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Brandom

Robert B. Brandom 2004 A Spirit of Trust

Representation, Error, and Retrospection: Experience in Hegel's Introduction to the Phenomenology


I. Background In Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegels Idealism I disc ssed t!o idealist theses central to Hegels tho ght" that the str ct re and nit# o$ concepts is the same as the str ct re and

nit# o$ sel$%conscio s selves&' and that S(irit as a !hole)incl ding h man beings and all o$ o r (ractices&

acti*ities& and instit tions described in a normatively rich *ocab lar# o$ concept se )is a sel$& and at least (otentiall# a self-conscious one. +,-bsol te .no!ledge is Hegels term $or the stage o$ S(irit at !hich it achie*es the $inal sort o$ sel$%conscio sness./ The $irst o$ these is the thesis o$ semantic idealism. I inter(ret it as e0(ressing a theor# abo t the nat re and str ct re o$ normativity as s ch. That theor# (roceeds $rom a social nderstanding o$ the instit tion o$ norms" normative stat ses)(aradigmaticall# commitments +Hegels and 1ichtes ,(ositings 2Set3 ngen4/ are social stat ses. 5hat I am calling their ,social character& Hegel ta6es to be s#nthesis b# reciprocal recognition. This means that !hat s ch a stat s +(aradigmaticall#& being responsible $or something& as in 7 dgment and action/ is in itself +its essence/ is a (rod ct o$ !hat it is for the one !ho nderta6es it and !hat is for others& !ho attrib te it.2
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This is one dimension o$ the claim that all conscio sness is sel$%conscio sness. Seeing the contrib tion to this res(onsibilit# o$ !hat it is about)!hat it normati*el# addresses& in the sense that matters $or assessment o$ tr th8error or s ccess8$ail re)!ill t rn o t to be intelligible +onl#/ as a $eat re o$ this recogniti*e process& $rom the (oint o$ *ie! o$ a retros(ecti*e reading o$ it as progressive. 22addresses8assesses9 (rocess8(rogress44

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The nderl#ing tho ght abo t normati*it# is !hat Hegel ma6es o$ .ants connection o$ normati*e bindingness !ith autonomy)!hich is& in t rn& !hat .ant ma6es o$ an idea o$ Ro ssea s. This is the idea that one onl# co nts as normatively bo nd or constrained b# obligations& res(onsibilities& or commitments that one onesel$ ac6no!ledges as binding. Seeing the contents o$ s ch normati*e stat ses as instit ted b# a (rocess o$ m t al recognition is Hegels !a# o$ sec ring the determinate contentfulness o$ commitments in the conte0t o$ sing this a tonom# condition as a (rinci(le o$ demarcation $or the normati*e. 1or determinate content$ lness re; ires that what I ha*e committed m#sel$ to not be ( to me in the same sense as that I ha*e committed m#sel$ to it +since !here !hate*er seems right to me $or that reason is right& there is not real ; estion o$ right or !rong/. Hegel abstracts a structure $rom this social +that is& recogniti*e/ (rocess b# !hich some o$ o r doings ac; ire normati*e signi$icances +are instit ted as normati*el# signi$icant/ and there$ore co nt as doings o$ o rs in a s(ecial sense)as things !e are responsible $or& that is& as 7 dgments and actions. He claims that wherever normati*e *ocab lar# is a((licable)!hich incl des !here*er concepts are a((lied& since a((l#ing conce(ts is itsel$ something that can be done correctl# or incorrectl#)there m st be reciprocity. +Hegel sa#s ,reci(rocal dependence& since tal6 o$ inde(endence and de(endence is his !a# o$ tal6ing abo t a thorit# and res(onsibilit#./ That is& there is

not authority !itho t a reci(rocal responsibility to!ards !hat one has +thereb# limited/ a thorit# o*er. He $inds this str ct re o$ reci(rocal a thorit# in the relation bet!een particulars and universals& and bet!een past a((lications o$ conce(ts +7 dgments and

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actions/ and future ones. So besides the social dimension o$ reci(rocal a thorit# and res(onsibilit#& Hegel discerns also conceptual and historical dimensions. This str ct re o$ reci(rocal a thorit# and res(onsibilit# is& $or Hegel& the str ct re o$ freedom)!hich consists in the ca(acit# to commit onesel$& to take res(onsibilit#& and so& in that s(ecial ,s(irit al sense& to claim or do an#thing at all. In SPTHI& I inter(reted the second idealist thesis)that S(irit itsel$ is an +act all# and (otentiall#/ e*er more sel$%conscio s sel$)in terms o$ the temporal dimension o$ the (rocess o$ a((l#ing conce(ts b# ma6ing 7 dgments and (er$orming actions. In *irt e o$ its recognitive normati*e str ct re& that as(ect o$ disc rsi*e (ractice deser*es to be called not 7 st ,tem(oral& b t ,historical. -nother se; ence o$ (a(ers& disc ssing the <onscio sness section o$ the Phenomenology& ( rs ed se*eral o$ these themes $ rther. In this section& Hegel in*estigates and begins to ma6e e0(licit !hat is im(licit in the idea o$ the immediate deli*erances o$ sense ha*ing determinate content. The o*erall claim Hegel de*elo(s is that determinate content$ lness re; ires !hat he calls =mediation= 2>ermittl ng4. This is his !a# o$ tal6ing abo t s(eci$icall# inferential artic lation. +The basis o$ the meta(hor is the !a# the conce(t common to the ma7or and the minor (remises o$ a classical s#llogism =mediates= the in$erence in*ol*ed. In the s#llogism" ? dgments are a((lications o$ conce(ts& -((lications o$ conce(ts are in$erentiall# artic lated& there$ore ? dgments are in$erentiall# artic lated&

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the conce(t a((lication o$ conce(ts (la#s the role o$ the middle term& !hich mediates the in$erence $rom the a((licabilit# o$ the conce(t 7 dgment to the a((licabilit# o$ the conce(t in$erentiall# artic lated./ 1or Hegel& mediation is the hallmar6 o$ the conceptual. So his concl sion is that all determinate content is s(eci$icall# conceptual content. I$ b# calling sense e0(erience immediate !e mean that it is not in$erentiall# artic lated& that it is not content$ l in a sense that ma6es it $it to ser*e at least as a (remise in inference& then immediate e0(erience !o ld be !itho t cogniti*el# signi$icant +that is& conce(t al/ content. The only sense in !hich cogniti*el# content$ l sense e0(erience can (ro(erl# be called =immediate= concerns its origins& not its content" that is& it ma6es a*ailable (otential (remises $or in$erences that are not themsel*es the (rod cts o$ (rior (rocesses o$ in$erence. The in$erences that artic late conce(t al content $or Hegel are not logically good in$erences b t materially good in$erences. That an in$erence is good in this sense is a matter o$ the concrete contents o$ the nonlogical conce(ts in*ol*ed. Hegel derides the in$erences st died b# traditional logic as merel# $ormal and abstract" not s ited to ma6e intelligible the concrete content o$ determinate conce(ts. -ltho gh he does not e0(lain the (oint this !a#& I thin6 !e can nderstand his idea in terms o$ the Bol3ano%1rege s bstit tional nderstanding o$ logical *alidit#. I$ !e start !ith a rich notion o$ !hat is a reason $or !hat& and so !hich in$erences in*ol*ing determinate conce(ts are good ones& !e can abstract $rom it a notion o$ !hat it is $or in$erences to be good in *irt e o$ their form +!ith res(ect to a (artic lar *ocab lar#)sa#& logical *ocab lar#/ as o((osed to the contents o$ the nonlogical conce(ts in*ol*ed& b# noting in*ariants nder s bstit tion. -n in$erence)sa#& the s#llogism instanced abo*e)is good in *irt e o$ its logical $orm 7 st

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in case" a/ it is a materiall# good in$erence& and b/ it cannot be t rned into a materiall# bad one b# s bstit ting nonlogical $or nonlogical *ocab lar#. B# considering all s bstit tions o$ terms (la#ing the role o$ means and e0tremes in the s#llogism& !e deri*e the abstract $orm" -ll As are Bs& -ll Bs are Cs There$ore -ll As are Cs -ltho gh s ch an abstract in$erence schema is not !holl# em(t#)$or it tells s something abo t the in$erential signi$icance o$ the logical conce(t +or A$orm determinationA/ ni*ersal& e0(ressed b# the se o$ =all=@)$oc sing on this sort o$ in$erence tells s nothing abo t the content o$ more concrete& nonlogical conce(ts s ch as 7 dgment& a((lication o$ conce(ts& and in$erentiall# artic lated. To nderstand those conce(ts& !e m st $oc s on the material goodness o$ the in$erence $rom Ap is a 7 dgment&A to Ap is an a((lication o$ conce(tsA& and $rom the latter to Ap is in$erentiall# artic lated.A The material (ro(riet# o$ those in$erences is merel# expressed b# the se o$ logical *ocab lar# s ch as =all=. The e0(ressi*e $ nction o$ logical *ocab lar# is accordingl# to ma6e e0(licit the e0(lanatoril# (rior material in$erential in*ol*ements that artic late the conce(t al content o$ nonlogical conce(ts. Hegel dra!s holist semantic concl sions $rom the claim that all determinate content is in$erentiall# artic lated +Athoro ghl# mediatedA/& and hence +b# de$inition/ conce(t al. He 7oins .ant in brea6ing !ith the logical tradition both inherit& !hich began
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2re$. To the Science of ogic disc ssion o$ this $orm o$ s#llogism.4

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its semantic e0(lanations !ith a doctrine o$ terms or concepts& di*ided into the sing lar and the general +(artic lar and ni*ersal/& and mo*ed com(ositionall# $rom them to a doctrine o$ !udgments arri*ed at b# combining terms& and then $inall# on to a doctrine o$ conse"uences or in$erences arri*ed at b# combining 7 dgments s#llogisticall# +de(ending on the (attern o$ terms occ rring in them/. .ant& o$ co rse& started his e0(lanations !ith !udgments& and (roceeded to terms onl# decom(ositionall#) nderstanding !hat is e0(ressed b# (artic lar and ni*ersal terms $ nctionall#& according to the contrib tions the# ma6e to!ard the contents o$ 7 dgments in !hich the# occ r. 1or him& the nit o$ cognition& tho ght& e0(erience& and a!areness)the smallest or sim(lest bit that has a tonomo sl# intelligible content)is the 7 dgment.4 Hegel ta6es this line o$ tho ght one ste( $ rther& and in a certain sense stands the traditional order o$ e0(lanation on its head. ? dgments $orm an im(ortant disting ishable le*el o$ conce(t al content& since the# are !hat can ser*e as (remises and concl sions o$ the material in$erences that artic late the contents o$ determinate conce(ts. B t nderstanding conce(t al content generall#& and there$ore (ro(ositional content more s(eci$icall#& in inferential terms means nderstanding the content o$ a 7 dgment not as something that it has all on its o!n& b t as essentiall# de(endent on its in$erential relations to other contents o$ (ossible 7 dgments. It means not starting o r acco nt !ith 7 dgments concei*ed o$ as (oints& each o$ !hich can alread# be s(eci$ied as !hat it is& and then adding in$erences as lines connecting these sel$%standing (oints. Instead& the (oints are (ic6ed o t as the (oints the# are onl# in terms o$ their role as intersections o$ lines o$ in$erence. The traditional order o$ e0(lanation is not $ ll# re*ersed& since 7 dgments and in$erences)the (oints o$ intersection and the lines connecting them& in o r image)are onl# m t all# intelligible.
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2re$. To the disc ssion o$ 7 dgment as the nit o$ responsibility& in SPTHI.4

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The# are t!o sides o$ one coin& since the (oints are !hat the# are +the 7 dgments ha*e the content the# do/ onl# in *irt e o$ their in$erential connections !ith one another& and the d all# the lines are !hat the# are +the in$erences (ermit the transitions the# do/ onl# in *irt e o$ the (oints the# connect. -ccordingl#& Hegel re7ects the .antian identi$ication o$ the 7 dgment as the nit o$ cognition.B Hegel is the $irst semantic holist& and the need to e0(ress and !or6 o t the conse; ences o$ s ch a *ie!)sim(l# to ma6e it coherent and intelligible)is one o$ the (rimar# $orces dri*ing him to de*elo( his radical (hiloso(hical idiom. Im(ortant as it is& inference +mediation/ is not the most basic conce(t Hegel ses to artic late his nderstanding o$ the content o$ determinate conce(ts. D*en more $ ndamental is the notion o$ negation& in terms o$ !hich in$erence +and m ch else/ is to be nderstood. In thin6ing abo t negation& no less than abo t in$erence +and $or the same reasons/ Hegel insists that it is im(ortant not to begin !ith the traditional nderstanding o$ !hat he calls =$ormal= or =abstract= negation. He starts instead !ith !hat he calls determinate negation. I nderstand this relation to be that o$ material incompatibility. The int iti*e idea is that the a((licabilit# o$ one conce(t +or commitment to one 7 dgment/ can exclude or r le o t the a((licabilit# o$ +or commitment to/ another. Being a (lant r les o t being a *ertebrate)not as a matter o$ logic or o$ form& b t beca se o$ the material& nonlogical contents o$ those conce(ts. There are t!o im(ortant conse; ences o$ starting !ith a notion o$ determinate& nonlogical& material negation or incom(atibilit# that Hegel does not e0(licitl# (oint o t&

2Ea#be !orth $ootnoting some Fermans here" Rol$ Peter Horstmann=s little boo6 2chec6 his re$erence4& and The nissen and the g #s he re$ers to.4

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b t that I thin6 are cr cial $or nderstanding !hat he does sa# abo t it. 1irst& one can de$ine abstract& $ormal& or logical negation in terms o$ determinate negation or material incom(atibilit#. 1or the logical negation o$ a claim is 7 st its in$erentiall# minimal incom(atible" the claim entailed b# e*er# claim incom(atible !ith the original claim +and corres(ondingl# $or (ro(erties/. Th s the claim #$T%Sam&s hair is red' is 7 st !hat is entailed b# e*er# claim that is materiall# incom(atible !ith +determinatel# negates/ Sam&s hair is red" $or instance Sam&s hair is yellow& Sam&s hair is blue& and so on. H$ co rse& s ch a de$inition a((eals to in$erential relations among the claims +or conce(ts/ in*ol*ed. This ma6es the second (oint (artic larl# signi$icant. 1or inferential relations +mediation/ can also be de$ined in terms o$ determinate negation or material incom(atibilit#. To sa# that A<oda is a dog&A entails A<oda is a *ertebrate&A is to sa# that e*er#thing incom(atible !ith A<oda is a *ertebrate&A is incom(atible !ith A<oda is a dog.A In$erence and mediation)and hence& $or Hegel& conce(t al content generall#) can be nderstood entirel# in terms o$ determinate negation. H$ (artic lar signi$icance $or the (resent essa# is a $ rther conse; ence& !hich Hegel ( rs es in the Perce(tion section o$ the Phenomenology. This is that the decom(osition o$ 7 dgments)!hat in the $irst instance stand in relations o$ material incom(atibilit# and +so/ in$erence to each other)into (artic lars and ni*ersals can also be nderstood in terms o$ determinate negation. Seeing ho! this is so is the $irst ste( in nderstanding the representational dimension o$ conce(t al content& !hich is o r o*erall to(ic here.

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1or the ob!ects o$ !hich !e become a!are in em(irical conscio sness are artic lated b# the determinate di$$erence +relation/ bet!een t!o sorts o$ determinate di$$erence" the strong di$$erence bet!een incom(atible (ro(erties +s ch as square and circular6/ and the !ea6 di$$erence bet!een merely di$$erent& b t not incom(atible (ro(erties +s ch as square and red/.G 1or in terms o$ this di$$erence& !e can nderstand the di$$erence bet!een properties& !hich can di$$er strongl#& and ob!ects& !hich cannot. 1 rther& !ea6 or mere di$$erence can itsel$ be nderstood in terms o$ strong di$$erence. Pro(erties P1 and P are merel# !ea6l# di$$erent i$ a/ the# are not incom(atible !ith each other& and b/ there is some (ro(ert# that is incom(atible !ith one and not !ith the other. Th s Hegel e0(lains !hat .ant callsI the A nit# !hich constit tes the conce(t o$ an ob7ectA)the !a# its (ro(erties Ahang togetherA)in terms o$ the notion o$ the !a# incom(atible (ro(erties are e0cl ded $rom association !ith the same ob7ect. The 6e# to nderstanding the ob7ects o$ conscio sness)!hat conscio sness is of or about in the normati*e sense o$ ans!ering to $or its correctness +in the sense that matters $or disting ishing truth $rom error/)then& lies in the notion o$ determinate negation& that is& material incompatibility. I$ cognition +!hether immediate or not/ deli*ers e*en ( tati*e 6no!ledge that is determinatel# content$ l& the s ((osed $acts it (resents m st stand in relations o$ material incom(atibilit# !ith other (ossible deli*erances o$ cognition. -nd this is alread# s $$icient $or those candidate $acts to be recogni3able as attrib ting properties to ob!ects. 1or that s bstr ct re is 7 st a
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2I=ll bold$ace !ords that re$er to (ro(erties& and nderline those that re$er to conce(ts +so as to ma6e it (ossible to disc ss& !itho t (res ((osing& Hegel=s conce(t al idealism& !hich e*ent all# identi$ies these !ith each other/.4 G In the Science of ogic& 24'G%':& II 4G%I4 Hegel mar6s this di$$erence as that bet!een Jnterschied and >erschiedenheit. 2See m# disc ssion o$ this (oint in the treatment o$ Consciousness4. I - '0B" A1or in so $ar as the# 2Dr6enntnisse4 are to relate to an ob7ect& the# m st necessaril# agree !ith one another& that is& m st (ossess that nit# !hich constit tes the conce(t o$ an ob7ect.A

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conse; ence o$ the !a#& in order to co nt as (resentations o$ determinate contents& candidate cognitions m st exclude or +as Hegel sometimes sa#s/ repel one another. -nd that the# do is also& as Hegel sa#s and !e can sho!& s $$icient to settle it that the# necessitate one another as !ell)that is& that the# stand in strong inferential relations to each other. So to nderstand the (rod cts o$ the e0ercise o$ o r ca(acities $or immediate cognition as determinatel# content$ l& !e m st nderstand it also as mediated& in the sense that those contents are essentiall# artic lated b# standing in relations o$ material incom(atibilit# and in$erence to one another. -nd to sa# this is to sa# that determinate content is al!a#s conceptual content& as Hegel ses the term =conce(t al=. Hne o$ the lessons !e ha*e learned $rom !hat .ant made o$ H me is that conce(t se in*ol*es an essential modal dimension.: 1or e0am(le& 7 dging that something has a mass o$ '0 6ilograms is& inter alia& committing onesel$ to !hat acceleration it would ha*e i$ it were s b7ected to *ario s im(ressed $orces& and 7 dging that something is red is similarl# committing onesel$ to !hat it would loo6 li6e i$ there were a com(etent obser*er ins(ecting it nder standard conditions. It is (ossible to ta6e a n mber o$ a((roaches to e0(ressing the modalities in*ol*ed in a((l#ing conce(ts. Perha(s in$l enced b# the modal logics that became standard d ring the t!entieth cent r#& !e are inclined to begin !ith to thin6 o$ the $ ndamental modal b ilding bloc6 as a necessit# o(erator that can be attached to sentences. Hegel& ho!e*er& ta6es the $ ndamental str ct re artic lating +conce(t al/ normati*it# to be determinate negation& in the strong sense in !hich the a((licabilit# o$ one conce(t can rule out or exclude the a((licabilit# o$ another)not 7 st de facto& b t +in a sense !e m st in*estigate/ de !ure. P rs ing this
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-t this (oint a Sellarsian !ill thin6 o$ the brilliantl# titled b t essentiall# im(enetrable essa# A<once(ts as In*ol*ing Ka!s& and Inconcei*able 5itho t Them.A

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idea alread# re(resents a signi$icant di*ergence $rom .ant=s a((roach. 1or .ant& the most basic $orm o$ normati*it# is the rule. <once(ts are nderstood as r les)r les $or doing something& in the (aradigmatic case& 7 dging. - la! is an ob7ecti*el# *alid r le. He nderstands r les as a 6ind o$ conditional 7 dgment" endorsing the r le is ma6ing the 7 dgment if the conditions obtain.'0 Th s 7 dgments are made to be termini o$ in$erences. 1or reason is Athe $ac lt# o$ in$erring&A'' and Athe general (rinci(le on !hich rests the *alidit# 2FLltig6eit4 o$ all concl sions thro gh reason ma# be e0(ressed in the $ollo!ing $orm la" 5hat stands nder the condition o$ a r le stands also nder the r le itsel$.A'2 It is in terms o$ s ch in$erences& and the r les as conditional 7 dgments on !hich the# are based& that !e are to nderstand necessity" The s#llogism (remises 2(rMmittirt4 a general r le and a s bs m(tion nder its condition. Hne thereb# cogni3es the concl sion a (riori not b# itsel$ b t as contained in the general and as necessar# nder a certain condition. The $act that e*er#thing stands nder the general and ma# be determined b# general r les& is the *er# (rinci(le o$ rationalit#& or o$ necessit# +(rinci(i m rationalitatis s. necessitatis/.'@

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A- r le is an assertion 2-ssertion4 nder a general condition. The relation o$ the condition to the assertion& ho! namel#& the latter stands nder the $ormer& is the e0(onent o$ the r le. The cognition that the condition +some!here/ ta6es (lace 2statt$inde4 is the s bs m(tion. The con7 nction o$ !hat has been s bs med nder the condition !ith the assertion o$ the r le is the concl sion 2der Schl N4.A 2 ogic& sBI9'2C4 '' AReason& considered as the $ac lt# o$ a certain logical $orm o$ 6no!ledge& is the $ac lt# o$ in$erring& i.e. 7 dging mediatel# +b# the s bs m(tion o$ the condition o$ a (ossible 7 dgment nder the condition o$ a gi*en 7 dgment/. The gi*en 7 dgment is the ni*ersal r le +ma7or (remiss/. The s bs m(tion o$ the condition o$ another (ossible 7 dgment nder the condition o$ the r le is the minor (remiss. The act al 7 dgment !hich a((lies the assertion o$ the r le to the s bs med case is the concl sion. The r le states something ni*ersall#& s b7ect to a certain condition. The condition o$ the r le is $o nd to be $ l$illed in an act al case. 5hat has been asserted to be ni*ersall# *alid nder that condition is there$ore to be regarded as *alid also in the act al case& !hich in*ol*es that condition.A 2.dr>& B@IC4 '2 2 ogic sBG9'2B4 '@ 2 ogic sBG9'2B4

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=Oecessit#= 2Oot!endig6eit4 is .ant=s !a# o$ tal6ing abo t normati*it#& !hose $orm is r les" =necessar#= 7 st means Aaccording to a r leA. The conce(t o$ negation (la#s no essential role in this (ict re. -ltho gh negation does& o$ co rse& sho! ( as a categor# o$ ; alit#& .ant has *er# little to sa# abo t it. H$ten& as in his disc ssion o$ the table o$ 7 dgments& it seems that it is denial +a 6ind o$ $orce& correlati*e !ith a$$irmation/& rather than negation +a 6ind o$ content that can& e.g.& a((ear in the antecedent o$ a h#(othetical 7 dgment/ that he addresses.'4 Hegel claims to be digging dee(er& to $ind a notion o$ negation and normati*e artic lation according to relations o$ e0cl sion among conce(ts that stands behind or beneath the notion o$ conditional r le and normati*e artic lation according to relations o$ in$erence among conce(ts. 5here $or .ant& the modal b ilding bloc6 artic lating the normati*e $orce o$ conce(t se is the idea that the a((licabilit# o$ one conce(t re; ires the a((licabilit# o$ another& $or Hegel it is the idea that the a((licabilit# o$ one conce(t r les o t the a((licabilit# o$ another. -ccording to the reading I ha*e been rging& one o$ the most im(ortant things to 6ee( in mind in reading Hegel is that his tal6 o$ mediation sho ld be nderstood as addressing material in$erences& and that his tal6 o$ determinate negation sho ld be nderstood as addressing material incom(atibilities. (ormal (ro(rieties o$ in$erence and formal inconsistencies are to be seen as abstractions $rom these richer& more concrete relations& !hich artic late the contents o$ ordinar#& determinate& em(irical and (ractical nonlogical conce(ts. D*en at the le*el o$ these $ormal shado!s& ho!e*er& it is (ossible to see e0(ressi*e ad*antages in Hegel=s strateg# o$ treating incom(atibilit# as the most basic
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See also the remar6 at -'008BG4&B. Eore e0(licitl#" AKogical negation& !hich is indicated sim(l# thro gh the !ord not& does not (ro(erl# re$er to a conce(t& b t onl# to its relation to another conce(t in a 7 dgment& and is there$ore ; ite ins $$icient to determine a conce(t in res(ect o$ its contentP -ll conce(ts o$ negations are th s deri*ati*e9 it is the realities !hich contain the data& and& so to s(ea6& the material or transcendental content& $or the (ossibilit# and com(lete determination o$ all things.A 2.dr> BC02%@4

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normati*e str ct re o$ conce(t al contents. 1or She$$er=s tr th $ nctional notion o$ incom(atibilit#)de$inable in ordinar# terms b# (Q; R+(S;/)is e0(ressi*el# com(lete o*er the tr th $ nctions. That is& it b# itsel$ s $$ices $or the de$inition o$ all o$ the s al connecti*es o$ the classical (ro(ositional calc l s.'B This $act ma# not seem (artic larl# signi$icant in the (resent conte0t. 1or !hat is o$ (rimar# interest abo t Hegel=s notion o$ determinate negation is its modal $orce& the $orce o$ =ma#= and =m st= in claims s ch as AHne ob7ect may not ha*e incom(atible (ro(erties&A and AHne s b7ect must not attrib te incom(atible (ro(erties to the same ob7ect.A -nd this modal $orce is& o$ co rse& not so m ch as re(resented b# the classical tr th $ nctions& ho!e*er generated. B t in $act& there are *ersions o$ the She$$er incom(atibilit# o(erator that can generate all the connecti*es o$ standard (ro(ositional'C modal logics& s ch as S4 and SB. The e0(ressi*e (o!er o$ incom(atibilit# o(erators is s bstantiall# greater than that o$ an# other com(arabl# sim(le (rimiti*e. The most (hiloso(hicall# im(ortant ; estion that then arises is ho! !e sho ld nderstand the relations o$ material incom(atibilit#& determinate negation& or strong +e0cl ding& re(elling/ di$$erence& !hich Hegel ta6es to be $ ndamental. 5hat is the nat re and origin o$ the force o$ e0cl sion or re( lsionT 5hen !e sa# that no one ob7ect can ha*e incom(atible (ro(erties +be& sa#& both s; are and circ lar/& !hat are !e sa#ingT Ho! sho ld !e nderstand the sense in !hich s ch a sit ation is impossible or forbiddenT
R( (Q(& (S; +(Q;/Q+(Q;/& and so on. Actually, I showed in an early paper how to extend the operators so as to express also quantified modal logicsbut that result really does seem irrelevant here. A Binary Sheffer Operator Which Does the Work of Quantifiers and Sentential Connectives, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, XX #2, April 1979, pp. 262264. See the references offered there for Sobocinski's and Massey's work on the Sheffer operators for propositional modal logics.
'B

16

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Hne o$ Hegel=s dee(est and most basic tho ghts is that the !a# the ob!ects o$ conscio sness =re(el= incom(atible properties m st be nderstood ltimatel# in terms o$ the !a# the sub!ects o$ conscio sness =re(el= incom(atible commitments. This tho ght is a dee(ening o$ the idealist claim that all conscio sness m st be nderstood in terms o$ self-conscio sness. 5e ha*e alread# rehearsed one !a# o$ beginning to e0(ress and de*elo( that claim in the $orm o$ the semantic idealist thesis that the str ct re and nit# o$ the conce(t is the same as the str ct re and nit# o$ the sel$%conscio s sel$. That thesis !as read as e(itomi3ing a *ie! abo t the nat re o$ commitments. -ccording to that *ie! the im(licit +an sich/ normati*e $orce and signi$icance o$ s ch a stat s is the (rod ct o$ a (rocess str ct red b# the interaction o$ t!o sorts o$ +e0(licit/ normati*e attitude& !hich o$$er di$$erent social (ers(ecti*es on it" !hat it is $or the one !ho nderta6es or ac6no!ledges the commitment& and !hat it is $or others& !ho attrib te it. The authority o$ an a((lication o$ conce(ts in a 7 dgment or action +the dimension o$ the 6no!er%and% agent=s inde(endence in nderta6ing commitments/ al!a#s)as a matter o$ the $ ndamental meta(h#sics o$ normati*it#)comes !ith a corres(onding responsibility +the dimension o$ the 6no!er%and%agent=s de(endence on those !ho administer the conce(t al content o$ the commitments/. Hegel=s semantic pragmatism consists in his commitment to nderstanding conce(t al content ltimatel# in terms o$ !hat one is doing in a((l#ing a conce(t +the (ractices he collecti*el# calls =e0(erience=/. <once(t al content& !e sa! in the disc ssion o$ the <onscio sness section o$ the Phenomenology& is to be nderstood as artic lated b# material incom(atibilities& that is& b# determinate negation. So !e m st

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no! begin to e0(lore the $ine str ct re o$ the artic lation o$ cogniti*e'G commitments) and hence conce(t al contents)b# material incom(atibilities. The basic claim o$ Hegel=s conceptual idealism is that the ob!ective material incom(atibilit# o$ (ro(erties and the sub!ective material incom(atibilit# o$ commitments are t!o sides o$ one coin. The# $orm an indissol ble conce(t al nit#& in the sense that neither is intelligible a(art $rom its relation to the other. It is clear that these are different notions o$ material incom(atibilit#. 1or one and the same ob7ect reall# cannot ha*e incom(atible (ro(erties& !hile one and the same s b7ect can ha*e incom(atible commitments)tho gh she ought not. The normati*e $orce o$ im(ermissibilit#)the sense o$ =ma# not= in (la# !hen !e sa# on the one hand that one ob7ect may not ha*e incom(atible (ro(erties and on the other that one s b7ect may not ha*e incom(atible commitments)is di$$erent in the t!o cases. S b7ects are also ob7ects& and their commitments are among their +normati*e/ (ro(erties. B t commitments that are incom(atible as commitments)in the sense that one s b7ect ought not sim ltaneo sl# endorse both)are not incom(atible as (ro(erties. Dach o$ s o$ten does endorse incom(atible commitments& both cogniti*e and (ractical& e*en tho gh none o$ s e*er has incom(atible properties. Ho!e*er& Hegel is claiming that the t!o sorts o$ incom(atibilit# are also identical& in his speculative sense o$ =identical=" the# are intelligible onl# in their relation to and determinate di$$erence $rom each other. Indeed& he (ro(oses to nderstand the conce(ts ob7ect and s b7ect as b#(rod cts o$ the relations bet!een the t!o sorts o$ incom(atibilit#. The# !ill emerge as necessar# scorekeeping de*ices $or 6ee(ing trac6
'G

In the ne0t cha(ter& !e e0tend the acco nt to the (ractical commitments im(licit in intentional action.

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o$ incom(atibilities. ? st as !e m st sort claims into those that do and those that do not (ertain to the same ob!ect& in 6ee(ing trac6 o$ incom(atibilities)since one ob7ect=s being red does not e0cl de another ob7ect=s being bl e)so !e m st sort claims into those that are and those that are not commitments o$ the same sub!ect. 1or in 6ee(ing trac6 o$ incom(atibilities o$ commitment& one s b7ect=s being committed to a certain ob7ect=s being red does not r le o t +e*en in the !ea6er sense o$ =r le o t=/ another s b7ect=s being committed to that same ob7ect=s being bl e. Indi*id al ob7ects are that to !hich one and the same s b7ect cannot +o ght not& are $orbidden $rom'I/ sim ltaneo sl# attrib te incom(atible (ro(erties. Indi*id al s b7ects are that !hich cannot +o ght not& etc./ sim ltaneo sl# attrib te incom(atible (ro(erties to one and the same ob7ect. In general& to ma6e sense o$ the notion o$ incom(atible commitments& !e m st be able to sort them into t!o di$$erent sorts o$ e; i*alence classes o$ concommitantl# nderta6en commitments and concommitantl# attrib ted instantiations)that is& to assign them both to (artic lar s b7ects and to (artic lar ob7ects. Tho gh the t!o notions o$ material incom(atibilit#)the sense in !hich os being red r les o t os being bl e& and the sense in !hich S claiming that o is red r les o t S claiming that o is bl e)are intelligible onl# in relation to each other& Hegel ado(ts an idealist order o$ e0(lication& !hich gi*es a certain (ride o$ (lace to incom(atibilit# o$ commitments. 5hat it means $or the (ro(erties red and !lue to be materiall# incom(atible in the ob!ective sense +and hence& !hat it is to be an indi*id al ob!ect/ is to be nderstood in terms o$ !hat it is $or the claim that o is red and the claim that o is bl e

'I

B# !homT B# those !ho attrib te commitments to them& on (ain o$ $ rther conse; ences cashed o t in terms o$ normati*e attit des on the (art o$ those attrib tors.

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to be materiall# incom(atible in the sub!ective)* sense +in terms o$ !hich !e nderstand !hat it is to be a sub!ect/. It is im(ortant to nderstand that this is not a reductive claim )as tho gh !e co ld ma6e $inal sense o$ s b7ecti*e incom(atibilit# !itho t a((eal to its relation to +its ind cing o$/ ob7ecti*e incom(atibilit#. Rather the idealist claim is that the s b7ecti*e notion is not onl# necessar# $or the intelligibilit# o$ the ob7ecti*e one +and vice versa/& b t is primus inter pares in an order o$ explicitation. That is& !e can ma6e certain as(ects o$ it e0(licit !itho t ha*ing e0(licitl# to mention ob7ecti*e incom(atibilities& and then go on to see that in doing so !e ha*e implicitly bro ght into (la# the ob7ecti*e notion o$ incom(atibilit# as !ell)i.e. ha*e e0(licitl# bro ght into (la# reso rces s $$icient to sho! that the ob7ecti*e dimension is im(licit in them. This general strateg# sets t!o 6inds o$ (hiloso(hical tas6. 5e need to nderstand the notion o$ incom(atible commitments& and !e need to nderstand the relation bet!een s ch commitments and the ob7ects the# address. The $irst o$ these tas6s is the to(ic o$ the ne0t cha(ter& !hich loo6s in more detail at the social dimension o$ reci(rocal recognition b# !hich normati*e stat ses s ch as commitments are instit ted& and at the signi$icance o$ the practical commitments embodied in intentional action. 5e begin the second tas6 in this cha(ter. Here !e loo6 at the representational dimension o$ conce(t al content& and ho! it can be made intelligible as a s bstr ct re o$ (ractices o$ a((l#ing conce(ts !hose contents are artic lated b# determinate negation or material incom(atibilit#. The o*erall ; estion is ho! to ma6e e0(licit those $eat res o$ conce(t se in *irt e o$ !hich conce(t all# content$ l commitments deser*e to be nderstood as ma6ing claims abo t

':

H$ co rse !hat commitments are incom(atible is not a s b7ecti*e matter in the sense that it is entirel# ( to the s b7ect)that is& not in the <artesian sense o$ =s b7ecti*e=. P tting this (ossibilit# to one side is one o$ the central (oints o$ SPTHI.

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+ans!ering $or their correctness to/ ho! things are !ith ob7ects the# re(resent as ha*ing determinate (ro(erties. E# o*erall claim !ill be that !hat is re; ired to nco*er the re(resentational dimension im(licit in an nderstanding o$ conce(t al content co ched in the $irst instance in terms o$ relations o$ material incom(atibilit# and +so/ in$erence is attention to the historical dimension o$ conce(t se.

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II. Pheno"ena and #ou"ena$%kepticis", &og"atis", and 'riticis"

Hegel=s Introd ction to the Phenomenology s6etches his strateg# $or nderstanding the cogniti*e relation bet!een s b7ects and ob7ects that is conscio sness& in terms o$ the (rocess he calls =e0(erience= 2Dr$ahr ng4. The e0(ositor# tra7ector# o$ the Introd ction is s6etched alread# in its $irst sentence20" It is a nat ral ass m(tion that in (hiloso(h#& one m st $irst come to an nderstanding concerning the nat re o$ 6no!ledge be$ore ta6ing ( the real s b7ect matter& namel# the act al 6no!ledge o$ !hat tr l# is. In one cla se& the real s b7ect matter o$ (hiloso(h#& !hat it o ght to be st d#ing& is characteri3ed as the act al 6no!ledge 2das !ir6liche Dr6ennen4 o$ !hat tr l# is 2!as in 5arheit ist4. Both (ieces o$ this s(eci$ication o$ !hat cogniti*e s ccess consists in are signi$icant. The in*ocation o$ actual 6no!ledge in*o6es Hegel=s nderstanding o$ the relation bet!een s6e(tical& dogmatic& and critical constr als o$ the normati*e !arrant !hich 6no!ledge claims re; ire and can obtain. Uescribing the ob7ect o$ act al 6no!ledge as !hat tr l# is mar6s his re7ection o$ a (ict re that restricts (ro(er 6no!ledge to 6no!ledge o$ a((earances. In the other cla se& Hegel re$ers to the $act that the e$$ect o$ Dnlightenment critical (hiloso(hi3ing& c lminating in .ant& has been to ma6e it nat ral to ass me that be$ore embar6ing on that (ro7ect& it is necessar# to in*estigate the conce(t o$ 6no!ledge itsel$)the conditions o$ the (ossibilit# o$ a((l#ing that conce(t and ho! one is committing onesel$ to things being b# doing so. Hegel !ill recommend and ( rs e a con*erse e0(lanator# ro te& on that r ns $rom consideration o$ the contents and (ractices o$ a((l#ing em(irical conce(ts s ch as red& rabbit& and mass to consideration o$ the contents and (ractices o$ a((l#ing e(istemological conce(ts s ch as knowledge& concept& sub!ect& and ob!ect& rather than the other !a# aro nd. B t in de$erence to the Dnlightenment tradition o$ the (riorit# o$ the e(istemological& he begins b# disc ssing
20

-ct all# onl# hal$ o$ the $irst sentence in the Ferman original.

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$amiliar (ict res o$ the relation o$ 6no!ing to !hat is 6no!n& !or6ing his !a# $rom there to ; estions abo t the contents o$ ordinar#& none(istemological conce(ts +o$ the sort to be dealt !ith in the <onscio sness section/ onl# in the second hal$ o$ the Introd ction. In the o(ening (aragra(h o$ the Introd ction& Hegel considers in *er# general terms some im(lications o$ the e(istemological imager# that nderlies broadl# .antian a((roaches to em(irical 6no!ledge. He (l nges in !ith the se o$ s ch alarming terms as =das -bsol te=)b# !hich he means things in themsel*es or the ltimate ob7ects o$ cognition !hen these are to be nderstood in abstraction $rom an# relation to or de(endence on the (rocess o$ 6no!ing itsel$. B t he is not ass ming that s ch !a#s o$ tal6ing are antecedentl# intelligible. V ite the contrar#. He !ants to (oint o t some o$ the ob7ectionable& indeed cri((ling& ass m(tions that are incor(orated in the (ict res that orient this sort o$ attem(t at critical e(istemolog#. - tr l# critical theor# o ght not to ta6e $or granted the nderstanding o$ ...!ords li6e =absol te=& =6no!ledge=& as !ell as =ob7ecti*e= and =s b7ecti*e= and inn merable others !hose meaning is ass med to be $amiliar to e*er#one. 1or to gi*e the im(ression that their meaning is ni*ersall# $amiliar and (artl# too that one himsel$ (ossesses their <once(t& does seem rather li6e an attem(t to a*oid the $ ndamental tas6& namel# to gi*e this <once(t. 2GC42' Hegel commits himsel$ to satis$#ing the methodological demand im(osed b# this $ ndamental tas6& and !e=ll see that this can onl# be done $or e(istemological conce(ts in the conte0t o$ an e0amination o$ the (rocess b# !hich determinate contents are con$erred on ordinar# none(istemological conce(ts. -ltho gh !e !ill not $or some time be in a (osition to nderstand 7 st !hat is re; ired& de$ining a term is neither necessar# nor s $$icient $or =gi*ing a conce(t= in Hegel=s sense. Hne o$ the tas6s o$ the Introd ction is to begin to ( t in (lace the moti*ation $or the historical (ict re according to !hich gi*ing a

2'

Passages $rom the Introd ction are cited in .. Uo*e=s translation +( blished as (art o$ +egel&s Concept of ,xperience ....2re$.4. Paragra(h n mbers cited are $rom Eiller.

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conce(t22& s(eci$#ing its content& is ma6ing e0(licit !hat is im(licit in the conce(t b# a narrati*e rehearsal o$ the !a# its content has +or co ld ha*e/ de*elo(ed in e0(erience. In insisting that (hiloso(h# be directed at e0(licating 6no!ledge o$ A!hat tr l# is&A Hegel is also here anno ncing his re7ection o$ a bi$ rcated nderstanding o$ the ob!ects o$ 6no!ledge. He reads the cartesian re(resentationalist tradition bro ght to its clearest e0(ression b# .ant as incor(orating an in*idio s distinction bet!een o r 6no!ledge o$ the real and o r 6no!ledge o$ the a((earances b# means o$ !hich the real becomes cogniti*el# a*ailable to s. His target here is a((roaches that disting ish a((earance and realit# as +in a s(eci$ic sense to be considered belo!/ di$$erent kinds o$ thing" an a((roach in*ited b# the idiom o$ (henomena and no mena. Ear6ing his distance $rom this !a# o$ thin6ing& Hegel !ill s(ea6 instead o$ !hat things are in themselves and !hat the# are for consciousness" t!o di$$erent !a#s o$ regarding the same things& one abstracting $rom their relations to s& and the other ac6no!ledging them.2@ In o r o!n time it has become a common(lace +tho gh not& to be s re& one ni*ersall# a((reciated or endorsed/ to be s s(icio s both o$ the rei$ication o$ a((earances and o$ the encom(assing gen s o$ acco nts that discern intermediaries +e(istemologicall# (ri*ileged in *ario s !a#s/ bet!een the 6no!ing s b7ect and the ob7ects it +at least (otentiall#/

22

Hegel claims this is the onl# !a# the content o$ any conce(t can be s(eci$ied)incl ding the logical conce(ts& !hose distincti*e e0(ressi*e role it is to ma6e e0(licit $eat res o$ the contents o$ all conce(ts& both ordinar#& non%logical ones& and the logical conce(ts themsel*es. The Phenomenology itsel$ is a (resentation o$ the content o$ the logical conce(ts b# one s ch rational reconstr ction o$ a histor# o$ their a((lication. The Science of ogic is another. I (art com(an# !ith Hegel on 7 st this (oint. I thin6 that the distincti*e e0(ressi*e role characteristic o$ logical conce(ts (ro*ides another ro te into the s(eci$ication o$ their content. So I thin6& as he did not& that one can ma6e the end o$ the Science of ogic intelligible !itho t ha*ing to do so b# rehearsing the ro te !hereb# he arri*es at that concl sion in the boo6. 2@ H$ co rse& in s(ite o$ .ant=s $ondness $or tal6 o$ o r 6no!ledge o$ a((earance and the n6no!abilit# o$ the Uing%an%sich& in ta6ing this line Hegel ma# merel# +as so o$ten/ be ma6ing e0(licit .ant=s better !isdom)as +!itho t t#ing the (oint to Hegel=s reading/ Henr# -llison has $orce$ ll# rged. 2re$.4

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6no!s something abo t.24 Tho gh he has some claim to (aternal rights o*er this sort o$ s s(icion& Hegel=s (ositi*e strateg# in this area is im(ortantl# sha(ed b# $ rther ideas and commitments that the tradition to !hich he ga*e rise has not t#(icall# e0(loited or shared. Hne o$ the most signi$icant o$ these concerns the direction he ta6es in mo*ing $rom a t!o%sorted to a one%sorted (ict re o$ the ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge. Hn the $ace o$ it& an e(istemological d alism& !hich di*ides the ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge into no mena and (henomena& (ro*ides reso rces $or t!o sorts o$ e(istemologicall# monistic strateg#. 1or the monist might constr e the no! ni$ied categor# o$ (ossible ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge either on the model o$ no mena as nderstood in the original bi$ rcated (ict re& or on the model o$ (henomena as nderstood there. So one might start !ith an nderstanding o$ ho! things reall# or in tr th are)(erha(s b# according to the nat ral sciences a thorit# to settle a *ocab lar# in !hich it is to be s(eci$ied)and then tell a stor# abo t !hat it is $or s ch things to a((ear& correctl# or incorrectl#& to someone. This sort o$ e(istemologicall# realistic a((roach is a $amiliar one on the contem(orar# scene& (artic larl# its nat ralistic *ariants. <on*ersel#& one might start !ith an artic lation o$ the notion o$ (henomena& o$ ho! things are for someone& and then tell a stor# abo t the realities that can sho! ( as something $or someone& that is& o$ !hat it is $or at least some o$ them to be a((earings of realit#& of things as the# are in themsel*es. Hegel=s a((roach is o$ this second& e(istemologicall# idealistic& *ariet#. Hne o$ the senses in !hich !hat he (resents is a phenomenology is that he starts !ith an acco nt o$ (henomena +!hat

24

1or instance& this s s(icion o$ mediational e(istemolog# nites (hiloso(hers o$ s ch other!ise di*erse *ie!s as Uonald Ua*idson and <harles Ta#lor. 2re$.s4 2c$. Sellars on the E#th o$ the Fi*en in DPE +and m# gloss on it/& and Rort# in PEO.4

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things are $or conscio sness/ and see6s to reconstr ct the notion o$ no mena +!hat things are in themsel*es/ o t o$ the reso rces it (ro*ides. This cha(ter see6s to s6etch the o tlines o$ that acco nt. H$ co rse strategies o$ either o$ these sorts co rt the danger o$ committing a $allac# o$ lost contrast. Inso$ar as the relation bet!een the conce(ts (henomena and no mena is essential to the nderstanding o$ each& it !ill be strictl# im(ossible to treat either b# itsel$ as the (aradigm in terms o$ !hich to nderstand e*er#thing that can be 6no!n& and so as the basis $or a monistic e(istemolog#. Ho!e*er& gi*en that ada(tation o$ the original notions !ill be re; ired $or trans(lantation $rom a t!o%sorted to a one% sorted setting& !hich conce(tion one starts !ith still ma6es a big di$$erence to the sha(e o$ the res lting stor#. 5ithin the sco(e o$ a commitment not to treat the distinction bet!een a((earance and realit# as an ontological one& not losing the contrast amo nts to ha*ing room $or a distinction bet!een realit# and its a((earance. 5e !ill see that Hegel insists this re; ires e0(laining both ho! gen ine knowledge is (ossible and !hat error consists in. Hn the realistic monistic e(istemological strateg#& this means sa#ing !hat it is both $or realities to a((ear& and $or them to mis%a((ear or be misre(resented. Hn the idealistic monistic e(istemological strateg#& this means ma6ing sense o$ a distinction bet!een *eridical and mista6en a((earances)bet!een those that are re*elator# o$ ho! things reall# are& and those that are not. -s Hegel !ill !or6 o t his stor#& this distinction is not an all%or%none a$$air. 5hat things are $or conscio sness is al!a#s to some e0tent re*elator# o$ ho! things are in themsel*es& b t some a((earances are more re*elator# than others" some ma6e e0(licit more im(licit $eat res than others do. Relations o$ di$$erential e0(ressi*eness accordingl# !ill be called on to do m ch o$ the !or6 that

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notions o$ re(resentation and misre(resentation are t#(icall# dra$ted $or on the realistic side. Be$ore loo6ing at ho! Hegel im(lements his (henomenological strateg#& !e sho ld as6 !hat is !rong !ith a t!o sorted acco nt o$ the ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge& !hich disting ishes no mena and (henomena. In the ordinar# cases that ser*e as the model $or s ch schemes& there is nothing !rong !ith disting ishing re(resentings $rom re(resenteds. - to6ening o$ the !ord =dog= is itsel$ an item in the (h#sical !orld. There is no illicit =rei$ication= going on in ac6no!ledging it as a thing& and not 7 st as a !a# in !hich a dog might be (resented to cognition. 1 rthermore& it is a di$$erent kind o$ thing $rom a dog& in all sorts o$ ncontro*ersial !a#s. So there is nothing illegitimate abo t recogni3ing an ontological di$$erence bet!een re(resentings and re(resenteds. +I$ dogs and !ord to6enings seem ins $$icientl# di$$erent in 6ind $or the di$$erence to be mar6ed as an ontological one& thin6 o$ n mbers and n merals& or tho ghts and the sentence to6enings that e0(ress them./ 1 rther& !ords and other s#mbols generall# ser*e as cogniti*e intermediaries& connecting s to their re$erents. 5itho t something (la#ing this mediating role& it is hard to see ho! I !o ld be able to thin6 abo t -ristotle& large cardinal n mbers& 7 stice& or the need $or re$orm o$ the international monetar# s#stem. The sort o$ re(resentationalism Hegel is addressing globali3es these ordinar# relations bet!een re(resentings and re(resenteds& and ses them as a model $or the relation bet!een a((earances and realities generall#. 5hat does Hegel thin6 is !rong !ith this strateg#T

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It is clear that the general $orm o$ his ob7ection is that this sort o$ *ie! leads to a 6ind o$ skepticism. It does not ma6e sense o$ the (ossibilit# o$ gen ine 6no!ledge o$ ho! things act all# are. 1or i$ 6no!ledge is the instr ment to ta6e hold o$ the absol te essence& one is immediatel# reminded that the a((lication o$ an instr ment to a thing does not lea*e the thing as it is& b t brings abo t a sha(ing and alteration o$ it. Hr& i$ 6no!ledge is not an instr ment $or o r acti*it#& b t a more or less (assi*e medi m thro gh !hich the light o$ tr th reaches s& then again !e do not recei*e this tr th as it is in itsel$& b t as it is in and thro gh the medi m. In both cases !e em(lo# a means !hich immediatel# brings abo t the o((osite o$ its o!n end. 2G@4 The tro ble !ith concei*ing cogniti*e $ac lties as tools or instr ments $or !or6ing on the ra! material o$ the real to sha(e it into the $inished $orm o$ a((earance +or as a medi m& a lens or (rism thro gh !hich the hard& !hite radiance o$ realit# is re$racted into the so$t& de$inite images that a((ear to s/ is that s ch models)e*en !hen accom(anied b# s itable commentaries)a((arentl# (recl de o r e*er 6no!ing abo t ho! things act all# are. 5hat !e reall# 6no!& according to these (ict res& is 7 st ho! things a((ear& trans$ormed b# o r cogniti*e acti*ities. It is small consolation at that (oint to ...dra! a distinction bet!een 6no!ledge o$ the absol te& !hich is the aim o$ science& and a 6no!ledge !hich& tho gh it indeed does not 6no! the absol te& might be ca(able o$ #et another tr th. 2GB4 The imager# s ggests that !e !o ldn=t end ( 6no!ing ho! things are in themsel*es& b t onl# ho! the# are $or s& ho! the# are re(resented as being. B t s ch a concl sion !o ld be hast#& e*en at the le*el o$ imager# in !hich it is co ched. 5e might call the !a# some ob7ect is +re/(resented a =sense=. I$ it !ere tr e that no ob7ect co ld be re$erred to at all)!hich is at least one notion o$ +re/(resentation)e0ce(t b# some sense& it !o ld not seem to $ollo! that ob7ects !ere ne*er re$erred to at all& b t onl# ob7ects%as% +re/(resented%b#%senses. Hegel sho ld not be nderstood as claiming that it !o ld. His

48:820'4%%2B

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ltimate goal is to $ind an idiom ca(able o$ ma6ing intelligible the relation bet!een a (resentation or sense and the realit# or re$erent that it (resents. That is& his real aim +li6e .ant=s/ is not e(istemological& b t semantic. Hegel=s criticism o$ the models he o((oses is that the# in*ol*e the con*iction Athat there is a strict line o$ demarcation se(arating 6no!ledge and the absol tePA o$ a sort that entails that Athere is an abs rdit# in the conce(t o$ e*en beginning a (rocess o$ 6no!ledge designed to gain $or conscio sness that !hich is in%itsel$.A2B He com(lains abo t the instr mental and o(tical e(istemological imager#" -bo*e all& it (res ((oses that the -bsol te stands on one side& and cognition on the other& inde(endent and se(arated $rom it& and #et is something real...2G44. It incor(orates ...ideas o$ a cognition c t o$$ $rom the -bsol te& and an -bsol te se(arated $rom cognitionA 2GC4. He is ob7ecting to b ilding into o r e(istemological conce(ts a certain 6ind o$ g l$ se(arating o r attem(ts at 6no!ing $rom !hat is ltimatel# to be 6no!n. 5hat sort o$ se(aration is at iss e hereT 5hat is $ ndamentall# ob7ectionable abo t the (ict re o$ the mind con$ronting the -bsol te across a g l$ that m st someho! be bridged is the (res m(tion it contains that re(resentings& (henomena& a((earance& or +in the o$$icial terminolog# Hegel (re$ers in (art beca se it does not b ild in the rei$#ing ass m(tion/ !hat things are for the mind& is intrinsically intelligible& !hile the -bsol te that is re(resented& the no mena& realit#& or !hat things are in themselves is intrinsically unintelligible. The b siness o$ the cogniti*e $ac lties& !or6ing in !a#s that the mind does not ha*e direct access to& that it is not conscio s or a!are o$& that are not e0(licit to it& is then ta6en to be to trans$orm the nintelligible into the intelligible. +-nd the
2B

Phenomenology 2GB4.

48:820'4%%2C

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( r(ose o$ e(istemological theor# is to ma6e these trans$ormational acti*ities e0(licit./ This is !hat the instr mental and o(tical meta(hors ha*e in common" the# are concei*ed as (rocesses that start !ith ra! materials +realit#/ that are not as s ch in the right sha(e or $orm to be gras(ed b# the mind& to be contents o$ 6no!ledge& and #ield (rod cts that are o$ that sha(e or $orm. It is nder this descri(tion that (ict res o$ cognition globall# disting ishing t!o sorts o$ ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge themsel*es are acc sed o$ seeming ltimatel# nintelligible. I$ realit# has to be changed someho! to be made cogniti*el# gras(able or intelligible& ho! are !e to ma6e sense o$ the idea that !hat is nderstood is !hat there reall# isT The se(aration he is com(laining abo t is a gulf of intelligibility bet!een 6no!ings and the 6no!n. It is this s(eci$ic sort o$ ontological di*ision that he thin6s to be cri((ling to an e(istemolog# broadened $rom concern !ith knowledge to a concern !ith understanding generall#. Th s& $or instance& as !as s ggested abo*e& there is nothing !rong !ith the notion o$ epistemological intermediaries as s ch& e*en i$ the# are concei*ed o$ as things o$ some 6ind +=rei$ied=/. Both Sellars +the great $oe o$ the AE#th o$ the Fi*enA/ and Ua*idson +the great $oe o$ a certain 6ind o$ e(istemological intermediaries/ cheer$ ll# a((eal to causal intermediaries bet!een the ob7ects o$ o r 6no!ledge and o r 6no!ings o$ them. S ch items are tho ght o$ as o$ the same general 6ind as the en*ironing ob7ects and e*ents that ca se them& and as merel# ca sall# triggering e*ents o$ 6no!ing in s& (aradigmaticall# (erce(t al 7 dgments. The intermediaries are not tho ght o$ as ha*ing content)something gras(able)in the same !a# that the tho ghts and belie$s the# occasion do. So the# are not tho ght o$ as am(hibio s bet!een a non%conce(t al realit# and conce(t all# artic lated belie$s. The

48:820'4%%2G

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idea o$ that sort o$ intermediar# is !hat Sellars calls the AE#th o$ the Fi*en&A and Ua*idson re7ects. -nd $rom the other direction& EcUo!ell=s conce(tion o$ (erce(t al e0(eriences ma6es them intermediaries bet!een& in the $a*ored cases& *isible +or more generall#& (erce(tible/ $acts and (erce(t al 7 dgments& tho ghts& and belie$s. B t once again& the# are not assigned the tas6 o$ trans$orming something not itsel$ gras(able into something gras(able. 1or EcUo!ell=s Hegelian .antianism insists that the $acts (resented b# (erce(t al e0(eriences are themsel*es alread# conce(t all# artic lated items& gras(able 7 st as the contents o$ tho ghts and belie$s are)since& indeed& !hen things go right the# 7 st are the contents o$ the tho ghts and belie$s the# bring abo t. 5hate*er ob7ections there ma# be to them on other gro nds& e(istemological intermediaries o$ these sorts are not s b7ect to the criticisms Hegel is $or!arding in the o(ening (aragra(hs o$ his Introd ction. 1or the# do not ( r(ort to o$$er means $or crossing a g l$ o$ di$$erential intelligibilit# that has been b ilt into the constr al o$ the relation bet!een a((earance and the realit# o$ !hich it is the a((earance.

D0(ressed in the terms ( t on the table 7 st abo*e in an e$$ort to get clearer abo t the ; estions to !hich Hegel=s (henomenological acco nt is s ((osed to be an ans!er& the iss e is ho! to bring together the t!o essential roles (la#ed b# 1regean Sinne. 1or s ch senses are& on the one hand& things that !e can immediatel# grasp. The# are !hat !e (ro0imall# understand& 7 st b# having them. -nd on the other hand& the# are the !a#s in !hich ob!ects +realit#& re$erents/ are presented to s. - satis$actor# stor# abo t s ch (henomena& a((earances& or tho ght%contents cannot 7 st !eld these t!o $eat res

48:820'4%%2I

Brandom

together& sim(l# asserting that one sort o$ thing can do both 7obs.2C It m st e0hibit gras(abilit# and the re$erential or intentional $ nction o$ senses)that the# are modes o$ (resentation o$ ob7ects& !hich can be correct or incorrect de(ending on ho! it is !ith the things the# are in that normati*e sense about)as t!o sides o$ one coin& as essentiall# m t all# in*ol*ing as(ects o$ one notion. Fras(ing senses m st be nderstanding them as (resenting ho! things reall# are& as !a#s those things sho! ( or a((ear. This is the tas6 that sets the criteria o$ ade; ac# $or a (henomenolog# or theor# o$ a((earances" the (ro7ect Hegel (ro(oses to ( rs e in an e(istemologicall# monistic !a#. I=*e s ggested nderstanding the sense in !hich the a((roaches that Hegel ob7ects to (resent cognition as Ac t o$$ $rom the -bsol te& and an -bsol te se(arated $rom cognitionA in terms o$ di$$erential intelligibilit#. These *ie!s treat the contents o$ tho ght as immediatel# intelligible as s ch and the !orld the tho ght is abo t as not o$ the right $orm to be intelligible as s ch in ad*ance o$ some o(eration on it b# cognition. I don=t see an arg ment here that is s ((osed to sho! that all s ch *ie!s m st be inade; ate& so m ch as a ; estion abo t ho! to tell a stor# that does 7 stice to the relation bet!een the $act that tho ght contents are as s ch gras(able b# s& on the one hand& and the $act that the# ( r(ort to s(eci$# ho! things reall# are. 5e might call these the intelligible and referential $eat res o$ cogniti*e contents& res(ecti*el#. So the challenge is ltimatel# a semantic one" to constr ct and de(lo# an idiom ade; ate to e0(ress and n(ac6 the com(le0 interde(endence o$ a((earances as (otential contents o$ conscio sness and as a((earances of things. This is an im(ortant iss e& and not one I
2C

Hne o$ the immediate conse; ences o$ a((reciating the considerations leading to semantic e0ternalism +e(itomi3ed in P tnam=s slogan" Ameanings aren=t in the headA/ !as the reali3ation o$ the strain bet!een these t!o as(ects o$ 1rege=s notion o$ sense" as !hat !e +in the most $ ndamental sense/ nderstand !hen !e nderstand +in a secondar# sense/ a sentence& and as !hat $i0es the re$erents o$ the e0(ressions that occ r in that sentence. 2re$.s4

48:820'4%%2:

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belie*e !e #et see o r !a# clear thro gh. So it is !orth seeing !hat !e might learn $rom Hegel=s treatment o$ it. It is also recogni3abl# a s ccessor to .ant=s $ ndamental ; estion in the $irst Criti"ue. 1or .ant had alread# seen that behind Uescartes= e(istemological ; estion abo t ho! !e co ld 6no! that there are rabbits corres(onding to m# rabbit%idea lies a dee(er semantic ; estion abo t !hat it is $or m# idea so m ch as to ( r(ort to re(resent rabbits. T!o dimensions along !hich Hegel de*elo(s his re(l# are (artic larl# !orth 6ee(ing in mind. 1irst& he ( rs es .ant=s insight into the normative character o$ cogniti*e contents as a cl e to their re$erential dimension. Tal6 o$ !hat an a((earance is an a((earance of& o$ !hat tho ght contents are about& is tal6 o$ !hat sets the standard $or assessments o$ their correctness as a((earances& the correctness o$ belie$s& 7 dgments& and claims that ha*e those contents. Th s Hegel can bring his so(histicated acco nt o$ the social%historical origins and reci(rocal str ct re o$ a thorit# and res(onsibilit# +!hich !e ha*e considered in a (reliminar# !a# in SPTHI/ to bear in e0(licating the re$erential as(ect o$ cogniti*e content" in sa#ing !hat it is $or o r tho ghts so m ch as to ( r(ort to be abo t things that are !hat the# are inde(endentl# o$ ho! the# are for s. The last third o$ Hegel=s Introd ction adds another signi$icant (iece to this stor#& !hich !e !ill be in*estigating in the rest o$ this cha(ter. The second dimension along !hich Hegel de*elo(s his re(l# to his s ccessor to .ant=s semantic ; estion concerns his acco nt o$ the gras(able or intelligible. J( to this (oint in m# disc ssion in this section I ha*e sed a blac6 bo0 notion o$ di$$erential intelligibilit#)almost 7 st as a label hel($ l in $oc sing on the $ ndamental concern

48:820'4%%@0

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moti*ating Hegel=s brie$ disc ssion o$ instr mental and o(tical e(istemological imager# and the a((roaches the# str ct re and e(itomi3e. It has been meant to ser*e as a reminder o$ the con*iction& shared b# the !hole tradition stretching $rom Uescartes thro gh .ant& that the mind is best 6no!n to itsel$& that !e ha*e a 6ind o$ access to the contents o$ o r o!n tho ghts that is (ri*ileged relati*e to o r access to the $acts those tho ghts ( r(ort to in$orm s abo t. B t Hegel has *er# de$inite *ie!s abo t the intelligibilit# o$ cogniti*e contents. Hnce again $ollo!ing .ant& he em(hasi3es the conceptual artic lation o$ the contents o$ tho ghts& belie$s& and (erce(tions +(erce(t al 7 dgments/& and so the conce(t al artic lation o$ a((earances. To sa# that something is intelligible or gras(able is& $or Hegel& to sa# that it has s(eci$icall# conceptual content. -nd he has a distincti*e *ie! abo t the str ct re something m st dis(la# in order to co nt as conce(t all# artic lated. His in*estigation o$ the re; irements $or determinateness o$ content +retailed in m# cha(ter disc ssing the <onscio sness section o$ the Phenomenology/ lead him to see standing in relations o$ determinate negation& and +so/ mediation to other s ch contents as necessar# and s $$icient $or s(eci$icall# conceptual content$ lness. I ha*e s ggested nderstanding these as material incom(atibilit# and in$erential relations& res(ecti*el#. H$ (artic lar signi$icance in nderstanding the sha(e o$ Hegel=s o*erall *ie! is the intimate relation maintained in his acco nt bet!een these t!o dimensions" his acco nt o$ the structure o$ conce(t al contents& in holistic terms o$ relations o$ determinate negation and mediation& and his acco nt o$ the normati*e force o$ a((l#ing conce(ts in 7 dgment and action& in terms o$ sociall# and historicall# reci(rocal relations o$ a thorit# and res(onsibilit#.

48:820'4%%@'

Brandom

B t !hat matters most in the c rrent conte0t is Hegel=s stor# abo t the conce(t al artic lation in *irt e o$ !hich something is to be gras(able or intelligible. It is !hat ma6es (ossible his e(istemological monism" his re$ sal to ma6e in*idio s distinctions o$ intelligibilit# bet!een di$$erent sorts o$ ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge. 1or !orldl# $acts and states o$ a$$airs& !hat !e see6 to 6no! about& also stand in relations o$ material incom(atibilit# and in$erence& 7 st as the contents o$ tho ght do. -nd to tal6 abo t the ob7ects and (ro(erties that artic late those $acts and states o$ a$$airs is& as !e ha*e alread# seen& a !a# o$ tal6ing abo t the $ine str ct re o$ those relations o$ determinate negation and +so/ mediation. Th s ob7ects and (ro(erties are intelligible in e0actl# the same sense in !hich the contents o$ tho ght are" both are conceptually artic lated& and so conce(t all# contentful& in the sense o$ standing in relations o$ material incom(atibilit# and in$erence. It sho ld be ob*io s that in this sense the terms =conce(t= and =conce(t al artic lation= are in no sense psychological notions. The# do not in the $irst instance (ertain to the acti*it# o$ thinking& b t onl# to the contents thought. <oncern !ith !hat goes on in o r heads comes into (la# onl# !hen !e tr# to sa# !hat is in*ol*ed in grasping or understanding the conce(t al artic lation o$ !hat is alread# there. The conce(t al artic lation o$ the !orld)that it comes in ob7ects !hose (ro(erties are determinate 7 st inso$ar as some o$ them are incom(atible !ith others and +so/ entail still others +thereb# determining the sense in !hich the ob7ects themsel*es are determinate/) can be reflected +more or less correctl#/ in o r acti*ities o$ nderta6ing and relin; ishing commitments. This ha((ens !hen I a((l# one conce(t in a 7 dgment or an action beca se its a((licabilit# $ollo!s $rom the a((licabilit# o$ another& to !hich I antecedentl# ac6no!ledge commitment& or !ithhold a((lication o$ one beca se o$ its incom(atibilit#

48:820'4%%@2

Brandom

!ith that o$ another& to !hose a((licabilit# I antecedentl# ac6no!ledge commitment. The ca(acit# to act in s ch !a#s)ad7 sting the commitments I ac6no!ledge in the light o$ their relations o$ material incom(atibilit# and in$erence to others)is !hat m# gras( or nderstanding o$ the conce(ts in*ol*ed comes to in (ractice. It is the 6no!%how that $orms the indis(ensable (ractical bac6gro nd against !hich alone I can be said to 6no! that something is the case" $or instance that the s gar is !hite and s!eet. In this idiom +!a# o$ sing the terms =conce(t= and =conce(t al=/& m# gras( o$ the conce(ts I de(lo# is no di$$erent in 6ind $rom +no better and no !orse than/ m# 6no!ledge o$ ho! things act all# are. The better I am in (ractice in disting ishing !hat is reall# incom(atible !ith !hat& and !hat reall# $ollo!s $rom !hat& the better gras( I ha*e on the contents o$ the conce(ts I a((l# in 7 dgment and action. In $inding o t more abo t those relations& I $ind o t more abo t the conce(ts that artic late the $acts abo t !hich I am in; iring. S ch a *ie! does not disting ish 6no!ings and the 6no!n& a((earance and realit#& !hat things are $or conscio sness and !hat the# are in themsel*es& as di$$erent kinds o$ things as $ar as concerns their conce(t al artic lation& and so their in%(rinci(le intelligibilit#. This is a conceptual idealism& !hich sees realit# itsel$ as ha*ing a conce(t al sha(e 2Oote'0802" I ha*e come to call this conceptual realism& reser*ing the other e0(ression $or something else& in HI.4. It sees cognition not onl# as see6ing to 6no! ob7ecti*e $acts& b t as also see6ing to gras( ob7ecti*e conce(ts. -bo*e I disting ished t!o com(lementar# strategies a*ailable to a monist dissatis$ied !ith t!o% sorted e(istemologies" a realist one& !hich models all the ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge on no mena as constr ed b# d alistic a((roaches& and an idealist one& !hich models all the

48:820'4%%@@

Brandom

ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge on (henomena as constr ed b# d alistic a((roaches.2G Ha*ing sei3ed on di$$erential intelligibilit# as the salient $eat re disting ishing no mena and (henomena +realities and a((earances/ as di$$erent 6inds o$ ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge& !e are no! in a (osition to see !hat this di$$erence in monistic e(istemological strategies comes to. The realistic monism abo t the ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge does not accord a((earances a (ri*ileged sort o$ intelligibilit#. +It denies that the mind is !hat is best 6no!n to itsel$./ -((earances ta6e their (lace as another 6ind o$ realit#& 6no!able and gras(able in the same !a# as the rest o$ the !orld. Oothing a((ears as ni; el# or (artic larl# s itable to be gras(ed. The corres(onding idealistic monism& b# contrast& assimilates all ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge as in (rinci(le gras(able& in something li6e the sense in !hich a((earances !here ta6en to be b# the d alistic tradition. H$ co rse there is the real (ossibilit# o$ a con*ergence in these a((roaches& as e*idenced $or instance b# the $act that both m st s rrender commitment to the trans(arenc# o$ conce(t al content i$ the# are to lea*e room $or error& and so retain a *ersion o$ the distinction bet!een a((earance and realit#. -nd Hegel is concerned to e0(loit the (ossibilit# o$ s ch con*ergence. 5hat ma6es it nonetheless correct to (lace him $irml# on the idealist side in this regard is that he has a de*elo(ed theor# o$ the conce(t al content$ lness and so intelligibilit# o$ tho ght contents +thin6ables& 7 dgeables& belie*ables/& and insists that in this same sense realit#) com(rising $acts and the ob7ects and (ro(erties that str ct re them)no less than +and in 7 st the same sense as/ its a((earance to s& is itsel$ conce(t all# artic lated. <once(t al idealism in this sense is& then& Hegel=s *ariet# o$ e(istemological monism& his res(onse to !hat he sees as the de$iciencies o$ e(istemological theories that
2G

I did not claim that these methodological (ossibilities are e0ha sti*e.

48:820'4%%@4

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are d alistic in the s(eci$ic sense o$ disting ishing t!o sorts o$ ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge& (henomena and no mena& b# ta6ing one to be str ct red b# conce(ts& and hence to be intelligible or gras(able& as ha*ing the right sha(e to be nderstood& 7 st as it is& and the other to be& a(art $rom all consideration o$ its relations to (otential 6no!ers& nonconce(t al in nat re. This is the third idealist thesis I ha*e attrib ted to Hegel +the third sense in !hich he is an idealist/. The $irst t!o !ere his claims that the str ct re and nit# o$ concepts is the same as the str ct re and nit# o$ sel$%conscio s selves +semantic idealism/& and that S(irit as a !hole is a sel$& and at least (otentiall# a self-conscious one +normati*e idealism/. <ommitment to conce(t al or ob7ecti*e idealism is !hat stands behind and is e0(ressed b# *ario s o$ Hegel=s alarming (rono ncements& in (artic lar that there is nothing o tside o$ S(irit& or that reason is conscio sness= certaint# o$ being all realit#.2I It (ro*ides the general $rame!or6 !ithin !hich Hegel !ill o$$er his acco nt o$ the relation bet!een s b7ect and ob7ect in conscio sness +and in action/.

Hegel is dri*en here b# an o*erriding commitment" -n acce(table e(istemological theor# m st e0(lain !hat it !o ld be $or s to ta6e things to be as the# reall# are. It is beca se the ...(res ((osition that 6no!ledge is o tside the absol te and there!ith o tside the tr th as !ell..2G44 )the imager# o$ an intrinsicall# nintelligible absol te con$ronting conscio sness across a g l$ that m st someho! be tra*ersed)that the critical im( lse !hose la dable moti*ation b# !as to anal#3e 6no!ledge so as to a*oid error ends b# treating all claims to gen ine 6no!ledge as erroneo s" ... !hat calls itsel$ the $ear o$ error re*eals itsel$ as $ear o$ the tr th. 2G44

2I

2re$.4

48:820'4%%@B

Brandom

Hegel res(onds to this second& anti%sce(tical criterion o$ ade; ac# on the e(istemological conce(ts a((lied in ma6ing intelligible the a((lication o$ ordinar# none(istemological conce(ts b# nderta6ing a d al e0(lanator# commitment. He aims to e0(lain i/ the conce(t al $orm o$ $acts and ob7ects)!hat ma6es them intelligible& !hat ma6es knowledge o$ them (ossible& the reason that !hat the# are can be said o$ them& on the one hand& and ii/ the ob7ecti*e content o$ claims and conce(ts)the !a# the# ans!er to ho! things are and !hat there is as a standard o$ correctness& !hat ma6es it (ossible $or them& !hen all goes right& to e0(ress gen ine 6no!ledge of something& as t!o sides o$ one coin& each o$ !hich can onl# be nderstood in terms o$ the other. Tho gh !e !ill not be in a (osition to nderstand this e0(lanation $ ll# ntil the end o$ the disc ssion o$ Reason& one o$ its g iding ideas is (resented alread# in the $inal eight (aragra(hs o$ the Introd ction& !hich !e=ll e0amine in detail in the ne0t section.

That is the idea that the !a# the re$erence o$ a((earances to an nderl#ing realit# )that the# are a((earances of something that !as al!a#s alread# there& considered a(art $rom its a((earings)arises and is sec red for conscio sness itsel$ is thro gh the e0(erience o$ error" thro gh the reali3ation o$ the ntr th o$ a((earances& as Hegel sa#s. That is to sa# that his acco nt o$ the representational dimension o$ conce(t se is a historical one. It is b# loo6ing at the (rocess b# !hich o r *ie!s +a((lications o$ conce(ts in 7 dgment and action/ develop that !e !ill nderstand !hat it is to take them to be views& that is& to be about something& to !hich the# ans!er $or their correctness as *ie!s +a((earings o$ some realit#/. This is not the onl# !a# in !hich one might ( rs e the idealist *ersion o$ the e(istemologicall# monistic strateg#& !hich& esche!ing a distinction o$ relati*e gras(abilit# bet!een no mena and (henomena& models its one categor# o$ ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge on the latter& rather than the $ormer. I s ggested abo*e 48:820'4%%@C

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that one *ersion o$ an e(istemologicall# d alistic theor#& o$ the sort Hegel is re7ecting& is a 1regean one& !hich disting ishes bet!een a realm o$ re$erents and a realm o$ senses b# !hich those re$erents are gi*en or (resented to s)so that !e can thin6 about ordinar# ob7ects indirectl#& by gras(ing tho ghts or senses& directl#. 1regeans ha*e long been tem(ted b# monistic *ersions o$ this t!o%sorted scheme. Some& starting !ith !hat the# ta6e to be a $irm gras( on !hat ob7ects& (ro(erties& and relations are& ha*e tried to !or6 o t $rom there to an acco nt o$ senses and tho ghts b# consideration o$ !hat a Amode o$ (resentationA o$ s ch things co ld be. This corres(onds to the realist monist strateg#. Hthers)most notabl# T gendhat)ha*e s ggested that 1rege=s Bede t ngen can be identi$ied !ith e; i*alence classes o$ Sinne& accordingl# as inters bstit tion (reser*es tr th. This is a *ersion o$ the idealist monist strateg#. I mention this onl# to em(hasi3e that Hegel is bringing to bear a $ rther idea in ( rs ing a historical%de*elo(mental *ersion o$ the idealist monist strateg#. He introd ces this ne! idea as his !a# o$ !or6ing o t a critical middle !a# bet!een skepticism and dogmatism. +Hegel ne*er !a*ered in his commitment to the (hiloso(hical re*ol tion e(itomi3ed in this .antian triad. His di$$erences $rom .ant are in this regard !holl# intram ral ones& concerning !hat a tr l# critical (ers(ecti*e re; ires./ 5e=*e seen that his ob7ections to e(istemologies b ilt aro nd the idea o$ di$$erent grades o$ intelligibilit# is moti*ated b# the demand that acco nts o$ 6no!ledge or conscio sness ma6e sense o$ the (ossibilit# o$ gen ine 6no!ledge o$ things as the# reall# are. This is 7 st to insist that one criterion o$ ade; ac# is that the# a*oid s6e(ticism. B t i$ s6e(ticism is the e(istemological Sc#lla& dogmatism is <har#bdis& and a$ter the o(ening (aragra(hs o$ the Introd ction& Hegel immediatel# mo*es on to disc ss

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that danger as !ell. Here the concern is that the tradition o$ Dnlightenment e(istemolog# $rom Uescartes thro gh .ant dogmaticall# endorses a certain standard o$ correctness $or the a((lication o$ e(istemological conce(ts. 1or Dnlightenment e(istemolog# al!a#s nderstood itsel$ to be concerned in the $irst instance !ith anal#3ing and assessing the signi$icance o$ the ne! $orms o$ 6no!ledge that !ere the (ro d (rod cts o$ the Scienti$ic Re*ol tion o$ the se*enteenth cent r#)abo*e all mathematical (h#sics as it de*elo(ed $rom Falileo thro gh Uescartes to its mat re $orm in Oe!ton=s Principia. Its ; estion is" !hat can !e learn abo t o rsel*es& the !orld& and the relations bet!een them& $rom the s(ectac lar cogniti*e s ccesses o$ the ne! science& in (artic lar $rom the gri( that meas rement and the se o$ relati*el# sim(le mathematical $orm lae has gi*en s on the motions o$ =middle%si3ed bits o$ dr# goods=T This nderstanding cr#stalli3es in .ant=s transcendental mo*e" not to ; estion the *alidit# o$ the sort o$ 6no!ledge that $inds its ( rest e0(ression in Oe!tonian science& b t to in; ire instead into the conditions o$ the (ossibilit# o$ !hat is ass med to be act al 6no!ledge. 1or .ant& this is the 7 sti$ication $or introd cing the transcendental machiner# o$ cogniti*e $ac lties that re(resent no mena b# (henomena)the clearest theoretical !or6ing%o t o$ the imager# Hegel is addressing. 1or !e come to 6no! abo t that transcendental digestion o$ n6no!able things%in%themsel*es& the e0traction $rom them o$ conce(t all# artic lated and so cogniti*el# no rishing a((earances& b# disco*ering the necessit# o$ s ch inter*ening (rocesses as (art o$ the conditions nder !hich alone s#stematic em(irical 6no!ledge is (ossible. The ass m(tion that Oe!ton=s (h#sics is the (aradigm and standard o$ gen ine em(irical 6no!ledge is the starting (oint o$ .ant=s critical theor#.

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Wet a (ro(erl# critical e(istemolog# o ght not 7 st dogmaticall# ado(t s ch a starting%(oint. Ho! might it be 7 sti$iedT Oot& in an# case& 7 st b# ma6ing a claim" ...science cannot sim(l# re7ect an ntr e $orm o$ 6no!ledge as a merel# common *ie! o$ things and gi*e ass rance that it is a com(letel# di$$erent !a# o$ 6no!ing& to !hich the other 6no!ledge is o$ no signi$icance !hatsoe*er. 2GC4 His remar6s on this to(ic need to be nderstood at t!o le*els or in t!o conte0ts. In the $irst& =5issenscha$t= re$ers to nat ral science& and the iss e concerns its ad*ent in and de*elo(ment since the se*enteenth cent r#& and its contrast !ith traditional& (artic larl# religio s& s#stems o$ 6no!ledge claims. In the second& =5issenscha$t= re$ers to the (hiloso(hical 6no!ledge claims Hegel himsel$ !ill e0tract as lessons codi$#ing e0(licitl# !hat is im(licit in the (rogressi*e sel$%ed cation o$ S(irit !hose ma7or stages are rehearsed $or s in the Phenomenology. In this sense it re$ers to metale*el concerns that are (recisel# to be disting ished $rom the gro nd le*el claims to 6no!ledge in terms o$ !hich he disc sses conscio sness generall#. The concl sions he dra!s abo t ho! standards $or assessing 6no!ledge claims can and cannot be legitimated are intended to a((l# to both9 b t the# emerge more clearl# i$ !e 6ee( o r e#es to begin !ith on the $irst sage& since at this (oint !e can ha*e onl# the ha3iest idea o$ !hat is in*ol*ed in the second. In both cases the initial (oint he is ma6ing is that the mere fact o$ ma6ing a claim to 6no!ledge& or to s (eriorit# o*er another sort o$ claim& cannot b# itsel$ carr# an# normati*e $orce. It co ld al!a#s be co ntered b# a corres(onding claim on the (art o$ the sort o$ ( tati*e 6no!ledge it dismisses and see6s to s ((lant& and as Hegel sa#s& Aone barren ass rance is o$ 7 st as m ch !orth as another.A +The second nsatis$actor# !a# o$ thin6ing abo t !arrant !ill be disc ssed in the $inal section o$ this cha(ter./

So Hegel is clear in re7ecting both s6e(ticism and dogmatism. B t his attit de is s bstantiall# more com(licated than mere re7ection. He also thin6s there is something right abo t each o$ them& and that the onl# a((roach to a (ro(erl# critical e(istemolog#

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lies in a((reciating and a((ro(riating this element as !ell. P tting the Pre$ace aside +as a characteri3ation that act all# comes ; ite late in the (ro7ect)!ritten& as it !as& li6e most (re$aces a$ter the com(letion o$ the rest& it reall# (resents a retros(ecti*e *ie! o$ !hat Hegel ta6es himsel$ to ha*e accom(lished in the !or6/& this is the $irst instance !e $ind in the Phenomenology o$ the dialectical emergence o$ a +more/ correct *ie! o t o$ an assessment o$ the insights& errors& and shared (res ((ositions o$ t!o diametricall# o((osed (redecessors. So it !ill be !orth 6ee(ing this theme in mind in !hile ( rs ing the disc ssion in the rest o$ this cha(ter. The general o tlines o$ !hat Hegel !ants to (reser*e $rom each o$ s6e(ticism and dogmatism are clear. S6e(tics are right to em(hasi3e the im(ortance $or o r nderstanding o$ e(istemological !arrant o$ o r (ast disco*eries o$ signi$icant errors in o r *ie!s& right in treating no c rrent cogniti*e or (ractical commitments as imm ne $rom the (ossibilit# o$ s ch deb n6ing disco*eries in the $ t re& and right to see no ((er bo nd in (rinci(le to the alterations in o r o*erall commitments that !e co ld accordingl# be obliged to ma6e. B t the# are !rong to thin6 this means that tr th is be#ond s and gen ine 6no!ledge o$ !hat reall# is im(ossible. Hnl# an ltimatel# dogmatic commitment to a bad model o$ tr th and 6no!ledge sec res their in$erence $rom the e0(erience o$ error to this s6e(tical concl sion. The# !o ld be right& he tells s& onl# i$ the *ie!s that s cceed the nco*ering o$ error co ld be nderstood onl# as the abstract or $ormal negations o$ their (redecessors. B t in $act the s ccessors are al!a#s determinate negations o$ them& and that means the# can in $a*ored cases be nderstood as ac6no!ledging& (reser*ing& and e0tending that in the earlier ta6es that& ho!e*er (artiall# and incom(letel#& !as gen inel# re*elator# o$ ho! things reall# are. Hegel sees the

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a((roaches he is reacting against as b ilding s6e(ticism in beca se the# ta6e it that the mere $act that cognition +conscio sness/ in*ol*es a((l#ing conce(ts means that it m st $alsi$# its ob7ects. So a((lications o$ conce(ts as s ch according to them can ne*er can ne*er be correct in the $ llest sense. B t !e sho ld not $orget that there is a sense in !hich Hegel himsel$ endorses a *er# similar concl sion" no 7 dgments are e*er $ ll# tr e. He dra!s this concl sion $rom his holism. H r 7 dgments cannot be $ ll# correct nless the conce(ts the# de(lo# are. B t that !ill be so onl# i$ all o r conce(ts are ade; ate& and all o r 7 dgments tr e. H tside o$ logic& Hegel does not thin6 this is an attainable& or e*en intelligible state o$ a$$airs. Ueterminate conce(t al contents as s ch contain negati*it#& the (otential $or re; iring their o!n re*ision !hen de(lo#ed in ma6ing no*el 7 dgments and e0(loring no*el in$erential connections. In order to o*ercome s6e(ticism& !e m st alter o r (ict re o$ 6no!ledge and tr th& and come to see it holisticall# and de*elo(mentall#" as residing in the !hole (rocess o$ in; ir#& in the !a#s in !hich !e groom and im(ro*e the !hole s#stem o$ o r conce(ts%and%commitments rather than in an# (artic lar tem(orar# member o$ it. Hegel is aiming to set o t an idiom in !hich it !ill ma6e sense to sa#& as he does in the Pre$ace2:" The e*anescent itsel$ m stPbe regarded as essential& not as something $i0ed& c t o$$ $rom the Tr e& and le$t l#ing !ho 6no!s !here o tside it& an# more than the Tr e is to be regarded as something on the other side& (ositi*e and dead. -((earance is the arising and (assing a!a# that does not itsel$ arise and (ass a!a#& b t is =in%itsel$=& and constit tes the act alit# and the mo*ement o$ the tr th. The Tr e is th s the Bacchanalian re*el in !hich no member is not dr n69 #et beca se each member colla(ses as soon as he dro(s o t& the re*el is 7 st as m ch trans(arent and sim(le re(ose. ? dged in the co rt o$ this mo*ement& the single sha(es o$ S(irit do not (ersist an# more than determinate tho ghts doPIn the whole o$ the mo*ement& seen as a state o$ re(ose& !hat disting ishes itsel$ therein& and gi*es itsel$ (artic lar e0istence& is (reser*ed as something that recollects itsel$ 2sich erinnert4P
2:

2E4G4

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5hat he here calls Athe Tr eA 2das 5ahr4 is the mo*ement8im(ro*ement o$ the !hole& !hich is the becoming more and more e0(licit o$ !hat is all along im(licit in it. It is dri*en b# ac6no!ledgement o$ the inade; ac# o$ some as(ect o$ o r e0(ression o$ the real& !hich mani$ests itsel$ b# the material incom(atibilit# o$ some o$ o r commitments. This is the higher lesson to be learned $rom s6e(ticism& the tr th that it incor(orates.

Uogmatists are !rong in thin6ing that the mere $act o$ o r commitment& ho!e*er dee( it ma# be& can entitle s to an# claims. B t the# are right that the e(istemological !arrant o$ *ario s claims and (roced res cannot be in*estigated in abstraction $rom consideration o$ the claims that ha*e act all# been endorsed and the (roced res that ha*e act all# been carried o t. It is o$ the essence o$ a (henomenolog# in Hegels sense to st d# 6no!ledge as itsel$ a (henomenon& that is& to start !ith o r act al endorsements and (ractices. So there is an im(ortant sense in !hich Hegel agrees !ith the dogmatist. His (ragmatism consists in a semantic monism" in seeing the institution o$ conce(t al norms and their application to (artic lar cases as as(ects o$ one and the same (rocess o$ e0(erience.@0 -ll there is to settle !hat co nts as a correct a((lication o$ a conce(t)that is& !hat its content reall# is)is other a((lications o$ that conce(t +and o$ conce(ts related to it b# material relations o$ incom(atibilit# and in$erence/. Th s the mere $act that a conce(t is a((lied on a (artic lar occasion does (ro*ide some !arrant $or it) something li6e a de$a lt (res m(tion o$ its correctness. B t& it is a de$easible !arrant" one that is thro!n into determinate do bt as soon as it sho!s itsel$ to be incom(atible !ith some other act al a((lication o$ a conce(t. Sorting o t these con$licts)diagnosing
@0

See Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegels Idealism.

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and res(onding to error)is the (rocess o$ e0(erience. Th s a tr l# critical attit de m st combine the gen ine insights o$ both s6e(ticism and dogmatism& !hile a*oiding the e0cesses into !hich the# are led b# their $ail re to a((reciate the signi$icance o$ e0(erience as a (rocess !hose normati*e motor is determinate negation.

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III: Hegel's ()n *ie)

In the $inal sentence o$ the $o rth (aragra(h& Hegel characteri3es the concl sion he !ants to dra!s $rom the considerations he has ad*anced in this $irst (art o$ the Introd ction" These& then& are the reasons $or (ro(osing to nderta6e a descri(tion o$ 6no!ledge as it a((ears& a (resentation o$ 6no!ledge as a (henomenon. 2GC4 His s ggestion is that !e e0amine act al (ractices o$ ma6ing 6no!ledge claims& in the same s(irit in !hich !e in*estigate other things that ha((en in the !orld. To do that !e m st loo6 at the a((lication o$ ordinar#& none(istemological conce(ts& $or it is these that artic late the contents o$ s ch act al claims to 6no!ledge as" !hen t!o bodies collide& the motions that res lt de(end on the mass& *elocit#& and rigidit# o$ the bodies& b t not on their colors& bea t#& or histor# o$ (re*io s o!nershi(. 5hat ma6es s ch 7 dgements claims to knowledge in the absence o$ e0(licit in*ocation o$ s ch e(istemological conce(ts is the !a# in !hich the a((lication o$ none(istemological conce(ts is held ( $or assessment as correct or incorrect according to some standard. Hegel (ro(oses to a*oid dogmatism b# seeing ho! s ch standards act all# arise and ho! the# are act all# a((lied in (ractice. -ltho gh it !o ld be dogmatic to in$er that a conce(t !as correctl# a((lied merel# beca se s ch a((lications are in $act& t#(icall#& or e*en in*ariabl# ta6en or treated as correct& the onl# nondogmatic !a# to nderstand !hat is meant b# tal6 o$ conce(ts as correctl# or incorrectl# a((lied)o r onl# gri( on the nat re o$ the conce(t al norms that set standards $or s ch a((lications)is (ro*ided b# act al (ractices o$ a((l#ing conce(ts and assessing those a((lications. The (ath Hegel (ro7ects here is the one traced o t b# t!entieth cent r# (hiloso(h# o$ science& !hen decades o$ basicall# a (riori (ositi*ist (rescri(ti*e theori3ing abo t the correct standards $or em(irical in; ir# ga*e !a# to the care$ l descri(ti*e historical in*estigation o$ act al (ractices $or cond cting and assessing s ch in; ir#. 1rom thin6ing o$ themsel*es as dictating norms

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to !or6ing scientists on the basis o$ their s (erior insight into !hat science m st or o ght to be& (hiloso(hers o$ science came to thin6 o$ themsel*es as tr#ing to ma6e e0(licit the norms that !ere im(licit in the act al (ractice o$ those scientists.

Tal6 abo t 6no!ledge as (henomenon& 6no!ledge as it act all# a((ears& is tal6 abo t claims to 6no!ledge)$or !e ha*e $o nd no nondogmatic !a# to 7 sti$# an antecedent normati*e discrimination o$ some o$ those claims as e0(ressing genuine 6no!ledge. The most ob*io s $eat re o$ 6no!ledge as s ch a (henomenon is that it has a history" !hat claims are endorsed as 6no!ledge changes o*er time. H r concern is to nderstand ho! cogniti*e or conce(t al norms go*erning the e(istemological assessment o$ s ch changes can be sec red. Ha*ing gi*en ( the idea o$ im(orting a transcendent normati*e standard go*erning s ch changes& !e are loo6ing to see i$ some immanent standard can be discerned or elaborated b# loo6ing at the (ractices that bring those changes abo t. later in the Introd ction +2IC4/ !e=ll learn Hegel=s term $or the (rocesses b# !hich one set o$ 6no!ledge claims is relin; ished and another ado(ted is =e0(erience= 2Dhr$ahr ng4. 5hen Hegel !rote the Introd ction& the !or6ing title $or the !hole boo6 !as The Science of the ,xperience of Consciousness. To be scientific +no! in Hegel=s technical (hiloso(hical sense& rather than in the narro!er sense o$ s#stematic em(irical in; ir# into nat ral (henomena/ abo t e0(erience is (recisel# to be in a (osition to ma6e the normati*e assessments re; ired to disting ish some changes o$ 6no!ledge claims as progressive. In 2GG4 he tells s that the (rogressi*eness o$ s ch changes might be concei*ed either in terms o$ a((roach to!ard true 6no!ledge%%!ere !e someho! to become entitled to a nondogmatic characteri3ation o$ s ch a state%%or b# nderstanding !hat is re; ired $or the 6no!ledge claimant to ...li$t itsel$ to the le*el o$ S(irit and attain cogni3ance o$ !hat it is in itsel$ thro gh the com(leted e0(erience o$ its o!n sel$.

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This is the alternati*e Hegel !ill ( rs e" constr ing the goal as self%6no!ledge& rather than 7 st 6no!ledge. Hegel !ill ltimatel# $ nd a notion o$ the sort o$ expressive (rogress that consists in coming to explicit a!areness o$ !hat is implicit in the (ractices b# !hich one has de*elo(ed)conscio sness becoming for itsel$ !hat it is in itsel$.@' B t at this stage s ch a remar6 can ser*e onl# as a sign%(ost $or !hat is to come& not as something !e are as #et in a (osition to nderstand.

5hat this (reliminar# characteri3ation o$ !here !e are going can do& ho!e*er& is alert s to loo6 $or lessons that can be learned $rom rehearsing the e0(erience b# !hich conscio sness de*elo(s" e0(licit (rinci(les codi$#ing str ct res that can be seen to ha*e been im(licit in the (rocesses b# !hich 6no!ledge claims are embraced and discarded. 1or !e ha*e been gi*en the hint that the standards o$ cogniti*e (rogressi*eness are to be so ght in the sel$%6no!ledge in*ol*ed in $orm lating (rinci(les go*erning those (ractices. The nat ral o tcome o$ s ch a search is !hat Hegel calls Aconscio s insight into the ntr th o$ (henomenal 6no!ledgeA 2GI4. Hne !a# o$ nderstanding the (roblem o$ the Introd ction is as raising the ; estion o$ intelligibilit# not 7 st $or gro nd%le*el em(irical conce(ts& b t $or the conce(ts o$ e(istemological theor# as !ell. The arg ment goes li6e this" It m st be (ossible $or s to gras( the !a# things reall# are& in themsel*es& on (ain o$ ha*ing to ac6no!ledge that gen ine 6no!ledge is im(ossible. So& the notion o$ gen ine

@'

The $ormal distinction bet!een these t!o a((roaches to conce(t al (rogressi*eness is analogo s to that bet!een 5eierstrass= and <a ch#=s de$initions o$ con*ergence. The $ormer assesses the con*ergence o$ a se; ence to a limit 6no!n in ad*ance b# considering !hether s ccessi*e members o$ the se; ence a((roach that limit e*er more closel#& a((ro0imating the limiting *al e !ith an# desired degree o$ acc rac#. The latter assesses con*ergence o$ a se; ence to an n6no!n limit b# loo6ing e0cl si*el# b# considering the relation bet!een s ccessi*e members o$ the se; ence& sho!ing that the# a((roach each other e*er more closel#& a((ro0imating each other !ith an# desired degree o$ acc rac#. This analog# is $ormal onl#& since it ignores the e0(ressi*e content that is essential to Hegel=s immanent sol tion o$ the (roblem o$ !arranting conce(t al norms.

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6no!ledge is incom(atible !ith nderstanding things in themsel*es and things as the# a((ear to s as di$$ering radicall# in their intelligibilit#& as se(arated b# the g l$. B t& as emerges in 2I24 and 2I44& the distinction bet!een !hat things are in themsel*es and !hat the# are $or s is essential to conscio sness itsel$. The (ointing be#ond itsel$ to !hat it is abo t& the re(resentational ( r(ort or intentionalit# o$ conscio sness is not 7 st (art o$ !hat conscio sness is in itsel$& b t also o$ !hat it is $or itsel$. Th s !e cannot sim(l# den# that there is s ch a distinction. Ho! are !e to nderstand that distinction !itho t erecting it into a g l$ di*iding the nintelligible $rom the intelligibleT Ho! can !e so m ch as gras( the conce(t o$ an in%itsel$ that o r 6no!ledge and nderstanding are abo t in the sense o$ being ans!erable toT Hegel=s ans!er !ill be +2IB4&2IC4&2IG4/ that !hat ma6es the e(istemological distinction bet!een !hat things are in themsel*es and !hat the# are $or conscio sness intelligible to conscio sness is experience. The nderstanding b# nat ral conscio sness that the conce(ts it gras(s are about something +2IG4/& that the# ans!er or are res(onsible to something $or the correctness o$ their a((lication +2I'4&2IB4/ deri*es $rom the ma6ing o$ mistakes& the (rocess !hereb# it obliged to alter the !a# it ta6es things to be& and so ac6no!ledge that !hat it (re*io sl# too6 to be ho! things !ere in themsel*es +a bent stic6 in the !ater/ !as in $act onl# the !a# something else +a straight stic6 in the !ater/ a((eared. It is the historical dimension o$ conscio sness that ma6es its referential dimension intelligible.

-s an e0am(le o$ ho! the t!o le*els o$ disco rse anno nced in the o(ening sentence o$ the Introd ction are !o*en together& it ma# be (ointed o t that in telling a stor# li6e this abo t the basis o$ some e(istemological conce(ts& Hegel is instantiating his general *ie!s abo t !hat ma6es an# conce(t& incl ding gro nd%le*el ones& determinatel# 48:820'4%%4G

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content$ l +and so determinatel# intelligible/. Ueterminate (ro(rieties go*erning the a((lication o$ conce(ts deri*e onl# $rom act al histories o$ a((lication o$ those and related conce(ts. The genetic $allac# that .ant diagnosed in*ol*es r nning together ; estions abo t ca sal antecedents !ith ; estions abo t !ustification. B t Hegel=s (oint concerns content$ lness and intelligibilit#& not 7 sti$ication. Hn his acco nt& conce(ts ac; ire their contents thro gh e0(erience. He is at least !illing to agree !ith the em(iricists as $ar as endorsing this *erbal $orm la. B t he means this slogan in a B r6ean sense o$ e0(erience +Ddm nd& not .enneth& tho gh (erha(s this is a (oint the# are not $ar a(art on/& or the ne!s(a(er ad*ertisement sense +AThree #ears e0(erience necessar#.A/. It is a matter o$ the conce(t e*ol*ing its content thro gh act al a((lication and misa((lication in concrete cases and !ith concrete conse; ences $or the a((licabilit# o$ other conce(ts. It is this (ractical se o$ the conce(t that gi*es it its ob7ecti*e =thic6ness=.

H$$ering this s mmar# is getting ahead o$ o r stor# in terms o$ $ollo!ing the se; ence o$ the te0t& ho!e*er. 5e le$t o$$ !ith Hegel=s criticisms o$ the e(istemological conce(ts he inherits as not ha*ing been made intelligible themsel*es& and not ser*ing to ma6e intelligible the (ossibilit# o$ gen ine 6no!ledge or nderstanding o$ !hat there reall# is. In 2GC4 he considers the s ggestion that Ainstead o$ bothering to re$ te all these ideas !e co ld re7ect them o t o$ hand as ad*entitio s and arbitrar#& and the !ords associated !ith them li6e =absol te=& =cognition=& =ob7ecti*e=& and =s b7ecti*e=& and co ntless others !hose meaning is ass med to be generall# $amiliar.A This co ld be tho ght o$ as retreating or ret rning $rom the metale*el at !hich !e are concerned !ith the correct a((lication o$ general e(istemological conce(ts& to the gro nd le*el at !hich !e are 48:820'4%%4I

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concerned !ith the correct a((lication o$ ordinar# conce(ts. B t& tho gh tem(ting& it is not in $act an o(tion sim(l# to $orego e(istemological criticism. Fen ine 6no!ing is a concrete occ rrence& and coming al!a#s into a !orld that is alread# $ ll o$ +!hat it ta6es to be/ $alse or inade; ate 6no!ledge claims. It cannot sim(l# assert its s (eriorit#& $or Aone barren ass rance is o$ 7 st as m ch !orth as anotherA& and its ri*als can res(ond in 6ind. Oeither !o ld it be s $$icient& he (oints o t !ith a gest re to!ard the acco nt he !ill e*ent all# endorse& sim(l# to (oint o t ho! the in$erior $orms o$ nderstanding can $rom the (oint o$ *ie! o$ the $orm one endorses be nderstood to be antici(ations or 7 *enile or (reliminar# *ersions o$ that (ri*ileged $orm. Hne !o ld still need some standard !ith res(ect to !hich to disting ish progressive de*elo(ments& those tending to better nderstanding& $rom those that degenerate& and this normati*e 7 dgement re; ires some sort o$ critical stand(oint. +The sort o$ dis( tes Hegel (robabl# has in mind here incl des both the ad*ent o$ em(irical science in the se*enteenth cent r#& against a bac6gro nd o$ Scholastic nat ral (hiloso(h# that contested its claims& and the Romantic assertion o$ the cogniti*e s (eriorit# o$ the concrete indi*id al nderstanding the# too6 to be achie*ed b# art o*er the abstract ni*ersal nderstanding the# too6 to be achie*ed b# ; antitati*e science./ The (roblem& then& is that on the one hand critical assessment o$ cogniti*e acti*ities cannot sim(l# be $oregone& !hile on the other hand& it cannot sim(l# be ass med that the conce(ts em(lo#ed in s ch metatheoretical criticism are a((ro(riatel# content$ l and $amiliar. So ho! are !e to !arrant the conce(ts em(lo#ed in criticismT The ans!er anno nced in the $inal sentence o$ 2GC4 is to nderta6e Aan e0(osition o$ ho! 6no!ledge ma6es its a((earance.A The determinate content$ lness and intelligibilit# o$ a set o$ metale*el e(istemological conce(ts is to be e0hibited b# an

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e0(osition o$ the career o$ base le*el conce(ts and 6no!ledge in terms o$ them. It is the tas6 o$ the rest o$ the Introd ction to e0(lain !hat s ch an e0(osition is& and !h# it is an a((ro(riate res(onse to the (roblem.

2GG4 characteri3es the ob7ect o$ the e0(osition both as phenomenal knowledge& and as the A(ath o$ the natural consciousness !hich (resses $or!ard to tr e 6no!ledge...and achie*e $inall#& thro gh a com(leted e0(erience o$ itsel$& the a!areness o$ !hat it reall# is in itsel$.A There are t!o distinctions being introd ced here& one contentio s among commentators and one not. The relati*el# straight$or!ard one contrasts phenomenal 6no!ledge& 6no!ledge as it a((ears& !ith the phenomenological 6no!ledge that !e readers o$ the Phenomenology ha*e o$ it. The more com(licated ; estion is ho! (henomenal 6no!ledge relates to nat ral conscio sness.@2 ? sti$#ing a reading o$ this distinction re; ires disc ssion o$ the !hole o$ Phenomenology- not 7 st the introd ction. In lie o$ that& let me 7 st o$$er a ; ic6 s6etch o$ !hat I ta6e it to come to. The =$orm o$ necessit#= that disting ishes the abstraction phenomenal knowing +6no!ing as a (henomenon $or s& the (henomenological 6no!er/ $rom concrete natural consciousness +the thing that comes in Sha(es 2Festalten4/ is the order o$ e0(osition o$ Phenomenology. 1rom o r latecoming retros(ecti*e +Athe H!l o$ Einer*a $lies onl# at d s6A/ (henomenological (oint o$ *ie!& !e can (ic6 o t $rom the !elter o$ (ast e0(erience o$ alterations o$ conce(ts a (ath thro gh the (ast to the (resent in !hich the transitions are progressive +heading to!ard -bsol te .no!ledge/. Tal6ing abo t this (rocess later& Hegel sa#s" AThis !a# o$ loo6ing at the matter is something contrib ted b# us& b# means o$ !hich the s ccession o$ e0(eriences thro gh !hich conscio sness (asses is raised into
@2

5erner Ear0 disc sses the di$$ic lties o$ this ; estion at length in his boo6 on Hegel. 2re$.4

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a scienti$ic (rogression%%b t it is not 6no!n to the conscio sness that !e are obser*ing&A 2IG4. The sense in !hich the# are (rogressi*e is an expressive one%%the later stage arises $rom the earlier one b# explicitating the (rior stage& ma6ing something that !as im(licit in it e0(licit $or conscio sness. In an e0(ressi*el# (rogressi*e trans$ormation& conscio sness becomes $or itsel$ !hat it !as in itsel$. This is as tr e $or the de*elo(ment o$ gro nd%le*el conce(ts as $or the metale*el e(istemological ones. Hne conse; ence at the higher le*el is that a (artic lar concrete de*elo(ment o$ nat ral conscio sness ma# co nt as ma6ing e0(licit some $eat re o$ that conscio sness& $or instance the nat re o$ its em(irical 6no!ledge& !itho t ma6ing e0(licit another& $or instance the nat re o$ its action. It is $or this reason that the same historical gro nd& !ith res(ect to nat ral conscio sness& is traced thro gh three times o*er in the order o$ e0(osition o$ the (rogress o$ (henomenal 6no!ledge to!ard absol te 6no!ledge& in the sections on <onscio sness& Sel$%<onscio sness& and then Reason. 5hat is c m lati*e across these sections is so only in an e0(ositor# sense& $or s !ho can better nderstand !hat is being made e0(licit in the e0(osition o$ the later as(ects beca se o$ o r e0(erience +not the e0(erience o$ nat ral conscio sness or (henomenal 6no!ledge/ o$ the earlier e0(osition. 1or s there is (rogression in com(le0it# and richness& beca se in each case !e ha*e read abo t the other e0(licitations& and so ha*e o rsel*es incor(orated some other insights& !hen !e come to the e0(osition o$ the latter as(ects. To begin his acco nt o$ the e0(osition o$ the e0(erience o$ nat ral conscio sness inso$ar as it is (rogressi*e in re*ealing the tr e nat re o$ that conscio sness& Hegel ma6es

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t!o claims in the o(ening sentences o$ 2GI4. He claims $irst that Anat ral conscio sness !ill sho! itsel$...not to be real 6no!ledge&A and that it Ata6es itsel$ to be real 6no!ledgeA. It thin6 that the second attit de is a de$initional characteristic o$ nat ral conscio sness" it ta6es it that the !orld reall# is the !a# it ta6es it to be. In this !a# it ado(ts the ncritical e(istemological attit de o$ ta6ing its gro nd%le*el nderstandings at $ace *al e. It ta6es itsel$ to ha*e gotten things right.@@ The $irst claim is Hegel=s in*ocation o$ fallibilism. Dach sha(e o$ nat ral conscio sness !ill come to sho! itsel$& not onl# to s& the (henomenological 6no!ers& b t to nat ral conscio sness as (henomenal 6no!ledge& as inade; ate and incorrect +!e !ill hear abo t !h# in 2IB4%2IG4/. The res lt o$ these t!o $eat res o$ nat ral conscio sness is that the (ath !hereb# nat ral conscio sness in $act (resses on to!ard tr e 6no!ledge Ahas a negati*e signi$icance $or itA 2GI4& and Acan be regarded as the...!a# o$ des(airA 2ibid.4. -gain& A...this (ath is the conscio s insight into the ntr th o$ (henomenal 6no!ledgeA 2ibid.4. S ((ose it is noticed that e*er# theor# em(irical science has e*er ( t $or!ard has t rned o t to be $alse and conce(t all# inade; ate +the $allibilist dat m/. It is then tem(ting to (er$orm the $allibilist metale*el ind ction& and concl de that all o r theories !ill t rn o t to be $alse and inade; ate& so that !e !ill ne*er 6no! or nderstand ho! things reall# are. To dra! this concl sion is to des(air& e(istemologicall#. Ootice that !hat tem(ts one to this concl sion is thin6ing o$ !hat is cogniti*el# central as knowledge as an achieved state& thin6ing o$ cogniti*e (rogress in terms o$ the ; antitati*e acc m lation o$ 7 sti$ied tr ths. I$ instead one thin6s o$ !hat is cogniti*el# central as understanding as an ongoing process& thin6ing o$ cogniti*e (rogress in terms o$ the ; alitati*e e*ol tion o$ conce(ts& one can a*oid the $allibilist metaind ction. Hne then can see the (rocess o$ being disa((ointed b# the
@@

<om(are o$ -rth r 1ine=s disc ssions o$ the Anat ral ontological attit de.A 2re$.4

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inade; ac# o$ one=s conce(ts instead as Athe detailed histor# o$ education 2Bild ng4 o$ conscio sness...A. Here Hegel goes the Dnlightenment one better& seeing (rogress not onl# in the ac; isition o$ tr ths& b t in the de*elo(ment o$ conce(ts as !ell.

To s6etch Ain a (reliminar# and general !a#A !h# the Ae0(osition o$ the ntr e conscio sness in its ntr th is not a merel# negati*e (roced reA 2G:4 Hegel introd ces the idea o$ determinate content and determinate negation +in its historical sense/. Hegel=s remar6s here a((l# both to the e*ol tion o$ gro nd%le*el conce(ts and to the e*ol tion o$ e(istemological ones& b t the idea he is a$ter emerges most clearl# i$ !e consider an e0am(le o$ the $ormer sort. 5hat the $allibilist metaind ction ignores is that !hen !e disco*er that a scienti$ic theor#& sa# Oe!tonian mechanics& is $alse and conce(t all# inade; ate& !e also learn something. It is not merel# or abstractl# $alse& it is $alse in (artic lar res(ects. It is not merel# conce(t all# inade; ate& (artic lar inade; acies emerge in (artic lar sit ations. Oor are !e t#(icall# ret rned to the blan6 beginning o$ in; ir#. 5e don=t ha*e to start all o*er again $rom !here !e !ere be$ore Oe!ton. -$ter the $ail re o$ Oe!tonian mechanics to !or6 (ro(erl# $or large masses and large *elocities !e are le$t 6no!ing and nderstanding more than sim(l# the general and abstract denial that Oe!tonian mechanics is tr e. 5e ha*e negated it determinatel#& b# coming to be entitled to (artic lar claims that are incom(atible !ith it. This is denied b# ... the s6e(ticism !hich onl# e*er sees ( re nothingness in its res lt and abstracts $rom the $act that this nothingness is s(eci$icall# the nothingness o$ that from which it results. 1or it is onl# !hen it is ta6en as the res lt o$ that $rom !hich it emerges& that it is& in $act& the tr e res lt9 in that case it is itsel$ a determinate nothingness& one !hich has a content. The sce(ticism that ends ( !ith the bare abstraction o$ nothingness or em(tiness cannot get an# $ rther $rom there& b t m st !ait to see !hether something ne! comes along& and !hat it is& in order to thro! it too in the same em(t# ab#ss. B t !hen& on the other hand& the res lt is concei*ed

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as it is in tr th& namel#& as a determinate negation& a ne! $orm has thereb# immediatel# arisen& and in the negation the transition is made thro gh !hich the (rogress thro gh the com(lete series o$ $orms come abo t o$ itsel$. 2G:4 Hegel !ill elaborate the conce(ts o$ determinate content and determinate negation in the acco nt o$ Perce(tion. In 2I04 !e are told that the goal or destination o$ the (rogression o$ $orms o$ ntr e (henomenal 6no!ledge that (henomenological conscio sness can e0tract $rom the *agaries o$ the act al de*elo(ment o$ nat ral conscio sness is $i0ed& and !e are gi*en three characteri3ations o$ it. It is the (oint at !hich 6no!ledge !ill no longer need to go be#ond itsel$& 6no!ledge !ill $ind itsel$& and conce(t and ob7ect !ill corres(ond 2ents(rechen4 to each other. In 2I24 !e !ill be concerned !ith !here this list comes $rom. 1or no! notice that this end(oint is a (rod ct o$ !hat !e (henomenological 6no!ers are bo nd to consider as progress in (ic6ing a de*elo(ing se; ence o$ (henomenal 6no!ledge o t o$ the alterations o$ nat ral conscio sness. That onl# a sit ation satis$#ing those three criteria !ill co nt $or s as (rogress is beca se onl# inso$ar as !e can ma6e sense o$ a((roaching s ch a state can !e a*oid the intelligibilit# g l$ threatened b# the o(ening (aragra(hs o$ the Introd ction& and a*oiding that g l$ is hal$ o$ the (roblem that has been set. So $or s& (rogress m st be seen to consist in conscio sness As(oiling its o!n limited satis$actionA 2I04& and so ( shing be#ond its +c rrent/ sel$. S(eci$icall#& !hat is (rogressi*e is conscio sness ma6ing e0(licit $or itsel$ the implicit inade; acies in its s#stem o$ conce(ts +again& !hether gro nd%le*el or metale*el/. 5hen (henomenal 6no!ledge becomes $or itsel$ !hat it is in itsel$& it $inds itsel$ +e0(licitl#/. 5hen the in%itsel$ becomes e0(licitl# $or conscio sness& ob7ect corres(onds to conce(t. It is this tho ght that is !or6ed o t in 2I'4%2I:4.

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-ccordingl#& Athis e0(osition is a !a# o$ relating Science 2or tr e 6no!ledge4 to (henomenal 2 ntr e4 6no!ledgeA 2I'4. Fen ine 6no!ledge is a result9 (henomenal 6no!ledge consists o$ its earl#& inade; ate& immat re $orms. B t !hat (res ((ositions m st !e ma6e abo t this goal& !hich de$ines the nat re and direction o$ the progressiveT 5here do !e get a standard $or 7 dging the res lt& and hence gi*ing a sense to the notion o$ (rogressT 5hat entitles s to the three characteri3ations o$ the goal o$$ered in 2I04T 5hence cometh the idealT Hegel e0(licitl# ( ts this iss e in normative terms" !hat is re; ired is some criterion or standard 2EaNstab4& a norm that !ill settle !hether some a((lication o$ a conce(t is A...right or !rong on the basis o$ the res lting agreement or disagreement o$ the thing e0amined.A 2I'4 This is& as !ill emerge& a ; estion abo t the e*ol tion o$ gro nd%le*el conce(ts& as !ell as abo t metale*el e(istemological conce(ts. The notion o$ (rogress and goal re; ires !arranting $or them as !ell. To the ; estion o$ ho! a criterion or standard determining the correct a((lication o$ conce(ts becomes a*ailable& 2I24 ans!ers that !e m st loo6 at the notions o$ 6no!ledge and o$ the tr th to !hich it is ans!erable as !e $ind them in and $or nat ral conscio sness. The ob7ect o$ o r (henomenological 6no!ledge and nderstanding is (henomenal 6no!ledge and nderstanding& and !e m st start !ith its nderstanding o$ the standard $or correct a((lication o$ its conce(ts. 5e are not to Aim(ort criteria& or to ma6e se o$ o r o!n bright ideas and tho ghts...it is (recisel# !hen !e lea*e these aside that !e s cceed in contem(lating the matter in hand 2=die Sache=& c$. the $irst sentence o$ 2G@4 !here this (hrase is sed to (oint to concern !ith the a((lication o$ gro nd%le*el

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conce(ts4 as it is in and $or itsel$&A 2I44. 5hen !e loo6 at nat ral conscio sness !e $ind that <onscio sness sim ltaneo sl# disting ishes itsel$ $rom something and at the same time relates itsel$ to it& or as it is said& something e0ists for conscio sness9 and the determinate as(ect o$...the being o$ something $or conscio sness is knowing. B t !e disting ish this being%$or%another $rom being-in-itself...this being%in%itsel$ is called truth. 2I24 The distinction bet!een conce(t and standard& bet!een 6no!ing and tr th& is alread# a distinction for conscio sness at the le*el o$ (henomenal ntr e 6no!ledge. B t this raises a ( 33le" 5hat is the content o$ this distinctionT Ho! is it intelligible $or (henomenal 6no!ledgeT Hegel sa#s in 2I44 A...the essential (oint to bear in mind thro gho t the !hole in*estigation is that these t!o moments& =conce(t= and =ob7ect=& =being%$or%another= and =being%in%itsel$= both $all within that 6no!ledge !hich !e are in*estigating.A B t ho! is this (ossible gi*en that A...it seems that conscio sness cannot& as it !ere& get behind the ob7ect as it e0ists $or conscio sness so as to e0amine !hat the ob7ect is in itself& and hence too cannot test its o!n 6no!ledge b# that standardA2IB4T Recall that the t!in $ormal constraints on an ade; ate conce(tion o$ the distinction bet!een !hat things are in themsel*es and !hat the# are $or another are" $irst that the distinction not be misconstr ed as an ontological di*ision bet!een entities that are and those that are not nat rall# or innatel# intelligible& and second that the distinction not be erased or ignored. 1ailing either o$ these constraints is $alling into a one%sided *ie! o$ conscio sness& either b# o*erem(hasi3ing the element o$ di$$erence& or b# o*erem(hasi3ing the element o$ identit#. These are t!o di$$erent !a#s o$ ma6ing the (ossibilit# o$ 6no!ledge nintelligible. Hegel thin6s that ho!e*er the broadl# .antian str ct re is concei*ed it is bo nd to $ail one or the other o$ these demands& either b# losing the contrast bet!een realit# and its a((earings& or b# ma6ing it nbridgeable. +Oor

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is this a s(ecial $eat re o$ the !a# .ant has set things o t. Rather Hegel ta6es .ant=s critical (hiloso(h# to ha*e the *irt e (recisel# o$ ha*ing made e0(licit and e*ident the str ct ral in$elicit# that !as al!a#s im(licit in Dnlightenment re(resentational e(istemolog#./ Hne o$ Hegel=s signal contrib tions to (hiloso(h# is the str ct re o$ the acco nt he s ggests $or a*oiding this dilemma and 7ointl# satis$#ing the t!o constraints. He starts !ith the idea that i$ the threat o$ s6e(ticism associated !ith creating a ; alitati*e g l$ o$ intelligibilit# is to be a*oided& things in themsel*es m st be treated as a 6ind o$ thing that is intrinsicall# as intelligible as their a((earances are& or less dangero sl# ( t& that the# m st be o$ a 6ind that can in (rinci(le a((ear to s or be nderstood 7 st as the# are in themsel*es. Hegel=s strateg# $or satis$#ing this constraint !ill be to $ nd the contrast bet!een !hat things are $or conscio sness and !hat the# are in themsel*es b# a((ealing to $eat res o$ the e0(erience +in his sense/ o$ conscio sness itsel$& and th s are in a broad sense (henomenal. His acco nt achie*es this b# maintaining that the distinction bet!een the truth o$ things& or !hat the# are in themsel*es& and certainty o$ them& or !hat the# are $or conscio sness& A$alls !ithin conscio sness itsel$A. This distinction is itsel$ something for conscio sness" A...the distinction bet!een the in%itsel$ and 6no!ledge is alread# (resent in the *er# $act that conscio sness 6no!s an ob7ect at all. Something is for it the in-itself9 and 6no!ledge or the being o$ the ob7ect $or conscio sness& is& for it& another momentA2IB4.@4 So the distinction bet!een things as the# are in themsel*es and as the# are $or conscio sness is e0(licit for conscio sness. It is clear that b# s ch a strateg# Hegel can ens re that there is no conce(t al ga( o$ intelligibilit# se(arating the ob7ects o$
@4

Reall# to conscio sness& that is& something we can see as im(licit in !hat is e0(licit to it& b t not something that is +#et/ e0(licitl# for conscio sness.

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6no!ledge and o r 6no!ledge o$ them. Things in themsel*es are not to be concei*ed as the ideal& nreachable& limiting ca se o$ sense and goal o$ intellect& as on the re(resentational (ict re& b t as an as(ect o$ the se; ence o$ de*elo(ing a((earances. The challenge is then to a*oid the other horn o$ the dilemma. 1or there seems to be a clear danger o$ losing the contrast bet!een !hat things are in themsel*es and !hat the# are $or conscio sness& i$ this distinction itsel$ is no! to be nderstood as something that is in and $or itsel$ a di$$erence for conscio sness. His strateg# is to concei*e o$ the distinction as a real one& b t as a distinction that can be nderstood and made meaning$ l b# loo6ing at distinctions !ithin conscio sness itsel$. He !or6s o t this strateg# b# cra$ting a no*el conce(tion o$ experience& as an acti*e (rocess !hereb# !hat ob7ects and conce(ts are $or conscio sness alters and de*elo(s. It is in this arg mentati*e conte0t that Hegel disc sses conscio sness= e0amination 2PrL$ ng4 o$ the correctness o$ its a((lication o$ conce(ts& according to the standard (ro*ided b# the ob7ect& the destr ction o$ its limited satis$actions& the restless going be#ond itsel$ that is its e0(erience. This conce(tion is laid o t !ith e0treme bre*it# in the three core (aragra(hs o$ the Introd ction& 2IB4& 2IC4& and 2IG4. Here Hegel is addressing the cr cial ; estion o$ !hat it is $or something to be 6no!ledge of or belie$ about an ob7ect& for or according to conscio sness. This is the ; estion o$ ho! to concei*e the representational purport o$ the contents o$ conscio sness& the !a# the# (oint be#ond themsel*es to ob7ects. This is another ; estion that Uescartes did not reall# as6& ne*er mind ans!er.@B The broad conce(tion o$ re(resentational ( r(ort +and the
@B

Both S(ino3a and Keibni3 noticed this omission& de(lored it& and so ght to recti$# it b# gi*ing an inferential acco nt o$ the intentionalit# o$ ideas%%see m# AKeibni3 and Uegrees o$ Perce(tionA& and A-de; ac# and the Indi*id ation o$ Ideas in S(ino3a=s ,thicsA& both in the .ournal of the +istory of Philosophy 2':I' and ':GG4.

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(ta6e it (res ((oses/ that Hegel brings to bear is o$ !hat is re(resented& the ob7ect o$ 6no!ledge& !hat o r tho ght or tal6 is abo t& as a normative matter& s(eci$icall# a matter o$ responsibility. The ob7ect o$ one=s cogniti*e attit de& !hat it is abo t& is !hat it answers to or is res(onsible to. +It !ill become clear as the (henomenological e0(osition (roceeds that one s#stematicall# im(ortant !a# o$ tal6ing abo t this normati*e relation is as one o$ dependence o$ 6no!ledge on its ob7ect. Th s the general anal#sis o$ the constellation o$ conce(ts associated !ith inde(endence and de(endence& and their - $heb ng into $reedom in the section on Sel$%<onscio sness !ill come to go*ern the nderstanding o$ this relation./ The $irst ; estion is accordingl# !hat it is abo t the experience or conscio sness that (ermits it to treat !hat things are $or it as ans!erable to something else& !hich accordingl# ser*es as a criterion determining the correctness o$ its a((lication o$ conce(ts. 5e !ere told in 2I44 that A<onscio sness (ro*ides its o!n criterion...A $or the correctness o$ the a((lication o$ its conce(ts. In 2IB4 !e hear $ rther that A...conscio sness is itsel$ the com(arison...A o$ A!hat $or it is the tr eA and Ait=s 6no!ledge o$ the tr thA. The com(arison o$ conce(t !ith the ob7ect that ser*es as the criterion o$ correctness o$ its a((lication is not a state or an achie*ement& b t something done& a (rocess. It is e0(erience& and conscio sness is its e0(erience +a $orm o$ !ords& at least& that Uescartes !o ld ha*e been ha((# !ith/. It is this (rocess o$ e0(erience that is concretel# real%%the essentiall# contrasti*e conce(ts o$ !hat things are in themsel*es and !hat the# are $or conscio sness are to be nderstood as ac; iring their content b# being abstracted $rom a gras( o$ the sort o$ act al ha((ening !ithin !hich the# are discernible as as(ects. Hegel o$$ers t!o $ ndamental characteri3ations o$ the (rocess o$ e0(erience

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+!hich is to (ro*ide& remember& Aconscio s insight into the ntr th o$ (henomenal 6no!ledgeA2GI4/. Dach re; ires some e0(lanation to be intelligible. The $irst can be gathered $rom t!o (assages concerning !hat ha((ens !hen conscio sness $inds that there is a dis(arit# bet!een its conce(t and the ob7ect that ser*es as a criterion $or the correctness o$ its a((lication" 5e see that conscio sness no! has t!o ob7ects" one is the $irst in-itself& the second is the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself...B t...the $irst ob7ect& in being 6no!n& is altered $or conscio sness9 its ceases to be the in%itsel$ and becomes something that is the in-itself onl# for consciousness...This ne! ob7ect contains the nothingness o$ the $irst& it is !hat e0(erience has made o$ it. 2IC4 ? st a bit later the (oint is ( t li6e this" ...as a matter o$ $act@C !e ha*e here the same sit ation as the one disc ssed in regard to the relation bet!een o r e0(osition and sce(ticism& *i3. that in e*er# case the res lt o$ an ntr e mode o$ 6no!ledge m st not be allo!ed to r n a!a# into an em(t# nothing& b t m st necessaril# be gras(ed as the nothing of that from which it results)a res lt that contains !hat !as tr e in the (receding 6no!ledge. It sho!s ( here li6e this" since !hat $irst a((eared as the ob7ect sin6s $or conscio sness to the le*el o$ its !a# o$ 6no!ing it& and since the in%itsel$ becomes a being-forconsciousness o$ the in%itsel$& the latter is no! the ne! ob7ect. 2IG4 -s !as indicated abo*e& the general idea is that the nderstanding b# nat ral conscio sness that the conce(ts it gras(s are about something& in the sense o$ ans!ering or being res(onsible to something $or the correctness o$ their a((lication deri*es $rom the ma6ing o$ mista6es& the (rocess !hereb# it is obliged 2a normative matter& in .antian terms& a matter o$ necessity4 to alter the !a# it ta6es things to be& and so ac6no!ledge that !hat it (re*io sl# too6 to be ho! things !ere in themsel*es +a bent stic6 in the !ater/ !as in $act onl# the !a# something else +a straight stic6 in the !ater/ a((eared. more detailed disc ssion o$ an e0am(le !ill ma6e clearer !hat is being claimed abo t the
@C

Ain der TatA" it !ill be !orth 6ee(ing in mind his care$ l se o$ this idiomatic e0(ression !hen !e disc ss action nder the heading o$ Reason%%AReason is ( r(osi*e actionA& and he o$ten se TatXdeed interchangeabl# !ith Handl ngXaction.

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e0(erience o$ a((l#ing ordinar# em(irical conce(ts. -t t0& sa# ':C0& scientists belie*e that the geometr# o$ the !orld is $o r dimensional& non%homogeneo s& c r*ed& and that $alling bodies + nder the in$l ence& per impossibile& o$ gra*itational $orces alone/ $ollo! geodesic +shortest/ (aths according to that geometr#. This is& $or them then& ho! the !orld is in itsel$. This acco nt does not e0ist in a *ac m ho!e*er. +That !o ld be the

doctrine o$ =immac late conce(tion= o$ re(resentationalism& !hich ignores !here these conce(ts come $rom& and ho! their meaning or content arises or is con$erred./ The# are the (rod ct o$ e0(erience& o$ a (artic lar de*elo(ment in scienti$ic tho ght. So at t0 scientists also belie*e that at t%'& sa# in 'IC0& the# +that is& =scientists=& a conce(t o$ e; i*alent generalit# to that o$ =conscio sness= in Hegel=s acco nt/ belie*ed that the geometr# o$ the !orld is three dimensional& homogeneo s& $lat +a$$ine/& and that $alling bodies do not $ollo! geodesic (aths in it. The# do not at t0 ta6e this to be a !a# the !orld is& b t onl# a re(resenting& a !a# the !orld might be ta6en& and !as ta6en& to be. 1 rther& at t0 the scientist belie*e that it is the $o r%dimensional etc. s(ace%time +the one the# no! belie*e in/ of which the# $ormerl# belie*ed $alsel# that it !as three%dimensional etc.. This belie$ is +an instance o$/ the com(arison o$ !hat things are in themsel*es and !hat things are $or conscio sness that ma6es e0(licit to conscio sness the distinction and mo*ement o$ e0(erience that is !hat conscio sness reall# consists in& and so is an e0(licit e0(ression to conscio sness o$ !hat conscio sness itsel$ is. It is in this sense that" A...conscio sness is& on the one hand& conscio sness o$ the ob7ect& and on the other& conscio sness o$ itsel$9 conscio sness o$ !hat $or it is the Tr e& and conscio sness o$ its 6no!ledge o$ the tr th.A 2IB4

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To o$$er this m ch o$ an e0am(le is to o$$er a sna(shot o$ the e0(licit resid e o$ !hat is im(licit in the acti*e trans$ormation o$ (ast e0(erience. B t o$ co rse the sit ation is not stable. -t t'& sa# ':I:& this conce(t al str ct re colla(ses o$ its o!n !eight& demonstrating its o!n ntenabilit#. The a((lication o$ conce(ts that encom(asses (h#sical geometr# m st be com(atible !ith o r best acco nts o$ all the $orces that act in it& in (artic lar !ith the acco nt o$ the $orces acting on s batomic (articles at s b%n clear distances. Those theories t rn o t +Scientific American tells me/ to re; ire& !hen con7oined !ith basic (rinci(les o$ (h#sical geometr#& that s(ace%time be at least ele*en%dimensional& !ith the additional se*en dimensions so tightl# c r*ed or $olded in on themsel*es as to be in*isible at an# b t the *er# smallest distances. coherent geometr# o$ this sort can be de*elo(ed& (ermitting s to e0(lain ho! it co ld ha*e a((eared to s as a $o r%dimensional s(ace& gi*en the distances !e !ere !or6ing !ith. +<om(are this to Dinstein=s obligation to sho! ho! things co ld loo6 Oe!tonian at slo! s(eeds and o*er relati*el# short distances& e*en tho gh on his acco nt these a((ro0imations ; ic6l# brea6 do!n i$ (ressed./ The $orm lation o$ s ch an acco nt and its *indication as (re$erable to the old s(eci$ies a ne! !a# in !hich things are nderstood to be as the# are in themsel*es. 5hat at the t0 stage (la#ed the role $or scientists o$ the !a# things !ere in themsel*es has sho!n itsel$ to be one more s(ecies o$ a((earance& a set o$ $alse *ie!s about !hat there reall# is& namel# ele*en%dimensional s(ace%time. The determinateness o$ the negation& the (ositi*e element thro gh !hich !hat is im(licit in realit# grad all# ma6es itsel$ e0(licit to conscio sness& consists (recisel# in the obligation o$ the s ccessor theor# to e0(lain !hat !as ta6en as the in%itsel$ as a legitimate a((earance o$ this ne!l# disco*ered +( r(orted/ realit#)the sense in !hich

48:820'4%%C2

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the old theor# m st be sho!n to be =a((ro0imatel# tr e=. The in%itsel$ o$ stage t0 has been nmas6ed as itsel$ a (henomenon& a !a# in !hich realit# a((ears rather than that realit# itsel$& a re(resentation rather than an ob7ect. This is the tr th o$ that conce(tion. It is the ne!& tr e ob7ect o$ the t0 conscio sness& as that ob7ect has been made o*er +disco*ered to be/ b# e0(erience. 5hat !as ta6en to e0(ress !hat things are in themsel*es t rns o t to e0(ress onl# !hat the# are $or conscio sness& onl# ho! the# are ta6en to be. So it is that AThis ne! ob7ect contains the nothingness o$ the $irst& it is !hat e0(erience has made o$ it.A2IC4 This acco nt has the ad*antage o$ bringing the conce(t o$ e0(erience home to its ordinar# a((lications& !hile still a((l#ing to the big changes in metale*el conce(ts that are described in the Histor# o$ the D0(erience o$ <onscio sness. It a((lies to theoretical and conce(t al shi$ts in em(irical science +and so not onl# to the sort o$ change Hegel in*ents and still has to con*ince s o$ the realit# and im(ortance o$ in the rest o$ his boo6/. B t it also a((lies to ordinar# (erce(t al e0(erience. 5hene*er I disco*er +to se a $a*orite e0am(le o$ the se*enteenth and eighteenth cent r#/ that !hat I had ta6en to be a bent stic6 does not (reser*e its constant sha(e !hen remo*ed $rom the !ater& as a constant sha(e o ght& as a res lt and e0(licit $orm lation o$ that e0(erience& I contrast the stic6 as it is in itsel$& that is the straight stic6 that I no! ta6e it to be& !ith the bent stic6 I (re*io sl# belie*ed in +as a res lt o$ (re*io s e0(erience/. The $ormer is !hat I ta6e to be the stic6 as it is in itsel$& !hile the latter is $or me a mere a((earing o$ that stic6 to me as bent& something merel# as it is $or conscio sness. -nd I sa# no! that I $ormerl# belie*ed of the straight stic6 that it !as bent. The large scale e0(eriences o$ scienti$ic theor# are not di$$erent in 6ind or origin $rom these ordinar#& small scale e0(eriences& and

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occ r in large (art beca se o$ them. +Hegel is disc ssing these e0(eriential (rocesses here beca se he !ants to se them to model the de*elo(ment o$ metale*el philosophical theories that he reconstr cts in the bod# o$ the boo6. B t I am ( r(osel# s ((ressing consideration o$ that methodological iss e)!hich is s all# all commentators address) in order to tr# to get clear abo t the $i0ed end o$ the analog#./ The greatest hermene tic challenge $or a reading o$ these critical (aragra(hs lies in the characteri3ation o$ e0(erience o$$ered in the last hal$ o$ 2IB4& !hich it is !orth ; oting at some length. The (oint is introd ced this !a#" ...the distinction bet!een the in%itsel$ and 6no!ledge is alread# (resent in the *er# $act that conscio sness 6no!s an ob7ect at all. Something is for it the in-itself9 and 6no!ledge& or the being o$ the ob7ect $or conscio sness is& for it& another moment. J(on this distinction& !hich is (resent as a $act 2in der Tat4& the e0amination 2PrL$ ng4 rests. I$ the com(arison sho!s that these t!o moments do not corres(ond 2ents(rechen4 to one another& it !o ld seem that conscio sness m st alter its 6no!ledge to ma6e it con$orm to the ob7ect. B t& in $act& in the alteration o$ the 6no!ledge& the ob7ect itsel$ alters $or it too& $or the 6no!ledge that !as (resent !as essentiall# a 6no!ledge o$ the ob7ect" as the 6no!ledge changes& so does the ob7ect& $or it essentiall# belonged to this 6no!ledge 2denn er gehYrte !esentlich diesem 5issen an4. 2IB4 In !hat sense does altering o r *ie!s alter their ob7ectT -nd e*en i$ !hat it is abo t is (art o$ the essence o$ a belie$& !h# sho ld it $ollo! that altering the belie$ alters !hat it is abo tT - $e! sentences later this claim is ( t this !a#" Since conscio sness th s $inds that its 6no!ledge does not corres(ond to its ob7ect& the ob7ect itsel$ does not stand the test9 in other !ords& the criterion $or testing is altered !hen that $or !hich it !as to ha*e been the criterion $ails to (ass the test 2PrL$ ng49 and the testing is not onl# a testing o$ !hat !e 6no!& b t also a testing o$ its criterion 2sondern a ch ihres EaNstabes4. 2IB4 It is hel($ l to translate these claims into more $amiliar tal6. ASomething is for 2conscio sness4 the in-itself9 and 6no!ledge& or the being o$ the ob7ect $or conscio sness is& for it& another moment.A Tal6 abo t !hat is for conscio sness is tal6 abo t !hat is explicit to it. 1or a model o$ the e0(licit& !e co ld do !orse than beginning !ith .ant=s

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claim& as Hegel nderstands it& that the minimal $orm o$ the e0(licit is the !udgement.@G The e0(licit e0(ression o$ a cogniti*e attit de in the $orm o$ a 7 dgement is ascri(tions o$ (ro(ositional attit des. This model s ggests that the t!o =moments= Hegel (oints to in !hat things are $or conscio sness corres(ond to !hat a belie$ is ta6en to be abo t& and !hat is belie*ed abo t it. These t!o elements are themsel*es made e0(licit in de re ascri(tions +incl ding sel$%ascri(tions/ o$ (ro(ositional attit des& s ch as AS belie*es o$ a straight stic6 that it is a bent stic6A. The content o$ the belie$ is s(eci$ied in the de dicto (ortion o$ the ascri(tion& Athat it is a bent stic6A& and !hat it is abo t is s(eci$ied in the de re (ortion o$ the ascri(tion& Ao$ a straight stic6A. The ob7ect& the in%itsel$& is the criterion determining the correctness o$ the belie$ abo t it& o$ !hat it is $or the belie*er +all according to the ascriber !ho is e0(ressing the attit de e0(licitl#& o$ co rse/. <onsider then the alteration o$ attit de that is e0(erience according to these (assages. 1rom m# +(henomenal& not o r (henomenological/ (oint o$ *ie!& at t0 I !o ld s bscribe to" '/ I belie*e +at t0/ o$ a bent stic6 in the !ater that it is a bent stic6& and at t' I !o ld s bscribe to 2/ I belie*ed +at t0/ o$ a straight stic6 in the !ater that it !as a bent stic6. Here are t!o descri(tions o$ one attit de. D0(erience is the (rocess that dri*es me $rom the $irst s(eci$ication to the second. <learl# m# =6no!ledge= or belie$ has changed& according to me. B t there is also a straight$or!ard sense in !hich the ob!ect& the in%itsel$ that is& according to me& the criterion determining the correctness o$ m# belie$ has changed $or me as !ell. 5hat is s(eci$ied as ob7ect in the $irst belie$ is a bent stic6& !hile !hat is s(eci$ied as ob7ect in the second belie$ is a straight one. Hegel sa#s o$ this (rocess" A/nasmuch as the new true ob!ect issues from it& this dialectical mo*ement !hich conscio sness e0ercises on itsel$ and !hich a$$ects both its 6no!ledge and its ob7ect is
@G

Hnl# as a (lace to start& $or in the end Hegel !ill den# the .antian thesis that the 7 dgment is the nit o$ cognition and e0(erience.

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(recisel# !hat is called experience&A2IC4. 5hat is the Ane! tr e ob7ectAT It is not& as one might thin6& the straight stic6. <onscio sness 6no!s something9 this ob7ect is the essence or in%itsel$9 b t it is also $or conscio sness the in%itsel$. This is !here the ambig it# o$ this tr th enters. 5e see that conscio sness no! has t!o ob7ects" one is the $irst in-itself& the second is the being-for-consciousness of this initself...B t as !as sho!n (re*io sl#& the $irst ob7ect& in being 6no!n& is altered $or conscio sness9 it ceases to be the in%itsel$& and becomes something that is the in-itself onl# for-consciousness. -nd this then is the Tr e" the being $or conscio sness o$ this in%itsel$. Hr& in other !ords& this is the essence or the ob!ect o$ conscio sness. 2IC4 The ne!& tr e ob7ect is !hat res lts $rom nmas6ing !hat I had (re*io sl# ta6en to be the in%itsel$& the criterion o$ correctness o$ m# belie$. 5hat did I $ind o t abo t !hat I had ta6en to be the ob7ect& namel# the bent stic6 I too6 m# belie$ to be abo tT I $o nd o t that there is nothing li6e that in%itsel$. 5hat I mistoo6 $or s ch an in%itsel$ !as reall# 7 st the a((earing to me o$ something ; ite di$$erent& a straight stic6. The bent stic6 is not an#thing in%itsel$& it is 7 st the being $or me o$ something else. 5hat I had treated as no menal is nmas6ed as merel# (henomenal. The emergence o$ the ne! tr e ob7ect is m# nderstanding the (henomenal nat re o$ !hat I had ta6en to be the in%itsel$. ...the moment o$ transition $rom the $irst ob7ect and the 6no!ledge o$ it& to the other ob7ect& !hich e0(erience is said to be abo t. H r acco nt im(lied that o r 6no!ledge o$ the $irst ob7ect& or the being%for%conscio sness o$ the $irst in%itsel$& itsel$ becomes the second ob7ect. 2IG4 1allibilism allo!s that in the long r n each ob7ect conscio sness ta6es itsel$ to be thin6ing abo t ma# t rn o t to be merel# (henomenal. B t at each stage and $or each conscio sness the distinction is maintained bet!een !hat things are in themsel*es and !hat the# are $or conscio sness. 1or& loo6ing bac6 o*er its e0(erience& each conscio sness can re(ort man# $alse or inade; ate belie$s it sed to s bscribe to abo t the ob7ects it no! ta6es to e0ist. The Free6s had belie$s that t rned o t to be abo t atmos(heric electrical discharges. Treating a claim as e0(ressing ho! things are in themsel*es is endorsing it& !hich incl des& as !ill a((ear later in Phenomenology- rel#ing on it in deliberation

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regarding action. -t each stage there is a di$$erence bet!een treating the a((lication o$ a conce(t as e0(ressing !hat things are +and a((ear to be/ in themsel*es and treating it as e0(ressing only ho! the# a((ear to be. D0(erience is the (rocess !hereb# !hat is $or conscio sness the in%itsel$ is re*ealed to be merel# something $or conscio sness. Hence it comes to (ass $or conscio sness that !hat it (re*io sl# too6 to be the initself is not an in-itself& or that it !as onl# an in%itsel$ for consciousness. 2IB4 Hegel !ants to ( t this b# sa#ing that the $irst ob7ect is negated& and so that the str ct re o$ e0(erience is negation. AThis ne! ob7ect contains the nothingness o$ the $irst& it is !hat e0(erience has made o$ itA2IC4. I$ I treat this negation abstractly& e0(erience is a (ath o$ des(air. This is to dra! the concl sion that !hene*er I ta6e m#sel$ to 6no! ho! things are in themsel*es& it !ill t rn o t that I !as misled #et again& that the !a# I too6 things reall# to be !as 7 st the !a# something else a((eared to me. E# belie$s are all $alse& m# cogniti*e e$$orts a $ail re. This is !hat e0(erience is $or nat ral conscio sness. I$& on the other hand& I treat the str ct re o$ e0(erience as determinate negation)ta6e serio sl# that the nothing that the negated $irst ob7ect becomes is a determinate nothing& and the nothing o$ that $rom !hich it res lts +2G:4/)then I can see e0(erience as cogniti*el# (rogressi*e& the ed cation and c lti*ation o$ conscio sness and its conce(ts. This is !hat e0(erience is $or s& the (henomenological 6no!ers loo6ing bac6 at the (rogress o$ (henomenal 6no!ledge. 5hat !e learn is the AScience o$ the e0(erience o$ conscio snessA 2II4. -t this (oint !e learn to treat the in%itsel$ not as a 6ind o$ thing !e con$ront across a g l$& b t as an as(ect o$ the (rocess o$ de*elo(ment that is e0(erience. In (ressing $or!ard to its tr e e0istence& conscio sness !ill arri*e at a (oint at !hich it gets rid o$ its semblance o$ being b rdened !ith something alien& !ith !hat is onl# $or it& and some sort o$ =other=& at a (oint !here a((earance becomes identical !ith essence so that its e0(osition !ill coincide at 7 st this (oint !ith the a thentic Science o$ S(irit. 2I:4

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So& $irst& =essence= or =s bstance=& !hat there reall# is& is not a di$$erent kind o$ thing $rom its a((earances. To ta6e it that things reall# are a certain !a# is 7 st to endorse one a((earance& and to re7ect incom(atible ones. -ltho gh the co rse o$ e0(erience is a se; ence o$ e(isodes in !hich !e disco*er that things are determinatel# di$$erent $rom !hat !e tho ght the# !ere& at e*er# stage ho! !e ta6e things really to be is a !a# the# can also appear to be. The notion that there can be *eridical a((earances& ones that (resent things as the# reall# are& is a bac6gro nd commitment b ilt into e0(erience at e*er# stage. 5hat is can be said o$ it.@I Dach mo*ement o$ e0(erience +trans$ormation o$ (henomena/ incor(orates and en$orces a distinction bet!een ho! things reall# are and ho! !e merel# ta6e them to be. B t this distinction is made within the realm o$ the determinate)o$ !hat stands in relations o$ material incom(atibilit# +determinate negation/ to others genericall# li6e itsel$. +Th s the determinate identit# o$ each s ch element is artic lated b# its determinate di$$erences $rom others. Identit#%in%di$$erence& di$$erence%in%identit# accordingl# becomes the slogan aro nd !hich Hegel organi3es his (resentation o$ his recommended mo*e $rom atomism to holism in the metalang age in !hich !e disc ss conce(t al contents. This is !hat in SPTHI I claimed needs to be modeled b# reci(rocal recognition./ -nd to sa# that is to sa# that in e0(erience !e in (ractice treat realit# as conceptually str ct red& 7 st as a((earances are. 1or +as I arg e in m# disc ssion o$ the <onscio sness section o$ the Phenomenology/& $or Hegel tal6 o$ the conce(t al is tal6 o$ mediation& that is& inferential artic lation. -nd that something stands in in$erential relations is a straight$or!ard conse; ence o$ its standing in relations o$ material incom(atibilit# or determinate negation. Hb7ects and (ro(erties& and the $acts
@I

2re$.4 to Hegel on actions" A!hat the deed is can be said o$ it.A

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concerning !hich determinate ob7ects ha*e !hich determinate (ro(erties& are all as s ch +as determinate& and as determinatel# $acts& ob7ects& and (ro(erties/ conce(t all# str ct red and related to one another. The# are the right sort o$ thing to be grasped or understood& 7 st as the# stand. 1or gras(ing or nderstanding them is being able to res(ond a((ro(riatel# to their relations o$ material incom(atibilit# and in$erence. -nd that is $or them to be able to (la# an a((ro(riate role in the co rse o$ e0(erience& !hich de(lo#s and e0(loits those relations in re7ecting some determinate tho ghts and endorsing others. This *ie! is one basic element in the third sort o$ idealism I disting ished at the o tset" !hat I called Hegel=s conceptual idealism. D0(erience is the (rocess in terms o$ !hich !e are to nderstand both the ob!ective material incom(atibilit# o$ (ro(erties +etc./ and the sub!ective material incom(atibilit# o$ commitments. Both the ob7ecti*e +!hat things are in themsel*es/ and the s b7ecti*e +!hat things are $or conscio sness/ (oles o$ e0(erience are to be nderstood as as(ects o$ the conceptual artic lation o$ e*er#thing determinate. Ho! things are ob7ecti*el#& or in themsel*es (la#s a distincti*e role in e0(erience as Hegel concei*es it in his Introd ction. That o r commitments are ans!erable to a realit# that is ob7ecti*e in the sense o$ s!inging $ree $rom and normati*el# constraining o r s b7ecti*e commitments is mani$ested in e0(erience in a certain 6ind o$ friction. In e0ercising m# conce(t al ca(acities)in a((l#ing conce(ts in no*el circ mstances according to the norms incor(orated in the contents the# ha*e ac; ired thro gh (re*io s a((lications nder concrete conditions)in 7 dging +and acting& as !ill be disc ssed in the ne0t cha(ter/& I $ind that the commitments I am dis(osed to ac6no!ledge collide !ith one another. 1or instance& m# commitment to the stic6=s ha*ing been straight be$ore I ( t

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hal$ o$ it in the !ater& to its being bent a$ter!ard& and to ( tting (art o$ a stic6 in still !ater not being ca(able o$ bending it are materiall# incom(atible. These conte0ted commitments coe0ist onl# neasil#& 7ostling each other& obliging me to change something& to relin; ish or re$orm at least one o$ them& and thereb# to alter the conce(t al content that (ermitted its a((lication nder these circ mstances. +Perha(s I gi*e ( the second commitment& and ad7 st m# conce(ts bent and straight b# no longer ta6ing it that !hen an air8!ater inter$ace is in*ol*ed& I can reliabl# determine !hat is bent and !hat is straight b# ho! it loo6s +that is& b# m# immediate inclination to res(ond nonin$erentiall# to the circ mstance b# classi$#ing stic6s as bent or straight/. Dach s ch alteration incor(orates a little bit o$ the !a# the !orld act all# is into the contents o$ *ario s elements o$ the holistic constellation o$ m# conce(ts%and%commitments. So another !a# o$ tal6ing abo t ho! things ob7ecti*el# are is to tal6 abo t this $riction& this tendenc# or (otential !e ha*e to $ind o rsel*es !ith materiall# incom(atible commitments. That is& !e can tal6 abo t it in terms o$ negativity& the !a# o r conce(ts at an# gi*en time $ail to $it smoothl# together& the $riction !ith each other that alters them b# r bbing o$$ corners !here the# collide. That determinate negati*it# can be tho ght o$ as a so rce o$ trans$ormation that is internal to +an essential as(ect o$/ the constellation o$ conce(ts%and%commitments at an# stage in e0(erience. Thin6ing o$ ob7ecti*it# this !a# is Agetting rid o$ the semblance o$ being b rdened !ith something alien& !ithPsome sort o$ =other=.A It is a !a# to ma6e sense o$ the claim that there is nothing o tside the normati*e& conce(t al realm o$ S(irit& nothing in (rinci(le o tside the (otential e0(erience o$ conscio sness.

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H$ co rse& i$ one decides to tal6 this !a#& it !ill be necessar# at the metale*el to reconstr e conce(ts and their contents. In (artic lar& it is clear that gras(ing a conce(t) being able to a((l# it in 7 dgment and action)does not ma6e it trans(arent to the one !ho is de(lo#ing it. 1or !hat its content really is de(ends on ho! things reall# are& that is& on !hat is reall# incom(atible !ith !hat& !hat reall# $ollo!s $rom !hat& and so on& in act al a((lication. 1or the contents o$ o r determinate conce(ts to be $ ll# trans(arent to s !o ld be $or s e0(licitl# to a((reciate all the (ossible collisions o$ a((lication !ith other conce(ts to !hich the# !ere in act al circ mstances s sce(tible. -nd that !o ld re; ire omniscience. Ho! things are in themsel*es can be tho ght o$ as implicit in the (rocess o$ e0(erience that is the trans$ormation o$ ho! the# are for s. -nd e0(erience then sho!s ( as the (rocess b# !hich ho! things are in themsel*es becomes more and more e0(licit $or s& as more and more o$ it is e0(licitl# ac6no!ledged in o r determinate tho ghts and the !a# !e de(lo# o r determinate conce(ts. D0(erience is nderstood as an expressive (rocess)as the (rocess b# !hich !hat things are in themsel*es becomes more and more e0(licit as something for s. The representational dimension o$ conce(t se)the normati*e dimension according to !hich assessments o$ the correctness o$ a((lications o$ conce(ts ans!ers to ho! it is !ith the things !e are thin6ing about) emerges as an as(ect o$ an expressive (rocess& !hereb# !hat is im(licit in o r conce(ts% and%commitments becomes more e0(licit. 1 rthermore& as (romised b# the str ct re o$ the Introd ction& beginning !ith a disc ssion o$ the constraints ( t on a tr l# critical theor# b# the necessit# to a*oid skepticism- and contin ing !ith a disc ssion o$ the constraints im(osed b# the necessit# to a*oid dogmatism& Hegel deri*es his acco nt o$ the intentional relation bet!een s b7ect and ob7ect +the essential ( r(orted abo tness o$

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conscio sness/ (recisel# $rom consideration o$ the (ractice and (rocess o$ critici0ing commitments in the light o$ others. This pragmatic theor# is his candidate $or a gen inel# critical theor# !orth# o$ being a s ccessor to .ant=s. <onsider the color$ l characteri3ation o$ tr th in the Pre$ace& ; oted at the end o$ Section II abo*e& !hich sa#s +lightl# (ara(hrasing/ that the tr e is a *ast Bacchanalian re*el& !ith not a so l sober. The (artici(ants are o r determinate tho ghts and conce(ts& !oo3#& s!a#ing& and staggering into each other& gi*ing ( their (lace at the table to a s ccessor. AWet beca se each member colla(ses as soon as he dro(s o t& the re*el is 7 st as m ch trans(arent and sim(le re(ose.A The re(ose& !hat is common to the !hole (art#& and (ersists thro gh the changes& is !hat is being e0(ressed" the !a# things reall# are& !hat is im(licit in e*er# stage& the (rinci(le moti*ating all the determinate re(lacements and ad7 stments. In the ne0t section o$ this cha(ter& !e loo6 more closel# at the !a# the re(resentational dimension o$ conscio sness& its normati*e direction at ob7ects& is to be nderstood in terms o$ the relation bet!een the historical artic lation o$ reci(rocal a thorit# and res(onsibilit#& and the broadl# inferential artic lation o$ reci(rocal a thorit# and res(onsibilit#& !hich Hegel in*o6es nder the heading o$ negativity. +The signi$icance o$ the social artic lation o$ reci(rocal a thorit# and res(onsibilit# !ill be e0amined in the ne0t cha(ter./

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I*. 'onclusion

In the (re*io s section I sta#ed (rett# close to the te0t +at least b# m# rela0ed standards/ in (resenting !hat I ta6e to be Hegel=s s ggestion $or the large%scale str ct re o$ an e(istemological stor# that can ser*e as an alternati*e and s ccessor to the Dnlightenment acco nts b ilt aro nd shar(l# disting ishing ob7ects o$ 6no!ledge according to !hether the# are or are not intrinsicall# intelligible +in .ant=s *ersion" conce(t all# str ct red/. The 6e# is s bstit ting one sort o$ trans$ormation 2>er!andl ng4 $or another. -ccording to the class o$ e(istemological and semantic metatheories Hegel gro (s together nder the heading o$ Jnderstanding 2>erstand4& e0(erience consists in trans$orming nonconce(t al ra! materials into conce(t all# str ct red (rod cts)something that is not alread# in the (ro(er sha(e to be gras(ed or nderstood or be a content o$ conscio sness into something that is. Hegel=s s ccessor stor# nderstands cogniti*e $ nctioning instead according to a metaconce(tion he calls Reason 2>ern n$t4. -ccording to stories o$ this 6ind&@: the trans$ormation characteristic o$ e0(erience is that bet!een !hat +conscio sness at that (oint ta6es to be/ ho! things are in-themselves +a realit#/ into !hat is e0(licitl# onl# taken to be the in%itsel$& that is& into something that is to conscio sness onl# ho! things are or !ere for consciousness +a mere40 a((earance/. This is a trans$ormation o$ !hat !as im(licit +the attit de I ( t in
@:

I ( t things this !a# to indicate that I do not ta6e it $or granted that Hegel=s o!n acco nt is the onl# one (ossible that !o ld deser*e to be classi$ied on the Reason side o$ the o*erarching and man#%$aceted distinction he dra!s bet!een (hiloso(hical theories !ith the sha(e o$ Reason and those !ith the sha(e o$ Jnderstanding. 40 B t =mere= here sho ld not be nderstood as indicating an abstract or $ormal negation& b t rather a determinate one. That is& altho gh the ta6ing is demoted $rom being treated as $ ll# correct to not being $ ll# correct& it is not being demoted to being $ ll# incorrect either. It no! is ta6en as a relati*el# inade; ate e0(ression& b# com(arison to a more ade; ate e0(ression. B t this is not the same thing as

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the $irst (arentheses in the $oregoing sentence/ into something e0(licit to the conscio sness !hose e0(erience it is. -nd Hegel=s master strateg# here is to se this second !a# o$ nderstanding a trans$ormation constit ti*e o$ e0(erience to do the e0(ressi*e and e0(lanator# !or6 $or !hich the trans$ormation o$ the nonconce(t al into the conce(t al !as originall# called into ser*ice. His strateg# is a metatheoretical >er!andl ng o$ conce(tions o$ e0(erience" the trans$ormation o$ the 1erwandlung des 1erstands into the 1erwandlung der 1ernunft. In this concl ding section o$ the cha(ter& I !ant to e0(lore the a((roach Hegel is ( tting in (la# here& !itho t he!ing so closel# to his te0t and terminolog#. -s I=*e set o t the stor#& !e start !ith a notion o$ conce(t al content that is (otentiall# common to +in his s ccessor sense/ sub!ective tho ghts and +in his s ccessor sense/ ob!ective $acts& !hich are to ta6e their (lace as t!o $orms in !hich s ch contents can be e0hibited& as t!o (ers(ecti*es !hose reci(rocal inter(la# m st be considered +at the metale*el/ in order to nderstand this notion o$ the conce(t al. To characteri3e these contents as conceptual is to ta6e them to be determined and artic lated b# relations o$ material incom(atibilit# +and hence material in$erence/" determinate negation. The sing lar%term8(redicate str ct re o$ 7 dgments and the ob7ect8(ro(ert# str ct re o$ $acts can ali6e be nderstood in terms o$ the $ine str ct re o$ s ch relations o$ material incom(atibilit#. This is the stor# !e $o nd Hegel elaborating in the Perception cha(ter o$ the Consciousness section o$ the Phenomenology. I ta6e the (ositi*e (oint o$ Hegel=s Introd ction to the Phenomenology to be a s ggestion as to !hat it is to treat s ch conce(t al contents as

ta6ing it not to be an e0(ression o$ ho! things +im(licitl#/ are at all. That !o ld be to ta6e it not 7 st to be a mere a((earance& b t not e*en to be an a((earance. This is Hegel=s e0(ressi*e s ccessor commitment to the rationalist Keibni3ian (rinci(le that Anothing is $or nothing.A

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a((earances of a realit#& to ta6e s ch Sinne to be modes o$ (resentation o$ Bede t ngen& to nderstand thin6ables that can be e0(ressed de dicto +e.g. as the tho ght that the ob7ect in the corner is ro nd/ as al!a#s also in (rinci(le e0(ressible de re +e.g. as the tho ght of the ball that it is ro nd/. To do that one m st ac6no!ledge them as s b7ect to a certain 6ind o$ normati*e assessment" ans!erabilit# $or their correctness to the $acts& ob7ects& and (ro(erties that the# thereb# co nt as about. +His recommended model o$ that correctness is not the)(erha(s more or less com(lete)corres(ondence o$ conce(t all# artic lated re(resenting !ith nonconce(t al re(resented& b t the more or less ade; ate e0(licit expression o$ something im(licit. B t I ta6e it that that model emerges as a res lt o$ this line o$ tho ght& rather than ser*ing as one o$ its (res ((ositions./ The ; estion is then !hat s ch ac6no!ledgement o$ thin6ables as ans!erable to $acts consists in. 5hat m st one be able to do& in (ractice& in order to ; ali$# as so nderstanding one=s tho ghtsT Hegel=s ans!er is not $ar to see6. Fras(ing or nderstanding s ch a content is being able to act a((ro(riatel#" to recogni3e incom(atibilities and in$erential relations and to ad7 st one=s commitments in the light o$ them. Hne m st be able to dra! in$erential conse; ences o$ the commitments one ac6no!ledges& b# ac6no!ledging commitment to them in t rn. -nd one m st be able to recogni3e incom(atibilities among one=s commitments b# res(onding a((ro(riatel# to them. B t to ac6no!ledge an incom(atibilit# among one=s commitments& to res(ond a((ro(riatel# to it as s ch& is to alter one=s !hole set o$ commitments& to ad7 st it b# relin; ishing& ; ali$#ing& or re(lacing some o$ the m t all# incom(atible s bset. -nd doing that 7 st is enacting the trans$ormation that is e0(erience on his ne! conce(tion. It is ac6no!ledging some o$ one=s commitments as errors& as incorrect or inade; ate. Hegel=s tho ght is that ado(ting

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that normati*e attit de is im(licitl# ac6no!ledging a standard o$ assessment& ta6ing them as ans!erable to something. 5e !o ld li6e to nderstand ho! this !or6s& and !hat notion o$ abo tness& re$erence& or re(resentation one can $ nd on this basis. B t !e are alread# in a (osition to see that the Introd ction (resents a strateg# according to !hich this relation o$ s b7ect to ob7ect)the essence o$ conscio sness)is im(licit alread# in the notion o$ conce(t al contents as determinate 7 st inso$ar as the# are artic lated b# relations o$ determinate negation. The acco nt o$ the representational dimension o$ conce(t al content deri*es $rom 7 st the same str ct re a((ealed to in e0(laining the determinateness o$ s ch content" namel# the stor# abo t determinate negation. Th s one notion generates both the metaconce(ts o$ Sinn and o$ Bede t ng& o$ !hat things are for conscio sness and !hat the# are in themsel*es. It is !hat is a((ealed to in order to e0(lain the conce(t al nat re o$ !hat things are in themsel*es& and hence the third idealist thesis. 5hat is re; ired to ma6e this !or6 is that commitment to materiall# incom(atible claims +!ell see in the ne0t cha(ter& es(eciall# those ha*ing to do !ith !hat !e ha*e done/ m st moti*ate +normati*el#/ an alteration in ones commitments. This !ill onl# !or6 inso$ar as an essential (art o$ the stor# abo t incom(atibilit# is !hat one m st +is obliged to/ do in res(onse to it. This is the restless negati*it# at the center o$ conce(t se. 5itho t it& !e cannot see ans!ering to ho! things al!a#s alread# are in themsel*es as ine0tricabl# bo nd ( !ith +indeed& s(ec lati*el# identical to/ determinateness o$ content. -nd to nderstand this active element& !e m st loo6 both at the social character o$ commitment +ho! others hold s to o r commitments/ and to intentional action. Those are the to(ics o$ the ne0t cha(ter.

48:820'4%%GC

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5e sa! in the disc ssion o$ Perception that relations o$ material incom(atibilit# ha*e a $ine str ct re that artic lates !hat stands in those relations according to the ob7ects and (ro(erties the# in*ol*e. Partic lar ob7ects are score6ee(ing centers $or incom(atibilities" i$ t!o claims are incom(atible& then the# m st in*ol*e some common ob7ect& and attrib te to it incom(atible (ro(erties. In the same terms& !e sa! that !e can ma6e sense o$ t!o com(atible claims addressing the same ob7ect +(erha(s beca se the# attrib te directl# in$erentiall# related (ro(erties& s ch as red and colored& (erha(s not& as !ith red and round/. S ((ose& then& that a s b7ect $inding itsel$ !ith commitments to t!o incom(atible claims does not 7 st gi*e ( one o$ them +treating it as abstractl# negated b# the other/& b t)as in the cases Hegel en*isages)re(laces one b# another regarding the same ob7ect +so treating the $irst claim as onl# determinatel# negating the other/. B# re(lacing the one !ith the other& the s b7ect is then in (ractice treating the re(lacing claim as a better e0(ression or re(resentation o$ ho! the ob7ect reall# is. Re7ecting one in $a*or o$ the other nder the normati*e (ress re o$ its incom(atibilit# !ith other commitments is treating it as an a((earance of something& ta6ing it that its s ccessor is a more ade; ate a((earance o$ it as it act all# is.4' This is Hegel=s ans!er to the ; estion o$ !hat re(resentational or re$erential ( r(ort consists in)!hat it is $or s in (ractice to ta6e or treat something as a re(resentation of something else& !hat it is $or a commitment to be $or a s b7ect Atan; am remA& as i$ o$ things& as Uescartes ( ts it. -ccording to this !a# o$ thin6ing abo t things& the re(resentational dimension o$ conce(t se becomes *isible $rom an essentiall# retrospective (ers(ecti*e)a (ers(ecti*e
4'

In this sense one claim can be a more ade; ate e0(ression o$ a realit# than another e*en i$ it is 7 st !ea6er)$or instance i$ I retreat $rom the claim that something is s; are to the claim that it is rectang lar& in the $ace o$ the incom(atibilit# o$ the $irst claim !ith m# commitment +it matters not !hence/ that it has ne; al sides.

48:820'4%%GG

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a*ailable onl# after the com(letion o$ an e0(eriential trans$ormation o$ one *ie! into another& thro gh the ac6no!ledgement o$ error and !hat one ta6es to be its recti$ication. The str ct re o$ the retros(ecti*e (ers(ecti*e ( t in (la# b# re*isions o$ commitments made in res(onse to the normati*e demands generated b# incom(atibilities is more com(le0 than ma# at $irst a((ear. So $ar& !e ha*e considered onl# single e0(eriences& nits o$ transition or trans$ormation)to be s re& alread# a *er# di$$erent !a# o$ identi$#ing& indi*id ating& and thin6ing abo t the s bstance o$ e0(eriences $rom that in (la# in the Dnlightenment tradition o$ e(istemolog# and (hiloso(h# o$ mind. B t each indi*id al transition also creates a (ers(ecti*e on all the (re*io s ones. 1or the (osition achie*ed at the end o$ each mo*ement o$ e0(erience (ro*ides a standard $or the e*al ation that can be bro ght to bear on e*er# earlier e0(eriential transition and e*er# earlier re(ertoire o$ 7 dgments%and%conce(ts a (artic lar conscio sness endorsed. Fi*en the !a# things ha*e t rned o t to be)according to m# c rrent commitments)I can as6 o$ each o$ m# (re*io s belie$s ho! !ell it re(resented the act al state o$ a$$airs& and o$ each earlier change I made& !hether or not it mo*ed me closer to getting things right. The termini o$ e0(eriential trans$ormations are constellations o$ commitments o$ t!o 6inds" do0astic and conce(t%s(eci$#ing. Uo0astic commitments are 7 dgments or belie$s)$or Hegel& commitments to the e$$ect that a +(artic lar/ ob7ect has some + ni*ersal/ (ro(ert#. <once(t%s(eci$#ing commitments concern the contents o$ the conce(ts de(lo#ed in 7 dgments. The# are commitments concerning !hat is incom(atible !ith !hat& and so +as !e ha*e seen/& !hat $ollo!s $rom !hat. That is to sa# that the# are commitments regarding !hat e0actl# !hat properties there are $or ob7ects to e0hibit. Since the e0am(les considered in the (re*io s section all had to do

48:820'4%%GI

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!ith alterations o$ 7 dgment& it is !orth considering one in*ol*ing the e*ol tion o$ conce(ts. Imagine a to# (ractice o$ the $ollo!ing sort. S ((ose I ha*e in (la# conce(ts bl e& red& s!eet& so r& and K+itm s/%(a(er& !here the elements o$ the $irst t!o (airs are nderstood as materiall# incom(atible !ith one another. In addition& I ha*e m t all# incom(atible conce(ts acid and base& s ch that I ta6e it that !hate*er tastes so r is an acid& and that !hate*er is an acid t rns K%(a(er red. Bl e& red& s!eet& and so r are all conce(ts !hose circ mstances o$ a((ro(riate a((lication incl de nonin$erential ones +!hat Hegel in Consciousness calls =immediate=& as e0(lained in m# cha(ter on that section/. That is& I ha*e been trained 7 st to res(ond to some things as bl e or red& s!eet or so r. +There is necessaril# a social element re; ired to hold these (ractices in (lace as e*en minimall# determinate& b t that is not the c rrent to(ic./ This minimall# in$erentiall# artic lated classi$icator# (ractice ma# go along s!immingl# $or some time. B t s ((ose some (artic lar sam(le comes ( that tastes so r and t rns K%(a(er bl e) that is& that these are the commitments I $ind m#sel$ !ith nonin$erentiall#& !hen e0ercising m# other!ise reliable di$$erential res(onsi*e dis(ositions on the sam(le. This lea*es me !ith an incom(atible set o$ commitments& since I can in$er $rom its so rness that it is an acid& and hence that it !ill t rn K%(a(er red. Oo! I might gi*e ( one o$ these claims)decide that it !as not reall# so r& or not reall# bl e. B t I also might alter m# in$erential commitments. Ooticing that this sam(le is di$$erent $rom those I ha*e e0amined be$ore& I co ld decide that the a((licabilit# o$ the conce(ts clear& and mil6# +!hich are incom(atible !ith each other and also conce(ts o$ obser*ables/ is rele*ant. I might then alter m# conce(t acid so that onl# sam(les that are so r and clear are ta6en to

48:820'4%%G:

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be acids.42 This sort o$ change is another !a# to remo*e this (artic lar incom(atibilit# $rom m# commitments. In $act& this sort o$ change is m ch more im(ortant to Hegel than sim(l# changing the 7 dgments I endorse.4@ 1or it is an insight ni; e to him +at the time& and $or some time to come/ that cogniti*e (rogress can ta6e the $orm o$ alterations o$ concepts& and not merel# o$ !udgments. Hne o$ his ma7or tas6s is to cra$t a disc rsi*e idiom in !hich to e0(ress this (oint& as a s ccessor to the Dnlightenment (ict re according to !hich cogniti*e (rogress comes in discrete nits o$ endorsing or re7ecting 7 dgments $ormed $rom a $i0ed%in%ad*ance stoc6 o$ conce(ts !hose contents don=t change as the# are a((lied and !ithheld in e0(erience)that is& !hose contents are entirel# inde(endent o$ !hat 7 dgments !e ma6e and !hat actions !e (er$orm. +That this is his aim is most ob*io s $or metale*el (hiloso(hical conce(ts s ch as ob7ecti*it#& indi*id alit#& and obligation& !hose e0(ressi*e de*elo(ment he rationall# reconstr cts in the Phenomenology. B t the methodological commitment that orients m# entire inter(reti*e a((roach is to loo6 $irst and $oremost at !hat he is claiming abo t the se and de*elo(ment o$ the gro nd le*el nonlogical em(irical and (ractical conce(ts he calls =determinate=./ Hne o$ Hegel=s central inno*ations is his V inean commitment to seeing the belie$s and the meanings !e are committed to as e*ol*ing together& each 6ind o$
42

To sa# that being so r entails being an acid is +according to the reading I=m o$$ering o$ Hegel/ to sa# that e*er#thing materiall# incom(atible !ith being an acid is materiall# incom(atible !ith tasting so r. 5ea6ening that in$erential commitment so that one ta6es it that onl# the con7 nction o$ being so r and being clear entails being an acid is ta6ing it that there is some (ro(ert# that is incom(atible !ith being an acid& and incom(atible !ith being both so r and clear& b t not incom(atible !ith being so r. 1or instance& this co ld be being so r and mil6#& or an#thing it entails. 4@ H$ co rse& this sort o$ alteration can also be e0(ressed in the $orm o$ a 7 dgment& namel# the mo*e $rom endorsing the conditional 7 dgment A/f something tastes so r& then it is an acid&A to endorsing instead the !ea6er conditional 7 dgment A/f something tastes so r and is clear& then it is an acid.A B t committing onesel$ to the (ro(riet# o$ the in$erential transition is (rior in the order o$ e0(lication. +1or reasons Ke!is <arroll rehearses in A-chilles and the Tortoise&A one cannot eliminate commitment to the (ro(riet# o$ in$erences !holesale in $a*or o$ commitment to the conditionals that codi$# them e0(licitl# as 7 dgments./

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commitment both e0erting a thorit# o*er and ha*ing a res(onsibilit# to!ard the other. The contents o$ conce(ts& s ch as the acid conce(t o$ o r e0am(le& incor(orate commitments as to ho! things reall# are)at least in the sense o$ !hat is reall# incom(atible !ith !hat& and !hat reall# $ollo!s $rom !hat. H$ (artic lar interest is the !a# in !hich an alteration o$ conce(t%s(eci$#ing commitments elicited b# a $elt incom(atibilit# arising $rom the deli*erances o$ mediated immediac# +the e0ercise o$ o r res(onsi*e ca(acities to a((l# in$erentiall# artic lated conce(ts non%in$erentiall#)i.e. not as the res lt o$ an in$erential (rocess/ can incor(orate $eat res o$ the !orld into the contents o$ conce(ts. This is ho! contingency& ho! things merel# ha((en to be& gets incor(orated in and so comes to ha*e the $orm o$ necessity)o$ the determinate rules or norms that artic late the content o$ ni*ersal or conce(ts. It is ho! immediacy +s bstance& the deli*erances o$ sense/ is incor(orated into mediation. In the conte0t o$ the act al !orld in !hich the (ractice is cond cted& the to# disc rsi*e (ractice initiall# described abo*e is nstable& in the sense that it is liable to lead to commitments that are materiall# incom(atible b# its o!n lights. That is& !hen those (ractices are ( rs ed& the# !ill lead to sit ations that demand that the (ractices be changed. The !orld& sho!ing ( in the $orm o$ normative friction among o r commitments& tells s that !e can=t ha*e that set o$ conce(ts. <hanging the content o$ a conce(t in res(onse to s ch a demand incor(orates into that content a bit o$ ho! the !orld reall# is. Hegel=s idea is that !e nderstand the ob7ecti*it# o$ o r conce(ts%and% 7 dgments& their ans!erabilit# to ho! things reall# are& in terms o$ this $eat re o$ their de*elo(ment. 5e al!a#s $ind o r determinate conce(ts alread# in medias res. The# are each and all the (rod cts o$ a long (rocess o$ e*ol tion s b7ect to $orces that mani$est

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themsel*es +and are to be nderstood in terms o$/ $riction among the conte0ted a((lication o$ those conce(ts in 7 dgement and action. -nd the# are all still s b7ect to $ rther alteration in res(onse to incom(atibilities o$ commitments res lting $rom a((lications o$ in$erentiall# related conce(ts #et to come. So each e0(eriential trans$ormation o$ the !hole constellation o$ 7 dgments%and% conce(ts #ields a ne! set o$ do0astic and conce(t%s(eci$#ing commitments& bo nd together b# material relations o$ incom(atibilit# and in$erence. That res lt (resents ho! the s b7ect o$ the e0(erience no! ta6es things reall# to be& the a((earance no! endorsed as *eridical" both !hat (ro(erties there are to be e0hibited +indi*id ated b# their determinate incom(atibilities !ith each other/ and ho! the# are distrib ted across (artic lar ob7ects. D*er# (re*io s e0(eriential transition can no! be assessed !ith res(ect to this standard)this acco nt o$ ho! things are in themsel*es)accordingl# as it re(resents (rogress to!ard this goal or !andering $arther a!a# $rom it. The e0(eriences that mo*ed the 7 dgements%and%conce(ts closer to the correct ones then are mar6ed +$rom the c rrent retros(ecti*e (ers(ecti*e/ as ha*ing re*ealed $eat res o$ ho! things reall# are& !hile the others are classi$ied as ha*ing (resented !a#s things onl# a((eared. The tradition o$ (re*io s conce(t%a((lications and trans$ormations can then be rationall# reconstr cted& b# (ic6ing o t a (ri*ileged tra7ector# thro gh it that consists solel# o$ expressively progressive e0(eriences. These are the ones that re*ealed $or conscio sness $eat res o$ ho! things are in themsel*es +according to the c rrent nderstanding o$ them& o$ co rse/. This tra7ector# is an e0(ressi*el# monotonic becoming +more/ e0(licit o$ !hat !e !ere all along im(licitl# thin6ing and tal6ing abo t.

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Selecting an e0(ressi*el# (rogressi*e tra7ector# thro gh the motle# o$ act al (rior e0(erience is a !a# o$ telling a 5higgish stor# abo t ho! !e grad all# came to disco*er !hat !e no! 6no! abo t ho! things are. - narrati*e o$ this $orm is essentiall# realistic. 5hat emerges at the end o$ the stor# as ho! things reall# are is nderstood as ha*ing been there all along& g iding s in o r re*isions. It is (resented as something !e found& rather than something !e made. It is a rational reconstr ction in the sense o$ e0hibiting the (rocess as rational)as the grad al n$olding into e0(licitness +i.e. the $orm o$ mediated/ o$ !hat !as other!ise im(licit +i.e. in the $orm o$ immediac#/. - 5higgish narrati*e o$ this sort e0hibits e0(erience as the !or6 o$ reason 2>ern n$t4& and is Hegel=s (ro(osed s ccessor +in his 5higgish meta%narrati*e/ to the Dnlightenment (ict re he identi$ies !ith nderstanding 2>erstand4& according to !hich e0(erience m st conce(t ali3e the nonconce(t al. This is the 6ind o$ stor# that is told in science te0tboo6s. Things are (res med +de$easibl# to be s re)it is a critical enter(rise/ to be as !e no! ta6e them to be& and the (oint o$ reco nting the histor# is to e0(lain ho! !e $o nd o t& ho! o r initiall# cr de nderstanding !as tested& re$ined& and e0tended ntil !e $o nd o t +to the still incom(lete e0tent that !e ha*e/ ho! things reall# are. Eista6es and !rong t rns that didn=t end ( incor(orated in the stor# !e tell toda# are o$ interest onl# to contrast them !ith the (rogressi*e ones. This is also the 6ind o$ stor# that is told b# 7 dges in the common la!& !hose rational reconstr ction o$ the histor# o$ a((lications o$ the conce(ts the# de(lo# single o t an e0(ressi*el# (rogressi*e tra7ector# o$ earlier a((lications that the# ta6e to be precedential)that is& to e0(ress as(ects o$ the content o$ the conce(t in ; estion and so to ha*e authority o*er $ t re candidate a((lications.44

44

Recall the disc ssion o$ this sort o$ e0am(le in SPTHI.

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Telling this 6ind o$ stor# is a !a# o$ (resenting the content o$ a conce(t. It is an +egelian Sinn $or a conce(t. 1or 1rege& one can s(eci$# a Bede t ng onl# b# (resenting a Sinn" some mode o$ (resentation o$ it. Re$erents are +or at least corres(ond to/ e; i*alence classes o$ senses. The# are !hat a !hole lot o$ modes o$ (resentation ha*e in common)namel#& that the# are all modes o$ (resenting the same thing. 5here 1rege tells a $lat& s#nchronic stor#& Hegel=s is three dimensional and diachronic. Hnl# a s(ecial 6ind o$ se"uence o$ 1regean senses co nts as s(eci$#ing !hat !e are tal6ing abo t !hen !e a((l# a conce(t)namel#& a se; ence that is e0(ressi*el# (rogressi*e relati*e to its end(oint. I$ the a((lications o$ conce(ts that are ta6en to mo*e $or!ard the e0(ressi*e enter(rise b# re*ealing as(ects o$ ho! things are in themsel*es are dra!n $rom act al (rior 7 dgments and actions& then the 5higgish narrati*e is a phenomenology o$ the conce(t al contents in ; estion. This is the sort o$ stor# Hegel tells at the metale*el in the Phenomenology of Spirit.4B B t the content o$ a conce(t can also be con*e#ed b# a made ( rational reconstr ction. This is a stor# abo t ho! one could ha*e ac; ired the correct conce(t& b# (assing thro gh *ario s inade; ate b t each (artiall# re*elator# a((ro0imations and a((earances o$ the act al content. This is the sort o$ stor# Hegel tells in the Science of ogic- abo t the *er# same meta%le*el conce(ts addressed in the Phenomenology. 5hat !e get there is a rational reconstr ction o$ a !a# !e could have arri*ed at the contents o$ the conce(ts he recommends at the end as $ ll# and $inall# ade; ate.

4B

- ca*eat" In the Phenomenology Hegel is also (resenting a (henomenolog# o$ some (henomena that !ere not Aal!a#s alread# thereA 2immer schon da4& namel# $orms o$ self-consciousness2 These arise along the !a#& as !e learn more and more abo t the (rocess b# !hich o r gro nd%le*el determinate conce(ts de*elo(& and come to nderstand o r o!n role in that (rocess in ne! !a#s.

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In $act& Hegel does not thin6 that rationall# reconstr cting a tradition o$ conce(t a((lications +!hether act al or merel# (ossible/ as an e0(ressi*el# (rogressi*e (ath to!ard a +(ro*isionall#/ $inal +c rrent/ a((earance is 7 st one !a# o$ (resenting the content o$ a conce(t.4C He thin6s this is the only !a#& in (rinci(le& to con*e# a conce(t al content. 1or instance& it cannot be done either b# ostension +as he arg es in Sense Certainty/ or b# a de$inition in the $orm o$ a 7 dgement& the ideal o$ the Dnlightenment meta%conce(t al a((roach he calls =>erstand=. -nd he ta6es this to be so not 7 st $or the s(eci$ication o$ the contents o$ determinate& gro nd%le*el conce(ts& s ch as mass& b t also $or the contents o$ the logical +or (hiloso(hical/ conce(ts !hose e0(ressi*e role it is to ma6e e0(licit gro nd%le*el determinate conce(ts +a tas6 !hich& according to this *ie!& re; ires them to be able to e0(ress also cr cial $eat res o$ the process b# !hich those contents de*elo( and become +more/ determinate/. This is !h# both the Phenomenology and the Science of ogic ha*e this $orm.
-ltho gh it re; ires a bit o$ a digression $rom the c rrent disc ssion& I !ant to ta6e this e0(ositor# o((ort nit# to ma6e e0(licit another o*erarching methodological commitment orienting m# reading o$ Hegel)one that mar6s it as a critical reading. +The (oint !ill be disc ssed more $ ll# in a later cha(ter./ This has to do !ith the relation bet!een logical& meta% le*el conce(ts and determinate& gro nd%le*el conce(ts. Hegel holds t!o $ ndamental *ie!s on this to(ic" '. That determinate conce(ts and logical conce(ts are alike in that their contents can onl# be s(eci$ied historically or developmentally& that is& b# a rational reconstr ction o$ process b# !hich the# are +or co ld b/ a((lied and their real content grad all# made +more/ e0(licit.
4C

Reall#& o$ a constellation o$ 7 dgements%and%conce(ts& b t I=m s ((ressing that com(lication $or e0(ositor# ( r(oses here.

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2. That determinate conce(ts and logical ones are different in that the (rocess o$ de*elo(ment o$ determinate ones is an in$inite tas6" !e !ill ne*er get $ ll or $inal s(eci$ications o$ their contents. 5hereas he thin6s that logical or (hiloso(hical conce(ts can sim(l# be gotten right& $inall#& once and $or all. 5e !ill disc ss this all at greater length nder the heading o$ A-bsol te .no!ledge.A This is !here the Phenomenology ends" Hegel claims& both !ith the (henomenon or conce(t and the no menon or realit# o$ absol te 6no!ledge. The greatest mis nderstanding o$ this conce(t stems $rom not a((reciating (oint +2/. In $act& I claim& !hat Hegel calls A-bsol te .no!ledgeA is the $orm o$ sel$%conscio sness one has !hen one has made $ ll# e0(licit the (rocess b# !hich ordinar# conce(ts de*elo(& and o r role in that (rocess. Beca se the e0(ressi*e role distincti*e o$ logical or (hiloso(hical conce(ts is to ma6e this (rocess e0(licit& Hegel thin6s !e can get +and he has got/ a $ ll# and $inall# ade; ate gras( o$ them. B t o$ten he is ta6en to be claiming this abo t ordinar#& non(hiloso(hical conce(ts. -nd his Real(hiloso(hie is read& not as a more%or% less s ccess$ l attem(t to se his logical conce(ts to ma6e e0(licit *ario s $eat res o$ ordinar# conce(ts +as it sho ld be/& b t as an attem(t& someho! modeled on the Science of ogic& to deri*e or ded ce those contents $rom $irst (rinci(les. 4G -chie*ing that sort o$ logical sel$%conscio sness abo t the (rocess b# !hich determinate conce(ts de*elo( does not bring that de*elo(ment to a halt. It onl# trans$orms it $rom something that is ha((ening behind o r bac6s into something !e do in the $ ll light o$ da#& 6no!ing !hat sort o$ a (rocess it is. This is a change o$ $orm& b t does not hold o t the (ros(ect o$ sol*ing all o r em(irical and (ractical (roblems& or e*en o$ (ro*iding a shortc t thereto. +Oot onl# does the o!l o$ Einer*a $l# onl# at d s6& b t her (erch is at the to( o$ a tree that ne*er sto(s gro!ing./

4G

D*en the most c rsor# consideration o$ the e*identl# e0(erimental s(irit in !hich Hegel tried o t di$$erent !a#s o$ sing his logical a((arat s to shed light on *ario s conce(ts in the di$$erent *ersions o$ his lect res on the (hiloso(h# o$ religion !o ld sho! s ch a tho ght to be misg ided and ins ((ortable.

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These t!o (rinci(les are *er# im(ortant commitments o$ Hegel=s. B t I thin6 he is !rong abo t both o$ them& !rong b# something li6e his o!n lights and in something li6e his o!n terms. -s to the $irst& I thin6 that the distincti*e e0(ressi*e role o$ logical conce(ts (ro*ides another !a# in (rinci(le to (resent their content. 1or their content can be made e0(licit in terms o$ !hat they ma6e e0(licit)namel# in terms o$ an acco nt in other terms o$ the (rocess b# !hich the content o$ ordinar# em(irical and (ractical conce(ts is e0(ressed thro gh their a((lication in concrete (ractice. So I thin6& $or instance& that it is (ossible to sa# !hat Hegel=s *ie! is at the end o$ his t!o (rinci(al boo6s without ha*ing to rehearse the narrati*e (ath b# !hich he arri*es at his $inal $orm lations. Indeed& doing that is the o*erall tas6 o$ this !or6 +altho gh in order to 7 sti$# m# attrib tions to him& I do $rom time to time consider his o!n (resentations o$ *ario s as(ects& es(eciall# in the Phenomenology/. -nd as to the second (rinci(le abo*e& I do not thin6 that the s(ecial e0(ressi*e role o$ logical *ocab lar# ma6es it s sce(tible to a 6ind o$ $inalit# o$ e0(ression that is not a*ailable to ordinar# em(irical and (ractical conce(ts. Oot onl# is the tas6 o$ ma6ing e0(licit !hat is im(licit in those conce(ts an in$inite one& b t for that reason the tas6 o$ grooming the e0(ressi*e tools !e em(lo# in that enter(rise is so as !ell. Indeed& the t!o are ob*erse and re*erse o$ a single coin. -nd the# can be seen to be so $or reasons cognate to those moti*ating the Hegelian%V inean insistence that the contents o$ conce(ts !e se are not to be tho ght o$ as inde(endent o$ the a((lications o$ them !e endorse& an# more than the other !a# aro nd. The de*elo(ment o$ all o$ o r conce(ts is in (rinci(le o(en%ended. So I thin6" '=. That determinate conce(ts and logical conce(ts are different in that the contents o$ the $ormer& b t not the latter can onl# be s(eci$ied historically or developmentally& that is& b# a rational reconstr ction o$ process b# !hich the# are +or co ld b/ a((lied and their real content grad all# made +more/ e0(licit. 2=. That determinate conce(ts and logical ones are alike in that the (rocess o$ de*elo(ment o$ both sorts is an in$inite tas6" !e !ill ne*er get $ ll or $inal s(eci$ications o$ their contents. #either can sim(l# be gotten right& $inall# and once and $or all.

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To ret rn to the (resent narrati*e thread& recall that I ha*e been claiming that each mo*ement o$ e0(erience has the normati*e signi$icance not onl# o$ a re7ection o$ one a((earance in $a*or o$ another +endorsed as (resenting ho! things really are/& b t also o$ setting ( a standard against !hich all (re*io s e0(eriential transition can be 7 dged as more or less e0(ressi*el# (rogressi*e. This means that an earlier trans$ormation& !hich sed to co nt as ma6ing e0(licit $eat res o$ ho! things are in themsel*es that had (re*io sl# remained im(licit& might a$ter a $ rther e0(erience had led the s b7ect to re*ise her commitments be 7 dged in $act to ha*e been dece(ti*e& a misre(resentation o$ ho! things act all# are. The shi$t in the c rrent end(oint& and hence in the standard o$ e0(ressi*e (rogressi*eness& accordingl# alters the $ield o$ a*ailable 5higgish rational reconstr ctions. 3ithin an# s ch narrati*e& e0(ressi*e (rogress is contin o s and monotonic. Dach ste( (rogressi*el# n*eils a $ rther as(ect o$ ho! things are in themsel*es)since those mo*es that do not ha*e that e0(ressi*e signi$icance $ind no (lace in the reconstr cted (resentation o$ the content. B t between narrati*es& the trans$ormation !ro ght b# e0(erience is discontin o s and irreg lar. - ne! em(irical disco*er# or theoretical achie*ement alters not onl# c rrent *ie!& b t also the !a# one tells the historical stor#)(romoting some hitherto s( rned e(isodes as (ro(hetic and insight$ l& !hile demoting others to merel# a((arentl# (romising misste(s. - landmar6 7 dicial r ling alters not onl# the c rrent nderstanding o$ the la!& b t also the assessments o$ (rior holdings as ha*ing (recedential a thorit#. These discontin ities and re*ol tionar# shi$ts (oint to another& less realistic& (ers(ecti*e on the (rocess o$ disc rsi*e de*elo(ment. 5e=*e seen ho! $or

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Hegel the (rocess b# !hich one (henomenon or a((earance gi*es !a# to another& nder the normati*e (ress re o$ the internal material incom(atibilities that arise !hen its conce(ts are act all# a((lied& nder!rites the re$erence o$ the !hole se; ence to an nderl#ing no menon or realit#& o$ !hich all the com(onent commitments are re(resentations. -nd !e=*e also seen ho! this acco nt o$ differential expressiveness) !hich comes in degrees along a (artial ordering& according to each retros(ecti*e e0(ressi*el# (rogressi*e career traced thro gh the histor#& (ic6ing some e*ents as (recedential and (rogressi*e)is !hat does the !or6 done in the schemes o$ >erstand b# t!o kinds o$ intelligibilit#& constr ed as a d#adic distinction bet!een !hat is and !hat is not in conce(t al $orm& and so in a (ro(er sha(e to be gras(ed or nderstood. Jnderstanding this is seeing one im(ortant dimension o$ ho! >ern n$t mo*es be#ond >erstand& and tells s at the end o$ o r stor# +in this cha(ter/ ho! to nderstand the criticism o$ the imager# that begins Hegel=s Introd ction. Retros(ecti*el#& then& a((l#ing conce(ts in 7 dgement +and& as !e=ll see in the ne0t cha(ter& action/ a((ears as the grad al emergence into e0(licitness o$ conce(t al bo ndaries)norms disting ishing correct $rom incorrect a((lication)that !ere im(licitl# there all along& g iding the co rse o$ o r e0(erience. -ccording to each s ch retros(ecti*e 5higgish narrati*e& e0(erience is a *o#age o$ discovery& o$ finding out thro gh a se; ence o$ a((earances ho! things reall# are +and !ere all along/& (reci(itating o t o$ the !elter o$ !hat things at *ario s times are for us an e*er better gras( o$ ho! the# are in themselves. B t !e=*e seen also that the transition bet!een these 5higgish stories is discontin o s)that !ith each mo*ement o$ e0(erience !hat !e ta6e to be !hat things are in themsel*es& and so the distinction among (rior e0(eriences bet!een (rogressi*e& re*elator# ones& and

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des ltor#& misleading ones& can alter radicall#. 1oc sing on this as(ect sho ld ser*e as a reminder that the trans$ormations that constit te e0(erience on Hegel=s conce(tion don=t 7 st happen. To be s re& !e ma# 7 st $ind o rsel*es !ith incom(atible commitments& some the (rod ct o$ immediate& nonin$erential con$rontation !ith ho! things immediatel# are.4I B t the res(onse to s ch a sit ation is not something that $ollo!s a tomaticall#. 1or& to begin !ith& altho gh ac6no!ledgement o$ the incom(atibilit# o$ one=s commitments normati*el# mandates some re*ision or other& it does not)at least not t#(icall#) mandate some particular re*ision. There are alternati*es. In the to# disc rsi*e (ractice s6etched abo*e& instead o$ res(onding to the incom(atibilit# b# !ea6ening the in$erential connection asserted bet!een so rness to acidit# to one bet!een the so rness o$ clear $l ids and acidit#& one might ha*e tried !ea6ening the in$erential connection bet!een acidit# and t rning K%(a(er red)sa# b# ta6ing it that onl# acids that are abo*e room tem(erat re ha*e that e$$ect. The e0(eriential anomalies that trigger conce(t al trans$ormations occur to s& b t $inding a ne! theor# so as to com(lete the trans$ormation o$ conce(ts is something that needs to be done by s. >ie!ed (ros(ecti*el#& as a tas6 to be accom(lished rather than an achie*ement that has been accom(lished& each mo*ement o$ e0(erience admits a n mber o$ di$$erent (ossible (aths. <hoice +or i$ that is too *ol ntaristic a term to $it the most (rimiti*e cases& at least selection/ is re; ired at e*er# (oint. The contents retros(ecti*el# read bac6 into the tradition o$ a((lications o$ a conce(t b# a retelling o$ it as e0(ressi*el# (rogressi*e are

4I

The disc ssion o$ Consciousness in the (re*io s cha(ter is an e0tended acco nt o$ the cr cial role (la#ed b# mediation +artic lation b# material in$erence and incom(atibilit#/ in s ch Aimmediate cognition o$ the immediate.A

48:820'4%%:0

Brandom

the (rod cts o$ a !hole se; ence o$ s ch choices. The# would be different& according to the retros(ecti*e 5higgish stor# !e would then tell& i$ !e at each (oint had made di$$erent choices abo t ho! to ad7 st o r do0astic and conce(t%s(eci$#ing commitments in res(onse to the ac6no!ledgement o$ material incom(atibilities. H$ co rse& an# (artic lar re*ision made at one stage co ld be re7ected as dece(ti*e at a later one. B t onl# *er# rarel# co ld it sim(l# be ndone. 1or other changes !ill ha*e been !ro ght in in$erentiall# neighboring conce(ts in the meantime. T#(icall#& each ado(tion o$ one o$ the (ossible $or6s leading to di$$erent e0(eriential o tcomes !ill ha*e (ermanent e$$ects& e*en i$ 7 st !hat the# are remains some!hat ( $or grabs in $ t re trans$ormations and retellings o$ the histor#. +Feneral relati*it#=s re%instit tion o$ the (rinci(le o$ e$$icac# o$ (lace& !hose re7ection !as so central to the Oe!tonian re*ol tion& did not sim(l# ret rn s to !here !e !o ld ha*e been had !e ne*er re7ected it./ So there is a real sense in !hich the bo ndaries o$ o r conce(ts are not $o nd& b t made b# s. The conce(t al norms are instit ted as the res lt o$ the m#riad decisions !e ha*e made in o r (ic6ing o r !a# thro gh the alternati*e (aths a*ailable at e*er# anomalo s occasion $or e0(erience. H$ co rse& the choices are not nconstrained. Oot e*er# alteration !ill eliminate the occasioning incom(atibilit#& e*en locall# and tem(oraril#. -nd it is not ( to s ho! !ell the changes !e instit te at one (oint !ill stand ( against the deli*erances o$ $ t re in$erences and immediate nonin$erential cogniti*e con$rontations !ith +res(onses to/ things. 5hat is at iss e is ho! best to tal6 abo t and nderstand this sort o$ constellation o$ $reedom and constraint& inde(endence and de(endence& a thorit# and res(onsibilit#. I s ggested at the end o$ ASome Pragmatist Themes in Hegel=s IdealismA 2<ha(ter '4 that a se$ l model to 6ee( in mind !hen thin6ing abo t Hegel=s *ie!s abo t the

48:820'4%%:'

Brandom

relation bet!een the acti*it# o$ applying conce(t al norms and the acti*it# o$ instituting them is (ro*ided b# decisions made b# 7 dges in $ rtherance o$ common la!. <ommon la! di$$ers $rom stat te la! in ha*ing no $o nding (rinci(le +the stat te or la! as enacted b# some com(etent a thorit#/ that e0(licitl# says !hat the content o$ the la! is. -ll there is to determine !hat the la! is)!hat is and is not correct& obligator#& or (ermitted b# it)is the tradition o$ decisions as to ho! to a((l# it in (artic lar cases. Dach 7 dge al!a#s comes in in the middle o$ the stor#& inheriting a tradition stretching bac6 inde$initel#& !ith no de$initi*e $irst element. The 7 dge=s tas6 is to decide !hether some gi*en conce(t +sa# tortio s indi$$erence/ a((lies to a set o$ $acts that is& in its (artic lars& no*el in the tradition. The decision m st come !ith a rationale" a set o$ reasons $or a((l#ing or !ithholding a((lication o$ the conce(t. Those reasons ta6e the $orm o$ a reading o$ the tradition as ha*ing re*ealed the bo ndaries o$ the conce(t)o$ten in terms o$ its relations o$ material incom(atibilit# and in$erence to the a((licabilit# o$ other conce(ts !hose content is similarl# determined. 5hen a (rior decision is treated in s ch a rationale as precedential in some res(ect)that is& as ha*ing a certain 6ind o$ a thorit# o*er the correctness o$ $ t re a((lications)it +and (erha(s also the rationale its deciding 7 dge a((ended to it/ is being treated as ha*ing made e0(licit some $eat re o$ the conce(t that had hitherto remained im(licit. The 7 sti$ication $or an# c rrent decision al!a#s ta6es the $orm o$ arg ing that it in*ol*es no change in the content the conce(t has ac; ired thro gh (re*io s decisions" that it at most re*eals $eat res o$ that content that !ere onl# im(licit in the inherited tradition o$ decisions. The 7 dge is charged !ith applying the la!& !ith finding out !hat it alread# +(erha(s onl# im(licitl#/ is& not !ith making it.

48:820'4%%:2

Brandom

-nd #et& all there is to the la! is !hat 7 dges ha*e made o$ it b# s ch a((lications. <ommon la! is& as it is o$ten called& 7 dge%made la!. Oot in$re; entl# !e can see that a 7 dge co ld ha*e $o nd legitimate reasons to go either !a# on a case& co ld ha*e $o nd rationales $or di$$erent holdings b# treating di$$erent (rior decisions as (recedential in *ario s res(ects. -nd !e can see the c rrent state o$ a$$airs)o r c rrent nderstanding o$ the content o$ the conce(ts)as the (rod ct o$ man# s ch more or less $ree decisions on the (art o$ (ast 7 dges. 5e can see *ario s sorts o$ contingencies +relati*e to the necessities that are the norms go*erning the a((licabilit# o$ conce(ts that are dictated b# the (re*io s histor#/ incor(orated into the contents o$ conce(ts b# s ch decisions. These can be en*ironmental contingencies& i$ !here the decision $alls in the s(ace o$ de$ensible alternati*es is determined b# s ch $actors as the 7 dge=s (olitics& c lt re circle& c rrent reading& and so on)classicall# s mmed ( in the (hrase A!hat the 7 dge had $or brea6$ast.A The# can be str ct ral contingencies& $or instance i$& as not ncommonl# ha((ens& the mere order in !hich cases (resent themsel*es a$$ects the ltimate sha(e accorded to the conce(t. So& do the 7 dges $ind o t !hat the la! alread# !as& or do the# ma6e it ( as the# go alongT Both& and neither. This idiom doesn=t c t $ine eno gh to describe !ell !hat is going on. Predictabl#& each (ers(ecti*e has been sei3ed on one%sidedl# b# theorists and (hiloso(hers o$ 7 ris(r dence as the $ ndamental tr th. The la! is there& and the conscientio s 7 dge merel# !eighs e*idence as to !hat it is& and i$ all goes !ell disco*ers it +a strand o$ legal realism or (latonism/. The 7 dges ma6e the la! e*er# bit as m ch as legislators do& and the conscientio s 7 dge assembles considerations e0ternal to the case

48:820'4%%:@

Brandom

and the tradition o$ a((lications o$ the conce(t at hand& in order to ma6e it !ell +a *ersion o$ legal (ositi*ism or nominalism/. The $irst a((roach can lead to a 6ind o$ dogmatism abo t the content o$ legal conce(ts& !hile the second can lead to a corres(onding 6ind o$ s6e(ticism. Hegel=s aim +to be s re& more generall#& and not !ith regard to this (artic lar 6ind o$ e0am(le/ is to gi*e s a better *ocab lar# $or thin6ing and tal6ing abo t !hat is going on)one that deser*es to be called =critical= both beca se o$ the !a# it is sit ated relati*e to dogmatism and s6e(ticism& and $or the !a# it $inds the 6e# to o*ercoming that sterile o((osition and oscillation in the (ractice o$ rational criticism. The retros(ecti*e& 5higgish& realistic (ers(ecti*e and the (ros(ecti*e& re*ol tionar#& (rod cti*e (ers(ecti*e m st be combined stereosco(icall# and seen as essential elements in o r nderstanding o$ the sort o$ determinateness that conce(t al norms are ca(able o$. The# are reci(rocall# de(endent elements in a distincti*e sort o$ !hole. The sort o$ o((ositions o$ !hich the ; estion A$o nd or madeTA is emblematic are en$orced b# a (artic lar !a# o$ thin6ing abo t !hat it is $or a conce(t al content to be determinate. It de(ends on thin6ing o$ conce(ts as $i0ed and static& !ith change a matter on the one hand o$ re(lacing one s ch determinate conce(t b# another& and on the other hand b# ma6ing di$$erent 7 dgments in*ol*ing those conce(ts. It de(ends& in short& on sing the metatheoretical categories Hegel brings together nder the heading o$ =>erstand=. The metatheoretical idiom o$ >ern n$t& b# contrast& !ill incor(orate the (rocess o$ determining the contents o$ conce(t al norms into the nderstanding o$ the sense in !hich s ch contents can be determinate. Hne might thin6 o$ conce(t al norms as determinate i$ and inso$ar as the# ha*e $i0ed bo ndaries& in the sense that it is alread# settled& $or e*er# (ossible (artic lar&

48:820'4%%:4

Brandom

!hether or not the conce(t correctl# a((lies to it. 5e might call this 1regean determinateness. 1or 1rege insisted that a (ers(ic o s lang age satis$# this constraint. I$ this standard is a((lied to the conce(ts in*ol*ed in the (rocess o$ e0(erience as Hegel describes it& one can sa# that according to each retros(ecti*e (oint o$ *ie!& the conce(t in*ol*ed is determinate& b t that !e 6ee( changing o r minds abo t !hich conce(t is in $act in*ol*ed. -nd according to the (ros(ecti*e (oint o$ *ie! at each stage& the conce(t has #et to become determinate in the 1regean sense. B t Hegel denies that an# conce(t is ever determinate in the 1regean sense. +Hne might com(are here the arg ments .ri(6e attrib tes to 5ittgenstein& or& e*en better& 5ittgensteins o!n)rather di$$erent) arg ments in his 4emarks on the (oundations of 5athematics2/ That conce(ts are& or can be& or m st be determinate in this sense is a mista6en commitment characteristic o$ >erstand. -n interesting *ariant o$ this *ie!)not #et commonl# held& to be s re)is !hat has been called tem(oral e0ternalism.4: This is the *ie! that altho gh i$ !e considered onl# !hat has been settled alread# at a gi*en time o$ a((lication& conce(ts are not in general determinate in the 1regean sense& their bo ndaries are in $act settled no! b# !hat !ill e*ent all# be decided abo t ho! it is correct to se them. 5e might call this Peircean determinateness. Some inter(reters o$ the later 5ittgenstein)$or instance& 5right and (erha(s .ri(6e)seem to ta6e this to be his *ie!. In an# case& Hegels *ie! is more radical. It is that conce(t al norms ha*e determinate content in a sense that essentiall# in*ol*es the a((ro(riateness o$ ado(ting each o$ the t!o tem(orall# disting ished (ers(ecti*es. 1rom each retros(ecti*e (oint o$
4:

Henr# ?ac6man 2re$.4. This *ie! is constr ed as (arallel to (erce(t al and social semantic e0ternalisms 2Ua*idson 2re$.44. -s !ill emerge in s bse; ent cha(ters& Hegels *ie!)tho gh moti*ated in (art b# some cognate considerations)is di$$erent $rom& and more radical than these *ie!s. He !ill treat each o$ these dimensions o$ ,semantic e0ternalism according to the same (attern" ro ghl#& as in*ol*ing the constellation o$ a thorit# and res(onsibilit# e(itomi3ed b# reci(rocal recognition +as s6etched in SPTHI/.

48:820'4%%:B

Brandom

*ie!& the# are determinate in the 1regean sense& and ha*e been all along. -nd *ie!ed (ros(ecti*el#& the# are indeterminate& becoming more determinate as their bo ndaries are $illed in a bit $ rther b# each a((lication and assessment. Dach o$ these t!o (ers(ecti*es embodies a dimension o$ gen ine a thorit#& and each remains gen inel# res(onsible to the a thorit# o$ the other. The# are reci(rocall# de(endent. Hegel does not e0(lain this str ct re in his Introd ction to the Phenomenology& and I ha*e not tried to sa# !hat it is here. 1illing in that notion is his tas6 in the remainder o$ the Phenomenology& and e0(laining it is the tas6 I !ill address in the ne0t t!o cha(ters. His (i*otal notion o$ expression& o$ ma6ing e0(licit !hat is im(licit& is neither to be tho ght o$ as the mere n*eiling o$ something that is alread# com(lete as it is considered a(art $rom the (ossibilit# or the act al (rocess o$ n*eiling it& nor is it the creation o$ something that !as not there be$ore. It is a sui generis (rocess distincti*e o$ the conce(t al. +He thin6s that Oat re is a meta(hor $or S(irit& altho gh admitting that it is a dar6 glass. So he is tem(ted b# the tro(es o$ his Romantic contem(oraries. In (artic lar& he thin6s !e sho ld nderstand (rocesses o$ organic mat ration as (oor and de$icient& b t still recogni3able& images o$ the determination%b#%e0(ression o$ conce(t al norms. I do bt that this is hel($ l& and am s6e(tical abo t !hether the com(arison ill minates either (henomenon./ The (rocess b# !hich conce(t al content is at once instit ted and re*ealed in e0(erience& as the conce(t +along !ith conce(ts related to it b# in$erence or incom(atibilit#/ is a((lied in 7 dgment and action& might be called e0(ressi*e de*elo(ment. Tensions im(licit in the c rrent conce(tion or gras( o$ the content o$ the conce(t +thin6 o$ the tensions im(licit in the $irst conce(tion o$ the content o$ the conce(t acid in the e0am(le/& in the conte0t o$ the other conce(ts !ith !hich it is de(lo#ed&

48:820'4%%:C

Brandom

s r$ace in the $orm o$ incom(atible commitments. That sit ation normati*el# re; ires a re*ision o$ those commitments. This is the moti*e +normati*e/ $orce that is an im(licit as(ect o$ the notion o$ determinate negation or material incom(atibilit#)the restlesness o$ negati*it#. This trans$ormation is the moment o$ making& o$ +$ rther/ determining content& o$ incor(orating contingenc# and the deli*erances o$ immediac#& !hich is the ltimate so rce o$ the determinateness o$ em(irical and (ractical conce(ts. B t there is an obligation to reconstr e the res lts o$ this trans$ormation retros(ecti*el# as the re*elation o$ a realit# that !as all along being re$erred to and ser*ing as a standard o$ correctness)as the ma6ing e0(licit $or conscio sness o$ !hat things im(licitl# !ere in themsel*es all along. 5ell see in the ne0t t!o cha(ters that Hegel thin6s this obligation is constit ti*e o$ reason. This is the moment o$ finding& in !hich !e treat the content as ha*ing al!a#s alread# been determinate. Being committed to telling the right sort o$ 5higgish retros(ecti*e stor# abo t the commitments one arri*es at a$ter res(onding to an incom(atibilit# anomal# is !hat it is to ta6e that res lt as an a((earance of something. Hegels *ie! is that gen ine determinateness o$ conce(t al content& and hence conscio sness itsel$& re; ires the mo*ement o$ e0(erience to ha*e both the moment that a((ears (ros(ecti*el#& and the one that a((ears retros(ecti*el#. Oot to a((reciate the (rod cti*e moment o$ ma6ing)the sense in !hich o r conce(t al norms are our products)is to $ail to be sel$%conscio sness in an im(ortant sense. Oot to a((reciate the rece(ti*e moment o$ $inding)the sense in !hich o r conce(t al norms are ans!erable to ho! things reall# are)is to be alienated. -s !e !ill see in the disc ssion o$ Spirit& Hegel thin6s modernit# began !ith the ad*ent o$ this sort o$ sel$%conscio sness& and !ill end !hen !e manage to combine it !ith the o*ercoming

48:820'4%%:G

Brandom

o$ alienation. This is to be accom(lished b# de(lo#ing ade; ate logical and (hiloso(hical conce(ts& and ma6ing the (rocess o$ e0(ressi*e de*elo(ment o$ o r conce(t al norms e0(licit to o rsel*es. This is the state he calls -bsol te .no!ledge. ZZZ There are three (rinci(al hermene tic challenges an# reader o$ Hegels Introd ction m st $ace. 5e ha*e addressed t!o o$ them alread# e0(licitl#. 5e are no! in a (osition to res(ond to res(ond to the third. The three challenges are these" '. 5ith res(ect to skepticism" e0(laining exactly the sco(e& nat re& and (oint o$ Hegel=s criticism o$ e(istemological *ie!s he in*o6es !ith his imager# o$ a ga( bet!een the real and its a((earances& needing to be bridged b# some (rocess. 2. 5ith res(ect to dogmatism" e0(laining ho! the *ie! he !ill endorse is di$$erent $rom the second o$ the dogmatic alternati*e he re7ects" seeing another *ie! as a (artial *ersion or antici(ation o$ the one ta6en to be correct. @. 5ith res(ect to Hegels o!n critical alternati*e" e0(laining 7 st !hat he is thin6ing o$ b# claiming that !hen o r 6no!ledge o$ a thing changes +o r *ie! o$ it/& the ob7ect itsel$ +the standard $or the 6no!ledge / also changes The $irst and third o$ these ha*e been disc ssed in detail& b t the second one has not. Recall that a$ter la#ing do!n as one criterion o$ ade; ac# o$ an ade; ate critical e(istemolog# that it not lead to s6e(ticism& Hegel re; ires also that it not be a $orm o$ dogmatism. He considers t!o (ossibilities& b t $inds neither ca(able o$ !ithstanding rational scr tin#. ...science cannot sim(l# re7ect an ntr e $orm o$ 6no!ledge as a merel# common *ie! o$ things and gi*e ass rance that it is a com(letel# di$$erent !a# o$ 6no!ing& to !hich the other 6no!ledge is o$ no signi$icance !hatsoe*er. 2GC4

48:820'4%%:I

Brandom

The mere fact o$ ma6ing a claim to 6no!ledge& or to s (eriorit# o*er another sort o$ claim& cannot b# itsel$ carr# an# normati*e $orce. It co ld al!a#s be co ntered b# a corres(onding claim on the (art o$ the sort o$ ( tati*e 6no!ledge it dismisses and see6s to s ((lant& and as Hegel sa#s& Aone barren ass rance is o$ 7 st as m ch !orth as another.A Eo*ing to the second sort o$ dogmatism& Hegel insists that in addition the assertion o$ the s (eriorit# o$ one=s o!n claim to 6no!ledge cannot be !arranted sim(l# b# telling a stor# according to !hich the seeds o$ !hat one ta6es to be the correct a((roach to 6no!ing can be discerned b ried alread# !ithin !hat one ta6es to be the incorrect a((roach& so that the one de*elo(s o t o$ the other. Still less can science re$er to the intimation o$ something better !hich is said to be (resent in ntr e 6no!ledge& (ointing the !a# to!ard science...2GC4 This is an im(ortant ac6no!ledgement on Hegel=s (art& $or the method he $inall# endorses and ado(ts co ld be mis nderstood as a((ealing to no notion o$ conce(t al and cogniti*e (rogress stronger than that sec red b# the (ossibilit# o$ telling a 5higgish retros(ecti*e stor#)one that redescribes the act al tri m(h o$ the (oint o$ *ie! $rom !hich the stor# is being told as (rogress $rom the less to the more de*elo(ed. He is ( tting s on notice here that he 6no!s s ch a stor# !on=t do and that there is more to his stor# than this. 1or once again& the normati*e di*ision o$ the disdained str ct re o$ 6no!ledge claims)into the incorrect bits& to be discarded& and the (romising bits& !hich can be de*elo(ed into the disdaining str ct re o$ 6no!ledge claims)(res ((oses the *alidit# o$ the claims made b# the assessing (oint o$ *ie!. -nd it is 7 st the *alidit# o$ those claims to s (erior 6no!ledge that is at iss e and !as s ((osed to be 7 sti$ied b# loo6ing at its characteri3ation o$ its ri*al. S ch an arg ment e0hibits a *icio s circ larit# o$ the *er# same sort that *ario s Dnlightenment thin6ers had de*astatingl# diagnosed in traditional attem(ts to gi*e reasons $or (artic lar elements o$ $aith b# a((ealing to the a thorit# o$ re*elation +scri(t re/& and to gi*e reasons $or belie*ing in the a thorit# o$ re*elation b# a((ealing to (artic lar elements o$ $aith +the di*ine origins o$ scri(t re/.

48:820'4%%::

Brandom

The hermene tic (roblem is to sa# ho! the sort o$ *ie! Hegel is re7ecting here as dogmatism di$$ers $rom the one he !ill endorse. The ans!er sho ld be clear eno gh at this (oint. It is Hegels notion o$ expressive progress. Dach retros(ecti*e stor# that e0hibits some discarded commitment as an im(licit antici(ation o$ the one endorsed no! is provisional and defeasible2 It is s b7ect to the same sort o$ assessment that it (ractices on its (redecessors)and liable to be $o nd !anting in the same !a#. Th s the notion o$ !arrant it incor(orates is a gen inel# critical one" it is itsel$ s b7ect to criticism& re*ie!& re*ision& and re7ection. The (res m(ti*e !arrant attached to an act al a((lication o$ a conce(t +thin6 o$ a 7 dges decision/ deri*es $rom the process o$ !hich it is a stage)a (rocess in !hich liabilit# to $ t re assessment is as im(ortant as the stor# it incl des abo t its inheritance o$ the a thorit# o$ (ast a((lications. The t!o $orms o$ dogmatism Hegel considers corres(ond to the t!o one%sided !a#s o$ nderstanding the essentiall# bi(ers(ecti*al str ct re o$ e0(ressi*e de*elo(ment o$ conce(t al contents. The $irst sees normati*e !arrant as residing in the sim(le endorsement o$ an a((lication o$ a conce(t& that is& in the (ros(ecti*e making o$ a bo ndar#. The latter sees normati*e !arrant as residing in the assessment o$ (rior a((lications as more or less correct according to the standard (ro*ided b# the c rrent one& that is& in the retros(ecti*e discernment o$ im(licit antici(ations o$ !hat is no! endorsed as ma6ing them +more/ e0(licit. B t to nderstand the !a# in !hich a((l#ing conce(t al norms in act al (ractice gi*es them both their content and their $orce& !e m st ta6e acco nt o$ both dimensions& and see them as indis(ensable elements o$ a single (rocess o$ e0(erience. Dd cating s to be able to do that& and e0(laining in detail ho! the (rocess !or6s& is the tas6 o$ the rest o$ the Phenomenology)and o$ the rest o$ this boo6& too. 48:820'4%%'00

Brandom

ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ Hne absol tel# cr cial note that I did not hit in the c rrent dra$t o$ <ha(ter III is this" the notion o$ recollection $rom Sense Certainty is !hat ma6es nre(eatable e*ents cogniti*el# signi$icant. ? st so& it is the (ossibilit# o$ being *ie!ed retrospectively& as precedents& that gi*es in$erentiall# artic lated commitments a representational dimension" a normati*e dimension along !hich the# ans!er $or their correctness to ho! things are !ith the things the# in that sense are about +ho! things are in themselves/. Th s the same sort o$ $ sion o$ t!o (ers(ecti*es that !e see in Sense Certainty is also in (la# in the /ntroduction +hat the pheno"enal,nou"enal distinction is thus ulti"atel- concei.ed as itsel/ a pheno"enal one 0it 1/alls )ithin consciousness itsel/12 is an i"portant "oti.ation /or calling the !ook a Pheno"enolog-. In the Introd ction to the Phenomenology & Hegel o$$ers the o tlines o$ an acco nt o$ ho! the representational content o$ conce(ts arises o t o$ the (rocess o$ their determination and de*elo(ment thro gh e0(erience. His idea is that treating o rsel*es as ans!erable to ho! things in an# case al!a#s alread# !ere is committing o rsel*es to o$$ering a certain sort o$ 5higgish rational reconstr ction o$ the conce(t al tradition !e inherit. Prod cing s ch a stor# is (ic6ing a (ath thro gh the act al a((lications o$ conce(ts that is expressively progressive& in the sense that it (resents the 7 dgments it treats as (recedential as $orming a monotonic series o$ conce(t a((lications that are constr ed as the grad al n$olding into e0(licitness and de$initeness o$ !hat is (resented as im(licit in the se o$ the conce(t $rom the *er# beginning. Rationall# reconstr cting a tradition so that it has this $orm& (rod cing s ch a retelling& is the !or6 o$ Reason& in the sense that doing that !or6 is making the contents o$ ones conce(ts rational. Ho!e*er& anomalies !ill occ r" $ollo!ing the norms $or a((l#ing the conce(ts !e ha*e !ill #ield materiall# incom(atible commitments. This sho!s s that !e dont ha*e the conce(ts ; ite right& and that a ne! and di$$erent retros(ecti*el# monotonicall# e0(ressi*el# (rogressi*e stor# is needed. <ontin it# reigns !ithin each s ch stor#& b t the shi$ts bet!een them are discontin o s. Hegel thin6s that b# thin6ing abo t a (rocess !ith this sha(e& !e can come to nderstand the representational dimension o$ o r tho ght)the !a# it (oints be#ond itsel$ to something that it is about& in the sense o$ ans!ering to it $or its correctness. The ; estion Hegel is addressing in the second hal$ o$ the Introd ction to the Phenomenology is ho! to nderstand !hat !e are doing& !hat practical stance it is !e ado(t& that is o r re$erring o r ideas to realit#& ta6ing (henomena to be a((earances o$ no mena& ta6ing !hat !e are doing as re(resenting something be#ond those re(resentings. -ltho gh in one sense the notion o$ ob7ecti*e ( r(ort is the to(ic o$ the $irst <riti; e& Hegel nonetheless thin6s that .ant has not been s $$icientl# critical abo t the conce(t o$ re(resentation he de(lo#s there. His idea is that the 6e# to that conce(t is the e0(erience o$ ma6ing mista6es& and being $orced +normati*el#" $inding o rsel*es obliged/ to change o r minds.

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Brandom

-ll three o$ the recogniti*el# str ct red dimensions o$ reci(rocal a thorit# mentioned in the te0t o$ this essa# are in (la# in this (rocess" the social& the in$erential& and the historical. Indeed& the (oint o$ elaborating them in the bod# o$ the Phenomenology is (recisel# to $ill in the acco nt s6etched alread# in the Introd ction. It is an idealist stor# beca se the recogniti*e str ct re o$ sel$%conscio s indi*id al sel*es ser*es as both model and conte0t $or the !hole (rocess. It is a (ragmatist stor#& beca se e*er#thing is re$erred to and e0(lained in terms o$ the (ractice o$ a((l#ing conce(ts)ma6ing 7 dgments that t rn o t to be correct or incorrect& and (er$orming actions that t rn o t to be s ccess$ l or ns ccess$ l& all b# their o!n internal lights& as artic lated b# the material in$erential and incom(atibilit# relations that mediate the immediac# incor(orated in those act al a((lications. It is a realist stor#& beca se !hat emerges is a !orld o$ $acts and ob7ects constr ed as al!a#s alread# there& their g iding in$l ence made e*ident b# each 5higgish retros(ecti*e reconstr al o$ the tradition o$ conce(t a((lications& !hich e0hibits a histor# o$ the grad al n$olding into e0(licitness o$ ho! things al!a#s alread# !ere. ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ 2Ui$$erence bet!een t!o contents being explicitly incom(atible& and their being onl# implicitly incom(atible is cr cial to the developmental character o$ Hegel=s e0(ressi*ism. Hne !a# t!o contents can be e0(licitl# incom(atible is i$ one o$ them ses formal negation. -nother is i$ the# are incom(atible gi*ens the a((licabilit# o$ some third conce(t. +This is not being immediately incom(atible& b t onl# mediately so./4 H tline o$ Introd ction" I. +'/%+@/ 2EG@%EGB4" Uisc ssion o$ Dnlightenment e(istemological imager#" the model o$ 6no!ledge
as instr ment or medi m. 5anted" a middle !a# bet!een s6e(ticism and dogmatism.

II. +4/%+B/ 2EGC%EGI4" Introd ction o$ a di$$erent model" 6no!ledge as itsel$ a (henomenon +a((earance
to conscio sness/. The idea is to a*oid dogmatism b# not (res ((osing an#thing abo t gen ine 6no!ledge& b t 7 st loo6ing at claims to 6no!ledge& and to a*oid s6e(ticism b# $ nding the a((earance8realit# distinction $rom within the se; ence o$ (henomenal claims to 6no!ledge. III. +C/%+G/ 2EGI%EG:4" T!o *ie!s o$ conce(t al and cogniti*e histor#" 1ormal negation and s6e(ticism& the (ath o$ des(air& the $allibilist metaind ction& *s. Ueterminate negation and material criticism& cogniti*e (rogress. I>. +I/%+'2/ 2EI0%EI44" Str ct re o$ <onscio sness. <once(t and Hb7ect& !hat things are for consciousness and !hat the# are in themselves. <onscio sness as distinction and relation. <onscio sness as re; iring and (ro*iding a standard +norm/. >. +'@/%+'B/ 2EIB%EII4" H r retros(ecti*e ta6e on the (rocess o$ e0(erience" Ho! !hen the t!o sides o$ conscio sness do not coincide& !hen the conce(t does not meas re ( to the standard +Xob7ect/& both o r conce(ts and o r nderstanding o$ their ob7ects changes. >I. +'C/ 2EI:4 <oncl sion" D0(erience is a tem(oral se; ence o$ sha(es o$ conscio sness that are not 7 st stages in the de*elo(ment o$ S(irit& b t also moments o$ it. -t one stage& it sto(s nderstanding itsel$ as ;b rdened !ith an alien other& !hich is merel# for it; +c$. the third thesis o$ idealism/& and thereb# achie*es -bsol te .no!ledge)the $inal and most%de*elo(ed str ct re +X form& not content 2see +C/ belo!4/ o$ sel$%conscio sness.

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