1) Please describe in bullet points how application of procedural due process, substantive due process, the socalled

takings clause, and the Community Development Act formerly known as the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Act or Growth Management Act come together to establish a procedural and
substantiveframeworkforconsiderationofapplicationsfordevelopmentapproval.

Dueprocess,whichcomesfromthe5
th
amendmentoftheU.S.Constitution,istheapplicationoftheconceptthatno
person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. There are two prongs to due
process: (1) procedural, which I would summarize as making sure our legal processes are fair; and (2) substantive,
whichIwouldsummarizeasmakingsurethelegaloutcomeisnecessaryandnotdiscriminatory.

Intermsofconsideringanapplicationfordevelopmentapproval,proceduraldueprocessexiststomakesurethereare
severalcriteriametthroughouttheprocess.Thesecriteriaoutlinedbelowattempttokeeptheprocessofdecidingona
development approval fair for all parties involved the property owner, developer, and any other residents or
neighbors who might be negatively or positively impacted by the proposed development. It is meant to ensure a
participatory procedure with meaningful participation and timely notice, and a process with clear rules and equal
treatment.

o The process must give notice to all parties. This means notice that is timely and effectively disseminated. A
problemwiththishasalwaysbeendecidingonwhatconstituteseffectivenotice,sincesomeresidentsmaylookto
websites for information while others prefer mailed notices of a hearing, though some cities may find the most
costeffectiveoptionisjusttoplaceasignatthepropertyunderconsideration.Keepingaconsistentpolicyforhow
andwhennoticeofahearingistobegivenisthebestwaytomitigatethis,sinceallresidents will knowwhatto
expect.

o Just like in a criminal or civil trial where both the accused and the plaintiff have a right to be heard as per
proceduraldueprocess,theremustbeanadministrativehearingregardingdevelopmentapprovalswherecitizens
havetherighttobeheardbyaneutralcommitteebeforeadecisionismade.

Weaknesses implicit to hearings include that the committee may not actually be impartial. Corrupt council
membersmayputtheirowninterestsaheadofcommunityfavorandthusapproveordenyadecisionwithout
regard to opinions expressed during a hearing, or may have taken part in ex parte communication and been
unduly influenced by information not presented to the public within the confines of the hearing. Per the
SunshineLaw,suchcommunicationsshouldbedisclosed,buttheyarenotalwaysdonesosufficiently.

Because no government system can absolutely ensure the presence of a fair and impartial tribunal, the best
way to mitigate these weaknesses (which would be violations of procedural due process) is to appeal the
decisiontothecourtsystemviaawritofcertiorariandallowthecourttoreviewtherecordofthehearing.

o One of the ways procedural due process is met in administrative hearings is to keep an accurate record, which
includes everything that was said or submitted to the committee during the hearing. Issues may arise when the
record is referred to by thecourts, whichcannot always tell whether the statements (for instance,regarding the
amountofsurplustrafficthatwillbegeneratedbytheproposeddevelopment)aremadebydisgruntledneighbors
orbytrafficengineerswithsubjectmatterexpertise.Awaytomitigatethisissueistoallowforcrossexamination
of speakers during the hearing, though this may prolong the meeting and risk ruffling a few feathers of the
committee.

Substantive due process also comes into play in an application for development approval. For one, it means that the
governments land use decisions should bear a relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare (as per Euclid v.
Ambler, 1926). In the context of major land use or zoning decisions, the courts generally defer to local government
decisions in these areas as long as city staff can show at least a fairly debatable link between their decision and the
publichealth,safety,andwelfare.Thus,ifanapplicationfordevelopmentapprovalisapproved,anditisappealedto
thecourts,andthecourtsfindthattherewasnoproceduraldueprocessviolationandthelocalgovernmentsdecision
wasfairlydebatable,itwouldlikelybeupheld.

However, some courtshavefound that when a land usedecision applies to onlya few (e.g., < 5) parcels, it maybe a
quasijudicialratherthanalegislativedecisionanditcouldbesubjecttostrictscrutinybythecourts(Brevardv.Snyder,
1993). Other times when an administrative decision is subject to strict scrutiny include when a suspect classification,
suchasrace,orafundamentalrightisthoughttoinvolved.

o This part of the substantive due process framework is contested, because it could theoretically make the courts
the final decisionmaking authority on individual development decisions, and thus bypass the local governments
authority for these decisions, which notably was not intended under Floridas 1985 Growth Management Act. In
addition,sincelowercourtjudgesarealsoelected,likethecitygovernmentmembers,therecannotalwaysbean
assuranceofimpartiality.

Inthemid1970s,asaresultoflocalgovernmentsinabilitytodealwithrapidpopulationgrowthinFlorida,thestate
passed the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, which among other
thingsrequiredthatlocalgovernmentsadoptcomprehensiveplanscompliantwithstateandregionalplans,andthen
makelandusedecisionsinaccordancewiththeplan.Thisactfurtheredthesubstantiveandproceduralframeworkby
adding another layer of justification for the context of development decisions (you can test in court whether it
complies with the plan) and set up a process for appealing certain decisions to an adjudicatory commission, which
fulfilledtheneedforahearingbutlimitedwhohadtherighttoparticipate.

The1970sELMSlawswerealsokeyfordesignatingaprocessfordevelopmentdecisionsconcerningdevelopmentsof
regional impact (DRIs) and for protecting areas of critical state concerns, such as the Florida Green Swamp or Florida
Keyswheredevelopmentcouldhaveseriousenvironmentalramifications.

o Alimitationoftheadjudicatoryprocesssetupinthe1970slawswasthatonlycertainpeoplehadstandingtobe
heardbythefinaladministrativepanel(youhadtobeastateplanningagency,propertyowner,orthedeveloper).
Individualcitizenshadnosay.

As a result of a number of issues with the 1970s legislation, including costly and lengthy development approvals,
inadequatefunding,limitedstandingtoappealdecisions,andacontinuedinabilityoflocalgovernmentstocopewith
infrastructureandenvironmentalconcernsduetopopulationgrowth,in1985Floridapassedanupdatedactknownas
theGrowthManagementAct.

UndertheGrowthManagementAct,therewerestricterrequirementsonlocalgovernmentsadoptionandcontentof
comprehensiveplans.Inadditiontorequiringthatlocallandusedecisionswereconsistentwiththeplan,whichwas
consistentwithstateandregionalmandates,therewasaconcurrencyrequirementtoensureadequateinfrastructure
concomitant with development decisionsalthough this concept did not take effect as intended. (Rather than
achievingappropriatepublicfacilities,developmentleapfroggedtoplaceswherethedeveloperwouldnotneedtobear
thecostsofwideningroadsetc.)

As a consequence of Growth Management, the due process framework for approving or denying a development
application must now take into account whether the application is consistent with the comprehensive plan, and now
cities must offer a hearing to any affected citizens (not just property owners or developers) who are challenging the
decision,whichistooccurviaanadministrativeappealprocess(seeearlierbulletsforissueswithcourtsnowbeingthe
finalsaysoonsomedevelopmentdecisions).

In addition to the quiet revolution in growth management that took place in Florida in the 1970s and 1980s, the
takingsclauseoftheU.S.Constitution,whichholdsthatprivatepropertyshouldnotbetakenforpublicuse,without
just compensation (5
th
Amendment), has also been an important topic in substantive due process. Since courts are
allowed to review the substance of legislative decisions as part of substantive due process, they can review cases
where a taking is alleged in land use. This was particularly important in the 1970s when local governments were
pushing the envelope as far as they could in terms of land use regulations in order to preserve a wealthy, white
identity.

Importantcasesthathaveshapedthesubstantiveissueoftakingsarebrieflysummarizedbelow.

o Pumpelly v. Green Bay (1871): Court recognized that an exercise of government power can have an impact that
constitutesataking,evenifthegovernmentdoesnottaketitletotheland.

o Mugler v. Kansas (1887): Government can prohibit noxious or illegal uses (such as Prohibition) without it
constitutingatakingofyourrighttouseyourproperty.

o Hadacheckv.Sebastian(1915):Whatconstitutesaneconomicallybeneficialuseofyourpropertycanchangeover
timeandnotbeconsideredataking.

o PennsylvaniaCoalv.Mahon(1922):Ifaregulationgoestoofar,itcanbeconsideredaregulatorytaking.

o PennCentralv.NewYork(1978):Determiningthejurisprudenceoftakingslooksatthedevelopmentasawhole,
not discrete segments, wherein the whole property must be deprived of all economically beneficial uses no
partialtakings.

o Monell v. City of New York (1978): Court ruled that governments, like corporations, are considered persons
underthelawandthuscanbeheldliablefordamagesinFederalcourtundercivilrightslawsaswellasliablefor
justcompensationinstatecourtsunderthetakingsclause.

Aweaknessofthetakingsissueisthatcourtsmaybehesitanttorulealegislativeactionasataking,becausethecourts
knowthatthemoneytopaythejustcompensation(andpossibledamages)willhavetocomefrompubliccoffersand
bedivertedawayfromnecessitiessuchaseducation.

OnesuchpossibleremedytotheissueofregulatorytakingsmaybelegislationsuchasFloridasBurtJ.HarrisProperty
Rights Act, which establishes an alternative dispute resolution process to resolve questions of regulatory excess
between the affected property owner and the government. Through this procedure, courts can be avoided and a
theoretically impartial arbiter can overseethedispute. To be fair to the property owner under this law,governments
areobligatedtoproposesuitablealternatives,whichtheyarenotrequiredtodothroughthenormalprocedure.

2)Acityszoningcodeprovidesthatnoticeshallbegivenatleastfourteen(14)dayspriortoapublichearingonazoning
matterbypostingasignofatleastfour(4)squarefeetonthepropertywhichisthesubjectofthezoningmatterandby
publishingnoticeinanewspaperofgeneralcirculation.Thenightofascheduledpublichearing,thecitydiscoversthat
noticewaspublishedinthenewspaper,butthatnoticewaspostedonthewrongproperty.Whatshouldthecitydo?
Postponethehearingandgivenoticeagainorproceedwiththehearingasscheduled?Pleaseexplainthebasisforyour
answer.

Thecityshouldpostponethehearingandgivenoticeagain.Becausethecityszoningcodeexplicitlystatesthat
noticeshouldbegivenbothinthenewspaperandpostedontheproperty,thecitycouldbeliableforviolatingprocedural
dueprocess.Itispossiblethatsomepersonsaffectedbythezoningmattermayhaveseenthepostingonthe(wrong)
propertyandpreparedanargumentoropinionthusly,basedontheexpectationthatthecitywasgivingnoticeofa
hearingonthat(wrong)property.Assuch,ifthehearinghadproceededasscheduled,thepartieswhosawthecorrect
noticeinthenewspaperwouldhaveanunfairadvantageoverthosethathadreliedonthecityspostingprocess.This
violatestheconceptofkeepingthehearingfundamentallyfairforallinvolved,whichisacornerstoneforproceduraldue
process.Asaquasijudicialproceeding,thezoninghearingisstillrequiredtobefundamentallyfair.Goingaheadwiththe
regularlyscheduledmeetingisnotonlyunfairtotheresidentspotentiallyaffectedbythezoningmatter,italsogoes
againstthecitysownzoningcodesparametersforhowtogiveeffectivenoticeanditwilllikelyopenupthecityto
litigationfollowingthehearing.Theeasiestandmostfairsolutionforallinvolvedistoreschedulethehearingand
redistributecorrectednotices.

3)AzoningmattercomesbeforeaCityCouncilforapublichearing.Afterthetitleoftheproposedapprovalisreadinto
therecord,theclerkswearsinallofthemembersoftheaudiencewhoplantospeakatthehearing.Duringthehearing,
aneighborwhowasnotsworncomesintothehearingroomandwhenthereisanopportunitytospeakdoesso;and
theDirectorofPlanningrealizesthatthepersonhadnotbeensworn.WhatshouldthePlanningDirectordoandexplain
yourthinkingorreasoning?

ThePlanningDirectorshouldstopthepersonfromspeaking,swearthemin,andthenletthemcontinuespeaking
fortheallottedtimeaseveryoneelsewasallowedto.Myrationaleforthisgoesbacktotheproceduraldueprocess
requirementoffundamentalfairness.WhentheCityCouncilholdsapublichearingonazoningmatterwhichaffects
individualinterests,itisaquasijudicialproceedingthatisrequiredtogooninafundamentallyfairandreasonable
manner.Swearinginallspeakersatthestartofthemeetinginoneactioniscertainlyanefficientwaytoconductthe
councilmeetingandshouldbeencouraged;however,thereisnoharmfromswearinginspeakersoneatatimeasthey
speakduringthemeeting.Todenysomeonetheirrighttobeheardonazoningmatterthatcouldaffectthemortheir
propertysimplyisaviolationofthatpersonsproceduraldueprocessandcouldbethebasisofafuturechallengetothe
zoningordinance.Idonotbelievethattheallottedtimeforswearinginthespeakershadpassedwouldbeasufficient
justificationfordenyingdueprocessifthematterwerechallengedincourt.Rather,itismorereasonabletoassumethat
thepersoncouldbequicklyswornin,allowedtospeakforthesameamountoftimeaswasgiventootherspeakers,and
themeetingtoproceedasusualwithoutgreatinterferenceortimedelay.

In1989,theSupremeCourtofHawaiiwrotethefollowing,whichappliedtothissituation:Thebasicelementsof
proceduraldueprocessoflawrequirenoticeandanopportunitytobeheardatameaningfultimeandinameaningful
mannerbeforegovernmentaldeprivationofasignificantpropertyinterest.Dueprocessisnotafixedconceptrequiringa
specificproceduralcourseineverysituation.Dueprocessisflexibleandcallsforsuchproceduralprotectionsasthe
particularsituationdemands.
1
Inordertogiveeachspeakertheirsaidproceduralprotectionsinthepublichearingon
thezoningmatter,theCityCouncilwouldneedtobeflexibleintheswearinginprocessbyallowingforlatecomerstobe
sworninindividually.

1
SandyBeachDefenseFundv.CityCounciloftheCityandCountyofHonolulu,April18,1989,(70Haw.361)

4)Pleasediscusstheconstitutionallimitsondevelopmentexactionsintermsoftherelationshipbetweenanexaction
andthejustificationfortheexactionandtheamountandformofanexaction.

Asanexerciseofthepolicepower,localgovernmentshavebegunimplementingafeeknownasanexactionasa
waytofundtheservices,infrastructure,orothercommunityimprovementsthatmaybeneededwhenthereisgrowthin
thecommunity.Exactionscancomeinmanyforms,fromimpactfeestorequiringthededicationofcertainportionsof
privatepropertytopublicuse.Exactionsarewagedonthedeveloperorpropertyowner(s)atthetimedevelopment
beginsinordertomitigatetheimpactsofthefuturegrowth.Thistoolofthelocalgovernmentisatypeoflanduse
regulationthathasitsjustificationinitslinktothepublichealth,safety,andwelfare:byallocatingthecostofbuildingout
publicfacilitiestothepropertyownerordeveloper,exactionsareintendedtoprotectexistingresidentsfromtheimpacts
ofgrowthbyprovidingarevenuesourcetopayforneededpublicfacilities.
1

Asnotedabove,exactionsarenotamunicipalorstatewidetax.Theyarenotbroadlybasedfeesorfinespaidbyall
residentstothecity.Rather,exactionsarespecifictoolsforfinancingadefinedimpactofdevelopmentinacertainarea.
Thus,theirusemustberoughlyproportionaltotheimpactofthedevelopment.Thisessentiallymeansthattheamount
andform(e.g.,feeorpropertyuse)oftheexactionmustbedictatedbyareasonablerelationshiptothe
development/growth.Anexactionislimitedbyanumberofaspects,includingwhetherthescopeofthedevelopment
trulymeritstheamount,typeof,andcostofnewpublicamenitiesbeingassessedandwhetherthedevelopmentpaying
fortheexactionisreceivingareasonablebenefitfromthenewfacilities.Courtshaveupheldthesecriteriaundera
rationalnexustestofthelinkbetweentheexactionandalegitimatepublicinterest.

AnexampleofthiswasseeninNollanv.CaliforniaCoastalCommission(1987),whereabeachfrontpropertyowner
wasrequiredbytheCoastalCommissiontodedicateaportionofhislandforpublicbeachaccess.Thecourtoverturned
theregulation,findingitasatakingoftheprivatepropertyandnotanallowableexactionbecausetherewasnota
reasonablerelationshipbetweentheexactionandtheconstructionproject.
2
Ofnote,thecourtaddressedtheformofthe

exactioninparticular,sayingthatanimpactfeemayhavebeenmorerelevantthantakingthepropertyitself.

1
JenniferEvansCowley,DevelopmentExactions:ProcessandPlanningIssues,LincolnInstituteofLandPolicy(2006).
2
Ibid.

5)Explainwhydefinite(measurable)standardsarearequirementofproceduraldueprocessintermsofthecharacterof
thelocaldecisionmakingprocessandduringjudicialreview.

Inthelocaldecisionmakingprocess,therearemanytypesofmeetingsandhearings.Someoftheseare
administrative,somearelegislative,andsomearequasijudicial.Proceduraldueprocessprotectionsinaquasijudicial
hearingarethemoststringent,andcities/municipalitiesmusttakegreatcaretoensureadherencetoproceduraldue
processinthesecases.Ifthereisdissentregardingthefinallandusedecision,thedissentingpartymaytrytobringacourt
challengetothedecisionviatheprocessofjudicialreview.Judicialreview(firstestablishedinMarburyv.Madison[1803])
istheplatformbywhichthecourtcanreviewtherecordofapublichearingessentially,everythingthatwassaidand
doneinthecourseofmakingthelandusedecision.Underjudicialreview,thecourtreviewstherecordforits
constitutionality,whichincludesmakingsurethatdueprocesswasfollowedinthecourseofmakingthedecision.

Thepurposeofdueprocesslawsistoensurethatindividualsarenotsubjectedtothearbitraryexerciseof
governmentpower;thus,dueprocessrequiresthattheproceduresbywhichlawsareappliedmustbeevenhanded.
1

Moreover,whenexaminingtherecord,courtslooktoseethatthelandusedecisionwasbasedonfindingsoffactandwas
notarbitraryorcapricious.Ifadecisionappearstobearbitrary,itcanbeoverturnedonthebasisofalackofdueprocess.
Definite,measurablestandardscanhelpstrengthentherecordandensurethatthelandusedecisionwasbasedona
definedlineofreasoningorpolicy(establishedstandards)thatthecourtcanlooktoandrelyuponaswell,thereby
mitigatingtheriskofaseeminglyarbitrarydecision.Moreover,astheEqualProtectionclauseofthe14
th
Amendment
readsnorshallanyStatedepriveanypersonoflife,liberty,orproperty,withoutdueprocessoflaw;nordenytoany
personwithinitsjurisdictiontheequalprotectionofthelaws,definitestandardshelpcitiesensurethat
laws/regulations/landusedecisionsarebeingappliedtoallcitizensimpartiallyandwithoutdiscrimination.Demonstrating
thisisparticularlyimportant,asaconcernthatalocaldecisionwasmadebasedonasuspectclassificationwillcausethe
courttolookverycloselyatthedecisionunderastrictscrutinyjudicialreview,whichplacesamuchlargerburdenonthe
state.

1
TheRequirementsofDueProcess,Justia.com,nodate,http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment14/36
proceduraldueprocesscivil.html

6)Atthebeginningofapublichearing,theMayorasksthemembersoftheCityCouncilifanyofthemhaveanyexparte
communicationstodisclose.Thefirstcouncilpersonstatesthatshemetwithawholebunchofneighborswhowere
opposedtotheproject.ThesecondcouncilpersonstatesthathetalkedtoMr.DeveloperandMr.Developer
encouragedhimtosupporttheproposal.ThethirdcouncilpersonstatesthathehadalsotalkedtoMr.Developer.The
fourthcouncilpersonstatesthathedidnttalktoanyoneanddidntneedtobecauseshehasalwaysbeenopposedto
thekindofhousingthatwasproposedinourcity.TheMayorfinishedthedisclosuresbystatingthathehadtalkedto
bothsidesoftheissueinordertounderstandtheirpositions.Pleasediscussindetailthelegalimplicationsandissues
raisedbythesedisclosurestatements.

Tounderstandthelegalramificationsofthestatementsmadeintheaforementionedpublichearing,wemustfirst
understandexpartecommunicationwhatitis,whatimpactsithasonthelocaldecisionmakingprocess,andwhatthe
lawsaregoverningit.Expartecommunicationisdefinedasanycontactorcommunication,whetherbyaninperson
conversation,emails,telephonecalls,orothermeans,betweentwoormoremembersofapublicgoverningbody,board,
orcommissionregardingaquasijudicialissuethatcouldpotentiallycomebeforethebodyforadecision.Exparte
communicationfurtherextendstosuchcommunicationbetweenamemberofthegoverningbodyandanonmember
whohasanopinion,interest,orroleintheissuecomingbeforethepublicbody.Intheexampleinquestionnumberone,
eachcouncilpersonwhodiscussedthematteroutsideofthepublichearingbothtotheoppositionandtoMr.
Developerwasguiltyofexpartecommunication.Undertheprinciplesofproceduraldueprocess,itispresumedtobe
fundamentallyunfairtoengageinexpartecontactsoutsideofthepublichearingprocesswithapartyinvolvedor
potentiallyinvolvedinamatterbefore[the]commission.
1
Inaquasijudicialproceeding,suchcommunicationis

consideredaviolationofproceduraldueprocessandcouldresultinthelocaldecisionbeingoverturnedbythelowercourt
andevenimposemonetarydamages/requirecompensationfromthecity.

Severalofthescenariosstatedinthequestioninvolvedprivatediscussionsoverapublicmatter.Forinstance,
whenthefirstcouncilpersonmetwiththeneighbors,Mr.Developerwasnotpresent.Ashehasnoknowledgeofwhat
discussionstookplacebetweenthecouncilpersonandtheneighbors,hedoesnotknowwhatheisupagainstorwhat
evidencetheneighborspresented,thusheisunabletosufficientlypreparehimselftocounterthenegativetestimonythey
mayhavegiven.Hewasalsodeprivedofhisrighttocrossexaminetheneighborsontheirdiscussionswiththecouncil
person.Likewise,whenthesecondandthirdcouncilpersonsspokewithMr.Developeroutsideofthecontextofthepublic
hearing,theneighborsweregivennonoticethatthatmeetingbetweenthecouncilpersonsandthedeveloperwasgoing
totakeplaceandweredeprivedoftheirrightstounderstandwhatwassaid,crossexaminethedeveloper,andgivetheir
owntestimonieseachofwhichinitselfissupposedtobeaffordedtoallpartiesunderdueprocess.Assuch,thesetwo
councilmemberscouldbeundulybiasedtowardthepositionofMr.Developergoingintothepublichearing,justasthe
firstcouncilmembercouldbebiasedfortheneighbors.WhiletheMayormadeitclearthathespoketobothsidesand
couldbepresumedtobeunbiasedasaresultofhearingbothsides,theinabilityforthepartiestocommentonorrefute
thestatementsmadebytheotherpartiesstillmakesthisexpartecommunicationguiltyofinfringingondueprocess.Such
formsofexpartecommunicationhavebeenheldbycourtstoviolatedueprocessforseveralreasons,oneofwhichisthat
theopposingpartywasnotgivennoticethatthemeetingwasoccurring.(MuttonHillEstatesInc.v.Oakland,468A.2d989
(Me.1983),appealafterremand,488A2d151(1985))
2

InFlorida,expartecommunicationisgovernedbytheSunshineLaw,whichestablishesrulesforthedisclosureof
suchcommunication.Underthislaw,whenthecommunicationisproperlydisclosedatthestartofthepublichearingand
madepartoftherecord,itcanbeconsideredtonullifythepresumptionofprejudice
3
ofthecouncilpersonswho
engagedintheexpartecontact.Asitrelatestothescenariopresentedinthequestion,thedisclosuremustcontainthe
subjectofthecommunicationandtheidentityoftheperson,group,orentitywithwhomthecommunicationtookplace.
4

FollowingthesedisclosuresasmadebytheCityCouncilatthepublichearing,theneighborsandMr.Developermusthave
theopportunitytorefuteorrespondtothecommunicationsthattookplaceoutsideofthepublichearing.

Thefourthcouncilpersonwhostatedthatshedidnotneedtotalktoanyonebecauseshehasalwaysbeen
opposedtotheproposedhousingtyperaisesaslightlydifferentlegalissue.Akeycomponentofdueprocessistherightto
animpartialtribunal,whichthiscouncilpersonhasalreadystatedsheisnot.Aftertheconclusionofthehearing,ifthe
councildeniedhisrequest,Mr.Developerwouldlikelychallengethedecisionincourtbasedonthebiasofthecouncil,as
hehadarighttopresentevidenceandhaveitheardbeforeadecisionwasmade.AnegativedecisionforMr.Developer
couldbeconstruedasarbitraryratherthanbasedonfindingsoffactasaresultofthiscouncilpersonsbias.

1
DwightH.MerriamandRobertJ.Sitkowski,ProceduralDueProcessinPractice,PlanningCommissionersJournal,
Number31,Summer1998
2
Ibid.
3
FloridasGovernmentintheSunshineLawandRelatedStatutes,Section286.0115
4
Ibid.

7)Pleasediscussordescribethesubstantivedifferencebetweenasubstantivedueprocesschallengetoalocalzoning
regulationasappliedtoaparticularparcelofland,andthescopeofjudicialreviewincircuitcourtundercertiorari
reviewofazoningmatterconductedasaquasijudicialmatter.

Dueprocess,whichcomesfromthe5
th
amendmentoftheU.S.Constitution,istheapplicationoftheconceptthat
nopersonshouldbedeprivedoflife,liberty,orpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.Therearetwoprongstodue
process:procedural,whichhasalreadybeendiscussedatlengthinthepriorexamquestions,andsubstantive,which
essentiallyentailsmakingsurethatthestatesdecisionsregardinglanduse(inthiscase)arenecessaryanddonot
arbitrarilydiscriminateorinfringeontherightsoftheprivateindividual.Substantivedueprocessmeansthatthe
governmentszoningdecisionsshouldbeararelationshiptothepublichealth,safety,andwelfare(asperEuclidv.Ambler,
1926).Achallengeofazoningdecisionbasedonsubstantivedueprocesswouldentaildemonstratingthatthestatehad
deprivedyouoftheuseofyourlandwithoutsufficientcauseorreason(i.e.,arbitrarily)becausethezoningregulationwas
notlinkedtothepublichealth,safety,orwelfare,orbecauseitranafoulofthelocalComprehensivePlan.Alternatively,a

substantivedueprocesschallengecouldseektodemonstratethatthestateszoningregulationhaddeprivedyouofthe
useofyourlandtosuchanextentastoconstituteatakingundertheConstitution.

UndertheStandardStateZoningEnablingAct,azoningdecisioncanbeappealedtothecourtsystemviaawritof
certiorari,wherebythepersonwithstandingtoappealthedecisionrequeststhatthecourtreviewtherecordofthe
zoningboardsdecision.Thescopeofjudicialreviewusingcertioraristandardsishighlydeferentialtotheboard,withthe
courtpresumingthedecisionoftheboardiscorrectandvalidsolongasthedecisionisconsistentwithdueprocessofthe
lawandbasedonevidence,notabiastowardoragainsttheapplicant.
1
Majorareasfallingunderthescopeofcertiorari
judicialreviewincludethefollowing:(1)whethertheboardhadtheauthorityorjurisdictiontomakethedecision;(2)
whethertheboardfollowedlegalproceduresandstandardsunderdueprocessandlocal,state,andnational
codes/ordinances/laws;(3)whethertherewasabiasorothermotivationasidefromfairjudgment,policy,orevidencefor
makingthedecision;and(4)whetherareasonablepersoncouldhavecometothesameconclusion.
2

AsfoundbythecourtinBrevardv.Snyder(1993),whenalandusedecisionisappliedtoonlyafew(e.g.,<5)
parcels,itmaybeaquasijudicialratherthanalegislativedecisionanditcouldbesubjecttoastrictscrutinyjudicial
review.Unlikeinitialzoningenactmentsandcomprehensiverezoningsorrezoningsaffectingalargeportionofthepublic,
arezoningactionwhichentailstheapplicationofageneralruleorpolicytospecificindividuals,interests,oractivitiesis
quasijudicialinnature.Underthelattercircumstances,thecourtreasonedthatastricterstandardofjudicialreviewofthe
rezoningdecisionwasrequired.
3

Understrictscrutiny,thescopeofjudicialreviewismuchmorestringentthanforothertypesofjudicialreview.
Thecourtslookverycloselyattherecordandrequirethestatetoshowthatitsregulationservesacompellingpublic
interest.Thestatewilllikelyalsohavetoshowthattherewasnotalessrestrictivealternativeavailablethatcouldhave
beenused.Essentially,azoningmatterasappliedtoaparticularparcelthatinvolvesachangeinstatusofthatparcelmay
requirethegovernmenttoshowreasonsforitsactionsbasedonfact,withthecourtreviewingtheevidencetosupport
thedecision(whichdiffersfromcertioraricaseswherethecourtreviewstherecordbutdoesnotconductfactfinding)and
thelegaladequacy,underapplicablelaw(i.e.,undergeneralcomprehensivezoningordinances,applicablestateandcase
lawandstateandfederalconstitutionalprovisions)ofthereasonsgivenfortheresultoftheactiontaken.
4
Ifthecourt
findsthatsubstantivedueprocesswasviolatedintheapplicationofazoningdecisiontoaparcel(s),thestatecouldbe
liableforjustcompensationunderthetakingsclause,andmayalsobethesubjectofalawsuitundertheFederalCivil
RightsActthatcouldincreasethemonetarydamagesforwhichthecityisliable.

Othertimeswhenanadministrativedecisionissubjecttostrictscrutinyincludewhenasuspectclassification,such
asrace,orafundamentalrightisthoughttoinvolved.Thispartofthesubstantivedueprocessframework(viewingland
usedecisionsonindividualparcelsasaquasijudicialaction)iscontested,becauseitcouldtheoreticallymakethecourts
thefinaldecisionmakingauthorityonindividualdevelopmentdecisions,andthusbypassthelocalgovernmentsauthority
forthesedecisions.

Becausesubstantivedueprocesschallengestozoningmatterscanbeverycomplexandpotentiallycostlyto
litigate(intermsofcourtcostsandfinancialliabilityforthecityiftheregulationwasindeedconsideredataking),there
havebeenattemptstocreatealternativedisputeresolutionprocessessuchasthroughFloridasBurtJ.HarrisProperty
RightsAct.ThisActaddressessubstantiveissuesbyputtinginplaceaprocedureforresolvingquestionsofregulatory
excessbetweentheaffectedpropertyownerandthegovernment.Throughthisprocedure,courtscanbeavoidedanda
theoreticallyimpartialarbitercanoverseethedispute.Tobefairtothepropertyownerunderthislaw,governmentsare
obligatedtoproposesuitablealternatives,whichtheyarenotrequiredtodothroughthenormalprocedure.

1
LynnMarkhamandRebeccaRoberts,ZoningBoardHandbook,UniversityofWisconsin,StevensPoint,2006.
2
Ibid.
3
BoardofCountyCommissionersofBrevardCounty,Floridav.JackR.Snyder,etux.,SupremeCourtofFlorida,No.79,720,
October7,1993
4
Ibid.

8)Explainyourunderstandingoftheroleofthedeferentialstandardofjudicialreview(fairlydebatableruleusedby
theU.S.SupremeCourttodecidethelandmarkfacialconstitutionalchallengetozoningin1926inVillageofEuclidv.
AmblerRealtyCo.)versusthenomorerestrictivethannecessarystandardwhichwasusedbymanystatesinas
appliedchallengesinthecontextofthehistoricalpracticeofzoningdiscrimination(e.g.raceorwealth)andgrowth
management.

InEuclidv.AmblerRealtyCo.(1926)andinsubsequentchallengestolandusedecisions,courtshavegenerally
upheldthattheactionofthecityinmakingmajorlanduseorzoningregulationsaffectinglargeswathsofacityorthe
entirecityisconsideredtobealegislativeact.InEuclid,thecourtfoundthatfacially(or,takingthezoningcodeinits
entirety),itwasnotunconstitutionalforalocalgovernmenttoactwithinitslegislativecapacitytoenactordinances
regardingzoning,aslocalgovernmentshavetheabilitytopasslawsviatheirexerciseofthepolicepower.Asstatedbythe
courtinEuclid,Thepolicepowersupportsalso,generallyspeaking,anordinanceforbiddingtheerectionindesignated
residentialdistricts,ofbusinesshousessincesuchordinances,apartfromspecialapplications,cannotbedeclaredclearly
arbitraryandunreasonable,andwithoutsubstantialrelationtothepublichealth,safety,morals,orgeneralwelfare.
1
In
thismanner,thecourtdeterminedtheconstitutionalityofzoningfacially,withinthecontextofadheringtosubstantivedue
process,whenthelocalzoningcodewastakenasawholeandnotchallengedonthebasisofhowaparticularprovisionof
thatcodeisapplied.

WhentheSupremeCourtdecidedEuclidin1926,itusedthefollowingstatementaspartofitsreasoning:Ifthe
validityofthelegislativeclassificationforzoningpurposesbefairlydebatable,thelegislativejudgmentmustbeallowedto
control.
2
Essentially,thismeansthatwhenacitysdecision(madewhenthecityisactinginitslegislativecapacity)is
challengedinthecourtsystem,courtsgenerallydefertothelocalgovernmentsdecisionsaslongascitystaffcanshowat
leastafairlydebatablelinkbetweentheirregulationandthepublichealth,safety,andwelfare.Thecourtwantstoseethat
thecityhadareasonableargumentformakingitsdecisionandthatthedecisionwasfairandbasedonfact,notthewhims
orattitudesofapublicofficialtowardaparticularindividualorsituation.Aslongasthecitycandemonstratethis,thecourt
willnotlookcloselyattheprosandconsofthecitysdecision.Therationaleforthisliesinthefactthatthejudiciary,while
responsibleforensuringthelegality,constitutionality,andfairnessoflegislativedecisions,isnotthelegislatureandshould
notcontrolthemannerinwhichlocalcodesarewritten.Thesearedonebythelegislature(inthiscase,thelocal
government)withtheintentionofrepresentingthedesiresofthelocalconstituency.Iftheresidentsdislikethelawsmade
bytheirgovernment,theirrecourseshouldbewiththeballotbox,notthecourts.

Thus,underthefairlydebatablerule,ifalocalzoningregulationispassedfortheentirecityandthenwas
appealedtothecourts,thelocalgovernmentsdecisionwouldlikelybeupheldsolongastheycanshowalinktofurthering
thepublicinterest.Thishasbeenreferredtoasthestupidstaffrule,becausethereisverylittleburdenofproofonthe
government.InFlorida,the1985GrowthManagementActstrengthenedthesubstantivedueprocessframeworkbyplacing
stricterrequirementsonlocallandusedecisions.Decisionslikezoningregulationsnowalsohavetobeconsistentwith
theapprovedComprehensivePlanaswellasbeararelationshiptothepublichealth,safety,andwelfare.

In1928,theSupremeCourtsettledthefirstasappliedchallengetozoninginNectowv.CityofCambridge.
Contrarytolookingatthezoningcodeinitsentirety,asinEuclid,thecourtherelookedataparticularapplicationofthat
codeononeparcelthathadbeenzonedresidentialtodetermineifthezoningofthatparcelwasreasonableandnecessary
underthesubstantivedueprocessframework.Thefindingherewasimportant,becausethecourtreversedthezoning
decisionthecityhadmade,findingthatitwasarbitrary,hadnosubstantialrelationtothepublichealth,thepublic
morals,thepublicsafetyorthepublicwelfare,andmadenoreasonablesenseinplacingthePlaintiffslandina
residentialdistrict.
3

Asappliedchallengesbecameincreasinglyimportantinthelaterpartsofthe20
th
century,aslocalgovernments
werepushingtheenvelopeasfarastheycouldintermsoflanduseregulationsinordertopreserveawealthy,white
identity.Byusingjudicialreviewtolookattheparticularapplicationofazoningordinanceononeperson,thecourtscould
betherecourseforthatpersontodetermineiftheywerebeingunfairlytargetedbyacitycodedesignedtokeepout
certainusesortypesofpeople,e.g.,prohibitingmultifamilyhousingbycreatingacodeforonlysinglefamilyresidentialin
thecity,whichisgenerallymoreexpensiveandwouldlimittheinfluxoflowerincomepeopletothecity.Specifically,
courtswouldlooktoseeifthedecisionmadebythecitywasmorerestrictivethanneeded.Forexample,in1994,aFlorida
courtinSection28Partnership,Ltd.v.MartinCountyfoundthatalandownerhasaconstitutionalrighttousepropertyin
amannerconsistentwithpreexistinggovernmentplans,absentclearevidenceofaconflictingpublicnecessityjustifyinga

morerestrictiveuse.
4

Inaddition,thetakingsclauseoftheU.S.Constitution,whichholdsthatprivatepropertyshouldnotbetaken
forpublicuse,withoutjustcompensation(5
th
Amendment),hasalsobeenanimportanttopicinasappliedchallenges.
Sincecourtsareallowedtoreviewthesubstanceoflegislativedecisionsaspartofsubstantivedueprocess,theycan
reviewcaseswhereatakingisallegedbyvirtueofanunreasonablyrestrictivezoningordinance.

1
VillageofEuclidv.AmblerRealtyCo.,272U.S.365,1926
2
Ibid.
3
BloombergLAW

,Nectowv.CityofCambridge,277U.S.183,1928
4
MaryDawson,TheBestLaidPlans:TheRiseandFallofGrowthManagementinFlorida,JournalofLandUse&
EnvironmentalLaw,1996