Phenomenology: The Fate of a Philosophical Gift in Anthropology From moral and political philosophy to epistemology and aesthetics, philosophy

as a discipline informs anthropology in a number of different ways and to speak prescriptively of how either discipline can or should inform the other is difficult. The focus of this essay is the trajectory of phenomenology, from its early 20th century beginnings in philosophy to its development and application in modern anthropology. We will begin by briefly treating of the history of phenomenology from Husserl and Heidegger, and through to Merleau-Ponty. We will trace the impact it has had both theoretically and practically in anthropology, with particular reference to the work of Michael Jackson and Thomas Csordas, ultimately advocating a moderate phenomenological approach that allows for dialogue with complimentary anthropological perspectives. Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote over sixty years ago, true philosophy consists in relearning to look at the world (1962, xxiii). Should this be an accurate assessment, the destinies of both anthropology and philosophy are inextricably linked. Just as the early 20th century phenomenologists sought to redefine the first principles upon which philosophical investigations could be based, some modern anthropologists are turning away from what they perceive as often imposed objective theoretical structures in favour of presenting the fluid and inchoate lifeworlds of their subjects. Phenomenological anthropology is bound up in the theoretical knots tied over the course of a century of philosophical thinking. We will seek here to trace the gift of phenomenology from philosophy to anthropology, both in theory and in practice, outlining some key aspects of the relationship between the two disciplines. The history of phenomenology is a story of theory, method and of perspective. A Brief History of Phenomenology Phenomenology, Thomas Csordas and Jack Katz write, has been a vague presence lapping at the edges of anthropology over the course of the last century (2003, 277). There are obvious reasons why anthropology should share with philosophy a concern for consciousness, perception, being-in-the-world, and the body. In order to explore the relationship between these two disciplines through the transplant of phenomenology, we must go back to the early 20th century to outline the beginnings and development of the philosophical idea. Though phenomenology appeared in the work of Hegel (1807) and Brentano, amongst others, Edmund Husserl is widely considered the father of phenomenology and it is with his work Ideas that we will begin our journey. It is impossible here to treat of this work extensively, though we can look at some key themes within this work that shape subsequent 20th century phenomenological investigation. Husserls Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (1913) was in many ways a reaction against the soaring popularity of science in general and psychology in particular.1 While Freud was beginning to make waves in Europe, Husserl sought a new way of looking at consciousness that did not engage with the material concerns of modern science but rather with subjective experience and consciousness of the world. Husserl wrote, pure or transcendental phenomenology will be established not as a science of facts, but as a science of essential Being (1962, 44). The importance of the exploration of this essential Being for Husserl lay in the fact that every factual science (empirical science) has essential theoretical bases in eidetic ontologies (ibid, 64) and without understanding these ontologies, the philosophical pursuit of absolute knowledge rests on shaky ground (ibid, 46).

1 His later work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936) exposes what Husserl believed to be the philosophical inadequacy of modern science (Pivcevic, 1970).

1 For Husserl, phenomenology is both an ideology and a method, a science of experience (ibid, 52). Outlining the aim of Ideas, Husserl writes, The precise task was to draw up a scheme on the foundations of pure Logic, as a sample of the logically originated fundamental constitution of all possible knowledge, or of the objectivities proper to such knowledge, according to which individuals must be determinable in terms of concepts and laws and under the leading of synthetic a priori principles, and all empirical sciences grounded in their own regional ontologies, and not merely on the pure logic which is common to all sciences (ibid, 78-79). Husserl did not see his phenomenology as antithetical but rather foundational to all scientific investigation. He goes to great lengths to establish the concept of phenomenology on solid logical ground, with rigorous conceptual precision (ibid, 210), philosophically justifying every step in a style unapologetically reminiscent of the Cartesian skepticism (ibid, 107). His analysis, writes Edo Pivcevic, is free of any a priori metaphysical commitment (1970, 12), though Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty may disagree. Husserl begins with what he calls the natural standpoint; I find continually present and standing over against me the one spatio-temporal fact-world to which I myself belong, as do all other men found in it and related in the same way to it (ibid, 106). The task of the phenomenologist is to bracket the natural standpoint (and for that matter the natural world) and focus on what is left, the we. Bracketing or suspending (also referred to as the phenomenological reduction or the epoch) is the key methodological tool by which Husserl isolates his subject of inquiry, the essence of pure consciousness (ibid, 111). Phenomenological reduction is achieved when we direct the glance of apprehension and theoretical inquiry to pure consciousness in its own absolute Being (ibid, 154). Pivcevic summarises, the method of phenomenological reduction is a means of detecting what is constitutive and essential in our cognitive relationship with the world (1970,65). Within the eidetic structures (or experiences) then, Husserl is interested in what he calls the noematic content (noema), as opposed to the noetic content (noesis). The noesis relates to the attitude or judgment, for example believing, thinking, enjoying etc. while the noema relates to the perceived object as perceived, or the perceived as such (ibid, 260). The example Husserl uses is the perception of a tree. The noema is not to be confused with the tree itself, but rather the tree, as perceived. It is the essential noematic content that is the subject of Husserls inquiry. Husserls contribution therefore was the demarcation of a discipline, an initial exploration of the obstacles and a defense of the legitimacy of phenomenology as an area and method of investigation. The immediate development of his thinking was left to a student of his, Martin Heidegger, whose seminal work Being and Time (1927) is an elaboration of and further investigation into the territory claimed by Husserls exploratory forays into phenomenology.2 Again, this is an extensive work and we will just touch on the major developments here, as are crucial for phenomenologys emergence in anthropology. Heideggers approach is based on Husserls phenomenological reductionism and can be explained in Heideggers words as letting that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself (1978, 58). Husserl felt deeply betrayed by this work and gradually grew distant from the phenomenological movement he so passionately catalysed. While Husserl sought to investigate the
2 Being and Time, Merleau-Ponty asserts derisively springs from an indication given by Husserl and amounts to no more than an explicit account of the Lebenswelt (1962, viii).

2 essential essence of being, Heideggers innovation was to focus on the essence of being-in-the-world (ibid, 86).3 Essentially, Heidegger moved the brackets, and in so doing, changed the focus of investigation. Being-in-the-world is the natural state of dasein, which is the manner of being a man possesses (ibid, 36). Like Husserl, much of the earlier chapters in this work are dedicated to problematizing the concept of being, tracing back to the Greeks a dogma has been developed which not only declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect (ibid, 22). Importantly, Heideggers dasein not only has spatiality but he introduces a horizon of temporality. While Cartesian method and influence are still evident in the work of Husserl, Heideggers concept of being-in-the-world gave philosophy a path out of the mindbody dichotomy. Though Heidegger did not allow so much for the body-in-the-world as much as he did the cogito-in-the-world, his rejection of the transcendental idealism of Husserl (Mooney and Moran 2002) paved the way for Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose seminal work The Phenomenology of Perception (1962)4 brings the body to the fore. Critical of Husserls idealism, he writes, Husserls essences are destined to bring back all the living relationships of experience, as the fishermans net draws up from the depths of the ocean quivering fish and seaweed (1962, xvii). In other words, we are inevitably and inescapably bound up in the world that Husserl seeks to transcend, and that Heidegger seeks to reclaim. Husserl had acknowledged the importance of sense perception (1962, 127) and also had alluded to the role of the body (ibid, 164), though had not elaborated satisfactorily either concept while the same can be claimed for Heideggers treatment of the world. 5 Despite such criticisms, it is the insights of Husserl and Heidegger that form the cornerstones of Merleau-Pontys work. Just as Heidegger modified Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, it can be said, modified Heidegger. While Husserl was concerned with consciousness bracketed from the world, Heidegger with consciousness-in-the-world, Merleau-Ponty is concerned with the pre-objective realm of body-mind sense experience in the world (1962, 14). His manifesto echoes Husserlian sentiments, is tempered with Heideggerian caveats and introduces a recalibration, seeking to understand the experience of sense perception in the world, through the mind-body. Implicit throughout is the insistence to leave behind the subject-object dichotomy (ibid, 202). The following extract outlines the thread of his argument: We shall no longer hold that perception is incipient science, but conversely that classical science is a form of perception which loses sight of its origins and believes itself complete. The first philosophical act would appear to be to return to the world of actual experience which is prior to the objective world, since it is in it that we shall be able to grasp the theoretical basis no less than the limits of that objective world, restore to things their concrete physiognomy, to organisms their individual ways of dealing with the world, and to subjectivity its inherence in history. Our task will be, moreover, to rediscover phenomena, the layer of living experience through which other people and things are first given to us, the system Self-others-things as it comes into being; to reawaken perception and foil its trick of allowing us to forget it as a fact and as perception in the interest of the object which it presents to us and of the rational tradition to which it gives rise (1964, 66).

3 Husserl was not unfamiliar with the concept of being-in-the-world, as his notion of intentionality underlines. As he writes, perceiving is the perceiving of something (1962, 243). 4 Originally published in 1945. 5 Husserl must be said to be somewhat ambivalent when it comes to the role of the body, which was bracketed with the rest of the natural world.

3 Merleau-Ponty was the only major phenomenologist of the first half of the twentieth century to engage extensively with the sciences and especially with descriptive psychology (Mooney and Moran, 2002). Littered throughout this work are references to medical conditions such as number blindness (ibid, 154) or aphasia (ibid, 203), enlisted to support his modifications of phenomenology, with particular reference to sense perception. He was also a keen subscriber to psychoanalytic theories of his day, as is evident throughout this and other works (ibid, 404). Many of his intuitive observations remain convincing, for example the proposition that normal functioning must be understood as a process of integration in which the text of the external world is not so much copied, as composed (ibid, 10). Most importantly for our purposes, Merleau-Pontys insights ground the philosophical investigation into the nature of experience and consciousness in the body, bridging the philosophical and anthropological perspectives on the study of man. Theoretical Reception in Anthropology Having looked briefly at the 20th century history and development of phenomenological philosophy, we can now turn our attention to how phenomenology has informed and influenced anthropology. With a few notable exceptions, anthropology has been relatively slow in mobilising phenomenological methods (Hallowell 1955, Bidney 1973, Bourdieu 1977, Watson 1976, Turner 1982, 1986, cited by Desjarlais, & Throop, 2011, 92). We will begin by treating of Michael Jacksons introduction to Things As They Are (1996), an important edition advocating various anthropological perspectives on phenomenology as both a theoretical and methodological frame of investigation. Finally, we will look at how anthropology has practically applied the phenomenological approach through Thomas Csordas The Sacred Self. Kim Knibbe and peter Versteeg refer to the phenomenological method as the refusal to transcend lived experience through theory (2008, 47), an opposition that is at the heart of the phenomenological manifesto. Phenomenology proposes in the very least a ground-up perspective and stands against what Jackson calls the fetishisation of the products of intellectual reflection (1996,1), privileging the inchoate experience of subjects over the imposition of objective theoretical structures. The mobilization of phenomenology, like reflexivity, is one of many responses to the widespread postmodern criticisms that have come to characterise anthropology from the early 1970s onwards. Jackson continues, what is at issue here is the intellectualist fallacy of speaking as if life were at the service of ideas (ibid, 2). Just as the macro theories of the late 20th and early 21st centuries gave way to a more sensitive and particularistic anthropology, phenomenology calls into question the longstanding division in Western discourse between the knowledge of philosophers or scientists and the opinions of ordinary mortals (ibid, 7). Phenomenology is first and foremost, then, a rejection of metaphysical abstraction (ibid, 4) and arguably an anti-intellectualist democratisation par excellence of anthropological knowledge. Phenomenology, as we have seen, was born out of philosophical concerns for logical purity. Such concerns led Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to problematize the self, consciousness and ultimately the body-mind-in-the-world. However there still remains substantial theoretical work to bring phenomenologys findings to bear on anthropological concerns. The philosophical method of universalizing subjective intuitions about consciousness, the self and our relationship to the world could not be more antithetical to the evolution of anthropological thought, on its steadfast course away from ethnocentrism. Phenomenologys relevance for anthropology, Jackson writes, implies... the suspension of inquiry into the divine or objective truth of particular customs, beliefs, or worldviews in order to explore them as modalities or

4 moments of experience, to trace out their implications and uses (ibid, 10). The phenomenological epoch is an apt analogy for anthropological creative regressions in the field (Abrahams, 1986, 45) whereby the anthropologist must bracket the majority of what he encounters, with the aim of achieving a certain conceptual focus. Inheriting the well-stocked conceptual tool shed of phenomenology (Edel, 1953, 650), anthropology has found not so much a new way of thinking but a novel way of expressing its methodological insecurities. Just as the early 20th century phenomenologists sought to rediscover firm philosophical ground upon which all investigations could be based, the goal of phenomenological anthropology is a ruthless self-critique and attempt to bring back to first principles the very assumptions and priorities that abound in our discipline. Having been adopted by anthropology as a vehicle for extrapolating postmodern methodological concerns, phenomenology at its very essence advocates the reclamation of embodied subjective experience. Of the privilege usually accorded to verbal praxis in anthropology, Jackson writes, thisis fallacious on epistemological grounds, as well as contradicting our experience of the body as lived reality, wherein no sense of the mind as causally prior can be sustained, and wherein any notion of the body as an instrument of mind or of society is absurd (1983, 329). In Jerome Bruners words, As social scientists we have long given too much weight to verbalisations at the expense of visualisations, to language at the expense of images (1986, 5). Reclaiming the body for anthropology, he continues, In so far as the body tends to be defined as a medium of expression or communication, it is not only reduced to the status of a sign; it is also made into an object of purely mental operations, a thing onto which social patterns are projected (ibid, 329). Advocating the interpretation of experience as a privileged anthropological perspective, Bruner calls for a processual anthropology that allows for the dynamic realities of the lifeworld (1986, 4). If, however, we are to embrace phenomenology in its purest form, we are arguably doing justice to the subject but sacrificing the level of the social in our interpretation. For a more compromising phenomenological anthropology, we turn to Thomas Csordas. Practical Application in Anthropology Phenomenology found its way into anthropologys methodological repertoire through a postmodern crack in the door. There is work to be done, however, to anthropologise this philosophical concept. While the musings of both Husserl and Heidegger carved the path for the more integrative and grounded conclusions of Merleau-Ponty, by their very nature, such ethnocentric, and arguably egocentric intuitions have no place in modern anthropology. As Michael Jackson writes, there cannot be such a thing as pure intuition, or a transcendental, monadic ego, because all acts of so-called intuition are informed by social interests, cultural bias, and the claims of our particular lifeworld upon usA universalising, eternalising theory of Being, grounded in the being of European bourgeois intellectuals, has little value for anthropology (1996, 18). Entangled with the thorny theoretical concepts of consciousness, subjectivity, the body and experience, the phenomenological perspective by its nature places itself at the heart of some of the most difficult debates in modern anthropology. To bridge the gap between the perspectives of the social-objective and the individual-subjective, Thomas Csordas has married the dichotomous concepts of Merleau-Pontys embodied phenomenology with Pierre Bordieus concept of habitus in an approach he calls cultural phenomenology (1997, vii). 6 For Merleau-Ponty, he writes, in the
6

For a similar approach, see also Michael Jackson (1983).

5 domain of perception the principal duality is that of subject-object, while for Bourdieu in the domain of practice it is structure-practice. Both attempt not to mediate but to collapse these dualities, and embodiment is the methodological principle invoked by both (1990, 8). As anthropology oscillates between social institutions, cultural performance, and the phenomenological self among selves, we must decide on how to present life as lived (Riesmann, quoted in Jackson 1996, 8). What is at stake in the phenomenological manifesto is perspective. The ground-up, anti-intellectualist stance so passionately advocated here by Jackson is not however without problems. Levi-Strauss refers to the over-indulgent attitude to the illusions of subjectivity (cited in Jackson 1996) and phenomenology has since its inception been criticized for being anti-scientific. Byron Good (2012), one of phenomenologys staunchest advocates, has recently rejected the approach and Robert Desjarlais has problematised the concept of experience itself, arguing, the problem with taking experience as an uniquely authentic domain of life is that one risks losing an opportunity to question either the social production of that domain or the practices that define its use. (1996, 72). Thomas Csordas is a good exemplar of the phenomenological method and it is through his book The Sacred Self we will treat of the application of phenomenology in anthropology. The Sacred Self: A Cultural Phenomenology of Charismatic Healing (1997) is an anthropological treatment of a Catholic Charismatic Renewal church in New England, with specific emphasis on healing practices. Csordas brings to bear both phenomenological and semiotic approaches (1997, ix), with particular privilege accorded to the subjects interpretation of their own experiences (ibid, xi). Csordas sees embodiment as the common ground between Bordieus semiotic improvisation and Merleau-Pontys phenomenological transcendence, a point of departure from which both objective social realities and subjective experience are accessible (ibid, 12). Investigating the culturally elaborated self-processes of imagination, memory, emotion, and language (ibid, 24), Csordas The Sacred Self is both an experiment in and a practical application of phenomenological anthropology. The premise of The Sacred Self is that to be healed is to inhibit the Charismatic world as a sacred self (ibid, 24), whereby removing suffering is a complementary goal to the creating of a sacred self (ibid, 109), though this assertion is that of the anthropologist rather than the subjects. Jackson bases his account on what he calls a particular variant of phenomenology in which bodily experience is understood as the existential ground of culture and the sacred (ibid, ix). There are four types of healing sessions: large public services with multiple patients, small services following prayer meetings, private services for the benefit of a single patient and solitary healing prayer (ibid, 36). There are furthermore four types of healing: physical healing of bodily illness (leg-lengthening for example), inner healing of emotional illness and distress, and deliverance from the effects of evil spirits (ibid, 40). Csordas covers each type of healing by chapter and elaborates on the specifics with reference to biographical data from the field. His account of the subjective experiences of these ritual events is coupled with an ever-present concern for what he sees as the North American ethnopsychological (or ethno-ontological) concept of the individual (ibid, 44). The various healing rituals listed above constitute Csordas focus, and more specifically ritual efficacy, the role of imagery and interpretation, and the creative selfprocess during ritual make up the foundations of his analysis. Finding himself awkwardly at times at the juncture of the social and the self, Csordas must steer his analysis through the various pitfalls of semiotics and phenomenology, the social and the individual. In trying to locate the point of convergence where his subjects

6 being-in-the-world is integrated and coordinated within a habitus (ibid, 276), Csordas has set himself a difficult task, made all the more difficult by the insistence that we must start not with self-awareness, but with the problem of how selfawareness is produced; not with the self as an object of awareness, but as the processes of orientation and engagement in which the person becomes objectified (ibid, 278). He suggests, for example, preobjectively, patients dont sense a demon but rather a feeling or pain that is then interpreted as a demon (ibid, 226). Relying on Pierces tripartite composite of the sign proper (representamen), the object, and the interpretant (ibid, 85), Csordas paints a picture of culturally informed interpretations of healing, negotiated between the healer and the healed (ibid, 101), though fails at times to acknowledge the heavy-handed role that he himself plays in the interpretation of these interpretations. The very premise of this book, as we have seen, is that in a wordCharismatic healing is about self (ibid, viii). While Csordas supports this suggestion with ample ethnographic and biographic evidence throughout, it is somewhat of a truism coming from the phenomenological perspective of embodiment, that all roads lead to the self. The conclusions are guided by the premise for the most part, though he does achieve a balance of sorts between the social and the self. Furthermore, Csordas conclusions of ritual efficacy as a kind of creativity and ritual transformation as an essentially indeterminate self process (ibid, 67) do not seem to be supported by the interpretations of the subjects themselves, and there is a feeling that a rich variety of experiences are necessarily essentialised for the greater good of his anthropological agenda. The process of the self, therefore, seems to be imposed at times by the anthropologist. Explaining away some elements of this dynamic belief system, Csordas claims, the personal relation with Jesus is a metaphor for that condition of selfhood (ibid, 158). Demonic affliction, Csordas also asserts, is an affliction of self and a crisis of being in the world (ibid, 165) though again it is unclear how the Christians themselves would respond to this assertion. Peeling away the cultural layers that are embedded in and inform the experience of the subject, Csordas imposes a categorisation and interpretation of experience here that seems to betray his phenomenological manifesto. Though this book has certain weaknesses, Csordas has given himself a huge task in marrying these disparate perspectives. Rather than asserting one over the other, Csordas is trying to find common ground, from which the social and the self can be brought together, and in theory at least, this surely is an admirable anthropological aspiration. Cultural phenomenology, he writes is above all a methodological starting point in concrete immediacy rather than in abstract structureI would argue for the immediacy of embodiment as a starting point only because I am convinced that it is easier to abstract from experience than to arrive at experience from abstraction (ibid, 282). Such an approach seems beneficial in that it weighs down theoretical vaulting ambition, anchoring the conclusions in the experiences of those for whom this work must do justice. Conclusion Anthropology without philosophy is blind, and philosophy without anthropology is empty (Kant, cited by Abraham 1953, 649). Though arguably over-simplistic, this Kantian sentiment holds true on some basic level. In tracing the fate of phenomenology from its early 20th century roots in philosophy to its postmodern mobilisation in anthropology, we can extrapolate some indications of the relationship between the two disciplines. In this particular case, philosophy has provided anthropology with a concept that is good to think with, though it was not until the postmodern era that phenomenology really had any impact at all in anthropology,

7 and that impact arguably remains rather limited. The phenomenological perspective is an almost inevitable methodological destination for anthropology to have reached; embedded as it was in colonial ethnocentric representations of the other, anthropology has been on a steadfast course from the universal to the particular, from the macro to the micro. Anthropologists who have embraced the phenomenological perspective have taken up the challenge of animating the lifeworlds of their subjects, breathing vitality into beings and worlds and are indebted to the philosophy of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, without whom anthropology may still lack the vocabulary to engage with this level of interpretation. What were hard-fought philosophical conclusions have informed anthropological perspectives and become points of departure that align with anthropologys postmodern humanist agenda. One of anthropologys great strengths is its flexibility, integrating evidence from a plethora of perspectives and a variety of disciplines. The philosophical gift of phenomenology has been, and promises to continue to be, a fruitful perspective from which anthropology can counterbalance its fetishised products of intellectual reflection. Not only should anthropology gain from this perspective, but philosophy itself has much to learn from the variety of contexts within which phenomenological methods have been mobilised and problematised in anthropology.

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