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Ancient Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

First published Wed Dec 13, 2006 Logic as a discipline starts with the transition from the more or less unreflective use of logical methods and argument patterns to the reflection on and inquiry into these and their elements, including the syntax and semantics of sentences. In Greek and Roman antiquity, discussions of some elements of logic and a focus on methods of inference can be traced back to the late 5th century BCE. The Sophists, and later Plato (early 4th c.) displayed an interest in sentence analysis, truth, and fallacies, and Eubulides of Miletus (mid-4th c.) is on record as the inventor of both the Liar and the Sorites paradox. But logic as a fully systematic discipline begins with Aristotle, who systematized much of the logical inquiry of his predecessors. His main achievements were his theory of the logical interrelation of affirmative and negative existential and universal statements and, based on this theory, his syllogistic, which can be interpreted as a system of deductive inference. Aristotle's logic is known as term-logic, since it is concerned with the logical relations between terms, such as human being, animal, white. It shares elements with both set theory and predicate logic. Aristotle's successors in his school, the Peripatos, notably Theophrastus and Eudemus, widened the scope of deductive inference and improved some aspects of Aristotle's logic. In the Hellenistic period, and apparently independent of Aristotle's achievements, the logicians Diodorus Cronus and his pupil Philo (see the entry Dialectical school) worked out the beginnings of a logic that took propositions, rather than terms, as its basic elements. They influenced the second major theorist of logic in antiquity, the Stoic Chrysippus (mid-3rd c.), whose main achievement is the development of a propositional logic, crowned by a deductive system. Considered by many in antiquity as the greatest logician, he was innovative in a large number of topics that are central to contemporary formal and philosophical logic. The many close similarities between Chrysippus' philosophical logic and that of Gottlob Frege are especially striking. Chrysippus' Stoic successors systematized his logic, and made some additions. The development of logic from c. 100 BCE to c. 250 CE is mostly in the dark, but there can be no doubt that logic was one of the topics regularly studied and researched. At some point Peripatetics and Stoics began taking notice of the logical systems of each other, and we witness some conflation of both terminologies and theories. Aristotelian syllogistic became known as categorical syllogistic and the Peripatetic adaptation of Stoic syllogistic as hypothetical syllogistic. In the 2nd century CE, Galen attempted to synthesize the two traditions; he also professed to have introduced a third kind of syllogism, the relational syllogism, which apparently was meant to help formalize mathematical reasoning. The attempt of some Middle Platonists (1st c. BCE2nd c. CE) to claim a specifically Platonic logic failed, and in its stead, the Neo-Platonists (3rd6th c. CE) adopted a scholasticized version of Aristotelian logic as their own. In the monumentalif rarely creativevolumes of the Greek commentators on Aristotle's logical works we find elements of Stoic and later Peripatetic logic; the same holds for the Latin logical writings of Apuleius (2nd c. CE) and Boethius (6th c. CE), which pave the way for the thus supplemented Aristotelian logic to enter the medieval era.

1. Pre-Aristotelian Logic o 1.1 Syntax and Semantics o 1.2 Argument Patterns and Valid Inference 2. Aristotle o 2.1 Dialectics

2 2.2 Sub-sentential Classifications 2.3 Syntax and Semantics of Sentences 2.4 Non-modal Syllogistic 2.5 Modal Logic 3. The early Peripatetics: Theophrastus and Eudemus o 3.1 Improvements and Modifications of Aristotle's Logic o 3.2 Prosleptic Syllogisms o 3.3 Forerunners of Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens o 3.4 Wholly Hypothetical Syllogisms 4. Diodorus Cronus and Philo the Logician 5. The Stoics o 5.1 Logical Achievements Besides Propositional Logic o 5.2 Syntax and Semantics of Complex Propositions o 5.3 Arguments o 5.4 Stoic Syllogistic o 5.5 Logical Paradoxes 6. Epicurus and the Epicureans 7. Later Antiquity Bibliography o Greek and Latin Texts o Translations of Greek and Latin Texts o Secondary Literature Other Internet Resources Related Entries
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1. Pre-Aristotelian Logic 1.1 Syntax and Semantics Some of the Sophists classified types of sentences (logoi) according to their force. So Protagoras (485415 BCE), who included wish, question, answer and command (Diels Kranz (DK) 80.A1, Diogenes Laertius (D. L.) 9.534), and Alcidamas (pupil of Gorgias, fl. 4th BCE), who distinguished assertion (phasis), denial (apophasis), question and address (prosagoreusis) (D. L. 9.54). Antisthenes (mid5thmid-4th cent.) defined a sentence as that which indicates what a thing was or is (D. L. 6.3, DK 45) and stated that someone who says what is speaks truly (DK49). Perhaps the earliest surviving passage on logic is found in the Dissoi Logoi or Double Arguments (DK 90.4, c. 400 BCE). It is evidence for a debate over truth and falsehood. Opposed were the views (i) that truth is a temporalproperty of sentences, and that a sentence is true (when it is said), if and only if things are as the sentence says they are when it is said, and false if they aren't; and (ii) that truth is an atemporal property of what is said, and that what is said is true if and only if the things are the case, false if they aren't the case. These are rudimentary formulations of two alternative correspondence theories of truth. The same passage displays awareness of the fact that self-referential use of the truth-predicate can be problematican insight also documented by the discovery of the Liar paradox by Eubulides of Miletus (mid-4th c. BCE) shortly thereafter. Some Platonic dialogues contain passages whose topic is indubitably logic. In the Sophist, Plato analyzes simple statements as containing a verb (rhma), which indicates action, and a name (onoma),

3 which indicates the agent (Soph. 261e262a). Anticipating the modern distinction of logical types, he argues that neither a series of names nor a series of verbs can combine into a statement (Soph. 262a d). Plato also divorces syntax (what is a statement?) from semantics (when is it true?). Something (e.g. Theaetetus is sitting) is a statement if it both succeeds in specifying a subject and says something about this subject. Plato thus determines subject and predicate as relational elements in a statement and excludes as statements subject-predicate combinations containing empty subject expressions. Something is a true statement if with reference to its subject (Theaetetus) it says of what is (e.g. sitting) that it is. Something is a false statement if with reference to its subject it says of something other than what is (e.g. flying) that it is. Here Plato produces a sketch of a deflationist theory of truth (Soph. 262e263d; cf. Crat. 385b). He also distinguished negations from affirmations and took the negation particle to have narrow scope: it negates the predicate, not the whole sentence (Soph. 257bc). There are many passages in Plato where he struggles with explaining certain logical relations: for example his theory that things participate in Forms corresponds to a rudimentary theory of predication; in the Sophist and elsewhere he grapples with the class relations of exclusion, union and co-extension; also with the difference between the is of predication (being) and the is of identity (sameness); and in Republic 4, 436bff., he anticipates the law of non-contradiction. But his explications of these logical questions are cast in metaphysical terms, and so can at most be regarded as proto-logical. 1.2 Argument Patterns and Valid Inference Pre-Aristotelian evidence for reflection on argument forms and valid inference are harder to come by. Both Zeno of Elea (born c. 490 BCE) and Socrates (470399) were famous for the ways in which they refuted an opponent's view. Their methods display similarities with reductio ad absurdum, but neither of them seems to have theorized about their logical procedures. Zeno produced arguments (logoi) that manifest variations of the pattern this (i.e. the opponent's view) only if that. But that is impossible. So this is impossible. Socratic refutation was an exchange of questions and answers in which the opponents would be led, on the basis of their answers, to a conclusion incompatible with their original claim. Plato institutionalized such disputations into structured, rulegoverned verbal contests that became known as dialectical argument. The development of a basic logical vocabulary for such contests indicates some reflection upon the patterns of argumentation. The 5th and early to mid-4th centuries BCE also see great interest in fallacies and logical paradoxes. Besides the Liar, Eubulides is said to have been the originator of several other logical paradoxes, including the Sorites. Plato's Euthydemus contains a large collection of contemporary fallacies. In attempts to solve such logical puzzles, a logical terminology develops here, too, and the focus on the difference between valid and invalid arguments sets the scene for the search for a criterion of valid inference. Finally, it is possible that the shaping of deduction and proof in Greek mathematics that begins in the later 5th century BCE served as an inspiration for Aristotle's syllogistic. 2. Aristotle (For a more detailed account see the entry on Aristotle's Logic in this encyclopedia.) Aristotle is the first great logician in the history of logic. His logic was taught by and large without rival from the 4th to the 19th centuries CE. Aristotle's logical works were collected and put in a systematic order by later Peripatetics, who entitled them the Organon or tool, because they considered logic not as a part but rather an instrument of philosophy. The Organon contains, in traditional order, the Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics and Sophistical Refutations. In

4 addition, Metaphysics is a logical treatise that discusses the principle of non-contradiction, and some further logical insights are found scattered throughout Aristotle's other works, such as the Poetics, Rhetoric, De Anima, Metaphysics and , and some of the biological works. Some parts of the Categories and Posterior Analytics would today be regarded as metaphysics, epistemology or philosophy of science rather than logic. The traditional arrangement of works in the Organon is neither chronological nor Aristotle's own. The original chronology cannot be fully recovered since Aristotle seems often to have inserted supplements into earlier writings at a later time. However, by using logical advances as criterion, we can conjecture that most of the Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Categories andMetaphysics predate the De Interpretatione, which in turn precedes the Prior Analytics and parts of the Posterior Analytics. 2.1 Dialectics The Topics provide a manual for participants in the contests of dialectical argument as instituted in the Academy by Plato. Books 27 provide general procedures or rules (topoi) about how to find an argument to establish or refute a given thesis. The descriptions of these proceduressome of which are so general that they resemble logical lawsclearly presuppose a notion of logical form, and Aristotle's Topics may thus count as the earliest surviving logical treatise. The Sophistical Refutations are the first systematic classification of fallacies, sorted by what logical flaw each type manifests (e.g. equivocation, begging the question, affirming the consequent, secundum quid) and how to expose them. 2.2 Sub-sentential Classifications Aristotle distinguishes things that have sentential unity through a combination of expressions (a horse runs) from those that do not (horse, runs); the latter are dealt with in the Categories (the title really means predications[1]). They have no truth-value and signify one of the following: substance (ousia), quantity (poson), quality (poion), relation (pros ti), location (pou), time (pote), position (keisthai), possession (echein), doing (poiein) and undergoing (paschein). It is unclear whether Aristotle considers this classification to be one of linguistic expressions that can be predicated of something else; or of kinds of predication; or of highest genera. In Topics 1 Aristotle distinguishes four relationships a predicate may have to the subject: it may give its definition, genus, unique property, or accidental property. These are known as predicables. 2.3 Syntax and Semantics of Sentences When writing the De Interpretatione, Aristotle had worked out the following theory of simple sentences: a (declarative) sentence (apophantikos logos) or declaration (apophansis) is delimited from other pieces of discourse like prayer, command and question by its having a truth-value. The truthbearers that feature in Aristotle's logic are thus linguistic items. They are spoken sentences that directly signify thoughts (shared by all humans) and through these, indirectly, things. Written sentences in turn signify spoken ones. (Simple) sentences are constructed from two signifying expressions which stand in subject-predicate relation to each other: a name and a verb (Callias walks) or two names connected by the copula is, which co-signifies the connection (Pleasure is good) (Int. 3). Names are either singular terms or common nouns (An. Pr. I 27). Both can be empty (Cat. 10, Int. 1). Singular terms can only take subject position. Verbs co-signify time. A name-verb sentence can be rephrased with the copula (Callias is (a) walking (thing)) (Int. 12). As to their quality, a (declarative) sentence is either an affirmation or a negation, depending on whether it

5 affirms or negates its predicate of its subject. The negation particle in a negation has wide scope (Cat. 10). Aristotle defined truth separately for affirmations and negations: An affirmation is true if it says of that which is that it is; a negation is true if it says of that which is not that it is not (Met. .7 1011b25ff). These formulations, or in any case their Greek counterparts, can be interpreted as expressing either a correspondence or a deflationist conception of truth. Either way, truth is a property that belongs to a sentence at a time. As to their quantity, sentences are singular, universal, particular or indefinite. Thus Aristotle obtains eight types of sentences, which are later dubbed categorical sentences. The following are examples, paired by quality: Singular: Callias is just. Callias is not just.

Universal: Every human is just. No human is just. Particular: Some human is just. Some human is not just. Indefinite: (A) human is just. (A) human is not just.

Universal and particular sentences contain a quantifier and both universal and particular affirmatives were taken to have existential import. (See entry The Traditional Square of Opposition). The logical status of the indefinites is ambiguous and controversial (Int. 67). Aristotle distinguishes between two types of sentential opposition: contraries and contradictories. A contradictory pair of sentences (an antiphasis) consists of an affirmation and its negation (i.e. the negation that negates of the subject what the affirmation affirms of it). Aristotle assumes that normallyone of these must be true, the other false. Contrary sentences are such that they cannot both be true. The contradictory of a universal affirmative is the corresponding particular negative; that of the universal negative the corresponding particular affirmative. A universal affirmative and its corresponding universal negative are contraries. Aristotle thus has captured the basic logical relations between monadic quantifiers (Int. 7). Since Aristotle regards tense as part of the truth-bearer (as opposed to merely a grammatical feature), he detects a problem regarding future tense sentences about contingent matters: Does the principle that of an affirmation and its negation one must be false, the other true apply to these? What, for example, is the truth-value now of the sentence There will be a sea-battle tomorrow? Aristotle may have suggested that the sentence has no truth-value now, and that bivalence thus does not holddespite the fact that it is necessary for there either to be or not to be a sea-battle tomorrow, so that the principle of excluded middle is preserved (Int. 9). 2.4 Non-modal Syllogistic Aristotle's non-modal syllogistic (Prior Analytics A 17) is the pinnacle of his logic. Aristotle defines a syllogism as an argument (logos) in which, certain things having been laid down, something different from what has been laid down follows of necessity because these things are so. This definition appears to require (i) that a syllogism consists of at least two premises and a conclusion, (ii) that the conclusion follows of necessity from the premises (so that all syllogisms are valid arguments), and (iii) that the conclusion differs from the premises. Aristotle's syllogistic covers only a small part of all arguments that satisfy these conditions.

6 Aristotle restricts and regiments the types of categorical sentence that may feature in a syllogism. The admissible truth-bearers are now defined as each containing two different terms (horoi) conjoined by the copula, of which one (the predicate term) is said of the other (the subject term) either affirmatively or negatively. Aristotle never comes clear on the question whether terms are things (e.g., non-empty classes) or linguistic expressions for these things. Only universal and particular sentences are discussed. Singular sentences seem excluded and indefinite sentences are mostly ignored. At An. Pr. A 7 Aristotle mentions that by putting an indefinite premise in place of a particular one obtains a syllogism of the same kind. Another innovation in the syllogistic is Aristotle's use of letters in place of terms. The letters may originally have served simply as abbreviations for terms (e.g.An. Post. A 13); but in the syllogistic they seem mostly to have the function either of schematic term letters or of term variables with universal quantifiers assumed but not stated. Where he uses letters, Aristotle tends to express the four types of categorical sentences in the following way (with common later abbreviations in parentheses): A holds of (lit., belongs to) every B (AaB) A holds of no B A holds of some B A does not hold of some B (AeB) (AiB) (AoB)

Instead of holds he also uses is predicated. All basic syllogisms consist of three categorical sentences, in which the two premises share exactly one term, called the middle term, and the conclusion contains the other two terms, sometimes called the extremes. Based on the position of the middle term, Aristotle classified all possible premise combinations into three figures (schemata): the first figure has the middle term (B) as subject in the first premise and predicated in the second; the second figure has it predicated in both premises, the third has it as subject in both premises: I II III

A holds of B B holds of A A holds of B B holds of C B holds of C C holds of B A is also called the major term, C the minor term. Each figure can further be classified according to whether or not both premises are universal. Aristotle went systematically through the fifty-eight possible premise combinations and showed that fourteen have a conclusion following of necessity from them, i.e. are syllogisms. His procedure was this: He assumed that the syllogisms of the first figure are complete and not in need of proof, since they are evident. By contrast, the syllogisms of the second and third figures are incomplete and in need of proof. He proves them by reducing them to syllogisms of the first figure and thereby completing them. For this he makes use of three methods:

7 (i) conversion (antistroph): a categorical sentence is converted by interchanging its terms. Aristotle recognizes and establishes three conversion rules: from AeB infer BeA; from AiB infer BiA and from AaB infer BiA. All second and third figure syllogisms but two can be proved by premise conversion. (ii) reductio ad impossibile (apagg): the remaining two are proved by reduction to the impossible, where the contradictory of an assumed conclusion together with one of the premises is used to deduce by a first figure syllogism a conclusion that is incompatible with the other premise. Using the semantic relations between opposites established earlier the assumed conclusion is thus established. (iii) exposition or setting-out (ekthesis): this method, which Aristotle uses additionally to (i) and (ii), involves choosing or setting out some additional term, say D, that falls in the non-empty intersection delimited by two premises, say AxB and AxC, and using D to justify the inference from the premises to a particular conclusion, BxC. It is debated whether D represents a singular or a general term and whether exposition constitutes proof. For each of the thirty-four premise combinations that allow no conclusion Aristotle proves by counterexample that they allow no conclusion. As overall result, he acknowledges four first figure syllogisms (later named Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio), four second figure syllogisms (Camestres, Cesare, Festino, Baroco) and six third figure syllogisms (Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison); these were later called the modes or moods of the figures. (The names are mnemonics: e.g. each vowel, or the first three in cases where the name has more than three, indicates in order whether the first and second premises and the conclusion were sentences of type a, e, i or o.) Aristotle implicitly recognized that by using the conversion rules on the conclusions we obtain eight further syllogisms (An. Pr. 53a314), and that of the premise combinations rejected as nonsyllogistic, some (five, in fact) will yield a conclusion in which the minor term is predicated of the major (An. Pr. 29a1927). Moreover, in the Topics Aristotle accepted the rules from AaB infer AiB and from AeB infer AoB. By using these on the conclusions five further syllogisms could be proved, though Aristotle did not mention this. Going beyond his basic syllogistic, Aristotle reduced the 3rd and 4th first figure syllogisms to second figure syllogisms, thus de facto reducing all syllogisms to Barbara and Celarent; and later on in the Prior Analytics he invokes a type of cut-rule by which a multi-premise syllogism can be reduced to two or more basic syllogisms. From a modern perspective, Aristotle's system can be represented as an argumental natural deduction system en miniature. It has been shown to be sound and complete if one interprets the relations expressed by the categorical sentences set-theoretically as a system of non-empty classes as follows: AaB is true if and only if the class A contains the class B. AeB is true if and only if the classes A and B are disjoint. AiB is true if and only if the classes A and B are not disjoint. AoB is true if and only if the class A does not contain the class B. The vexing textual question what exactly Aristotle meant by syllogisms has received several rival interpretations, including one that they are a certain type of conditional propositional form. Most plausibly, perhaps, Aristotle's complete and incomplete syllogisms taken together are understood as formally valid premise-conclusion arguments; and his complete and completed syllogisms taken together as (sound) deductions. 2.5 Modal Logic

8 Aristotle is also the originator of modal logic. In addition to quality (as affirmation or negation) and quantity (as singular, universal, particular, or indefinite), he takes categorical sentences to have a mode; this consists of the fact that the predicate is said to hold of the subject either actually or necessarily or possibly or contingently or impossibly. The latter four are expressed by modal operators that modify the predicate, e.g. It is possible for A to hold of some B; Anecessarily holds of every B. In De Interpretatione 1213, Aristotle (i) concludes that modal operators modify the whole predicate (or the copula, as he puts it), not just the predicate term of a sentence. (ii) He states the logical relations that hold between modal operators, such as that it is not possible for A not to hold of B implies it is necessary for A to hold of B. (iii) He investigates what the contradictories of modalized sentences are, and decides that they are obtained by placing the negator in front of the modal operator. (iv) He equates the expressions possible and contingent, but wavers between a one-sided interpretation (where necessity implies possibility) and a two-sided interpretation (where possibility implies non-necessity). Aristotle develops his modal syllogistic in Prior Analytics 1.822. He settles on two-sided possibility (contingency) and tests for syllogismhood all possible combinations of premise pairs of sentences with necessity (N), contingency (C) or no (U) modal operator: NN, CC, NU/UN, CU/UC and NC/CN. Syllogisms with the last three types of premise combinations are called mixed modal syllogisms. Apart from the NN category, which mirrors unmodalized syllogisms, all categories contain dubious cases. For instance, Aristotle accepts: A necessarily holds of all B. B holds of all C. Therefore A necessarily holds of all C. This and other problematic cases were already disputed in antiquity, and more recently have sparked a host of complex formalized reconstructions of Aristotle's modal syllogistic. As Aristotle's theory is conceivably internally inconsistent, the formal models that have been suggested may all be unsuccessful. 3. The early Peripatetics: Theophrastus and Eudemus Aristotle's pupil and successor Theophrastus of Eresus (c. 371c. 287 BCE) wrote more logical treatises than his teacher, with a large overlap in topics. Eudemus of Rhodes (later 4th cent. BCE) wrote books entitled Categories, Analytics and On Speech. Of all these works only a number of fragments and later testimonies survive, mostly in Aristotle commentators. Theophrastus and Eudemus simplified some aspects of Aristotle's logic, and developed others where Aristotle left us only hints. 3.1 Improvements and Modifications of Aristotle's Logic The two Peripatetics seem to have redefined Aristotle's first figure, so that it includes every syllogism in which the middle term is subject of one premise and predicate of the other. In this way, five types of non-modal syllogisms only intimated by Aristotle later in his Prior Analytics (Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo and Frisesomorum) are included, but Aristotle's criterion that first figure syllogisms are evident is given up (Theophrastus fr. 91, Fortenbaugh). Theophrastus and Eudemus

9 also improved Aristotle's modal theory. Theophrastus replaced Aristotle's two-sided contingency by one-sided possibility, so that possibility no longer entails non-necessity. Both recognized that the problematic universal negative (A possibly holds of no B) is simply convertible (Theophrastus fr. 102A Fortenbaugh). Moreover, they introduced the principle that in mixed modal syllogisms the conclusion always has the same modal character as the weaker of the premises (Theophrastus frs. 106 and 107 Fortenbaugh), where possibility is weaker than actuality, and actuality than necessity. In this way Aristotle's modal syllogistic is notably simplified and many unsatisfactory theses, like the one mentioned above (that from Necessarily AaB and BaC one can infer Necessarily AaC) disappear. 3.2 Prosleptic Syllogisms Theophrastus introduced the so-called prosleptic premises and syllogisms (Theophrastus fr. 110 Fortenbaugh). A prosleptic premise is of the form: For all X, if (X), then (X) where (X) and (X) stand for categorical sentences in which the variable X occurs in place of one of the terms. For example: (1) A [holds] of all of that of all of which B [holds]. (2) A [holds] of none of that which [holds] of all B. Theophrastus considered such premises to contain three terms, two of which are definite (A, B), one indefinite (that, or the bound variable X). We can represent (1) and (2) as X (BaX AaX) X (XaB AeX) Prosleptic syllogisms then come about as follows: They are composed of a prosleptic premise and the categorical premise obtained by instantiating a term (C) in the antecedent open categorical sentence as premises, and the categorical sentences one obtains by putting in the same term (C) in the consequent open categorical sentence as conclusion. For example: A [holds] of all of that of all of which B [holds]. B holds of all C. Therefore, A holds of all C. Theophrastus distinguished three figures of these syllogisms, depending on the position of the indefinite term (also called middle term) in the prosleptic premise; for example (1) produces a third figure syllogism, (2) a first figure syllogism. The number of prosleptic syllogisms was presumably equal to that of types of prosleptic sentences: with Theophrastus' concept of the first figure these would be sixty-four (i.e. 32 + 16 + 16). Theophrastus held that certain prosleptic premises were equivalent to certain categorical sentences, e.g. (1) to A is predicated of all B. However, for many, including (2), no such equivalent can be found, and prosleptic syllogisms thus increased the inferential power of Peripatetic logic. 3.3 Forerunners of Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens

10 Theophrastus and Eudemus considered complex premises which they called hypothetical premises and which had one of the following two (or similar) forms: If something is F, it is G Either something is F or it is G (with exclusive or)

They developed arguments with them which they called mixed from a hypothetical premise and a probative premise (Theophrastus fr. 112A Fortenbaugh). These arguments were inspired by Aristotle's syllogisms from a hypothesis (An. Pr. 1.44); they were forerunners of modus ponens and modus tollens and had the following forms (Theophrastus frs. 111 and 112 Fortenbaugh), employing the exclusive or: If something is F, it is G. a is F. Therefore, a is G. If something is F, it is G. a is not G. Therefore, a is not F.

Either something is F or it is G. Either something is F or it is G. a is F. a is not F. Therefore, a is not G. Therefore, a is G. Theophrastus also recognized that the connective particle or can be inclusive (Theophrastus fr. 82A Fortenbaugh); and he considered relative quantified sentences such as those containing more, fewer, and the same (Theophrastus fr. 89 Fortenbaugh), and seems to have discussed syllogisms built from such sentences, again following up upon what Aristotle said about syllogisms from a hypothesis (Theophrastus fr. 111E Fortenbaugh). 3.4 Wholly Hypothetical Syllogisms Theophrastus is further credited with the invention of a system of the later so-called wholly hypothetical syllogisms (Theophrastus fr. 113 Fortenbaugh). These syllogisms were originally abbreviated term-logical arguments of the kind If [something is] A, [it is] B. If [something is] B, [it is] C. Therefore, if [something is] A, [it is] C. and at least some of them were regarded as reducible to Aristotle's categorical syllogisms, presumably by way of the equivalences to Every A is B, etc. In parallel to Aristotle's syllogistic, Theophrastus distinguished three figures; each had sixteen modes. The first eight modes of the first figure are obtained by going through all permutations with not X instead of X (with X for A, B, C); the second eight modes are obtained by using a rule of contraposition on the conclusion: (CR) From if X, Y infer if the contradictory of Y then the contradictory of X The sixteen modes of the second figure were obtained by using (CR) on the schema of the first premise of the first figure arguments, e.g.

11 If [something is] not B, [it is] not A. If [something is] B, [it is] C. Therefore, if [something is] A, [it is] C. The sixteen modes of the third figure were obtained by using (CR) on the schema of the second premise of the first figure arguments, e.g. If [something is] A, [it is] B. If [something is] not C, [it is] not B. Therefore, if [something is] A, [it is] C. Theophrastus claimed that all second and third figure syllogisms could be reduced to first figure syllogisms. If Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd c. CE Peripatetic) reports faithfully, any use of (CR) which transforms a syllogism into a first figure syllogism was such a reduction. The large number of modes and reductions can be explained by the fact that Theophrastus did not have the logical means for substituting negative for positive components in an argument. In later antiquity, after some intermediate stages, and possibly under Stoic influence, the wholly hypothetical syllogisms were interpreted as propositional-logical arguments of the kind If p, then q. If q, then r. Therefore, if p, then r. 4. Diodorus Cronus and Philo the Logician In the later 4th to mid 3rd centuries BCE, contemporary with Theophrastus and Eudemus, a loosely connected group of philosophers, sometimes referred to as dialecticians (see entry Dialectical School) and possibly influenced by Eubulides, conceived of logic as a logic of propositions. Their best known exponents were Diodorus Cronus and his pupil Philo (sometimes called Philo of Megara). Although no writings of theirs are preserved, there are a number of later reports of their doctrines. They each made ground-breaking contributions to the development of propositional logic, in particular to the theories of conditionals and modalities. A conditional (sunmmenon) was considered as a non-simple proposition composed of two propositions and the connecting particle if. Philo, who may be credited with introducing truthfunctionality into logic, provided the following criterion for their truth: A conditional is false when and only when its antecedent is true and its consequent is false, and it is true in the three remaining truth-value combinations. The Philonian conditional resembles material implication, except thatsince propositions were conceived of as functions of time that can have different truth-values at different timesit may change its truth-value over time. For Diodorus, a conditional proposition is true if it neither was nor is possible that its antecedent is true and its consequent false. The temporal elements in this account suggest that the possibility of a truth-value change in Philo's conditionals was meant to be improved on. With his own modal notions (see below) applied, a conditional is Diodorean-true now if and only if it is Philonian-true at all times. Diodorus' conditional is thus reminiscent of strict implication. Philo's and Diodorus' conceptions of conditionals lead to variants of the paradoxes of material and strict implicationa fact the ancients were aware of (Sextus Empiricus [S. E.] M. 8.109117).

12 Philo and Diodorus each considered the four modalities possibility, impossibility, necessity and nonnecessity. These were conceived of as modal properties or modal values of propositions, not as modal operators. Philo defined them as follows: Possible is that which is capable of being true by the proposition's own nature necessary is that which is true, and which, as far as it is in itself, is not capable of being false. Non-necessary is that which as far as it is in itself, is capable of being false, and impossible is that which by its own nature is not capable of being true. Diodorus' definitions were these: Possible is that which either is or will be [true]; impossible that which is false and will not be true; necessary that which is true and will not be false; non-necessary that which either is false already or will be false. Both sets of definitions satisfy the following standard requirements of modal logic: (i) necessity entails truth and truth entails possibility; (ii) possibility and impossibility are contradictories, and so are necessity and non-necessity; (iii) necessity and possibility are interdefinable; (iv) every proposition is either necessary or impossible or both possible and nonnecessary. Philo's definitions appear to introduce mere conceptual modalities, whereas with Diodorus' definitions, some propositions may change their modal value (Boeth. In Arist. De Int., sec. ed., 234235 Meiser). Diodorus' definition of possibility rules out future contingents and implies the counterintuitive thesis that only the actual is possible. Diodorus tried to prove this claim with his famous Master Argument, which sets out to show the incompatibility of (i) every past truth is necessary, (ii) the impossible does not follow from the possible, and (iii) something is possible which neither is nor will be true (Epict. Diss. II.19). The argument has not survived, but various reconstructions have been suggested. Some affinity with the arguments for logical determinism in Aristotle's De Interpretatione 9 is likely. On the topic of ambiguity, Diodorus held that no linguistic expression is ambiguous. He supported this dictum by a theory of meaning based on speaker intention. Speakers generally intend to say only one thing when they speak. What is said when they speak is what they intend to say. Any discrepancy between speaker intention and listener decoding has its cause in the obscurity of what was said, not its ambiguity (Aulus Gellius 11.12.23). 5. The Stoics The founder of the Stoa, Zeno of Citium (335263 BCE), studied with Diodorus. His successor Cleanthes (331232) tried to solve the Master Argument by denying that every past truth is necessary and wrote booksnow loston paradoxes, dialectics, argument modes and predicates. Both philosophers considered knowledge of logic as a virtue and held it in high esteem, but they seem not to have been creative logicians. By contrast, Cleanthes' successor Chrysippus of Soli (c. 280207) is without doubt the second great logician in the history of logic. It was said of him that if the gods used any logic, it would be that of Chrysippus (D. L. 7.180), and his reputation as a brilliant logician is amply testified. Chrysippus wrote over 300 books on logic, on virtually any topic logic today concerns itself with, including speech act theory, sentence analysis, singular and plural expressions, types of predicates, indexicals, existential propositions, sentential connectives, negations, disjunctions, conditionals, logical consequence, valid argument forms, theory of deduction, propositional logic, modal logic, tense logic, epistemic logic, logic of suppositions, logic of imperatives, ambiguity and logical paradoxes, in particular the Liar and the Sorites (D. L. 7.189 199). Of all these, only two badly damaged papyri have survived, luckily supplemented by a considerable number of fragments and testimonies in later texts, in particular in Diogenes Laertius (D. L.) book 7, sections 5583, and Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism (S. E. PH) book 2

13 and Against the Mathematicians (S. E. M) book 8. Chrysippus' successors, including Diogenes of Babylon (c. 240152) and Antipater of Tarsus (2nd cent. BCE), appear to have systematized and simplified some of his ideas, but their original contributions to logic seem small. Many testimonies of Stoic logic do not name any particular Stoic. Hence the following paragraphs simply talk about the Stoics in general; but we can be confident that a large part of what has survived goes back to Chrysippus. 5.1 Logical Achievements Besides Propositional Logic The subject matter of Stoic logic are the so-called sayables (lekta): they are the underlying meanings in everything we say and think, butlike Frege's sensessubsist also independently of us. They are distinguished from spoken and written linguistic expressions: what we utter are those expressions, but what we sayare the sayables (D. L. 7.57). There are complete and deficient sayables. Deficient sayables, if said, make the hearer feel prompted to ask for a completion; e.g. when somone says writes we enquire who?. Complete sayables, if said, do not make the hearer ask for a completion (D. L.7.63). They include assertibles (the Stoic equivalent for propositions), imperativals, interrogatives, inquiries, exclamatives, hypotheses or suppositions, stipulations, oaths, curses and more. The accounts of the different complete sayables all had the general form a so-and-so sayable is one in saying which we perform an act of such-and-such. For instance: an imperatival sayable is one in saying which we issue a command, an interrogative sayable is one in saying which we ask a question, a declaratory sayable (i.e. an assertible) is one in saying which we make an assertion. Thus, according to the Stoics, each time we say a complete sayable, we perform three different acts: we utter a linguistic expression; we say the sayable; and we perform a speech-act. Chrysippus was aware of the use-mention distinction (D. L. 7.187). He seems to have held that every denoting expression is ambiguous in that it denotes both its denotation and itself (Galen, On ling. soph. 4; Aulus Gellius 11.12.1). Thus the expression a wagon would denote both a wagon and the expression a wagon.[2] Assertibles (aximata) differ from all other complete sayables in their having a truth-value: at any one time they are either true or false. Truth is temporal and assertibles may change their truth-value. The Stoic principle of bivalence is hence temporalized, too. Truth is introduced by example: the assertible it is day is true when it is day, and at all other times false (D. L. 7.65). This suggests some kind of deflationist view of truth, as does the fact that the Stoics identify true assertibles with facts, but define false assertibles simply as the contradictories of true ones (S. E. M 8.85). Assertibles are simple or non-simple. A simple predicative assertible like Dion is walking is generated from the predicate is walking, which is a deficient assertible since it elicits the question who?, together with a nominative case (Dion's individual quality or the correlated sayable), which the assertible presents as falling under the predicate (D. L. 7.63 and 70). There is thus no interchangeability of predicate and subject terms as in Aristotle; rather, predicatesbut not the things that fall under themare defined as deficient, and thus resemble propositional functions. It seems that whereas some Stoics took theFregeanapproach that singular terms had correlated sayables, others anticipated the notion of direct reference. Concerning indexicals, the Stoics took a simple definiteassertible like this one is walking to be true when the person pointed at by the speaker is walking (S. E. M 100). When the thing pointed at ceases to be, so does the assertible, though the sentence used to express it remains (Alex. Aphr. An. Pr. 1778). A simple indefinite assertible like someone is walking is said to be true when a corresponding definite assertible is true (S. E. M 98). Aristotelian universal affirmatives (Every A is B) were to be rephrased as conditionals: If

14 something is A, it is B (S. E. M 9.811). Negations of simple assertibles are themselves simple assertibles. The Stoic negation of Dion is walking is (It is) not (the case that) Dion is walking, and not Dion is not walking. The latter is analyzed in a Russellian manner as Both Dion exists and not: Dion is walking (Alex. Aphr. An. Pr. 402). There are present tense, past tense and future tense assertibles. Thetemporalizedprinciple of bivalence holds for them all. The past tense assertible Dion walked is true when there is at least one past time at which Dion is walking was true. 5.2 Syntax and Semantics of Complex Propositions Thus the Stoics concerned themselves with several issues we would place under the heading of predicate logic; but their main achievement was the development of a propositional logic, i.e. of a system of deduction in which the smallest substantial unanalyzed expressions are propositions, or rather, assertibles. The Stoics defined negations as assertibles that consist of a negative particle and an assertible controlled by this particle (S. E. M 103). Similarly, non-simple assertibles were defined as assertibles that either consist of more than one assertible or of one assertible taken more than once (D. L. 7.689) and that are controlled by a connective particle. Both definitions can be understood as being recursive and allow for assertibles of indeterminate complexity. Three types of non-simple assertibles feature in Stoic syllogistic. Conjunctions are non-simple assertibles put together by the conjunctive connective both and . They have two conjuncts.[3] Disjunctions are non-simple assertibles put together by the disjunctive connective either or or . They have two or more disjuncts, all on a par. Conditionals are non-simple assertibles formed with the connective if , ; they consist of antecedent and consequent (D. L. 7.712). What type of assertible an assertible is, is determined by the connective or logical particle that controls it, i.e. that has the largest scope. Both not p and q is a conjunction, Not both p and q a negation. Stoic language regimentation asks that sentences expressing assertibles always start with the logical particle or expression characteristic for the assertible. Thus, the Stoics invented an implicit bracketing device similar to that used in ukasiewicz' Polish notation. Stoic negations and conjunctions are truth-functional. Stoic (or at least Chrysippean) conditionals are true when the contradictory of the consequent is incompatible with its antecedent (D. L. 7.73). Two assertibles are contradictories of each other if one is the negation of the other (D. L. 7.73); that is, when one exceeds the other by apre-fixednegation particle (S. E. M 8.89). The truthfunctional Philonian conditional was expressed as a negation of a conjunction: that is, not as if p, q but as not both p and not q. Stoic disjunction is exclusive and non-truth-functional. It is true when necessarily precisely one of its disjuncts is true. Later Stoics introduced a non-truth-functional inclusive disjunction (Aulus Gellius, N. A. 16.8.1314). Like Philo and Diodorus, Chrysippus distinguished four modalities and considered them as modal values of propositions rather than modal operators; they satisfy the same standard requirements of modal logic. Chrysippus' definitions are (D. L. 7.75): An assertible is possible when it is both capable of being true and not hindered by external things from being true. An assertible is impossible when it is [either] not capable of being true [or is capable of being true, but hindered by external things from being true]. An assertible is necessary when, being true, it either is not capable of being false or is capable of being false, but hindered by external things from being false. An assertible is nonnecessary when it is both capable of being false and not hindered by external things [from being

15 false]. Chrysippus' modal notions differ from Diodorus' in that they allow for future contingents and from Philo's in that they go beyond mere conceptual possibility. 5.3 Arguments Arguments arenormallycompounds of assertibles. They are defined as a system of at least two premises and a conclusion (D. L. 7.45). Syntactically, every premise but the first is introduced by now or but, and the conclusion by therefore. An argument is valid if the (Chrysippean) conditional formed with the conjunction of its premises as antecedent and its conclusion as consequent is correct (S. E. PH 2.137; D. L. 7.77). An argument is sound (literally: true), when in addition to being valid it has true premises. The Stoics defined so-called argument modes as a sort of schema of an argument (D. L. 7.76). A mode of an argument differs from the argument itself by having ordinal numbers taking the place of assertibles. A mode of the argument If it is day, it is light. But it is not the case that it is light. Therefore it is not the case that it is day. is If the 1st, the 2nd. But not: the 2nd. Therefore not: the 1st. The modes functioned first as abbreviations of arguments that brought out their logically relevant form; and second, it seems, as representatives of the form of a class of arguments. 5.4 Stoic Syllogistic Stoic syllogistic is an argumental deductive system consisting of five types of indemonstrables or axiomatic arguments and four inference rules, called themata. An argument is a syllogism precisely if it either is an indemonstrable or can be reduced to one by means of the themata (D. L. 7.78). Syllogisms are thus certain types of formally valid arguments. The Stoics explicitly acknowledged that there are valid arguments that are not syllogisms; but assumed that these could be somehow transformed into syllogisms. All basic indemonstrables consist of a non-simple assertible as leading premiss and a simple assertible as co-assumption, and have another simple assertible as conclusion. They were defined by five standardized meta-linguistic descriptions of the forms of the arguments (S. E. M 8.2245; D. L. 7.801):

A first indemonstrable is an argument composed of a conditional and its antecedent as premises, having the consequent of the conditional as conclusion. A second indemonstrable is an argument composed of a conditional and the contradictory of its consequent as premises, having the contradictory of its antecedent as conclusion. A third indemonstrable is an argument composed of a negated conjunction and one of its conjuncts as premises, having the contradictory of the other conjunct as conclusion. A fourth indemonstrable is an argument composed of a disjunctive assertible and one of its disjuncts as premises, having the contradictory of the remaining disjunct as conclusion.

16

A fifth indemonstrable, finally, is an argument composed of a disjunctive assertible and the contradictory of one of its disjuncts as premises, having the remaining disjunct as conclusion.

Whether an argument is an indemonstrable can be tested by comparing it with these meta-linguistic descriptions. For instance, If it is day, it is not the case that it is night. But it is night. Therefore it is not the case that it is day. comes out as a second indemonstrable, and If five is a number, then either five is odd or five is even. But five is a number. Therefore either five is odd or five is even. as a first indemonstrable. For testing, a suitable mode of an argument can also be used as a stand-in. A mode is syllogistic, if a corresponding argument with the same form is a syllogism (because of that form). However in Stoic logic there are no five modes that can be used as inference schemata that represent the five types of indemonstrables. For example, the following are two of the many modes of fourth indemonstrables: Either the 1st or the 2nd. But the 2nd. Therefore not the 1st. Either the 1st or not the 2nd. But the 1st. Therefore the 2nd.

Although both are covered by the meta-linguistic description, neither could be singled out as the mode of the fourth indemonstrables: If we disregard complex arguments, there are thirty-two modes corresponding to the five meta-linguistic descriptions; the latter thus prove noticeably more economical. The almost universal assumption among historians of logic that the Stoics represented their five (types of) indemonstrables by five modes is false and not supported by textual evidence. Of the four themata, only the first and third are extant. They, too, were meta-linguistically formulated. The first thema, in its basic form, was:

When from two [assertibles] a third follows, then from either of them together with the contradictory of the conclusion the contradictory of the other follows (Apuleius Int. 209.9 14).

This is an inference rule of the kind today called antilogism. The third thema, in one formulation, was:

When from two [assertibles] a third follows, and from the one that follows [i.e. the third] together with another, external assumption, another follows, then this other follows from the first two and the externally co-assumed one (Simplicius Cael. 237.24).

17 This is an inference rule of the kind today called cut-rule. It is used to reduce chain-syllogisms. The second and fourth themata were also cut-rules, and reconstructions of them can be provided, since we know what arguments they together with the third thema were thought to reduce, and we have some of the arguments said to be reducible by the second thema. A possible reconstruction of the second thema is:

When from two assertibles a third follows, and from the third and one (or both) of the two another follows, then this other follows from the first two.

A possible reconstruction of the fourth thema is:

When from two assertibles a third follows, and from the third and one (or both) of the two and one (or more) external assertible(s) another follows, then this other follows from the first two and the external(s). (Cf. Bobzien 1996.)

A Stoic reduction shows the formal validity of an argument by applying to it the themata in one or more steps in such a way that all resultant arguments are indemonstrables. This can be done either with the arguments or their modes (S. E. M 8.2308). For instance, the argument mode If the 1st and the 2nd, the 3rd. But not the 3rd. Moreover, the 1st. Therefore not: the 2nd. can be reduced by the third thema to (the modes of) a second and a third indemonstrable as follows: When from two assertibles (If the 1st and the 2nd, the 3rd and But not the 3rd) a third follows (Not: both the 1st and the 2ndthis follows by a second indemonstrable) and from the third and an external one (The 1st) another follows (Not: the 2ndthis follows by a third indemonstrable), then this other (Not: the 2nd) also follows from the two assertibles and the external one. The second thema reduced, among others, arguments with the following modes (Alex. Aphr. An. Pr. 164.2731): Either the 1st or not the 1st. But the 1st. Therefore the 1st. If the 1st, if the 1st, the 2nd. But the 1st. Therefore the 2nd.

The Peripatetics chided the Stoics for allowing such useless arguments, but the Stoics rightly insisted that if they can be reduced, they are valid. The four themata can be used repeatedly and in any combination in a reduction. Thus propositional arguments of indeterminate length and complexity can be reduced. Stoic syllogistic has been formalized, and it has been shown that the Stoic deductive system shows strong similarities with relevance logical systems like those by McCall. Like Aristotle, the Stoics aimed at proving nonevident formally valid arguments by reducing them by means of accepted inference rules to evidently

18 valid arguments. Thus, although their logic is a propositional logic, they did not intend to provide a system that allows for the deduction of all propositional-logical truths, but rather a system of valid propositional-logical arguments with at least two premises and a conclusion. Nonetheless, we have evidence that the Stoics expressly recognized many simple logical truths. For example, they accepted the following logical principles: the principle of double negation, stating that a double negation (not: not: p) is equivalent to the assertible that is doubly negated (i.e. p) (D. L. 7.69); the principle that any conditional formed by using the same assertible as antecedent and as consequent (if p, p) is true (S. E. M 8.281, 466); the principle that any two-place disjunctions formed by using contradictory disjuncts (either p or not: p) is true (S. E. M 8.282, 467); and the principle of contraposition, that if if p, q then if not: q, not: p (D. L. 7.194, Philodemus Sign., PHerc. 1065, XI.26XII.14). 5.5 Logical Paradoxes The Stoics recognized the importance of both the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes (Cicero Acad. 2.958, Plut. Comm.Not. 1059DE, Chrys. Log. Zet. col.IX). Chrysippus may have tried to solve the Liar as follows: there is an uneliminable ambiguity in the Liar sentence (I am speaking falsely, uttered in isolation) between the assertibles (i) I falsely say I speak falsely and (ii) I am speaking falsely (i.e. I am doing what I'm saying, viz. speaking falsely), of which, at any time the Liar sentence is uttered, precisely one is true, but it is arbitrary which one. (i) entails (iii) I am speaking truly and is incompatible with (ii) and with (iv) I truly say I speak falsely. (ii) entails (iv) and is incompatible with (i) and (iii). Thus bivalence is preserved (cf. Cavini 1993). Chrysippus' stand on the Sorites seems to have been that vague borderline sentences uttered in the context of a Sorites series have no assertibles corresponding to them, and that it is obscure to us where the borderline cases start, so that it is rational for us to stop answering while still on safe ground (i.e. before we might begin to make utterances with no assertible corresponding to them). The latter remark suggests Chrysippus was aware of the problem of higher order vagueness. Again, bivalence of assertibles is preserved (cf. Bobzien 2002). 6. Epicurus and the Epicureans Epicurus (late 4thearly 3rd c. BCE) and the Epicureans are said to have rejected logic as an unnecessary discipline (D. L. 10.31, Usener 257). This notwithstanding, several aspects of their philosophy forced or prompted them to take a stand on some issues in philosophical logic. (1) Language meaning and definition: The Epicureans held that natural languages came into existence not by stipulation of word meanings but as the result of the innate capacities of humans for using signs and articulating sounds and of human social interaction (D. L. 10.756); that language is learnt in context (Lucretius 5.1028ff); and that linguistic expressions of natural languages are clearer and more conspicuous than their definitions; even that definitions would destroy their conspicuousness (Usener 258, 243); and that philosophers hence should use ordinary language rather than introduce technical expressions (Epicurus On Nature 28). (2) Truth-bearers: the Epicureans deny the existence of incorporeal meanings, such as Stoic sayables. Their truth-bearers are linguistic items, more precisely, utterances (phnai) (S. E. M 8.13, 258; Usener 259, 265). Truth consists in the correspondence of things and utterances, falsehood in a lack of such correspondence (S. E.M 8.9, Usener 244), although the details are obscure here. (3) Excluded middle: with utterances as truth-bearers, the Epicureans face the question what the truth-values of future contingents are. Two views are recorded. One is the denial of the Principle of Excluded Middle (p or not p) for future contingents (Usener 376, Cicero Acad. 2.97, Cicero Fat. 37). The other, more interesting, one leaves the Excluded Middle intact for all utterances, but holds that, in the case of future contingents, the

19 component utterances p and not p are neither true nor false (Cicero Fat. 37), but, it seems, indefinite. This could be considered as an anticipation of supervaluationism. (4) Induction: Inductive logic was comparatively little developed in antiquity. Aristotle discusses arguments from the particular to the universal (epagg) in the Topics and Posterior Analytics but does not provide a theory of them. Some later Epicureans developed a theory of inductive inference which bases the inference on empirical observation that certain properties concur without exception (Philodemus De Signis). 7. Later Antiquity Very little is known about the development of logic from c. 100 BCE to c. 250 CE. It is unclear when Peripatetics and Stoics began taking notice of the logical achievements of each other. Sometime during that period, the terminological distinction between categorical syllogisms, used for Aristotelian syllogisms, and hypothetical syllogisms, used not only for those introduced by Theophrastus and Eudemus, but also for the Stoic propositional-logical syllogisms, gained a foothold. In the first century BCE, the Peripatetics Ariston of Alexandria and Boethus of Sidon wrote about syllogistic. Ariston is said to have introduced the so-called subaltern syllogisms (Barbari, Celaront, Cesaro, Camestrop and Camenop) into Aristotelian syllogistic (Apuleius Int. 213.510), i.e. the syllogisms one gains by applying the subalternation rules (that were acknowledged by Aristotle in his Topics) From A holds of every B infer A holds of some B From A holds of no B infer A does not hold of some B to the conclusions of the relevant syllogisms. Boethus suggested substantial modifications to Aristotle's theories: he claimed that all categorical syllogisms are complete, and that hypothetical syllogistic is prior to categorical (Galen Inst. Log. 7.2), although we are not told what this priority was thought to consist in. The Stoic Posidonius (c. 135c. 51 BCE) defended the possibility of logical or mathematical deduction against the Epicureans and discussed some syllogisms he called conclusive by the force of an axiom, which apparently included arguments of the type As the 1st is to the 2nd, so the 3rd is to the 4th; the ratio of the 1stto the 2nd is double; therefore the ratio of the 3rd to the 4th is double, which was considered conclusive by the force of the axiom things which are in general of the same ratio, are also of the same particular ratio (Galen Inst. Log. 18.8). At least two Stoics in this period wrote a work on Aristotle's Categories. From his writings we know that Cicero (1st c. BCE) was knowledgeable about both Peripatetic and Stoic logic; and Epictetus' discourses (late 1stearly 2nd c. CE) prove that he was acquainted with some of the more taxing parts of Chrysippus' logic. In all likelihood, there existed at least a few creative logicians in this period, but we do not know who they were and what they created. The next logician of rank, if of lower rank, of whom we have sufficient evidence to speak is Galen (129199 or 216 CE), whose greater fame was as a physician. He studied logic with both Peripatetic and Stoic teachers, and recommended to avail oneself of parts of either doctrine, as long as it could be used for scientific demonstration. He composed commentaries on logical works by Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus and Chrysippus, as well as treatises on various logical problems and a major work entitled On Demonstration. All these are lost, except for some information in later texts, but his Introduction to Logic has come down to us almost in full. In On Demonstration, Galen developed, among other things, a theory of compound categorical syllogisms with four terms, which fall into four figures, but we do not know the details. He also introduced the so-called relational syllogisms, examples of which are A is equal to B, B is equal to C; therefore A is equal to C and Dio owns half

20 as much as Theo; Theo owns half as much as Philo. Therefore Dio owns a quarter of what Philo owns. (GalenInst. Log. 1718). All relational syllogisms Galen mentions have in common that they are not reducible in either Aristotle's or Stoic syllogistic, but it is difficult to find further formal characteristics that unite them. In general, in his Introduction to Logic Galen merges Aristotelian Syllogistic with a strongly Peripatetic reinterpretation of Stoic propositional logic. This becomes apparent in particular in Galen's emphatic denial that truth-preservation is sufficient for the validity or syllogismhood of an argument, and his insistence that, instead, knowledge-introduction or knowledge-extension is a necessary condition for something to count as a syllogism.[4] The second ancient introduction to logic that has survived is Apuleius' (2nd cent. CE) De Interpretatione. This Latin text, too, displays knowledge of Stoic and Peripatetic logic; it contains the first full presentation of the square of opposition, which illustrates the logical relations between categorical sentences by diagram. The Platonist Alcinous (2nd cent. CE), in his Handbook of Platonism chapter 5, is witness to the emergence of a specifically Platonist logic, constructed on the Platonic notions and procedures of division, definition, analysis and hypothesis, but there is little that would make a logician's heart beat faster. Sometime between the 3rd and 6th century CE Stoic logic faded into oblivion, to be resurrected only in the 20th century, in the wake of the (re)-discovery of propositional logic. The surviving, often voluminous, Greek commentaries on Aristotle's logical works by Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 200 CE), Porphyry (234c. 305), Ammonius Hermeiou (5th century), Philoponus (c. 500) and Simplicius (6th century) and the Latin ones by Boethius (c. 480524) have their main importance as preservers of alternative interpretations of Aristotle's logic and as sources for lost Peripatetic and Stoic workswith elements of Stoic logic either tacitly adopted or loudly decried. Two of the commentators deserve special mention in their own right: Porphyry, for writing the Isagoge or Introduction (i.e. to Aristotle's Categories), in which he discusses the five notions of genus, species, differentia, property and accident as basic notions one needs to know to understand the Categories. For centuries, the Isagoge was the first logic text a student would tackle, and Porphyry's five predicables (which differ from Aristotle's four) formed the basis for the medieval doctrine of the quinque voces. The second is Boethius. In addition to commentaries, he wrote a number of logical treatises, mostly simple explications of Aristotelian logic, but also two very interesting ones: (i) His On Topical Differentiae bears witness to the elaborated system of topical arguments that logicians of later antiquity had developed from Aristotle's Topics under the influence of the needs of Roman lawyers. (ii) His On Hypothetical Syllogisms systematically presents wholly hypothetical and mixed hypothetical syllogisms as they are known from the early Peripatetics; it may be derived from Porphyry. Boethius' insistence that the negation of If it is A, it is B is If it is A, it is not B suggests a suppositional understanding of the conditional, a view for which there is also some evidence in Ammonius, but that is not attested for earlier logicians. Historically, Boethius is most important because he translated all of Aristotle's Organon into Latin and thus these texts (except the Posterior Analytics) became available to philosophers of the medieval period. Bibliography Greek and Latin Texts Alcinous, Enseignement des doctrines de Platon, J. Whittaker (ed.), Paris: Bude 1990. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Vol. 2.1, Wallies, M. (ed.), Berlin: Reimer 1883. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Topics. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Vol. 2.2. Wallies, M. (ed.), Berlin: Reimer 1891.

21 Apuleius, Peri Hermeneias in Apuleius, De Philosophia libri, C. Moreschini, (ed.), Stuttgart / Leipzig: Teubner 1991. (Apulei opera quae supersunt vol.3.) Aristotle, Analytica Priora et Posteriora, L. Minio-Paluello. (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press 1964. Aristotle, Categoriae et Liber de interpretatione, L. Minio-Paluello. (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press 1949. Aristotle, Metaphysica, W. Jaeger, (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press 1957. Aristotle, Topica et Sophistici Elenchi, W.D. Ross, (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press 1958. Boethius, De hypotheticis syllogismis, L. Obertello (ed.), with Italian translation, Brescia: Paideia 1969. (Istituto di Filosoofia dell'Universit di Parma, Logicalia 1.) Boethius, De topicis differentiis, D.Z. Nikitas (ed.), in Boethius, De topicis differentiis kai hoi buzantines metafraseis tou Manouel Holobolou kai Prochorou Kudone, Athens/Paris/Brussels: Academy of Athens/Vrin/Ousia 1969. Boethius, In librum Aristotelis De interpretationesecunda editio, C. Meiser, (ed.), Leipzig 1880. Cicero, M. Tullius, Academica posterioraAcademica priora (Academicorum reliquiae cum Lucullo), O. Plasberg (ed.), Leipzig: Teubner 1922. Reprinted Stuttgart 1966. (Stoics, Epicureans) Cicero, M. Tullius, De divinationeDe fatoTimaeus, W. Ax (ed.), Leipzig: Teubner 1938. Reprinted Stuttgart 1965. (Stoics, Epicureans) Diels, H. (ed.), Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Berlin: Reimer, 18821909. Diodorus Cronus, in Die Megariker. Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien, K. Dring (ed.), Amsterdam: Gruener, 1972, 2845 and 124139. (Diodorus and Philo) Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, 2 vols., M. Marcovich (ed.), Stuttgart & Leipzig: Teubner, 1999. Dissoi Logoi, Contrasting ArgumentsAn Edition of the Dissoi Logoi, Robinson, T. M. (ed.), London 1979. nd Epicurus: Arrighetti, G., (ed.), Epicuro Opere, 2 Ed., Turin: Einaudi 1973. (Collection of Epicurean fragments.) Epicurus: Usener, H., (ed.), Epicurea. Leipzig: Teubner 1887. (Collection of Epicurean fragments.) Galen, Institutio Logica, Kalbfleisch, K., (ed.), Leipzig 1896. Giannantoni, G., (ed.), Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, 4 vols, Elenchos 18, Naples, 19831990. Plato, Euthydemus, in Platonis Opera, vol. III, J. Burnet, (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press 1903. Plato, Republic, in Platonis Opera, vol. IV, J. Burnet, (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press 1902). Plato, Sophistes, in Platonis Opera, vol. I, J. Burnet, (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press 1900. Porphyry, Isagoge Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Vol 4.1, A. Busse, (ed.), Berlin 1887. Sextus Empiricus, Works, 3 vols, H. Mutschmann and J. Mau (eds), Leipzig: Teubner 1914 61. Stoics, in Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, K. Hlser (ed.), 4 vols, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 19878. Theophrastus, Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, P.M. Huby (ed.), Leiden: Brill 1992, 114275. Zeno, in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), Berlin: Weidmann 1951. Translations of Greek and Latin Texts Ackrill, J. L., (trans. & comm.), 1961, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

22

Annas, J. and J. Barnes, (trans.), 2000, Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism, 2nd Ed., New York: Cambridge University Press. Barnes, J., and S. Bobzien, K. Ierodiakonou, (trans.), 1991, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.17, London: Duckworth. Barnes, J., (trans.), 2003, Porphyry's Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Porphyry: Isagoge). Barnes, J., (trans. & comm.), 1975, Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2nd Ed. 1996. Barnes, J., (trans. and comm.), 1987, Early Greek Philosophy London: Penguin Books. (Zeno) Brittain, C. (trans.), 2006, Cicero: On Academic Scepticism (= Academica) Indianapolis: Hackett. (Stoics, Epicureans) Bury R. G., (trans.), 19331949, Sextus Empiricus, 4 vols., Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., Loeb Classical Library, vols 1 and 2. De Lacy, Ph. H. and E. A. De Lacy, (trans.), 1978, Philodemus. On Methods of Inference, 2nd Ed., Naples: Bibliopolis. (Epicureans) Dillon, J. M., 1993, Alcinous. The Handbook of Platonism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dorion, L.-A., (trans & comm.), 1995, Aristote: Les refutations sophistiques, Paris: J. Vrin. Hicks, R.D., (trans.), 1925, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 2 vols, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., Loeb Classical Library. (Protagoras Alcidamas, Antisthenes, Eubulides, Stoics) Huby, P.M., (trans.), 1992, in W. W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), Theophrastus of Eresus: Sourses for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence texts & tr., Leiden: Brill, 114275. Hlser, K. (trans.), 19878, Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker. 4 vols, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog. (Stoics; Chrysippus) Kieffer, J. S. (trans), 1964, Galen's Institutio logica, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lee, D. (trans. & comm.), 1955, 1974, Plato. The Republic, New York: Penguin Books. Londey, D. and C. Johanson, (trans.), 1988, The Logic of Apuleius, Leiden: Brill. McCabe, M.M., (trans. & comm.), 2005, Plato, Euthydemus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mueller I., with J. Gould, (trans.), 1999, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's Prior Analytics I.813. and I,1422, 2 vols, London: Duckworth. Oldfather, W. A., (trans.), 19258, Epictetus, The Discourses, The Manual and Fragments, 2 vols, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., Loeb Classical Library. (Stoics) Ophuisen, J. M. van, (trans.), 2001, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's Topics 1, London: Duckworth. Pickard-Cambridge, W. A. (trans.), 1984, Aristotle, Topics and Sophistical Refutations, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 1, J. Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ross, W. D. (trans.), Aristotle, Metaphysics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 2, J. Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Sharples, R. W., 1991, Cicero: On Fate & Boethius: The Consolations of Philosophy IV.57, V, Warminster: Oxbow Books. (Stoics, Epicureans) Smith, R., (trans. & comm.), 1989, Aristotle's Prior Analytics. Indianapolis: Hackett. Smith, R., (trans. & comm.), 1997, Aristotle, Topics I, VIII, and Selections, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

23 Stump, E. (trans.), 1978, Boethius's De topicis differentiis, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. Waterfield, R., (trans.), 2000, The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and The Sophists, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). (Dissoi Logoi and Sophists) Weidemann, H., (trans. & comm.), 1994, Aristoteles, De Interpretatione. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. White N. P., (trans.), 1993, Plato: Sophist, Indianapolis: Hackett. Whittaker, J. (trans.), 1990, Alcinous. Enseignement des doctrines de Platon, Paris: Bude. Secondary Literature General Anderson, A. R. and N. D. Belnap Jr., 1975, Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, vol. I, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Barnes, J., 2007, Truth, etc., Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kneale, M. and W. Kneale, 1962, The Development of Logic, Oxford: Clarendon Press. The Beginnings Frede, M., 1992, Plato's Sophist on false statements, in The Cambridge companion to Plato, (ed.) R. Kraut, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 397424. Kapp, E., 1942, Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic, New York: Columbia University Press. Mueller, I. 1974, Greek Mathematics and Greek Logic, in Corcoran, J. (ed.) Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretation, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 3570. Netz R., 1999, The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: a study in cognitive history, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Robinson, R., 1953, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd. Ed., Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Salmon, W. C., 2001, Zeno's Paradoxes, 2nd Ed., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. Inc. Aristotle Barnes, J. , 1981, "Proof and the Syllogism", in E. Berti (ed.), Aristotle on Science: the Posterior Analytics, Padua: Antenore, 1759. Corcoran, J., 1973, "A Mathematical Model of Aristotle's Syllogistic", Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie 55: 191219. Corcoran, J., 1974, Aristotle's Natural Deduction System, in Corcoran, J. (ed.) Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretation, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 85131. Evans, J.D.G., 1975, The Codification of False Refutations in Aristotle's De Sophistici Elenchis, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 201: 4552. Frede, D., 1985, The sea-battle reconsidered. A defence of the traditional interpretation, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3: 3187. Frede, M., 1987, "The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of the Aristotelian Categories" in M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1128. Kretzmann, N., 1974, Aristotle on Spoken Sounds Significant by Convention, in Corcoran, J. (ed.) Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretation, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 3 21. Lear, J., 1980, Aristotle and Logical Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ukasiewicz, J., 1957, Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic, 2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Owen, G. E. L., (ed.) 1968, Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics. Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Owen, G.E.L., 1965, "Inherence," Phronesis 10: 97105. Patterson, R., 1995, Aristotle's Modal Logic: Essence and Entailment in the Organon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

24 Patzig, Gnther, 1969, Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism, J. Barnes (trans.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Primavesi, O., 1996, Die aristotelische Topik, Munich: C. H. Beck. Smiley, T., 1974, "What Is a Syllogism?" Journal of Philosophical Logic 1: 136154. Smith, R., 1983, What is Aristotelian Ecthesis? History and Philosophy of Logic 24: 22432. Smith, R., 1994, Logic, in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, J. Barnes (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2765. Smith, R,, Aristotle's Logic, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/aristotlelogic/>. Striker, G., 1979, Aristoteles ber Syllogismen Aufgrund einer Hypothese Hermes 107: 33 50. Striker, G., 1994, "Modal vs. Assertoric Syllogistic", Ancient Philosophy (special issue): 3951. Whitaker, C. W. A., 1996, Aristotle's De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Theophrastus and Eudemus Barnes, J., 1985, Theophrastus and Hypothetical Syllogistic, in J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung I , Berlin, 55776. Bobzien, S., 2000, Wholly hypothetical syllogisms, Phronesis 45: 87137. Bobzien, S., 2002, Pre-Stoic hypothetical syllogistic in Galen in V. Nutton (ed.), The Unknown Galen, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies,Supplement volume, 5772. Bochenski, I.M., 1947, La Logique de Thophraste (reprinted 1987). Lejewski, Czesaw, 1976, On prosleptic premisses, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 17: 118. Lejewski, Czesaw, 1961, On prosleptic syllogisms, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 2: 158176. Diodorus Cronus and Philo the Logician Bobzien, S., 1993, Chrysippus' modal logic and its relation to Philo and Diodorus, in Dialektiker und Stoiker, K. Dring and Th. Ebert (eds), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. Bobzien, S., 2004, Dialectical School, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/dialectical-school/>. Denyer, N.C., 1981, Time and Modality in Diodorus Cronus, Theoria 47: 3153. Prior, A.N., 1955, Diodorean Modalities, The Philosophical Quarterly 5: 205213. Prior, A.N., 1967, Past, Present, and Future, Oxford: Clarendon Press, chapters II.12 and III.1. Sedley, D., 1977, Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 203, NS 23: 74120. The Stoics Atherton, C., 1993, The Stoics on Ambiguity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bobzien, S., 1996, Stoic Syllogistic, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: 13392. Bobzien, S., 1997, Stoic Hypotheses and Hypothetical Argument, Phronesis: 299312. Bobzien, S., 1999, Stoic Logic, in K. Algra & J.Barnes & J.Mansfeld & M.Schofield (eds), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 92157. Bobzien, S., 2002, Chrysippus and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102: 217238. Brunschwig, J., 1994, Remarks on the Stoic theory of the proper noun, in his Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3956.

25 Brunschwig, J., 1994, Remarks on the classification of simple propositions in Hellenistic logics , in his Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5771. Cavini, W., 1993, Chrysippus on Speaking Truly and the Liar, in Dialektiker und Stoiker, K. Dring and Th. Ebert (eds), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. Crivelli, P., 1994, Indefinite propositions and anaphora in Stoic logic Phronesis 39: 187206. Ebert, Th., 1993, Dialecticians and Stoics on Classifying Propositions in K. Dring u. Th. Ebert (eds), Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoiker und ihrer Vorlufer, Stuttgart: Steiner, 111127. Frede, M., 1974, Die stoische Logik, Gttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. Frede, M., 1994 The Stoic notion of a lekton, in Companion to ancient thought 3: Language, (ed.) Stephen Everson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 109128. Frede, M., 1975, "Stoic vs. Peripatetic Syllogistic", Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie 56. Gaskin, R., 1997, The Stoics on Cases, Predicates and the Unity of the Proposition, in Aristotle and After (ed.) R. Sorabji, London: Institute of Classical Studies, 91108. Lloyd, A. C., 1978, Definite propositions and the concept of reference, in J. Brunschwig (ed.) Les Stociens et leur logique, Paris: Vrin, 285295. Long, A.A., 1971, Language and Thought in Stoicism, in A. A. Long, (ed.) Problems in Stoicism, London, 75113. Mates, B., 1961, Stoic Logic, Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press. McCall, S., 1966, Connexive Implication, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 31: 415433. Schenkeveld, D.M., 1984, Stoic and Peripatetic Kinds of Speech Act and the Distinction of Grammatical Moods Mnemosyne 37: 291351. Epicurus Atherton, C., 2005, Lucretius on what language is not, in D. Frede and Brad Inwood (eds), Language and Learning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Barnes, J., 1988, Epicurean Signs, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol., 13544. Manetti, G., 2002, Philodemus' De signis: An important ancient semiotic debate, Semiotica 138: 279297. Later Antiquity Barnes, J., 1993, A Third Sort of Syllogism: Galen and the Logic of Relations in Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers, R. W. Sharples, (ed.) Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Barnes, J., 1997, Logic and the Imperial Stoa. Leiden: Brill. Bobzien, S., 2002, The development of modus ponens in antiquity: From Aristotle to the 2nd century AD, Phronesis: 359394. Bobzien, S., 2002, Propositional logic in Ammonius in H. Linneweber-Lammerskitten / G. Mohr (eds): Interpretation und Argument, Wrzburg: Knigshausen & Neumann, 103119. Bobzien, S., 2004, Hypothetical syllogistic in GalenPropositional logic off the rails? Rhizai: Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 2: 57102. Ebbesen, S., 1990, Porphyry's legacy to logic, in R. Sorabji, Aristotle TransformedThe Ancient Commentators and their Influence, London: Duckworth, 141171. Ebbesen, S., 1990, Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator in R. Sorabji Aristotle TransformedThe Ancient Commentators and their Influence, London: Duckworth, 37391. Lee, T. S., 1984, Die griechische Tradition der aristotelischen Syllogistik in der Sptantike. Hypomnemata 79. Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Martin, C. J., 1991, The Logic of Negation in Boethius, Phronesis 36: 277304. Sullivan, W.M., 1967, Apuleian Logic. The Nature, Sources and Influences of Apuleius' Peri Hermeneias, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.

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Stump, E., 1989, Dialectic and Boethius's De topicis differentiis, in Stump, E., Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 3156.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ancient/ 2/2/2014

Medieval Theories of Consequence

First published Mon Jun 11, 2012 Latin medieval theories of consequence are systematic analyses by Latin medieval authors[1] of the logical relations between sentences[2], in particular the notions of entailment and valid inference. When does a sentence B follow from a sentence A? (For example, from Some human is an animal one may infer Some animal is a human.) What are the grounds for the relation of entailment/consequence? Are there different kinds of consequences? These and other questions were extensively debated by these authors. Theories of consequence explicitly acquired an autonomous status only in the 14th century, when treatises specifically on the concept of consequence began to appear; but some earlier investigations also deserve the general title of theories of consequence, in view of their scope, sophistication and systematicity. Taken as a whole, medieval theories of consequence represent the first sustained attempt at adopting a sentential/propositional perspective[3] since the Stoics in Greek antiquity, and unlike Stoic logic, which had little historical influence provide the historical background for subsequent developments leading to the birth of modern logic in the 19th century. Indeed, it will be argued that the medieval concept of consequentia (in its different versions) is the main precursor of the modern concept of logical consequence.

1. Preliminary Considerations o 1.1 A genealogy of modern conceptions of consequence o 1.2 What are medieval theories of consequence theories of? 2. Early Theories of Consequence o 2.1 Predecessors o 2.2 Abelard th o 2.3 13 Century 3. 14th Century Theories of Consequence th o 3.1 The emergence of treatises on consequence in the 14 century o 3.2 Burley and Ockham o 3.3 Buridan and the Parisian tradition o 3.4 The British School 4. Conclusion Bibliography o Primary Literature o Secondary Literature Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries

1. Preliminary Considerations

27 1.1 A genealogy of modern conceptions of consequence In his much-discussed 1936 paper On the concept of logical consequence, Tarski presents two criteria of material adequacy for formal accounts of logical consequence, which jointly capture the common notion of logical consequence (or so he claims). They are formulated as the following condition: If in the sentences of the class K and in the sentence X we replace the constant terms which are not general-logical terms correspondingly by arbitrary other constant terms (where we replace equiform constants everywhere by equiform constants) and in this way we obtain a new class of sentences K and a new sentence X, then the sentence X must be true if only all sentences of the class K are true. (Tarski 2002, 2.3) In more mundane terms, the two core aspects that Tarski attributes to the so-called common notion of logical consequence can be formulated as: (TP) necessary truth-preservation: it is impossible for the antecedent to be true while the consequent is not true; (ST) substitution of terms: the relation of consequence is preserved under any (suitable) substitution of the non-logical terms of the sentences in question; this is now often referred to as the formality criterion. Different accounts of logical consequence can be (and have been) formulated on the basis of (TP) and/or (ST): they can be viewed as both necessary but independent components of the notion of logical consequence, as Tarski seems to suggest in the passage above; they can also be viewed as closely related, in particular if (TP) can be reduced to (ST) (i.e. satisfaction of (ST) would entail satisfaction of (TP) and vice-versa) a view that Etchemendy (1990) attributes to Tarski; or one may hold that the actual core of the notion of (logical) consequence is (TP), and that (ST) simply specifies a particular subclass of valid consequences, often referred to as formal consequences (Read 1994). Tarski correctly identified these two features as key components of the notion of logical consequence as entertained by philosophers and mathematicians of his time (and also today). But the question arises: why these two features and not others? In particular, through what (historical) processes have they come to constitute the conceptual core of the notion of logical consequence? These questions are even more pressing in view of the fact that both features have recently been questioned as to whether they truly capture the conceptual core of logical consequence see e.g. Etchemendy (1990) for the centrality of formality and (ST); Fields (2008) for the centrality of necessary truth-preservation in view of the semantic paradoxes. To make further progress in these debates, an important element is arguably the historical development of the notion of (logical) consequence over the centuries, so that we may come to understand where the so-called pre-theoretical notion of logical consequence comes from. Engaging in what could be described as a project of conceptual genealogy may allow for a better grasp of the reasons why this notion (now widely endorsed) established itself as such in the first

28 place. If these are compelling reasons, then they may count as arguments in favor of the centrality of formality and necessary truth-preservation; but if they rest on disputable, contentious assumptions, then the analysis may provide elements for a critical evaluation of each of these two components as truly constitutive of the concept of logical consequence. From this point of view, the historical developments in the Latin Middle Ages, in particular from the 12th to the 14th century, occupy a prominent position. As will be argued, it is in this period that concepts and ideas inherited from Greek Antiquity (Aristotle in particular, but also the ancient commentators) were shaped and consolidated into conceptions of consequence that bear a remarkable resemblance to the Tarskian condition of material adequacy presented above. Thus, an analysis of these historical developments is likely to contribute significantly to our understanding of the notion(s) of logical consequence as currently entertained. Naturally, as with any historical analysis, an investigation of these developments has intrinsic historical value in and of itself, independently of its possible contribution to modern debates. Indeed, medieval theories of consequence are a genuine medieval contribution: while medieval authors are clearly taking ancient Greek sources and ideas as their starting point, the emergence of theories of consequence as such is a Latin medieval innovation. But as it turns out, following the thread provided by the two key notions (TP) and (ST) as formulated above provides a suitable vantage point to investigate the development of the notion of consequence in the Latin Middle Ages. In other words, historical and conceptual analysis can easily be combined in this case. 1.2 What are medieval theories of consequence theories of? At first sight, it is not immediately clear what the object of analysis of medieval theories of consequence is (Boh 1982). Is it the semantics of conditional sentences? Is it the validity of inferences and arguments? Is it the relation of consequence, construed as an abstract entity? In fact, at times it seems that medieval authors are conflating these different notions, perhaps betraying some conceptual confusion. After all, these are very different concepts: a conditional is a sentence, which can be true or false; an argument or inference is an act, a consecution of assertions, which can be valid or invalid; a consequence is a relation between sentential/propositional entities, which can hold or fail to hold (Sundholm 1998). However, even though the medieval authors may use the same terminology to refer to these different concepts, this does not mean that they are not aware of the relevant differences, in particular between a conditional and a consequence. As Buridan (Tractatus de Consequentiis (henceforth TC), 21) remarks, it is for the most part a matter of terminology: he says he will adopt the definition of consequence as a true hypothetical sentence, but then throughout his text also uses the terminology of a consequence being valid or holding rather than simply being true or false. At any rate, it seems fair to say that, even though analyses of conditionals are often in the background (as is especially obvious in Boethius and Abelard, and in analyses of the syncategorematic term si, if), the main focus of medieval theories of consequence tends to be the logical relations between sentential/propositional components (King 2001; Read 2010), essentially (though not entirely) in the spirit of modern accounts of the notion of logical consequence (Shapiro 2005). Some modern scholars (e.g. Spade in his translation of Burley's De Puritate; Read 2010) prefer to translate the medieval term consequentia as inference, but arguably consequence is a more appropriate translation, both for etymological and for conceptual reasons.

29 One may also wonder to what extent medieval theories of consequence really add anything novel to the Aristotelian logical legacy. Kant (in)famously claimed that Aristotle had discovered everything there was to know about logic, and insofar as they deal with logical relations between sentences, it might be thought that theories of consequence would not have added anything substantially new to Aristotle's theory of syllogistic in particular. In fact, the relations between theories of syllogistic and theories of consequence at different times seem essentially to fall within one of three categories: 1. Syllogistic and consequence are essentially disjoint concepts, each having their own foundations and scope. In such cases, the framework of Aristotle's Topics is often (though not always) summoned to provide the foundations for non-syllogistic arguments/consequences. 2. All valid arguments, including non-syllogistic ones, are ultimately to be reduced to syllogistic arguments, as syllogistic offers the grounds for the validity of every single valid argument. A proponent of this approach is the 13th century author Robert Kilwardby. 3. Theories of consequence are seen as an expansion and generalization of syllogistic; syllogistic is a special case of consequence. In these cases, syllogistic is absorbed by consequence, which is also more general in that it can deal with arguments having fewer or more than two premises (syllogistic only treats of arguments with exactly two premises). The 14th century author John Buridan, for example, treats extensively of syllogisms, both assertoric and modal, in his treatise on consequence. It is fair to say that approach 3 became predominant in the 14th century, the golden age of medieval theories of consequence; but the earlier Boethian view that all valid arguments (including syllogistic arguments) are valid in virtue of topical rules can also be seen as belonging to category 3. However, given that medieval theories of syllogistic are treated extensively elsewhere (see the entry on medieval theories of the syllogism of this encyclopedia), in what follows we shall focus on nonsyllogistic consequences/arguments, but with the proviso that many of the interesting developments in syllogistic in the 14th century are presented in treatises or chapters on consequence. Another point worth mentioning is the fact that medieval discussions of the concept of consequence cover both what we would now describe as philosophy of logic and as logic proper. As for the latter, a number of medieval authors such as Abelard (Martin 2004), Burley (De Puritate), and Buridan (TC) formulated rules of inference and proved theorems about them. Many authors had for the most part understood the logical behavior of what we now view as the main sentential/propositional operators, such as ifthen, or, negating terms, as well as meta-level rules such as the transitivity of consequence, from the impossible anything follows, or the necessary follows from anything (the latter two were however not unanimously endorsed see (Martin 1986), (Read 1993, 2010)). (For discussions of the rules formulated by different authors, see (Pozzi 1978), (Boh 2001), (Dutilh Novaes 2008)). They also offered sophisticated investigations of the logical behavior of e.g. modal terms (Buridan, TC). Alongside with this more technical layer, medieval authors also discussed extensively the very nature of the notion of consequence: what counts as appropriate grounds for a valid consequence, adequate definitions, subdivisions of kinds of consequence etc. In what follows, the predominant focus will be on the philosophy of logic side of medieval theories of consequence, i.e. how they articulated this very notion, rather than on spelling out the exact inferential rules endorsed by the different authors. But some medieval treatises on consequence also contain a high level of technical

30 sophistication, even though the language used is the regimented academic Latin of the time the only symbolic device present is the use of schematic letters, which in fact dates back to Aristotle. 2. Early Theories of Consequence 2.1 Predecessors Without a doubt, the most important ancient source for the development of theories of consequence by medieval authors is, unsurprisingly, Aristotle. The Prior Analytics and the theory of syllogistic provided the main model for the correctness/validity of arguments for centuries, and even though theories of consequences can be seen as a generalization of the rather narrow theory of validity presented in the Prior Analytics, it is clear that syllogistic remains one of the key elements in the background. Indeed, the famous definition of a valid deduction (syllogism) at the beginning of the Prior Analytics is already a formulation of the necessary truth-preservation criterion (TP): A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so. (24b19-20) Retracing the historical sources for the development of this notion would take us too far afield, but it seems that the emergence of the idea of following of necessity is closely related to dialectical practices of debates, both in philosophy/logic (Marion and Castelnerac 2009) and in mathematics (Netz 1999). But while it is a necessary condition, necessary truth-preservation is notoriously not a sufficient condition for syllogistic validity. For example, as is well known, Aristotle's syllogistic does not validate the principle of reflexivity, i.e., A implies A for any sentence A, even though this principle is the most transparent occurrence of necessary truth-preservation one can think of. Instead, it seems that syllogistic validity requires a great deal more to hold (Thom 2010). Indeed, it has been claimed that Ancient logics were all in some sense relevance logics. They insisted that for an argument to be valid, conditions must be met that guaranteed both that it would be impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false and that there would be connections of various kinds between the premises and conclusions. (Normore 1993, 448) We shall see that, besides variations of (TP) and (ST), criteria of relevance and containment will also appear frequently in the writings of medieval authors. The extent to which (ST) is present in the Prior Analytics is also a moot point (Thom 2010). Aristotle does not apply the concepts of form and matter anywhere in his logical writings, but his consistent use of schematic letters and many of his argumentative strategies in this work suggest that he relies on something resembling what we now refer to as the logical form of arguments. What is not clear is whether Aristotle relies on (ST) merely as a convenient technical device to capture the more fundamental property of necessary truth-preservation, or whether for him (TP) and (ST) are independent core components of the concept of a syllogism/deduction. The Prior Analytics is not the only Aristotelian text providing the historical background for the development of the notion of consequence. Equally important is one of his (presumably) older logical texts, the Topics; this text, which unlike the Analytics clearly presupposes a dialectical background, presents rather unsystematic considerations on how to argue well in the dialectical contests of Plato's academy (see the entry on ancient logic of this encyclopedia, section 2.1). But by

31 discussing which moves are allowed in a debate, it also ends up touching upon the general idea of what follows from what. As we shall see, the Topicsbecame an important starting point for discussions on the validity of arguments; the theory of syllogistic only covers a rather limited range of arguments (two-premised arguments containing only the four kinds of categorical sentences), and the framework of the Topics was often called upon to fill in the gap between what syllogistic had to offer and the much larger range of putatively valid arguments one might be interested in. Two other ancient traditions which may have contributed to the development of medieval theories of consequence are the Stoic tradition (see the entry on ancient logic of this encyclopedia, section 5) and the tradition of the ancient commentators (Barnes 1990, 2008; entry on the ancient commentators of this encyclopedia). But in fact, while a Stoic connection is prima facie plausible unlike Aristotelian term-based logic, Stoic logic is also largely sentence-based historical evidence for direct Stoic influence remains elusive; for now, no record of actual channels of influence has been identified.[4] The ancient commentators, by contrast, had significant (both indirect and direct) impact on the development of the notion of consequence at first via Boethius, later via the Arabic authors, and as their commentaries were translated and read by the Latin authors in the 13th century and onwards. While the notion of necessary truth-preservation was already quite mature in the Prior Analytics, the conceptual development of the substitutivity criterion is essentially a later contribution of the ancient commentators (Barnes 1990, 2008; Dutilh Novaes 2012a). Recall that Aristotle had not applied the metaphysical notions of form and matter to logical objects such as sentences and arguments in any systematic way; this crucial step was undertaken by the ancient commentators. References to the form and matter of syllogisms are pervasive in their writings, especially in commentaries on the Prior Analytics, from that of Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd century AD) up to that of Ammonius (6th century AD). The ancient commentators not only distinguished between the form and the matter of syllogisms: they sometimes also suggested (though usually rather obliquely) that the form of an argument is precisely that in virtue of which it is valid and reliable. This would later pave the way for the distinction between formal and material consequences and the idea of validity in virtue of form. Here is an illustrative passage by Alexander of Aphrodisias: Combinations are called syllogistic and reliable if they do not alter together with differences in the matter i.e. if they do not deduce and prove different things at different times, but always and in every material instance preserve one and the same form in the conclusion. Combinations which change and alter configuration together with the matter and acquire different and conflicting conclusions at different times, are non-syllogistic and unreliable. (Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Apr 52.2024, 114) Alexander also comments on Aristotle's use of schematic letters, and clearly relates what takes the place of schematic letters to the matter of the argument: He uses letters in his exposition in order to indicate to us that the conclusions do not depend on the matter but on the figure, on the conjunction of the premises and on the moods. For so-and-so is deduced syllogistically not because the matter is of such-and-such a kind but because the combination is so-and-so. The letters, then, show that the conclusion will be such-and-such universally, always, and for every assumption. (Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Apr53.2854.2, 116)

32 In first instance, the Greek logical heritage was almost single-handedly (though selectively) passed on to the Latin tradition by one man, the neo-platonic philosopher Boethius. Prior to the late 12th century (Aristotle's and other ancient texts became widely read again in the Christian parts of Europe only in the 12thcentury see (Dod 1982)), what the medieval authors had inherited from Greek logic had been almost exclusively transmitted by Boethius, who had also established the logical terminology in Latin. His translations of Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione were widely read, as well as his textbooks on syllogistic and his two texts De hypotheticis syllogismis (On Hypothetical Syllogisms HS) (dating 516522) and De topicis differentiis (On Topical differentiae TD) (dating 522 523). Boethius uses the term consequentia to refer to that which a hypothetical sentence such as If it's day, then it's light signifies: For it [the sentence] does not propose that it's day and it's light, but rather that if it's day, then it's light. Whence it signifies a certain consequence (consequentia) and not the being [of things]. (Boethius, Commentary on On Interpretation 2, 10910, translation in Martin 2009, 67.)[5] It is from Boethius that later authors inherited the term consequentia, but the influence of Boethius is not only terminological. In HS, he focuses on conditionals of the form If something's (not) A, then it's (not) B (si (non) est A, (non) est B), and lists a number of principles and rules governing the logical behavior of such sentences (Martin 2009, 6678). Boethius' considerations are not sufficiently worked out as to be viewed as a full-fledged theory of consequence, and indeed there are a number of tensions and inconsistencies in his doctrines. But HS will prove to be an important source for the later development of theories of consequence. For example, in this text Boethius introduces the distinction between natural and accidental consequences, which then remains the main subdivision of consequences up until the 14th century (when it is surpassed by the distinction between formal and material consequences). For Boethius, both kinds of consequences, natural and accidental, entail inseparability, roughly meaning that the antecedent cannot be true while the consequent is false (i.e. a version of (TP)), but natural consequences entail something more, namely a real causal, metaphysical connection between the items in question. The other text mentioned above, De topicis differentiis, is equally significant for the development of later theories of consequence. It is presented as a commentary on Cicero's Topics, which in turn claims to have been inspired by Aristotle's Topics. Cicero's work, however, is very different from Aristotle's, and Boethius in some sense attempts to offer a unification of both approaches. One of the key concepts introduced by this text is the concept of maximal propositions, which he claims are the general principles underlying the correctness of topical arguments. As described by C. Martin, Such [maximal] propositions may either appear as a premise in a categorical syllogism or, much more importantly for the history of logic, as the warrant for an inference. In this second case they are the generalizations of the consequential relation which may hold between the premises and conclusion of an enthymeme or the antecedent and the conclusion of a conditional proposition. (Martin 2009, 79) Crucially, topical arguments were originally seen as merely probable, contrasting with the necessary truth-preservation of syllogisms. So for maximal propositions to serve as grounds for the relation of consequence, a transformation on the status of topical arguments (from probable to necessary) had

33 to occur at a later stage (Stump 1982, 290). Moreover, it is important to notice that, although Boethius is familiar with the work of the Greek ancient commentators and incorporates some elements from their discussions, he does not explicitly apply the form vs. matter distinction to syllogisms, as the earlier authors had done. Barnes (1990) suggests that the logical hylomorphism (i.e. the application of Aristotle's doctrine of form and matter to logic) of these authors is nevertheless present in Boethius' terminology, such as in the opposition between propositionum complexio and rerum natura (the structure of a sentence vs. the nature of things) (e.g. HS II ii 5). But Boethius does not present the idea of substitution/variation of terms as a property related to the validity of arguments, as Alexander of Aphrodisias had suggested. In other words, substitutivity of terms as captured by (ST) is not a key element of Boethius' account of validity neither terminologically nor conceptually. 2.2 Abelard From Boethius in the 6th century to Abelard in the 12th century, Latin authors did not have anything particularly new and remarkable to say about the concept of consequence (at least judging from the textual sources currently available). The Dialectica formerly attributed to Garlandus Compotista (11th century) and now thought to have been written by Garlandus of Besanon (early 12th century) is an exception worth mentioning (Boh 1982, 303305). But for the most part, it seems that the Boethian approach to consequence prevailed essentially uncontested. It was only in the 12th century, in Abelard's Dialectica, that a novel and highly sophisticated theory of consequence/entailment was to be formulated. Abelard's starting point is the same material inherited from Boethius which had been available for centuries, and yet what he does with it is quite extraordinary; in particular, he understood better than anyone before him the nature of what we now refer to as propositional operations. And yet, his account is ultimately untenable (Martin 2004). Tellingly, his theory of consequence is presented in the part of the Dialectica dedicated to the topical framework (the book De Locis), which again illustrates the close historical connections between theories of consequence and the Topics. Abelard speaks mostly of inferentia rather than consequentia, as the latter is for him a subspecies of the former. He defines the concept of inferentia as follows: Therefore, inference consists in the necessity of consecution, that is, in that the sense (sententia) of the consequent is required (exigitur) by the sense (sensus) of the antecedent, as is asserted with a hypothetical proposition (Dial. 253, translation from (Martin 2004, 170)) The phrase necessity of consecution could be viewed as Abelard's formulation of the criterion of necessary truth-preservation (TP), but it is a property he attributes to the sense (meaning) of the antecedent sentence. Thus, it may be argued that Abelard requires something more than mere truthpreservation, namely a connection of relevance between antecedent and consequent (Martin 2004, section II.5). Indeed, in addition to variations of (TP) and (ST), there is a third recurrent theme in medieval discussions on consequence: (Co) In a valid consequence, the conclusion is contained/understood in the premises. Different interpretations of this clause run through medieval discussions of consequence, ranging from the 12th to the 15th century and beyond; some (e.g. Abelard in the passage just quoted) seem to

34 treat the notion of containment in semantic/relevantist terms, while others (in particular the British authors of the second half of the 14th century) lean more heavily towards what appears to be an epistemic interpretation (see section 3.4). Abelard then further distinguishes perfect from imperfect inferences,[6] and this distinction sets him apart from the whole preceding tradition: But inferences are either perfect or imperfect. An inference is perfect when, from the structure of the antecedent itself, the truth of the consequent is manifest, and the construction of the antecedent is so disposed that it contains also the construction of the consequent in itself, just as in syllogisms or in conditionals which have the form of syllogisms. (Dial. 253/4) He goes on to argue that what warrants a perfect inference, i.e. its vis inferentiae, is the construction itself: the truth of perfect inferences comes from the structure (complexio), not from the nature of things (Dial. 255). This is a novel development, as for authors such as Boethius and those following him, the warrant of all consequences is ultimately to be found in the nature of things, and is captured by means of topical principles. (Abelard then goes on to provide arguments directed against this Boethian view.) What Abelard refers to as the construction/structure of an inference is indeed roughly what we now understand as a schema (see entry on schemata of this encyclopedia), as his discussion of examples suggests: it is the substitution of terms by other terms while preserving the consecution (i.e. a version of (ST)) that is the hallmark of perfect inferences. Whatever terms you substitute, whether they are compatible or incompatible with one another, the consecution can in no way be broken. (Dial. 255, translation from Martin 2004, 171) Now, while proto-traces of the substitutional conception of validity could be perceived in Aristotle as well as in some of the ancient commentators, with Abelard it is (arguably) for the first time presented as providing the grounds for a certain class of consequences. And yet, Abelard's conception of consequence is not reduced to (ST), given that imperfect inferences are just as legitimate/valid as the perfect ones: imperfect inferences are those that fail the substitution criterion but satisfy the necessity of consecution criterion. Thus, for Abelard, (ST) defines a special subclass among valid inferences, but (TP) (supplemented by (Co)) remains the true core of his notion of inference/consequence; indeed, in his subsequent discussion he deals with imperfect inferences much more extensively than with the perfect ones. Many of Abelard's logical concepts were tacitly absorbed by later authors, though not by means of direct influence, and often with no explicit attribution to Abelard (Martin 2004). It is revealing that we now have only one surviving copy of his Dialectica, a clear sign that it was not widely read. 2.3 13th Century The two main features of 13th century logic are arguably the emergence of the terminist tradition (authors such as Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood and Lambert of Auxerre/Lagny) and the absorption of the newly rediscovered Aristotelian texts and other Greek sources. The latter resulted in the distinction between three groups of logical theories: what became known as the logica vetus (topics emerging from the traditional texts which had remained available throughout: the Categories, On Interpretation, Porphyry's Isagoge); the logica nova (covering the material from the newly discovered Aristotelian texts); and the logica modernorum (topics not directly related to the Aristotelian corpus, such as consequence, insolubles and obligations).

35 The terminist authors did not address consequence as an autonomous topic of investigation; their views on the matter are scattered along their analyses of sentences, the Topics, fallacies and syncategoremata (the syncategorema si in particular). For instance, William of Sherwood recognizes the distinction between natural and accidental consequences inherited from Boethius, as well as the distinction between absolute and as-of-now (ut nunc) consequences (Stump 1982, 291) the latter remained ubiquitous in the 14th century (Dutilh Novaes 2008). But one cannot really speak of fullfledged theories of consequence among the terminist authors, given the rather unsystematic and piecemeal nature of their analyses (Stump 1982, 281283; Boh 1982, 306307). Perhaps more significant for the overall development of the concept of consequence is the growing presence of Aristotelian hylomorphism in logical contexts. While hylomorphism had not been entirely unknown to Latin authors prior to the rediscovery of the remaining Aristotelian texts in the late 12th and 13thcenturies, in this period an explosion of applications of Aristotelian metaphysical concepts in other areas occurred, especially in logic (Spruyt 2003). In particular, applications of the form-matter distinction to arguments (syllogisms in particular) became frequent again, after a hiatus of many centuries since the ancient commentators. Such applications can be found in the only known 12th-century commentary on the Prior Analytics, the Anonymus Aurelianensis III (Ebbesen 1981), in the Dialectica Monacensis (an anonymous text of the early 13th century, edited in De Rijk 1962/7), and in Robert Kilwardby's commentary on the Prior Analytics (1230s see (Thom 2007)), among other texts. The significance of these applications is that they paved the way for the consolidation of the notion of formal consequence in the 14th century (Dutilh Novaes 2012b), which in turn was to have a huge impact on the rest of the history of logic. Indeed, one of the earliest known uses of the phrase formal consequence can be found in Simon of Faversham's questions on the Sophistical Refutations, written in the 1280s: When it is said that an animal is a substance; therefore a man is a substance is a good consequence I reply that this consequence does not hold in virtue of form (ratione formae), but rather in virtue of matter. Because according to the Commentator [Averroes] on the first book of the Physics, an argument which is valid (concludens) in virtue of form must hold in all matter. This consequence, however, holds only for features which are essential [] and so this consequence is not formal (formalis). (Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones Super Libro Elenchorum, quaestio 36, 200; translation from (Martin 2005) 135.) It is significant that Simon refers to Averroes' commentary on the Physics, thus illustrating the importation of the Aristotelian (meta)physical framework into logical analyses. We here have the notion of valid in virtue of form (as with Abelard's complexio), and the association of form and formality with the idea of substitution of terms (ST). Other authors of the same period, John Duns Scotus for example, also use the phrase consequentia formalis and its variants, but not in the substitutional sense of holding in all matter (Martin 2005). Now, this is the historical background for the consolidation of the distinction between formal and material consequences in the 14th century: a progression towards general theories of consequence rather than exclusive focus on syllogisms, and the increasing application of hylomorphism to arguments at first to syllogisms, and later to arguments and consequences in general. 3. 14th Century Theories of Consequence

36 3.1 The emergence of treatises on consequence in the 14th century The precise historical origins of 14th century theories of consequence are still debated among scholars. The fact is that, at the beginning of the 14th century, treatises and chapters bearing the title De consequentiis and similar titles began to appear. Why then, and not before? Naturally, the subject itself, that is, the logical/inferential relations between sentences, had been extensively discussed by earlier authors, as we have seen. But no treatises or chapters were specifically dedicated to the topic or bore such titles before the 14th century. According to a once influential hypothesis, medieval theories of consequences would have emerged from the tradition commenting on and discussing Aristotle's Topics (Bird 1961; Stump 1982). At first sight, this hypothesis may seem plausible: traditionally, the role of the topical framework was often that of accounting for the patterns of (correct) inference and reasoning which did not fit into the syllogistic system presented in the Prior Analytics. So, conceptually, it would seem quite natural that the tradition on the Topics might represent the historical origins of theories of consequences. Moreover, as we have seen, some earlier discussions of the notion of consequence were conducted explicitly within the context of the topical framework, following Boethius. However, on closer scrutiny, this hypothesis fails to receive historical and textual confirmation. (Green-Pedersen 1984, chapter E in particular) is (still) the most comprehensive study on this subject, covering virtually every text known to us that is relevant for the hypothesis. Green-Pedersen argues (1984, 270) that the late 13th century literature on the Topics, that is, the period immediately preceding the emergence of treatises on consequences, gives absolutely no indication of what was to come. In other words, there are no significant similarities between the contents of these 13th century treatises on the Topics and the 14th century treatises on consequences. Therefore, we may conclude that the Topics could not have been the main, and in any case certainly not the only, source for the emergence of 14th century theories of consequences. Be that as it may, the importance of the Topics for the development of 14th century theories of consequences should not be dismissed altogether. It is worth noticing that two of the first authors who presented systematic discussions of consequence in the 14th century, namely Ockham and Burley, are both in some way or another influenced by the Topics. Burley explicitly says that all valid consequences are based on dialectical Topics (On the purity, p. 158 and 162). In contrast, the relation of Ockham's theory of consequence to the Topics is more convoluted; Green-Pedersen argues convincingly that Bird's reconstruction of Ockham's theory within the framework of the Topics (Bird 1961) is not satisfactory (Green-Pedersen 1984, 268), but he also confirms that Ockham's intrinsic and extrinsic middles, crucial concepts for his theory of consequence (to be explained shortly), are concepts essentially taken (albeit in modified form) from the topical framework. In short, although the current availability of texts still does not allow for definitive conclusions, the picture that at this point seems most plausible is that different strands of traditional logical theories converged in order to give rise to the 14th century theories of consequences. It seems that at least four traditions contributed substantially to these developments: treatises on syncategoremata, especially in connection with the syncategorema si; discussions of hypothetical syllogisms; commentaries on the Prior Analytics; and the tradition of the Topics. Different elements of each of these traditions contributed to the development of different aspects of the theories of consequence.[7] GreenPedersen (1984, 295) argues, for example, that the late 13th-century treatises that most resemble early

37 14th-century treatises on consequences are the treatises on syncategorematic words and a number of sophism-collections arranged after syncategoremes. The different 14th century treatises on consequences can be divided into four main groups: 1. The treatises on consequences from the very beginning of the 14th century: Burley's De consequentiis and two anonymous treatises of roughly the same time (Green-Pedersen 1981). They are in fact rather unsystematic collections of rules of consequence/inference; it seems that their purpose was solely to provide rules of thumb to deal with sophismata related to some syncategorematic terms. No conceptual or systematic discussion of the nature of consequence is presented. 2. The second group is represented by Burley's De Puritate, the chapters on consequence in Ockham's Summa Logicae (III-3), a few Pseudo-Ockham treatises, and the Liber consequentiarium (edited in Schupp 1988). In these texts, the concept of (intrinsic and extrinsic) middles and other topical concepts occupy a prominent place. They display a much deeper interest in the very nature of consequence than the previous group, presenting general definitions and criteria for what is to count as a consequence, as well as divisions of kinds of consequence. 3. The third group is represented by Buridan's treatise on consequence and the treatises inspired by it, most notably Albert of Saxony's (a chapter of hisPerutilis logica) and Marsilius of Inghen's (as yet unedited) treatise on consequence. There is also the interesting commentary on the Prior Analyicsformerly attributed to Scotus[,8] which is thought to have been composed before or in any case independently of Buridan's treatise (Lagerlund 2000, chapter 6). In these treatises, topical vestiges such as the doctrine of intrinsic and extrinsic middles have disappeared completely. What characterizes them as a group is the definition of formal consequence based on the substitutivity criterion, in the spirit of (ST) (more on this below). This tradition can be referred to as the Parisian/continental tradition on consequences. 4. The fourth group of treatises is predominantly British, and is represented by a significantly greater number of surviving treatises than group (3). It is represented by the treatises of Robert Fland, John of Holland, Richard Billingham, Richard Lavenham, Ralph Strode, and the Logica Oxoniensis, among others (Ashworth and Spade 1992). What characterizes this group as such is the definition of formal consequence in terms of containment of the consequent in the antecedent, in the spirit of (Co), usually interpreted in epistemic terms. Chronologically, the development of theories of consequence in the 14th century is thus characterized by an early and rather primitive stage (1), then by a stage of further development, in which, nevertheless, topical notions still play a prominent role (2), and then by two further traditions which run more or less parallel, namely the Parisian/continental tradition (3) and the British tradition (4). While they differed in particular in the various definitions given to the formal vs. material consequence distinction, they all agreed that necessary truth-preservation (TP) is a necessary condition for something to count as a (valid) consequence (Dutilh Novaes 2008). It is important to note that, in the 14th century, rules of consequence were often discussed against the background of the genre of oral disputation known asobligationes (see entry on obligationes of this encyclopedia). It is common to encounter formulations of rules of consequence in obligational terms, for example: if you have conceded the consequence and its antecedent, then you must

38 concede the consequent. Thus, interesting reflections on consequence are also to be found in obligationes treatises (and vice-versa). 3.2 Burley and Ockham Walter Burley is the author of the oldest treatise on consequence with known authorship (edited by Brown in 1980), but it is in his later work De Puritate, longer version, that one finds his fully developed theory of consequence. The shorter version of De Puritate is thought to have been composed before Ockham's Summa Logicae, and contains only a section on consequence and a section on syncategoremata. The received view is that, after becoming acquainted with Ockham's Summa Logicae, Burley abandoned the text of what is now known as the shorter version of De Puritate and began to work on a new draft, which was to become the longer version (Spade 2000). The theory of consequence presented in the shorter version is based on ten basic principles, four of which are clearly sentential/propositional, while the other six take terms as the basic logical unit (Boh 1982). The only distinction of consequence that Burley discusses is that between simple and as-of-now consequence, a traditional distinction which remained popular in the 14th century: First therefore I assume a certain distinction, namely this one: One kind of [consequence] is simple, another kind is as-of-now (ut nunc). A simple [consequence] is one that holds for every time. For example A man runs; an animal runs. An as-of-now [consequence] holds for a determinate time and not always. For example Every man runs; therefore, Socrates runs. For that [consequence] does not hold always, but only while Socrates is a man. (Burley, De Puritate, 3) This temporal understanding of the simple vs. as-of-now distinction is the one adopted by most authors, both before and after Burley (however, see Pseudo-Scotus' formulation, discussed in the next section), and is repeated verbatim in the longer version of On the Purity (p. 146). Another interesting feature of the shorter version is the fact that it treats syllogisms under the concept of consequence, thus illustrating the absorption of syllogistic by theories of consequences in the 14th century. Burley's mature theory of consequence, as presented in the longer version of De Puritate, is best discussed against the background of the theory of consequence presented in Ockham's Summa Logicae, so let us now turn to Ockham first. Ockham's Summa Logicae is thought to have been written in the first years of the 1320s; section 3 of Part III is entirely dedicated to consequences. In chapter 1 of III-3, Ockham presents a somewhat confusing account of consequences based on nine distinctions, including the simple vs. as-of-now distinction; the distinction between formal and material consequence is the last one presented.[9] It seems that this important distinction was discussed systematically for the first time in this very text (Martin 2005), but Ockham offers virtually no justification for his use of the notions of form and matter with respect to consequences. It is also clear that Ockham deliberately ignores the wellentrenched distinction between natural and accidental consequences, as is obvious from the fact that he mentions nine distinctions, but not this one. Here is how Ockham introduces the notion of a formal consequence: Formal consequences are of two kinds. Some hold in virtue of an extrinsic middle, which concerns the form of propositions. For example, such rules as from an exclusive to a universal, with transposition of terms, is a good consequence; if the major premise is necessary and the minor premise is assertoric (de inesse), the conclusion is necessary. Others hold immediately in virtue of an intrinsic middle, and mediately in virtue of an extrinsic middle regarding the general conditions of

39 the proposition, [] such as in Socrates is not running, therefore a man is not running. (William of Ockham, Summa Logicae III-3, ch. 1, lines 4554) Thus, according to Ockham, formal consequences are those that hold in virtue of middles, be they intrinsic or extrinsic. A consequence holds immediately in virtue of an intrinsic middle when it holds in virtue of the truth of a different sentence formed from its terms. For example, Socrates is not running, therefore a man is not running holds in virtue of this middle: Socrates is a man, since if Socrates is a man is not true, the consequence does not hold. These are typically enthymematic consequences, i.e. consequences with a missing premise (with the additional premise, they become a valid syllogism). An extrinsic middle, by contrast, is a sentence not containing the terms that form the antecedent and the consequent of the putative consequence, but which is a general rule describing the fact that warrants the passage from the antecedent to the consequent (reminiscent of Boethius' maximal propositions), and which concerns theform of sentences. Ockham's example of a consequence holding immediately in virtue of an extrinsic middle is Only a man is a donkey, therefore every donkey is a man, which holds in virtue of this general rule: an exclusive and a universal with transposed terms signify the same and are convertible. Notice however that Socrates is not running, therefore a man is not running and Only a man is a donkey, therefore every donkey is a man are both formalconsequences for Ockham (since both hold in virtue of middles), whereas the former is clearly an enthymeme, not valid in all substitutional instances of the terms Socrates, man, and running (thus not satisfying (ST)). The latter, on the other hand, is valid in all substitutional instances of donkey and man, and indeed this seems to be the case of most, if not all, of Ockham's formal consequences immediately valid in virtue of extrinsic middles; he explicitly says for example that syllogisms are of the latter kind. Effectively, formal consequences immediately valid in virtue of extrinsic middles satisfy the (ST) criterion of being valid in all matter, but the same does not hold of Ockham's (enthymematic) consequences valid in virtue of an intrinsic middle. Curiously, while Ockham can be credited with having been the first to use the terms formal consequence and material consequence systematically, thecontent of his distinction did not pass on to later authors. This is arguably because Ockham's distinction is cast in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic middles, peculiar concepts belonging to the Boethian framework which was already losing its influence by Ockham's time (Green-Pedersen 1984). Indeed, one seldom encounters the concept of middles in writings of the post-Ockham period, except for texts under direct Ockhamist influence. As for material consequences, it is not entirely clear how exactly Ockham intended to define this class of consequences. He says that material consequences are those that hold in virtue solely of (the meaning of) their terms (Ockham, Summa Logicae III-3, ch. 1, lines 5557) but the two examples he gives are of a consequence with an impossible antecedent and a consequence with a necessary consequent. This suggests the reading that this category consists exclusively of consequences of this sort (ex impossibili and ad necessarium consequences), but there is no conclusive evidence supporting this interpretation; in particular, he did not offer any explicit motivation for his use of the concept of matter to characterize this class of consequences.[10] As mentioned above, the longer version of Burley's De Puritate is thought to be largely a response to Ockham's Summa Logicae, not exclusively but also with respect to consequence. Burley recovers the natural vs. accidental distinction which had been deliberately neglected by Ockham, but in fact

40 formulates it with a terminology similar to that used by Ockham for formal consequences, namely in terms of the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic topics (rather than middles, but this appears to be above all a mere terminological difference): Simple [consequence] is of two kinds. One is natural. That happens when the antecedent includes the consequent. Such an inference holds through an intrinsic topic. An accidental inference is one that holds through an extrinsic topic. That happens when the antecedent does not include the consequent but the inference holds through a certain extrinsic rule. (Burley, De Puritate, 146) One may conjecture that Burley sought to neutralize Ockham's distinction between formal and material consequences in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic middles by formulating the traditional distinction between natural and accidental consequences in terms of containment and intrinsic/extrinsic topics. Moreover, when discussing the notion of formal consequence later in the text (pp. 171173, replying to a possible objection), Burley seems to be criticizing Ockham's definition of material consequences as those which hold solely in virtue of the meaning of terms: Thus for a [consequence] to hold by reason of the terms can happen in two ways, either because it holds materially by reason of the terms, or because it holds formally by reason of the terms that is, by the formal reason of the terms. (Burley, On the Purity, 173) In other words, Burley seems to be saying that Ockham's formulation of the distinction is ineffective and thus inadequate. The exact formulation of the distinction between formal and material consequences presented by Ockham was indeed not adopted by later authors, but it would be excessively speculative to attribute this outcome to Burley's criticism. In effect, even less of a Burleian legacy is to be found in later authors specifically with respect to consequence, in particular as the formal vs. material distinction became the main subdivision of consequence later on (albeit under different formulations). 3.3 Buridan and the Parisian tradition John Buridan's treatise on consequence (TC, edited by H. Hubien in 1976) quite likely represents the pinnacle of sophistication for (Latin) medieval discussions of the concept of consequence.[11] Its modern editor dates it to the 1330s, thus belonging to the early stages of Buridan's career. We currently know much less about Buridan's immediate predecessors than about Burley's or Ockham's, so it is not clear who Buridan takes inspiration from or is criticizing. The treatise is composed of four books: Book I presents general considerations on the very notion of consequence; Book II treats of consequences involving modal sentences; Book III treats of syllogisms involving assertoric (i.e. non-modal) sentences; Book IV deals with syllogisms involving modal sentences. Each of them is remarkable in its own way (Book III for example represents a radical subversion of Aristotelian orthodoxy, with the suggestion that third-figure syllogisms are more foundational than first-figure syllogisms), but here we shall focus on the first two books (Book I in particular), given the methodological decision of leaving syllogistic aside in the present analysis. In Book I, Buridan presents the general definition of a consequence in the familiar terms of necessary truth-preservation: Many people say that of two propositions, the one which cannot be true while the other is not true is the antecedent, and the one which cannot not be true while the other is true is the consequent, so

41 that every proposition is antecedent to any other proposition when it [the rst proposition] cannot be true without the other being true. (Buridan, TC, 21) He then goes on to reformulate the definition for reasons related to his view that only actually produced sentences (sentence-tokens) can have a truth-value (Klima 2004; Dutilh Novaes 2005). No sentence is negative, therefore no donkey is running comes out as a valid consequence according to the criterion thus formulated, because No sentence is negative can never be true: its mere existence falsifies itself whenever it is produced. According to Buridan, this example should not count as a valid consequence, and one reason he gives for this is that its contrapositive Some donkey is running, therefore some sentence is negative is not a valid consequence. He formulates a definition of consequences in terms of howsoever the antecedent/consequent signifies things to be in order to accommodate such counterexamples, but adds that in most cases, the simpler definition is sufficiently accurate. Commitment to sentence-tokens aside, Buridan's notion of consequence clearly has necessary truthpreservation as its fundamental component. So for him, enthymematic consequences such as a man runs, therefore an animal runs are just as valid as syllogistic consequences or other consequences satisfying the criterion of preservation of validity under term substitution (ST). However, Buridan does recognize that there is an important distinction between consequences which do and those which do not satisfy the substitutional criterion; giving continuation to a tradition which includes Alexander of Aphrodisias and Simon of Faversham, he conceptualizes this distinction in hylomorphic terms, more specifically in terms of the distinction between formal and material consequence: Formal consequence means that [the consequence] holds for all terms, retaining an analogous form. Or, if you want to express it according to the proper force of discourse, a formal consequence is that which, for every proposition similar in form which might be formed, it would be a good consequence, such as what is A is B; thus what is B is A. (Buridan, TC, 2223, my emphasis) Material consequences are those which do satisfy the necessary truth-preservation criterion (TP) but do not satisfy the substitutional criterion (ST). At first sight, Buridan's distinction between formal and material consequence seems very similar to, for example, Abelard's distinction between perfect and imperfect inferences. There is, however, a fundamental difference; nowhere does Buridan suggest that formal consequences are valid in virtue of their form, as Abelard had claimed for the complexio of perfect inferences. He does say that the validity of a material consequence is made evident only by means of a reduction to a formal consequence (TC, 1.4), but this observation pertains to the epistemic level of how the validity of a consequence is made apparent to us, not to the quasimetaphysical level of what grounds it.[12] Buridan also comments explicitly on what is to be understood as the form and the matter of a consequence: In the present context, the way in which we here speak of matter and form, we understand by the matter of the proposition or consequentia the purely categorematic terms, i.e. subjects and predicates, omitting the syncategorematic terms that enclose them and through which they are conjoined or negated or distributed or forced to a certain mode of supposition. All the rest, we say, pertains to the form. (Buridan, TC, 30)

42 The view that the form of a consequence/argument pertains to its syncategorematic terms while its matter pertains to its categorematic terms is presupposed in both earlier and subsequent texts, but here with Buridan it receives a rare explicit formulation. A modern version of this idea still survives, in the form of the doctrine of the logical form of arguments and the modern preoccupation with logical constants (Read 1994; Dutilh Novaes 2012a; entry on logical constants of this encyclopedia). However, it is worth emphasizing once again that drawing the line between the form and the matter of an argument/consequence in this manner still does not entail the thesis that the form is that in virtue of which a valid argument is valid; nor does it entail the thesis that only the arguments/consequences satisfying the substitutional criterion are indeed valid. Buridan, in particular, does not hold either one of these theses. In the final section of Book I, Buridan formulates a series of general principles which follow from his proposed definition of consequence, such as that from the impossible anything follows (first conclusion), the principle of contraposition (third conclusion), and also many principles pertaining to the semantic properties of the categorematic terms in a consequence (see entry on medieval theories of properties of terms). Thus, here again we see that medieval theories of consequence never completely abandon the term perspective to adopt an exclusively sentential/propositional perspective. Book II of Buridan's treatise presents a sophisticated analysis of the logical behavior of modal sentences. Modal sentences can be either composite or divided, depending on where the modal term occurs: if it is either the subject or the predicate of the sentence, while the other term is an embedded sentence in nominalized form (in dictum form, in the medieval terminology), then the sentence is a composite modal sentence. If however the modal term occurs as an adverb modifying the copula, then it is a divided modal sentence. Buridan then proves a series of conclusions and equivalences for each kind of modal sentences, such as that B is necessarily A is equivalent to B is not possibly not A. The other treatises on consequence in the Parisian/continental tradition do not seem to have anything of substance to add to Buridan's, with one possible exception: the commentary on the Prior Analytics formerly attributed to Scotus (edited in Yrjnsuuri 2001), and whose authorship remains controversial. The dating is equally problematic; crucially, it is not clear whether it was written before or after Buridan's treatise, but some scholars (Lagerlund 2000, chapter 6) have argued that at any rate Pseudo-Scotus displays no knowledge of Buridan's treatise (likewise, there is no obvious evidence that Buridan was familiar with Pseudo-Scotus' text). The treatise proceeds very much in the spirit of chapter 3 of Book I of Buridan's treatise: a putative definition of consequence is proposed, but then quickly a counterexample is found, namely something that should not count as a consequence and yet satisfies the criterion, or the other way round (Boh 1982, 307310).[13] But while Buridan rests his case after the third proposed definition, Pseudo-Scotus goes on, and formulates a counterexample to the definition that Buridan settles on: God exists, hence this argument is invalid. If this consequence is valid, then it has a necessary antecedent and a false consequent (since the consequent says that it is invalid). But then it is invalid. In sum, if it is valid, it is invalid; thus, by the consequentia mirabilis ((A ~A) ~A), it is invalid. But if it is invalid, it is necessarily so, since the premise is a necessary sentence; therefore, we have a consequence with a necessary consequent, thus satisfying the necessary truth-preservation criterion, but which is plainly invalid. This has been described as a proto-version of Curry's paradox.[14]

43 The treatise of Pseudo-Scotus also offers an interesting formulation of the simple vs. as-of-now distinction: in contrast with e.g. Burley, according to Pseudo-Scotus this distinction applies only to material consequences (recall that for him, a formal consequence is the one that satisfies the substitutional criterion), and amounts to the modal value of the missing premise that can be added in order to turn the (enthymematic) consequence into a formal one. That is, if the missing premise is a necessary sentence, then the consequence is an absolute/simple one. But if the missing premise is a contingent truth (it has to be true with respect to the time indicated by the verbs of the consequence, otherwise the original material consequence does not hold), then the original material consequence holds only in some situations, namely the situations in which the contingent sentence happens to be true, and is thus an as-of-now consequence. The same formulation of the simple vs. as-of-now distinction can be found in Buridan's treatise, Book I chapter 4, which again illustrates the conceptual connection between the two texts. 3.4 The British School In the British tradition, which is then continued in Italy in the late 14th century and 15th century (Courtenay 1982), the definition of consequence in terms of necessary truth-preservation (TP) is also unanimously adopted, as for example in Billingham (Billingham/Weber 2003, 80), Strode (cited in (Pozzi 1978, 237)) and Paul of Venice (Logica Parva, p. 167). In fact, these authors present variations of (TP) without much discussion or analysis, contrary to what is found in Buridan's treatise, for example. More generally, the treatises in this tradition are characterized by a lesser degree of conceptual sophistication if compared to the earlier treatises by Ockham, Burley or Buridan. The goal seems to be mostly pedagogical, i.e. presenting rules of thumb to argue correctly, rather than presenting a systematic, conceptual analysis of the concept of consequence. Still, what is potentially novel in this tradition is a specific interpretation of the idea of the conclusion being contained/understood (intelligitur) in the premises that is, condition (Co) which these authors rely on extensively to define the concept of formal consequence. We have seen that for Abelard, this is a necessary condition for all consequences/inferences, which Martin (2004) spells out in terms of a criterion of relevance. 13th century authors, such as Kilwardby (for whom (Co) provided the definition of natural consequences) and Faversham, also discussed variations of this idea (Read 2010, 177/8), but prior to the late 14th century, it was typically not formulated in epistemic/psychological terms. The authors in the 14th century British tradition typically formulate the definition of formal consequence on the basis of variations of (Co), but giving it a more explicitly epistemic twist. Lavenham, for example, says (as quoted in King 2001, 133): A consequence is formal when the consequent necessarily belongs to the understanding of the antecedent, as it is in the case of syllogistic consequence, and in many enthymematic consequences. Strode presents a similar formulation: A consequence said to be formally valid is one of which if it is understood to be as is adequately signified through the antecedent then it is understood to be just as is adequately signified through the consequent. For if someone understands you to be a man then he understands you to be an animal. (Translation in Normore 1993, 449). Several other authors held similar definitions, such as Billingham (Weber 2003, 80) and Fland (Fland/Spade 1976). Normore (1993, 449) argues that a significant transformation occurred in the

44 14th century British tradition, which puts in play the idea that deduction is not an objective relation between abstract objects or sentences but a mental operation performed on the bases of what can be understood or imagined. This is noticeable not only in the definitions of formal (as opposed to material) consequence, but also in the very definitions of consequence which begin to mention mental acts, such as: a consequence is a derivation (illatio) of the consequent from the antecedent (Strode, quoted in Normore 1993, 449). The epistemic/psychological interpretation of these formulations of formal consequences has not gone uncontested; arguably, they are equally compatible with a semantic interpretation emphasizing the signification of sentences (Read 2010, 178). But it is clear that, while the Parisian tradition defined the concept of formal consequence in terms of (ST), the British tradition formulated the same concept in terms of (Co). Both were ideas that had been floating around for centuries, but which yield very different conceptions of what counts as a formal consequence. These two approaches are not only intensionally divergent; they also disagree on the extension of the class of formal consequences. (ST)-formal consequences do not include enthymematic consequences such as Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an animal, but (Co)-formal consequences typically do. For British authors, the class of material consequences is often composed exclusively of consequences of the kind from the impossible anything follows and the necessary follows from anything, which satisfy the truth-preservation criterion (TP) a fortiori, but typically fail relevant/containment criteria. God does not exist, therefore you are a donkey counts as a valid consequence according to (TP) (God does not exist is considered to be an impossible sentence), but the consequent is not contained in the antecedent in the same way as in Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an animal. To mark this distinction, 14th century British authors would typically view the former as a material consequence and the latter as a formal consequence (Ashworth &amp; Spade 1992). 4. Conclusion We started by surveying the ancient background for the emergence of Latin medieval theories of consequence, in particular Aristotle's Topics and Prior Analytics, the commentaries by the ancient commentators, and Boethius' influential logical texts. Theories of consequence only became an autonomous topic of investigation in the 14th century, but previous developments, in particular Abelard's theory of inference/entailment and the increasing application of hylomorphism to logic in the 13th century, are equally deserving of attention. Nevertheless, the golden age for theories of consequence was undoubtedly the 14th century, when different theories were proposed by Burley, Ockham, Buridan, Billingham, Strode, Paul of Venice, and many others. As with much of scholastic logic, the topic of consequence continued to be explored in the 15th century and beyond (Ashworth 1974, chapter III), providing the background for much of what was to come in the history of logic, in particular the persistent association between logic and forms (MacFarlane 2000). Bibliography Primary Literature Abelard, Peter, Dialectica, edited by Lambertus M. de Rijk, Assen: van Gorcum, 1956. Albert of Saxony, Perutilis logica, in the incunabular edition of Venice 1522, with a Spanish translation by A. Muoz Garca, Maracaibo: Univ. del Zulia, 1988. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.17, translation J. Barnes, S. Bobzien, K. Flannery, K. Ierodiakonou, London: Duckworth, 1991. Billingham, Richard, De Consequentiis, in S. Weber, Richard Billingham De Consequentiis mit Toledo-Kommentar, Amsterdam: B.R. Grner, 2003.

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Boethius, De hypotheticis syllogismis, L. Obertello (ed.), with Italian translation, Brescia: Paideia, 1969. , De topicis differentiis, D.Z. Nikitas (ed.), in Boethius: De topicis differentiis kai hoi buzantines metafraseis tou Manouel Holobolou kai Prochorou Kudone, Athens/Paris/Brussels: Academy of Athens/Vrin/Ousia (Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi. Philosophi Byzantini 5), 1969. Buridan, John, Iohannis Buridani tractatus de consequentiis, edited by Hubert Hubien), Series Philosophes Mdievaux, Vol. XVI, Louvain: Universit de Louvain, 1976. , Treatise on Supposition and Treatise on Consequences, in Peter King (tr.), John Buridan's Logic (The Treatise on Supposition; The Treatise on Consequences), translation from the Latin with a Philosophical Introduction, Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster: Reidel, 1985. , Summulae de Dialectica, translation by G. Klima, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. Burley, Walter, De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1955. , De Consequentiis, ed. N.J. Green-Pederson, Fransciscan Studies, 40 (1980): 102-166. , On the Purity of the Art of Logic the shorter and the longer treatises, transl. P.V. Spade, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. Fland, Robert, Consequentiae, in P.V. Spade, Robert Fland's Consequentiae: An Edition. Mediaeval Studies, 38 (1976): 5484. Garlandus Compotista, Dialectica, edited by Lambertus M. de Rijk, Assen: van Gorcum, 1959. Lavenham, Richard, in P.V. Spade, Five Logical Tracts by Richard Lavenham, in J. Reginald O'Donnell, ed., Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974, pp. 70124. Ockham, William (of), Opera Philosophica I, St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1974. Paul of Venice, Logica Parva, translation by. A. Perreiah, Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1984. , Logica Parva, edited by A. Perreiah, Leiden: Brill, 2002. Pseudo-Scotus, Questions on Aristotle's Prior Analytics: Question X, In Yrjnsuuri (ed.) 2001, pp. 225234. Schupp, F., Logical problems of the medieval theory of consequences, with the edition of the Liber consequentiarum, Naples: Bibliopolis, 1988. Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones Super Libro Elenchorum, edited by Sten Ebbesen et al, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1984. Strode, Ralph, Tractatus de Consequentiis, in W. Seaton, An Edition and Translation of the Tractatus de Consequentiis by Ralph Strode, Fourteenth Century Logician and Friend of Geoffrey Chaucer, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1973.

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, 2004, Logic, in J. Brower and K. Gilfoy (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Abelard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 158199. , 2005, Formal consequence in Scotus and Ockham: towards an account of Scotus' logic, in O. Boulnois, E. Karger, J.-L. Solre, G. Sondag (eds.), 1302: Duns Scot Paris 1302 2002, Actes du colloque de Paris, septembre 2002, Turnout: Brepols. , 2009, The logical textbooks and their influence, in J. Marenbon (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 5684. Netz, R., 1999, The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: A study in cognitive history, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Normore, C., 1993, The necessity in deduction: Cartesian inference and its medieval background, Synthese, 96: 437454. Pozzi, L., 1978, Le consequentiae nella logica medievale, Padova: Liviana. Read, S., 1993, Formal and material consequence, disjunctive syllogism and Gamma, in K. Jacobi (ed.) 1993, pp. 233262. , 1994, Formal and material consequence, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 23: 24765 , 2001, Self-reference and validity revisited, in M. Yrjnsuuri (ed.) 2001, pp. 183196. , 2010, Inference, in R. Pasnau (ed.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Rijk, L. M., 19621967, Logica Modernorum, Assen: van Gorcum. Schupp, F., 1993, Zur Textrekonstruktion der formalen und materialen Folgerung in der kritischen Ockham-Ausgabe, In K. Jacobi (ed.) 1993, pp. 213221. Shapiro, S., 2005, Logical consequence, proof theory, and model theory, in S. Shapiro, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 651670. Spade, P.V., 2000, Introduction to Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic, New Haven: Yale University Press. Spruyt, J., 2003, The Forma-Materia Device in Thirteenth-Century Logic and Semantics, Vivarium, 41: 146. Stump, E., 1982, Topics: their development and absorption into consequences, in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds.) 1982, pp. 273299. Sundholm, B. G., 1998, Inference, consequence, implication: a constructivist's perspective, Philosophia Mathematica, 6: 178194. Tarski, A., 2002, On the Concept of Following Logically, History and Philosophy of Logic, 23, 155196. Thom, P., 2007, Logic and Ontology in the Syllogistic of Robert Kilwardby, Leiden: Brill. , 2010, Three conceptions of formal logic, Vivarium, 48 (1-2): 228242. Yrjnsuuri, M. (ed.), 2001, Medieval Formal Logic, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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