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TOWARD A DANGEROUS WORLD
U.S. National Security Strategy for the Coming Turbulence
This study examines the foreign policy and national security implications of a single dominant hypothesis: A dangerous world may lie ahead, a world of greater turbulence than today. After the Cold War, many observers felt optimistic that an enduring era of peace lay ahead. The recent past however,has brought troubling events abroad and mounting worry among governments and security experts everywhere. This study offers scenarios of how certain trends may play out and puts forth ideas about how U.S. and Western policies will need to be altered over the coming decade or two. But its message is more fundamental. It asserts that a dangerous world will be far more complex than the menacing but comfortably clearcut situation faced by the Western world during the Cold War. The United States will no longer confront a single hegemonic threat in a bipolar setting with many close allies at its side. Indeed, the era ahead may offer precisely the opposite of these features. The United States will need to learn not only how to act differently than during the Cold War but how to think very differently as well. The looming prospect of a dangerous world means that before the United States starts to act, it had best think deeply about precisely what confronts it, what options are at its disposal, and what it is trying to achieve. Many powerful factors are at work, and they are interacting in ways that magnify their negative consequences. Moreover, in varying ways and with varying magnitudes nearly all regions are being affected, and trends in one region are influencing those in another. The result is an often silent, but global drift toward instability.
Subject Categories :
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
DEFENSE SYSTEMS
MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS
ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
MILITARY FORCES AND ORGANIZATIONS
Titre original
TOWARD A DANGEROUS WORLD U.S. National Security Strategy for the Coming Turbulence
TOWARD A DANGEROUS WORLD
U.S. National Security Strategy for the Coming Turbulence
This study examines the foreign policy and national security implications of a single dominant hypothesis: A dangerous world may lie ahead, a world of greater turbulence than today. After the Cold War, many observers felt optimistic that an enduring era of peace lay ahead. The recent past however,has brought troubling events abroad and mounting worry among governments and security experts everywhere. This study offers scenarios of how certain trends may play out and puts forth ideas about how U.S. and Western policies will need to be altered over the coming decade or two. But its message is more fundamental. It asserts that a dangerous world will be far more complex than the menacing but comfortably clearcut situation faced by the Western world during the Cold War. The United States will no longer confront a single hegemonic threat in a bipolar setting with many close allies at its side. Indeed, the era ahead may offer precisely the opposite of these features. The United States will need to learn not only how to act differently than during the Cold War but how to think very differently as well. The looming prospect of a dangerous world means that before the United States starts to act, it had best think deeply about precisely what confronts it, what options are at its disposal, and what it is trying to achieve. Many powerful factors are at work, and they are interacting in ways that magnify their negative consequences. Moreover, in varying ways and with varying magnitudes nearly all regions are being affected, and trends in one region are influencing those in another. The result is an often silent, but global drift toward instability.
Subject Categories :
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
DEFENSE SYSTEMS
MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS
ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
MILITARY FORCES AND ORGANIZATIONS
Droits d'auteur :
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Formats disponibles
Téléchargez comme PDF, TXT ou lisez en ligne sur Scribd
TOWARD A DANGEROUS WORLD
U.S. National Security Strategy for the Coming Turbulence
This study examines the foreign policy and national security implications of a single dominant hypothesis: A dangerous world may lie ahead, a world of greater turbulence than today. After the Cold War, many observers felt optimistic that an enduring era of peace lay ahead. The recent past however,has brought troubling events abroad and mounting worry among governments and security experts everywhere. This study offers scenarios of how certain trends may play out and puts forth ideas about how U.S. and Western policies will need to be altered over the coming decade or two. But its message is more fundamental. It asserts that a dangerous world will be far more complex than the menacing but comfortably clearcut situation faced by the Western world during the Cold War. The United States will no longer confront a single hegemonic threat in a bipolar setting with many close allies at its side. Indeed, the era ahead may offer precisely the opposite of these features. The United States will need to learn not only how to act differently than during the Cold War but how to think very differently as well. The looming prospect of a dangerous world means that before the United States starts to act, it had best think deeply about precisely what confronts it, what options are at its disposal, and what it is trying to achieve. Many powerful factors are at work, and they are interacting in ways that magnify their negative consequences. Moreover, in varying ways and with varying magnitudes nearly all regions are being affected, and trends in one region are influencing those in another. The result is an often silent, but global drift toward instability.
Subject Categories :
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
DEFENSE SYSTEMS
MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS
ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
MILITARY FORCES AND ORGANIZATIONS
Droits d'auteur :
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Formats disponibles
Téléchargez comme PDF, TXT ou lisez en ligne sur Scribd
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Availability Oddes
‘This reports the final product of RAND’S two-year National Defense
Research Institute (NDRI) project on future U.S. military strategy for
the twenty-first century. The project's first report dealt with U.S.
conventional-force planning methodology for the post-Cold War era.
A second report dealt with future trends in American military strat-
egy as a function of U.S. interests and goals, alternative intemational
security systems, technological changes, and military wends.
Building on those efforts, this report focuses on one particular chal-
lenge of the future: the possibility that the current international sys-
tem will give way to something far mote dangerous. The need to
prepare for this possibility is growing because negative trends have
emerged in international politics (e.g., stagnating world economy,
turmoil in formerly communist countries, cultural antagonism) since
the optimistic aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. If such trends
gather force, they could confront the United States with a need to
rethink its national security policy, military strategy, and force plan-
ning.
This report was prepared for the Department of Defense. The re-
search for it was carried out within the International Security and
Defense Policy Center, a component of RAND's NDRI. NDRI is a
federally funded research and development center sponsored by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense
agencies.Ww Toward Dangerous World
The material presented here is intended to be helpful to U.S. gov-
ernment officials who deal with national security policy, military
strategy, and forces. It also will be of interest to other analysts who
deal with these issues.Preface
Tables
Summary
Acknowledgments .
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
‘The Essence of a Dangerous World.
The Uncertainty Ahead
Consequences for National Security Planning
Difficulties Posed by Changes in Pi
Need for Change in Intellectual Style .
Need to Develop Strategy Resources .
Need to Develop Assets . ....
‘Toward a Dangerous World?
The Global Security System
Analysis of Future Military Conflicts .
‘The Emerging Defense Agenda. :
‘Away from Canonical Scenarios .. . . .
-y and Strategy
Contribution Needed from Overseas Security
Alliances.
Methodology and Organization .
Chapter Two
‘THE LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL OPTIMISM
Stability and Unclear Trends . .
Post
Cold War Optimism, Then Pessimism -Vi Toward Dangerous World
‘The Postulates of Optimism .
Background
Conclusions of the Literature .
Conceptual Flaws of Optimism .
Collapse of Unstable Old Order 2 ‘aStable New.
Order .
Democracy and Capitalism Operate Together Under
Market Democracy
Incompatible Political Ideology Is the Source of |
Interstate Conflicts .........
Economics Has Peace-Enhancing Effects...
Conflict Stems from the Nation-State System .
Miltary Power Has «Discounted Role in Preserving .
Global Peace .
Democracy Has Tranquility-inducing Effects .
‘The Complex Relationship Between Democracy and
Peace co
Realities Outside Democracy’s Orbit
Former Soviet Bloc.
China ...
Middle East . 7
Guarding Against Naive Optimism .
Chapter Three
‘THE WORRIED VISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
PESSIMISM . A
‘The Postulates of Realism
Conflict .
Economics
History :
Nation-State System.
Military Power and War .
Morality .
Foreign Poli
Alternative Security Systems
Realism’s Security-System Models and a Dangerous
World .. cee
Dynamics of Polarization... 2...
Military Imbalances .
2
22.
25
27
28
al
31
32
34
35,
38
4a
a
45
46
49
49
50
51
52
52
53
54
55
56
58
60‘The Scholarship of International Pessimism . ..
Prophets of Global Anarchy and Chaos .......
Prophets of Nationalism and Ethnic Strife.
Prophets of Economic Troubles .
A Critique of Pessimism
Russia and China Critical
‘Variable Level of Turmoil
Chapter Four
PESSIMISTIC STRATEGIC SCENARIOS FOR THE
FUTURE
ingle-Dimension Scenarios.
Shortcomings of Single-Dimension Scenarios
Multiple-Dimension Scenarios . .
Analysis of Four Multidimension Scenarios .
Higher Potential for Global Stress. .
‘The Need for Individual, Sensible Policies. .
Specific Dangers Different from Today's .
Possibilities in Unincluded Regions
Mote-Stressful Scenarios
Future Divergence from Identified Scenarios
Different Rivalries and Power Blocs.
Barriers to Different Power Blocs
Summary
Chapter Five
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY .
Recognizing the Dangers Ahead.
Four Speeches
1 Aspin Bottom-Up Review.
Toward a New Strategic Concept
Enlargement . .
Enlargement ina Dangerous World
Systemic Containment :
‘An Enduring Strategic Concept. -
‘The Ways and Means of National Security Plicy
Erecting a Barrier
Extending Geopolitically
‘An Activist Policy .
Contents
ward a Scenario- Based Framework for Planning
vil
"4
81
93,
95
96
101
101
104
108,
0
15
116
117
118
ug
120
120
121
122
125
127
127
127
130
132
133,
134
135
136
137
139
40
3vill Toward a Dangerous World
From ‘Russia-First” to “Alliance-First” Policy ........ M4
Steps Toward an Alliance-First System... +. 46
Russia and China in U.S. Policy .....22220ee00002+ 149)
Legitimate Equilibrium ee isl
US. Approach to Regional Turbulence eee iss
Summary = 157
Chapter Six
‘THE ROLE OF MILITARY POWER IN A DANGEROUS
WORLD... 5 161
‘The Dynamics of Future Military Competition . 162
Polite Confit Military Competiton Cycle 162
Technological Influences . 164
Imbalance of Resources . 164
Nuclear Force Trends 165
United States and Russia . 165
Proliferation 167
spread Proliferation . 170
Other Instruments of Mass Destruction . i. 170
Conventional-Force Trends in Europe and Eurasia...... 171
Burope—NATO ..- : 172
Burasia—Russia ..- 176
Eurasia—East Central Europe. 2 185
Summary: The Military Mathematics of Imbalance... 188
Conventional-Force Trends in Asia . . se 189
Korea . eeoponooe 190
Russia . 193
China 194
Japan eams6d 195
Northeast sian itary Gompediion « Sens5d 196
Southeast Asia .....- ce 198
Summary: Asia ina Dangerous World. 199
Conventional-Force Trends in the Middle East and the
Persian Gulf. . 200
Middle East . 201
Persian Gulf... 204
The Composite Picture 207
Chapter Seven
MILITARY STRATEGY FOR TOMORROW .....---+++++ 209
ee 710
Current US. Defense Policy... .Contents
More Vigilant Strategy Needed for Dangerous World
Strategic Scenario 3 ......-.. 000+
Strategic Scenario 1 .......-
Strategic Scenario2 .... _
Strategic Scenario 4 .
Characteristics of U.S. Military Strategy
eacetime Shaping Function
Defense Planning
Changing Geographic Perimeters .
Power Projection ..... ,
Limited Wars
Desert Storm as Model
Forms of Conflict . :
Conventional Strategy and Forces in'a Dangerous
World
Enhanced Jointness.
Chapter Eight
‘CONVENTIONAL-FORCE PLANNING FOR A
DANGEROUS WORLD
Will U.S. Forces Remain Qualitatively Superior to the
Enemy? :
What Standards Should Be Employed for Force.
zing? :
The Lessons of Desert Storm. .
Bosnia: A Recent Example of Less Favorable
Conditions. .
Cautions .
Canonical Versus Nonstandard Scenarios
Force Needs for Canonical MRCs -
Persian Gulf MRC.
Korean MRC.
Summary...
Force Needs for Other Conflicts.
Flexibility. Sepodeace
Deep Thinking. .
Nonstandard Scenarios for the Future
Conventional Conflicts. .....--+++
Regional Nuclear Scenarios .......
Summary of Contingencies.
213
214
214
215
216
217
217
219
223
225
225
226
228
228
234
237
238
239
242
248
249
250
252
254
257
258
258
258
259
261
262
266
267x Toward a Dangerous World
Toward Mission-Based Force Planning
‘A Continuing Role for Canonical Scenarios . .-
Handling the Full Spectrum of Military Challenges «
What If Stronger U.S. and Allied Forces Are Needed?
Cost-fective Guidelines for Strengthening U
Forces . :
West European Power Projection
Chapter Nine
CONCLUSIONS co ce
Findings - 600 cones
Recommendations . .
Appendix
‘A. THE EXPERIENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND
Ce
1EUS. HE
‘SCENARIOS
Bibliography
B.
‘ORICAL EXPERIENCE WITH CANONICAT,
268
268
2a.
275
276
27
279
280
281
283
289
30141
61.
62.
63.
6a.
7A.
72.
a,
TABLES
Future International Security Systems in a More
Dangerous World ...... boieed um
Force Levels in the “Near Abroad” Dieeeeees 183
Force Levels in East Central Europe -..........2-. 186
Conventional Forces in Korea: 1993. ..........+.. 191
Conventional Forces in the Middle East: 1993 ...... 201
Examples of Changing Situations and Strategy
Shifts . 230
Single-Dimension Postures - goa
Possible Nuclear Crises Outside the Persian Gulf'and
Korea . 267
Future Contingencies Involving U.S. Military Forces... 268
Future Strategic Missions for U.S. Conventional
Forces... Bopousondada 9 273SUMMARY
This study examines the foreign policy and national security impli-
cations of a single dominant hypothesis: that a dangerous world may
lie ahead, a world of greater turbulence than today’s. Immediately
after the Cold War ended, many observers felt optimistic that an
enduring era of peace lay ahead, and the generally tranquil situation
gave them reasons for thinking so. ‘The past months, however, have
brought troubling events abroad and mounting worry among
governments and security experts everywhere. Only a year ago, the
prevailing mood was optimism, but pessimism is now starting to take
hold. Nobody can pretend to have a crystal ball. Yet the time is fast
arriving when the United States and its allies will need to take stock
of the negative trends that are unfolding, determine what those
trends mean for Western security interests, and decide how to
respond.
Surveying the current trends, this study offers scenarios of how those
trends may play out and puts forth ideas about how U.S. and
Wester policies will need to be altered over the coming decade or
two. But its message is more fundamental than that of endorsing any
single, inevitably controversial scenario or policy response: It asserts
that a dangerous world will be far more complex than the very
menacing but comfortingly clear-cut situation faced by the Western
world during the Cold War. ‘The United States will no longer con-
front a single hegemonic threat in a bipolar setting with many close
allies at its side. Indeed, the era ahead may offer precisely the op-
posite of all these features. The United States will need to leam not
only how to act differently than during the Cold War but how to think
very differently as wellxiv Toward a Dangeous World
Many of the security premises and precepts inherited from the Cold
‘War are today buried so deeply in the “subconscious” of U.S. strate:
gic doctrine that policymakers and strategists are scarcely aware of
their existence. Most will have to be uprooted and replaced by
something new. During the nineteenth century, Britain—then a
global superpower—developed a capacity to react flexibly and adap-
tively, and to juggle many “security balls” in an ever-changing and
turbulent international setting. ‘The United States will not have to
repeat Britain's performance, for the twenty-first century will be very
different from the nineteenth century, and U.S. values are different
from imperial Britain's. But if a dangerous world evolves, USS.
policymakers may have to acquire some of Britain's core strategic
skills. Thus, the looming prospect of a dangerous world means that
before the United States starts to act, it had best think deeply about
exactly what confronts it, what options are at its disposal, and what it
is trying to achieve."
TRENDS: TOWARD A DANGEROUS WORLD?
‘Any attempt to grapple with a dangerous world should begin by ac-
knowledging that the heady optimism of the immediate post-Cold
War years was premature, as the survey of the literature of optimism
in Chapter Two demonstrates. The end of the Cold War did not itself
mean the onset of permanent tranquility, and the downfall of
European communism did not mean that peaceful, market democ-
racy? was on the verge of spreading everywhere. Today's mounting
pessimism thus is partly the product of exaggerated expectations
suffering inevitable disappointment.
Yet more is involved than readjusting U.S. hopes downward, for in-
ternational events appear to be sliding downhill: Democratic re-
forms are faltering in Russia, and the Bosnian crisis continues. The
underlying causes go far beyond these two events, however. If the
‘Por an assessment of changes in US. policy and strategy if the international system
becomes more stable than now, see Richard L. Kupler, U.S. Military Strategy and Foree
Posture in the 21st Century” Capabilities and Mequirements, Santa Monica, Cal.
RAND, MR-328-15, 199.
2p marker democracy sa country that has a democratic politcal system and a capt
tals, free-enterprise economic sytem,summary
newly published academic literature of international pessimism sur-
veyed in Chapter Three is correct, many powerful factors are at work,
and they are interacting in ways that magnify their negative conse-
quences. Moreover, not just one region is being affected. In varying
ways and with varying magnitudes, nearly all regions are being af-
fected, and trends in a separate region are influencing those in other
regions. The result is a global drift toward instability that is taking
place silently, unobserved, below the surface—but one that is real
nonetheless.
This drift is being caused by many factors working together, some old
and some new. ‘They include the rise of angry ethnicity, resurgent
nationalism, cultural antagonism, and anti-Western ideologies. Also
important are rising expectations amid deepening poverty, turmoil
in former communist countries, a stagnating world economy, and
growing economic competition that is threatening to bring about a
return to autarchy and mercantilism. Faced with these negative
trends, governments everywhere seem to be losing not only the will-
ingness to cooperate with each other but also the ability to shape
their own destinies. To top this list are destabilizing geopolitical dy-
namics reminiscent of bygone eras: explosive power vacuums,?
mounting fears that give rise to imprudent conduct, the reappear-
ance of old rivalries, and the replacement of stable bipolarity with
unstable multipolarity—dynamics that are magnifying the incentives
for nuclear proliferation while posing an equal risk of the spread of
modern conventional weapons. The consequence is not only a
‘growing capacity to wage war but also the emergence of military im-
balances of power that further weaken global stability.
Where will all these trends lead? If the worst does transpire, the
world could combine the negative features of nineteenth-century
geopolitics, twentieth-century political passions, and twenty-first-
century technology: a chronically turbulent world of unstable multi-
polarity, atavistic nationalism, and modern armaments. Yet the fu-
ture is unknowable. The “tectonic plates” of international politics
are shifting in profound ways, and because we do not grasp the
complex causal dynamics at work, we are unable to predict the
4 power vaccum isa situation in which security guarantees are absent and imbal:
ances in physical resources—especilly miliary resources invite agressive conduct.svi Toward a Dangeous World
outcome. To the extent that destabilizing dynamics take hold,
tomorrow's world may well be more dangerous than today’s, not
only in the magnitude of the dangers but in the types of dangers.
SCENARIOS FOR A DANGEROUS WORLD
In an effort to forge conceptual order out of confusion, this study
points to three variables as being critical to the future: Western rela-
tions with Russia and China; the magnitude of regional tensions in
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf; and the status of the
Western Alliance. ‘These variables will not control all dimensions of
the future, but they will play influential roles in shaping the all-
important structural features of the international security system: As
they go, so will go the world.
Chapter Four describes 28 different ways in which these variables
could interact. It points to one scenario as being the most probable,
or at least as best representing a host of similar outcomes: tra
tional geopolitical rivalry of the West with Russia and China; height-
ened tensions in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf; and
a still-cohesive Wester Alliance, but with an uncertain capacity to
‘address problems beyond its borders. If this scenario hints at the fu-
ture, it offers some comfort, for it is not a worst-case outcome.
Western geopolitical rivalry with Russia and China is far less danger-
us than all-out confrontation and can be moderated by diplomacy
and responsive policies. Heightened tensions in all three regions do
not imply an explosion into permanent warfare: Such tensions will
be more difficult to manage than those of today, but they will be
manageable. A Western Alliance with an uncertain capacity to act is
far less worrisome than an alliance that fractures altogether, leaving
its members on their own.
Even so, were this scenario to be realized, it would confront the
United States with greater international troubles than today.
Currently, the United States faces serious tensions in only two re-
gions: the Middle East/Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia (Korea).
Bosnia notwithstanding, Europe is stable. Minor frictions aside,
Western relations with Russia and China are harmonious. If a dan-
gerous world appears in the form of this scenario, the U.S. security
agenda will expand greatly. It will be like a juggler who will have to
juggle five weighty, unwieldy “balls” instead of a manageable two.