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Re St el ees eC ee el ete ele ero aol LLU tele ol THE BLACK VAULT Lee See Re steel laa oad ae Pao eoameto sgh RECORD CLEARING HOUSE IN THE WORLD. THE RESEARCH EFFORTS HERE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS THROUGHOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND ALL CAN BE DOWNLOADED BY VISITING: RIALS ate eh a7 Ueto) YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO YOUR FRIENDS, BUT PLEASE KEEP THIS IDENTIFYING IMAGE AT THE TOP OF THE PDF SO OTHERS CAN DOWNLOAD MORE! 6850800 073. | decession F TIS GRAAT pTtc TAB Unannounced Justifioatt = ____ PREFACE Disegibat Lom Availability Oddes ‘This reports the final product of RAND’S two-year National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) project on future U.S. military strategy for the twenty-first century. The project's first report dealt with U.S. conventional-force planning methodology for the post-Cold War era. A second report dealt with future trends in American military strat- egy as a function of U.S. interests and goals, alternative intemational security systems, technological changes, and military wends. Building on those efforts, this report focuses on one particular chal- lenge of the future: the possibility that the current international sys- tem will give way to something far mote dangerous. The need to prepare for this possibility is growing because negative trends have emerged in international politics (e.g., stagnating world economy, turmoil in formerly communist countries, cultural antagonism) since the optimistic aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. If such trends gather force, they could confront the United States with a need to rethink its national security policy, military strategy, and force plan- ning. This report was prepared for the Department of Defense. The re- search for it was carried out within the International Security and Defense Policy Center, a component of RAND's NDRI. NDRI is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies. Ww Toward Dangerous World The material presented here is intended to be helpful to U.S. gov- ernment officials who deal with national security policy, military strategy, and forces. It also will be of interest to other analysts who deal with these issues. Preface Tables Summary Acknowledgments . Chapter One INTRODUCTION ‘The Essence of a Dangerous World. The Uncertainty Ahead Consequences for National Security Planning Difficulties Posed by Changes in Pi Need for Change in Intellectual Style . Need to Develop Strategy Resources . Need to Develop Assets . .... ‘Toward a Dangerous World? The Global Security System Analysis of Future Military Conflicts . ‘The Emerging Defense Agenda. : ‘Away from Canonical Scenarios .. . . . -y and Strategy Contribution Needed from Overseas Security Alliances. Methodology and Organization . Chapter Two ‘THE LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL OPTIMISM Stability and Unclear Trends . . Post Cold War Optimism, Then Pessimism - Vi Toward Dangerous World ‘The Postulates of Optimism . Background Conclusions of the Literature . Conceptual Flaws of Optimism . Collapse of Unstable Old Order 2 ‘aStable New. Order . Democracy and Capitalism Operate Together Under Market Democracy Incompatible Political Ideology Is the Source of | Interstate Conflicts ......... Economics Has Peace-Enhancing Effects... Conflict Stems from the Nation-State System . Miltary Power Has «Discounted Role in Preserving . Global Peace . Democracy Has Tranquility-inducing Effects . ‘The Complex Relationship Between Democracy and Peace co Realities Outside Democracy’s Orbit Former Soviet Bloc. China ... Middle East . 7 Guarding Against Naive Optimism . Chapter Three ‘THE WORRIED VISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL PESSIMISM . A ‘The Postulates of Realism Conflict . Economics History : Nation-State System. Military Power and War . Morality . Foreign Poli Alternative Security Systems Realism’s Security-System Models and a Dangerous World .. cee Dynamics of Polarization... 2... Military Imbalances . 2 22. 25 27 28 al 31 32 34 35, 38 4a a 45 46 49 49 50 51 52 52 53 54 55 56 58 60 ‘The Scholarship of International Pessimism . .. Prophets of Global Anarchy and Chaos ....... Prophets of Nationalism and Ethnic Strife. Prophets of Economic Troubles . A Critique of Pessimism Russia and China Critical ‘Variable Level of Turmoil Chapter Four PESSIMISTIC STRATEGIC SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE ingle-Dimension Scenarios. Shortcomings of Single-Dimension Scenarios Multiple-Dimension Scenarios . . Analysis of Four Multidimension Scenarios . Higher Potential for Global Stress. . ‘The Need for Individual, Sensible Policies. . Specific Dangers Different from Today's . Possibilities in Unincluded Regions Mote-Stressful Scenarios Future Divergence from Identified Scenarios Different Rivalries and Power Blocs. Barriers to Different Power Blocs Summary Chapter Five IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY . Recognizing the Dangers Ahead. Four Speeches 1 Aspin Bottom-Up Review. Toward a New Strategic Concept Enlargement . . Enlargement ina Dangerous World Systemic Containment : ‘An Enduring Strategic Concept. - ‘The Ways and Means of National Security Plicy Erecting a Barrier Extending Geopolitically ‘An Activist Policy . Contents ward a Scenario- Based Framework for Planning vil "4 81 93, 95 96 101 101 104 108, 0 15 116 117 118 ug 120 120 121 122 125 127 127 127 130 132 133, 134 135 136 137 139 40 3 vill Toward a Dangerous World From ‘Russia-First” to “Alliance-First” Policy ........ M4 Steps Toward an Alliance-First System... +. 46 Russia and China in U.S. Policy .....22220ee00002+ 149) Legitimate Equilibrium ee isl US. Approach to Regional Turbulence eee iss Summary = 157 Chapter Six ‘THE ROLE OF MILITARY POWER IN A DANGEROUS WORLD... 5 161 ‘The Dynamics of Future Military Competition . 162 Polite Confit Military Competiton Cycle 162 Technological Influences . 164 Imbalance of Resources . 164 Nuclear Force Trends 165 United States and Russia . 165 Proliferation 167 spread Proliferation . 170 Other Instruments of Mass Destruction . i. 170 Conventional-Force Trends in Europe and Eurasia...... 171 Burope—NATO ..- : 172 Burasia—Russia ..- 176 Eurasia—East Central Europe. 2 185 Summary: The Military Mathematics of Imbalance... 188 Conventional-Force Trends in Asia . . se 189 Korea . eeoponooe 190 Russia . 193 China 194 Japan eams6d 195 Northeast sian itary Gompediion « Sens5d 196 Southeast Asia .....- ce 198 Summary: Asia ina Dangerous World. 199 Conventional-Force Trends in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. . 200 Middle East . 201 Persian Gulf... 204 The Composite Picture 207 Chapter Seven MILITARY STRATEGY FOR TOMORROW .....---+++++ 209 ee 710 Current US. Defense Policy... . Contents More Vigilant Strategy Needed for Dangerous World Strategic Scenario 3 ......-.. 000+ Strategic Scenario 1 .......- Strategic Scenario2 .... _ Strategic Scenario 4 . Characteristics of U.S. Military Strategy eacetime Shaping Function Defense Planning Changing Geographic Perimeters . Power Projection ..... , Limited Wars Desert Storm as Model Forms of Conflict . : Conventional Strategy and Forces in'a Dangerous World Enhanced Jointness. Chapter Eight ‘CONVENTIONAL-FORCE PLANNING FOR A DANGEROUS WORLD Will U.S. Forces Remain Qualitatively Superior to the Enemy? : What Standards Should Be Employed for Force. zing? : The Lessons of Desert Storm. . Bosnia: A Recent Example of Less Favorable Conditions. . Cautions . Canonical Versus Nonstandard Scenarios Force Needs for Canonical MRCs - Persian Gulf MRC. Korean MRC. Summary... Force Needs for Other Conflicts. Flexibility. Sepodeace Deep Thinking. . Nonstandard Scenarios for the Future Conventional Conflicts. .....--+++ Regional Nuclear Scenarios ....... Summary of Contingencies. 213 214 214 215 216 217 217 219 223 225 225 226 228 228 234 237 238 239 242 248 249 250 252 254 257 258 258 258 259 261 262 266 267 x Toward a Dangerous World Toward Mission-Based Force Planning ‘A Continuing Role for Canonical Scenarios . .- Handling the Full Spectrum of Military Challenges « What If Stronger U.S. and Allied Forces Are Needed? Cost-fective Guidelines for Strengthening U Forces . : West European Power Projection Chapter Nine CONCLUSIONS co ce Findings - 600 cones Recommendations . . Appendix ‘A. THE EXPERIENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND Ce 1EUS. HE ‘SCENARIOS Bibliography B. ‘ORICAL EXPERIENCE WITH CANONICAT, 268 268 2a. 275 276 27 279 280 281 283 289 301 41 61. 62. 63. 6a. 7A. 72. a, TABLES Future International Security Systems in a More Dangerous World ...... boieed um Force Levels in the “Near Abroad” Dieeeeees 183 Force Levels in East Central Europe -..........2-. 186 Conventional Forces in Korea: 1993. ..........+.. 191 Conventional Forces in the Middle East: 1993 ...... 201 Examples of Changing Situations and Strategy Shifts . 230 Single-Dimension Postures - goa Possible Nuclear Crises Outside the Persian Gulf'and Korea . 267 Future Contingencies Involving U.S. Military Forces... 268 Future Strategic Missions for U.S. Conventional Forces... Bopousondada 9 273 SUMMARY This study examines the foreign policy and national security impli- cations of a single dominant hypothesis: that a dangerous world may lie ahead, a world of greater turbulence than today’s. Immediately after the Cold War ended, many observers felt optimistic that an enduring era of peace lay ahead, and the generally tranquil situation gave them reasons for thinking so. ‘The past months, however, have brought troubling events abroad and mounting worry among governments and security experts everywhere. Only a year ago, the prevailing mood was optimism, but pessimism is now starting to take hold. Nobody can pretend to have a crystal ball. Yet the time is fast arriving when the United States and its allies will need to take stock of the negative trends that are unfolding, determine what those trends mean for Western security interests, and decide how to respond. Surveying the current trends, this study offers scenarios of how those trends may play out and puts forth ideas about how U.S. and Wester policies will need to be altered over the coming decade or two. But its message is more fundamental than that of endorsing any single, inevitably controversial scenario or policy response: It asserts that a dangerous world will be far more complex than the very menacing but comfortingly clear-cut situation faced by the Western world during the Cold War. ‘The United States will no longer con- front a single hegemonic threat in a bipolar setting with many close allies at its side. Indeed, the era ahead may offer precisely the op- posite of all these features. The United States will need to leam not only how to act differently than during the Cold War but how to think very differently as well xiv Toward a Dangeous World Many of the security premises and precepts inherited from the Cold ‘War are today buried so deeply in the “subconscious” of U.S. strate: gic doctrine that policymakers and strategists are scarcely aware of their existence. Most will have to be uprooted and replaced by something new. During the nineteenth century, Britain—then a global superpower—developed a capacity to react flexibly and adap- tively, and to juggle many “security balls” in an ever-changing and turbulent international setting. ‘The United States will not have to repeat Britain's performance, for the twenty-first century will be very different from the nineteenth century, and U.S. values are different from imperial Britain's. But if a dangerous world evolves, USS. policymakers may have to acquire some of Britain's core strategic skills. Thus, the looming prospect of a dangerous world means that before the United States starts to act, it had best think deeply about exactly what confronts it, what options are at its disposal, and what it is trying to achieve." TRENDS: TOWARD A DANGEROUS WORLD? ‘Any attempt to grapple with a dangerous world should begin by ac- knowledging that the heady optimism of the immediate post-Cold War years was premature, as the survey of the literature of optimism in Chapter Two demonstrates. The end of the Cold War did not itself mean the onset of permanent tranquility, and the downfall of European communism did not mean that peaceful, market democ- racy? was on the verge of spreading everywhere. Today's mounting pessimism thus is partly the product of exaggerated expectations suffering inevitable disappointment. Yet more is involved than readjusting U.S. hopes downward, for in- ternational events appear to be sliding downhill: Democratic re- forms are faltering in Russia, and the Bosnian crisis continues. The underlying causes go far beyond these two events, however. If the ‘Por an assessment of changes in US. policy and strategy if the international system becomes more stable than now, see Richard L. Kupler, U.S. Military Strategy and Foree Posture in the 21st Century” Capabilities and Mequirements, Santa Monica, Cal. RAND, MR-328-15, 199. 2p marker democracy sa country that has a democratic politcal system and a capt tals, free-enterprise economic sytem, summary newly published academic literature of international pessimism sur- veyed in Chapter Three is correct, many powerful factors are at work, and they are interacting in ways that magnify their negative conse- quences. Moreover, not just one region is being affected. In varying ways and with varying magnitudes, nearly all regions are being af- fected, and trends in a separate region are influencing those in other regions. The result is a global drift toward instability that is taking place silently, unobserved, below the surface—but one that is real nonetheless. This drift is being caused by many factors working together, some old and some new. ‘They include the rise of angry ethnicity, resurgent nationalism, cultural antagonism, and anti-Western ideologies. Also important are rising expectations amid deepening poverty, turmoil in former communist countries, a stagnating world economy, and growing economic competition that is threatening to bring about a return to autarchy and mercantilism. Faced with these negative trends, governments everywhere seem to be losing not only the will- ingness to cooperate with each other but also the ability to shape their own destinies. To top this list are destabilizing geopolitical dy- namics reminiscent of bygone eras: explosive power vacuums,? mounting fears that give rise to imprudent conduct, the reappear- ance of old rivalries, and the replacement of stable bipolarity with unstable multipolarity—dynamics that are magnifying the incentives for nuclear proliferation while posing an equal risk of the spread of modern conventional weapons. The consequence is not only a ‘growing capacity to wage war but also the emergence of military im- balances of power that further weaken global stability. Where will all these trends lead? If the worst does transpire, the world could combine the negative features of nineteenth-century geopolitics, twentieth-century political passions, and twenty-first- century technology: a chronically turbulent world of unstable multi- polarity, atavistic nationalism, and modern armaments. Yet the fu- ture is unknowable. The “tectonic plates” of international politics are shifting in profound ways, and because we do not grasp the complex causal dynamics at work, we are unable to predict the 4 power vaccum isa situation in which security guarantees are absent and imbal: ances in physical resources—especilly miliary resources invite agressive conduct. svi Toward a Dangeous World outcome. To the extent that destabilizing dynamics take hold, tomorrow's world may well be more dangerous than today’s, not only in the magnitude of the dangers but in the types of dangers. SCENARIOS FOR A DANGEROUS WORLD In an effort to forge conceptual order out of confusion, this study points to three variables as being critical to the future: Western rela- tions with Russia and China; the magnitude of regional tensions in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf; and the status of the Western Alliance. ‘These variables will not control all dimensions of the future, but they will play influential roles in shaping the all- important structural features of the international security system: As they go, so will go the world. Chapter Four describes 28 different ways in which these variables could interact. It points to one scenario as being the most probable, or at least as best representing a host of similar outcomes: tra tional geopolitical rivalry of the West with Russia and China; height- ened tensions in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf; and a still-cohesive Wester Alliance, but with an uncertain capacity to ‘address problems beyond its borders. If this scenario hints at the fu- ture, it offers some comfort, for it is not a worst-case outcome. Western geopolitical rivalry with Russia and China is far less danger- us than all-out confrontation and can be moderated by diplomacy and responsive policies. Heightened tensions in all three regions do not imply an explosion into permanent warfare: Such tensions will be more difficult to manage than those of today, but they will be manageable. A Western Alliance with an uncertain capacity to act is far less worrisome than an alliance that fractures altogether, leaving its members on their own. Even so, were this scenario to be realized, it would confront the United States with greater international troubles than today. Currently, the United States faces serious tensions in only two re- gions: the Middle East/Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia (Korea). Bosnia notwithstanding, Europe is stable. Minor frictions aside, Western relations with Russia and China are harmonious. If a dan- gerous world appears in the form of this scenario, the U.S. security agenda will expand greatly. It will be like a juggler who will have to juggle five weighty, unwieldy “balls” instead of a manageable two.

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