Ayn Rand's Theory of Rights: The Moral Foundation of a Free Society

Craig Biddle

What are rights? Where do they come from? Ones answers to these questions determine whether one is capable of defending a free society. If one does not know the nature and source of rights, one cannot know whether rights are real or imagined. And if rights are not real, there is no foundation for freedom go!ernments and societies may do as they please. "he traditional answers to the abo!e questions fall into three categories# $%& 'ights are moral laws specifying what a person should be free to do, and they come from God. $(& 'ights are political laws specifying what a person is free to do, and they are created by governments. $)& 'ights are moral laws specifying what a person should be free to do, and they are inherent in mans nature. *ut each of these theories is demonstrably false, and a person or society attempting to defend freedom on such grounds will ultimately fail+as Americans are failing today. Ayn 'ands answers to the abo!e questions, howe!er, are demonstrably true+and those who come to understand her answers thereby equip themsel!es to defend freedom on solid, philosophic ground. "oward understanding 'ands theory of rights and its crucial !alue in the cause of freedom, let us begin with a brief o!er!iew of the traditional theories and their essential deficiencies. "hen we will turn to 'ands theory, see how it sol!es the !arious problems left unsol!ed by the other theories, and disco!er how it grounds rights in obser!able facts.

Traditional Theories of Rights and Why They Are Wrong

God-Given Rights
"he idea that rights come from ,od is particularly popular among conser!ati!es and 'epublicans. According to this theory, an all-powerful, infallible, all-good being makes moral law and gi!es man rights thus rights e.ist prior to and apart from any man-made law and cannot be granted or repealed by go!ernment. As /arah 0alin puts it# 1"he 2onstitution didnt gi!e us our rights. Our rights came from ,od, and theyre inalienable. "he 2onstitution created a national go!ernment to protect our ,od-gi!en, unalienable rights.3 1 'ush 4imbaugh agrees# 15ou ha!e indi!idual rights, as granted by ,od, who created you, and our founding documents enshrine them# 4ife, liberty, pursuit of happiness. "hose rights dont come from other men or go!ernments. . . . "hey come from our 2reator.32 6ewt ,ingrich challenges anyone to identify another possible source of inalienable rights# 1If you are not endowed by your 2reator with certain inalienable rights where do they come from?33 And 7ames 8obson warns# 1If you say that rights do not come from ,od, and they come from the state, they can be taken away.3 4 *ut the theory that rights come from ,od is hopeless. "o begin with, there is no e!idence for the e.istence of such a being, much less for the e.istence of rights that somehow emanate from his will. Whether one belie!es in ,od is beside the point here. 9ither way, the fact remains that there is no e!idence for ,ods e.istence, which is why it is supposed to be accepted on faith+in the absenceof e!idence. 'ights in support of which there is no e!idence are not rights but fantasies. :urther, what would it mean for an all-powerful, infallible, and all-good being to gi!e man rights? /urely, if ,od e.isted and possessed such qualities, he could at any time repeal those rights and kill people at will $as he does in the stories of the Old "estament& or command or permit certain people to kill, ensla!e, or rape others $as he does in the scriptures of 7udaism, 2hristianity, and Islam&. And if ,od+who is supposed to be infallible, all good, and the maker of moral law+did commit or permit such acts, then such acts would, by definition, be morally good. 1'ights3 that can be re!oked are not rights but permissions. And a 1theory3 of rights that permits murder, ensla!ement, and rape is not a theory of rights but a mockery of them.

"he supposition that rights come from ,od entails additional problems $e.g., which 1,od3+ 5ahweh? *rahman? Allah?&, but the foregoing flaws are sufficient to disqualify it. "he 1theory3 amounts not to a rational theory about a demonstrable source of inalienable rights, but to a fantasy about supernatural permissions. "o say that rights come from ,od is to say that there is no e!idence in support of their e.istence, that there is no basis for them in perceptual reality, that they are not rationally pro!able. "his is not a sound theory of rights it cannot ser!e as a solid foundation on which to ad!ocate or defend liberty.

Government-Granted Rights
4eftists and modern 1liberals3 cash in on this apparent absence of e!idence. "here is no such thing as rights, they say, at least not in the sense of absolute moral prerogati!es to li!e ones own life, by ones own ;udgment, in pursuit of ones own happiness. 'ights, say the left, do not precede political laws butfollow from them# ,o!ernments create laws, and the laws, in turn, dictate the rights and non-rights of the people who li!e under those go!ernments. 1Absent a go!ernment,3 writes 9. 7. 8ionne, 1there are no rights.35 /tephen <olmes and 2ass /unstein elaborate# 1='>ights are powers granted by the political community3 thus, 1an interest qualifies as a right when an effecti!e legal system treats it as such by using collecti!e resources to defend it.3 <olmes and /unstein conclude by fa!orably quoting ?tilitarian philosopher 7eremy *entham, who famously said a 1right3 is a 1child of the law36 and thus that 1imprescriptible rights3 $i.e., inalienable rights& are 1rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.3 'ights, on this account, are go!ernmental decrees# If the go!ernment says that you ha!e a right to take a particular action $or to be pro!ided with a particular good or ser!ice&, then you do if the go!ernment says you dont, then you dont. *ut this notion of rights entails a fundamental contradiction. "he idea that rights are permissions granted by a go!ernment $or a legal system or a political community or the like& contradicts the !ery purpose of the concept of rights. 'ights are fundamentally a moral concept they pertain to that which a personshould be free to do. "he essential function of the concept is to specify those actions that no one+including go!ernment+can morally preclude one from taking. Whether rights actually e.ist is beside the point here. "he purpose of the concept+its function in thought and communication+is to identify the actions $real or imagined& that a person morally must be free to take and to distinguish them from the actions that he morally may be prohibited from taking. "o say that rights are go!ernmental decrees is to imply, among other absurdities, that Islamic theocracies do nothing wrong in stoning adulterous women or hanging homose.uals+and that the 6a@is did nothing wrong in torturing and killing millions of 7ews+because, well, the go!ernments in!ol!ed deem such people to be right-less. 1'ights3 that can be granted or nullified by go!ernments are not rights but political policies $or laws&, and they logically should be identified as such. "o call them 1rights3 is to abuse language. ! "he notion that go!ernments create rights is not a !iable foundation on which to ad!ocate or defend liberty.

Natural Rights
Well aware of the dangers of go!ernments dictating what 1rights3 people ha!e and ha!e not, 9nlightenment thinkers, classical liberals, and the :ounding :athers sought to ground rights in nature. 'ights, they posited, are born not of man-made law but of natural law+specifically, natural moral law# natural law concerning how people should and should not act. As 7ohn 4ocke put it, there is 1a law of nature,3 and this law 1teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.3" "he :ounders agreed. 1Aan,3 wrote "homas 7efferson, is 1endowed by nature with rights,31# and these rights are a matter of 1moral law3 11 thus they are 1inherent,3 1inalienable,3 and 1unchangeable.312 A free people claim 1their rights as deri!ed from the laws of nature, and not as the gift of their chief magistrate.313

"his is the !iew held by many 1constitutional conser!ati!es,3 "ea 0artiers, and others who admirably seek to defend freedom. *ut this theory does not withstand scrutiny, either. "he 1natural3 law to which 4ocke, 7efferson, and the other 9nlightenment thinkers refer is not natural law but 1supernatural3 law. It comes not from nature but from 1,od.3 As 4ocke put it in the e.tended !ersion of the passage quoted abo!e# "here is a 1law of nature,3 and this law
teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions# for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker all the ser!ants of one so!ereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one anothers pleasure.14

In other words, the 1law of nature3 that gi!es rise to mans rights is the law of ,od# He ordains that we are his property and must ser!e his purposes thus, men may not make us ser!e their purposes.15 7efferson and the other :ounders held essentially the same !iew. 1"he moral law of our nature,3 wrote 7efferson, is 1the moral law to which man has been sub;ected by his 2reator.3 16
?nder the law of nature, all men are born free, e!ery one comes into the world with a right to his own person, which includes the liberty of mo!ing and using it at his own will. "his is what is called personal liberty, and is gi!en him by the Author of nature.1

Ale.ander <amilton wrote#

,ood and wise men, in all ages . . . ha!e supposed that the deity, from the relations we stand in to himself and to each other, has constituted an eternal and immutable law, which is indispensably obligatory upon all mankind, prior to any human institution whate!er. "his is what is called the law of nature. . . . ?pon this law depend the natural rights of mankind.1!

,eorge Aason wrote# 1"he laws of nature are the laws of ,od, Whose authority can be superseded by no power on earth.31" And 7ohn Adams wrote that man possesses rights 1antecedent to all earthly go!ernment+'ights, that cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws+'ights, deri!ed from the great 4egislator of the uni!erse.32# "his is the generally accepted !iew of the source and meaning of 1natural3 rights. *ut the idea that rights come from a law of nature created by ,od is beset with all the same problems as the idea that rights come from ,od+because it is the same idea, albeit with ,ods in!ol!ement one step remo!ed. If natural rights come from ,od, then proof of their e.istence depends on proof of ,ods e.istence +and further, on proof that ,od somehow makes rights e.ist and cannot repeal them. *ut, again, there is no e!idence for the e.istence of ,od, much less for the e.istence of natural moral laws or inalienable rights that somehow emanate from his will. "o accept the e.istence of 1,od3 is ultimately to accept it on faith accordingly, to accept the idea that 1rights3 somehow 1come from ,od3 is to rest ones case for rights on faith. "his will not do. As Ayn 'and obser!ed#
=">o rest ones case on faith means to concede . . . that one has no rational arguments to offer . . . that there are no rational arguments to support the American system, no rational ;ustification for freedom, ;ustice, property, indi!idual rights, that these rest on a mystic re!elation and can be accepted only on faith+that in reason and logic the enemy is right.21

"his is undeniably true. With all due respect to 4ocke and the :ounders $and the respect due is monumental&, the idea that rights come from ,od or from a law of nature created by ,od not only fails to meet the requirement of demonstrability it also concedes that reason and logic are on the side of tyrants. 6either the notion that rights come from ,od+nor the notion that they come from go!ernment+nor the notion that they come from a law of nature created by ,od is !iable. 6one of these theories identifies a demonstrable, obser!ation-based source for rights. 6one e.plains rationally why people should be free to li!e $the right to life& to act on their own ;udgment, free of coercion $ liberty& to

keep, use, and dispose of the product of their effort $ property& and to pursue the goals and !alues of their own choosing $the pursuit of happiness&. 6one supplies an ob;ecti!e foundation for freedom. In the absence of demonstrable proof of the e.istence of rights, proponents of rights ha!e nothing to support their claims+and the modern intellectuals know it. As philosopher Alasdair AacIntyre bluntly and mockingly puts it#
=">hose rights which are alleged to belong to human beings as such and which are cited as a reason for holding that people ought not to be interfered with in their pursuit of life, liberty and happiness. . . . the rights which are spoken of in the eighteenth century as natural rights or as the rights of man. . . . there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and unicorns. "he best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no such rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no witches and the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no unicorns# e!ery attempt to gi!e good reasons for belie!ing that there are such rights has failed.22

If we want to defend rights, we need to be able to do more than ;ust say that we ha!e them. We need to be able rationally to e.plain where rights come from and why we ha!e them. "oward that end, we need a rational account of natural moral law+moral law deri!ed not from 1super-nature3 but from actual nature+moral law not merely asserted but pro!en+pro!en by means of e!idence and logic. Ayn 'and pro!ided ;ust that. 4ike 4ocke and the :ounders, 'and held that indi!iduals ha!e a right to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. *ut she arri!ed at this conclusion in a !ery different manner than did they or any other natural rights ad!ocates. Whereas traditional conceptions of rights are based $ultimately& on presumptions of ,od, 'ands conception is rooted in obser!ations of fact. <er theory of rights deri!es from her more fundamental theory of morality+which deri!es from her obser!ations of reality, of the nature of !alues, and of the requirements of life. "hus, to understand 'ands theory of rights, we must begin with a brief sur!ey of her theory of morality and the obser!able facts that gi!e rise to it.

Ayn Rands Observation-Based Morality

Our purpose here is not to flesh out 'ands entire moral theory, which would require a book, but rather to e.amine certain aspects of her ethics that are essential to understanding her theory of rights. "hus, I want to stress that the following streamlined sur!ey is no substitute for a thorough study of her ethics.23 Aorality or ethics, obser!ed 'and, 1is a code of !alues to guide mans choices and actions+the choices and actions that determine the purpose and the course of his life.3 24 And the first step toward understanding a code of !alues, she reasoned, is to understand the nature of !alues. "hus, 'ands approach to morality began not with the question# Which of the e.isting codes should I accept?+but rather with the questions# 1What are values? Why does man need them?3 25 "hese questions directed her thinking away from the established !iews and toward the facts of reality. 4ooking at reality, 'and obser!ed that a 1!alue3 is 1that which one acts to gain andBor keep.3 26 We can see the truth of this all around us# 0eople act to gain and keep money they !alue money. /tudents act to gain and keep good grades they !alue good grades. 2hurchgoers act to gain or keep a relationship with 1,od3 they !alue that relationship. 0eople act to de!elop fulfilling careers, to establish and maintain romantic relationships, to gain and keep freedom, and so on. "he things one acts to gain or keep are ones !alues. And the key word here is# acts. Calues are ob;ects of actions. $0lease take special note of this, as it is a crucial aspect of 'ands deri!ation of moral principles+including the principle of rights. We will obser!e the relationship of actions and !alues repeatedly and with mounting significance throughout the remainder of this essay.& 4ooking at reality, 'and further saw that this phenomenon in!ol!es not only human beings but all li!ing things+and only li!ing things. We can see this# "rees, tigers, and people take actions toward goals. 'ocks, ri!ers, and hammers do not. "rees, for e.ample, e.tend their roots into the ground and their branches and lea!es toward the sky they !alue minerals, water, and sunlight.

"igers hunt antelope and nap under trees they !alue meat and shade. "his pattern continues throughout the plant and animal kingdom# All living things take self-generated, goal-directed action. 6onli!ing things, on the other hand, take no such action. "hey can be mo!ed, but they cannot act+ not in the self-generated, goal-directed sense that li!ing things do. A rock ;ust remains where!er it is unless some outside force, such as a wa!e or a hammer, hits and mo!es it. A ri!er flows, but its motion is not self-generated water mo!es only by means of some outside force+in this case, the gra!itational pull of the earth. And a hammer does not, by itself, smash rocks or dri!e nails it does not generate its own action. 'and obser!ed that the reason inanimate ob;ects do not act in the same sense that li!ing things do is that they ha!e no needs and therefore no corresponding means of action. Only li!ing organisms ha!e needs, goals, or !alues accordingly, only they ha!e a means of acting toward such ends. <a!ing clarified that a !alue is that which one acts to gain or keep+and that only li!ing things pursue !alues+'and proceeded to ask# Why do li!ing things seek !alues? What are !alues for? 1"he concept D!alue is not a primary,3 'and obser!ed. 1It presupposes an answer to the question# of !alue to whom and forwhat? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achie!e a goal in the face of an alternati!e.3 A tree faces the alternati!e of reaching water and sunlight+or not. A tiger faces the alternati!e of catching and keeping its prey+or not. And a person faces the alternati!e of achie!ing his goals+or not. "he ob;ects a li!ing thing acts to gain or keep are its !alues+!alues to it. "hat answers the question# 1to whom?3 *ut the question 1for what?3 remains. What difference does it make whether an organism achie!es its goals? What happens if it succeeds? What happens if it fails? What ultimately is at stake? <ere is 'ands key passage on the issue#
"here is only one fundamental alternati!e in the uni!erse# e.istence or non-e.istence+and it pertains to a single class of entities# to li!ing organisms. "he e.istence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the e.istence of life is not# it depends on a specific course of action. Aatter is indestructible, it changes forms, but it cannot cease to e.ist. It is only a li!ing organism that faces a constant alternati!e# the issue of life or death. 4ife is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of e.istence.2

"he reason why li!ing things need !alues is# to live. "he answer to the question 1for what?3 is# for life. 4ife is conditional# If a li!ing thing takes the actions necessary to remain ali!e, it remains ali!e if, for whate!er reason, it fails to take those actions, it dies. And human beings are no e.ception to this principle. 0eople need !alues for the same reason plants and animals do# in order to sustain and further their life. On the basis of such obser!ations, 'and disco!ered that an organisms life is its ultimate !alue and thus its standard of !alue+the standard by which all of its other !alues and actions are to be e!aluated. A trees standard of !alue is the requirements of its life as set by its nature. A tigers standard of !alue is the requirements of its life as set by its nature. And a mans standard of !alue is the requirements of his life as set by his nature. 6ow, our purpose here is not to e.amine e!ery nuance of the proof that an organisms life is its standard of !alue, nor to address e!ery ob;ection that might be raised to the idea. 2! 'ather, our purpose is to sur!ey the essential facts that gi!e rise to the principle, to see generally how they anchor it in perceptual reality, and ultimately to see how this principle underlies and gi!es rise to the principle of rights. "oward that end, we will focus on a few crucial components. *y pursuing the question 1Why does man need !alues?3 'and kept her thinking fact-oriented. If man needs !alues, then the reason he needs them will go a long way toward establishing which !alues are legitimate and which are not. If man doesnt need !alues, well, then, he doesnt need them+ and there is no point in pursuing the issue at all. 2" 'and disco!ered that man does need !alues, and the reason he needs them is in order to live. Aoral !alues+!alues in the realm of human choice+are facts in relation to the requirements of mans life.

*ecause we possess free will, we choose our !alues thus, we can choose either ob;ecti!ely legitimate, life-ser!ing !alues $e.g., to pursue a wonderful career, to remain with a worthy spouse, to establish and maintain a ci!ili@ed society&+or ob;ecti!ely illegitimate, life-thwarting !alues $e.g., to shoot heroin, to stay with an abusi!e spouse, or to ad!ocate communism or sharia&. *ut whate!er our choices, these facts remain# "he only reason we can pursue !alues is because we are ali!e, and the only reason we need to pursue !alues is in order to li!e. "his obser!ation-based, twopronged principle is essential to understanding how morality+and, in turn, the principle of rights+is grounded in the immutable facts of reality# Only life makes !alues possible, and only life makes !alues necessary. Or# We ha!e to be alive in order to pursue !alues, and we ha!e to pursue !alues in order to stay alive. "hese are metaphysically gi!en facts+facts about the fundamental nature of reality, about how the world is regardless of what anyone hopes, feels, prays, or chooses. And they gi!e rise to a crucial epistemological principle+a principle pertaining to the correct and incorrect use of the concept of 1!alue.3 Euoting 'and#
Aetaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself# a !alue gained and kept by a constant process of action. 9pistemologically, the concept of 1!alue3 is genetically dependent upon and deri!ed from the antecedent concept of 1life.3 "o speak of 1!alue3 as apart from 1life3 is worse than a contradiction in terms. 1It is only the concept of D4ife that makes the concept of DCalue possible.33#

"he reason that to speak of !alue as apart from life is worse than a contradiction in terms is that to do so is to tear the concept of !alue away from its conceptual foundation+the foundation on which it hierarchically depends and in relation to which it has ob;ecti!e meaning. 'ipped away from the concept of life, the concept of !alue has no grounding in reality it is se!ered from its factual base and thus amounts to a sub;ecti!e utterance. "o speak of !alue as apart from life is to commit what 'and called 1the fallacy of concept stealing,3 which consists in using a concept while ignoring or denying a more fundamental concept on which it logically depends. 31 "he concept of !alue is rooted in the concept of life. Calue means 1that toward which a li!ing thing acts.3 And moral !alue+!alue proper to human beings+means 1that toward which a person acts in accordance with the requirements of human life.3 'and further obser!ed that because human beings are indi!iduals+each with his own body, his own mind, his own life+this standard applies to human beings as indi!iduals. Aans life is the standard of moral !alue+and each indi!iduals ownlife is his own ultimate !alue. 9ach indi!idual is morally an end in himself+not a means to the ends of others. 32 "he moral principle here is egoism. 9goism is the recognition of the fact that each indi!idual should act to promote his own life and is the proper beneficiary of his own moral action. 33 "he !alidity of this principle is implicit in the !ery nature of !alues. A !alue is the ob;ect of an action taken by a li!ing organism to sustain and further its life. Again, the fact that people can choose antilife !alues doesnt change the roots of the concept of !alue or the fact that the only demonstrably legitimate !alues are those that promote ones life. Importantly, egoism $properly understood& is not hedonism or sub;ecti!ism it does not hold 1pleasure3 or 1feelings3 as the standard of !alue. A person may find pleasure in actions that are not good for his life for instance, a ballerina might en;oy eating lots of cake and ice cream, but if doing so causes her to gain too much weight, it will ruin her career as a ballerina. 4ikewise, a person may feellike doing something that is not good for his life for instance, a salesman might feel like sleeping in one morning, but if doing so means missing a crucial meeting and losing a ma;or customer, it is not in his best interest to do so. 4ooking at reality, 'and saw that although e.periencing pleasure+and, more broadly, achie!ing happiness+are crucial aspects of human life, they are not and cannot be the standard of moral !alue. 1<appiness,3 obser!ed 'and, 1can properly be the purpose of ethics, but not the standard. "he task of ethics is to define mans proper code of !alues and thus to gi!e him the means of achie!ing happiness.3 /he elaborated on the relationship as follows#
"he maintenance of life and the pursuit of happiness are not two separate issues. "o hold ones own life as ones ultimate !alue, and ones own happiness as ones highest purpose are two aspects of the same

achie!ement. 9.istentially, the acti!ity of pursuing rational goals is the acti!ity of maintaining ones life psychologically, its result, reward and concomitant is an emotional state of happiness. . . . *ut the relationship of cause to effect cannot be re!ersed. It is only by accepting 1mans life3 as ones primary and by pursuing the rational !alues it requires that one can achie!e happiness+not by taking 1happiness3 as some undefined, irreducible primary and then attempting to li!e by its guidance. If you achie!e that which is the good by a rational standard of !alue, it will necessarily make you happy but that which makes you happy, by some undefined emotional standard, is not necessarily the good.34

On the basis of such obser!ations, 'and arri!ed at and !alidated the dual principle that mans life is the ob;ecti!e standard of moral !alue, and the achie!ement of happiness is the moral purpose of each indi!iduals life. "his brings us to the question# <ow can we know which actions will ser!e our life and happiness? What must we do to li!e and prosper? "o answer this question, 'and again looked at reality and formulated principles on the basis of obser!ation. 'and saw that man, like all li!ing things, has a means of sur!i!al. Whereas plants sur!i!e by means of an automatic vegetative process $photosynthesis&, and whereas animals sur!i!e by means of automatic instinctive processes $hunting, fleeing, nest-building, etc.&, man sur!i!es by volitional means+bychoosing to use his mind to identify and pursue the requirements of his life. While the choice of whether to use ones mind is up to the indi!idual $one can choose to e.ert mental effort or not to do so&, the basic requirements of mans life are set by his nature. "hey are metaphysically gi!en facts. We need food, clothing, shelter, medicine, and other material goods in order to li!e and prosper. We also need self-confidence, personal goals, romantic lo!e, and other spiritual !alues in order to thri!e. Aore fundamentally, we need knowledge of such needs and knowledge of how to acquire them. /o the question becomes# What must we do to gain such knowledge and acquire such !alues? 'and obser!ed that first and foremost we must use reason, the faculty that identifies and integrates the material pro!ided by mans senses. 'eason is our means of understanding the world, oursel!es, and our needs thus, if we want to gain such understanding, we must use it we must obser!e reality and think.
Aan cannot sur!i!e, as animals do, by the guidance of mere percepts. A sensation of hunger will tell him that he needs food $if he has learned to identify it as 1hunger3&, but it will not tell him how to obtain his food and it will not tell him what food is good for him or poisonous. <e cannot pro!ide for his simplest physical needs without a process of thought. <e needs a process of thought to disco!er how to plant and grow his food or how to make weapons for hunting. <is percepts might lead him to a ca!e, if one is a!ailable+but to build the simplest shelter, he needs a process of thought. 6o percepts and no 1instincts3 will tell him how to light a fire, how to wea!e cloth, how to forge tools, how to make a wheel, how to make an airplane, how to perform an appendectomy, how to produce an electric light bulb or an electronic tube or a cyclotron or a bo. of matches. 5et his life depends on such knowledge+and only a !olitional act of his consciousness, a process of thought, can pro!ide it.35

And reason is not only our means of gaining knowledge of our physical needs it is also our means of gaining knowledge of our spiritual needs. It is by means of reason that we learn what selfconfidence is, why we need it, and how to gain it the importance of long-range goals, which ones will ser!e our life and happiness, and which ones will not the nature of lo!e, and how to build and maintain a wonderful romantic relationship and so on. We are not born with any such knowledge if and to the e.tent that we gain it, we do so by means of reason. On the basis of such obser!ations, 'and identified reason as our fundamental means of li!ing, our basic life-ser!ing !alue, and thus our basic moral !alue. If we want to li!e and prosper, we must use reason# We must obser!e reality and think we must integrate our obser!ations into concepts, generali@ations, and principles that correspond to reality and we must act accordingly. <ere again is the action thread, but now with another element folded in# Whereas all li!ing things must act in order to li!e, human beings must act rationally. "his does not mean we must always be correct or ne!er make errors+that would be an impossible standard. We are neither omniscient nor infallible our knowledge is limited to whate!er we ha!e learned at any gi!en time, and we can err in our thought processes, conclusions, and ;udgments. "his, howe!er, is not a problem, because we can always gain additional knowledge or correct errors by applying or reapplying reason+by

looking at reality, integrating our obser!ations into concepts and generali@ations, and checking for contradictions in our thinking. "he moral principle is# If we are to li!e and prosper, we must always act on our rational ;udgment+ our basic means of li!ing. 36 And this brings us to the question# What can stop us from acting on our ;udgment? 4ooking at reality, 'and obser!ed that the only thing that can stop a person from acting on his ;udgment is other people and the only way they can stop him is by means of physical force.3 "o see this !i!idly, suppose you are alone on an island. What can stop you from acting on your ;udgment? 6othing can. If you decide that you should go fishing or pick some berries or build a shelter, you are free to do so. *ut suppose another person rows up to the island, hops off his boat, and ties you to a tree. 2learly, you are no longer free to act on your ;udgment. If you had planned to go fishing, you cant go. If you had planned to build a shelter, you cant build it. Whate!er your plans were, they are now ruined, and, if you are not freed from bondage, you will soon die. "he brutes force has come between your thinking and your acting, between your planning and your doing. 5ou can no longer act on your ;udgment you can no longer act as your life requires you can no longer li!e as a human being. Of course, the brute could feed you and keep you breathing but a 1life3 of bondage is not a human life. A human life is a life guided by the udgment of ones mind. In order to li!e as a human being, a person must be able to act on his own ;udgment the only thing that can stop him from doing so is other people and the only way they can stop him is by means of physical force. "his principle holds regardless of location, regardless of the kind of force used $a gun to the head, fraud, the threat of incarceration, etc.&, regardless of who uses the force $an indi!idual, a group, or a go!ernment&, and regardless of the e.tent to which force is used. A few e.amples will bear this out. /uppose a woman is walking to the store intent on using her money to buy groceries, and a thug ;umps out from an alley, puts a gun to her head, and says, 1,i!e me your purse or die.3 6ow the woman cant act according to her plan. 9ither she is going to gi!e her purse to the thief, or she is going to get shot in the head. 9ither way, shes not going grocery shopping. If she hands her purse to the thief, and if he flees without shooting her, she can resume acting on her ;udgment+but, importantly, not with respect to the stolen money. Although the thief is gone, the effect of his force remains. *y keeping the womans money, he continues to pre!ent her from spending it, and, to that e!tent, he continues to stop her from acting on her ;udgment. "his ongoing force does not thwart her life totally, but it does thwart her life partially# If she had her money, she would either spend it or sa!e it but because the thief has her money, she can do neither. /he cannot use her money as she chooses, and her life is, to that e.tent, retarded. "o whate!er degree physical force is used against a person, it impedes his ability to act on his ;udgment, his basic means of li!ing. "ake another e.ample. /uppose a man reads an ad!ertisement for a used car and goes to check it out. "he owner assures the man that the cars odometer reading is correct this, howe!er, is not true, and the owner knows it because he turned back the mileage himself. As far as the man can tell, though, the owner is being honest, and e!erything seems to be in order so he buys the car and dri!es it away. *ut notice that the man is not dri!ing the car he bargained for he is not dri!ing the car he was willing to buy. ?nbeknownst to him, he is dri!ing a different car+one with higher mileage than the one for which he was willing to pay. *y lying to the man about the cars mileage and by selling it to him on the basis of that false information, the crook has defrauded the man. *ecause the mans willingness to e.change his money for the car was based partly on the crooks lie, the crook has gained and is now keeping the mans money against his will. In so doing, the crook is physically forcing the man to act against his ;udgment. *y fraudulently taking and keeping the mans money, the crook is physically pre!enting him from spending or sa!ing it as he otherwise would. "raud, the act of gaining or keeping someones property by means of deception, is a form of indirect physical force. It is physical force, because, although indirect, it physically impedes the !ictims

ability to act fully on his ;udgment. Other types of indirect physical force include e!tortion, the act of gaining or keeping someones property by distant threat of force copyright and patent infringements, acts of misusing someones intellectual property $and thus impinging on his ability to act on it& slander, the act of making false statements that damage a persons reputation $and thereby retarding his ability to act on it& unilateral breach of contract , the act of refusing to deli!er goods or ser!ices one has agreed to deli!er and so forth. In all such cases, although the force is indirect, it is still physical# When and to the degree it is used, it physically pre!ents the !ictim from acting according to his ;udgment. Whether direct or indirect, physical force used against a person stops him from li!ing fully as a human being# "o the e.tent it is used, it pre!ents him from employing his means of sur!i!al+the ;udgment of his mind. Importantly, lone thugs and crooks are not the only perpetrators of physical force nor are they the most dangerous. As history makes clear, the most dangerous agents of force, by far, are go!ernments. 1A go!ernment,3 obser!ed 'and, 1holds a legal monopoly on the use of physical force.3
6o indi!idual or pri!ate group or pri!ate organi@ation has the legal power to initiate the use of physical force against other indi!iduals or groups and to compel them to act against their own !oluntary choice. Only a go!ernment holds that power. "he nature of go!ernmental action is# coercive action. "he nature of political power is# the power to force obedience under threat of physical in;ury+the threat of property e.propriation, imprisonment, or death.3!

9!eryone today knows that go!ernments such as 6a@i, communist, and theocratic regimes ha!e tortured, slaughtered, and otherwise ruined the li!es of hundreds of millions of people $and counting&. A person forced by a go!ernment into a eugenics lab or a concentration camp cannot li!e as a human being, because he cannot act on the ;udgment of his mind. A person forced by a go!ernment to become a farmer or a dancer or a physicist cannot li!e as a human being, because he cannot act on his ;udgment. And a woman forced by a go!ernment to wear a burka or to stay with her husband or to stay at home cannot li!e as a human being, because she cannot act on hers. *ut go!ernments can and unfortunately do use physical force against people in subtler, lessob!ious ways as well. 2onsider, for instance, Anna "omalis of 2larks!ille Aaryland. In (FFG, when Anna was ten years old, she was diagnosed with a rare form of li!er cancer. After surgery and chemotherapy failed to halt the cancer, her doctors told her there was nothing more they could do. /o Anna and her parents searched the web and disco!ered e.perimental drugs that, in clinical trials, had e.tended the li!es of patients with the same kind of cancer. Anna and her parents were relie!ed# In their ;udgment, these e.perimental drugs were worth the risks in!ol!ed in her taking them. *ut the ?./. go!ernment forbade the dying girl to take the drugs because the :ood and 8rug Administration $:8A& hadnt appro!ed them. Asked in an inter!iew what she thought about this situation, Anna replied# 1I know there are other drugs out there for me. Im not happy with it. I dont think its right.3 Annas mother pleaded with 2ongress to pass a proposed bill that would ha!e enabled Anna to take the drugs# 10lease help her. /he wants to sur!i!e.3 3" *ut 2ongress did not pass the bill. Anna wrote to the :8A requesting a 1compassionate-use e.emption,3 which, if granted, would permit her to take the drugs. *ut the :8A bureaucrats took their time. Aonths passed before they re!iewed Annas request and granted her permission. *y then it was too late. Although the drugs might ha!e sa!ed or e.tended Annas life if she had been free to take them earlier, at this point the cancer had spread too far, and the drugs could not stop it. After recei!ing only one round of treatment, she died of the disease. /he was then thirteen. "he issue of people being forced to act against their ;udgment is a matter of life and death. In some cases, such force results in a subhuman e.istence. In other cases, it means going out of e.istence. In all cases, it thwarts peoples basic means of li!ing and thus stops them from li!ing fully as human beings.

2onsider a few more of the countless instances of force used against Americans on a daily basis. We are saddled with laws that force e!eryone to purchase health insurance $Obama2are&, laws that force bankers to lend money to people they deem un-creditworthy $2ommunity 'ein!estment Act&, laws that force citi@ens to bail out bankers who go bankrupt $"A'0&, laws that force homeowners to hand o!er their property for the 1greater good3 $eminent domain&, laws that forbid businessmen from merging their companies $antitrust&, laws that forbid couriers from deli!ering mail $postal monopoly&, laws that force people to pay for the education of other peoples children $go!ernment-run schools&, laws that force younger Americans to pay for the health care and retirement of older Americans $Aedicare and /ocial /ecurity&, laws that force students to 1!olunteer3 in their communities, laws that forbid employers and employees from contracting in accordance with their own ;udgment $minimum wage laws&, laws that force automakers to 1contract3 with labor unions on terms that are detrimental to their businesses $6ational 4abor 'elations Act&+and on and on. In all such cases, people are forced to act against their own ;udgment+against their basic means of li!ing thus they are unable to li!e fully as human beings. Of course, people can remain alive under these kinds and degrees of force but insofar as any force is used against them, they cannot li!e fully as human beings. A human life is a life guided by the ;udgment of ones mind. On the basis of such obser!ations, Ayn 'and established the ob ective, fact-based case for indi!idual rights.

Ayn Rands Observation-Based Principle of Rights

'and reasoned that because mans life is the standard of moral !alue, because each person should act to sustain and further his own life, and because physical force used against a person stops him from acting on his basic means of li!ing, we need a moral principle to protect oursel!es from people and go!ernments that attempt to use force against us. "hat principle in!ol!es the concept of rights.
1'ights3 are a moral concept+the concept that pro!ides a logical transition from the principles guiding an indi!iduals actions to the principles guiding his relationship with others+the concept that preser!es and protects indi!idual morality in a social conte.t+the link between the moral code of a man and the legal code of a society, between ethics and politics. #ndividual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law.4#

"he moral law that 'and speaks of here is the principle of egoism+the obser!ation-based moral truth that each indi!idual should act to promote his own life and is the proper beneficiary of his own actions. Indi!idual rights are the means of subordinating society to the truth of egoism. A 1right,3 'and continues, 1is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a mans freedom of action in a social conte.t.341 Again, the key word is action. 7ust as on the personal le!el we need principles of action to guide us in pursuing our life-ser!ing !alues, so on the social le!el we need principles of interaction to protect us from those who attempt to interfere with our plans. And ;ust as our ultimate !alue is our own life, so our fundamental right is our right to our own life.
"here is only one fundamental right $all others are its consequences or corollaries&# a mans right to his own life. 4ife is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action the right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action+which means# the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the en;oyment of his own life. $/uch is the meaning of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.&42

6ote 'ands reference to the obser!able fact that life is a process of self-sustaining and selfgenerated action. Again, this is a metaphysically gi!en fact its the way the world is, regardless of what anyone hopes, feels, prays, or does. 4ife depends on such action+and human life depends on rational action, action in accordance with ones own ;udgment. *ecause each indi!iduals life requires self-generated, goal-directed action in accordance with his own ;udgment, each indi!idual morally must be left free to act on his own ;udgment+and each indi!idual morally must lea!e others free to act on theirs. 'and further obser!ed that because a right is a sanction to action, it is not and cannot be a sanction to be given goods or ser!ices. If a person had a 1right3 to be gi!en food, or a house, or medical care, or an education, or the like, that would imply that other people must be forced to pro!ide him with these goods or ser!ices. It would mean that some people must produce while others dispose of

their product. As 'and put it# 1"he man who produces while others dispose of his product is a sla!e.3
If some men are entitled by right to the products of the work of others, it means that those others are depri!ed of rights and condemned to sla!e labor. Any alleged 1right3 of one man which necessitates the !iolation of the rights of another, is not and cannot be a right. 6o man can ha!e a right to impose an unchosen obligation, an unwarranted duty or an in!oluntary ser!itude on another man. "here can be no such thing as 1 the right to enslave.343

"he 6orth fought $and thankfully won& a !ital war against the /outh on the principle that there can be no such thing as the right to ensla!e. 'and made e.plicit the fundamental reason this principle is true. "he reason each indi!iduals life should legally belong to him is that each indi!iduals life does in fact morally belong to him. 9ach indi!idual is morally an end in himself+not a means to the ends of others. 9ach indi!idual has a moral right to act on his own ;udgment for his own sake+and to keep, use, and dispose of the product of his effort+so long as he respects the same right of others. "his brings us to the question# What binds a person to respect the rights of others? Again, 'ands answer is deri!ed from obser!able facts+many of which we ha!e seen in this essay $and others of which may be seen in a fleshed-out presentation of the morality of egoism&. In essence, what obligates a person to respect the rights of others is his own self-interest. If a person wants to li!e and be happy, he must recogni@e and respect the metaphysically gi!en facts of reality $e.g., the fact that e!erything, including man, has a specific nature&, the nature of man $i.e., the kind of being he is&, the basic requirements of human life and happiness $e.g., reason, shortand long-term goals, self-esteem&, and the social conditions that make peaceful human coe.istence possible $e.g., indi!idual rights, freedom, the rule of law&. ,ranted, although this truth is based on obser!ation and logic, it is ne!ertheless highly abstract to grasp it one must e.ert substantial mental effort+and not e!eryone will choose to e.ert that effort. *ut the abstract nature of a truth does not alter its truth. 7ust as the abstract nature of the principles of physics and biology does not change the fact that those principles are true, so, too, the abstract nature of the principles of morality does not change the fact that these principles are true. 7ust as dri!ing ones car off a cliff or failing to treat ones cancer will ha!e a negati!e effect on ones life regardless of whether one understands the principles in!ol!ed there, so, too, being irrational or !iolating rights will ha!e a negati!e effect on ones life regardless of whether one understands the principles here. Ciolating rights does not and cannot lead to happiness it necessarily retards ones life, leads to unhappiness, and may lead to incarceration or premature death. "he e!idence of this is all around us# from the 1life and happiness3 of *ernie Aadoff $Wall /treet 0on@i-schemer& to that of 7ohn ,otti $Aafia 1boss3&, from the 1life and happiness3 of "imothy AcCeigh $Oklahoma 2ity bomber& to that of 8illon Hlebold and 9ric <arris $2olumbine murderers&, from the 1life and happiness3 of *ashar alAssad and AuDammar ,adhafi to that of sundry swindlers and petty thie!es who must constantly worry about being caught, who know that they ha!e chosen to sur!i!e not as rational producers but as pathetic parasites on such producers, and whose li!es and souls are correspondingly damaged. 0rotestations to the contrary notwithstanding, these are not happy people. *ut e!en if rights-!iolators could fool themsel!es into belie!ing that they are happy $which they cant&, the fact remains that by !iolating the rights of others, they thereby relinquish some or all of their own rights and rights-respecting people and go!ernments morally may deal with them accordingly. $'ands !iews on the nature and need of go!ernment and on the proper application of the principle of rights to the !arious areas of social and political life are a sub;ect for another day. Our concern in this essay is limited to her deri!ation of and the essential meaning of the principle of rights.& 'especting the rights of others, obser!ed 'and, 1is an obligation imposed, not by the state, but by the nature of reality3 it is a matter of 1 consistency, which, in this case, means the obligation to respect the rights of others, if one wishes ones own rights to be recogni@ed and protected.3 44 A person cannot rationally claim the protection of a principle that he repudiates in action.

$$$ We ha!e seen the essential elements of 'ands obser!ation-based deri!ation of the principle of indi!idual rights# the truth that each indi!idual morally must be left free to act on his own ;udgment, so long as he does not !iolate the same right of others. "his principle does not come from ,od or from go!ernment nor is it self-e!ident or 1inherent3 in mans nature. 'ather, it is deri!ed from obser!ation and logic. It is disco!ered and formulated by looking at reality+focusing on rele!ant facts about the nature of !alues, the requirements of life, the nature of man, the propriety of egoism, the !alue of reason, mans need to act on his ;udgment, and the antilife nature of physical force+all the while integrating ones obser!ations into concepts, generali@ations, and moral principles. "his is what 'and did. And this is why her theory is true. Importantly, 'ands theory does not $as some people mistakenly belie!e& fall into the category of 1natural rights3 theory. <ers is a different theory altogether. :irst, whereas natural rights theory holds that rights are moral laws emanating from 1super-nature3 $i.e., 1,od3&, 'and showed that rights are moral principles deri!ed from actual nature. On that count, if 1natural rights3 theory did not ha!e a long history of actually being ,od-gi!en rights theory, it might ha!e been appropriate to categori@e 'ands theory as one of natural rights. *ut natural rights theory does ha!e that problematic history thus it is improper to include 'ands theory in that category. 45 /econd, 1natural rights3 theory holds that rights are 1inherent3 in mans nature+meaning, 1inborn3 and a part of man by !irtue of the fact that he is man. *ut rights are not inherent or inborn 46+which is why $a& there is no e!idence to suggest that they are, and $b& belief that they are is mocked as 1one with belief in witches and unicorns.3 'ands theory holds not that rights are 1inherent,3 but that they are ob ective+not that they are 1inborn,3 but that they are conceptual identifications of the factual requirements of human life in a social conte.t. <er theory is, as this essay has endea!ored to show, demonstrably true. ?nfortunately, although 'ands theory is demonstrably true, and although it sol!es the problems that are inherent in the traditional theories, few people today are willing to recogni@e and embrace it. *ecause our culture is steeped in the notion that self-interest is e!il+and because 'ands theory is based on the fact that self-interest is good+many people, e!en upon reading or hearing 'ands argument, will ignore or deny it and continue clinging to the old saw that rights come from 1,od3 or are somehow 1inherent3 in human nature. *ut ignoring or denying 'ands proof cannot change the fact that real rights+defensible rights+hierarchically depend on and are indeed logical e.tensions of egoism. Whereas the principle of egoism is the recognition of the fact that each person should act to promote his life and is the proper beneficiary of his own life-ser!ing actions, the principle of rights is the recognition of the fact that in order for a person to uphold the principle of egoism, he must be free to act on his ;udgment. "he former principle gi!es rise to the latter. 7ust as the concept of life makes the concept of !alue both possible and necessary, so too the principle of egoism makes the principle of rights both possible and necessary. And ;ust as to speak of !alue as apart from life is worse than a contradiction in terms, so to speak of rights as apart from egoism is worse than a contradiction in terms+and for the same reason. 1'ights3 torn from their foundation in egoism are not rights but stolen concepts+concepts lifted from the foundation that gi!es rise to them, the foundation that connects them to reality, the foundation on which they hierarchically depend and in which they ha!e ob;ecti!e meaning. 0eople are free to use words as they wish, but they are not free to wish away facts. Apart from egoism, rights simply ha!e no foundation in reality. We who want to defend mans rights to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness+we who want to li!e fully as human beings+must embrace and ad!ocate the underlying ideas that support and gi!e rise to the principle of rights. We must embrace and ad!ocate 'ands demonstrably true theory of rights.