shall be done, the last day falls on a Sunday or a holiday, the act can still be done the following day. (Sec. 31, Revised Administrative Code) This principle does not apply to the computation of the period of prescription of a crime, in which the rule is that if the last day in the period of prescription of a felony falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the information concerning said felony cannot be filed on the next working day, as the offense has by then already prescribed. (Yapdiangco v. Buencamino)

The word or may also be used as the equivalent of that is to say, giving that which precedes it the same significance as that which follows it. (San Miguel Corp. v. Municipal City of Mandaue) The word or may also mean successively. (US v. De la Sabta) On the other hand, the word and is a conjunction pertinently defined as meaning together with, joined with, along or together with, added to or linked to, used to conjoin word with word, phrase with phrase, clause with clause. (Phil. Constitutional Assn., Inc. v. Mathay) The term and/or means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive and and the disjunctive or or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute (AE Davidson v. FW Wollworth Co.) Retroactivity The general rule is that laws have no retroactive effect. However, there are exceptions to the general rule such as procedural laws and curative laws which are given retroactive operation. (Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc.) Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The rule does not apply where it is shown that the legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing or object from enumeration (People v. Manantan) Computation of Time See Article 13 of the Civil Code and CIR v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.. Where a statute requires the doing of an act within a specified number of days, such as ten days, from notice, it means ten calendar days and not ten working days. (Vir-jen Shipping & Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC)