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DevelopingTheoriesofIntention
SocialUnderstandingandSelfControl
Editedby PhilipDavidZelazo JanetWildeAstington DavidR.Olson UniversityofToronto

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Copyright1999byLawrenceErlbaumAssociates,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyform,byphotostat,microfilm,retrieval system,oranyothermeans,withoutpriorwrittenpermissionofthepublisher. LawrenceErlbaumAssociates,Inc.,Publishers 10IndustrialAvenue Mahwah,NJ07430 CoverdesignbyKathrynHoughtalingLacey. Coverart:billbissett,"thskywithinus"(1998, mixedmedia).Privatecollection,Toronto, Canada.Reproducedwithpermission.

LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData Developingtheoriesofintention:socialunderstandingand selfcontrol/editedbyPhilipDavidZelazo,JanetWilde Astington,andDavidR.Olson. p.cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN080583141X(cloth:alk.paper)ISBN 0805831428(pbk.:alk.paper). 1.Selfcontrolinchildren.2.Socialperceptioninchildren.I. Zelazo,PhilipDavid.II.Astington,JanetW.III.Olson, DavidR. BF723.S25D461998 153.8dc219850446 CIP BookspublishedbyLawrenceErlbaumAssociatesareprintedonacidfreepaper,andtheirbindingsarechosenforstrengthanddurability. PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica 10987654321

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ForWilliamKessen(d.1999) humanist,scholar,friend

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CONTENTS
Preface 1 Introduction:Actions,Intentions,andAttributions DavidR.Olson,JanetWildeAstington,AndPhilipDavidZelazo PartI DevelopmentofIntentionandIntentionalUnderstandinginInfancyand EarlyChildhood 2 Toddlers'UnderstandingofIntentions,DesiresandEmotions:Explorationsofthe DarkAges AndrewN.Meltzoff,AlisonGopnik,AndBettyM.Repacholi 3 IntentionalRelationsandTriadicInteractions ChrisMoore 4 HavingIntentions,UnderstandingIntentions,andUnderstandingCommunicative Intentions MichaelTomasello 5 Intentions,Consciousness,andPretendPlay MichaelLewisAndDouglasRamsay 6 Language,LevelsofConsciousness,andTheDevelopmentofIntentional Action PhilipDavidZelazo 95 77 63 43 15 ix 1

17

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7 DevelopmentofIntention:TheRelationofExecutiveFunctiontoTheoryof Mind DouglasFrye 8 ExecutiveFunctionsandTheoryofMind:CognitiveComplexityorFunctional Dependence? JosefPerner,SandraStummer,AndBirgitLang 9 TheTheoryofAscriptions DavidR.OlsonAndDeepthiKamawar PartII ComparativePerspectivesonIntentionality 10 PrimateRepresentationsandExpectations:MentalToolsforNavigatingina SocialWorld MarcD.Hauser 11 SocialUnderstandinginChimpanzees:NewEvidenceFromaLongitudinal Approach DanielJ.Povinelli PartIII TheSocioculturalContextofIntentionality 12 MakingSenseoftheSocialWorld:Mindreading,Emotion,andRelationships JudyDunn 13 InfluencesonMaternalAttributionofInfantIntentionality J.StevenReznick 14 IntentionandEmotioninChildPsychopathology:BuildingCooperativePlans JennyJenkinsAndRachelGreenbaum

119

133

153

167

169

195

227

229

243

269

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PartIV IntentionalityandLanguage 15 TheLanguageofIntention:ThreeWaysofDoingIt JanetWildeAstington 16 IntentionalityandInterpretation CarolFleisherFeldman 17 TheIntentionalityofReferring JeromeBruner AuthorIndex SubjectIndex Contributors

293

295

317

329

341 351 357

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PREFACE
Thecurrentvolumegrewoutofasmallconference,DevelopingIntentionsinaSocialWorld,thatwasheldatUniversityCollege,UniversityofToronto,inApril, 1997.Theconferencewasdesignedtoassessthe"stateoftheart"ofresearchonthedevelopmentofintentionvisvissocialunderstandingandselfcontrol,butit alsoservedtocommemoratetheuniversity'slonghistoryasacenterforinquiryintothistopic.In1891,J.MarkBaldwinestablishedthefirstfullyequipped psychologylaboratoryatUniversityCollege(apparentlythefirstintheBritishCommonwealth)andbeganaseminalseriesofstudies(e.g.,Baldwin,1891,1892a, 1892b,1894)ontheemergenceofintentionalimitationininfancyanditsrelationtothedevelopingsociusthechild'ssenseofselfandother.Thesestudies culminatedinhislandmarkbooks,MentalDevelopmentintheChildandtheRace(1895)andSocialandEthicalInterpretationsinMentalDevelopment (1897),theinfluenceofwhichhasbeenpervasivebut,untilrecently,largelyfilteredthroughthewritingsofJeanPiaget. ArenewedinterestintheissuesaddresseddirectlybyBaldwinprobablyderivesinpartfromseveralsourcesincluding:agrowingappreciationofthesociocultural workofVygotskyandLuriarecentworkindevelopmentalneuropsychologyonthetopicofprefrontalcorticalfunctionandwidespreadfascinationwiththeproblem ofconsciousness.However,oneobviousantecedentofthisinterestisresearchonchildren'sbeliefsaboutthemindtheir"theoryofmind."Itwillbenotedthatmany ofthecontributorstothecurrentvolumewereparticipantsinthe1986DevelopingTheoriesofMindConferenceattheUniversityofToronto.Thatconference, organizedbyJanetAstington,LyndForguson,AlisonGopnik,andDavidOlson,helpedtoestablishtheoryofmindasamajorfocusonresearch.Asaresultofthat research,wehavelearnedagreatdealaboutchildren'segocentrismandtheirideasaboutthoughtandmisleadingappearances.Now,however,manytheoryofmind researchersarereturningtoquestionsposedmorethanacenturyagobyBaldwin:questionsaboutthecontrolofactionandhowthiscontrolisrelatedtochildren's developingselfconsciousnessandtheirincreasinglysophisticatedappreciationofotherpeople'sperspectives.Aswillbeclearfromthe

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followingchapters,intentionisattheintersectionofcurrentresearchonimitation,earlyunderstandingofmentalstates,goaldirectedbehaviorinnonhumananimals, executivefunction,languageacquisition,andnarrativeunderstanding,tonamejustafewoftherelevantfoci.Bybringingtheselinesofresearchtogetherinasingle volume,wehopetoshedlightonseveralquestions:Whatarethepsychologicalprocessesunderlyingintentionalaction?Towhatextentdoestheuseofintentions(i.e., actionorientedplans)byindividualsdependuponsocialization?Isitnecessarytoknowaboutintentions(inselfandothers)inordertoactintentionally?Doindividuals attributeintentionalitytoothersbyanalogytotheirownexperienceofactingintentionally?Whatistherelationbetweenindividualandshared(ormutual)intentions? Nodoubt,theseareextremelydifficultquestionstoanswer,buttheywouldseemtobedifficultindirectproportiontotheirimportanceforanadequateunderstanding ofmind. Thetalksattheconferencewereorganizedintosessionscorrespondingtothesectionsinthisvolume.However,severalmotifssoonbecameapparent,including:(1) thepossibilityofacausalrelationbetweenthedevelopmentofintentionalactionininfancyandthesubsequentunderstandingofintentionalstatesinothers(2)the potentialimportanceofparentalattributionsofintentionalitytothedevelopmentofintentionalactionininfancyandearlychildhood(3)theclose(andpossibly complex)relationbetweenexecutivefunctionandtheoryofmindand(4)theinstrumentalrolethatlanguageappearstoplayinthedevelopmentofsocial understandingandselfcontrol.Thesemotifsaremaintainedinthechapters,whichwerecontributedbynearlyallofthe18participantsintheconference(regrettably, JamesRusselldeclinedduetopriorcommitments). TheconferencewaspresentedbytheCognitiveScienceProgramatUniversityCollege(UniversityofToronto),undertheauspicesofthePrincipalofUniversity College,LyndForguson.PrincipalForgusonconvenedtheconferenceplanningcommittee,whichincludedKeithOatley,inadditiontotheeditorsofthisvolume.We wouldliketothankLyndandKeithfortheirhardworkandperspicacity,andColeenMcColeman,ofthePrincipal'sOffice,UniversityCollege,forhersecretarial supporttotheconferenceorganizers. Ofcourse,theconferencecouldnothavebeenheldwithoutgenerousfinancialsupportfromseveralsourcesincludingtheConnaughtFundUniversityCollegethe DepartmentofPsychologytheOfficeoftheVicePresidentandProvost,UniversityofTorontoFieldServicesandResearch,theOntarioInstituteforStudiesin Education/UniversityofToronto(OISE/UT)andtheLaidlawResearchCentre,InstituteofChildStudy,OISE/UT.Weareverygratefulforthatsupport.Wearealso gratefulfortheassistanceofthosestudentswhograciouslyvolunteeredtheirtime:PaulAndrews,TateAvery,CarlaBaetz,SandraBosacki,DavidCollister,Bruce

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Homer,SophieJacques,DeepthiKamawar,ElizabethLee,StuartMarcovitch,BruceMorton,TerriSloss,TracySolomon,andJessicaSommerville.Finally,weare gratefultoJudiAmsel,ExecutiveEditoratLawrenceErlbaumAssociates,forhertimelyinterestandhelpfuladvice,andherunflaggingeffortstoexpeditethe publicationofthisvolume. PHILIPDAVIDZELAZO JANETWILDEASTINGTON DAVIDR.OLSON

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Chapter1 Introduction: Actions,Intentions,andAttributions

DavidR.Olson JanetWildeAstington PhilipDavidZelazo UniversityofToronto Disciplines,likeweedpatches,growmostprolificallyattheiredges,soperhapsitisnotsurprisingthatcognitivescience,occupyingaspacebetweenthebiological sciencesandthesocialsciences,shouldshowitsgreatestsignsofgrowthatitsborders.Atthefirstborder,wefindseriousconsiderationofthequestion,''Howcana biologicalmechanism,thebrain,giverisetointentionalstates?"Atthesecondborder,weseetheequallyimportantquestion,"Howcanseeminglyprivateintentional statesreflectpublicformsoftalkandaction?"Together,thesequestionscaptureBrentano's(1874/1973)insightthatintentionalityisthemarkofthemental,andthey helptoframedevelopmentalquestionsconcerningtheoriginsofintentionality. DevelopmentofIntentionality InBrentano's(1874/1973)sense,thetermintentionalityreferstothatpropertyofdirectednessataninternalobjectthatdistinguishesnotjustpropositionalattitudes (e.g.,belief),buteventhesimplestmentalstates(e.g.,painBrentano,1874/1973,p.89ff.)fromthosestatesoftheworldthataremerelyphysical(seeZelazo,1996, fordiscussion).InaseriesofstudiesstartedjustoveracenturyagoattheUniversityofToronto,Baldwin(e.g.,1891,1892a,1892b)laidthefoundationforhis comprehensiveaccountoftheoriginanddevelopmentofintentionality(Baldwin,1897).Inthis

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work,Baldwinaddressedboththebiologicalandthesocialaspectsofintentionality,andconsideredintentionalitynotonlyinBrentano's(1874/1973)sense,butalsoin theeverydaysenseof"purposeful."TheeverydaysenseofintentionalityiscloselyrelatedtoBrentano'ssense,bothetymologicallyandconceptually(paceMeltzoff, Gopnik,&Repacholi,chap.2,thisvolume),becauseintentionalactionsaredirectedatgoalsinverymuchthesamewaythatmentalstatesaredirectedattheirobjects (i.e.,whattheyareofseeCrane,1998,foradiscussionofcommonmisunderstandingsofBrentano'snotionofintentionality).Moreover,thetwosensesare definitionallydependentbecause,formanyauthors,intentionalactionisgoaldirectedbehaviorthatisaccompaniedby(orcausedby)aparticulartypeofintentional statenamely,anintention(e.g.,Adams,1986).Similarly,Baldwintiedintentionalactiontotheemergenceofdesire,deliberation,andeffort:theconscious representationofagoal,theactiveconsiderationofalternativemeansandends,andthefeelingaccompanyingtheselectionandexecutionofaplan.Althoughearly behaviorsaremediatedbyconsciousness,andareoftencomplexandwelladapted,theyarenotdeliberate.ForBaldwin,thematurationofacoordinatingcenterat theendofthefirstyearoflifemakespossibletheconsciousrepresentionofgoalsanddeliberationamongmeans(cf.Olson,1993,on"holdinginmind"Zelazo,chap. 6,thisvolume),andhence,intentionalaction. Baldwin(1897)clearlyrecognizedthatthedevelopmentofintentionalactionthedeliberateuseofgoalsandmeansisinseparablefromthedevelopmentofthe infant'sunderstandingofintentionality(initsbroadersense)inothers.AccordingtoBaldwin,egoandalterareidealendsofacontinuumthathedefinedasthesocius (whichisasynthesisofSelfandOther).Ego(one'ssenseofSelf)andalter(one'ssenseoftheOther)developtogetherthroughacircularprocess.First,oneobserves projectivebehavior,thatis,behaviorseenonlyintermsofitsoutwardaspects.Then,byimitatingthisprojectivebehavior,onecomestocomprehendthesubjective sideofit,forexample,theaffectthataccompaniesit.Finally,oneejectsthissubjectivitybackintotheproject.Thus,afathermayprickhimselfwithapin,andhischild willimitatethebehavior,cometocomprehendthepainfulconsequence,andthenbelievethatthefatherfeltit,too.Thirdandfirstpersonperspectivesonbehaviorare therebysynthesized.Throughthedialectic,thechildexpandsthescopeofhisorheridentifications.Baldwin's(1897)slogan,"ItisnotI,butIamtobecomeit"(p.36) anticipatedFreud's(1933/1940)famousdictum,"WhereItwas,thereIshallbe(WoEswarsollIchwerden)"(p.86).Byunderstandingoneselfinrelationtothe Otheroneacquiresmeansforactingintentionallyandcomestoconceptualizeoneselfasseparatefromamindindependentworlduponwhichonecanact.

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TheessentialroleoftheOtherinthedevelopmentofintentionalityandintentionalactionhasbeenacentralconcernofsocialtheoristsaswellaspsychologists.Radical socialtheoristssuchasMarxandDurkheim(Lukes,1973)attemptedtoexplainhumanbehaviorbyappealtosocial,notpsychological,causes.Therealfact,forsuch theorists,is"thefactofthedependenceofthemental(andnotonlymental)activityoftheindividualonthesystemofcultureestablishedbeforehimandcompletely independentlyofhim,asysteminwhichthe[mentallife]ofeveryindividualbeginsandrunsitscourse"(Ilyenkov,1977,p.78).Vygotsky's(1978seealsoLuria, 1961)contributiontothisapproachwastoformulatetherelationbetweenmindandsocietyinadevelopmentalframework.AccordingtoVygotsky,children's psychologicalstructurescometoresemblethoseofadultsintheirculturethroughtheinternalizationofsocialpractices,andbehaviorsfirstengagedininterpersonally cometobemanagedintrapersonally.Thisisnolesstrueforsimpleprocedures,suchashowtoplayagameofmarbles,thanforunderstandingtheintentionalstatesof others.Beliefs,desires,andintentionsarethusseentobothcauseandreflectparticipationinasocialworld(seeBruner,chap.17,thisvolumeFeldman,chap.16,this volume). Althoughthecontributionsofsociallifetothedevelopmentofintentionalitylikelyareessential,itisclearthatchildrenmustfirstpossessasetofinternal,biologically given,cognitiveresourcesinordertobenefitfromsocialandculturalpractices.Theseresources,whichcontinuetodevelopthroughoutchildhood,aremuchmore scarceamongourprimatecousins,andpossiblyabsentaltogetherinotheranimals(fordiscussion,seeHauser,chap.10,thisvolumePovinelli,chap.11,thisvolume Tomasello,chap.4,thisvolume).Whatchildrenbringbywayofresources,andhowthisinteractswithwhateveritisthatsocialinteractionsprovide,remainsacentral, andstillunresolved,issue.Indeed,theinteractionbetweenthesebiologicallygivenresourcesandthesocialenvironmentisprominentinrecentwork,includingthatof Frye(1981,1991),Moore(1996alsoseeMoore,chap.3,thisvolume),Meltzoff,Gopnik,andRepacholi(chap.2,thisvolume),andTomasello(chap.4,this volume),andformsthecentralthemeofthecurrentvolume:Howarewe,asscientists,tounderstandtheinterplaybetweenbiologicalandsocialinfluencesonthe developmentoftheabilitytohaveintentionalstatesandattributethemtoothers?Morespecifically,however,theworkreportedinthisvolumecanbeseenas addressingacommonsetofthreequestionsaboutintentionalityingeneralandintentionalactioninparticular.First,onwhatgroundscanwecallbehaviorintentional (i.e.,accompaniedbytheintentionalstateofintention)?Second,whatistherelationbetweenhavingintentionsandhavingaconceptofintention?Third,whatisthe functionoruseoftheabilityto

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attributeintentionalstates(includingintention)tooneselfandothers?Thesequestionswillnowbeconsidered,inturn. WhenDoesBehaviorBecomeIntentional? Itiscommonlysuggestedthatchildrenbelowacertainage,theageofaccountability,arenotintentional,moralagents.Similarly,otheranimals,includingprimates,are notmoralcreaturesinthattheiractionscannotbejudgedbyappealtosocialnorms.Praiseandblame,asopposedtorewardsandpunishments,arerelevantonlyto creatureswho,aswesay,knowthedifferencebetweengoodandevil.Butwhatarethecriteriafordecidingthatbehaviorisintentional,andfurther,fordeciding whetheritmeritsrewardandpunishment,orpraiseandblame?Searle(1983)distinguishedbetweenintentioninactionandpriorintention,thelatterbeinginvolvedin deliberateorpremeditatedactions(seeAstington,chap.15,thisvolume).Priorintentionallowsforplanninganactionandalsofordeliberatelychoosingnottoact.It seemssafetosuggestthatactionsbasedonapriorintentioncanclearlybeconstruedasmoral.However,whataboutintentioninaction?Certainunpremeditated actions(e.g.,spontaneousgesturesofcomfort,orsuddenaggressiveacts)areoftenpraisedorblamed,althoughthisisprobablybecauseweassumethattheywere motivatedbyamoregeneralpriorintention,todogoodortoharm,forexample.Inconsideringintentionsinaction,thereisanimportantdistinctiontobemade betweenbehaviorthatisdirectly"suggested"(Baldwin,1891)byasituationgraspingforexampleandwhatisproperlyreferredtoas"action"(andassociatedwith intentionsinaction).Actions,inthissense,aredistinguishedbythedissociationbetweenmeansandends,asBaldwin(1892b)andPiaget(1936/1952)noted.They implyanendheldinviewwhilemeansareemployedrepeatedlyoralternativemeansaresought(cf.Bruner,1973).Suchactionmayormaynotbepresentinlower animals(seeHauser,chap.10,thisvolumePovinelli,chap.11,thisvolumeTomasello,chap.4,thisvolume)butitisperhapsfirstseeninchildrenattheendofthe firstyearintheirpersistentattemptsatimitation(Baldwin,1892b).Ifthisisthecase,itraisesthepossibilitythatevenintentioninactionisdirectlyrelatedtothe recognitionofthementalstatesofothers.AsMeltzoffshows,18montholdsimitatewhatothersareintendingtodo,notwhattheyactuallydothatis,theyappearto recognizetheother'sintention(seeMeltzoff,Gopnik,&Repacholi,chap.2,thisvolume).Itmightbethoughtthatthiscreatesaproblem,inthattherecognitionof beliefinothers,asindicatedbyanunderstandingoffalsebelief(Wimmer&Perner,1983),doesnotappearuntilabout4yearsofage.However,itmaybethat nonepistemicstates,suchasanintention,aremoreeasilyrecognized,oritmaybethattheearlyrecognitionofintentiondoesnot

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involvemetarepresentation(Astington,1991).Certainly,otherthingsweassociatewiththemetarepresentationofintention,suchasselfcontroloractingintermsofa socialormoralnorm,continuetodevelopwellpastinfancy.Thereareanumberofimportantdevelopmentalachievementshere,andthechaptersinthefirstsectionof thisvolumeattempttosortthemout(e.g.,Lewis&Ramsay,chap.5,thisvolumeMeltzoff,Gopnik,&Repacholi,chap.2,thisvolumeMoore,chap.3,thisvolume Zelazo,chap.6,thisvolume). IntentionsandConceptsofIntention Historically,intentionplayedacentralroleinpsychologicalexplanation.Conationorvolitionwasoneofthetrinityofmentalfacultiescognition,conation,and affectthatcamedowntousfromclassicaltimes.IntentionwaschangedfromafacultyintoafunctioninmodernpsychologybyWilliamJames,JohnDewey,andJ. MarkBaldwin,amongothers.Baldwin(1897),forexample,arguedthatasenseofpersonalagencyaroseinthecontextofsolvingproblems(e.g.,imitatingothers), andlayattherootofsocialconsciousness.However,onceonecandoasonelikes,onecanalsobeheldaccountableforwhatonedoesandthisaccountability appearstoplayaroleinthefurtherdevelopmentandelaborationoftheconceptofintention.Thus,thenatureanddevelopmentoftheconceptofintentionisacentral topicinmoraldevelopmentandthedevelopmentofsocialcognition,andhasbeenforsometime.Nonetheless,itseemslikelythatthetopicofintentionhasinherited someofitsrecentpopularityfromthenowwidespreadinterestinchildren'stheoryofmind.Likethepresentvolume,DevelopingTheoriesofMind(Astington, Olson,&Harris,1988)grewoutofaconferenceheldattheUniversityofTorontoandhelpedtocrystallizewhathasbecomeoneoftheliveliestareasof developmentalresearch.Intheintroductiontothatvolumeitwasarguedthatinacquiringatheoryofmind,"childrenbegintorecognizementalstatesinthemselvesand otherstheycometorecognizebeliefsasbeliefs,desiresasdesires,andintentionsasintentions"(Olson,Astington,&Harris,1988,p.1).Althoughmuchhassince beenlearnedaboutchildren'sunderstandingofintentionalstatessuchasbeliefand,toalesserextent,desire,westillknowrelativelylittleaboutchildren's understandingofintention.Weknowarguablyevenlessaboutthedevelopmentofintentionitself,andtherelationbetweenintentionandconceptsofintention. Intherushofnewworkinvestigatingchildren'stheoryofmind,itquicklybecameclearthatimportantdevelopmentsoccuraround4yearsofageinchildren's reasoningaboutbeliefs.Childrenyoungerthanage4tendedtoattributetoothersthebeliefstheythemselvesheld,namely,thosecongruentwiththecurrentsituation. Thoseolderthanage4ascribed

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beliefsonthebasisofthecausesofthosebeliefs,namely,whattheotherhadseen,heard,anddone.Consequently,thesechildrencouldascribetoothersbeliefsthat theythemselvesknewtobefalse(hencethesignificanceofthe"falsebelieftask"totheunderstandingofchildren'stheoryofmindWimmer&Perner,1983).To some,thisdevelopmentseemedlittlemorethanyetanotherexampleofPiagetianegocentrism,ratherthanevidenceoffailuretounderstandbeliefs,becausechildren didascribetoothersthebeliefstheyheldthemselves.However,thepicturewassooncomplicatedbythefindingthatchildrenwerenobetteratunderstandingtheir ownbeliefsthanthoseofothers(Gopnik&Astington,1988Wimmer&Hartl,1991).Incontrast,childrenmuchyoungerthan4yearsofagecanunderstandthat othersmayhavedesiresdifferentfromtheirown,andcanrememberearlierdesires,differentfromtheirpresentones(Gopnik&Slaughter,1991Repacholi& Gopnik,1997butseeMooreetal.,1995).Suchyoungchildrenalsounderstandthatdesiresmotivateactionsandtheyrefertodesirestatesintheirspeechayearor morebeforetheyrefertobeliefs(Wellman,1991). Whereastheconceptsofbeliefanddesirequicklyfoundtheirplaceindevelopmentalandevolutionarytheoriesofmind,theconceptofintentionhasremained enigmatic.Intentionsaremorelikedesiresthanbeliefs.Thatis,theyareneithertruenorfalsebutarefulfilled(ornot)byoutcomesintheworldandindeed,serveto motivateactiontobringaboutthoseoutcomes.Certainly,muchofthetimeourdesiresandourintentionscoincide.Suchconsiderationsmayleadtotheassumption thatchildrenunderstandintentionwhentheyunderstanddesire.Thereare,however,importantdifferencesbetweendesireandintention(Astington&Gopnik,1991). Intentionsareselfreferential,thatis,theyarenotfulfilledbyoutcomesintheworldunlesstheintentionitselfcausestheactionthatbringsaboutthatoutcome(Searle, 1983).Intentionsarealsomorecloselytiedtobeliefs(Moses,1993)onecandesire,butnotintend,whatonebelievestobeimpossible.Frequently,theoryofmindis usedtoexplainbehaviorasaproductofbeliefanddesire,leavingunexploredjusthowbeliefsanddesiresturnintointentionsorhowpriorintentionsandplansare formedorexecuted.Perhapswemaygetaclearerpictureofhowintentionsarerelatedtootherintentionalstatesbythinkingofintentionalstatesasgeneratedbya mentalcalculus. TheMentalCalculus Considertheproblemofdeterminingwhenbehaviorisdirectlycausedbyexternalorinternalstimuliandwhenbehavioris,rather,aproductofmentalrepresentation, includingbelief,desire,andintention.Canananimal'sbehavior,saythatofadogchasingacat,becorrectlycharacterizedasintentional?Thedogcertainlyhasagoal, usesavarietyofmeans,andevenmaintainsthememoryofthegoalovertime.

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However,intentionalstates,includingbeliefs,desires,andintentions,arearguablyconstitutedbyacalculusofagents,modes,andcontents: AGENT John Mary Sam MODE believes intends wants CONTENT thedogwantstogoout toletthedogout thedogtobeout

Searle(1983)remarked,"Onlysomeoneinthegripofaphilosophicaltheorywoulddenythatsmallbabiescanliterallybesaidtowantmilkandthatdogswanttobe letoutorbelievethattheirmasterisatthedoor"(p.5).However,ifacreaturecanmanifestonlyoneofthemodes,say,intending,thentherearelesssecuregrounds forsayingthatthebehaviorisintentional.Hence,contraSearle,thedogwho,whenshownabone,canonlytrytogetthebone,ratherthanthinkthatitisabone,may notbewelldescribedasintentional.Instead,thebehaviorwouldseemtobeunderthecontrolofaschemaforbonegetting(suggestedbythebone).Itmaybethat onlylinguisticcreatureswithaccesstothesortofmentalcalculusjustmentioned,creatureswhocanbothtreatexpressionsasassertingsomethingastrue("Thisisa bone")andinitiateanactioncanbecorrectlydescribedasintentionalinthattheyhaveasetofoptionalmodesforrelatingthemselvestotheworld.Agreeingoncriteria (includinglinguisticcriteria)forrecognizingintentionremainsacriticaltask,andisexploredinmoredetailinseveralofthechaptersinthisvolume(Astington,chap.15, thisvolumeFeldman,chap.16,thisvolume). StructuralandFunctionalExplanationsofIntentionalUnderstanding Althoughtheoriginsofanunderstandingofintentionalstatesingeneralandintentionsinparticularmaybetracedtostructuralchangesintheorganizationofthemind andultimatelythebrain,theoriginsofthisunderstandingcanalsobeexaminedintermsofthefunctionsthattheseunderstandingssustain.Piaget's(1936/1952)account ofthedevelopmentoftherepresentationalfunctionisaclassicexampleofastructuralchange.Amorerecentstructuralchangeexplanationofthedevelopmentofan understandingofintentionalitywasarticulatedbyLeslie(1987),whoproposedaspecific"decoupling"devicethatservestoseverthelinkbetweensituationand content,thiscontenttherebybeingeligibleformetarepresentation.Othersinthistraditionhavepointedtootherplausiblemechanisms:changesintheexecutive functionsofprefrontalcortexthatallowperspectivetaking(fordiscussionseeFrye,chap.7,thisvolumePerner,chap.8,thisvolumeZelazo&Frye,1998)changes inmemory(e.g.,Gordon&Olson,

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1998Olson,1993)thatallowchildrento"holdinmind"arepresentationacrosschangingsituationsorthedevelopmentofhigherorderlevelsofconsciousnessthat supportselfreflectionandpsychologicaldistancing(Lewis&Ramsay,chap.5,thisvolumeZelazo,chap.6,thisvolume). But,itmaybeargued,structuralchangeoccurstosustainparticularfunctionsanditisthefunctionofparticipatinginasocialworldthatisresponsibleforthegrowthof anunderstandingofintentionalstates.Thefunctionsservedbysuchanunderstandingarebothsocialandcognitive.Socially,theattributionofintentionalstatesallows forincreasinglysophisticatedsocialactionsandinteractions.Notonlydoesitallowthechildtorecognizetheintentionbehindtheactionofanother,andtherefore,to cooperateintheachievementoftheaction,butitalsoallowsforthetransmissionofculturethroughlearningandimitation,apointthatisexploredinthechaptersinthe thirdsectionofthisvolume(Dunn,chap.12,thisvolumeJenkins&Greenbaum,chap.14,thisvolumeReznick,chap.13,thisvolume). Thecognitivefunctionsservedbythedevelopmentofintentionalityaremetacognitiveones,allowinganewkindofconsciousnessofmentallife,notonlyfor introspectionofone'sownthoughtsbutalsoofthesourcesofone'sownbeliefs.Thisisthereflectivekindofconsciousnessthatusuallywarrantsthelabelthinking. Suchmetacognitivecompetenceiscriticaltotheformationofplanned,premeditatedactions,thekindofdeliberateactionsweassociatewiththe"ageof accountability."Indeed,theplanfulnessofone'sownactionsisidenticalinformtotheparticipationincooperativeactionswithothers,acontingencythatinvitesthe inferencethatthisaspectofcognitivedevelopmentismoreappropriatelythoughtofassocialdevelopment(seeJenkins&Greenbaum,chap.14,thisvolume). Arecentfocusonindividualdifferencesinthedevelopmentofintentionalunderstandinghasshownthisunderstandingtoberelatedtocertaincharacteristicsof children'ssocialinteractions(Dunn,chap.12,thisvolume).Forexample,demographicapproachesfindrelationsbetweenachild'sunderstandingoffalsebeliefandthe sizeofthechild'sfamily,particularlythenumberofsiblingsthechildhas(Jenkins&Astington,1996Lewis,Freeman,Kyriakidou,MaridakiKassotaki,&Berridge, 1996Perner,Ruffman,&Leekam,1994).Arelationalsoexistsbetweenchildren'stheoryofmindandfamilybackgroundmeasures,suchasparentaloccupationand education(Cutting&Dunn,inpress),orparentingstyle(Vinden,1997).Suchfindingsleadtotheargumentthatinvolvementinsocialrelationsistheprecisecausal mechanismthroughwhichsocialunderstandingandselfcontrolareacquired.Engagementinasocialworld,especiallytheworldofcomplexsocialinteractions mediatedbylanguage,isseentobetheimmediatecauseofthechild'sacquisitionofanunderstandingofhisorherownmentalstates,aswellasthoseofotherpeople. Dunn(chap.12,this

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volume)cautionsagainstmakingcausalinferencesfromsuchcorrelationaldatastrongevidence,bestprovidedbylongitudinalandtrainingstudies,isrequiredto supportthecausalargument.Wedo,however,knowthatparticularpatternsofsocialinteractionandlanguageuseinthehome,suchassiblingcooperation,social pretendplay,andfamilytalkaboutfeelingstates,areassociatedwithlaterdifferencesinfalsebeliefandemotionunderstanding(Dunn,Brown,Slomkowski,Tesla,& Youngblade,1991Youngblade&Dunn,1995).Inaddition,participationintrainingproceduresinvolving,forexample,conversationsaboutsurprise,hasbeenshown topromotefalsebeliefunderstanding(Appleton&Reddy,1996). Consequently,socialfactorsdoappeartohaveanimpactonthechild'sacquisitionofatheoryofmind.Suchsocialperspectivesaresometimesseentobeinconflict withmorecognitiveonesinsofarastheseperspectivesseemtoseelittleneedforspecificcognitivemechanismstoacquireadultformsofcompetence(Raver& Leadbeater,1993).Sometimes,theseperspectivesseemtoassumethattheadultformsofcompetencearetheinevitableproductofpracticeinterpretingactionsand speechinasocialworld.Nonetheless,mostresearchersagreethatdevelopingcognitivemechanismsareinvolved,anditremainstobedeterminedhowbestto characterizethesemechanisms.Anycompleteaccountwouldhavetoacknowledgeboththestructuralandfunctionalpropertiesofintentionality:Therearebrain mechanismsthatmaketheformationofintentionalstatespossibletherearefunctionalrolesthatthesestatesplaythesefunctionalrolesare,atleastinpart,and perhapsoriginally,socialonesandfinally,thesestatescanthemselvesbecomesubjecttoreflection. OrganizationoftheVolume Thechaptersinthisvolume,toorichtobesummarizedbriefly,areorganizedintofoursections,althoughanumberofthemescutacrossthefoursections.Thefirstand longestsection,focusingonthedevelopmentofintentionandintentionalunderstandingininfancyandearlychildhood,iscentraltoalloftheissueswehaveraisedinthe introductorychapter.Forexample,Meltzoff,Gopnik,andRepacholi(chap.2)arguethattheoriginsofsocialunderstandingandselfcontrolcanbeseeninneonatal imitation,andtheytracethedevelopmentofsocialunderstandingfromthisearly,intrinsicallyinterpersonalcontextthroughwhattheyrefertoasthe"darkages"ofthe toddlerperiod.Tomasello(chap.4)arguesthatattheendofthefirstyear,infantscaninferothers'intentionsbecausetheyrecognizetheintentionalityoftheirown actions,andbecausetheyrecognizeothersascreatureslikethemselves.Zelazo(chap.6)arguesthatincreasinglyhigherlevelsofconsciousness,mediatedby language,allowmorecomplexknowledgestructurestogovernchildren'sintentionalactions.

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LewisandRamsay(chap.5)alsodiscussthedevelopmentofincreasinglyhigherorderlevelsofintentionthatyieldaselfreflectiveunderstanding.Frye(chap.7)and Perner,Stummer,andLang(chap.8)considerhowbesttocharacterizethewellestablishedrelationbetweenactioncontrolandtheoryofmindinpreschoolers.Some authors'focusisnotonthedevelopmentofintentionperseinstead,theyareconcernedwithintentionalityinthebroadersense.Forexample,Moore(chap.3) discussesinfants'understandingofattentionwithinaninteractivecontext,arguingthatinfantsunderstandintentionalrelationsasapropertyoftheinteraction,notasa propertyofeithertheselfortheotherexclusively.OlsonandKamawar(chap.9)discussintentionalattributions,focusingonbeliefattribution,andproposeastrict criterionforthepossessionofintentionalstates,thatis,theabilitytoascribesuchstatestoselfandother. Thechaptersinthesecondsectionfocusoncomparativeperspectivesonintentionalitytheytooareconcernedwithissuesofunderstandingandattributingintentional states,broadlyconsidered.Hauser's(chap.10)topicistheextenttowhichhumansandotherprimatesdifferwithrespecttothecausalrelationbetweenrepresentation andexpectation.Hediscussesprimates'expectationsconcerningcommunicativesignals,selfpropelledmotions,andthegreatestchallenge,mentalstates,suggesting thatprimatesknowsomethingaboutcommunicationandanimacy,ifnotbelief.Povinelli(chap.11)summarizeshisextensivebodyofresearchonchimpanzees' understandingofseeing,leadingtotheperhapsstartlingconclusionthatalthoughchimpanzeesfollowanother'sgaze,thereisnoevidenceforanintentional understandingofseeing,eventhoughsimilargazefollowingbehaviorsinchildrenarecorrectlysointerpreted. Thechaptersinthethirdsectionleadonfromtheretodiscussthepeculiarlyhumansocioculturalcontextofintentionality.Dunn(chap.12)makesacompelling argumentforthesignificanceoftheemotionalcontextinchildren'sacquisitionofintentionalunderstanding.Shearguesthatitisemotionallychargedsocialexperiences thatplayavitalroleinthedevelopmentofsocialunderstanding,rightfromthebeginning.Reznick(chap.13)showshowreadilymothersattributeintentionalitytoinfant behaviorsdisplayedonvideotapeordescribedinaquestionnaire,andDunn(chap.12)makesthepointthatintherealworldsuchinteractionsarerarelyemotionally neutral.JenkinsandGreenbaum(chap.14)arealsoconcernedwiththelinkbetweencognitionandemotionintheirinvestigationofchildren'sabilitytoengagein cooperativeendeavors.Theyfindthatchildrenwhoseemotionallivesaredominatedbyfeelingsofangerandaggressionarelessabletonegotiatecooperativegoals, andlessskilledinusingintentionaltermstodiscussjointplans. Thefourthandfinalsection,onintentionalityandlanguage,picksupanumberofissuesfromtheearlierchapters:thethemesthatcutacrossthe

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foursections.Astington's(chap.15)discussionofthemediatingroleoflanguageinthedevelopmentofintentionalunderstandingrelatestoJenkinsandGreenbaum's (chap.14)findings,andreflectsbacktoZelazo's(chap.6)focusontheroleoflanguageinthegenesisofaction.Theacquisitionoflanguagedependsontheinfant's understandingofcommunicativeintentions,asTomasello(chap.4)argues,andthedevelopmentoflanguageallowsfortheascriptionofintentionality,asOlsonand Kamawar(chap.9)argue.Feldman(chap.16)emphasizesthatintentionsareunderstoodwithinaninterpretivecommunity,whichlinksbacktothechaptersonthe socioculturalcontextofintentionalunderstanding,andalsotoMoore's(chap.3)argumentthatintentionalrelationsarefirstconstruedaspartoftheinteractivecontext, notasindependentlybelongingtoselforother.Bruner's(chap.14)focusoninfantrecognitionandparentalattributionofepistemicandintrumentalintentionsrelatesto Astington's(chap.15)andFeldman's(chap.16)concerns,andTomasello's(chap.4)andReznick's(chap.13)chaptersalsofindechoeshere. Inconclusion,cognitivescience,asheirtothedisciplinethatWilliamJames(1890/1950,p.1)definedas''theScienceofMentalLife"centersonintentionand intentionalunderstandingtheabilitytomakejudgmentsoftruthandgoodness,andtheabilitytoactintentionallyintermsofthosejudgments.Theseabilitiesmaywell turnouttobefoundonlyinpersonswithsophisticatedcognitiveandlinguisticpowerspowersthatarenotonlyrepresentational,butalsometarepresentationaland, moretothepoint,theproductofparticipationinasocialworld.Ifso,thenafullunderstandingoftheseabilitieswillrequireunderstandingofthecognitiveandcultural determinantsofintentionalityanditsdevelopment.Webelievethatthecontributorstothisvolumetakeimportantstepstowardthisgoal. References Adams,F.(1986).Intentionandintentionalaction:Thesimpleview.MindandLanguage,1,281301. Appleton,M.,&Reddy,V.(1996).Teaching3yearoldstopassfalsebelieftests:Aconversationalapproach.SocialDevelopment,5,275291. Astington,J.W.(1991).Intentioninthechild'stheoryofmind.InD.Frye&C.Moore(Eds.),Children'stheoriesofmind(pp.157172).Hillsdale,NJ:Lawrence ErlbaumAssociates. Astington,J.W.,&Gopnik,A.(1991).Developingunderstandingofdesireandintention.InA.Whiten(Ed.),Naturaltheoriesofmind:Evolution,development andsimulationofeverydaymindreading(pp.3950).Oxford:BasilBlackwell. Astington,J.W.,Olson,D.R.,&Harris,P.L.(Eds.).(1988).DevelopingtheoriesofmindNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Baldwin,J.M.(1891).Suggestionininfancy.Science,18,113117. Baldwin,J.M.(1892a).Infants'movements.Science,19,1516. Baldwin,J.M.(1892b).Originofvolitioninchildhood.Science,20,286288.

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Baldwin,J.M.(1897).Socialandethicalinterpretationsinmentaldevelopment:Astudyinsocialpsychology.NewYork:Macmillan. Brentano,F.(1973).Psychologyfromanempiricalstandpoint.(O.Kraus,Ed.A.C.Ranculrello,D.B.Terell,&L.L.McAlister,Trans.).London:Routledge& KeganPaul.(Originalworkpublishedin1874) Bruner,J.(1973).Organizationofearlyskilledaction.ChildDevelopment,44,111. Crane,T.(1998).Intentionalityasthemarkofthemental.InA.O'Hear(Ed.),Currentissuesinphilosophyofmind(pp.229251).Cambridge,England: CambridgeUniversityPress. Cutting,A.,&Dunn,J.(inpress).Theoryofmind,emotionunderstanding,languageandfamilybackground:Individualdifferencesandinterrelations.Child Development. Dunn,J.,Brown,J.,Slomkowski,C.,Tesla,C.,&Youngblade,L.(1991).Youngchildren'sunderstandingofotherpeople'sfeelingsandbeliefs:Individual differencesandtheirantecedents.ChildDevelopment,62,13521366. Freud,S.(1940).NeuefolgederVorlesungenzurEinfhrungindiePsychoanalyse[Newintroductorylecturesonpsychoanalysis].InA.Freud,E.Bibring,&E. Kris(Eds.),GesammelteWerke:XV(Wholevolume).London:ImagoPublishingCo.(Originalworkpublished1933) Frye,D.(1981).Developmentalchangesinstrategiesofsocialinteraction.InM.E.Lamb&L.R.Sherrod(Eds.),Infantsocialcognition(pp.315331).Hillsdale, NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Frye,D.(1991).Theoriginofintentionininfancy.InD.Frye&C.Moore(Eds.),Children'stheoriesofmind(pp.1538).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaum Associates. Gopnik,A.,&Astington,J.W.(1988).Children'sunderstandingofrepresentationalchangeanditsrelationtotheunderstandingoffalsebeliefandtheappearance realitydistinction.ChildDevelopment,59,2637. Gopnik,A.,&Slaughter,V.(1991).Youngchildren'sunderstandingofchangesintheirmentalstates.ChildDevelopment,62,98110. Gordon,A.C.L.,&Olson,D.(1998).Therelationbetweenacquisitionofatheoryofmindandinformationprocessingcapacity.JournalofExperimentalChild Psychology,68,7083. Ilyenkov,E.V.(1977).Theconceptoftheideal.InR.Daglish(Ed.andTrans.),PhilosophyintheUSSR(pp.7199).Moscow:ProgressPublishers. James,W.(1950).Theprinciplesofpsychology.NewYork:Dover.(Originalworkpublishedin1890). Jenkins,J.M.,&Astington,J.W.(1996).Cognitivefactorsandfamilystructureassociatedwiththeoryofminddevelopmentinyoungchildren.Developmental Psychology,32,7078. Leslie,A.M.(1987).Pretenseandrepresentation:Theoriginsof"theoryofmind."PsychologicalReview,94,412426. Lewis,C.,Freeman,N.H.,Kyriakidou,C.,MaridakiKassotaki,K.,&Berridge,D.M.(1996).Socialinfluencesonfalsebeliefaccess:Specificsiblinginfluencesor generalapprenticeship.ChildDevelopment,67,29302947. Lukes,S.(1973).EmileDurkheim:Hislifeandwork.Markham,ON:PenguinBooks. Luria,A.R.(1961).Theroleofspeechintheregulationofnormalandabnormalbehaviour(J.Tizard,Ed.).NewYork:PergamonPress. Moore,C.,Jarrold,C.,Russell,J.,Lumb,A.,Sapp,F.,&MaCallum,F.(1995).Conflictingdesireandthechild'stheoryofmind.CognitiveDevelopment,10, 467482. Moses,L.J.(1993).Youngchildren'sunderstandingofbeliefconstraintsonintention.CognitiveDevelopment,8,125. Olson,D.R.(1993).Thedevelopmentofrepresentations:Theoriginsofmentallife.CanadianPsychology,34,114. Olson,D.R.,Astington,J.W.,&Harris,P.L.(1988).Introduction.InJ.W.Astington,P.L.Harris,&D.R.Olson(Eds.),Developingtheoriesofmind(pp.1 15).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

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Perner,J.,Ruffman,T.,&Leekam,S.R.(1994).Theoryofmindiscontagious:Youcatchitfromyoursibs.ChildDevelopment,65,12281238. Piaget,J.(1952).Theoriginsofintelligenceinchildren(M.Cook,Trans.).NewYork:Norton.(Originalworkpublishedin1936). Raver,C.C.,&Leadbeater,B.J.(1993).Theproblemoftheotherinresearchontheoryofmindandsocialdevelopment.HumanDevelopment,36,350362. Repacholi,B.M.,&Gopnik,A.(1997).Earlyreasoningaboutdesires:Evidencefrom14and18montholds.DevelopmentalPsychology,33,1221. Searle,J.(1983).Intentionality.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Vinden,P.(1997,April).Theeffectsofparentingstyleontheoryofmindunderstanding.PaperpresentedattheBiennialMeetingoftheSocietyforResearchin ChildDevelopment,Washington,DC. Vygotsky,L.S.(1978).Mindinsociety:Thedevelopmentofhigherpsychologicalprocesses.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Wellman,H.M.(1991).Fromdesirestobeliefs:Acquisitionofatheoryofmind.InA.Whiten(Ed.),Naturaltheoriesofmind:Evolution,developmentand simulationofeverydaymindreading(pp.1938).Oxford:BasilBlackwell. Wimmer,H.,&Hard,M.(1991).AgainsttheCartesianviewonmind:Youngchildren'sdifficultywithownfalsebelief.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology, 9,125138. Wimmer,H.,&Perner,J.(1983).Beliefsaboutbeliefs:Representationandconstrainingfunctionofwrongbeliefsinyoungchildren'sunderstandingofdeception. Cognition,13,103128. Youngblade,L.M.,&Dunn,J.(1995).Individualdifferencesinyoungchildren'spretendplaywithmotherandsibling:Linkstorelationshipsandunderstandingof otherpeople'sfeelingsandbeliefs.ChildDevelopment,66,14721492. Zelazo,P.D.(1996).Towardsacharacterizationofminimalconsciousness.NewIdeasinPsychology,14,6380. Zelazo,P.D.&Frye,D.(1998).II.Cognitivecomplexityandcontrol:thedevelopmentofexecutivefunctioninchildhood.CurrentDirectionsinPsychological Science,7.

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PARTI DEVELOPMENTOFINTENTIONANDINTENTIONALUNDERSTANDINGININFANCYANDEARLYCHILDHOOD

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Chapter2 Toddlers'UnderstandingofIntentions,Desires,andEmotions: ExplorationsoftheDarkAges

AndrewN.Meltzoff UniversityofWashington AlisonGopnik UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley BettyM.Repacholi MacquarieUniversity Oursensoryexperienceofotherpeopletellsusabouttheirmovementsinspacebutdoesnottellusdirectlyabouttheirmentalstates.Althoughafewradical philosophersandpsychologistsmaydenytheexistenceofmentalstates,mostregular"folk"feelsurethattheythemselvesandothershavethem.Itisadaptivetoread anotherperson'smentalstatebecauseitallowsustoexplaintheactionstheyhavetakeninthepastandpredicttheiractionsinthefuture.Thegeneralaimof"theory ofmind"researchistoilluminatethedevelopmentofthiseveryday,folkpsychologicalframeworkforunderstandingpeople(e.g.,Astington&Gopnik,1991b Astington,Harris,&Olson,1988Flavell&Miller,1998Perner,1991Taylor,1996Wellman,1990). Thisresearchhastaughtusthatchildren'sunderstandingofmentallifeisnotallofonepiece.Thereisnosinglemomentatwhichchildrendevelopatheoryofmind. Instead,childrengraduallyconvergeonanadultunderstandingofmind.Thefocusonwhenchildrenunderstand"falsebelief"hasbeenmisleadinginthisregard.Beliefs areonlyoneofmanymentalstatesthatchildrenunderstandanduseintheireverydayinteractionswithpeople.Childrenmayonlydevelopafirmunderstandingoffalse beliefsatabout4yearsold,buttheyhavestartedontheirpathofdevelopingafolkpsychologicalunderstandingofpeoplemuchearlier.Preschoolersunderstanda greatdealaboutperceiving,wanting,andintendingatanagewhentheystillhaveonlyashakyunderstandingoffalsebeliefs(e.g.,Astington&Gopnik,1991aFlavell, Flavell,Green,&Moses,1990Gopnik&Slaughter,1991Gopnik,Slaughter,&Meltzoff,1994Wellman,1990,1993).

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However,justasitisadistortiontothinkthatchildrendon'thaveanunderstandingofminduntiltheypassafalsebeliefexam,itislikewiseadistortiontoholdthat infantshavetheadultconceptionofthemindassoonastheyshowaspecialinterestinpeople.Analternativeisagenuinelydevelopmentalaccountofchildren's understandingofthemind.Theviewwefavoristhatinfantsaregivenajumpstartinunderstandingpeoplebecauseofcertaininnatestructures,buttheygradually cometounderstandthewholerangeofpsychologicalfloraandfaunaincludingpretenses,images,emotions,perceptions,desires,intentions,andbeliefs.Newbornsdo nothaveanythinglikethisfullunderstandingofthemind,buttheydohaveprivilegedwaysofunderstandingotherpeopleandhumanacts. Inearlierwork,wearguedthatinfantimitationmayprovidethefirstgroundworkforlaterunderstandingofthemind(Gopnik&Meltzoff,1994Meltzoff&Gopnik, 1993).Imitationisabehavioralmeasureindicatingthatnewborns,atsomelevelofprocessingnomatterhowprimitive,canmapactionsofotherpeopleontoactions oftheirownbody.Thefindingsofearlyimitationhavenowbeenreplicatedandextendedin25differentstudiesfrom13independentlaboratories,bothinthiscountry andcrossculturally(forahistoryandliteraturereview,seeMeltzoff&Moore,1977,1994,1997). AcomprehensivemodelofearlyimitationwasofferedbyMeltzoffandMoore(1997)anddubbedtheAIM(activeintermodalmapping)model.Thecentralnotionis thatimitation,evenearlyimitation,isamatchingtotargetprocess.Thegoalorbehavioraltargetisspecifiedvisually.Infants'selfproducedmovementsprovide proprioceptivefeedbackthatcanbecomparedtothevisuallyspecifiedtarget.AIMproposesthatwhenbabiesimitate,theyarelinkingthevisualappearanceofother peopletotheirowninternalkinestheticandproprioceptivefeelings,connectingthevisiblebodilyactionsofothersandtheirowninternalstates. Thistypeofinitialstatewouldprovideajumpstartforinfants'understandingofpersonsandcommonsensepsychologybecauseitprovidesthefirstandmost fundamentalbuildingblockofthefolkpsychologicalframework:"Thoseentitiesarelikeme."Thus,whennewbornslookatthemovingadults,theydonotsimplysee "visualcomplexity,""highcontrastareas,"ormerephysicalmotions,butspecialactsthatareliketheactstheycananddoperform.Newbornsarenotalonethey perceivethatotherentityis"likeme."1
1

InusingtheEnglishword"me,"wedonotsuggestthattheinfanthasthefullfledgedadultsenseofself.Indeed,wehavearguedthatsuchasenseofselfisadevelopmental product(Meltzoff&Moore,1995).Ourargumentcouldberephrasedbypurgingthe"me"wordandinsteadsaying,"Thatlookslikethisfeels."Elsewherewehaveattemptedto describetheinitialstateinaprecisetechnicalmanner,usingacomputationalmodelandavoidingtheglossesofeverydayEnglish(Meltzoff&Moore,1997).Interestedreadersare referredtothisworkfordetailedargumentsaboutearlyselfotherrelations.

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Developmentinsocialcognitiondependsontwowaytrafficbetweenselfandother,onwhatmightbecalled"projection"fromone'sowncasetotheotherand "appropriation"fromtheothertotheself.Butthisdependsonapriorassumptionthatselfandotherhaveanythingwhatevertodowithoneanother.Newborn imitationprovidesademonstrationthatatsomeprimitivelevelthislinkhasbeenmadeinthenormalinfant.Withoutthisfundamentalconnectedness,therewouldbeno reasoningbidirectionallyfromone'sowncasetoanother'sbecausethetwocaseswouldnotbeknowntobesimilar(Meltzoff&Moore,1995). Regardlessofourtheoryabouttheinitialstate,thereis,admittedly,asubstantialgapinthefindingsbetweenearlyinfancyandearlychildhood.Weknowsomething abouttheinitialstateofnewbornsfromstudyingimitationandotherearlyphenomenalikeinteractionalsynchronyandfacerecognition.Weknowsomethingaboutthe stateof3yearoldswhoareonthevergeofunderstandingbelief.However,"thedarkages,"fromabout15to36months,remainsomethingofamystery.Ask graduatestudentstotest2yearoldsandtheywilloftenshudderandscurryoutofthelabthe"terribletwos"leadtobothsubjectandgraduatestudentattrition.Inthe darkages,theestablishedtechniquesofinfancy(e.g.,preferencefornoveltyprocedures)donotworkbecausethechildrenaretoooldtositandpassivelywatch conversely,testsdemandingsubtleverbaldistinctionsdonotwork("WhenIfirstaskedyou,beforewedidX,whatdidyoubelieve..."),becausetoddlersaretoo youngforsuchverbalgymnastics.We'releftguessing.Theabsenceofempiricalfindingsfromthisperiodhascontributedtoourdifficultyinlayingoutafinegrained developmentaltheory.Itisasifbiologistshadonlyseenfrogsandtadpoleswithoutthetransitionsinbetween.Itwouldbehardtotelladevelopmentalstory,andno onewouldbelieveitifyoudid.2 Avarietyoftechniques,however,haverecentlybeendevelopedtotestchildrenduringthedarkages.Onesetoftechniquesusestoddlers'languageabilities.Such studiessuggest,forexample,that18montholdchildrenunderstandthatwordsrefertoobjectsandcanuseanadult'sattentionalcues(e.g.,gazedirection,gestures) toidentifythereferentofanovellabel(e.g.,Baldwin,1993a,1993bBaldwinetal.,1996).Atasimilarage,childrenalsotakeintoaccounttheintentionsoftheother personintheirattemptstodeterminethereferentofanovelword(e.g.,Tomasello,1995Tomasello
2

Wedonotmeantoimplythattherehasbeennoworkinthe15to36montholdagerange.Therehasbeenagreatdealofwork(e.g.Damon,1998Kagan,1981),butnotmuch fromthe"theoryofmind"viewpointlinkingwhatinfantsknowaboutpersonsandwhat3to5yearoldsknowabouttheintentionalmentalstatesofpersons.Researchershave discoveredagooddealaboutsocialcognitionininfancyandagooddealaboutsocialcognitionin3to5yearolds,butnotenoughaboutwhathappensinbetween.Weexpect thatfutureresearchwillshedincreasinglighton"thedarkages."

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&Barton,1994Tomasello,Strosberg,&Akhtar,1996).Finally,analysesofnaturalisticstudiesofearlyconversationhaveilluminatedchildren'sunderstandingofthe mind(e.g.,Bartsch&Wellman,1995). Asecondnewlydevelopedtechnique,calledthe"behavioralreenactmentprocedure"(Meltzoff,1995),alsoexploreswhatchildrenknowaboutthemind,butdoesnot relyonlanguage.Thebehavioralreenactmentprocedurecapitalizesonchildren'snaturaltendencytoreenactorimitatethebehaviorstheysee,butusesitinamore abstractway.Ahostofresearchindicatesthatchildren,evenyounginfants,donotimitatebyrotetheydonotimmediatelyimitatetheeventstheysee,butrathertheir interpretationofthem(Meltzoff&Moore,1995,1997,1998).Thismeansthatifwearrangeasituationcorrectly,wecanusetheirnaturaltendencytoreenactadult behaviorasa"readout"ofhowtheyunderstandtheworld.Suchanapproachhasbeenextensivelyusedinthepsycholinguisticliteraturetoassesschildren'slinguistic structure.Thisworkshowsthatchildrenwhoareaskedtoimitateasentenceoftheadultlanguagetendtorespondwithasimilarsentence,oftensynonymouswiththe tobeimitatedone,butwhichconformstothechild'sownlinguisticrules.Thebehavioralreenactmentprocedureusestheimitationofgoaldirectedactstoexaminethe psychologicalstructureschildrenuseininterpretinghumanbehavior. Athirdsetoftechniquescapitalizesonchildren'sveryearlytendencytoreadmeaningintohumanemotionalexpressions.Thisunderliesearly"socialreferencing" studiesbutalsohasbeendevelopedinamoresophisticatedwaybyRepacholi(Repacholi,1998Repacholi&Gopnik,1997).Thereisevidencethatbasicemotions suchashappiness,sadness,anddisgustareassociatedwithparticularfacialexpressionsfromearlyinfancyanduniversallyacrosscultures(e.g.,Darwin,1872Ekman, 1980).Emotionsarecloselyandintricatelyconnectedtointentionsanddesiresinouradultunderstandingofmind.Intheeverydayadultframework,weassumethat gettingwhatwewantoractingasweintendtowillleadtohappyemotions,whereasfailurewillleadtonegativeemotions.Wealsoassumethatweactinawaythat willbringaboutpositivebutnotnegativeemotions.Someofthenewtechniqueswediscussinthischapterexploittheearlynonverbalabilitytoreademotional expressionsasawayofinvestigatingchildren'sunderstandingofthemind. Takentogether,theserecentproceduraladvancesinaddressingquestionstoveryyoungchildrenarestartingtorevealsomeofwhatchildrenunderstandinthedark ages.Therearetwoimportantfociofchildren'sdevelopingunderstandingofthemindinthisperiod.Oneistheirunderstandingofperceptionandattention(e.g., Baldwin,1993a,1993bGopnik,Slaughter,&Meltzoff,1994Gopnik&Wellman,1994O'Neill,1996Slaughter&Gopnik,1996Tomasello,1995).Theotheris anunderstanding

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ofwhatSearle(1983)called"worldtomindstates"suchasdesireandintention.Wefocusonthelatterinthepresentchapter. UnderstandingDirectedness Infullfledgedadultpsychology,animportantfeatureofdesiresandintentionsisthattheyare"directedat"objectsandevents.Infact,inadultpsychologythisisone thingthatdistinguishesdesiresandintentionsfrommeremoods,feelings,oremotionsandmakesthemsimilartoperceptionsandbeliefs.Atthesametime,desires, intentions,andemotions,unlikeperceptionsandbeliefs,sharewhatwemightcallvalence.Desirescarrywiththemanimplicationofcertainpositiveornegative attitudestowardsobjectsandevents.Gettingwhatwewantisgood,andbeingfrustratedisbad.Doingwhatweintendtodoisgood,failingtodosoisbad. AConceptualClarification:IntentionandIntentionality Whatwearecallingthe"directedness"ofthesestatessometimesisreferredtoinpsychologyasthe"intentional"characterofdesireandintention,butthisderivesfrom amisunderstanding(orlooseadaptation)ofatechnicalphilosophicalterm.Intentioninthetechnicalphilosophicalsensereferstothepropositionalcharacterofa mentalstate,notsolelythefactthatitisdirectedatobjectsintheworld.Thisisanimportantdistinctioninasmuchassomementalstatesmaybedirectlyorcausally relatedtorealobjectsoreventsintheworld,withoutbeingintentional.Theclassicalphilosophicalexampleis"seeing"(asopposedto"believing"or''seeingthat").This mentalstateisrelatedtorealobjectsandeventsintheworld,nottomentalrepresentationsofevents,andthishasimportantconsequences.Icansubstitutedifferent descriptionsofthesameeventandpreservethetruthofthesentencewhen"see"isusedinthenonintentionalsense.Forexample,itistruetosaythatsomeonesees theauthorofWaverleywhentheyseeScott,butitisnottruetosaythatsomeone,whobelievesthispersonisScott,alsobelievesthatheistheauthorofWaverley. Thesameholdsforworldtomindstatessuchaswantingandintending.Thesestatesmaysimplybedirectedatobjectsorevents,whichmeansthatdescriptionscan besubstitutedpreservingtruth,ortheymaybegenuinelyintentional(inthetechnical,philosophicalsense),whichmeansthattheycannot. Theterminologicaldistinctionisimportantfordevelopmentalpsychologistsbecauseitletsusdiscriminatebetweentwodifferentwaysyoungchildrenmightunderstand the"aboutness"or"directedness"ofmentalstates.Italsoshouldpreventusfromassumingthatifachildhastheminimalideaofthedirectednessofmentalstates,they mustalsohaveanunder

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standingofthefactthatmentalstateshavepropositionalcontent,involverepresentations,andthereforeare"intentional."Infact,thereislikelyadevelopmentalchange fromchildrenfirstunderstandingthenonintentionalaspectsofmindtolaterunderstandingitsintentionalcharacter. Tomakethingsevenworse,thesephilosophicalconcernsaboutwhatitmeanstobe"intentional"haveliterallynothingtodowiththeeverydayuseof"intention,"asin theintentiontoactitisjustahomonym,althoughitisrelatedtothe"intension"ofsentences(nowonderphilosophersprefertotalkaboutx'sandy's).Toassumea deeplinkbetweenthetwointentions,aspsychologistssometimesdo,islikeassumingthattheFederalbankmustbeanhistoricaloutcomeoftheeconomicimportance ofrivers.Ofcourse,intentions,inthesenseofintendingtoact,arementalstatesandcanbe"intentional"(inthesenseofhavingpropositionalcontent),althoughthey neednotnecessarilybe,justasdesires,perception,andothermentalstatesmayormaynotbe''intentional."ButthentheFederalbankmay(forallweknow)have somethingtodowiththeeconomicimportanceofrivers.Thesimilarityofthetwowordsisobviouslynotanindicationofanydeeperlinkbetweenthetwoconcepts: Beliefsare"intentional"mentalstatesparexcellence,andthere'snohomonymatplayinthiscase.Finally,itmaybetrue(wethinkitis)thattheearliest"intentional" conceptsofchildrenconcernintention,desire,andperception,butifso,thiswillbeanempiricaldiscoveryofdevelopmentalists,notalogicaltruthembodiedinthe homonyms. ExploringToddlers'UnderstandingoftheDirectednessofEmotionalAttitudes Infantimitationandotherphenomenaofearlyinfancyshowthatinfantscanlinktheirownfeelingsandthoseofothers.However,theseearlybehaviorsdonotinvolve objects.Thefeelingsthatchildrenunderstandatfirstarejustthat,purelyinternalfeelings.Whendoinfantsunderstandboththevalencedanddirectedcharacterof adults'attitudestowardobjects?Theliteratureonsocialreferencingsuggeststosomethatthismaybeunderstoodasearlyas9monthsofage.Inthesestudies, mothersreactedtoobjectsandeventswithparticularemotions,andbabiesseemedtoadopttheseemotionalattitudes.However,acloserlookattheexperimentsin thatparadigmsuggeststhatthisconclusionmaybeunwarranted.Thefactthatinfantsadoptedthemother'sattitudedoesnotdemonstratethattheyunderstoodthatthis attitudewasdirectedataparticularobject.First,typicallyonlyoneobjectispresented,soitremainsunclearwhetherinfantstrulyunderstoodthattheemotional messagewasdirectedtowardthisandnototherobjects.Second,thefactthatinfantsadoptedthemother'sattitudedoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheyunderstood thather

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attitudewasdirectedatanyobjectwhatever.Variousformsofemotionalcontagionand/orsimpleassociativeprocesses(e.g.,temporalcontiguity,stimulussalience) couldbeatworkinthesestudies,asarguedbyadvocatesofa"leaninterpretation"ofthestandardsocialreferencingwork(Baldwin&Moses,1994). Todemonstratethatchildrenreallyunderstanddirectedness,youneedtoshowthattheyunderstandthatapersoncanhaveoneattitudetowardoneobjectanda differentattitudetowardanotherobject.Atleasttwoobjectsshouldbepresented,andtheseshouldbeequallyattractiveandsalient.Someresearchershaverecently adoptedadualobjectdisplay(e.g.,Baldwin&Moses,1994Mumme,Won,&Fernald,1994),butthisbyitselfhasnotbeensufficienttoeliminatethepossibilityof allsimplernonreferentialprocesses(seeRepacholi,1998,foradiscussion). Repacholi(1998)developedatechniquetotestinfants'understandingofdirectednessofemotionalsignalsthatrulesoutnonreferentialmechanisms.Inthesestudies, 14montholdinfantssawthesameexperimenterproducetwodifferentemotionalexpressions,anexpressionofdisgustandanexpressionofjoy,towardtwodifferent objects.Theobjectswereinclosedboxessothatthechildrendidnotseetheobjectsatthetimethattheysawtheemotions.Insteadtheysawtheexperimenterpeek intoeachboxandmakeadifferentemotionalresponse.Thechildrenwerethengiventhetwoboxes. Theresultsshowedthatchildrentouchedandhandledbothboxesequallyquicklyandfrequently,indicatingthattherewasnosimpleemotionalcontagionatwork.The importantresultwasthattheyopenedtheboxwiththe"happy"objectinsidesignificantlymorefrequentlythantheyopenedtheboxwiththe"disgust"object.We concludethatthechildrenhadinferredthattheadult'sattitudewasspecificallydirectedattheobjectinsidethecontainers,eventhoughtheyhadnotseentheemotions andtheobjectsatthesametime. Onthebasisoftheseresults,wecanalsofirmlyaddressthetemporalcontiguityandsalienceissuesthathavebedeviledsocialreferencingresearch.Howdoweknow thatinfantswerenotsimplynotingthetemporalcontiguitybetweentheemotionalsignalandwhicheverstimulustheywerelookingat,atthetimethesignalwasissued? Thisisruledoutbecausetheonlyvisibleobjectswerethetwoboxes,nottheobjectstheycontained.Moreover,infantsshouldhaveconnectedanemotionto whicheverboxwasthefocusoftheirownattentionwhentheexpressionwasdisplayed,andtheresultsshowedthatthiswasnotthecase(becausetheyhandledboth boxesequally).Similarly,theparadigmrulesoutthepossibilitythatsimplesaliencewasatwork.Bothboxeswereextremelysalientandtheexperimenter'sactions (e.g.,pickingtheboxesup,openingtheirlids)madethemallthemoreso.Yetinfantsdidnotlinkthesesalientstimuli

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totheemotions:Theywerenotloathetotouchandexamineeitherbox,eventheboxcontainingthedisgustobject.Theyjustdidnotwanttograbtheobjectthatwas hiddeninsidethatbox.Becausetheobjectwashidden,itcouldhardlyhavebeenvisuallysalientwhentheemotionwasoriginallydisplayed. Weconcludethattheinterpretationofthesocialreferencingdemonstratedin9to13montholdinfantsisstillequivocal.Perhapsa"lean"interpretationofthose effectsarestillinorder.However,theworkdiscussedhereshowsthatby14monthsinfantsgenuinelyunderstandthatemotionalattitudeswithparticularvalencesmay bedirectedatparticularobjects.Theyunderstandthattheobjectstowhichanadult'semotionsaredirectedmaybeonesthatareneitherperceptuallysalient,noreven perceptuallypresent,contiguouslywiththeemotionalexpression.Thisisanimportantsteptowardtheadultunderstandingofdesire. EarlyUnderstandingofSimpleIntentions Anotherimportantaspectoftheadultunderstandingofthemindisadistinctionbetweentheactualactionssomeoneperformsandtheirintentioninperformingthose actions.Wittgenstein(1953)asked,"WhatisleftoverifIsubtractthefactthatmyarmgoesupfromthefactthatIraisemyarm?"(p.161).Answer:Intention. Thispithyexampleshowsthatintentionisnotwhollyreducibletobodilymovement.Intentionsarementalstatesandbodilymovementsarephysicaleventsinthe world.Thetwohaveanintimaterelationbecauseintentionsunderlieandcausebodilymovements.Ifweknowaperson'sintentions,we(often)canpredictheractions, andconverselyifweseeheractions,wecanoftenreasonbackwardstowhatherintentionsmusthavebeen.Moreover,withintheadultframework,onlycertaintypes ofmovementsareascribedtointention.Chairsandbouldersmove,buttheirrockingandrollingarenotseenasintentional.Mostprototypically,humanactsarethe typesofmovementpatternsthatareseenascausedbyintentions.Justastheyoungestinfantsdonotshowevidenceofunderstandingthedirectednessofmentalstates, theyalsoshowlittleevidenceofunderstandingthisdistinctionbetweenunderlyingintentionsandvisiblemovements,althoughtheydolinktheirownintentional movementstotheintentionalmovementsofothers(asinbodyimitation).Whendochildrenbegintodifferentiatebodilymovementsfromtheunderlyingpsychological statesthatcausethem,andwhendotheybegintounderstandthatonlycertaintypesofmovementsandnotothersareintentional? Toaddressthesequestions,itisnotenoughtoshowthatyounginfantsactintentionallythemselves.Wewanttoknowwhentheybegintounder

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standtheintentionsofothers,andmostimportant,whentheybegintodifferentiatesurfaceactionsfromunderlyingintentions.Therehasbeensomeexcellentresearch onthisquestionusingverbaltestsonyoungchildrenjustbeyond"thedarkages,"between3and4yearsofage(e.g.,Astington&Gopnik,1991bMoses,1993 Shultz,1980Shultz,Wells,&Sarda,1980).Ourgoalwastousethebehavioralreenactmenttechniquetoposethequestiontopreverbalchildren. Inonestudy,wetestedwhether18montholdchildrencouldreadbelowtheliteralsurfacebehaviordemonstratedinanadultact(Meltzoff,1995).Thestudy involvedshowinginfantsanunsuccessfulact.Forexample,theadultaccidentallyunderorovershothistarget,orhetriedtoperformabehaviorbuthishandslipped severaltimes.Thusthegoalstatewasnotachieved(Fig.2.1).Toanadult,itwaseasytoreadtheactor'sintentions,eventhoughhewasnotabletofulfillthem.The experimentalquestionwaswhetherchildreninterpretedthisbehaviorinpurelyphysicaltermsorwhethertheytooreadthroughtheliteralbodymovementstothe underlyinggoalorintentionoftheact.Themeasureofhowtheyinterpretedtheeventwaswhattheychosetoreenact,inparticularwhethertheychosetoproducethe intendedactdespitethefactthatitwasneverpresenttothesenses.Inasense,the"correctanswer"wastonotcopytheliteralmovement,buttheintendedactthat remainedunfulfilledandthereforeinvisible. Usingthisbehavioralreenactmentparadigm,Meltzoff(1995)testedfourgroupsof18montholdinfants.Thedemonstrationtargetgroupsawtheadultsuccessfully fulfillhisintentionsandperformaseriesoftargetactsonfivedifferentobjects.Thedemonstrationintentiongroupsawaccidentalfailuresforfivedifferentevents.With eachobject,theadultstrove

Fig.2.1. Thedisplaysusedinthestudyoftoddlers'understandingofsimpleintentions. Thetoppanelshowsthehuman'sacts.Theadulttriedtopullapartthedumbbell threetimes.Eachtime,hishandslippedofftheendofthecube(firsttoone side,thentheother,andthenthefirstsideagain).Thechildrendidnotcopy thissurfacebehavior.Whengiventheirturnwiththedumbbell,theywrappedtheir handsaroundthecubesandfirmlypulleditapart.Thebottompanelshowsthe inanimatedevice.Resultsshowedthatchildrendidnottrytopullthedumbbell apartafterseeingthesemotions.Theyinterpretedthehumanactsdifferentlythan thesimilarmotionsoftheinanimatedevice.(FromMeltzoff,1995.)

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toreachthegoalbutdidnotsuccessfullycarryouthisintention.Theadult'smotoractionswererealisticlookingattemptstoreachthegoal,buthedidnotverbalizeor showfacialexpressionsoffrustrationathisfailures.Twocontrolgroupswereused.Thecontrol1groupsimplyomittedanyadultdemonstrations.Thecontrol2 groupsawtheadultperformcontrolactionsontheobjectsforthesamelengthoftimeasinthetwodemonstrationgroups,buttheadultshowedneitherthetargetacts northeintentiontoachievethem.Thecontrolactswerecarefullydesignedsoastocontrolforthepossibilitythatspatialproximityoftheadult'shandstothetarget,or proximityoftwoobjectswitheachother,might"suggest"thetargetbehavior(seeMeltzoff,1995,fordetails). Theresultswereveryclearcut.Infantsinthecontrolgroupsdidnottendtoproducethetargetactsspontaneouslyorbychance.However,infantsinthetwo demonstrationgroupsproducedmorethan75%ofthetargetacts.Theyreproducedthetargetsafterobservingtheadultdoso,whichisstraightforwardimitation.The important,newfindingisthattheyalsoproducedthetargetsintheintentioncondition.Indeedinfantswereequallylikelytoproducethetargetafterseeingtheadult "trying"butfailingastheywerewhenthetargetwasactuallyachieved.Theyseemedtointerprettheadult'seffortfulbehaviorasgoingbeyondtheliteralsurface behavioritself,andasbeingaboutsomethingelse,abouttheunseenbutinferredgoaloftheact(seealsoTomasello&Barton,1994,forworkusingaslightlydifferent approachandyieldingcompatibleresults). Severalfollowupstudieshavenowbeencompletedthatconfirmandexpandtheoriginalfindings.Ifinfantsarepickinguptheunderlyinggoalorintentionofthehuman actfromseeingthefailedattempttheyshouldbeabletoachievetheactusingavarietyofmeans.Thiswastestedinarecentstudy(Meltzoff,1996b).Asbefore,the adultshowedthefailedattemptwithhishandsslidingofftheends.Thenhehandedtheinfantagiganticdumbbellthatwastoobigfortheinfant'shands.Theinfantsdid notevenmakeanattempttograsptheendsofthedumbbell.Theydidnotappeartobetryingtomimicthesurfacebehavior.Instead,theyusednovelwaystostruggle togetthegigantictoyapart.Theyputoneendofthedumbbellonthetableandusedbothhandstopulltheotherendupwardsortheyputtheirhandsinsidethetoy andpushedoutwards,andsoon.Inshort,theyusedifferentmeansthanhadbeendemonstratedbytheexperimenter,butusedthemtowardthesameend.Ofcourse, theinterestingthingisthattheyhadneverseentheend.Theyinferredtheendandthenusedpreviouslyunseenmeanstogetthere.Thiseliminatesthepossibilitythat infantsintheoriginalstudyhadmerelytriedtoimitatethesurfacebehavioroftheadult(handsslippingoffthecubes)andhadpulledthetoyapartbymistake.Itis consistentwiththehypothesisthat

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infantshadinferredthegoaloftheact,differentiatingitfromtheliteralsurfacebehaviorthatwasobserved. Anotherexperimentpressedthispointfurther.Inthisstudy,infantswereshownthestandard"failedattempt"display,buttheywerehandedatricktoy.Thetoyhad beengluedshutbeforethestudybegan.Wheninfantspickeditupandattemptedtopullitapart,theirhandsslippedofftheendsofthecubes.Thisofcoursematched thesurfacebehavioroftheadult.Thequestionwaswhetherthismatchtotheadults'behaviorsatisfiedthem.Theresultsshoweditdidnot.Infantswerenotsatisfied whentheymatchedthesurfacebehavioroftheadultthisdidnotterminatetheirbehavior.Theyrepeatedlygrabbedthetoyandyankedonitindifferentways,and appealedtotheirmothersandtheadult.Ninetypercentoftheinfantslookedupatanadultimmediatelyaftertheinfantfailedtopullthetricktoyapart.Theydidso withanaveragelatencyoflessthan2secondsandaccompaniedbyvocalizationswhiletheystaredintotheadults'faces(Meltzoff,1996b).Whyweretheyappealing forhelp?Theyhadmatchedtheadult'ssurfacebehavior,butevidentlywerestrivingtowardanothergoal,notthebehavioritself.(Ofcourseitdidnotmakealotof sensetoseektheadult'shelpbecausehehadalreadyfailed.Ifalargeadultfailed,theinfant'sfailurewasperhapsinevitable.Thissubtletyescapedthem,however.) Wehavebeguntoexploretheaspectsoftheadult'sbehavioralenvelopethatcarrytheinformationthatanactionwasafailedattemptandnotasuccess.Whenwesee anadultrelaunchtheactandvarythemeans,weinterprettheadultas"effortfullytrying"toaccomplishsomethingbeyondwhatheisdoing.Wetestedwhetherinfants weresensitivetothistryandtryagainaspectofintentionalaction(Meltzoff,1996a).Inthisstudy,fourindependentgroupsof18montholdssawtheadultperform eitherthefailedattemptorthesuccessfultargetacteitheroneorthreetimes.(RecallthatinfantsintheoriginalMeltzoff,1995,studysawthreefailedattempts.)Infants whosawonefailedattemptperformedpoorly.Theirbehaviordroppedtochancelevels,significantlylowerthaninfantswhosawthreefailedattempts.Ontheother hand,theinfantswhosawtheadultperformthesuccessfultargetbehavioronlyoncedidaswellasiftheysawitthreetimes.Thisestablishesthatitisnotanacross theboardsensorylimitationofsomekind. Theseresultssuggestthatseeingapersonrelaunchhisbehaviorseveraltimesisanimportantcuetothepurposivenessoftheactforinfants,justasitisforadults (Heider,1958).Whenanadultrelauncheshisbehaviorseveraltimes,usingdifferentbutrelatedactions,infantsinferthatthereisacommoncauseunifyingthissurface behavior.Inshort,18montholdsusethewholepatternofbehaviortoindicatewhethertheadultisaimingtodowhattheyaredoingorsomethingelse.

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WhatKindofEntitiesAreInterpretedasPurposive? Theresultswehavediscussedsofarsuggestthatnormalinfantscanpickupthesimpleintentionsofhumanactors.Oneinterestingquestioniswhetherthisintentional readingofbehaviorisspecifictopeopleoratleastmostreadilyascribedtothem.Tobegintoexaminethis,Meltzoff(1995)testedhow18montholdsrespondedto amechanicaldevicethatmimickedthesamemovementsastheactorinthefailedattemptcondition.Aninanimatedevicewasconstructedthathadpolesforarmsand mechanicalpincersforhands.Itdidnotlookhumanbutitcouldmoveverysimilarlytothehuman(Fig.2.1,bottompanel).Forthetest,thepincers"grasped"the dumbbellatthetwoendsjustasthehumanhandsdid.Onemechanicalarmwasthenmovedoutwards,justasinthehumancase,anditspincerslippedofftheendof thedumbbelljustasthehumanhanddid.Themovementpatternsofmachineandmanwerecloselymatchedfromapurelyspatiotemporaldescriptionofmovements inspace. Theresultsshowedthatinfantsdidnotattributeagoalorintentiontothemovementsoftheinanimatedevice.Althoughtheywerenotfrightenedbythedeviceand lookedatitaslongasatthehumandisplay,theysimplydidnotseethesequenceofactionsasimplyingagoal.Infantswerenomore(orless)likelytopullapartthe toyafterseeingthefailedattemptoftheinanimatedevicethantheydidinbaselinelevelswhentheysawnothing. Anotherstudypursuedthispoint.Inthisstudy,wehadtheinanimatedevicesucceed.Theinanimatedeviceheldthedumbbellfromthetwoendsandsuccessfully pulleditapart.Afterwitnessingthisdisplay,infantsweregiventhedumbbell.Theresultsshowedthattheytoopulleditapart(Meltzoff,1996b).Itappearsthatinfants canpickupcertaininformationfromtheinanimatedevice(theypullitapartafterseeingthedevicedoso),buttheycannotpickupotherinformation(concerningfailed attempts). Webelieve18montholdsinterprettheperson'sactionswithinapsychologicalframeworkthatdifferentiatesbetweenthesurfacebehaviorofpeopleandadeeper levelinvolvinggoalsandintentions.Whentheyseeaperson'shandsslipofftheendsofthedumbbell,theyinferwhattheadultwas"trying"todo(whichisdifferent fromwhathediddo).Whentheyseetheinanimatedeviceslipofftheendofthedumbbell,theyseeitasmechanicalslippageandslidingwithnoimplicationsfor purposiveness.3
3

Itisquitelikelythatdisplayscanbeconstructedthatfoolinfants,analogouslytothosethatfooladults(ismycomputerintentional?).Wedonotknowthenecessaryand sufficientconditionsforattributionofintention,butundercertaincircumstancesinfantsmayseepurposivenessintheactionsofpretendhumans(e.g.,stuffeddollsoranimals)or indynamicdisplaysthatmayseemtobeambiguousastoanimacy(2Dspotsthatleapandmovespontaneously,asinGergely,Ndasdy,Csibra,&Br,1995).Thisdoesnot contradictourthesis,butunderscorestheneedforresearchonboundaryconditions.The3D,clearlyinanimateobjectusedbyMeltzoff(1995)givesalowerboundary(infants fail)andrealpeoplegiveanupperboundary(infantssucceed).Thereisalotofroominbetween.

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HumanActsVersusMechanicalMotions Onthebasisofthesefindings,itisusefultointroduceadistinctionthatisdiscussedlaterinthechapter.Wewishtodistinguishbetweenconstruingthebehaviorsof othersinpurelyphysicalversuspsychologicalterms.Tohelpkeepthisdistinctionclear,wecalltheformermovementsormotionsandthelatterhumanacts.The behaviorofanotherpersoncanbedescribedusingeitherphysicsorpsychology.Wecansay,"Thepresident'shandcontactedthecupthecupfellover,"or"The presidentwastryingtopickupthecup."Strictbehaviorists(andsomelawyers)sticktotheformerdescriptionpreciselybecausetheyeschewappealingtoinvisible psychologicalstates.Evidently,infantsarenotbehaviorists(nottomentionlawyers).Theydonotconstruethebehaviorofotherssimplyas,"Holdthedumbbelland thenremoveonehandquickly,"butratherconstrueitasaneffortatpulling.Moreover,thenewworkshowsthatinfantshaveadifferentiationinthekindsof attributionstheymaketopeopleversusthings.By18monthsofagechildrenhavealreadyadoptedafundamentalaspectofafolkpsychology:Personsareunderstood withinaframeworkinvolvinggoalsandintentions.Humanactsareseenasdrippingwithpurposivenessandaremappedontoone'sownlikeacts. UsingaPerson'sEmotionalReactionstoUnderstandTheirIntentions Intheadultframework,itmakessensethatthesameexternaleventmaycauseonepersontobecomehappyandanothersad.Thisisbecauseemotionsdonotmap directlyontooutcomes,butaremediatedbytheperson'sdesires.Usingavarietyofverbaltests,ithasbeenshownthatyoungchildrenunderstandquiteabitaboutthe linkagebetweendesires,actions,andemotionalreactions.Forexample,theyknowthatfulfilleddesiresleadtohappinessandacessationofsearching,whereas unfulfilledonesleadtosadnessandacontinuanceofsearchforthedesiredobject(Hadwin&Perner,1991Harris,1989Stein&Levine,1989Wellman& Banerjee,1991Yuill,1984).Thereisclearevidenceforthissortofunderstandingin3to4yearoldsandsomeevidencethatchildrenasyoungas34months (Wellman&Woolley,1990)cancorrectlypredictwhetheraprotagonistinastorywillbehappyorsad,dependingonthematchbetweenherdesiresandthe outcome. Thebehavioralreenactmentprocedureprovidesanonverbalwayofbeginningtoexplorechildren'sunderstandingofthelinksbetweendesire/intention action emotionalreaction.Inonestudy,childrenrangingfrom18to36monthsoldwereshownanadultperforminganactionandtheadult'semotionalreactiontoheraction wassystematically

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manipulated(Meltzoff,1996b).Aftertheactionwascompleted,theadultreactedinoneoftwoways.Forhalfthechildren,theadultreactedwithhappy/satisfied facialexpressionsandexclaimed,"Yeah!There!"andfortheotherhalfshereactedwithunhappy/dissatisfiedfacialexpressionsandexclaimed,"Uhoh!Ohdear!"The importantpointisthattheadult'sphysicalactionswereidenticalinbothcases.Whatdifferedwastheadult'sreactiontotheeventshecaused.Thequestionwas whetherthechildren'sinferenceabouttheadult'sdesire/intentionchangedasafunctionofheremotionalreactions. Usingthebehavioralreenactmentprocedure,threegroupsofinfantsaged18,24,and36monthsoldwererandomlyassignedtotheseethehappy/satisfiedand unhappy/dissatisfiedreaction.Theeventsinthemselveswerecarefullydesignedonthebasisofpilotstudiestobeambiguousinthemselves.Forexample,theadultput atoyunstablyontopofa12inchhighshelfandthetoytoppledoffmakingabangingsoundasithitthetable.Theusualresponseafterthetoyfellwastolookathis facetoclarifytheambiguousevent.Immediatelyaftertheobjectfell,theadultgaveoneofthereactions,happy/satisfiedorsad/dissatisfied.Theobjectswerethen giventothechild.Thisprovedtobeaverymotivatingtask,andchildrenleaptattheopportunitytoplaywiththeobjects. Theresultsrevealedaninterestingdevelopmentalchange.Thebehaviorofthe18and24montholdsdidnotsystematicallyvaryasafunctionoftheadult'semotional reactions.The36montholdsshowedahighlysignificantandorderlyresponse.Theycarefullyputthetoystablyontheshelf(whichisnotwhattheysaw)inthecase thattheadultseemeddissatisfiedbytheoutcome.Conversely,theyexaggeratedlyknockedthetoyofftheshelfiftheadulthadshownthehappy/satisfiedreaction. Weconcludethatinanambiguoussituationchildrenusetheadult'semotionalreactionstoclarifythemeaningoftheadult'sbehavior.Onthisinterpretation,childrenby 36monthsbutnot18to24montholdscanreasonbackwardsfromanemotionalreactiontowhattheadultwasstrivingtodo.Itisinterestingthatthisageestimate fitswellwiththatobtainedbyverbalmethods(Wellman&Woolley,1990).Amodestadditionalpieceofinformationprovidedbythebehavioralreenactment procedureisthatchildrenarenotsimplypresentedwithamultiplechoiceverbalresponse("willhebehappyorsad").Thechildrenaresurroundedwiththeclutterof realworldactivityandhavetocreateforthemselvesthedesiredendstate.Theadultneverputthetoystablyontheshelfandthechildrenwhotuckitfirmlyupthere, farfromtheedge,areimaginingandcreatingtheresultofwhattheadult"hadinmind"butneverachieved.Anotherinterestingpointisthatthechildrenwereforcedto reasonbackwardsfromemotionalreactiontotheunseendesireorintention,notforward,asinmanyoftheverbalstoryscenarios,fromthedesireandeventstothe

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predictedemotion.Theresultsindicatethatatleastby36monthsold,childrenknowthattheadultmaydesire/intendtodosomethingdifferentfromwhattheydoand thattheperson'semotionalreactionsaftertheeventareacluetotheunderlyingdesire/intentionoftheperson.Itmakessomedevelopmentalsensethatchildrencan firstreadthegoaloftheadult'sact(by18months)andthenlatercandetectregularitiesinhowtheythemselvesandothersemotionallyreacttothesuccessesand failuresofgoaldirectedactions.Presumably,thisisthedatabasethatallowsthem(at36months)togivemeaningtomessy,naturallyoccurringeventssuchasanactor whoreactseitherpositivelyornegativelytotopplingtoys. UnderstandingDifferencesbetweenOne'sOwnDesiresandThoseofOthers Theworkdiscussedsofarhasfocusedononeimportantaspectofouradultunderstandingofintention,theabilityto"readthrough"surfaceactionstodeterminethe intentionsofthepersonwhoperformedthem.Oneimportantaspectofthisabilityisthatthechildseemstogobeyondtheimmediateactionitself.Childrenalsoseem totakeintoaccountotheraspectsofthesituation,forexampletheactor'sattendantemotionalreactions,todetermineintentions.Thisresearchassumesthatthechild identifiestheirownintentionswiththeintentionsofadults.Infact,onereasonboththebehavioralreenactmentandsocialreferencingparadigmsaresoeffectiveisthat thechildrensoreadily"takeon"theintentions,desires,andattitudesofadults,evenwhenthoseintentionsarenottheirowninitially. However,animportantaspectofouradulttheoryofmindisthefactthatwecandifferentiatebetweenourownintentionsanddesiresandtheintentionsanddesiresof others.Weunderstandthatourdesiresandintentionsmaydifferfromandevenbeinconflictwith,thedesiresofthosearoundus.Insomewaysthesedifferences amongdesiresparallelthedifferencesinbeliefthataretestedinfalsebeliefparadigms.Thisunderstandingofdifferencesindesiresemergesconsiderablyearlierthan theunderstandingofdifferencesinbelief(e.g.,Flavelletal.,1990Gopnik&Slaughter,1991).Asinthecaseofintention,thereisaconsiderablebodyofwork suggestingthatchildrenunderstandthisaspectofdesirebythetimetheyareabout3yearsold(Astington&Gopnik,1991aBartschandWellman,1995),butthe originsofthisunderstandinghavebeenlostin"thedarkages." RepacholiandGopnik(1997)devisedanonverbalmethodtoexploreyoungchildren'sunderstandingofdifferencesindesires.Themethod,likethatintheprevious studyofintentionandtheearlierstudyon"di

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rectedness,''capitalizedonyoungchildren'sabilitytodetectemotions.Here,however,weaskedaratherdifferentquestionaboutemotions.Inthiswork,14and18 montholdinfantswerepresentedwithaplateofrawbroccoliandaplateofgoldfishcrackers.Infantsconsistentlypreferthecrackers.Theexperimenterindicatedher preferenceforoneobjectoranotherbytastingitandproducingaparticularemotionalexpression(disgustorpleasure).Infantswererandomlyassignedsuchthathalf ofthemsawtheadultapparentlylikethegoldfishcrackers(thechild'sownpreference)andhalfsawherapparentlylikethebroccoli(thechild'snonpreferredfood).In thecrucialtestcondition,theexperimenterthenreachedherhandouttotheinfantmidwaybetweenthefoodsandaskedtheinfanttogiveheran(unspecified)food. Theresultsshowedthat18montholdinfantsconsistentlygavetheadulttheobjectforwhichshehadexpressedapreference,evenwhenthepreferencedifferedfrom theirowndesire.Theygaveherbroccoliwhenshehadpreviouslyexpressedadesireforthebroccoli,andcrackerswhensheexpressedadesireforcrackers.Thisis adevelopmentalachievementinasmuchas14montholdsdidnotdothis.Instead,theyalwaysgavetheexperimentercrackers,theirownpreference,regardlessofthe experimenter'sexpresseddesires.Thisworksuggeststhatevenveryyoungchildren,18montholds,mayhaveanonegocentricunderstandingofthedifferences betweentheirownmentalstatesandthoseofothersinsomecases. Thisearlyunderstandingofdesire,liketheunderstandingofintention,goesbeyondthesimplecuesofactionoremotionthemselves.Itconfirmsthat18monthold childrenarenotlimitedtotheimmediateevidenceoftheexperimenter'sperceptuallypresentaction,ortheirownpresentfeelings,indeterminingtheadult'sdesires. Instead,theytakeintoaccountanearlier,andsuperficiallyquitedifferent,pieceofevidenceabouttheexperimenter'sunderlyingmentalstate,namelyheremotional expression.Liketheearlierunderstandingofsocialreferencing,italsoshowsthatyoungchildrenunderstandthedirectednessofmentalstates.Theyunderstandthat disgustandpleasureweredirectedatdifferentobjects.Butthisunderstandingalsogoesbeyondunderstandingthedirectednessandvalenceofmentalstatesandthe factthattheyunderlie,butarenotidentifiedwith,actions.Itshowsthat18montholds,althoughnot14montholds,understanddifferencesbetweentheirown desiresandthoseofothers.By18months,acomplexityoffolkpsychologyhasdawnedonchildren.Theyhavecometounderstandthatpeoplenotonlyhavemental states,justastheydo,butthesementalstatesmaysometimesnotbethesameastheirown.Otherpeoplearelikemebutdonotnecessarilyhavemylikes.The childrennolongerliveinamentalGardenofEdenwithoutconflictinwhicheveryoneisconceivedofassharingthesamedesires.

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DevelopingTheoriesofIntentionforOurselvesandinOurChildren Wefirstsummarizesomeofthedevelopmentalchangesthathavebeendescribedinchildren'sunderstandingofmindbetween0and3yearsofage.Nextwesketch threemechanismsofchangethatmayinducethesedevelopments. ConceptualChangeBetweenBirthand3YearsofAge Newbornsarenotassophisticatedas18montholds,noless3yearolds.Newbornscanimitateactionsthemselves.Theycanlinktheactionstheyseetointernal feelings.However,theydonotinitiallyappreciatethatthosefeelingsmaybedirectedtowardobjects.Imitationofobjectdirectedactsarisesinthesecondhalfyearof life(Meltzoff,1988Meltzoff&Moore,1998).Similarly,younginfantscanimitatewhattheadultactuallydoes,buttheycan'timitatewhattheadultintendstodobut failstoachieve.Oneofushastriedinvaintogetneonatestoimitateintendedactions(e.g.,anadultstrainingtoproduceatongueprotrusionormouthopening).They simplydonotseemtoreadthroughtheactions.Henceadevelopmentalchangefromtheyoungestinfantsimitatingwhatwedotoolderonesimitatingwhatwemeant todo.Youngerinfantsalsoinitiallydonotappreciatefullythedifferencesbetweentheirownstatesandthoseofothers.Infact,wehaveseenthattheyseemtobegin byassumingthatthetwowillbesimilar.By18months,theywillhavelearnedaboutallthesecharacteristicsofthemind.Sothereisarichinitialstatebutalsoprofound developmentalchange.Thefactthatnewbornshaveanywayatallofinterpretingothersasequivalenttotheselfprovidesafoundationforthedevelopmentofthe notionofpersonsthatwilleventuallyincludedesireandintention. Aswehaveseen,the18monthold'sabilitiesarequitedifferentfromthenewborn'sabilities.Atthesametime,theyarealsoquitedifferentfromyoung3yearold abilities.Eighteenmontholdsdifferentiatebetweenintentionalandunintentionalactions,betweentheirowndesiresandthoseofothers,andunderstandthatdesires andintentionsaredirectedatobjects.However,thereisnoevidencethattheyconceptualizedesiresorintentionsasmentalstatesthatexistinthemindpriortoand independentfromanyactionatall,althoughthereisevidencethatolderchildrendoso.Nor,infact,isthereanyevidencethattheydifferentiatebetweendesires, intentions,andemotionalattitudestowardobjects,althoughwehavebeenusingthoseadulttermsdifferentiallyinthischapter. Reconstructingthechild'sworldviewintermsofadultlanguageisalwaysdifficult.OneideawefindhelpfulisSearle's(1983)notionof

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"intentioninaction."Searlesuggeststhatevenadultsoftenunderstandactionasinformedandshapedbydesiresandintentions,eveniftheydonotthinkaseparate mentalstateprecededthataction.WhenIsitdowninthemorningtodrinkmyteaandgoovermyplansforthecomingday,Imaybesaidtohaveformulatedthe intentionandthedesiretodrivetotheofficeat9:45a.m.Wheninthecourseofthatdrive,Iswervetoavoidtheconstructionpothole,Idosointentionallyandhave thedesiretodoso,butIcouldnotbesaidtohavehadthosedesiresandintentionsbeforeIstartedoutthatmorningorevenrightbeforeIswerved.When,inthe courseofthedrive,mymindissofulloftheintentionanddesiretomakeagoodargumentatthe10:00a.m.meetingthatIactuallydriveintothenextconstruction pothole,thedamagetomyaxleisneitherintentionalnordesired.Wesuggestthatthe18monthold'sconceptionofdesire/intentionisakintomyconceptionofthe intentioninvolvedinswervingtoavoidthepothole.Itisnotidentifiedwithorreducibletoanybodilymovementinparticular,butitisassumedtoaccompanyactions. MechanismsofDevelopment Wearesuggestingthenthatthereareimportantdevelopmentalchangesinthechild'sconceptionofthemind,inparticularintheirunderstandingofdesireandintention, betweenbirthand3years(foramorecompleteaccountseeGopnik&Meltzoff,1997).Whatmechanismsareresponsibleforthosechanges?Wesuggestthatthree mechanismsmaybeparticularlyimportant:imitationandinterpretationofhumanacts,spontaneousexperimentation,andintegrationoftheevidence. ImitationandInterpretationofHumanActsas"LikeMe" Webelievethatinfantsstartoffwithawellstockedtoolkitfordevelopingafolkpsychology.Wecanbepreciseabouthowtheinitialstateenableslaterdevelopment. Inourview,the"humanact"maybethemostelementaryparsingoftheworldforsocialcognition.Humanactsareespeciallyrelevanttoinfantsbecausetheylooklike theinfantfeelshimselftobeandbecausetheyarethingsinfantscanintend.Whenahumanactisshowntoanewbornbaby,itmayprovideaprimordial"Aha" experience:"Somethinginterpretable!That(seen)eventislikethis(felt)event."Itisnotsimplytheattractiveeyesandlipsoftheadultsthatarespecialforinfantsbut thewaythebodymovesanditsrelationtotheself.Thefactthatinfantscanrecreatetheactallowsthemtoimbueitwithspecialmeaning. Thus,weproposethattheinitialparsinginfantsimposeontheworldisnotanyoneofthe"usualsuspects"foundintextbooksandcommonlydiscussedatthebiennial meetingsoftheSocietyforResearchonChildDevelopment.ItisnottheGelmanSpelkedistinctionbetween"animate

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versusinanimate"(becausearmadillosareonlyofpassinginteresttoinfants).ItisnotthePremackLeslieMandlerdistinctionbetween"selfpropelledversusmoved byaseenforce"(becauseswingingclockpendulumsandfallingleavesarenotviewedbyinfantsasspecial).Itisnoteventhephilosopher'sdistinctionbetween "people(asadultsknowthem)versusthings."Webelievethattheprimordialdistinctionmaybesomethingcloserto"humanactsversusotherevents''(seeMeltzoff& Moore,1995,1997,formoredetailedargumentsalongthisline). Infants'construingcertainmovementsintheenvironmentintermsofhumanactsthatcanbeimitatedhascascadingdevelopmentaleffects:(a)Theworldofmaterial objectsisthendivisibleintothosethatperformhumanacts(people)andthosethatdonot(things)and(b)havingmadethedivisionintheexternalworld,new meaningsarepossible.Icanimitateothers,andthoseentitiesouttherecangenerativelyimitateme.Personsarespecialentities,theonlyentitiesintheworldwith whomIcansharebehavioralstates. Furthermore,therecognitionthatothersshareyourstateslaysthefoundationformakingfurtherprogresstowardascribingpsychologicalpropertiestothesepeople. Thismaycomeaboutinpartbecausetheinfantdetectsregularitiesintheirownbehaviorsandfeelings.Whentheyareactingina"tryandtryagain"mannertheyare strivingtoreachagoalthatisnotachieved.Whentheyfeelhappy,theyregularlyproduceasmilingface.Thereareregularitiesbetweenthewaytheyactandtheway theyfeel.Thiswouldhavenointerpersonalsignificanceifinfantscouldnotrecognizethatothersareactingjustlikethem.Butaswehavediscoveredfromstudiesof imitation,infantscanreadilyactlikeothersandrecognizewhenothersareactinglikethem.Thisrecognitionofsharingbehavioralstatesiscrucialbecauseitallowsa footholdforinfantsattributinglikementalstatestoothers.Weenvisionathreestepdevelopmentalsequence:(a)WhenIperformthatbodilyactIhavesuchandsuch aphenomenalexperience,(b)Irecognizethatothersperformthesametypeofbodilyactsasme,(c)theotherissharingmybehavioralstateergo,perhapstheother ishavingthesamephenomenalexperience.(Forfurtheranalysisofthisdevelopmentalsequence,seeMeltzoff,1990Meltzoff&Moore,1995,1997.) Onthisview,imitationandthecrossmodalrepresentationofhumanactsprovideakickstartforgettingfolkpsychologicalthinkingofftheground.Withoutit,people wouldnotbeseenaspsychologicalentities,'justlikeme."The"likemeness"ofothersistheessentialfoundationforalllatersocialcognitionfromtheattributionof mentalstates,toempathy,tomoraljudgments. Experimentation Wehavesuggestedelsewherethatyoungchildrenusepsychologicaldevicesthatbearaninterestingsimilaritytothecognitivedevicesthatareinvolvedintheory changeinscience(Gopnik,1996,1998

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Gopnik&Meltzoff,1997).Onesuchdeviceisactiveexperimentation.Wehaveproposedthatnormalinfantshaveanearly,andperhapsinnate,drivetoactively experimentwiththeworldinawaythatwillincreasetheirunderstandingofitandthatthisexperimentationplaysanimportantroleindevelopment. Thereisevidenceforaperiodofexperimentationaccompanyingthenewunderstandingofdesireandintentionthatemergesin"thedarkages."Wecandemonstrate thisdiscoveryinthelaboratory,butitisalsodramaticallyapparentinordinarylife.Parentsknowitasthe"terribletwos."(Thedarkages,indevelopmentasinhistory, aredarkinbothsenses,inmysteryandinretchedness.)Whatmakestheterribletwossoterribleisnotthatthebabiesdothingsyoudonotwantthemtodo,butthat theydothingsbecauseyoudonotwantthemto.Twoyearoldsaredeliberatelyperverse,whattheBritishcallbloodyminded.The2yearolddoesnotevenlookat theforbiddencomputerkeyboardasyoutypeyourgrantproposal.Insteadhishandgoesoutashelooks,steadily,gravely,andwithgreatdeliberation,atyou.Why dotheytortureusbyseekingtoplaywiththeverythingsintheworldwedesirethattheydonottouchthecomputer,thelampcord,thelipstick,thepowertools? Thisperversebehaviormayturnouttobequiterational.Considerthat2yearoldsareonlyjustinthecourseofdiscoveringthatpeoplemayhavedifferentdesires. Thebroccoliexperimentshowsthatchildrenfirststarttorealizethattherearedifferencesbetweentheirowndesiresandthoseofotherswhentheyareabout18 monthsold.Theterribletwosseemtoinvolveasystematicexplorationofthatidea,almostakindofexperimentalresearchprogram(seeGopnik&Meltzoff,1997 Repacholi&.Gopnik,1997,forfurtherarguments). Toddlersaresystematicallytestingthedimensionsonwhichtheirdesiresandthedesiresofothersmaybeinconflict.Thegravelookisdirectedatyoubecauseyou andyourreactions,ratherthantheforbiddenpowertools,arethereallyinterestingthings.Ifthechildisabuddingpsychologist,parentsarethelaboratoryrats. Moreover,theexperimentationisstrikingbecauseitactuallyconflictswiththechild'sapparentinterestindomesticpeace.TheFallhascome:Theyoungchildnow understandsthattheirowndesiresandthoseofothersarenotonlynotthesamebutthattheyoftenconflict.TheyareforcedfromthementalGardenofEden. IntegrationofEvidence Afurthercommonfactorinbothconceptualchangesinchildhoodandtheorychangeinscienceistheimportanceofrelevantevidence.Childrenhaveextensive evidenceaboutthenatureofhumanaction,intention,anddesire.Therearetwosetsofexperimentalfindingssuggestingthatevidenceaboutdesiresandintentionsmay induce

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developmentalchangeandpropeltoddlerstowardafullerunderstandingofmind. First,thereisaconsistentfindingintheliteraturethatyoungersiblingsdobetterontheoryofmindtasksthanonlyorolderchildren(Jenkins&Astington,1996 Perner,Ruffman,&Leekam,1994).Themostlikelyexplanationforthiseffectisthatsiblingsprovidechildrenwithrichevidenceaboutthemindandparticularlyabout differencesinminds.Rememberthatmuchofwhatchildrenlearninvolvesthedifferencesbetweentheirownmindsandthemindsofothers.Theylargelytakethe similaritiesforgrantedinfact,theassumptionthatwearelikeotherpeopleseemstobepartofabasicfoundationforunderstandingmindfoundininfancy.Parents, andperhapsespeciallysomemothers,tendtominimizethedistancebetweentheirownmentalstatesandthoseofthebabies.Theylookforcommonalityand understandinginsteadofdifference,andtheirlessonsarelargelylessonsaboutcongruence.Siblingsmayprovideanecessarycounterweight.Theyaremuchmore likelytoemphasizedifferencesbetweenwhattheywantandthebabywants,ortowitheringlycontrasttheirhighlysuperior4yearoldknowledgeandthebaby's pitiful2yearoldignorance.Otherdatashowingapositivecorrelationbetweenearlyparentchildtalkaboutfeelingsandlaterperformanceontheoryofmindtasks (Dunn,Brown,&Beardsall,1991Dunn,Brown,Slomkowski,Tesla,&Youngblade,1991)mightalsobeinterpretedfromthisviewpoint,assumingthatthe frequencyofconversationsmeasurescaptureincreasedtalkaboutconflictsindesires,notsolelyincreasedcongruencetalk,areasonableassumptiongiventhe functionsofeverydayconversations(e.g.,Bruner,1990). Thesecondsetofdatacomesfromworkinwhichweexplicitlytriedtoinducechangesinchildren'sunderstandingofthemindbygivingthemevidence(Slaughter& Gopnik,1996).Thefocusinthisstudywasondevelopmentsinfalsebelief,appearancereality,andsourceunderstandingbetween3and4yearsofage.Thetheory guidingtheresearchwassimilartothatofthischapterthatanunderstandingofmentalstatessuchasbeliefsemergefromapriorunderstandingofthemindthat includesconceptssuchasdesire,intention,perception,andsoon.Onepredictionfromthisviewpointisthatgivingchildrenexperiencewithunderstandingtheseearlier statesshouldinducethemtodevelopmorequicklyandtoacquireanunderstandingofbelieflikementalstateseventhoughthelatterwerenotpartofthetraining.Such anaccelerationstudywasconductedandtheresultsconfirmedthatprovidingchildrenwithevidencerelevanttodesireandperceptionsignificantlyincreasedtheir understandingofbelieflikementalstates,includingpassingthefalsebeliefexam.Thisaccelerationstudystronglysuggeststhatexperiencewithreasoningaboutdesires andperceptionsaredevelopmentalprecursorstounderstandingofbelief.

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Conclusions Thechallengenowistoarticulateatheoryaboutearlydevelopmentthattakesseriouslytherichnessoftheinitialstateofinfants'understandingofpersons,asrevealed inmoderninfancyresearch,andstillembracesdevelopmentalchange(Gopnik&Meltzoff,1994,1997Meltzoff&Moore,1997,1998).Wehavearguedforwhat wecalla"startingstatenativism"thatdoesn'treducetoFodor's(1987)"modularityorfinalstatenativism"inwhichtheoutcomesarefixedtobeginwithandsimply maturewithage.Onthecontrary,weproposethatdevelopmentproceedsbyaconstantprocessofrevision,liketheprocessoftheorychangeinscience.Infants neverfacetheempiricistdilemmaofinducingtheexistenceofthemindfromtherawdataofbehavior.Ontheotherhand,theyalsoarenottrappedbytheconstraints ofasingle,biologicallyfixedconstrualofotherpeople. Theanalogytoscienceenablesustosuggestthatthesophisticatedmentallifeofthe4yearoldcouldemergewithoutbeingpreprogrammedinthemindofthe newborn.ThefolkpsychologicalframeworkofWesternadultsisneitherinnatenormaturationallydetermineditisfashionedbythechildlargelytoaccountforhis experienceswithotherpersons.Children,liketheadultswhostudythem,startoffwithcertainpowerfulassumptions,theyexperiment,andthetheorytheyconstructis deeplyinfluencedbytheevidencetheyreceive.Ourunderstandingofchildrenandtheirunderstandingofusisnotfixedbynaturebutcobbledtogetherasweinteract witheachother. References Astington,J.W.,&Gopnik,A.(1991a).Developingunderstandingofdesireandintention.InA.Whiten(Ed.),Naturaltheoriesofmind:Evolution,development andsimulationofeverydaymindreading(pp.3950).Oxford:BasilBlackwell. Astington,J.W.,&Gopnik,A.(1991b).Theoreticalexplanationsofchildren'sunderstandingofthemind.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,9,731. Astington,J.W.,Harris,P.L.,&Olson,D.R.(1988).Developingtheoriesofmind.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Baldwin,D.A.(1993a).Earlyreferentialunderstanding:Infants'abilitytorecognizereferentialactsforwhattheyare.DevelopmentalPsychology,29,832843. Baldwin,D.A.(1993b).Infants'abilitytoconsultthespeakerforcluestowordreference.JournalofChildLanguage,20,395418. Baldwin,D.A.,Markman,E.M.,Bill,B.,Desjardins,R.N.,Irwin,J.M.,&Tidball,G.(1996).Infants'relianceonasocialcriterionforestablishingwordobject relations.ChildDevelopment,67,31353153. Baldwin,D.A.,&Moses,L.J.(1994).Earlyunderstandingofreferentialintentandattentionalfocus:Evidencefromlanguageandemotion.InC.Lewis&P.Mitchell (Eds.),Children\earlyunderstandingofmind:Originsanddevelopment(pp.133156).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates.

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Meltzoff,A.N.(1995).Understandingtheintentionsofothers:Reenactmentofintendedactsby18montholdchildren.DevelopmentalPsychology,31,838850. Meltzoff,A.N.(1996a,April).Theroleofimitationindevelopingatheoryofmind.InP.D.Zelazo(Chair),Intentionality:Aninterdisciplinaryapproach. SymposiumconductedatthemeetingoftheInternationalConferenceonInfantStudies,Providence,RI. Meltzoff,A.N.(1996b,August).Understandingintentionsininfancy.InA.Leslie(Chair),Children'stheoryofmind.SymposiumconductedattheXXVI InternationalCongressofPsychology,Montreal,Canada. Meltzoff,A.N.,&Gopnik,A.(1993).Theroleofimitationinunderstandingpersonsanddevelopingatheoryofmind.InS.BaronCohen,H.TagerFlusberg,& D.J.Cohen(Eds.),Understandingotherminds:Perspectivesfromautism(pp.335366).NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. Meltzoff,A.N.,&Moore,M.K.(1977).Imitationoffacialandmanualgesturesbyhumanneonates.Science,198,7578. Meltzoff,A.N.,&Moore,M.K.(1994).Imitation,memory,andtherepresentationofpersons.InfantBehaviorandDevelopment,17,8399. Meltzoff,A.N.,&Moore,M.K.(1995).Infants'understandingofpeopleandthings:Frombodyimitationtofolkpsychology.InJ.Bermdez,A.J.Marcel,&N. Eilan(Eds.),Thebodyandtheself(pp.4369).Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Meltzoff,A.N.,&Moore,M.K.(1997).Explainingfacialimitation:Atheoreticalmodel.EarlyDevelopmentandParenting,6,179192. Meltzoff,A.N.,&Moore,M.K.(1998).Objectrepresentation,identity,andtheparadoxofearlypermanence:Stepstowardanewframework.InfantBehavior andDevelopment,21,201235. Moses,L.J.(1993).Youngchildren'sunderstandingofbeliefconstraintsonintention.CognitiveDevelopment,8,125. Mumme,D.L.,Won,D.,&Fernald,A.(1994,June).Dooneyearoldinfantsshowreferentspecificrespondingtoemotionalsignals?Posterpresentedatthe meetingoftheInternationalConferenceonInfantStudies,Paris,France. O'Neill,D.K.(1996).Twoyearoldchildren'ssensitivitytoaparent'sknowledgestatewhenmakingrequests.ChildDevelopment,67,659677. Perner,J.(1991).Understandingtherepresentationalmind.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Perner,J.,Ruffman,T.,&Leekam,S.R.(1994).Theoryofmindiscontagious:Youcatchitfromyoursibs.ChildDevelopment,65,12281238. Repacholi,B.M.(1998).Infants'useofattentionalcuestoidentifythereferentofanotherperson'semotionalexpression.DevelopmentalPsychology,34,1017 1025. Repacholi,B.M.,&Gopnik,A.(1997).Earlyreasoningaboutdesires:Evidencefrom14and18montholds.DevelopmentalPsychology,33,1221. Searle,J.R.(1983).Intentionality:AnessayinthephilosophyofmindNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Shultz,T.R.(1980).Developmentoftheconceptofintention.InW.A.Collins(Ed.),TheMinnesotaSymposiumonChildPsychology(Vol.13,pp.131164). Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Shultz,T.R.,Wells,D.,&Sarda,M.(1980).Developmentoftheabilitytodistinguishintendedactionsfrommistakes,reflexes,andpassivemovements.British JournalofSocialandClinicalPsychology,19,301310. Slaughter,V.,&Gopnik,A.(1996).Conceptualcoherenceinthechild'stheoryofmind:Trainingchildrentounderstandbelief.ChildDevelopment,67,29672988. Stein,N.L.,&Levine,L.J.(1989).Thecausalorganizationofemotionalknowledge:Adevelopmentalstudy.CognitionandEmotion,3,343378. Taylor,M.(1996).Atheoryofmindperspectiveonsocialcognitivedevelopment.InR.Gelman&T.Au(Eds.),Handbookofperceptionandcognition:Vol.13. Perceptualandcognitivedevelopment(pp.283329).NewYork:AcademicPress.

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Tomasello,M.(1995).Jointattentionassocialcognition.InC.Moore&P..Dunham(Eds.),Jointattention:Itsoriginsandroleindevelopment(pp.103130). Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Tomasello,M.,&Barton,M.E.(1994).Learningwordsinnonostensivecontexts.DevelopmentalPsychology,30,639650. Tomasello,M.,Strosberg,R.,&Akhtar,N.(1996).Eighteenmontholdchildrenlearnwordsinnonostensivecontexts.JournalofChildLanguage,23,157176. Wellman,H.M.(1990).Thechild'stheoryofmind.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Wellman,H.M.(1993).Earlyunderstandingofmind:Thenormalcase.InS.BaronCohen,H.TagerFlusberg,&D.J.Cohen(Eds.),Understandingotherminds: Perspectivesfromautism(pp.1039).NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. Wellman,H.M.,&Banerjee,M.(1991).Mindandemotion:Children'sunderstandingoftheemotionalconsequencesofbeliefsanddesires.BritishJournalof DevelopmentalPsychology,9,191214. Wellman,H.M.,&Woolley,J.D.(1990).Fromsimpledesirestoordinarybeliefs:Theearlydevelopmentofeverydaypsychology.Cognition,35,245275. Wittgenstein,L.(1953).Philosophicalinvestigations(G.E.M.Anscombe,Trans.).NewYork:Macmillan. Yuill,N.(1984).Youngchildren'scoordinationofmotiveandoutcomeinjudgmentsofsatisfactionandmorality.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,2, 7381.

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Chapter3 IntentionalRelationsandTriadicInteractions
ChrisMoore DalhousieUniversity Thesecondhalfofinfancy,fromabout9monthstoabout18monthsofage,seestheadventofaparticularlyimportantsetofsocialskills.Duringthisperiod,infants starttoengagewithotherpersonsinvariousinteractionsthatinvolveathirdobjectorevent.Anessentialcomponentofthese"triadic"(Bakeman&Adamson,1984) interactionsisthat,forthefirsttime,infantsbecomeabletomakeuseofanotherperson'sintentionalactiontofindoutabouttheworld.Inanessentialway,these interactionsaredevelopmentallyhomologouswithalllaterculturalactivitiesinvolvingasharedfocusofattention,including,forexample,thewritingandreadingofthis volume.Itisthisabilitytoengageintriadicinteractionsthatdefinesusashumanbecausehumanknowledgeisknowledgethatissharedwithothers(e.g.,Tomasello, Kruger,&Ratner,1993). Eventheearliesttriadicinteractionsoflateinfancyclearlyinvolveasensitivitytotheintentionsofothers.However,thenatureofthissensitivityisstillatissue.This chapterisaboutwhattheinfantofabout12monthsknowsoftheintentionsofothers.Idonotsaymuchmoreaboutthedevelopmentofintentionalactionitself.Asa numberofauthorshavenoted(e.g.,Frye,1981,1991Russell,1996Tomasello,1995),itisprobablynocoincidencethatinfantsshowcoordinatedmeansends sequencesofactionataboutthetimetheystarttorespondappropriatelytoothers'objectorientedaction.Infact,partofmystoryisthattheinfant'sownintentional orientationstoobjectsandstatesofaffairsareanecessarycomponentofthefirstunderstandingofintention.However,mymain

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goalistoelucidatehowtheinfantatthisageunderstandsothers'intentionalaction. Tobeclearfromtheoutset,IshouldsaysomethingaboutwhatImeanbyintentional.Iamconcernedwithintentionsinthebroadersenseofintentionality,andnot limitedtopurposefulbehavior.Inthissense,intentionalcoversallpsychologicalorientationstoanobjectorstateofaffairs.Indeed,ofspecialinterestarethose psychologicalorientationsforwhichtheobjectisrealbutdisplacedinspace,ofwhichtheparadigmcaseinmyopinionislookingatsomething.Wehavearguedin recentyears(e.g.,Moore,inpressMoore&Corkum,1994)thatinfantsofabout12monthsdonotunderstandthatotherscanlookat(orattendto)things.Our claimhasbeenthat12montholdsinterpretothersprimarilyintermsoftheiractionsandnotintermsoftheirintentions(seealsoPovinelli,chap.11,thisvolume). AftergivingmytalkattheTorontoconferenceonwhichthisbookisbased,Iwasaccusedofassertingthatinfantsarebehaviorists.Thatwasnotthefirsttimethe chargehadbeenlaid,norhasitbeenthelast.Ithinkthisaccusationoccursfrequentlybecauseinmanypeople'sminds,eitheroneallowsthatinfants(oranyone) interpretactionasintentionalandmediatedbymentalstatesoronedisallowstheinvolvementofsuchmentalpropertiesininfants'interpretationsandtherebyconsigns infantstobeinglimitedtobehavioralinterpretation.BecauseIhavetakenaskepticalstanceintheevaluationofinfants'socialunderstanding,myaccounttendstoget assimilatedtothelatterview.Infact,mypositionisthatbothviewinginfantsashavinganunderstandingofothers'intentionsandviewinginfantsaslittlebehavioristsare problematicandequallysointhattheyimputeanindividualisticformofinterpretationtotheinfant.Incontrast,myviewisthatat12monthstheinfant'sunderstanding ofintentionisgroundedininteractivecontexts,notinindividuals. Inthesecondhalfofthechapter,Iconsidersomerecentworkfrommylaboratoryusingthenoveltypreferencetechniquetoexamineinfants'understandingofothers. Althoughbynomeansconclusive,thisworkis,Ibelieve,consistentwiththetheoreticalaccountdevelopedinthefirstpartofthechapter. IntentionalRelations Inearlierwork(Barresi&Moore,1996),BarresiandIarguedthatthedevelopmentoftheunderstandingofintentionalityisbestseenasaprogressivecoordinationof whatwecallintentionalrelations.Thelattertermismeanttodenotetheideathatallintentionalactivityisactivitybyanagentinrelationtosomething.The "something"canbearealobject,directlyperceived,oritcanbeamentalobject,whichincludespropositions.

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Thus,theideaofintentionalrelationsissupposedtocapturenotonlythemostcomplexpropositionalattitudesthatareusuallythedomainofphilosophersbutalsothe simplestintentionalacts.Significantly,ourgoalwastounitethephilosophicalnotionofthementalasintentionalwiththecommonsensenotionofpurposefulaction. Althoughthereisclearlyadifferencebetweenmentalactivityandbehavioralactivity,castingbothasformsofintentionalrelationrecognizestheircommonroots. Asadults,wehaveanindividualisticconceptionofintentionalrelations.Ourcommonsenseorfolkpsychologyisindividualisticinthesensethatagents,commonly persons,aretakentobeindividualcentersofintentionalactivitycapableoftakinguparangeofintentionalrelationswithrealandrepresentedobjects.Importantly,one ofthoseagentsistheself.Thefactthattheselfisrecognizedtobeanindividualagentlikeothersaroundusisselfevidentandyetarguablyoneofthemostsignificant featuresofcommonsensepsychology.Whenitcomestoagenthood,selfandotherareunderstoodtobeessentiallyequivalent.Weunderstandthatotherpeoplehave consciousexperienceoftherealandimaginativeworldsinthesamewaythatwedoandatthesametime,weunderstandthatweareobjectiveagentiveentitiesofthe samekindastheothersweseearoundus. Inourearlierwork,BarresiandI(Barresi&Moore,1996Moore&Barresi,1993)usedtheunderstandingofselfotherequivalenceasastartingpointforour theoreticalinvestigationintotheoriginsofintentionalunderstanding.Understandingthisequivalence,weargued,mustpresentaproblemforanaiveobserverof intentionalactivitybecausetheinformationavailabletoanobserverabouttheirownintentionalactivityisqualitativelyverydifferentfromtheinformationavailableto thatobserveraboutanyoneelse'sintentionalactivity.Toelaborate,wearguedthatinformationthatisavailabletoanobserveraboutanotheragent'sintentionalactivity emphasizestheagent'saction.Correspondingly,theobjectislesssalient,inparticularwhentheintentionalactivityisinrelationeithertoamentalobjectortoareal objectthatisdisplacedinspace.Theobservercannotknowdirectlytheobjectofanother'sintentionalrelation(theintentionalobject)andconsequentlyitwillhaveto beinferredinsomeway.Incontrast,theinformationthatisimmediatelyavailabletoanobserverabouthisorherownintentionalactivityisprimarilyfocusedonthe intentionalobject.Theagent(self)andanyactioninvolvedarelesssalient.Inthisway,thirdpersoninformationandfirstpersoninformationtendtoemphasize differentcomponentsoftheintentionalrelation.Thirdpersoninformationemphasizestheagentandhisorheractivity.Firstpersoninformationtendstoemphasizethe phenomenalcharacteristicsoftheobjectandone'sattitudetowardsit. Theepistemicproblemforanaiveobserverofintentionalactivityishowtorecognizethatbothfirstandthirdpersoninformationaboutthat

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activitycorrespondtothesamekindofthing,namelyanintentionalrelationbetweenanagentandanobject.We(Barresi&Moore,1996)arguedthattheremustbe somewayfortheyounginfanttoconstructtheequivalenceofintentionalrelationsofselfandotherfromtheavailableinputandsuggestedthatinteractivecontextsin whichintentionalrelationsbetweenselfandotheraresharedwouldprovidetherightkindofexperiencefromwhichtoconstructsuchanunderstanding.Gopnikand Meltzoff(1994)alsopointedtoselfotherequivalenceasanepistemicproblemforunderstandingintentionality,althoughtheirproposedsolutiontoitsdevelopmentis somewhatdifferentfromours(seeMoore,1996). Ouraccountindicatesthatthereisaperiodindevelopmentduringwhichinfantscanparticipateinsharedintentionalrelationswithoutbeingabletoattributean intentionalrelationtoanindividualagent,eitherselforother.Thesuggestionisthatthisperiodcomesinthesecondhalfofinfancyfromabout9monthsofage.As notedearlier,itisataboutthisagethatinfantsstarttoshowavarietyofbehaviorsthatallowthemtointeractwithanotherpersoninrelationtosomethirdobject.I adoptthetermtriadic(cf.Bakeman&Adamson,1984)torefertotheseinteractionsbecauseitcapturesinarelativelytheoreticallyfreemannertheimportantissue thattherearenowthreethingsinvolved:infant,adult,andthirdobject.Commonlycitedexamplesoftriadicinteractionsarejointvisualattentionorgazefollowing, socialreferencing,andprelinguisticcommunicativeactssuchaspointing(seeMoore&Corkum,1994). Althoughsomehaveinterpretedthesephenomenaasrevealinganearlyformoftheoryofmind(e.g.,Bretherton,1991Wellman,1993),Ithinkitisfairtosaythat suchaninterpretationisnotwarrantedonthebasisofthephenomenaalone.Elsewhere(Moore&Corkum,1994),wehaveprovidedaskepticalaccountofinfants' jointvisualattention,wherebyinfantswillturntolookinthesamedirectionasaninteractivepartner.Wearguedthatsuchgazefollowingdoesnotrequirethe attributiontoyounginfantsofanunderstandingofattention.Instead,infantsmayunderstandthatothers'gazebehaviorispredictiveofwhereinterestingsightswill occur.Theempiricalliteratureonthetopicisfullyconsistentwithsuchaview(seeMoore,inpress,forareview).BaldwinandMoses(1996)similarlyconsideredthe phenomenonofsocialreferencing,orcheckingofacaregiver'semotionalexpressionintimesofuncertainty,andconcludedthatitsoriginsmaylieintheattachment systemandnotinintentionalunderstanding(seealsoPovinelli,chap.11,thisvolume). Ifinfantsattheendofthefirstyeardonotunderstandothersintermsofintentionalrelations,thenhowdotheyrepresentothers?Wehavearguedthat,atthisage, infantsprocessothers'activityintermsofthirdpersoninformation,orinformationaboutthespatiotemporalpropertiesofbehavior.Theyareabletoengageintriadic interactionsbecausethethird

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personinformationprovidedbytheother'sintentionalactivitydirectedatobjectshasbecomelinkedinfamiliarandarousinginteractivestructureswiththeinfant'sown intentionalobjectorientedactivity.Thethirdpersoninformationprovidedbytheobservationoftheother'sactivityislinkedtothecorrespondingfirstperson informationprovidedbytheinfant'scoordinatedresponse. Totakeagaintheexampleofgazefollowing,infantsturninthesamedirectionassomeoneelse,notbecausetheyunderstandthattheotherislookingatsomething,but becausetheyareabletoparticipateinaninteractivestructurewherebytheobservationofanother'sheadturnleadstoanexpectationthataninterestingsightwill appeartotheside,andtoaconsequentheadturntolooktotheside.Thisaccountofgazefollowingfitsthedataongazefollowing.Forexample,Butterworthand others(e.g.,Butterworth&Cochran,1980Morissette,Ricard,&GouinDecarie,1995)showedthatwheninfantsfirststarttofollowgazetoobjectsoutsideofthe immediatevisualfield,theydonotseekoutthetargetoftheother'sgazebutonlyturnasfarasnecessarytoseesomethingofinterest. Ataboutthesametimeastheystarttofollowgazetoobjectsoutsidethevisualfield,infantsalsostarttodirectothers'attentiontowardsnovelorinterestingobjects usinggesturessuchaspointing(seeCarpenter,Nagell,&Tomasello,1998).Again,however,thisbehaviorcanbeunderstoodintermsofthethirdpersoninformation providedbytheactivityoftheotherbeinglinkedwithinfamiliarandarousinginteractivestructureswiththefirstpersoninformationprovidedbytheinfant'sown intentionalorientationtothenovelorinterestingevent.Here,theinfant'sownobservationofsomethingofinterestleadshimorhertoperformagesturewiththe expectationthattheadultwillthenprovidesomeinterestingfeedback(Moore,1998Moore&Corkum,1994). Insuchinteractiveepisodes,theinfantispresentedwithcorrespondingfirstandthirdpersoninformationabouttheintentionalrelation,anditisthecombinationof thesetwoformsofinformationthatprovidesthefirstformofintentionalunderstandinginthatanagentistherebyconnectedtoanintentionalobject.Thecriticalpoint forpresentpurposes,however,isthattheintentionalrelationisnotunderstoodtobeapropertyofeithertheselfortheinteractivepartner. WhyThisIsNotaBehavioralAccountofInfantSocialUnderstanding Itisimportanttopointoutherethattheclaimthatinfantsprocessothers'activityintermsofthirdpersoninformationdoesnotcommitonetoabehavioristviewof infantsocialunderstanding.AsInotedearlier,itissometimesthoughtthateitherinfantsunderstandtheintentionalnature

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ofothers'activityortheyarelittlebehaviorists.Ifinfantsonlyprocessinformationaboutothersinthirdpersonterms,thenisthatnotabehavioralview?Toseewhy not,considerwhatitmeanstohaveabehavioralunderstandingofhumanactivity.Toconstruehumanactionbehaviorallymeansthattheobserverunderstandsthereto bearelationbetweentheactionoftheotherpersonandtheobjectivestateofaffairs.Thisrelationisdeemedtobeacausalone,withtheobjectivestateofaffairs causingtheperson'sbehavior,andonethatisunmediatedbythatperson'smentalstates.Important,theobjectivestateofaffairsisunderstoodtobeaffectingtheother personindependentlyofitseffectsontheobserver.Thus,behavioralunderstandingresemblesadultintentionalunderstandinginthatitisindividualistic.Itdiffersfrom intentionalunderstandinginthatiteschewsmentalisticvariables. Ourclaimisthatinfantsdonotunderstandthattheotherisinarelation,intentionalorotherwise,totheobjectivestateofaffairs.Theother'sactivityisnotseentobe relatedtoanobjectineitherabehavioraloranintentionalmanner.Theactivityofanotheragentislinkedtoanobjectorstateofaffairsonlythroughtheconnection withtheinfant'sownfirstpersonintentionalorientationtothatobjectorstateofaffairs.Thus,theotherisnotunderstoodtohaveintentionalorientationstoobjects independentlyoftheinfant'sownorientationstothoseobjects.Equally,whereastheinfanthasintentionalorientationstoobjects,theselfisnotunderstoodtobean intentionalagent.Itisthethirdpersoninformationprovidedbytheobservationoftheother'sactivitycombinedwiththefirstpersoninformationprovidedfromthe infant'sownintentionalorientationtotheobjectorstateofaffairsthatconstitutesthefirstformofunderstandingofintentionalrelations.Onemightsaythatthe12 montholdrecognizesintentionalrelationsbutonlytotheextentthatshecansharesucharelationwithaninteractivepartner.Forthe1yearold,intentionalrelations existintheinteractionandarenotapropertyof,ordescriptiveof,individuals. This,then,isaconstructivistdevelopmentalstoryinthattheinteractivestructuresthatcontaintheessentialcomponentsforintentionalunderstandingformthebasison whichmoremature,individualisticformsofunderstandingdevelop.Ourclaimhasbeenthattheindividualisticformofunderstandingdependsonthecapacityfor imaginationorsecondorderrepresentation,whichdevelopsaroundthemiddleofthesecondyear.Onlywhenthechildcanimaginethecomponentoftheintentional relationthatisnotgiveninimmediateexperience(i.e.,firstpersoncomponentforothersandthirdpersoncomponentforself)willthenotionofintentionalrelationsthat aredescriptiveofpersonsbepossible.Imaginationmeansthatwhenthechildobservesanotherpersonengagedinintentionalactivity,shecanimaginethe correspondingfirstpersoninformationcom

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ponentandattributeittotheother.Atthesametime,whenthechildherselfactsintentionally,shecanimagineherselffromathirdpersonperspective.Inthiswaya uniformunderstandingofselfandotherbecomespossiblebecausethechildcanrepresentbothasagentsactinginrelationtointentionalobjects.Noticethatalthough thisaccounthassomesimilaritiestothesimulationviewofsocialunderstanding(e.g.,Harris,1992),itdiffersinthesensethatnotonlyisselfusedasamodelfor others,butalsoothersareusedasamodelforself. EmpiricalApproaches So,onepartofourclaimisthat1yearoldsrepresentothers'activityintermsofthirdpersoninformation,notintermsofintentionalrelations,buthowcanone examineinfants'understandingofothers'intentionalactivity?Someyearsago,CorkumandI(Moore&Corkum,1994)proposedthatthenoveltypreference paradigmcouldbeusedtoshedsomelightontheseissues.WewereparticularlyintriguedbytheuseofthenoveltypreferencemethodbyCohenandOakes(1993 Oakes&Cohen,1990)tostudyinfants'representationofcausalrelations.Likeintentionalrelations,causalrelationsinvolvearelationbetweenanagentandanobject, albeitonethatisbasedonthephysicalratherthanpsychologicalpropertiesoftheagent.Inaningeniousseriesofexperiments,CohenandOakesshowedthat10 montholdinfantsaresensitivetothecharacteristicsoftheobjectservingastheagentandthetypeofaction,butnottothecharacteristicsoftheobjectservingasthe recipientofthecausalevent. Ouridea(seealsoWoodward,1995)wasthatif12montholdsunderstandothersmainlyintermsofthirdpersoninformation,then,whenobservinganagent engagedinanintentionalrelationwithanobject,theyshouldpaymoreattentiontotheagentandhisorheractivityandlessattentiontotheoverallrelationincludingthe object,especiallyforintentionalactivityoperatingatadistance.Taketheexampleofsomeonepointingatanobject.Figure3.1arepresentsthecaseofaperson pointingatoneoftwoobjects,indicatingattentionorinterestinthatobject.Fromapurelythirdpersonperspective,therelevantinformationcomesfromthespatial propertiesoftheagent'saction,namelythedirectionofthepointinggesture.Imagineshowinganinfantthisscenerepeatedlyuntilhabituationoccursandthen substitutingeitherofFig.3.1borFig.3.1cinwhichthepositionofthetwoobjectshasbeenswitched.Bothofthesefiguresshowthesameagentpointingatoneofthe twoobjects.InFig.3.1b,theagentcontinuestopointtothesamelocationbutnowitistowardstheotherobject.InFig.3.1c,theagentcontinuestopointtothesame objectasbefore,therebychangingthespatialpropertiesofthepointinggesture.Accordingtothelogicofnovelty

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Fig.3.1. Schematicrepresentationofhabituationanddishabituationpointingevents.

preference,iftheinfantprocessedtheoriginalsceneintermsoftheintentionalrelation,''AgentisattendingtoObjectA,"thenthereshouldbegreaterrecoveryof lookingtoFig.3.1b.Incontrast,iftheinfantprocessedtheoriginalsceneintermsoftheagent'sactivityalone,thenthereshouldbegreaterrecoveryoflookingtoFig. 3.1c. Wehavenowconductedaseriesofthreeexperimentsusingthislogic(seeTable3.1)andalthoughtheresultsdidnotcomeoutexactlyasanticipated,Ibelievethey doshedsomelightontheissuesdiscussed.

TABLE3.1 OverviewoftheThreeExperimentsUsingNoveltyPreference ParadigmtoExamineInfants'RepresentationofIntentionalAction Experiment 1 Format Live HabituationStimulus Adult1pointsatToyA DishabituationStimuli Adult1pointsatToyA Adult1pointsatToyB Adult2pointsatToyA Adult2pointsatToyB Adult1pointsatToyA Adult1pointsatToyB

Live

Adult1pointsatToyA

Video

Adult1pointsatToyA

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GeneralMethod Inallthreeexperiments,participantsrangedinagefrom12to14months.Fortyinfantsparticipatedineachofthefirsttwoexperimentswithaverageagesof131(i.e., 13months,1day)and136,respectively.Thirtysixinfantsofaverageage137participatedinExperiment3.Ateachage,infantsweredividedintotwoequal presentationordergroups. Theexperimentswereconductedinalaboratoryroomenclosedinplainbrowncurtains.Theinfantsatinahighchairpulleduptoatable,60cmhigh,90cmlong,and 60cmwide.Inthemiddleofthetablewasaslotintowhichaclothscreen(60cmwide40cmhigh)wasfolded.Thisscreenwasattachedviafishinglineanda pulleysystemtoahandlethattheexperimenter,whowaspresentintheroomwiththeinfant,manipulated.Thescreentherebycouldberaisedandloweredbythe experimenterattheappropriatepointsinthesession.Thestimuliwerepresentedontheothersideofthescreenfromtheinfantsothatwhenraised,thescreen obscuredtheinfant'sviewofthestimulusmaterials.Thestimulusincludedanadultwhoproducedthepointinggestureandtwotoysplacedatjustoverarm'slengthin frontoftheadult.Thetoys,asmallstuffeddogandasimilarlysizedplasticcar,wereplacedonsmallplatformssothattheywereabout4inchesoffthetable. Anoveltypreferenceparadigmwasemployed.Inthefirstphase,infantswerepresentedrepeatedlywiththehabituationstimulus.Infantlookingwascodedbyan observerinanadjacentroomfromamonitor.Adifferentobserverwasusedforeachexperiment.Theobservercouldcommunicatewiththeexperimenterthroughthe useofwirelessintercom.LookingtimewasmeasuredusingMacXHab1.4software,1995(J.Pinto,StanfordUniversity,1995)runningonaMacintoshPowermac 7100computer.Whenevertheinfantwasjudgedtobelookingatthedisplay,theobserverdepressedacomputerkeyandreleaseditwhentheinfantlookedaway. Forthepurposesofscoringinfantlooking,thedisplayincludedtheadultandthetwotoys.Ifthekeywasreleasedfor2seconds,thecomputersignaledthatthetrial wasoverandtheobserverrelayedthisinformationtotheexperimenter.Theexperimenterthenraisedthescreenfor2secondsandlowereditagaintobeginthenext trial.Thecomputercalculatedlookingtimeautomaticallyandsignaledwhenthehabituationcriterion(a50%decrementinmeanlookingtimeoverthreetrials comparedtothefirstthreetrials)wasreached.Atthispoint,theobserversignaledtotheexperimenterthatthecriterionhadbeenreached.Theexperimenterraised thescreenandswitchedtothedishabituationstimuli.Therewere6dishabituationtrialscomprisingthreedifferenttoytrialsandthreesametoytrialsinalternating sequence.Orderofthetrialswascounterbalanced.Fordifferenttoytrialstheexperimenterpointedatthesecondtoy,which

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wasnowinthesamelocationasthefirsttoyhadbeenduringhabituationtrials.Inthisway,thepointinggesturewasexactlythesameasbefore,butitwasnow towardsadifferenttoy.Forthesametoytrialstheexperimenterpointedatthesametoyasbefore,butnowitwasinadifferentlocationrequiringachangeinthe spatialorganizationofthepointinggesture.Dishabituationtrialsproceededandwerecodedinthesamemannerashabituationtrials. Reliability Inordertocheckreliability,allsubjects'lookingbehaviorwascodedfromvideotapebyanewcoderwhowasnaivetotheexperimentalhypotheses.Reliabilitycoding wasdoneinthesamewayaslivecoding.Ratherthangenerateanarbitraryreliabilitystatisticforcodingacceptability,wewantedtodetermineifthepatternsofresults wereaffectedbywhodidthecoding.Tothisend,foreachexperiment,weanalyzedallofthedataforthelivecoderandforthereliabilitycoderinoverallrepeated measuresanalysesofvariance(ANOVAs),treatingcoderasawithinsubjectsvariable.Theseanalysesallshowedamaineffectofcoderwiththelookingtimesbeing longerforthereliabilitycoder.Inaddition,forExperiment2only,thecodervariableinteractedsignificantlywiththeothervariables.Furtheranalysesshowedthatthe effectsoftheothervariableswerestrongerforthereliabilitycoderthanforthelivecoder.ForExperiments1and3,thecodervariabledidnotshowinteractioneffects withanyoftheothervariables.Thus,althoughthereliabilitycodertendedtorecordlongerlookingtimesingeneral,theothereffectswererobustindependentlyofwho didthecodingorwhetheritwasdoneliveorfromreplay.Inwhatfollows,onlytheresultsfromthelivecoderarereported. Experiment1 Inthefirstexperiment,weessentiallyconductedtheexperimentsketchedintheintroductiontothissection.Infantssatoppositeanadultexperimenterwhostoodinfull viewandfacingtheinfant.Oneachtrialtheexperimentersaid,"Ohlook,"andproducedapointwitharmextendedatoneoftwotoys.Throughoutthehabituation phasetheexperimenterpointedatthesameobjectonthesameside.Theparticularobjectusedinthehabituationphaseaswellasthesideonwhichitwaslocated wascounterbalancedacrosssubjects.Oncethehabituationcriterionhadbeenreached,theexperimenterswitchedthelocationsofthetoysandtheexperimentmoved intothedishabituationphase.Oversixtrials,theexperimenteralternatedthelocationofherpoint,therebypresentingdifferenttoyandsametoytrialsinalternating sequence.Forhalfoftheinfants,the

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experimenterstartedthedishabituationphasewithadifferenttoytrialandfortheotherhalf,thisphasewasstartedwithasametoytrial. Todeterminewhetherinfantslookedlongeratthedishabituationstimuli,atwowayrepeatedmeasuresANOVAwascarriedoutontheresults.Foreachpresentation order,themeanlookingtimeofthelastthreehabituationtrialswascomparedwiththelookingtimesforthefirstdifferenttoytrialandforthefirstsametoytrial.This analysisyieldedonlyasignificanteffectoftrial,F(2,76)=28.62,p<.001.Analysisofleastsquaremeansshowedthatallthreemeansweresignificantlydifferent fromeachother,withthegreatestrecoveryoflookingforthedifferenttoytrials(seeFig.3.2). AthreewayrepeatedmeasuresANOVAwasalsoconductedonthedishabituationtrialsalonewithpresentationorderasabetweensubjectsvariableandtrialtype (differenttoy,sametoy)andtrialnumber(first,second,third)aswithinsubjectsvariables.Thisanalysisshowedthatalthoughlookingtimesdecreasedsignificantly throughthedishabituationphase,F(2,76)=34.32,p<.001,thedifferenceinlookingtimebetweenthetrialtypeswasmaintainedwithasignificantmaineffectfor trialtype,F(1,76)=6.51,p<.05,andnointeractioneffects. Theimportantresultfromthisexperimentwasthatalthoughinfantsshowedasignificantrecoveryoflookingtobothofthetwodishabituation

Fig.3.2. Meanlookingtimeforthelastthreehabituationtrialsandforthetwo typesofdishabituationtrialsforExperiment1.

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stimuli,thisrecoverywasgreaterforthestimuluseventinwhichtheexperimenterpointedatthedifferenttoy.Becausethelocationofthetoyshadbeenswitched,the pointinggestureinthiseventhadthesamespatialpropertiesasinthehabituationevent.Therefore,itappearsthattheinfantssawmorenoveltyintheexperimenter pointingtothesamelocationatthedifferentobjectthanintheexperimenterpointingtothedifferentlocationatthesameobject. Accordingtothelogicoutlinedabove,thisfindingisnotconsistentwithourtheoreticalaccountbutratherimpliesthatinfantsdorepresentagent'sactivityintermsof theintentionalrelationbetweentheexperimenterandthetoy.However,webelievedthatanotherinterpretationwasalsopossible.Becausetheinfantswerepresented withthesameadultpointinggestureinthehabituationphase,theymayhavefollowedthispointrepeatedlyandtherebyendedupattendingmoreduringhabituationto thefirsttoy.Ifso,thenhabituationmayhaveoccuredtothetoyratherthantothewholeeventofexperimenterpointingatthetoy.Havinghabituatedtothefirsttoy,it wouldbenaturalfortheinfanttoshowmorerecoveryoflookingtotheeventinwhichtheexperimenterpointedatthesecondtoy.Inordertoexaminethispossibility, weconductedasecondexperimentinwhichtheonlymodificationfromthefirstexperimentwastheuseoftwodifferentexperimenterstoperformthehabituationand dishabituationevents.Iftheinfantswererepresentingthepointingeventsintermsofanintentionalrelationbetweentheadultagentandthetoy,thenwhenanewadult wasintroducedtoperformthedishabituationevents,botheventsshouldbeequallynovelbecausetheagentoftheintentionalrelationhaschanged.Thereshould, therefore,benodifferenceinrecoveryoflookingtothetwotypesofdishabituationtrials.However,iftheeffectwasachievedmerelythroughtherelativefamiliarityof thetoys,thentheresultsshouldbeunchangedfromthefirstexperimentbytheintroductionofasecondexperimenter. Experiment2 Inthenextexperiment,wecloselyfollowedthedesignandmethodofthefirstwithoneimportantchange.Twoexperimenterswereusedtodeliverthestimuli,onefor habituationandonefordishabituation.Thefirstexperimenterdeliveredthehabituationstimuliasinthefirstexperimentwhilethesecondexperimenterwaitedbehind thecurtaintotherearofthefirstexperimenter.Afterhabituationhadbeenachieved,thefirstexperimenterraisedthescreen,switchedthelocationsofthetwotoys, andthenchangedplaceswiththesecondexperimenter,whocompletedtheexperiment,deliveringthedishabituationstimuli.Inallotherrespects,thisexperimentwas anexactreplicationofthefirst.

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ThesameanalysesasforExperiment1werecarriedoutandessentiallythesamepatternofresultswasobserved.ThetwowayrepeatedmeasuresANOVA comparingthemeanlookingtimesforthelastthreehabituationtrialswiththelookingtimesforthefirstdifferenttoytrialandforthefirstsametoytrialshoweda significanteffectoftrial,F(2,76)=17.42,p<.001,butnoeffectofpresentationorder,orinteraction.Analysisofleastsquaremeans(p<.05)showedthatallthree meanswereagainsignificantlydifferentfromeachother,withthegreatestrecoveryoflookingforthedifferenttoytrials(seeFig.3.3). ThethreewayrepeatedmeasuresANOVA(OrderTrialTypeTrialNumber)conductedonthedishabituationtrialsshowedthatthedifferencebetweendifferent toytrialsandsametoytrialsmaintaineditselfthroughoutthedishabituationphase,F(1,76)=6.98,p<.05,evenaslookingtimesdecreasedthroughthephase,F(2, 76)=10.84,p<.001. Theresultsfromthisexperimentcloselymatchedthosefromthefirstexperiment.Infantsshowedsignificantrecoveryoflookingtobothdishabituationevents,thereby showingevidenceofdiscriminatingbothfromthehabituationevent,butsignificantlymorerecoverytotheeventinwhichtheexperimenterpointedtothesamelocation atthesecondtoy.Theseresultscannoteasilybeinterpretedtomeanthatinfantsrepresentothersintermsoftheirintentionalrelationstoobjects.Theinfantshad becomehabituated

Fig.3.3. Meanlookingtimeforthelastthreehabituationtrialsand forthetwotypesofdishabituationtrialsforExperiment2.

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totheeventinvolvingthefirstexperimenterpointingatthefirsttoy.Therefore,thetwoeventsinthedishabituationphaseinvolvedequallynovelintentionalrelations becauseasecondexperimenteractedastheintentionalagent.However,thetwoeventswerenottreatedasequallynovelbytheinfants.Theexperimenterpointingat thesecondtoywasseenasmorenovel.Asaresult,amorereasonableinterpretationoftheresultsisthattheinfantshadhabituatedlargelytothefirsttoyandthus weremoreinterestedinthedishabituationeventinvolvingthesecondtoy. Thesetwoexperimentshaveleftusinapositionwherewemightsimplydoubttheutilityofthisapproachtoinvestigatinginfants'understandingofintentionalrelations. Inasense,theactivityoftheagentdidnotenterintotheinfants'representationstheinfantjustattendedtothedesignatedtoys.However,itisimportanttorecognize thatthereasontheinfantsattendedtothetoysinthewaythattheydidwasbecauseoftheactivityoftheexperimenters.Althoughwemaythinkoftheeventsas experimentalstimuli,fortheinfantstheseeventsincludedrealinteractivepeople,eveniftheywereinteractinginaratherstiltedmanner.Theinfantsattendedtothe objectsthattheydidbecausetheyweredirectedtodosobytheexperimenters.Inshort,theexperimentaleventswerethemselvestriadicinteractionsbetweenthe infantsandtheexperimenters. Inordertotrytoremovethisinteractivecomponentfromtheexperimentalsituation,wedecidedtorepeatthefirstexperimentwithvideotapedstimulusevents.Our hopewasthatbypresentingtheeventsonaTVmonitor,theinfantswouldbelesslikelytorespondtothemasinteractiveevents.Clearlyadults,forthemostpart, responddifferentlywhenobservingsocialbehaviorliveandonvideotape.Althoughthereisevidencethatyoungerinfantswillrespondinteractivelytosocialstimulation presentedonTVscreens(e.g.,Murray&Trevarthen,1986),thisevidenceinvolvesdyadicnottriadicinteraction.Becausetriadicinteractionincludesathirdobjectin thesharedworldoftheinteractivepartners,itispossiblethatitislesslikelytooccurwhentheinteractivepartnersarenotsimultaneouslypresentwiththethirdobject. Inanycase,ourhopewasthat12montholdinfantswouldbelesslikelytorespondinteractivelytovideotapedimagesofpeoplepointingtoobjectsandconsequently morelikelysimplytoattendtotheoverallevents. Experiment3 Inthethirdexperiment,werepeatedthefirstexperimentexceptthatthestimuluseventswerepresentedona20inchTVmonitorfromvideotape.Themonitorsat facingtheinfantonthetablebehindtheslotforthescreen.TheVCRwasonthefloorbehindthetableandtheexperimentersatonasmallstooloutofviewbehind themonitorandcontrolledthe

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presentationofthestimuli.Atotalofsixvideotapeswereconstructed,twohabituationandfourdishabituation.Forthehabituationtapes,anadultfemaleexperimenter wastapedasshesaid"Ohlook!"andpointedatoneofthetoys,adifferenttoyforeachtape.Thesetapescontained14trials,each30secondslong.Two dishabituationtapesweremadeforeachhabituationtape,withthepositionofthetwotoysswitched.Thesetapescorrespondedtothetwoordersofpresentationof thedishabituationtrialsandallsixdishabituationtrialswererecordedoneachtape. Duringthehabituationphasethechosenhabituationtapewasplayeduntiltheinfantlookedawayfor2seconds.Thescreenwasthenraisedandthetapefast forwardedtothestartofthenexttrial,whichwaselectronicallymarkedonthetape.Thescreenwasloweredandthisnexttrialplayed.Afterthehabituationcriterion hadbeenreached,thescreenwasraisedandthehabituationtapewasejectedfromthecassetterecorder.Theassigneddishabituationtapewasinsertedandthe screenlowered.Thefirstdishabituationtrialwasthenplayed.Oncetheinfanthadlookedawayfor2seconds,thescreenwasraisedandthetapefastforwardedto thebeginningofthenexttrial,whichwaselectronicallymarked. Again,thesameanalysesasforthepreviousexperimentswerecarriedout.Onlyasignificanteffectoftrial,F(2,78)=17.24,p<.001,wasfoundforthetwoway repeatedmeasuresANOVAcomparingthemeanlookingtimeofthelastthreehabituationtrialswiththelookingtimesforthefirstdifferenttoytrialandforthefirst sametoytrialshowedforthetwopresentationorders.Analysisofleastsquaremeans(p<.05)showedthatallthreemeansweresignificantlydifferentfromeach other.Thisresultshowsthatdishabituationoccurredtobothstimulusevents,whichisimportantbecauseitconfirmsthattheinfantsdidnoticetheswitchingofthetoys inthevideotapeddisplays.Inthisexperiment,unliketheprevioustwo,thegreatestrecoveryoflookingwasforthesametoytrialsinwhichtheexperimenterpointedto thedifferentlocation(seeFig.3.4). ThethreewayrepeatedmeasuresANOVAconductedonthedishabituationtrialsshowedonlyasmallmaineffectoftrialnumber,F(2,68)=3.17,p<.05,withtrial onehavinggreaterlookingtimesthantrialthree(leastsquaremeans,p<.05).Theothertrialnumbercomparisonswerenotsignificantlydifferentfromeachother. Therewasnotasignificantdifferencebetweensametoytrialsanddifferenttoytrialswhenthedishabituationphasewasconsideredasawhole. Whereastheeffectsinthisexperimentwerenotasstrongasintheprevioustwoexperiments,itwasneverthelessthecasethatinfantsshowedmorerecoveryof lookingtotheeventinwhichtheadult'sactionchanged.Itisworthpointingoutthatthiseffectoccurredeventhoughtheinfantshadnoticedtheswitchinthetoys, giventhattheyshowedsignificantrecoveryoflookingtobothdishabituationevents.

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Fig.3.4. Meanlookingtimeforthelastthreehabituationtrialsand forthetwotypesofdishabituationtrialsforExperiment3.

Incontrasttothosefromthefirstexperiment,theresultsfromthisexperimentareconsistentwithouroriginalideathatinfantsrepresentintentionalactivitylargelyin termsoftheagent'sactionandnotintermsoftherelationbetweentheagentandtheobject.Whenthespatiotemporalpropertiesoftheagent'sactionchanged,the infantshowedmorerecoveryoflookingeventhoughtheactionwasstilldirectedatthesameobject.Lessrecoveryduringthedishabituationphasewasseenwhenthe actionhadthesameformasinthehabituationphasebutwasdirectedatthenewobject. SummaryandConclusion TheresultsfromExperiment1showedthatinfantssawmorenoveltywhentheadultpointedtoanewtarget,eventhoughthepointinggesturehadexactlythesame spatiotemporalproperties,thanwhenshepointed,usingagesturewithdifferentspatiotemporalproperties,tothesametargetasbefore.TheresultsfromExperiment2 showedthatthiseffectwasnotlikelyduetotheinfantsrepresentingtheeventsintermsoftheintentionalrelationbetweentheparticularadultandthetoybecausethe sameresultswereachievedevenwhenadifferentadultperformedthepointinggesture

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inthedishabituationphase.InExperiment3,theinfantssawmorenoveltywhentheadultusedadifferentpointinrelationtothesametoythanwhensheusedthesame pointinrelationtoadifferenttoy. ItisthecontrastbetweentheresultsfromExperiments1and3thatisparticularlystriking.Thestructureofthesetwoexperimentswasverysimilar,withthemain differencebeingthemethodofeventpresentation.InExperiment1,aliveadultpointedtooneoftwotoysinfrontoftheinfantsinExperiment3,thesameevents wereshownonTV.Inevitably,thischangeinmethodofpresentationentailedanumberofdifferencesinthecharacteristicsofthestimuliforexample,theoverallsize ofthestimuliwasreducedintheTVpresentation.However,perhapsmostimportantwasthechangefromlivetorecordedpresentation.TheadultinExperiment1 wasarealadultstandinginfrontoftheinfantwithtworealtoysinterposedbetweenthem.InExperiment3,theadultandtoyswereonTV.Correspondingly,the infantsinExperiment1appearedtorespondappropriatelyforaliveinteraction,attendingmoretothetoytowhichtheadultpointed.However,theinfantsin Experiment3didnotrespondasthoughitwasaliveinteractionandappearedtorepresentthevideotapeddisplaysintermsoftheadult'sgesture.Inasense,then,the changebetweenExperiments1and3wasthatthepointingadulthadbecomeanobjectofcontemplationratherthananinteractivepartnerandassuchtheinfantspaid moreattentiontotheformoftheaction. FinalWords Althoughtheresultsfromourhabituationexperimentsdidnotcomeoutexactlyaswehadinitiallypredicted,Ithinkthattheresultsarerelevanttotheissuesconsidered inthefirsthalfofthechapter.ThecontrastbetweentheresultsofExperiments1and2ontheonehandandExperiment3ontheothercharacterizesthedifferences betweenaninteractiveunderstandingofintentionalrelationsandarepresentationofother'sagentiveactivityfromathirdpersonperspectiverespectively.Infantsofthis agearequiteadeptatparticipatingwithothersinsharedintentionalrelations(e.g.,Carpenteretal.,1998).Whensomeonepoints,theywillattendtowhateveris indicated.Althoughineffecttheinfantsaretherebyattendingtothepartner'sintentionalobject,suchresponsivitydoesnotentailaninferencethattheotherisattending tothatobject.Theinfant'sownresponsemaybelinkedtotheobservationoftheother'sbehaviorbecausethethirdpersoninformationprovidedbytheother'sactivity leadsininteractivecontextstoanexpectationofaninterestingexperience.However,whentheinteractivecontextisremovedandtheinfantsdonotrespondtothe adult'spointing,itispossiblethatapurerassessmentoftheinfants'

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intepretationoftheintentionaleventisachieved.Inthatcase,itappearsthattheother'sactivityisrepresentedintermsofitsspatiotemporalproperties(orthirdperson information),notintermsoftherelationtotheintentionalobject. Nevertheless,theexperiencethattheinfantsreceivedinExperiment3wasparticularlyartificial.Inreallife,infantsdonotsitaspassiveobserversofotherpeople's activity.Rather,theyparticipatewithothersininteractiveexchangeswherethecombinedexperienceoftheavailablefirstandthirdpersoninformationenablesa genuineapprehensionofanintentionalrelation.Whereinfantsdifferfromolderchildrenisthat,forinfants,theintentionalrelationisnotheldtobeapropertyofeither oftheinteractivepartnersindividuallybutratherisapropertyoftheinteractionitself. Acknowledgments ManyofthetheoreticalideasinthischapterwereworkedoutincollaborationwithJohnBarresi.IamgratefultoAmandaWoodwardforanumberofstimulating discussionsandsuggestionsontheempiricalworkandtothefollowingwhohelpedwiththedatacollection:KarenAnthony,PaulaBennett,ShannonMacgillivray,and KristaWalters.Finally,thankstoPhilipZelazofororganizingtheTorontoconferenceonintentioninactionandtoDavidOlsonforhisvaluablefeedbackonthis chapter. References Bakeman,R.,&Adamson,L.(1984).Coordinatingattentiontopeopleandobjectsinmotherinfantandpeerinfantinteractions.ChildDevelopment,55,1278 1289. Baldwin,D.A.,&Moses,L.(1996).Theontogenyofsocialinformationgathering.ChildDevelopment,67,19151939. Barresi,J.,&Moore,C.(1996).Intentionalrelationsandsocialunderstanding.BehavioralandBrainSciences,19,107122. Bretherton,I.(1991).Intentionalcommunicationandthedevelopmentofmind.InD.Frye&C.Moore(Eds.),Children'theoriesofmind:Mentalstatesand socialunderstanding(pp.4975).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Butterworth,G.,&Cochran,E.(1980).Towardsamechanismofjointvisualattentioninhumaninfancy.InternationalJournalofBehavioralDevelopment,3, 253272. Carpenter,M.,Nagell,K.,&Tomasello,M.(1998).Socialcognition,jointattention,andcommunicativecompetencefrom9to15monthsofage.Monographsof theSocietyforResearchinChildDevelopment,63(SerialNo.255,1142). Cohen,L.B.,&Oakes,L.M.(1993).Howinfantsperceiveasimplecausalevent.DevelopmentalPsychology,29,421433. Frye,D.(1981).Developmentalchangesinstrategiesofsocialinteraction.InM.Lamb&L.Sherrod(Eds.),Infantsocialcognition(pp.315331).Hillsdale,NJ: LawrenceErlbaumAssociates.

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Frye,D.(1991).Theoriginsofintentionininfancy.InD.Frye&C.Moore(Eds.),Children'stheoriesofmind.Mentalstatesandsocialunderstanding(pp.15 38).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Gopnik,A.,&Meltzoff,A.N.(1994).Minds,bodies,andpersons:Youngchildren'sunderstandingoftheselfandothersasreflectedinimitationand''theoryof mind"research.InS.Parker,M.Boccia,&R.Mitchell(Eds.),Selfawarenessinanimalsandhumans:Developmentalperspectives(pp.166186).NewYork: CambridgeUniversityPress. Harris,P.L.(1992).Fromsimulationtofolkpsychology.MindandLanguage,7,120144. Moore,C.(1996).Theoriesofmindininfancy.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,14,1940. Moore,C.(inpress).Gazefollowingandthecontrolofattention.InP.Rochat(Ed.),Earlysocialcognition.Mahwah,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Moore,C.(1998).Socialcognitionininfancy.MonographsoftheSocietyforResearchinChildDevelopment,63(SerialNo.255,167174). Moore,C.,&Barresi,J.(1993).Knowledgeofthepsychologicalstatesofselfandothersisnotonlytheoryladenbutalsodatadriven.BehavioralandBrain Sciences,16,6162. Moore,C.,&Corkum,V.(1994).Socialunderstandingattheendofthefirstyearoflife.DevelopmentalReview,14,349372. Morissette,P.,Ricard,M.,&GouinDecarie,T.(1995).Jointvisualattentionandpointingininfancy:Alongitudinalstudyofcomprehension.BritishJournalof DevelopmentalPsychology,13,163175. Murray,L.,&Trevarthen,C.(1986).Theinfant'sroleinmotherinfantcommunications.JournalofChildLanguage,13,1529. Oakes,L.M.,&Cohen,L.B.(1990).Infantperceptionofacausalevent.CognitiveDevelopment5,193207. Russell,J.(1996).Agency.Itsroleinmentaldevelopment.Mahwah,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Tomasello,M.(1995).Jointattentionassocialcognition.InC.Moore&P.Dunham(Eds.),Jointattention:Itsoriginsandroleindevelopment(pp.103130). Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Tomasello,M.,Kruger,A.C.,&Ratner,H.H.(1993).Culturallearning.BehavioralandBrainSciences,16,495511. Wellman,H.M.(1993).Earlyunderstandingofmind:Thenormalcase.InS.BaronCohen,H.TagerFlusberg,&D.Cohen(Eds.),Understandingotherminds: Perspectivesfromautism(pp.1039).Oxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress. Woodward,A.(1995,March).Infants'reasoningaboutthegoalsofahumanactor.PaperpresentedatthebiennialmeetingoftheSocietyforResearchinChild Development,Indianapolis.

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Chapter4 HavingIntentions,UnderstandingIntentions,andUnderstandingCommunicativeIntentions
MichaelTomasello MaxPlanckInstituteforEvolutionaryAnthropology,Leipzig,Germany InmuchofmypreviousworkIhavefocusedonhumaninfants'earliestunderstandingofotherpersonsasintentionalagentsbeginningataround9monthsofage(e.g., Tomasello,1995aCarpenter,Nagell,&Tomasello,1998).Inthischapter,Iwouldliketolookatamajorcauseandamajorconsequenceofthis9monthsocial cognitiverevolutionandbothofthesealsoconcerninfantintentionality.First,Iarguethatyoungchildren'sunderstandingofotherpersonsasintentionalagentsresults inlargepartfromnewlyemergingformsofintentionalityintheirownsensorymotoractions.Thisaccountalsospecifieswhynonhumanprimatesundernormal circumstancesdonotcometounderstandconspecificsasintentionalagents.Second,Iexploreyoungchildren'sunderstandingofaspecialtypeofintentionthat emergesdirectlyontheheelsofthe9monthrevolution,namely,communicativeintentions.Thisunderstandingisofapiecewithinfants'otherformsofintentional understandingatthisage,butithassomespecialcharacteristicsaswell.Onceagain,comparisonwithnonhumanprimatesisinstructiveinthatithelpstoidentifysome oftheparticularsocialcognitiveskillsinvolved. The9MonthRevolution Sixmontholdinfantsinteractdyadicallywithobjects,graspingandmanipulatingthem,andtheyalsointeractdyadicallywithotherpeople,expressingemotionsback andforthinaturntakingsequence.Butataround

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9to12monthsofageinfantsbegintoengageininteractionsthataretriadicinthesensethattheyinvolvethereferentialtriangleofchild,adult,andsomeoutsideentity towhichtheyshareattention.Thus,infantsatthisagebegintoflexiblyandreliablylookwhereadultsarelooking(gazefollowing),useadultsassocialreferencepoints (socialreferencing),andactonobjectsinthewayadultsareactingonthem(imitativelearning)inshort,to"tunein"totheattentionandbehaviorofadultstoward outsideentities.Atthissameage,infantsalsobegintousecommunicativegesturestodirectadultattentionandbehaviortooutsideentitiesinwhichtheyareinterested (imperativesanddeclaratives)inshort,togettheadultto"tunein"tothem.Inmanycasesseveralofthesebehaviorscometogetherastheinfantinteractswithan adultinarelativelyextendedboutofjointengagementwithanobject(Bakeman&Adamson,1984).Mostoftenthetermjointattentionhasbeenusedto characterizethiswholecomplexoftriadicsocialskillsandinteractions,anditrepresentssomethingofarevolutioninthewayinfantsrelatetotheirworlds(seechapters inMoore&Dunham,1995). Myownviewisthatinfantsengageinjointattentionalinteractionswhentheybegintounderstandotherpersonsasintentionalagents(Tomasello,Kruger,&Ratner, 1993Tomasello,1995a).Intentionalagentsareanimatebeingswiththepowertocontroltheirspontaneousbehavior,buttheyaremorethanthat.Intentionalagents havegoalsandmakeactivechoicesamongbehavioralmeansforattainingthosegoals.Important,intentionalagentsalsomakeactivechoicesaboutwhattheypay attentiontoinpursuingthosegoals(seeGibson&Rader,1979,fortheargumentthatattentionisintentionalperception).Thecentraltheoreticalpointisthatallofthe differentjointattentionalbehaviorsinwhichinfantsfollow,direct,orshareadultattentionandbehaviorarenotseparateactivitiesorcognitivedomainstheyaresimply differentbehavioralmanifestationsofthissameunderlyingunderstandingofotherpersonsasintentionalagents. Supportforthisviewisprovidedbyarecentstudyinwhichagroupof24infantswerefollowedlongitudinallyfrom9to15monthsofage(Carpenteretal.,1998).At monthlyintervalstheseinfantswereassessedonninedifferentmeasuresofjointattention:jointengagement,gazefollowing,pointfollowing,imitationofinstrumental acts,imitationofarbitraryacts,reactiontosocialobstacles,useofimperativegestures,anduseofdeclarativegestures(includingproximalsuchas"show"anddistal suchas"point").Ineachcase,verystringentcriteriawereusedtoensurethatinfantswereattemptingeithertofollowintoortodirecttheadult'sattentionorbehavior (e.g.,alternatingattentionbetweengoalandadult)notjustreactingtoadiscriminativestimulus.Thefindingsofmostimportanceinthecurrentcontextwere:(a)all nineofthesetriadicjointattentionalskillsemergedformostchildrenby12monthsofage(b)alloftheseskills

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emergedinclosedevelopmentalsynchronyforindividualchildren,withnearly80%oftheinfantsmasteringallninetaskswithina4monthwindowand(c)ageof emergencewasintercorrelatedforalltheskills. Furthersupportforthehypothesisthatjointattentionalskillsareunderlainbyanunderstandingofotherpersonsasintentionalagentsisprovidedbytworecentsetsof findings,usingaverydifferentmethodology(lookingtime),whichfindthat9monthsofageistheageatwhichinfantsfirstunderstandintentionalaction.First,Csibra, Gergely,Br,andKoos(inpress)showed9montholdinfantsonedotonascreenmovinginagoaldirectedmannertowardanotherdotonthatsamescreen, detouringaroundanobstacletodoso(seealsoGergely,Ndasdy,Csibra,&Br,1995).Infantsclearlyshowedthattheyviewedthemovementsofthefirstdotas goaldirectedbecausetheydishabituatedifthatdotmadeidenticalmovementsonlywiththeobstacleremoved(thusmakingthephantomdetourinexplicablefroman intentionalpointofview),buttheyremainedhabituatedtothedot'sdifferenttrajectoriessolongastheyweredirectedatthesamegoal.Important,6montholdinfants didnotbehaveinthissameway.Second,Rochat,Morgan,andCarpenter(1995seealsoRochat&Morgan,1998)foundsimilarevidencefor9montholds',but not6montholds',understandingofintentionalactioninasituationinwhichinfantsviewedonemovingball"chasing"anotherinagoaldirectedmanner.Thesetwo setsoflookingstudiesthusdemonstrate,onceagain,that9monthsofageisaspecialageintheunderstandingofintentionality,andtheydothisusingamethodology thatdoesnotrequiretheinfanttocoordinatedifferentpiecesofinformationinthesamewayasnaturallyoccurringjointattentionalskillsthusunderminingtheview thattheseskillssimplyreflecttheexpansionofsomegeneralinformationprocessingcapacityorthelike. Together,allofthesedifferentstudiesservetoundermineseveralwellknowntheoriesoftheemergenceofjointattentionalskills.Thus,Trevarthen(1979)expresses theviewthathumaninfantshaveadultlikesocialcognitionfrombirth,andthattheemergenceofjointattentionalbehaviorsat9to12monthsofagesimplyreflectsthe developmentofbehavioralperformanceskillsformanifestingthiscognitioninovertbehavior.ButthelookingtimestudiesofGergeleyandRochatwouldseemto underminethisviewbecausetheyrequireminimalskillsofbehavioralperformance.BaronCohen(1995)believesthatinfantsarepreprogrammedwithseveral independentsocialcognitivemodules,includinganEyeDirectionDetector,anIntentionDetector,andaSharedAttentionMechanism,eachofwhichhasitsown predetermineddevelopmentaltimetablethatisaffectedneitherbytheontogenyoftheothermodulesnorbytheorganism'sinteractionswiththesocialenvironment. Similarly,althoughstressingprocessesoflearning,Moore(1996Barresi&Moore,1996)believesthatin

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fants'jointattentionalinteractionsat9to12monthsofagerepresentindependentaccomplishmentsaswellinthiscaseindependentlylearnedbehavioralsequences, eachofwhichhavingitsowncriticalstimuli,environmentalcontingencies,andlearninghistory.Theintercorrelatedandnearsimultaneousdevelopmentalemergenceof thedifferentjointattentionalbehaviors,however,asevidencedmostclearlybythestudyofCarpenteretal.(inpress),seriouslyunderminesanyviewthatpositsthat thedifferentskillsare,foronereasonoranother,independent. Itisofcoursepossiblethatallofthedifferentjointattentionalbehaviorsemergetogetherat9monthsofageforsomeotherreason,forexample,theinformation processingcharacteristicthattheyallrequirethecoordinationoftwocognitiveelements(Moore,1996Zelazo,inpress).However,tomyknowledge,thereareno independentassessmentsofthispurportedexpansionininformationprocessingcapacityat9monthsofagethewaythereareindependentassessmentsofthe understandingofintentionalityat9monthsinthestudiesofGergeleyetal.andRochatandMorganandsoIremainskepticalofthesesomewhatunderspecified proposals. HavingIntentionsandSimulatingOthers'Intentions Inadditiontothefactthatinfants'manyskillsofjointattentionemergetogetherontogeneticallyandinacorrelatedfashion,anyserioustheoryofearlysocialcognition mustalsoanswerthequestion:Whydoesthishappenatprecisely9monthsofageandnoother?NoneoftheNativisticorLearningTheoryaccountshasacoherent answertothisquestion,otherthansomevagueandunsubstantiatedappealtoamaturationaltimetableforeitherinnatemodulesorinformationprocessingskills.My ownanswerisquitespecific.Infants'understandingofothersasintentionalagentsdependsontheemergenceoftheirownintentionality(cf.Frye,1981)in combinationwithanotherkeycomponentthatIelaborateshortly.Thestoryisasfollows.Inthefirstmonthsoflifeinfantsunderstandthattheirbehavioralactions achieveresultsintheexternalenvironment,buttheydonotseemtounderstandhowtheydothis.Piaget(1952,1954)devisedanumberofcleverexperimentsin whichinfantsproducedinterestingeffectsonmobiles,toys,andhouseholdobjects,andthenweregiventheopportunitytoreproducethoseeffectssometimesin slightlymodifiedcircumstancesthatcalledforanaccommodationontheinfant'spart.Forthefirst6to8monthsoflife,theinfantsrepeatedbehaviorsthatreproduced interestingresults,buttheymadeveryfewaccommodationsfortheexigenciesofparticularsituations.Forexample,iftheinfantmanagedtoshakearattleandproduce aninterestingsightandsoundbecauseherhandwastetheredviaastringtothesuspendedrattle,removalofthe

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stringdidnotleadtoanychangesofbehaviortheinfantmadethesamearmmovementsasbefore.Piagetobservedmanyotherinstancesofthis"magical"thinking abouthowactionsproduceresultsintheexternalworld. Butataround8monthsofage,Piaget'sinfantsseemedtodisplayanewunderstandingofactionoutcomerelations.Thenewbehaviorsthatevidencedthisnew understandingwereasfollows:(a)theuseofmultiplebehavioralmeanstothesamegoaland(b)therecognitionofbehavioralintermediariesinthepursuitofgoals. Forexample,whentheinfantswantedtoreachatoy,andPiagetplacedapillowasanobstacleintheway,priorto8monthsofagetheinfantswouldeitherstart interactingwiththepillow,forgettingtheoriginaltoy,orelsetheywouldstayfocusedonthetoyandsimplybecomefrustrated.Butat8monthsofagetheinfants reactedtotheinterventionofthepillowbypausing,thenremovingthepilloworsmashingitdown,thenproceedingdeliberatelytograspthetoy.Theconverseofthe removalofobstacleswastheuseofintermediaries,mostlyhumanintermediaries,toachievegoals.Forexample,whentheinfantswantedtooperatesometoyand couldnot,theywouldpushtheadult'shandtowarditandwaitforaresult(inafewcasestheyattemptedtouseinanimateintermediaries,buttheseweremostlyused onlyafewmonthslater).Inallcasestheinfantsshowedmuchmoreflexibilityinusingdifferentmeanstothesamegoalthanintheimmediatelyprecedingmonths,so thatPiagetcharacterizedthisstageofinfantdevelopmentas"thedissociationofmeansandends." Althoughitisfairtosaythatpriorto8monthsofageinfantsareactingintentionallyinthegeneralsensethattheyareactingtowardagoal,theuseofmultiplemeansto thesameendandtheuseofintermediariesindicatesanewlevelofintentionalfunctioning.Ameansthatwasusefultowardagoalinonecircumstanceisreplacedby anotherinanothercircumstance.Abehaviorthatononeoccasionwasanendinitself,forexample,smashingdownapillow,isnowonlyameanstoagreaterend (graspingthetoy).Theimplicationisthusthatinfantsnowhaveanewunderstandingofthedifferentrolesofendsandmeansinthebehavioralact.Theyhavecometo differentiatethegoaltheyarepursuingandthebehavioralmeanstheyusetopursuethatgoalmuchmoreclearlythanintheirprevioussensorymotoractions.Thefact thatactionscanindifferentcircumstancesbeeitherendormeans,andthefactthatsomeactionsareinsomecasessubordinatedasmeanstoothersactions,suggests thatatthisagewehavetheemergenceoftrulyintentionalbehaviorinthesensethatinfantshaveagoalinmindaheadoftime(presumablyintheformofanimagined stateofaffairsintheworld)thattheyclearlydifferentiatefromthevariousbehavioralmeansfromwhichtheymustchoose. Actingintentionallyinthisway,ofcourse,doesnotdirectlyimplyanythingaboutinfants'understandingofotherpersonsasintentionalagents.

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Manynonhumananimalsengageinflexible,intentionalbehaviorwithoutunderstandingthattheirconspecificsareintentionalaswell.Themissingcomponent,obviously, isthatinfantsmustcometotherealizationthatotherpersonsoperateinthesamewaytheydo.Myownbestguessisthatthisisacognitivecompetencythatisactually developmentallypriortotheemergenceofintentionallyorganizedaction.Basedonanumberofphenomena,butespeciallyneonatalimitation,MeltzoffandGopnik (1993)believethathumaninfantsunderstandotherpersonsas"likeme"veryearlyinontogeny.Whyelsewouldtheyimitatethefacialmovementsofadults?Because heisdubiousaboutneonatalimitation,Moore(1996)believesthatthisunderstandingonlyemergessomewhatlater,basedontheinfants'experienceinsocial interactionsinwhichtheymayobserveboththeirownandtheadult'ssimultaneousrelationstosomethirdobject(i.e.,theyseethe"same"relationfromafirstperson andathirdpersonperspectivesimultaneously). Ineithercase,themainpointisthatbecauseinfantsviewotherpersonsas"likeme"fromaveryearlyage,anynewunderstandingoftheirownfunctioningleads immediatelytoanewunderstandingofthefunctioningofothers:Theymoreorlesssimulateotherpersons'behavioralandpsychologicalfunctioningonanalogytotheir ownmoredirectlyandintimatelyknownfunctioning.Thus,followingsocialtheoristssuchasVico,Dilthey,Cooley,andMead,thehypothesisisthatourunderstanding ofotherpersonsrestsonaspecialsourceofknowledgethatisnotavailableinothercasesofknowing:theanalogytotheself.Thesimplefactisthatwehavesources ofinformationabouttheselfanditsworkingsthatarenotavailableforexternalentities.AsIactIhaveavailablevariousformsofproprioception(correlatedwithmy exteroception)andtheinternalexperienceofgoals,andthestrivingforgoals,andhowtheserelatetobehavioralexpression.TotheextentthatIunderstandsome otherbeingintheworldas"likeme,"andcanthereforeunderstanditintermsofthesamekindsofinternalworkingsasmyown,tothatextentcanIgainextra knowledgeofaspecialtypeabouthowitworks.Presumably,theanalogyisclosestandmostnaturalwhenitisappliedtootherhumanbeings,butitcanalsobe stretchedtoothercases.Thisisofcourseoneversionofasimulationtheoryofhumansocialcognitivedevelopment. Interestingtonote,thissimulationaccountmayalsobeappliedtofindingswithevenyoungerinfants,beforetheyunderstandothersasintentionalagents.Thus,inthe studiesofLeslie(1984)andWoodward(1998),infants5to6monthsofageshowsurprise(looklonger)whentheyobserveotherpeople'shandsdoingthingsthey normallydonotdo,forexample,changingtheobjecttheyaregraspingorgraspingfornoapparentreason.Thesefindingsclearlysuggestthat5to6monthold infantshaveanunderstandingthatotherpersonsareanimatebeings,with

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powersofselfmovement,thatbehaveincertainways.Thesefindingsdonotimply,nordoanyotherbehaviorsatthisageimply,thattheseinfantsunderstandothers asintentionalagentswithclearlydifferentiatedmeansandgoals.Consistentwiththecurrentsimulationtheory,thisunderstandingofothersasanimate(butnotyet intentional)correspondspreciselytothewayinfantsunderstandtheirownactionsatthisage,thatis,as"magical"proceduresthatsimplymakethingshappen,as studiedbyPiaget(1954).Thus,5to6montholdinfantsaresurprisedwhenpeopledothingstheydonotnormallydobecausetheyhavelearnedtoexpectcertain thingsoutoftheseanimatebeingslikethemselvesbuttheydonotshowsurpriseineithertheGergeleyortheRochatparadigmswhenentitieschangefrom intentionallyguidedbehaviortorandombehaviorbecausetheydonotevenunderstandtheirownbehaviorasintentional.Wheninfantsunderstandthemselvesas animate,theyunderstandothersasanimatewhentheyunderstandthemselvesasintentional,theyunderstandothersasintentional. Theontogeneticaccountisthusthathumaninfantsidentifywithotherhumanbeingsfromveryearlyinontogeny.Aslongasinfantsunderstandthemselvesonlyas animateagentswiththeabilitytomakethingshappeninsomegeneralizedway,forthefirst7to8monthsorso,thatishowtheywillalsounderstandandsimulate otherpersons.Whentheybeginunderstandingthemselvesasintentionalagentsinthesensethattheyrecognizethattheyhavegoalsthatareclearlyseparatedfrom behavioralmeans,at8to9monthsofageorso,thatishowtheyunderstandandsimulateotherpersonsaswell.Thisunderstandingalsopavesthewayfor understandingtheperceptualchoicesthatothersmaketheirvoluntaryattentionasdistinctfromtheirperception.Althoughatthispointweshouldnotpushthe argumenttoofar,itisalsopossiblethatinfantsmakesomeofthesesamekindsofsimulations,perhapssomewhatinappropriately,toinanimateobjects,andthisisthe sourceoftheirunderstandingsofhowsomephysicalevents"force"otherstohappen:thefirstbilliardballispushingthesecondwiththesamekindofforcethatIfeel whenIpushit(Piaget,1954).Perhapsthiskindofsimulationisweakerforinfantsthanthesimulationofotherpersonsbecausetheanalogybetweenthemselvesand inanimateobjectsisweaker. Thisaccountalsoprovidesaplausibleexplanationforwhynonhumanprimatesdonotseemtounderstandothersasintentionalagentsinhumanlikeways(for evidenceonthispointseeTomasello,1996,1998Tomasello&Call,1997).Chimpanzeesandsomeothernonhumanprimatesclearlyunderstandsomethingofthe efficacyoftheirownactionsontheenvironment,andindeedtheyevenengageinmanykindsofintentionalsensorymotoractionsinwhichtheyusedifferentmeans towardthesameend,removeobstacles,anduseintermediariessuchastools.If

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theydonotunderstandothersasintentionalagents,thenitcannotbebecauseofthisfactor.Instead,thereasontheydonotunderstandothersasintentionalagentsis becausetheydonotidentifywithconspecificsinthesamewayasdohumanbeings.Andso,eventhoughtheythemselvesactintentionally,theydonotunderstandtheir conspecificsasintentionalbeingslikethemselves(andthismightalsobethesourceoftheirdifficultywithphysicalproblemsinwhichtheymustattempttounderstand thecausalrelationsamongtheactionsofinanimateobjects).Althoughwearefarfromunderstandingtheseissuesfully,asimilarapproachmightbeviableinattempting toaccountforautisticchildren'sproblemswithjointattentionandrelatedsocialcognitiveskills(Tomaselloetal.,1993). UnderstandingCommunicativeIntentions Thereisaspecialformofintentionalunderstandingthathumanchildrenemploysoonaftertheemergenceoftheirotherjointattentionalskills,andthisisthe understandingofcommunicativeintentions.Theconceptualizationandexplanationofcommunicativeintentionshasarichphilosophicalhistory,beginninginitsmodern formwithGrice(1975seeLevinson,1983,foranespeciallyusefulanalysis).IfollowalongthelinesofClark(1996),whogivesamorepsychologicallybased account,andIignoremanysubtletiesandcomplexitiestofocusononekeycharacteristic:Theunderstandingofcommunicativeintentionsinvolvesapartiallyrecursive understandinginwhichIunderstandyourintentionstowardmyintentionalstates. Anexamplehelpstoclarify.Ifyoucomeandpushmedownintoachair,IrecognizeyourintentionthatIsitdown.Butifyoutellme,"Sitdown,"Irecognizeyour intentionthatIattendtoyourverbalproposalandasaresultthatIintentionallysitmyselfdown.Ifyoutellme,"Thatchairismine,"IrecognizeyourintentionthatI attendtothechairanditsownershipstatus(fromwhichImayalsomakeinferencesaboutmyownsittingbehavior).Ithusunderstand: Youintendfor[metoshareattentionto[X]]. Understandingofthistypeisclearlymorecomplexthansimplyunderstandinganotherperson'sintentionsimpliciter.Tounderstandthatanotherpersonwantstokick aball,Imustsimplydeterminetheirgoalwithrespecttotheball.Buttounderstandwhatanotherpersonintendswhentheymakethesound"Ball!"inmydirection,I mustdeterminehisorhergoalwithrespecttomyintentional/attentionalstate.Figure4.1illustratesasituationinwhichtheinfantcomprehendsareferential communicativeintentioninwhichtheadultwantsthechildtofollowintoherattention

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Fig.4.1. Schematicdepictionofinfant'sunderstanding ofa(referential)communicativeintention.

toanobjectanespeciallyinterestingandimportantcasebecauseitisthebasisformuchoflanguageacquisition(Tomasello,inpress). Itshouldbenotedthatthisformulationmakesexplicitreferencetotheself("me").Ibelievethisisimportant,andindeedinotherplacesIhaveattemptedtoshowhow theinfants'understandingofselfemergesfromtheirjointattentionalskillsingeneral(Tomasello,1993,1995b).Thewayitgoesisthis.Asjustdescribed,9to12 montholdinfantsbegintofollowintoanddirecttheattentionofotherstooutsideentities,indicatinganewunderstandingthatotherpeopleperceivetheworldand haveintentionstowardit.Nowthattheinfantcanmonitortheattentionofotherstooutsideentities,ithappensthatonoccasionothersarefocusedontheinfanthimor herself.Theinfantthenmonitorstheirattentiontohimorherinawaythatwasnotpossiblebeforethisnewunderstandingofothersasintentionalagents.Atthispoint theinfant'sfacetofaceinteractionswithotherswhichappearonthesurfacetobecontinuouswithherfacetofaceinteractionsfromearlyinfancyareradically transformed.Heorsheisnowinteractingwithanintentionalagentwhoperceivesandintendsthingstowardhimorherinawaythatwassimplynotperceivedbefore. Whentheinfantdidnotunderstandthatothersperceiveandrelatetoanoutsideworld,therecouldbenoquestionofhowtheyperceivedandrelatedtome.After comingtothisunderstanding,theinfantnowcan

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monitortheadult'sintentionalrelationtotheworldincludinghimorherself(the''me"ofMead,1934).Thisisanecessaryprerequisiteforunderstandingthatsomeone elsewantsmetoattendtoX,thatis,forunderstandingacommunicativeintention. IamemphasizingtheunderstandingofcommunicativeintentionsbecauseIwanttoillustratehowtheunderstandingofothersasintentionalagentsleadsthechild immediatelyintoanewrealityculturalreality.Asthechildbeginstounderstandothersasintentionalagents,heorshebeginstounderstandtheirintentionstowards himorherandhisorherintentionalstates.Thisistheprerequisiteformofsocialunderstandingforchildren'scomprehensionof:(a)thecommunicativeintentions embodiedinnaturallanguages,(b)theadult'sintentionstowardtheirintentionalstatesininstructionalsituations,and(c)thedeonticformsofcultureinwhichcertain formsofbehaviorandcognitionaremorally"expected"and"forced"(Bruner,1993).Itisforthisreasonthatitisatthefoundationoflanguage,teaching,and moralitythattheunderstandingofcommunicativeintentions,asaspecialformoftheunderstandingofintentions,isofsuchcrucialimportanceinhumansocial cognitivedevelopmentandinthetransformationofhumaninfantsfromsocialbeingsintoculturalbeings. Thereiscurrentlysomecontroversyoverwhethernonhumanprimatesunderstandothersasintentionalandculturalagents.Theissuesareverydifficult,however,as therearewellknownproblemsinspecifyingexactlywhatbehavioraldifferencesweshouldexpecttoseeifanorganismdoesordoesnotunderstandtheintentionsof others(Tomasello&Call,1997).AlthoughImyselfhaveexpressedskepticismonthispoint(e.g.,Tomasello,1996,inpress)andcouldargueitatlengthif neededinthecurrentcontextIwillsimplymaintainthatnonhumanprimates,whatevertheymayormaynotunderstandaboutthesimpleintentionsofothers,clearly donotunderstandthecommunicativeintentionsofothers. First,considerthebehaviorofchimpanzeesastheyattempttocomprehendcommunicativebehaviorsthataretotallynoveltothem.Tomasello,Call,andGluckman (1997)indicatedforbothchimpanzeesand2to3yearoldhumanchildrenwhichofthreedistinctcontainerscontainedarewardbypointingtothecorrectcontainer, placingasmallwoodenmarkerontopofthecorrectcontainer,orholdingupanexactduplicateofthecorrectcontainer.Childrenalreadyknewaboutpointing,but theydidnotknowaboutusingmarkersandreplicasascommunicativesigns.Theyneverthelessusedthesenovelsignsveryeffectivelytofindthereward.Incontrast, noapewasabovechanceforanyofthecommunicativesignsthatitdidnotknowbeforetheexperiment.Myexplanationoftheseresultsisthatthechildren understoodthattheadultwasattemptingtodirecttheirattentiontothecorrectcontainersotheycouldfindtheprize(i.e.,they

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understoodhercommunicativeintentions),whereastheapeswerenotabletounderstandthatthehumanbeinghadintentionstowardtheirownattentionalstates.The apesthustreatedthecommunicativeattemptsofthehumanasdiscriminativecuesonaparwithallothertypesofdiscriminativecuesthathavetobelaboriously learnedoverrepeatedexperiences. Second,becausethisexperimentwasdonewithchimpanzeesattemptingtounderstandthecommunicativeintentionsofhumans,weshouldalsolookattheway chimpanzeescommunicatewithoneanotherintheirnaturalsocialinteractions.Thekeypointhereisthatintheirnaturalhabitatschimpanzeesdonoteveractively directtheattentionofotherstooutsideentitiesbypointing,showing,offering,teaching,oranyotherindicativebehaviors(Tomasello&Camaioni,1997).Andthe signalschimpanzeesandothernonhumanprimatesusearenotintersubjectivelyunderstoodsymbols,butsimplyritualizedintentionmovementsthatsignalwhattheyare likelytodonext.Chimpanzeeshaveintentionstowardstheinteractant'sbehavior,nottowardsherintentional/attentionalstates.Andsoevenifindividualscomprehend thesebehavioralintentions(adubiousproposition,inmyopinion),theyarenotcomprehendingintentionstowardtheirintentionalstates(i.e.,communicativeintentions). Whetherchimpanzeesraisedbyhumansinhumanlikeculturalandcommunicativesettingscometounderstandtheintentionsandcommunicativeintentionsofhumans isafascinatingquestioninneedofsystematicresearch(Call&Tomasello,1996). Conclusion WhatIhaveattemptedtodohereistofocusattentiononthehumanunderstandingofconspecificsasintentionalagents.Itisacoherentandpowerfulunderstanding thatemergesallinapieceataround9monthsofage,inthelaterphasesofhumaninfancy.Althoughmanytheorieshavebeenpropoundedtoaccountforthenew behaviorsthatemergeatthisage,onlyatheorythatfocusesoninfantunderstandingofothersasintentionalagentscanaccountforthefactthattheyallemergetogether inacorrelatedfashionatprecisely9monthsofage. Inthecurrentaccount,thereasonitemergesatthisageisbecausethisistheageatwhichinfants'ownsensorymotoractionbegintodisplayaclearintentional organizationintermsofclearlydifferentiatedmeansandgoals.Coupledwithinfants'previouslydevelopedunderstandingofotherpersonsas"likeme,"theinfant assumesthatthesepersonsmustoperateinthesamewayastheself,thatis,asanintentionalagentwhichincludesnotonlytheintentionalcontrolofbehaviorbut alsooftheintentionalcontrolcfperceptionintheformofvoluntaryattention.Theyarethusinapositiontounderstandothersatleastpartiallyonanalogytotheself,

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thatis,bysimulation.Nonhumanprimates,andsomeautisticchildren,donotunderstandothersasintentionalagentsbecausetheycannotmakethelinkbetweenself andotherinthesamewayastypicallydevelopingchildren. Important,asthe9montholdinfantmonitorstheattentionofotherstooutsideentities,includingtheirattentiontohimorher,thisleadstoanunderstandingof"me"as anobjectintheworld.Thisthenopensupthepossibilitythattheinfantcanunderstandadultswhentheyexpressintentionstowardhisorherintentionalstates,thatis, whentheyexpresscommunicativeintentions.Understandingthecommunicativeintentionsofothersformsthesocialcognitivefoundationfortheacquisitionoflanguage andmanyotherculturalskills,aswellasforchildren'sinternalizationofteachingandsocialnorms(Tomaselloetal.,1993).Humaninfants'understandingofthe intentionalityofothers,especiallyasitappliesrecursivelytotheself,isthusinlargemeasureresponsibleforhumaninfants'entryintotheworldofculture,including language,whichleadsthemdowncognitivepathsuniqueintheanimalkingdom. References Bakeman,R.,&Adamson,L.(1984).Coordinatingattentiontopeopleandobjectsinmotherinfantandpeerinfantinteractions.ChildDevelopment,55,1278 1289. BaronCohen,S.(1995).Mindblindness.:Anessayonautismandtheoryofmind.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Barresi,J.,&Moore,C.(1996).Intentionalrelationsandsocialunderstanding.BehavioralandBrainSciences,19,107154. Bruner,J.(1993).CommentaryonTomaselloetal."CulturalLearning."BehavioralandBrainSciences,16,515516. Call,J.,&Tomasello,M.(1996).Theroleofhumansinthecognitivedevelopmentofapes.InA.Russon(Ed.),Reachingintothought:Themindsofthegreat apes(pp.401431).Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Carpenter,M.,Nagell,K,&Tomasello,M.(1998).Socialcognition,jointattention,andcommunicativecompetencefrom9to15monthsofage.Monographsof theSocietyforResearchinChildDevelopment,63. Clark,H.(1996).Usesoflanguage.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Csibra,G.,Gergely,G.,Br,S.,&Koos,O.(inpress).Theperceptionof'purereason'ininfancy.Cognition. Frye,D.(1981).Developmentalchangesinstrategiesofsocialinteraction.InM.E.Lamb&L.R.Sherrod(Eds.),Infantsocialcognition(pp.315331).Hillsdale, NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Gergely,G.,Ndasdy,Z.,Csibra,G.,&Br,S.(1995).Takingtheintentionalstanceat12monthsofage.Cognition,56,165193. Gibson,E.,&Rader,N.(1979).Attention:Theperceiverasperformer.InG.Hale&M.Lewis(Eds.),Attentionandcognitivedevelopment(pp.103141).New York:PlenumPress. Grice,H.(1975).Logicandconversation.InP.ColeandJ.Morgan(Eds.),Syntaxandsemantics,Vol.3(pp.119).NewYork:AcademicPress. Leslie,A.(1984).Infantperceptionofamanualpickupevent.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,2,1932.

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Levinson,S.(1983).Pragmatics.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Mead,G.(1934).Mind,self,andsociety.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress. Meltzoff,A.N.,&Gopnik,A.(1993).Theroleofimitationinunderstandingpersonsanddevelopingatheoryofmind.InS.BaronCohen,H.TagerFlusberg,& D.J.Cohen(Eds.),Understandingotherminds:Perspectivesfromautism(pp.335366).NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. Moore,C.(1996).Theoriesofmindininfancy.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,14,1940. Moore,C.,&Dunham,P.(1995).Jointattention:Itsoriginandroleindevelopment.Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Piaget,J.(1952).Originsofintelligenceinchildren.NewYork:Norton. Piaget,J.(1954).Theconstructionofrealityinthechild.NewYork:Norton. Rochat,P.,&Morgan,R.(1998).Detectionofintentionalactionininfancy.Manuscriptsubmittedforpublication. Rochat,P.,Morgan,R.,&Carpenter,M.(1997).Theperceptionofsocialcausalityininfancy.CognitiveDevelopment,12,537561. Tomasello,M.(1993).Theinterpersonaloriginsofselfconcept.InU.Neisser(Ed.),Theperceivedself:Ecologicalandinterpersonalsourcesofselfknowledge (pp.134140).Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Tomasello,M.(1995a).Jointattentionassocialcognition.InC.Moore&P.Dunham(Eds.),Jointattention:Itsoriginsandroleindevelopment(pp.103130). Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Tomasello,M.(1995b).Understandingtheselfassocialagent.InP.Rochat(Ed.),Theselfinearlyinfancy:Theoryandresearch(pp.350360).Amsterdam: NorthHollandElsevier. Tomasello,M.(1996).Chimpanzeesocialcognition.CommentaryforSocietyforResearchinChildDevelopmentMonographs,61(3,pp.161173). Tomasello,M.(1998).Uniquelyprimate,uniquelyhuman.DevelopmentalScience,1,124. Tomasello,M.(inpress).Perceivingintentionsandlearningwordsinthesecondyearoflife.InM.Bowerman&S.Levinson(Eds.),Languageacquisitionand conceptualdevelopment.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Tomasello,M.,&Call,J.(1997).Primatecognition.Oxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress. Tomasello,M.,Call,J.,&Gluckman,A.(1997).Thecomprehensionofnovelcommunicativesignsbyapesandhumanchildren.ChildDevelopment,68,1067 1081. Tomasello,M.,&Camaioni,L.(1997).Acomparisonofthegesturalcommunicationofapesandhumaninfants.HumanDevelopment,40,724. Tomasello,M.,Kruger,A.C.,&Ratner,H.H.(1993).Culturallearning.BehavioralandBrainSciences,16,495552. Trevarthen,C.(1979).Instinctsforhumanunderstandingandforculturalcooperation:Theirdevelopmentininfancy.InM.vonCranach,K.Foppa,W.Lepenies,& D.Ploog(Eds.),Humanethology:Claimsandlimitsofanewdiscipline(pp.530571).Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Woodward,A.(1998).Infantsselectivelyencodethegoalobjectofanactorsreach.Manuscriptsubmittedforpublication. Zelazo,P.D.(inpress).Selfreflectionandthedevelopmentofconciouslycontrolledprocessing.InP.Mitchell&K.Riggs(Eds.),Children'sreasoningandthe mind.London:PsychologyPress.

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Chapter5 Intentions,Consciousness,andPretendPlay
MichaelLewis DouglasRamsay RobertWoodJohnsonMedicalSchool,NewBrunswick,NJ Inthischapterwearguethatintentionsvaryinnatureandthatthisvariationhasadevelopmentalsequence.Second,wearguethatthisvariationissupportedby,andis afunctionof,thedevelopmentofconsciousness.Wealsoarguethatintentionsareseeninchildren'searlypretendplayandthattheemergenceofconsciousnessis relatedtotheemergenceofpretendplay. OntheNatureandDevelopmentofIntentions Recently,an8yearoldwastalkingabouthowtheleavesontheplantinherroommovedtowardthesunwhentheplantwasplacedonthetableinsteadofthe window.Shesaid,"Theleaveschangedtheirminds."Herswasanintentionalstanceinregardtoplants(Dennett,1987).Thatis,shebelievedinintentionand attributedittoplants.Shewastoldbyherparentsthat"itwasautomatic."Theirsisnotanintentionalstancevisvistheplant. Thisexamplehighlightstheproblembeforeus.Itisclearthatsomeformsoflifehaveintentions,whereasothersdonot.Thedevelopmentalquestionisthis:Whencan wesaythatintentionsemerge?AsSearle(1983)pointedout,intentionalityisapropertyofcertainmentalstates.Iftheorganismhasnomentalstates,itcanhaveno intentionalityandnointen

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tions.Mostadultsbelieveinamorelimitedintentionalstancethanchildrendo,inpartbecauseofourbeliefinwhatkindsofthingshaveamentallife.Onalmost everyone'slistofthosethingslackingmentallife,intentionality,andintentionareplants.Whenitcomestoanimallife,thechoicebecomesmoredifficult.Ingeneral,we saythatwormsandslugsdonothaveintentions,whereasdomesticanimals(suchascatsanddogs)aswellashigherlivingformsdo.Approachingthissamequestion fromadevelopmentalpointofview,wesaythattheadulthumanhasintention,whereasitseemsthatmostwouldagreethatnewbornsdonot. Whenweaskonwhatbasissuchdecisionsaremade,wefindthatthedecisionismadearoundsomeaprioribeliefaboutmentallife.Itisthisproblemthe connectionbetweenmentalandemotionallifeasitrelatestointentionality/intention,consciousness,andpretendplaythatweraise.Inaddressingtheissuesand problemsraised,weidentifyseveralspecificintentions.Theseareconsciousintentionsthatareassociatedwithmentalstatesandaffect. WhatDoInfantsDo? Lewisandassociates(Alessandri,Sullivan,&Lewis,1990Lewis,Alessandri,&Sullivan,1990)foundthatinfantsgiventheopportunityhavenodifficultylearning howtocontrolaparticularsetofeventsintheirenvironment.Thisfindinghasbeenknownforsometime.Usingavarietyofprocedures,itwasshownthatinfantsas youngas6weeksareabletolearntherelationbetweentheirresponseandaconsequence(e.g.,Papousek,1967).Whatisuniqueaboutthisfindingistheobservation oftheaffectivecomponentassociatedwiththislearning.Infantsshowedinterestandenjoymentastheylearnedtherelationbetweentheirsimplemotorbehaviorandan outcome.Sixto8weekoldinfantswereobservedwithsmilingandinterestedfacesastheygotsomethingtooccurwhenpullingonastring.Infantsdidnotshowthe sameinterestandenjoymentwhentheyexperiencedthesameoutcomewithoutcausingittohappen. Howmightweexplainsuchbehavior?Ifweobservedthissamebehaviorinanadult,wewouldlikelyconcludethattheadulthasmentalactivityandisworkingto obtainanintendedoutcomeandthathavingobtainedit,heorsheishappydoingthisactivity.Mostofuswouldhavelittletroubleassumingthattheadult"knows"of therelationofstringtopictureandintendstopullthestringtoseethepicture.Ontheotherhand,weareuncomfortableinascribingtoinfantsatthisagesuchmental activity,and,therefore,intentionalbehavior,unlesswewishtoconsiderdifferenttypesofintention(Dennett,1987). Nonetheless,theideathatthebehavioroftheseyounginfantsiscomplexandinneedofexplanationseemsreasonableinlightoftheirresponse

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whentheirlearnedcontrolisremoved.Nowtheinfantshowsangerandincreasedarmpulling(cf.Amsel,1958,1992).Thisspecificincreaseinactivityandchangeof affectiveexpressionfromjoytoangerspeakstothedirectedresponseoftheinfanttothelossofcontrol.Againimaginethat,insteadofobservingtheinfant,weare observinganadult.ImaginealsothatthisadultlivesinNewJerseyandisworkingaslotmachineinAtlanticCity.Themachinesuddenlystopsworkingandtheadult becomesangryandtriesevenhardertopullthelevertogetittowork.Wewouldhavenotroubleinascribingintentiontothisaction:Theadultintendstogetthe machinetowork. Wedonotthinkthatconditioningresultsofthekindweobserveinthefirstpartofthestudy(learningtopullthestring)canbereadilyexplainedwithoutsomenotionof mentallifeandintention(seeRescorla,1987).However,itiscertainlythecasethattheinfant'schangingbehaviorasaconsequenceofthechangingactionoutcome patternsseemstorequirethatweconsidertheinfant'sbehaviorintentional.Again,however,weareconfrontedwiththequestionofascribingtosoyoungachilda mentalstateofthesamekindofintentionthatwearewillingtoacknowledgeinanadult.Ourchoice,then,iseithertoarguethattheinfant'sbehaviorisnotintentional ortosuggestthattheinfanthasintention,butofasortsomehowdifferentfromadultintention. DoesIntentionDevelopandIfSo,When? TheobservationsmadefromthestudyoftheseinfantsraisestheGeneralquestionofintentionalityandthemorefocusedquestionofthedevelopmentofintention. Althoughthequestionofintentionisrelevantforhumansatanyage,weareparticularlyconcernedwiththequestionofitsearlydevelopment.Theproblemof developmentcarrieswithitcertainuniquefeaturesnotfoundwhenwestudyintentionfromthepointofviewoftheadulthumanitraisesthesamequestionsaddressed whenintentionisconsideredfromaphylogeneticpointofview.Forus,thetopicofthedevelopmentofintentionisparticularlyimportantbecauseofthis.Moreover, becausewearetalkingaboutthedevelopmentofintention,weareconfrontedwiththeissueofwhetherthereischange,whenitoccurs,andhowitcomesabout. Moreover,weneedtoconsiderwhetheritispossibletohaveintentionalitywithoutmentalstates.Asweconcludelater,emotionalstates(specifically,whatwecall desires)areatypeofintentionwithoutmentalstates. Intryingtosolvethisproblem,Lewis(1990a,1990b)arguedforthegenerousdistributionofintentionality.LikeSearle(1983),Lewisarguedthatintentionality,in part,isapropertyofmentalstatesinthesameway

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asisemotionality.Thegeneralmodelpresented,framedas"goaldirectedbehaviorisintention,"markstheideathatintentionalityshouldbemorebroadlydefinedthan apropertyofmentalstates.Emotionalactionisintentional,butmaynotinvolvethesametypeofintentionasfoundformentalstates.Clearly,suchbroaddefinitionsrun theriskofmakingeverythingintentional.Wecantakeadvantageoftheoverinclusivenessofthetermandfocusinsteadonthemoreimportantissueofthechanging natureordifferenttypesofintention.Themoregenerousdefinitionshouldnotbeconstruedasanativisticefforttogivethenewbornthesamecapacitiesasthoseofthe adult.Tosuggestthatitdoesthisconstitutesamisreadingofanyeffortatalevelsanalysis.Indeed,theentireeffortofalevelsanalysisistoarguethatveryyoung infants'capacitiesarenotthesameasadults'. LevelsofIntention Levelsortypesofintentioncanbeappliedeithertoanontogeneticprocessortodifferencesinspecies.Theymayevenbehelpfulinourconcernforunconscious intentions(Bargh,1990).BecauseLewis(1990a)articulatedtheselevelselsewhere,westatethemhereintheirbroadestform.Theselevelsrepresentdifferenttypes ofintentionalityaswellasdifferentlevelsofintention.Roitblat(1990)alsofounditusefultodistinguishbetweentwotypesofintentionality,thetypewithoutany"mental stateaboutitsgoals"andthetypewith.Infact,thetypewithmentalstatesaboutitsgoalslooksmuchlikeourfinallevelofobjectiveawarenessofgoals. First,adaptiveintentionsaregoaldirectedbehaviorsthatarebuiltintotheorganism'saffectactionpatterns.Thesearedesireswhicharenotrepresentational. Second,knowledgeintentionshavetodowithanorganism'slearnedactionpatternswhichhavesomeadaptivefeatures,butwhichcomeaboutthroughthe organism'sinteractionwithitsenvironment.Theseintentionscanberepresentationalwhattheyarenotisobjectivelyselfreflected(seeDuval&Wicklund,1972).Itis thislackofselfreflectionthatdistinguishesthislevelfromthethirdorhighestlevel,consciousintention,whichweexplaininmoredetaillater.Theselevelsortypesof intentions,andthementalandemotionalstatessupportingthem,bearsomesimilaritytoPiaget's(1936/1952)levels(especiallyafterthefirstlevel)and,infact,also bearsomesimilaritytoDennett's(1987)differentordersofintention.Thisisparticularlytrueforourthirdlevel.Indeed,weneedtorecognizeintentionalstatesbeyond thesecondlevelinordertodiscussconsciousness,orawarenessoftheself. Oncewerecognizethatthemodelproposedisnotanativisticonenewbornsaredifferentfrom1yearolds,whoaredifferentfromadultsitisclearthatanyfocus ondevelopmentmustaccountforchangesinlevel.

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Thedetailsofthemovementfromleveltolevelhavebeenraised,buttheypresentacontinuingproblem.AlthoughPiagetforonehastriedtoarticulatethestagesof change,theproblemhasnotbeensolved.Brieflyarticulated,thedevelopmentalproblemisthis:Howdowegofromasetofprimitivestosomehigherformnotatall likethatbeginningstate?Infact,intransformationalandconstructivistmodelsofdevelopment,theseearlierprimitivesaretransformedanddisappearintheprocessof developmentitself.Understandingdevelopmentisnoeasytask.Fodor(1975,1981)andSugarman(1987)pointedoutthelogicalproblemsinexplainingthe developmentalprocess.Mounoud(1990),however,offeredasolutiontothisproblem:Heallowedfordifferenttypesofprimitivesthatoccurateachnewlevel.Thus, theyarenotconstructed,butemerge,muchliketheearliestprimitives,fromthebiologyoftheorganism.Weagree,then,thateachlevelhasdifferentandmore elaborateprimitives. ConsciousnessandIntentionasMentalandEmotionalStates Ourthreetypesofintentionalprocesses,adaptiveintentions,knowledgeintentions,andconsciousintentions,areallrelatedtogoals.Adaptiveintentionsareaffectively boundandareconnectedtogoalsasactionsofdesire.Theemotionalpropertyofgoalsgivesthemactionbecauseemotions,inpart,arethemselvesactionpatterns (seeDarwin,1872Searle,1984).Knowledgeintentionsare,asthenameimplies,connectedtogoalsthroughknowledge.ConsiderNewell's(1982)constructofa knowledgelevel.Ineverysystem,thereisahierarchyofknowledge.Evenatthelowestlevelofknowledge,thesystemhasabodyofknowledgethatincludes knowledgeofthesystem'sgoals.Lewis(1995)arguedfortwoaspectsoftheself,the"machineryoftheself"andthecognitiveselfwherethereisthe"ideaofme."The machineryoftheselfmaybethoughtofasanautomaticnonconsciousactivity,forexample,thefunctioningoftheamygdalaorhippocampus(seeLeDoux,1990, 1993).Themachineryofselfaspectcontrolsmuchofourbehavior,hasemotionalstatesandaffects,learnsfromexperience,andaffectsourthoughtprocesses.For themostpart,theseprocessesareunavailabletous.Whatisavailableisthementalstateortheideaofme.Themachineryofselfistheequivalentofknowledge, whereastheideaofmeistheequivalentofmyknowledgeofknowledge.Boththemachineryandcognitiveaspectsoftheselfhaveintentions. Newell(1982)wouldnotneedourthirdprocessofselfconsciousness(orknowledgeofknowledgeofgoals)becausehewouldincludethisasanotherlevelofthe hierarchysystem.Totheextentthatweclaimthisthirdprocesshasnodifferentstatusitisthesamesubstanceasthesecondwehavelittledisagreement. Nevertheless,weseethisprocessasuniquelydifferentfromtheothertwo.Webasesuchaclaimonnomorethanthegeneralclaimthat

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metacognitionisnotinthesameknowledgelevelascognition.Considerthecaseofmemory.Amemoryofamemoryisnotofthesameclassasanothermemory becausethesystems(orlevels)thatsupportthemandthematerialfromwhichtheyaremademaynotbethesame.Wecanthinkofthisdifferenceinknowledgeandin knowledgeofknowledge(whatwewishtocallconsciousness)asemanatingfromdifferentpartsofthebrain(LeDoux,1990,1993).DuvalandWicklund(1972) madeuseofobjectiveselfawareness(knowledgeofknowledgeofgoals)bydifferentiatingitfromsubjectiveselfawareness(knowledgeofgoals). Considerthemetaphor,oftenmentioned,thatthepropertyofwetnesscannotbederivedfromthepropertiesofoxygenandhydrogen.Inthesamefashion, "consciousnessemergedatsomepointinevolutionandinontogeny,inawayunderivablefromitsconstituentparts"(Jaynes,1977,p.12).Searle(1984)madea similarclaiminregardtopropertiesofthemind.Indiscussingartificialintelligence,heassertedthatdifferenttypesofknowledgecomefromdifferenttypesof "machines."Ahumanbrainisnotacomputerandbecause"understandingisapropertythatcomesfromacertainkindofmachineonly,amachinelikethehuman brain"(Gardner,1985,p.174),Searleappliedsuchananalysistointentionalityaswell.Hesawintentionsascausedbythespecificpropertiesofthehumanbrain. Forthisanalysis,weclaimthatknowledgeprocessesorlevelscanbedividedintotwolevels.Inthefirst,anonconsciousknowledgelevelexists,thatpartwhichwe havecalledthemachineryofself,orwhatDuvalandWicklund(1972)calledsubjectiveselfawareness.Mosthumanthinkingoccursatthislevel.Althoughweare usuallyunaware(whatwemeanherebynonconscious)oftheprocessesofourthought,wemaybecomeawareofthemthroughspecialeffort.Forexample,thereare timeswhenwedesiretotraceasetofassociations.Weallhaveexperiencedthisabilitytoretraceourmentalstepsandarriveatasatisfactoryrecognitionofwhat occurredbyusingourobjectiveawarenesstotapthesubjectiveself.Whatwefindisthatthissubjectiveselfawarenesshasknowledgeandgoalsandtherefore intentions.Forexample,incompleteactionstowardgoalssetupintentions(perhapswemightcallthesetensionsifweusedanotherlanguageseeFreud, 1915/1959),whicharethensatisfied. Theotherknowledgelevel,objectiveselfawareness,iswhenweareawareofourthoughts,feelings,andactions.Phenomenologically,weappeartobewatching ourselves.Thisknowledgelevelofteninvolvesouremotionallife,aswhenwebecomeembarrassedbysomeaction,thought,orfeelingoftheself(Lewis,1990b Lewis,Sullivan,Stanger,&Weiss,1989).Blushing,asDarwin(1872)firstnoted,isthemosthumanofallemotionalexpressions.Hestatedthat"itisnotthesimple actofreflectingonourownappearance,butthethinkingwhatothersthinkofus,whichexcitesablush"(p.325).Asanaside,Darwindidnotbelievethatthese emotions

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couldemergemuchbefore3yearsofage.Itseemsclearthatthisknowledgelevel(objectiveselfawareness)isdifferentfromtheotherformofknowing(subjective selfawareness)andthatitisreasonabletoassumethatametaknowledge(knowledgeofknowledge)hasdifferentialeffectsvisvisthelevelsofintentionweseekto explain.Intentionsassociatedwiththislevelofknowledgephenomenonologicallyappearquitedifferentfromintentionsatotherlevels.Forexample,weintendtostudy aparticularproblem.Thisisadirectoperationonaplan,andisquitedifferentfromtheintentionsfollowingthis,whichproceedfromtheplanofwhichwehaveno awareness(althoughwemight),andwhichact,soitseems,independentlyofourgenerationofotherplansorintentions.Itisafamiliarexperiencetomostofustobe thinkingaboutaproblemadirectintentionwhenanotherintentionarises,forexample,adesireforaglassofwater.Intentionalactiononthisdesiredoesnot preventintentionsatotherlevelsfromproceeding.Thispossibilityappearstooccur.Infact,itisonewayofconceivingofintrapsychicconflictthatwasgivensomuch attentioninFreud'stripartitenotionofthepsyche(Freud,1923/1961). Insummary,therearethreelevelsofintention:(a)adaptiveintention,ordesires,(b)knowledgeaboutintention,orsubjectiveselfawareness,and(c)conscious intention,orobjectiveselfawareness.Theselevelshaveanontogeneticcourseandmayhaveaphylogeneticoneaswell.Mostimportantfromourpointofview, theselevels,oncedeveloped,donotbecometransformedasnewlevelsarereached.Foreachadulthuman,therefore,thesethreelevelscoexistandattimesmayeven conflict.Moreover,aparticularlevelmaybeinvolvedforonesetofgoalsandanotherforanotherset.Theregulationofourimmunocompetencesystemisusuallyleft tothefirstlevelorperhapseventothesecond.Yetevenherethethirdorconsciouslevelmaybeemployed.Therearethosewhosubscribetotheviewthatdeliberate attempts(conscious)tomakeyourselfhappy,ortoreducestress,willaffecttheimmunesystem(Dantzer,1991).Letusstatefourgeneralpropositionsthatwehave sofaridentified: 1.Intentionalityisapropertyofallgoaldirectedsystems. 2.Developmentisnottransformational.Suchaviewallowsthedevelopmentofemergingprimitives.Italsoallowsfortheoperationofallachievedlevelsthroughout development.Thisavoidstheinherentproblemsofregressionandhowtransformationscomeabout. 3.Emotionalproperties(thedesire/goalfeaturetoallrepresentations)underlieallintentions,althoughemotionisonlypartofthelasttwointentions. 4.Thelevelsviewallowsfortheconsiderationofconsciousnessasthehighestlevelofintentionality.

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TheUseofConsciousness:ConsciousIntentions Asweindicatedhereandelsewhere(Lewis,1990a,1990b),thefinallevelofintentionalityinvolvesconsciousnessorobjectiveawarenessofintention.Herethe organismnotonlyhastheflexibilityofabstractrepresentationofactionsandgoals,butisnowaware(theselfturnedtowardtheself)ofthesegoalsandactions.This consciousnessallowsthechildtoconsiderthatithasdivergentintents.Consciousnessisametaprocess(e.g.,thematurehuman,unlikeotherorganisms,hasmemory ofitsmemory,ascapturedbytherecursivestatement,''IrememberthatIrememberedtowanttodosomething").Atthispointindevelopment,fromabout18months on,intentionsarenowviewedbythechilditself.Bythisactofconsciousness,intentionalityitselfbecomesavailableforconsideration.Assuch,intentionalityitselfis changed.Thechildcannowsay,"IamawarethatIintendedtodoX,butthatisreallynotwhatIwishtodo."Themanipulationofintentionsthemselvesisone propertyofobjectiveawarenessorconsciousness. Consciousintent,likealllevelsofintentions,issupportedbyemotion.Nevertheless,thenewemergentstructureofobjectiveselfawarenessnowbecomesthematerial ofdesire.Herewemeanthattobeawareofdesires,asopposedtohavingthembutnotbeingaware,becomesanewkindofdesire.Thissupportsanewkindof intention.Now,andforthefirsttime,intentionscanbedisassociatedfromthedirecteffectsofemotion.Thinkingabouttheself,independentofdirectemotion,can sustainintentions.Inasense,one'sawarenessthat"Iwishfor..."acognitiveactcreatesitsownemotion.Thedegreetowhichtheselfisnotselfaware(not conscious)thatitwantssomethingisthedegreetowhichemotions,ratherthantheotherlevelsofknowledge,controlitsaction.Suchaviewhasbeenaddressedin consideringthetopicofprimaryversussecondaryprocesses(Freud,1915/1959)andisconsistentwiththeassumptionthatunconsciousthoughtprocessesarenotthe equivalentofconsciousthoughtprocesses. Intentionalsystemsareorganizedintoaseriesofincreasinglymorecomplexstructures.Elsewhereweshowedthatthereisasignificantchangeinemotionallifewiththe introductionofobjectiveawarenessorconsciousness.Whenconsciousnessemerges,twoclassesofemotionarepossible:(a)thosewehavecalledselfconscious emotions,whichincludeembarrassment,empathy,andenvyand(b)thosewecalledselfconsciousevaluativeemotions,whichincludepride,shame,guilt,and satisfaction/competency(Lewis,1990a,1992,1995,1997Lewisetal.,1989).Theseemotionsbecomethebasisofanewsetofintentionsbecausehumansactso astoavoidshameandguiltandtoachievepreferableemotions,forexample,pride.

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Althoughweshowedthat2montholdinfantsacttoproducecertainlearnedoutcomesandthuspossesssometypeofintention(Alessandrietal.,1990Lewisetal., 1990),ourinterestisonthelaststageofthedevelopmentofintentions,consciousintention.Weshowedthataround15to18months,infantsshowclearindicationof selfrecognition(Lewis&BrooksGunn,1979Lewisetal.,1989).Allinfantsshowthisabilityby24months.However,thisabilitydoesnotemergewithoutamental ageof15to18months(e.g.,BrooksGunn&Lewis,1980Loveland,1987a,1987bMans,Cicchetti,&Sroufe,1978Spiker&Ricks,1984).Moreover,thereis littleevidencethatexperienceaffectsthiswindowofemergence.Inaddition,weshowedthattemperamentlikecharacteristicsmayexplainindividualdifferencesinthe emergenceofselfrecognitionwithinthiswindow(DiBiase&Lewis,1997Lewis&Ramsay,1997).Finally,andperhapsmostimportant,wedemonstratedthatthe emergenceofselfrecognitionishighlyassociatedwiththeemergenceofspecificselfconsciousemotionsincludingembarrassmentandempathy(Lewis,1992Lewis etal.,1989).Althoughthesefindingspointtotheemergenceofaninternalrepresentationoftheself,littleworkhasbeendonerelatingintentionalbehaviortothe emergenceofthiscapacity. PretendPlayAsConsciousIntention Itisourbeliefthatpretendorsymbolicplayreflectsthecapacityforconsciousintentionandtheobjectiveselfawarenessassociatedwiththislevelofintention.Pretend playrequiresconsciousintentionandselfawarenessinthatchildrenknowthattheiractionsonobjectsarenotrealotherwise,theplaywouldnotbepretensebuta hallucination.Thechildfeedingadollimaginaryfood,orthechilddrinkinganimaginaryliquidfromacupmustknowthatwhatheorsheisdoingisnotreal.Thisearly pretendplayinvolves,ineffect,anegationnamely,thisisnotwhat"Ipretendittobebutsomethingelse."Piaget's(1951/1962)viewofsymbolicfunctioningindicated thatpretendplayrequiresanawarenessofselfinorderforchildrentodistinguishbetweenwhatisrealityandwhatisafantasy. MeasuringPretendPlay Onedifficultyinstudyingpretendplayistherelativeinfrequencyofspontaneouspretendplay,particularlyinyoungtoddlers.Toovercomethisproblem,investigators usedmodelingprocedurestoincreasetheincidenceoftargetplayacts(Fenson&Ramsay,1981Largo&Howard,1979Pipp,Fischer,&Jennings,1987Watson &Fischer,1977).Inlargepart,thevalidityofusingmodelingtoindexpretenseisbasedonthebeliefthat

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childrenonlyimitatewhattheyunderstand,althoughsomeresearchers(e.g.,Harris,Kavanaugh,&Meredith,1994)believethatthereproductionofagivenaction followingmodelingmaymorelikelyinvolvemotoricimitationthanpretendplay.Meltzoff(1995)andAsendorpfandcolleagues(Asendorpf&Baudonnire,1993 Asendorpf,Warkentin,&Baudonnire,1996)successfullyused18montholds'imitativeplayoftheactionsofotherstoindicatetheirselfawareness.Thisresultdoes suggestthatmodelingmaywellindicatedifferencesintoddlers'emergingsymboliccapacities. Pretendplaycantakeplacewiththeselfastheobjectofthepretense(i.e.,childrenpretendtofeedthemselves)and/orothersastheobjectofthepretense(i.e.,when achildpretendstofeedadollFenson&Ramsay,1980,1981Lowe,1975McCune,1995Nicolich,1977).Thispastworkfoundadevelopmentaltransitionfrom predominatelyselftodolldirectedpretendplay.Dolldirectedplaybecomesmorefrequentthanselfdirectedplayfromthelatterpartofthesecondyearoflife. Thus,atitsonsetpretendplayislikelytobemuchmoreselfthandolldirected.Whereasthereisgeneralagreementthatdolldirectedplayinvolvessymbolic capacity,thereissomedisagreementaboutwhetherornotselfdirectedplaywithoutlanguagerequiresthiscapacity(e.g.,McCune,1995). PretendPlayandSelfRecognition Ifpretendplayreflectsconsciousintentionandobjectiveselfawareness,thereshouldbearelationofpretendplaytovisualselfrecognition,anindexofobjectiveself awareness(e.g.,Lewis&BrooksGunn,1979Lewisetal.,1989).Surprisingly,althoughthereisconsiderableevidencethatpretendplayandselfrecognitionemerge atapproximatelythesamepointindevelopment(e.g.,Pippetal.,1987),previousworkdidnotexaminewhetherthisrelationispresentinindividualcases.The likelihoodofsucharelationissuggestedbyAsendorpfandcolleagues'(Asendorpf&Baudonnire,1993Asendorpfetal.,1996)findingthatselfrecognitionwas relatedtoimitativeplay. Weexaminedtherelationbetweenselfrecognitionandpretendplay.Weassessedthisrelationat15monthsofagewhenselfrecognitionwasfoundtofirstemerge (Lewis&BrooksGunn,1979).Evidencefortherelationsuggeststhatpretendplaydoesreflectobjectiveselfawarenessandconsciousintention.Ourworkinvolved observationofselfrecognitiondifferencesinspontaneousandimitativeselfanddolldirectedpretendplay. Selfrecognitionandpretendplaywereobservedinasampleofsixtyfive15montholds.Asinpreviouswork(Lewis&BrooksGunn,1979Lewisetal.,1989), selfrecognitionwasassessedbysurreptiouslyapplyingaspotofrougetothechildren'sfacesandthenobservingwhethertheytouched

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themarkontheirfaceswheninfrontofamirror.Ofthe65participants,only11%(7children)demonstratedselfrecognition.Thus,aswouldbeexpectedbasedon ourpastresearch,onlyaminorityofchildrenhadbeguntoshowselfrecognitionatthispointindevelopment. Bothspontaneousandimitativepretendplaywereassessed.Forspontaneouspretendplay,childrenwereobservedduringa3minutefreeplayperiodwitha standardizedsetoftoys.Wescoredtheoccurrenceofpretendplayactsinvolvingthefollowingthreescenarios:feedingtheselforadollwithaspoonhavingtheself ordolltalkonatelephoneandgivingtheselfordolladrinkfromaglass.Forimitativepretendplay,anexaminermodeledforthechildrendolldirectedpretendplay forthethreescenariosinsuccessionaftereachofwhichthechildren'sbehaviorwasobservedfora1minuteperiod.Thenumberofselfanddolldirectedacts involvingthethreescenarioswassummedforspontaneousandforimitativepretendplay. SpontaneousVersusImitativePretendPlay Forthewholesample,asmightbeexpected,imitativepretendplaywasmorefrequentthanspontaneouspretendplay(M=4.52vs.1.30).1Moreover,therewas considerableconsistencyintheamountofspontaneousandimitativepretendplay(r=.55),suggestingthatbothreflectthesameunderlyingsymboliccapacities. Itwasofinteresttodeterminewhetherselfrecognitiondifferencesinpretendplaywerepresentforbothspontaneousandimitativepretendplay.Figure5.1showsthe frequencyoftotalpretendplayaswellasthefrequencyofspontaneousandimitativepretendplayfortheselfrecognizersandnonselfrecognizers.Selfrecognizers showedsignificantlymorespontaneousandimitativepretendplaythannonselfrecognizers.Thisdifferencewasthesameforspontaneousandimitativepretendplay.2 Therelationbetweenselfrecognitionandpretendplaysupportstheviewthatpretendplayreflectsbothconsciousintentionandobjectiveselfawareness.Thatthis relationwaspresentforbothimitativeandspontaneouspretendplayindicatesthatmodelingcanbeusedtoassesssymbolicfunctioningintoddlers(Fenson& Ramsay,1981Largo&Howard,1979Pippetal.,1987Watson&Fischer,1977).
1 2

Forthewholesample,thegreaterfrequencyofimitativethanspontaneouspretendplaywassignificant,F(1,64)=99.71,p <.001.

SelfrecognitiondifferencesinspontaneousversusimitativepretendplaywereanalyzedbyatwowayMANOVAwithonewithinsubjectsfactor(condition)andonebetween subjectsfactor(selfrecognition).Acrossspontaneousandimitativeplay,selfrecognizersshowedmorepretendplaythannonselfrecognizers,F(1,63)=13.53,p <.001.The interactionbetweenconditionandselfrecognitionwasnotsignificant.

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Fig.5.1. Spontaneousandimitativepretendplaybyselfrecognition.

SelfVersusDollDirectedPretendPlay Forthewholesample,spontaneouspretendplaywasmoreselfthandolldirected(M=.94vs..36),whereasimitativepretendplaytendedtobemoredollthan selfdirected(M=2.49vs.2.03).3Thus,therewasnooveralldifferenceinamountofselfanddolldirectedplay.Thatspontaneouspretendplaywaspredominately selfdirectedisnotsurprisinggiventheageofthepresentsample.Previousfindingssupporttheearlieremergenceofspontaneousselfasopposedtodolldirected pretendplay(Fenson&Ramsay,1980,1981Lowe,1975McCune,1995Nicolich,1977).Themodelingprocedure,whichinvolveddemonstrationofonlydoll directedacts,ledtomoreimitativedollthanselfdirectedacts.Nonetheless,themodelingproceduredidleadtoaconsiderableamountofselfdirectedacts.This likelyreflectsthetendencyforimitativeplaytoindicatechildren'sgenerallevelofsymbolicunderstandingatthispointindevelopment. Selfrecognitiondifferencesinpretendplaywereexaminedforbothselfanddolldirectedpretendplay.Figure5.2showsthefrequencyofselfanddolldirected pretendplayfortheselfrecognizersandnonselfrecognizers.Selfrecognizersshowedsignificantlymoreselfanddolldirected

3

Forthewholesample,differencesinselfversusdolldirectedspontaneousandimitativepretendplaywereexaminedbyatwowayMANOVAwithtwowithinsubjectsfactors (condition,playtype).ThisMANOVAyieldedasignificantinteraction,F(1,64)=16.78,p <.001.Therewasagreaterfrequencyofspontaneousselfthandolldirectedpretend play(p<.001byposthocttest)andatrendforagreaterfrequencyofimitativedollthanselfdirectedpretendplay(p <.06byposthocttest).Acrossimitativeandspontaneous pretendplay,therewasnosignificantdifferenceinthefrequencyofselfanddolldirectedpretendplay.

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Fig.5.2. Selfanddolldirectedpretendplaybyselfrecognition.

pretendplaythannonselfrecognizers.Thisdifferencewasthesameforselfanddolldirectedpretendplay.4Thus,incontrasttotheviewbysome(e.g.,McCune, 1995)thatselfasopposedtodolldirectedplaymaynotindicatesymbolicfunctioning,thepresentfindingssuggestthatbothselfanddolldirectedplaydoreflect emergingpretenseintoddlers. PersonalPronounUseAsAnotherIndexofObjectiveSelfAwareness Theuseofpersonalpronounsincluding"me"and"mine"providesalinguisticdemonstrationofobjectiveselfawareness.Itwasofinteresttoustoobtainconfirming evidencethatselfrecognitiondoesindicateobjectiveselfawarenessbyexaminingtherelationbetweenselfrecognitionandpersonalpronounuseinindividual children. Previousstudies(e.g.,Bertenthal&Fischer,1978Pippetal.,1987)examinedtherelationbetweenthemarkdirectedbehaviorandselfreferentialverbalmeasures ofselfrecognitionwhilechildrenareinfrontofamirror.Theseverbalmeasuresincludedchildren'suseofthepersonalpronoun"me"andtheirname.Thesestudies generallyfoundthatverbalmeasuresappearafterthemarkdirectedbehavior(cf.Harter,1983).Itis
4

SelfrecognitiondifferencesinselfversusdolldirectedpretendplaywereanalyzedbyatwowayMANOVAwithonewithinsubjectsfactor(playtype)andonebetween subjectsfactor(selfrecognition).Acrossselfanddolldirectedplay,selfrecognizersshowedmorepretendplaythannonselfrecognizers,F(1,63)=13.52,p <.001.The interactionbetweenplaytypeandselfrecognitionwasnotsignificant.

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possiblethatlanguagebehaviorduringmirrorselfrecognitiontestingmaynotprovideanadequateindicationofchildren'sselfreferentiallanguageability,especiallyin othersituations.Forexample,LewisandBrooksGunn(1979)foundageneralinhibitioninactivitywhenyoungchildrenareplacedinfrontofmirrors.Althoughitis clearthatpersonalpronounusecontinuestodevelopwellaftertheonsetofselfrecognition,itmaywellbethattheearliestmanifestationsofpersonalpronounsbegin atthesamepointthattheselfdirectedbehaviorappears,particularlyifmeasuredindependentlyfromthemirrorprocedure. Weexaminedtherelationbetweenselfrecognitionandpersonalpronounuseinthesamesampleof15montholds.Personalpronounusewasassessedbyaself conceptquestionnaire(cf.Stipek,Gralinski,&Kopp,1990)completedbythechildren'smothers.Wereliedonmaternalreporttoprovideasensitiveindexoftheir children'semergingselfreferentialverbalcapacities,whichmightnotbereadilyobservedinalaboratorysetting,particularlywhenthechildrenwereinfrontofa mirror.Sixitemsfromthisquestionnairereflectedchildren'suseornotofthepersonalpronouns"me,""my,"or"mine,"andthephrases,"I'm...,''"Doitmyself,"or"I can't." Therewasevidenceforarelationbetweenselfrecognitionandpersonalpronounuse.Selfrecognizersusedsignificantlymorepersonalpronounsthatnonself recognizers(M=1.14vs..22).Inaddition,asignificantlygreaterproportionofselfrecognizersthannonselfrecognizershadbeguntouseatleastonepersonal pronoun(.71vs..16).5Thisrelationbetweenselfrecognitionandpersonalpronounuseprovidesadditionalevidencethatselfrecognition,asgivenbymarkdirected behaviorinfrontofamirror,doesreflectemergingselfawareness. Consciousness,Intentions,andTheoryofMind Inourview,therearethreedifferentlevelsortypesofintentionthatemergeatdifferentpoints:adaptiveintentionknowledgeintention,orsubjectiveselfawareness andconsciousintention,orobjectiveselfawareness.Atthethirdlevel,consciousintention,theindividualnotonlyhastheflexibilityofabstractrepresentationof actionsandgoals,butisnowaware(theselfturnedtowardtheself)ofthesegoalsandactions.This
5

Thegreaterfrequencyofpersonalpronounusebyselfrecognizersthannonselfrecognizerswassignificant,F(1,64)=11.48,p <.001.Thegreaterproportionofselfrecognizers thannonselfrecognizersusingatleastonepersonalpronounwassignificant(p<.004)byaFisher'sExacttest.

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awarenessisametacognitionasreflectedinthestatement,"IknowthatIknow."Emotionsthemselvesarechanged(addedto)asintentionsdevelopfromthefirstto thethirdlevel.Withconsciousintention,one'sawarenessthat"Iwishfor"createsitsownemotion.Elsewhereweshowedthatthereisasignificantchangeinemotion whenobjectiveselfawarenessemerges(Lewis,1992,1995,1997Lewisetal.,1989).Itisinlargepartthismetaawarenessthatdistinguishesthethirdlevelof intentionfromotherlevelspresentatearlierpointsindevelopment(Butterworth,1992Lewis,1990a,1990b,1995Lewisetal.,1989Rochat,1995). Whenobservingplayespeciallyinyoungchildren,oneneedstoinferpretensebecausetheirlanguageisrelativelyunderdeveloped.Moreover,becausespontaneous pretendplayisrelativelyinfrequentparticularlyatitsinception,modelingprocedureshavebeenusedtoassesstheemergingcapacityforpretense.Ourresultssupport thepresenceofpretendplaybythemiddleofthesecondyearoflifeandindicatetheutilityofmodelingtoassessthiscapacity.Moreover,thereisarelationbetween selfrecognitionandpretendplayatthepointofemergenceofselfawareness.Thissuggeststhattoddlersatthisagearedevelopingatheoryofmind(cf.Gallup,1991 Leslie,1987Povinelli&Eddy,1996),whichinvolvesaselfpretending,thatis,theappearanceoftheselfthatknowsthatitknowsorknowsthatitsplayisnotreal.In ourview,pretendplayreflectsthemetacognitiveability,"IknowthatIknow,"ofconsciousintentionandselfawareness.Itmarksnotonlythebeginningofatheoryof mind,butalsolikelystartstheprocessthatleadstothe3to4yearswitchwhenchildrenknowthatwhattheyknowisnotnecessarilywhatanotherknows(e.g., Perner,1991Rosen,Schwebel,&Singer,1997Taylor&Carlson,1997Wimmer&Perner,1983). AlthoughPiaget's(1936/1952,1937/1954,1951/1962)earlytheoryofsensorimotorintelligencedidnotemphasizethedevelopmentoftheself,itwouldappearthat consciousintentionandselfawarenessarenecessaryaspectsofthevariousrepresentationalabilitiesthatemergeduringthesecondyearoflife.Forexample,the capacityforrecallmemoryindicatesthepresenceofconsciousintentionandselfawarenessinthattheindividualhastoknowthatitremembersthatitremembersan event.Similarly,thecapacityforbothobjectandpersonpermanencerequirestherepresentationoftheselfforittoknowtheexistenceofobjectsandotherpeople.In thisregard,BertenthalandFischer(1978)foundastrongcorrespondencebetweenthedevelopmentofobjectpermanenceandvisualselfrecognitioninthemirror. Theseresearchers,infact,hadexpectedconsiderabledcalageindevelopmentacrossthetwodomains.Thisstrongrelationisconsistentwithacentral,perhaps organizingroleforselfknowledgeinrepresentationalfunctioning(cf.Mounoud&Vinter,1981).Thus,wewouldexpectrelationsofselfrecognitiontovarious milestonesinthe

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developmentofrepresentationinadditiontothepresentonebetweenselfrecognitionandpretendplay. References Alessandri,S.M.,Sullivan,M.W.,&Lewis,M.(1990).Violationofexpectancyandfrustrationinearlyinfancy.DevelopmentalPsychology,26,738744. Amsel,A.(1958).Theroleoffrustrativenonrewardinnoncontinuousrewardsituations.PsychologicalBulletin,55,102119. Amsel,A.(1992).FrustrationtheoryManyyearslater.PsychologicalBulletin,112,396399. Asendorpf,J.B.,&Baudonnire,P.M.(1993).Selfawarenessandotherawareness:Mirrorselfrecognitionandsynchronicimitationamongunfamiliarpeers. DevelopmentalPsychology,29,8895. Asendorpf,J.B.,Warkentin,V.,&Baudonnire,P.M.(1996).SelfawarenessandotherawarenessII:Mirrorselfrecognition,socialcontingencyawareness,and synchronicimitation.DevelopmentalPsychology,32,313321. Bargh,J.A.(1990).Goal intent:Goaldirectedthoughtandbehaviorareoftenunintentional.PsychologicalInquiry,1,248250. Bertenthal,B.I.,&Fischer,K.W.(1978).Developmentofselfrecognitionintheinfant.DevelopmentalPsychology,14,4450. BrooksGunn,J.,&Lewis,M.(1980,March).Selfrecognitioninhandicappedinfantsandtoddlers.PaperpresentedattheSecondInternationalConferenceon InfantStudies,NewHaven,CT. Butterworth,G.(1992).Originsofselfperceptionininfancy.PsychologicalInquiry,3,103111. Dantzer,R.(1991).Stressanddisease:Apsychobiologicalperspective.AnnalsofBehavioralMedicine,13,205210. Darwin,C.(1872).Theexpressionoftheemotionsinmanandanimals.London:Murray. Dennett,D.C.(1987).Theintentionalstance.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. DiBiase,R.,&Lewis,M.(1997).Therelationbetweentemperamentandembarrassment.CognitionandEmotion,11,259271. Duval,S.,&Wicklund,R.A.(1972).Atheoryofobjectiveselfawareness.NewYork:Academic. Fenson,L.,&Ramsay,D.S.(1980).Decentrationandintegrationofthechild'splayinthesecondyear.ChildDevelopment,51,171178. Fenson,L.,&Ramsay,D.S.(1981).Effectsofmodelingactionsequencesontheplayoftwelve,fifteen,andnineteenmontholdchildren.ChildDevelopment, 52,10281036. Fodor,J.A.(1975).Thelanguageofthought.NewYork:Crowell. Fodor,J.A.(1981).Representations:Philosophicalessaysonthefoundationofcognitivescience.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Freud,S.(1959).Instinctsandtheirvicissitudes.InJ.Riviere(Trans.),Collectedpapers(Vol.4,pp.6083).NewYork:Basic.(Originalworkpublished1915) Freud,S.(1961).Theegoandtheid.InJ.Strachey(Ed.&Trans.),ThestandardeditionofthecompletepsychologicalworksofSigmundFreud(Vol.19,pp. 366).London:Hogarth.(Originalworkpublished1923) Gallup,G.G.,Jr.(1991).Towardacomparativepsychologyofselfawareness:Specieslimitationsandcognitiveconsequences.InG.R.Goethals&J.Strauss (Eds.),Theself:Aninterdisciplinaryapproach(pp.121135).NewYork:SpringerVerlag. Gardner,H.(1985).Themind'snewscience.NewYork:Basic. Harris,P.L.,Kavanaugh,R.D.,&Meredith,M.C.(1994).Youngchildren'scomprehensionofpretendepisodes:Theintegrationofsuccessiveactions.Child Development,65,1630.

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Harter,S.(1983).Developmentalperspectivesontheselfsystem.InE.M.Hetherington(Ed.),Handbookofchildpsychology(4thed.).Socialization, personality,andsocialdevelopment(Vol.4,pp.275385).NewYork:Wiley. Jaynes,J.(1977).Theoriginsofconsciousnessinthebreakdownofthebicameralmind.Boston:HoughtonMifflin. LargoR.H.,&Howard,J.A.(1979).Developmentalprogressioninplaybehaviorofchildrenbetweennineandthirtymonths,I:Spontaneousplayandimitation. DevelopmentalMedicineandChildNeurology,21,299310. LeDoux,J.E.(1990).Cognitiveandemotionalinteractionsinthebrain.CognitionandEmotions,3,265289. LeDoux,J.E.(1993).Emotionalnetworksinthebrain.InM.Lewis&J.M.Haviland(Eds.),Handbookofemotions(pp.109118).NewYork:Guilford. Leslie,A.M.(1987).Pretenseandrepresentation:Theoriginof"TheoryofMind."PsychologicalReview,94,412426. Lewis,M.(1990a).Thedevelopmentofintentionalityandtheroleofconsciousness.PsychologicalInquiry,1,231248. Lewis,M.(1990b).Intention,consciousness,desiresanddevelopment.PsychologicalInquiry,1,278283. Lewis,M.(1992).Shame,theexposedself:NewYork:TheFreePress. Lewis,M.(1995).Aspectsofself:Fromsystemstoideas.InP.Rochat(Ed.),Theselfinearlyinfancy:Theoryandresearch(pp.95115).Amsterdam,The Netherlands:Elsevier. Lewis,M.(1997).Alteringfate:Whythepastdoesnotpredictthefuture.NewYork:GuilfordPress. Lewis,M.,Alessandri,S.M.,&Sullivan,M.W.(1990).Violationofexpectancy,lossofcontrol,andangerinyounginfants.DevelopmentalPsychology,26,745 751. Lewis,M.,&BrooksGunn,J.(1979).Socialcognitionandtheacquisitionofself.NewYork:Plenum. Lewis,M.,&Ramsay,D.S.(1997).Stressreactivityandselfrecognition.ChildDevelopment,68,621629. Lewis,M.,Sullivan,M.W.,Stanger,C.,&Weiss,M.(1989).Selfdevelopmentandselfconsciousemotions.ChildDevelopment,60,146156. Loveland,K.A.(1987a).BehaviorofyoungchildrenwithDownsyndromebeforethemirror:Exploration.ChildDevelopment,58,768778. Loveland,K.A.(1987b).BehaviorofyoungchildrenwithDownsyndromebeforethemirror:Findingthingsreflected.ChildDevelopment,58,928936. Lowe,M.(1975).Trendsinthedevelopmentofrepresentationalplayininfantsfromonetothreeyearsanobservationalstudy.JournalofChildPsychologyand Psychiatry,16,3347. Mans,L.,Cicchetti,D.,&Sroufe,L.A.(1978).MirrorreactionsofDown'ssyndromeinfantsandtoddlers:Cognitiveunderpinningsofselfrecognition.(Child Development,49,12471250. McCune,L.(1995).Anormativestudyofrepresentationalplayatthetransitiontolanguage.DevelopmentalPsychology,31,198206. Meltzoff,A.N.(1995).Understandingtheintentionsofothers:Reenactmentofintentedactsby18montholdchildren.DevelopmentalPsychology,31,838850. Mounoud,P.(1990).Consciousnessasanecessarytransitionalphenomenonincognitivedevelopment.PsychologicalInquiry,1,253258. Mounoud,P.,&Vinter,A.(Eds.).(1981).Lareconnaissancedesonimagechezl'enfantetl'animal.Paris:DelachauxetNiestl. Newell,A.(1982).Theknowledgelevel.ArtificialIntelligence,18,81132. Nicolich,L.(1977).Beyondsensorimotorintelligence:assessmentofsymbolicmaturitythroughanalysisofpretendplay.MerrillPalmerQuarterly,23,89102.

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Papousek,H.(1967).Experimentalstudiesofappetitionalbehaviorinhumannewbornsandinfants.InH.W.Stevenson,E.H.Hess,&H.L.Rheingold(Eds.), Earlybehavior:Comparativeanddevelopmentalapproaches(pp.249277).NewYork:Wiley. Perner,J.(1991).Understandingtherepresentationalmind.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Piaget,J.(1952).Theoriginsofintelligenceinchildren(M.Cook,Trans.).NewYork:InternationalUniversitiesPress.(Originalworkpublished1936) Piaget,J.(1954).Theconstructionofrealityinthechild(M.Cook,Trans.).NewYork:BasicBooks.(Originalworkpublished1937) Piaget,J.(1962).Play,dreamsandimitationinchildhood(C.Gattegno&F.M.Hodgson,Trans.).NewYork:Norton.(Originalworkpublished1951) Pipp,S.,Fischer,K.W.,&Jennings,S.(1987).Acquisitionofselfandmotherknowledgeininfancy.DevelopmentalPsychology,23,8696. Povinelli,D.J.,&Eddy,T.J.(1996).Whatyoungchimpanzeesknowaboutseeing.MonographsoftheSocietyforResearchinChildDevelopment,61(3,Serial No.247). Rescorla,R.A.(1987).APavloviananalysisofgoaldirectedbehavior.AmericanPsychologist,42,119129. Rochat,P.(Ed.).(1995).Theselfinearlyinfancy.Theoryandresearch.Amsterdam,TheNetherlands:Elsevier. Roitblat,H.L.(1990).Causation,intentionality,andCognitiveActionTheory.PsychologicalInquiry1,263265. Rosen,C.S.,Schwebel,D.C.,&Singer,J.L.(1997).Preschoolers'attributionsofmentalstatesinpretense.ChildDevelopment,68,11331142. Searle,J.(1983).Intentionality:Anessayonthephilosophyofmind.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Searle,J.(1984).Minds,brainsandscience.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Spiker,D.,&Ricks,M.(1984).Visualselfrecognitioninautisticchildren:Developmentalrelationships.ChildDevelopment,55,214225. Stipek,D.J.,Gralinski,J.H.,&Kopp,C.B.(1990).Selfconceptdevelopmentinthetoddleryears.DevelopmentalPsychology,26,972977. Sugarman,S.(1987).Piaget'sconstructionofthechild'sreality.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Taylor,M.,&Carlson,S.M.(1997).Therelationbetweenindividualdifferencesinfantasyandtheoryofmind.ChildDevelopment,68,436455. Watson,M.W.,&Fischer,K.W.(1977).Adevelopmentalsequenceofagentuseinlateinfancy.ChildDevelopment,48,828836. Wimmer,H.,&Perner,J.(1983).Beliefsaboutbeliefs:Representationandconstrainingfunctionofwrongbeliefsinyoungchildren'sunderstandingofdeception. Cognition,13,103128.

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Chapter6 Language,LevelsofConsciousness,andtheDevelopmentofIntentionalAction
PhilipDavidZelazo UniversityofToronto
InthebeginningwastheWord. John,1:1

IntheSecondActofFaust(Part1),Goethe(1808/1972)hashisherorevisethefirstverseofJohn'sGospeltoread,"Inthebeginningwasthedeed!(ImAnfang wardieTat!)."Deed,asthetermisusedhere,doesnotrefermerelytothebehavioroforganisms,buttoactionbehaviorforwhichonemaybeheldresponsible (e.g.,Meldon,1964).1Becauseactionis,bydefinition,thepropersubjectofmoralevaluation,itisnaturaltosuggestthatitsetsthestagefortheentiredramaof humanlifedefinestheplayers,ushersintheaudience.Andindeed,mostpsychologists(includingBaldwin,1894/1968,Piaget,1936/1952,andVygotsky, 1934/1962,p.153)havefollowedFaustinemphasizingthe(temporal)priorityofactionoverlanguageinontogeny.Althoughthereisdebateabouttheexactageat whichthereisevidenceofintentionalityininfantbehavior,thereisnownearconsensusthatinfantsactintentionallyontheirenvironmentwellbeforetheyuttertheirfirst word(e.g.,seeBruner,1973Meltzoff,Gopnik,&Repacholi,chap.2,thisvolumeMeltzoff&Moore,1995Tomasello,chap.4,thisvolumeTrevarthen,1979).In thischapter,Iargueinsteadthatthegenesisofactionactuallydoesconsistinlanguage,becauselabelingan

1

TheGermanwordTatissometimestranslatedasact(e.g.,byBarkerFairleyGoethe,1808/1972).

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experienceisapreconditionforthecontrolofbehaviorbyaconsciousrepresentation.Moreover,Iarguethatinadditiontothisinitial,constitutivefunction,language playsanexecutivefunctioninthedevelopmentofactioncontrol(becausethisdevelopmentdependsondiscursivereasoning,orruleuse).Theformerargumentsfollow fromtheLevelsofConsciousness(LOC)modeloftheroleofreflectioninthecontrolofthoughtandaction(P.D.Zelazo,inpressP.D.Zelazo&Jacques,1997P. R.Zelazo&Zelazo,1998),whereasthelatterderivefromtheCognitiveComplexityandControl(CCC)theoryofthedevelopmentofdeliberatereasoningand intentionalaction(Frye,Zelazo,&Palfai,1995P.D.Zelazo&Frye,1997). ConsciousnessandAction Theimportanceofconsideringconsciousnessinascientificexaminationofactionispartlyamatterofdefinitionandpartlyamatterofepistemologicalprudence.Onthe onehand,ifweareinterestedinconsciousness,thenwewouldbewisetoproceedfromanexaminationofaction,becauseaction,unlikeconsciousness,canbe observedfromanobjective,thirdpersonperspective.Ontheotherhand,ifweareinterestedinactionasconsciouslycontrolledbehavior,thenweareobligedto pursuetheproblemofconsciousnessevenifitleadsusdeepintothedomainofsubjectivity.Thisdefinitionalinterdependencebetweenconsciousnessandactionis underscoredbythefactthatbothareintentionalinasimilar,ifnotidentical,sense.ForBrentano(1874/1973),intentionality(fromtheLatinintendere,meaning"to stretch")capturesthefactthatanysubjective,consciousexperience,nomatterhowminimal,isanexperienceofsomething.2Unlikethingsthataremerelyobjective (e.g.,rocks),consciousexperiencesalwayshaveintentionalobjects,whetherthoseintentionalobjectsbesimplepainorpleasure,orsomethingmorecomplex,likea proposition.Intentionalityisthusagroundlevelcharacteristicofconsciousness,whichaimsbeyonditselfatanobject,muchinthesamewaythatintentionalactions aimatsomething(viz.,theirgoals).Indeed,theobjectofanintentionalactionnecessarilycorrespondstotheobjectof(atleastoneof)itsaccompanyingconscious states(i.e.,itcorrespondstotheobjectofadesire[e.g.,Baldwin,
2

Brentano(1874/1973)evidentlyunderstoodmentalitytobecoextensivewithconsciousness(seehisdescriptionof"presentations,"p.78ff.).Thisisimportantbecauseit underscoresthefactthatthe(real)problemofintentionalityisnotrestrictedtopropositions,whichexhibitreferentialopacity.Thefundamentalproblemofintentionality(i.e.,how tocashinBrentano'sof)ismorecloselyrelatedtoquestionsconcerningtheperspectivalcharacterofsubjectiveexperience(e.g.,Eilan,1995)thanitistoquestionsconcerning senseandreference(e.g.,Frege,1892/1949Russell,1905/1949).Thelatterquestions(atleastintheirpsychologicalapplications)presupposesolutionstotheformer(e.g.,they takeforgrantedthepossibilityofacquaintance,inRussell'ssenseoftheterm).

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1892]oranintention[e.g.,Adams,1986]),andactionwouldthusseemtoinherititsintentionalityfromtheconsciousnessthatcontrolsit.Behaviorthatis unaccompaniedbyconsciousstatesmaywellbegoaldirected(inthesensethatathermostatisgoaldirected),butitisnotintentionalonthisaccount(and,asaresult, itisproperlyexemptfrommoralevaluation). TheLOCModel TheLOCmodelisaninformationprocessingmodelthatisdesignedtoaddresstheinterdependencebetweenconsciousnessandactionindevelopment.Asan informationprocessingmodel,ittracestheflowofinformationthroughafunctionalsysteminthiscase,illustratingthewayinwhichprimitiverepresentations (intentionalobjects)areoperatedonastheycometofigureintheconsciouscontrolofbehavior.Asadevelopmentalmodel,theLOCmodeldepictsthewayinwhich thisfunctionalsystemchangesinthecourseofontogeny,andtheconsequencesofthesechangesforactioncontrol.Acentralclaimofthemodelisthatagerelated changesinactioncontrolfrominfancythroughthepreschoolyears(forreviews,seeP.D.Zelazo,Carter,Reznick,&Frye,1997P.D.Zelazo&Jacques,1997)are causallydependentonagerelatedincreasesinthehighest"levelofconsciousness"thatchildrencanattainwhenattemptingtosolveaproblem.Levelsof consciousnesscorrespondtodegreesofrecursioninarecurrentorreentrantsystem.3Thefunctionalprocessofrecursionpermitsthecontentsofconsciousnessat onelevelofconsciousnesstobeconsideredinconnectionwithothercontentsofconsciousnessatthatsamelevel.InthissectionIreviewthebasicclaimsoftheLOC model,summarizingmaterialthatispresentedmorefullyelsewhere(P.D.Zelazo,1998forsimilarsummaries,seeP.D.Zelazo,inpressP.R.Zelazo&Zelazo, 1998),andemphasizingthewayinwhichthismodelassignslanguageacrucialroleinthedevelopmentofconsciousnessandaction. MinimalConsciousness Thefirst,andmostimportant,theoreticalprimitiveintheLOCmodelisminimalconsciousness(cf.Armstrong,1980),whichismeanttobethesimplest,butstill conceptuallycoherent,kindofconsciousnessthatwecanimagine.Fromthisfoundation,itispossibletotracethedevelopmentofadultlikeconsciousnessusingvery fewtheoreticaltools(mainlyrecursion),andtoexplainawiderangeofagerelatedchangesinbehavioralcontrol.
3

Thetermrecursionisusedhereinthesenseofacomputerprogramthatcallsitself.

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Asarguedelsewhere(P.D.Zelazo,1996),minimalconsciousnessmustbecharacterizedbyintentionalityinBrentano'ssense(i.e.,ifoneisconsciousinanysense thenonemustbeconsciousofsomething).Inaddition,minimalconsciousnessisconativeandfunctionalinsofarasitmotivatesapproachandavoidancebehavioron thebasisofpleasureandpain(seeBaldwin,1894Dewey,1896,fordiscussion).Moreover,contraCarruthers(1989,1996),whoarguesthatinfants(andperhaps evenpreschoolers)lacksubjectiveexperience,therewouldbesomethingthatitisliketobeaminimallyconsciousinfant(cf.Nagel,1974).Itshouldbenoted, however,thattheinfantwouldnotknowthis,andheorshewouldbeunablelatertorecallwhatitwaslikebecause,incontrasttomoresophisticatedformsof consciousness,minimalconsciousnessisunreflective,presentoriented,andmakesnoreferencetoanexplicitsenseofselfthatcontainsorexplainssubjective experience.Whileminimallyconscious,aninfantisconsciousofwhatheorshesees(theobjectofexperience),butheorsheisnotconsciousofseeingwhatheor shesees,letalonethatheorshe(asanagent)isseeingwhatheorshesees.Andsubsequently,heorshecouldnotrememberseeingwhatheorshesaw.Processing ataminimallyconsciousnesslevelisoftendescribedasimplicitorunconscious(cf.Gray,1998),butthesetermsarepotentiallymisleadingbecausetheprocessingis infactconsciousinanimportantsenseitisjustthattheprocessingisunreflective,andunavailableforsubsequentrecollection(forreasonsthatwillbeaddressed). Inadditiontominimalconsciousness,whichisdepictedinFig.6.1asageometricplane,theLOCmodelassumestheexistenceoflongtermmemory(abbreviated LTM),whichhasbothsemanticandproceduralfunctions,or"systems"(Tulving,1985).Thesemanticsystemstorespotentiallydeclarativeknowledge,whereasthe proceduralsystemstoressensorimotorschemata.

Fig.6.1. Aprocessmodelofminimalconsciousness.(Adaptedfrom"Children'sRuleUse: Representation,Reflection,andCognitiveControl"byP.D.Zelazo&S.Jacques, 1997,inR.Vasta(Ed.),AnnalsofChildDevelopment,Vol.12,p.163).Anobject intheenvironment(objA)triggersanintentionalrepresentationofthatobject(IobjA) thatisstoredinsemanticlongtermmemory(LTM)thislobjA,whichiscausally connected(cc)toobjA,becomesthecontentofminimalconsciousness(minC),by wayofwhichittriggersanassociatedactionprogramstoredinproceduralLTM.

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Considerhowaninfantcanactonthebasisofminimalconsciousness.Anactualobjectintheenvironment(objA)triggersanintentionalobject(IobjA)thatis"stored" inLTM(withintheinformationprocessingsystem,thereexistonlyintentionalobjects,orrepresentationsobjectsasthingsinthemselvesarenoumenal,beyondthe reachofphenomenalawareness).ThisIobjA,withitsparticularaspectualshape(Searle,1990),thenbecomesthecontentofminimalconsciousness.InFig.6.1,the IobjAisdepictedascausallyconnected(cc)toabracketed(i.e.,noumenal)objA.WhentheIobjAbecomesthecontentofminimalconsciousness,itcantriggeran associated(reflexiveoracquired)actionprogramthatis"stored"inproceduralmemory.Thisprogramisthenexecutedasaresponse. Becauseitmediatesrespondingtotheenvironment,minimalconsciousnessplaysafunctionalroleintheproductionofbehavior.However,behaviorataminimally consciouslevelisnecessarilystereotypical(andhence,lackskeydefiningfeaturesofintentionalaction).Thepresenceofarattle,forinstance,elicitsanhabitual stereotypicalresponsetheinfantputstherattleintohisorhermouth,assimilatingittotheintentionalobject"suckablething,"whichis(reflexively)associatedwitha suckingschema.Althoughsensorimotorschemataaremodifiedthroughpracticeandaccommodation,andcoordinatedintohigherorderunits,asBaldwin(1894/ 1968)andPiaget(1936/1952)describedindetail(seealsoCohen,1998),aminimallyconsciousinfantwouldnotrepresenttheseschematainminimalconsciousness (theinfantwouldonlybeawareofthestimulithattriggerthem).Areviewoftheliterature(e.g.,P.R.Zelazo&Zelazo,1998)revealsthatminimalconsciousness managestoaccountforinfantbehaviorreasonablywelluntilabouttheendofthefirstyearoflife. OnsetofRecursiveConsciousness Attheendofthefirstyear(9to12months),alargenumberofnewabilitiesappearwithhighintervalsynchrony,whichsuggestssomesortofunderlyingcentral,and probablymaturational,determinant,asKagan(1972),P.R.Zelazo(1982),P.R.Zelazo&Leonard(1983),andothers(e.g.,Frye,1981Moore&Corkum,1994 Tomasello,chap.4,thisvolume)havepointedout.Withinthespanofafewmonths,infantsspeaktheirfirstwords,pointprotodeclaratively,searchforhidden objects,useobjectsinafunctionalway,anddisplaydeferredimitation,socialreferencing,andjointattention,amongmanyothermajorbehavioralmilestones. AccordingtotheLOCmodel,thesynchronousemergenceofthesebehaviorscanbeparsimoniouslyexplainedbytheonsetofthefirstnewformofconsciousness (seeFig.6.2). Whenthecontentsofminimalconsciousnessarereenteredintominimalconsciousnesssothattheycanbecombinedwithothercontentsofminimal

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Fig.6.2. Modelofrecursiveconsciousness.(Adaptedfrom''Children'sRuleUse:Representation, Reflection,andCognitiveControl"byP.D.Zelazo&S.Jacques,1997,inR.Vasta(Ed.), AnnalsofChildDevelopment,Vol.12,p.163).Whentheentirecontentsofminimal consciousness(minC)arefedbackintominCviaarecursiveprocess,ahigherlevelof consciousnessisachieved,namelyrecursiveconsciousness(recC).ThecontentsofrecC canberelated(Rel1)toacorrespondingdescription(descA)orlabel,whichcanthenbe depositedintoworkingmemorywhereitcanserveasagoal(G1)totriggeranaction program(storedinproceduralLTM).SeetextandFig.6.4foradditionaldefinitions.

consciousnessviaanidentity("is"or"isa")relation(abbreviatedRel1),thenthe(first)contentsofminimalconsciousnessbecomeavailabletotheinfantinwhatis calledrecursiveconsciousness,orRecC.(NotethatRecCisjustminimalconsciousnessdepictedinanotherpsychologicalmoment,orfunctionalphase).Naming(or labeling)istheprototypeofthisrecursiveprocess.Whena12montholdlooksathisorherfatherandsays,"Daddy,"heorshesays(effectively),"[Daddy]is Daddy."Aperceptualexperienceisassociatedwithadescriptionfrommemory,andthisdescriptionisbroughttobearontheperceptualexperience.Accordingto theLOCmodel,theremustbetwothings,theperceptionandthelabel,inorderforoneofthem,theperceptioninterpretedintermsofthelabel,tobecomeanobject ofconsciousexperience(notethenontrivialredundancyofthisexpression).Intheabsenceofalabelordescription,thecontentsofconsciousnessarefleetingand unrecoverabletheyareimmediatelyreplacedbynewstimulation.However,becausealabelcanbe"decoupled"(cf.Leslie,1987)fromtheexperiencethatislabeled, thelabelprovidesapotentiallyenduringtraceofthatexperience.Thishasconsequencesforthequalitativecharacterofexperience,and,moreimportantforthe presentpurpose,ithasconsequencesformemory.Specifically,recursiveconsciousnessallowsadescriptiontobedepositedintolongtermmemory(sothatthe experiencecansubsequentlyberememberedunderthatdescription),anditallowsthedescriptiontobedepositedintoworkingmemory,whichisunderstoodhere simplytobeashorttermbufferformaintainingcontentsofconsciousnessinanactivatedstate(e.g.,GoldmanRakic,1990).

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Accordingtothemodel,recursiveconsciousness(atleast)ofarepresentationisanecessarypreconditionforthedepositionofarepresentationintoworkingmemory. Thecontentsofworkingmemory(e.g.,representationsofhiddenobjects)canserveasgoalstotriggeractionprogramsindirectlysothattheinfantisnotrestrictedto responsesthataretriggereddirectly,or"suggested"(Baldwin,1891),bythe(minimallyconscious)perceptionofanimmediatelypresentstimulus.Itisatthispoint, whentheinfantiscapableofrecursiveconsciousnessandabletokeepan(absent)objectinmindasagoal,thatthenewbehaviorsatendofthefirstyearbecome possible.Nowwhentheinfantispresentedwithastimulus,suchasarattleoranobjecthiddenatanewlocation(asinanAnotBtaskPiaget,1936/1952),heor sheisabletoactmediately,inlightofadescriptionofthestimulus,ratherthanimmediately,accordingtoaprepotent,defaultactionprogramthatistriggereddirectly byasuperficial,perceptualexperience.Forexample,therecursivelyconsciousinfantmayseearattle,describeitasarattle,andrespondtoitunderthatdescription, shakingitappropriately(functionalplayP.R.Zelazo&Kearsley,1980).Or,inthecaseoftheAnotBtask,therecursivelyconsciousinfantmaysearchsuccessfully atlocationBbasedonarepresentationofthehiddenobject(inworkingmemory),ratherthanresponddirectlyandperseverativelytotheperceptionoflocationA (seeMarcovitch&Zelazo,inpressP.D.Zelazo,Reznick,&Spinazzola,1998,forfurtherdiscussion). Intermsofthemodel(seeFig.6.2),anobjAtriggersIobjA,whichthenbecomesthecontentofminC.However,insteadoftriggeringanassociatedactionprogram directly(asinaminimallyconsciousinfant),theIobjAisfedbackintominimalconsciousness(whichiscalledrecursiveconsciousnessafteronedegreeofrecursion) whereitisrelatedviaanidentityrelationtoadescription(descA)fromsemanticLTM.ThisdescAisdecoupledfromtheIobjAanddepositedintoworkingmemory whereitservesasagoal(G1)andcanelicitanactionprogramevenintheabsenceofobjA,andeveniftheIobjAwouldotherwisetriggeradifferent,prepotentaction program. TheEmergenceofSelfConsciousness Theyearoldinfantbehavesinawaythatisconsiderablymorecontrolledthan,say,the6monthold.However,inthesecondhalfofthesecondyearoflife,thereisa transitioninchildren'sbehaviorthatisnearlyasdramaticastheoneattheendofthefirstyear.Infact,itissodramaticthatPiaget(1936/1952)attributedittothe emergenceofsymbolicthought.Morerecentaccounts(Kagan,1981Lewis&BrooksGunn,1979Lewis&Ramsay,chap.5,thisvolume)havetendedtofocuson theimplicationsofthis

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transitionforchildren'sconsciousnessofself,emphasizingchildren'sfirstuseofpersonalpronouns,theirselfrecognitioninmirrors,andtheirdisplayofselfconscious emotionssuchasshame.Althoughinterpretationofanyoneofthesebehavioraldevelopmentsmaybeunderdetermined,consideringthemtogether(i.e.,"horizontally" Fischer&Bidell,1992)providesinterpretiveleverage. TheLOCmodelisconsistentwiththeserecentaccounts,butitalsofollowsPiagetinconsideringtheimplicationsforreasoningandaction.Accordingtothemodel,the behavioralchangesduringthesecondyearoccurbecauseofanadditionaldegreeofrecursioninconsciousness,whichyieldsanewlevelofconsciousnessreferredto (unsurprisingly)asselfconsciousness.Thisfurtherreflectionuponthecontentsofconsciousnessallowschildrentorelatedifferentconsciousexperiencestoaconcept ofself,whichisinvokedinordertoexplainthoseexperiences.OneparticularlysuggestivepieceofevidencecomesfromKagan(1981),whonotedthewayinwhich 2yearoldsrespondwhenshownacomplexseriesofstepsinthecontextofanimitativeroutine.Kaganfoundthatchildrenatthisage(butnotbefore)sometimes exhibitedsignsofdistress,asiftheyknewthattheseriesofstepswasbeyondtherangeoftheirbehavioralrepertoire,andwasnotamongthemeansthattheyhadat theirdisposal.Inlightoftheotherbehavioralchangesmentionedabove,andconsistentwithresearchonthedevelopmentontoddlers'actionandtheirunderstandingof intention(e.g.,Frye,1981,1991Meltzoff,1995,Meltzoff,Gopnik,&Repacholi,chap.2,thisvolumeTomasello,chap.4,thisvolume),itseemsreasonableto supposethatthechildmaybeconsideringhisorherowncapabilitiesforthefirsttime(Kagan,1981). Knowledgeofone'sowncapabilitiesinasituationthatis,considerationofavailablemeansaswellasdesiredendsmarksthebeginningofanewphaseofaction control.Keepingameansinmindasapriorintention(Searle,1983seeAstington,chap.15,thisvolume,fordiscussion)andthentranslatingitintoactionisan instanceofruleuseinsofarasaconditionallyspecifiedmeansisconsideredrelativetothegoalthatoccasionsit.(Notethatthemeansareconditionallyspecified becausetheycanonlybeexecutedwhencertainantecedentconditionsaresatisfied.)AccordingtotheLOCmodel,selfdescriptiverulesareformulatedinpotentially silentselfdirectedspeech,aswhenwesaytoourselves,"IfIseeamailbox,thenIwillmailthisletter."Inordertocontrolbehaviorconsciously,theserulesmustbe maintainedinworkingmemorysothattheycanconstrainrespondingregardlessoffluxionalenvironmentalstimulation,whichmaypullforinappropriateresponses.As showninFig.6.3,aselfconsciouschildcantakeasanobjectofconsciousnessaconditionallyspecifiedselfdescription(SdescA)ofhisorherbehavioralpotential. ThisSdescAcanthenbemaintainedinworkingmemoryasasinglerule(R1),considered

Page103

Fig.6.3. Modelofselfconsciousness.(Adaptedfrom"Children'sRuleUse: Representation,Reflection,andCognitiveControl"byP.D.Zelazo &S.Jacques,1997,inR.Vasta(Ed.),AnnalsofChildDevelopment, Vol.12,p.163).Seetextfordefinitions.

againstthebackgroundofthegoalthatoccasionsit.NotethattherelevantselfdescriptionscaneitherberecalledfromLTMorprovidedtothechildintheformof instructions.Intheformercase,whenthedescriptionsarerecalledfromLTM,specificrulesmaybeformulatedinanadhocfashionfromknowledgeofrelatively generalregularitiesthevariablesthatfigureinrepresentationsofregularitiesmaybeinstantiatedwithvaluesappropriatetoaspecificsituation.Thelattercase,in whichchildrenarepresentedwithinstructions,correspondstotheruleuseparadigmpioneeredbyVygotskyandLuria(seeP.D.Zelazo&Jacques,1997,fora review). Inanyruleusetask(unlikerulelearningtasks,suchastheWisconsinCardSortTest[WCST]Grant&Berg,1948),participantsarepresentedwithrulesand requiredtousethemtoguidetheirbehavior.Ifweassume(ratheruncontroversially)thatpeopleareconsciousofinformationthattheycanverballyreport,thenrule usecanbeseenasaclearcaseoftheuseofaconscious,actionorientedplantoguidebehavior.Thatis,itcanbeseenasaclearcaseofintentionalaction(basedon apriorintentionAstington,chap.15,thisvolumeSearle,1983). RecentresearchoncardsortinghasconfirmedLuria's(1961)findingthateven2yearoldscanuseasingleexcitatory(vs.inhibitory)rulesystematicallytocontrol theirbehavior(e.g.,Jacques,1995P.D.Zelazo,Reznick,&Pion,1995).Cardsortingbyanarbitraryruleprovidesacleardemonstrationofruleusebecause systematicrespondingisunderdeterminedbynonlinguisticaspectsofthetask.Inaseriesofstudies,SteveReznickandI(P.D.Zelazo&Reznick,1991P.D.Zelazo etal.,1995)presented2.5to3yearoldswithapairofadhocrulesforsortingpictures.Childrenweretold,forexample,"IfIshowyousomethingthatgoesoutside thehouse,putitherethingsthatgoinside,gooverhere.Here'sasnow

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man,whichboxdoesthatgoin?Howaboutthisrefrigerator?Etc."The2.5yearoldsstartedtousetheserules,butthentheyperseveratedononeofthem.For example,theymightputthesnowmanintherightbox,butthenassimilatetherefrigeratortothatsamerule.Inonestudy(P.D.Zelazo,Reznick,&Pion,1995, Experiment1),71%ofchildren'serrorswereperseverativeinthisway,whichissignificantlymorethanthe50%thatwouldbeexpectedifchildrenweresorting randomly.Thisfailuretoswitchbetweentworulesisindicativeofalimitontheirlevelofreflection.Ifthe2.5yearoldshadbeenabletostepbackfromtheir knowledge(viarecursion),andconsideroneruleinrelationtotheother,thentheywouldrecognizetheneedtochoosecarefullybetweenthem. ReflectiveConsciousness1:ContrastiveRelationsAmongRules Incontrastto2.5yearolds,3yearoldscansuccessfullyemployapairofarbitraryrules:inside/outside,thingsthatmakenoise/arequiet,animalsthatcanfly/run,etc. Intermsofthelevelsofconsciousnessmodel,thisnewlevelofactioncontrolisexplainedbytheacquisitionofahigherlevelofconsciousness,referredtoasreflective consciousness1(RefC1seeFig.6.4).ThreeyearoldchildrencanreflectuponaSdescAofarule(R1)andconsideritinrelationtoanotherSdesc(SdescB)of anotherrule(R2).Thisrelation(Rel2)isasecondordercontrastiverelation(asopposedtoanidentityrelation).Bothoftheserulescanthenbedepositedinto working

Fig.6.4. Modelofreflectiveconsciousness1.(Adaptedfrom"Children'sRuleUse: Representation,Reflection,andCognitiveControl"byP.D.Zelazo&S. Jacques,1997,inR.Vasta(Ed.),AnnalsofChildDevelopment,Vol.12, p.163).Seetextfordefinitions.

Page105

memorywheretheycanbeusedcontrastivelytocontroltheelicitationofactionprograms.Asaresult,3yearoldsdonotperseverateonasinglerulewhenprovided withapairofrulestouse. Ofcourse,therearestilllimitationsonchildren'slevelofconsciousnessandconsequentselfcontrol.Thelimitationsofreflectiveconsciousness1becomeobvious whenchildrenarerequiredtoswitchflexiblybetweentwoconflictingperspectivesonasinglesituation.Aperspectiveonasituationis(minimally)establishedbya discriminativejudgmentapairofrulesbecausetherulescanvarywhilethesituationremainsconstant.Asinglerulefailstoconstituteaperspectivebecausetherule cannotbedifferentiatedfromitsconditionofapplicationthesituation. Thedimensionalchangecardsort,orDCCS(seeFig.6.5),providesanillustration.InthecolorshapeversionoftheDCCS,childrenaregiventargetcardsandthen testcardsthatwouldbesorteddifferentlybycolorandshape.Theyarefirsttoldtworulesforseparatingtestcardsbyonedimension(e.g.,"Alltheredonesgohere, butalltheblueonesgothere"),showntestcards,andasked,"Wheredoesthisgointhe(e.g.,color)game?"Then,theyaretoldtoswitchandsortthe cardsbytheotherdimension.TheDCCSthusinvolvesconflictingperspectivesbecauseadiscriminationmustbereversed. Threeyearoldscansuccessfullyuseasinglepairofrules,suchas"Redherebluethere,"intheabsenceofinterference.However,oncetheyhaveusedtheserules, theyhavedifficultyswitchingtothenew,incompatiblepairofrules("Rabbitshere,boatsthere")inthatsamesituationdespitebeingtoldthenewrulesoneverytrial. Regardlessofwhichrulesarepresentedfirst,when3yearoldsaretoldtoswitch,theytypicallyperseverateonthefirstpairofrules. Confirmationthat3yearoldsperseverateonapairofrules,asopposedtolearningwhattodowithspecificstimuli,orlearningtoattendselectivelytoonedimension (e.g.,color),comesfromresearchdesignedtotestpredictionsderivedfromtheCCCTheory.InastudyinvolvingtwonewversionsoftheDCCS(seeFig.6.6), targetcardsweretakendownbetweenthepreandpostswitchphases,andreplacedwiththesameorwithnewcards.

Fig.6.5. Stimulifromthedimensionalchangecardsort(DCCS).

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Fig.6.6. Stimulifromthestandard,partialchange,andtotalchangeversionsoftheDCCS.

Theparticularcardsonlystayedthesameinthestandardtask,soifthechildrenlearnedresponsestoparticularstimuli,thenitwasexpectedtheyshouldonly perseverateonthisversion.Iftheylearnedtoattendselectivelytocolor,thentheywereexpectedtoperseverateonallthreeversions,eventhetotalchangeversion. However,ifthechildrenpersistedinusingspecificrules(redhere,bluethere),thentheywereexpectedtoperseverateinthepartialchangetask,butnotinthetotal changetask,whichisessentiallywhatwasfound(althoughthereseemedtobesomegeneraldisruptionofchildren'ssetinthepartialchangeversionseeTable6.1). TheLOCmodelisalsosupportedbythepresenceofanabulicdissociationbetweenknowingrulesandusingthem.Inonestudy(P.D.Zelazo,Frye,&Rapus,1996, Experiment4),childrenwhoperseveratedontheDCCSwerethenaskedaseriesofknowledgeandactionquestionspertainingtothepostswitchrules.Oneboxwas designatedErnie'sboxandtheotherBigBird's.Childrenwhoweresortingperseverativelyaccordingtocolorwereasked,"Whoseboxdotherabbitsgoin,inthe shapegame?Whoseboxdo

Page107 TABLE6.1 Numbersof3and4YearOldsFailingandPassingthe Standard,PartialChange,andTotalChangeVersions oftheDimensionalChangeCardSort(DCCS)

CardSort Condition 3yearolds Standard

Performance

Fail

Pass

12

8 10 16

PartialChange 10 TotalChange 4yearolds Standard 4

14 13 17

PartialChange 7 TotalChange 3

theboatsgoin?"andthentheyweretold(forexample),"Ok,now,playtheshapegame.Here'saredrabbit.Whoseboxdoesthisgoin,intheshapegame?" Remarkably,almostallchildrenwhoperseveratedontheDCCSproper(i.e.,most3yearolds)answeredtheknowledgequestionscorrectly,buttheythen proceededtoanswertheactionquestionincorrectly. Thus,3yearoldsappeartorepresentthepostswitchrulesconsciously,whichiswhytheycananswertheknowledgequestions,andtheyobviouslyknowthecolor rulesbecausetheyusethem.However,theydonotseemtoreflectfurtherontheirconsciousrepresentationsofthetwopairsofrules,whichiswhytheycannotmake adeliberatedecisiontousethepostswitchrulesincontradistinctiontothepreswitchrules(whicharenowprepotentbecausetheyhavebeeninvokedandusedinthis context).ThissituationisillustratedinFig.6.7a.ArulesuchasA,whichlinksantecedent1(a1)toconsequent1(c1),standsinacontrastive(exclusiveor,Vx)relation withruleB,whichlinksantecedent2(a2)toconsequent2(c2).Thiscontrastiverelationdefinesauniverseofdiscourse(U1),whichinthiscaseamountstoapairof rules.NotethatU1isincompatiblewithU2,comprisingrulesCandD,becausetherelationsbetweenantecedentsandconsequentsarereversed.AsshowninFig. 6.7a,bothrulepairsarerepresented,butchildrencannotformulateahigherorderrulethatallowsthemtointegratebothrulepairsintoasingleuniverseofdiscourse. Onlywhentherulepairsareconsideredinrelationtooneanothercantheappropriaterulepairbeselectedtocontrolaction.Otherwise,arulepairwillbeselectedon thebasisofrelativelylocalconsiderations(i.e.,theywillselectwhicheverrulepairismoststronglyassociatedwiththesituation). Confirmationthat3yearolds'difficultyiswithselectingtheappropriaterules,notexecutingthoserules,comesfromarecentstudyconductedby

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Fig.6.7. (a)Unintegratedtreestructureshowingtwopairsofrules.(b)Hierarchical treestructureshowinghowonerulecanbeembeddedunderanotherand controlledbyit.Note:U=universeofdiscourseV=exclusiveor,a contrastiverelations ands2 =settingconditionsa2 anda2=antecedent

1

conditionsc1 andc2 =consequences.

Jacques,Zelazo,Kirkham,andSemcesen(inpress)inwhich3yearoldsobservedapuppetplayingversionsoftheDCCS,andwererequiredtoevaluatethe puppet'sbehaviorasrightorwrong.Thus,theactioncomponentwasremovedfromthetaskaltogether.Inoneexperiment,thepuppeteitherperseverated,switched correctly,orswitchedgratuitouslyeventhoughitwasnotinstructedtodoso.Whenthepuppetperseverated,childrenincorrectlysaiditwasright,andwhenthe puppetswitchedcorrectly,childrenincorrectlysaiditwaswrong.However,whenthepuppetswitchedgratuitously,theycorrectlysaiditwaswrong.Furthermore, theirevaluationperformanceinthefirsttwoconditionswasrelatedtotheirownsortingperformancewhentheyweregiventhestandard(Child)DCCS.Together, thesefindingsindicatethat3yearoldsselectthewrong(i.e.,preswitch)rulesforthepurposeofevaluatingthepuppets'behaviorandforthepurposeofguidingtheir ownbehavior.ItdoesnotappeartobethecasethatontheirownDCCS,theyselecttherightrulesbutsimplycannotinhibitrespondingaccordingtothewrongpair (forfurtherdiscussionoftheroleofinhibitioninexecutivefunction,seeFrye,chap.7,thisvolumePerner,Stummer,&Lang,chap.8,thisvolumeP.D.Zelazo& Frye,1998P.D.Zelazo,Carteretal.,1997). ReflectiveConsciousness2:PuttingRulesIntoPerspective By4or5yearsofage,childrenswitchflexiblyontheDCCS,andintermsoftheLOCmodel,childrenatthisageattainahigherlevelofreflectiveconsciousness(see Fig.6.8),reflectiveconsciousness2(RefC2).Atthislevel,anadditionaldegreeofrecursionallowschildrentoconsidertheentire

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Fig.6.8. Modelofreflectiveconsciousness2.(Adaptedfrom"Children'sRuleUse: Representation,Reflection,andCognitiveControl"byP.D.Zelazo&S. Jacques,1997,inR.Vasta(Ed.),AnnalsofChildDevelopment,Vol.12,p. 163).Seetextfordefinitions.

contentsofRefC1inrelationtoaselfdescription(Sdesc)ofcomparablecomplexity.Asaresult,theyseethattheyhaveonepairofrulesforrespondingtoasituation, andthattheyhaveanother,incompatiblepairofrulesforrespondingtothesamesituation.Fromthisperspective,theyareabletoformulateanduseahigherorderrule forselectingwhichpairofrulestouse.ThesinglesystemofrulesdepictedinFig.6.7bcharacterizestheconsciousinferencesthatchildrenatthisagearecapableof making. Ahigherorderrule(ruleE)cannowbeusedtoselectrulesAandB,asopposedtorulesCandD.TouseruleE,onemustconsiderboththesettingcondition(s1or s2)andthelowerorderantecedentconditions(a1ora2),inordertodeterminewhichconsequencefollows(c1orc2):"Ifplayingcolor,thenifredrabbit,thenhere." Thus,ahigherlevelofconsciousnessallowstheformulationofamorepowerfulandflexiblesystemofrulestobemaintainedinworkingmemory.4Asexplainedbythe CCCtheory,children'sabilitytouserulesystemsatthislevelofcomplexityhasconsequencesfortheirdeliberatereasoningaboutavarietyoftopics,includingphysical causality(Frye,Zelazo,Brooks,&Samuels,1996),"theory

4

Notethatthecontentsofworkingmemoryarenotidenticaltotheoccurrentcontentsofconsciousness(e.g.,Baars,1988).Forexample,whenwerehearseatelephonenumber,all sevendigitsremaininanactivatedstate(i.e.,inworkingmemory)butweareonlyawareofsubsetofthematanygiveninstant.

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ofmind''(Fryeetal.,1995),morality(P.D.Zelazo,Helwig,&Lau,1996),andexternalrepresentations(P.D.Zelazo,Sommerville,&Nichols,inpress). SummaryoftheLOCModel TheLOCmodelstartswithacharacterizationofminimalconsciousnessandchartsfourmajoragerelatedincreasesinthelevelofconsciousnessthatchildrenareable tomusterinresponsetosituationaldemands.Theseincreasesarebroughtaboutbyafunctionalprocessofrecursionwherebythecontentsofconsciousnessarefed backintoconsciousnesssothatthecontentsofconsciousnessatonelevel(ormoment)becomeavailabletoconsciousnessatahigherlevel,withvarious consequencesforthequalityofsubjectiveexperience,thepotentialforrecall,andthepossibilityofactioncontrol.Recursionaddsdepthtosubjectiveexperience becausemoredetailscanbeintegratedintotheexperiencebeforethecontentsofconsciousnessarereplacedbynewenvironmentalstimulation.Ingeneral,each degreeofrecursioncausesinformationtobeprocessedatadeeper,lesssuperficiallevel(Craik&Lockhart,1972),whichincreasesthelikelihoodofretrieval(Craik &Tulving,1975).However,theconsequencesofthisfirstdegreeofrecursionareperhapsthemostcategoricalinnature,involving,astheydo,notmerelybetter recall,buttheverypossibilityofrecall.Moreover,witheachnewlevelofconsciousness,thechildisabletoexerciseanewdegreeofcontroloverhisorher environmentandbehaviorbecauseheorsheisabletoformulaterulesofgreatercomplexityandmaintainthoserulesinworkingmemory.Still,behaviorataparticular levelofconsciousnessissubjecttolimitationsthatcannotbeovercomeuntilyetanotherlevelisachieved.Dissociationsbetweenknowledgeandtheabilitytousethat knowledgetocontrolbehaviorwilloccuruntilincompatiblepiecesofknowledgeareintegratedintoasingle,morecomplexsystemviaanotherdegreeofrecursion. Thesedissociationsareimportanttheoreticallybecausetheyshowthatchildrensometimeshaveconsciousknowledgethattheyareunabletobringtobearona particularsituationunderconditionsofinterferencefromprepotentresponsesorrepresentations.Intheabsenceofintegration,theparticularconsciousknowledgethat controlsbehaviorisdeterminedbyrelativelylocalassociations.Forexample,therulesthatareselectedandstoredinworkingmemorymaydependonthewayin whichatestquestionisasked,oronwhatchildrenhavedonepreviouslyinthat(selfdescribed)samesituation. TheLOCmodelismeanttoaddressthechangesinruleusethataredescribedbytheCCCtheory(Fryeetal.,1995P.D.Zelazo&Frye,1997),andtoillustratethe causal(enabling)relationbetweenchangesinconsciousnessandchangesinrulecomplexity.Ingeneral,therelationbetween

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levelsofconsciousnessanddegreeofembeddingcanbedescribedintermsofthetreestructureinFig.6.7b:Twoyearoldswithselfconsciousnesscanformulatea singleconsciousrule,3yearoldswithreflectiveconsciousness1canconsiderapairofrulesatatime,and5yearoldswithreflectiveconsciousness2canreflect upontwoincompatiblepairsofrulesthatapplytothesamesituation(i.e.,theycanconsidertwodifferentperspectives).Recursionmovesconsciousnessfurtheraway fromtheexigenciesofenvironmentalstimulationinwhatmightbecalledpsychologicaldistance(cf.DeLoache,1993Dewey,1931/1985Sigel,1993),andthis allowsfortheformulationofincreasinglycomplexdiscursivereasoning. TheRole(S)ofLanguageinConsciousness(andAction)

Adesireis"conscious"whenwehavetoldourselvesthatwehaveit. B.Russell(1921,p.31)

Languagehaslongbeenbelievedtoplayanimportantroleinconsciousness.Indeed,theability(atleastpotentially)totalkaboutone'sexperienceshasbeentakento beacriterionofconsciousnessbytheoristsas(otherwise)dissimilarasFreud(1901/1938),Skinner(1969),andPiaget(1964/1967).Piaget(1964/1967),for example,writesthat"thoughtbecomesconscioustothedegreetowhichthechildisabletocommunicateit"(p.19).ForFreud(1901/1938),thetranslationofadrive fromaprimarytoasecondaryprocessistypicallyachievedthroughverbalinteraction(e.g.,withananalyst).Similarly,withinaSkinnerianframework,theverbal descriptionoftherelationbetweenanenvironmentalconditionandanactionistantamounttoconsciousrepresentation(seeSkinner,1969,p.245seealsoVygotsky, 1934/1962).Onthelattertwoaccounts,consciousnesscreatesthepossibilityofactioncontrol(oractioninlightofa"precurrent"descriptioninSkinner's[1969,p. 155]terms). TheLOCModellikewiseassignslanguageaninstrumentalroleinconsciousnessandaction,althoughitdoessointwodifferentways.Accordingtothemodel, languagehasbothaconstitutivefunctionandanexecutivefunctionintheconsciouscontrolofbehavior. TheConstitutiveFunction Recursionallowsthecontentsofminimalconsciousnesstoberelatedtoasemanticdescription(i.e.,alabel)andinterpretedintermsofthedescription.This descriptioncanthenbedecoupledfromtheperceptiondescribed,andmaintainedinworkingmemory.Unlikeminimalconscious

Page112

ness,whosecontentsarecontinuallyreplacedbynewperceptualinput,recursiveconsciousnessthereforeprovidesapotentiallyenduringtraceofone'sexperience, andallowsonetoactintheabsenceof,orinspiteof,directenvironmentalstimulation.Withoutlanguage,recursiveconsciousnesswouldbeimpossible,andsowould thecontrolofbehaviorbythecontentsofworkingmemory. Althoughthisinitialdegreeofrecursioncreatesthemostcategoricalchangesinthecharacteristicsofconsciousness,andhasthemostdramaticconsequencesfor action,itshouldbenotedthatitisonlythefirststeptowardsthedevelopmentofadultlikeconsciousness.Accountsofconsciousness(evendevelopmentalaccounts) typicallyassumethatconsciousnessisaunitaryphenomenon,andthattheemergenceofconsciousnessnecessarilyinvolves,say,theacquisitionofselfconsciousness (Lewis&Ramsay,chap.5,thisvolume),oratheoryofmind(Carruthers,1996).However,asarguedabove,oneneednotbeselfconsciousinordertobeconscious ofobjectsintheenvironmentortheobjectsofone'sdesires.Moreover,althoughthefunctionalprocessofrecursioneventually(withtheacquisitionofRefC2)allows childrentoengageinmetarepresentation(i.e.,torepresenttheirrepresentationsasrepresentationsPerner,1991),itdoesnotdemandthattheydoso. Metarepresentation,and"theoryofmind"ingeneral,involvestheacquisitionofcontingentknowledge(orbeliefs)aboutmindsandthewaytheywork,whereas recursionisafunctionalprocesswithinaninformationprocessingsystem.Thesuggestionthatmetarepresentation,andanunderstandingoftheappearancereality distinction,isrequiredforconsciousexperience(Carruthers,1996)wouldseemtobearatherseverecaseofthepsychologist'sfallacy(James,1890/1950)the confusionofthepsychologist'sstandpointwiththatofthementalfactaboutwhichheorsheismakinghisorherreport.AsJames(1890/1950)writes,"Whatthe thoughtseesisitsownobjectwhatthepsychologistseesisthethought'sobject,plusthethoughtitself,pluspossiblytherestoftheworld"(p.197),andhewarnsus to"avoidsubstitutingwhatweknowtheconsciousnessIS,forwhatitisaconsciousnessOF..."(p.197).Oneneednothaveaconceptofpain,forexample,in ordertofeelit(Anand&Hickey,1987).Adevelopmentalperspectiveisinstructiveinhelpingustoappreciatethispoint,whichissupportedempiricallybythe presenceofagerelateddissociationsbetweendifferentlevelsofconsciousness. TheExecutiveFunction Languageisrequiredforthedevelopmentofrecursiveconsciousness,anditthereforeplaysaconstitutiveroleintheemergenceofactioncontrol,butitalsohasan executivefunction.Whenadescriptionisdepositedinworkingmemory,itcanbeusedasarepresentationalproxyfortheper

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ceptionofastimulusinordertoguiderespondingindirectly.Thepossiblecontentsofworkingmemorybecomemoresophisticatedwitheachadditionallevelof consciousness.Unlikeinfants,toddlersareabletoreasondiscursively,formulatingselfinstructionsthatareinstrumentalinallowingthemtoexertconsciouscontrol overtheirenvironmentandoverthemselves.Thiskindofreasoningistantamounttoruleuse,andthereisnowstrongsupportforthesuggestionthatchildrenroutinely represent,select,andconsultrulesinordertoguidetheirbehavior(seeP.D.Zelazo&Jacques,1997).Indeed,overthecourseofthepreschoolyears,thereare reliableincreasesinthecomplexityoftherulesystemsthatchildrenareabletouse.Theseincreasesincomplexityallowchildrentobringtherightknowledgetobear ontheirbehavior(ortheirinferences)attherighttimeinspecificsituations.Thus,forexample,whenpresentedwiththeDCCS,a3yearoldwithreflective consciousness1cansaytohimorherself,"Okay,redonesgohereandblueonesgothere.Thisredrabbitisaredone,soI'dbetterputitoverhere."Incontrast,a 5yearoldwithreflectiveconsciousness2cansay,"Beforewewereplayingbycolor,butnowwe'replayingbyshape,sothisredrabbithastogooverherenow becauseit'sarabbit."Thesamechildpresentedwitharepresentationalchangetask(Gopnik&Astington,1988)maysaysomethinglikethis:"Therearesticksinthe box,notcrayons,butI'mbeingaskedaboutbeforeIsawthat.sotheansweriscrayons,notsticks."Intheseexamples,childrenmustformulaterulesinnatural language(basedonboththeirknowledgeandthetaskdemands)thatallowthemtoaccessandfocusonparticularpiecesofknowledgeatthetimeofresponding.The LOCmodeldescribesthefunctionalprocessesinconsciousnessthatpermit(orconstrain)thecomplexityofthediscursivereasoningthatchildrencanengageinat differentages.However,performanceinanyparticularsituationwouldalsobeexpectedtovaryasafunctionofexperienceandlanguageproficiency(andespecially, proficiencywithcertainaspectsoflanguage,e.g.,conditionalsBowerman,1986).Recently,correlationswithlanguageproficiencyhaveindeedbeenfoundforboth theDCCS(Bialystok,inpress,whocomparedtheperformanceofmonoandbilingualchildren)andtheoryofmind(Jenkins&Astington,1996). ThisviewoftheroleoflanguageinactionisveryVygotskyian:AccordingtoVygotskyandLuria(Luria,1961Vygotsky,1934/1962),languageinitiallyservesa communicativefunction,butitlateracquiressemantic,syntactic,anddirectivefunctions.Thisdirectivefunctionallowschildrentoorganizeandplantheirbehavior, essentiallyrenderingthemcapableofvoluntary,purposefulbehavior.Thus,despiteVygotsky's(1934/1962,p.153)insistencethat"thewordwasnotthebeginning actionwastherefirst,"hemaintainedthattherewasacloseconnectionbetweenlanguageandconsciouscontrol.TheLOCmodelfollowsVygotskyinthisregard. However,

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incontrasttoVygotsky,fortheLOCmodel,languagereallyisrequiredforaction.Onthismodel,theonsetofnamingsignalsasplitbetweennamerandnamed,andin animportantsense,itbringsintobeingtheworldasweknowit(asopposedtotheworldasitisexperienced).Themodelattemptstoshowhowthissplitmakes intentionalactionpossiblebyfollowingtheroleoflanguagefromitsinitialconstitutivefunctioninrecursiveconsciousnessthroughitscontinuedexecutivefunctionin discursivereasoning. Acknowledgments PreparationofthischapterwassupportedinpartbyagrantfromNSERCofCanadatoP.D.Zelazo.IwouldliketothankD.FryeandP.R.Zelazofortheir valuablecontributionstotheideascontainedinthischapter,andJ.Astington,M.Greif,S.Jacques,andS.Marcovitchforveryhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraft. References Adams,F.(1986).Intentionandintentionalaction:Thesimpleview.MindandLanguage,1,281301. Anand,K.J.,&Hickey,P.R.(1987).Painanditseffectsinthehumanneonateandfetus.NewEnglandJournalofMedicine,317,13211329. Armstrong,D.M.(1980).Thenatureofmindandotheressays.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress. Baars,B.J.(1988).Acognitivetheoryofconsciousness.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Baldwin,J.M.(1891).Suggestionininfancy.Science,18,113117. Baldwin,J.M.(1892).Originofvolitioninchildhood.Science20,286288. Baldwin,J.M.(1894).Imitation:Achapterinthenaturalhistoryofconsciousness.Mind,3,2655. Baldwin,J.M.(1968).Mentaldevelopmentinthechildandtherace(3rded.).NewYork:AugustusM.Kelley.(Originalworkpublished1894) Bialystok,E.(inpress).Cognitivecomplexityandattentionalcontrolinthebilingualmind.ChildDevelopment. Bowerman,M.(1986).Firststepsinacquiringconditionals.InE.C.Traugott,A.terMeulen,J.S.Reilly,&C.A.Ferguson(Eds.),Onconditionals(pp.285307). Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Brentano,F.(1973).Psychologyfromanempiricalstandpoint.(O.Kraus,Ed.A.C.Rancurello,D.B.Terell,&L.L.McAlister,Trans.).London:Routledge& KeganPaul.(Originalworkpublished1874) Bruner,J.S.(1973).Organizationofearlyskilledaction.ChildDevelopment,44,111. Carruthers,P.(1989).Bruteexperience.JournalofPhilosophy,86,258269. Carruthers,P.K.(1996).Language,thought,andconsciousness:Anessayinphilosophicalpsychology.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

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Cohen,L.B.(1998).Aninformationprocessingapproachtoinfantperceptionandcognition.InG.Butterworth&F.Simion(Eds.),Thedevelopmentofsensory, motor,andcognitivecapacitiesinearlyinfancy:Fromperceptiontocognition(pp.277300).Hove,UK:Taylor&Francis. Craik,F.I.M.,&Lockhart,R.S.(1972).Levelsofprocessing:Aframeworkformemoryresearch.JournalofVerbalLearningandVerbalBehavior,11,671 684. Craik,F.I.M.,&Tulving,E.(1975).Depthofprocessingandtheretentionofwordsinepisodicmemory.JournalofExperimentalPsychology:General,104, 268294. DeLoache,J.(1993).Distancinganddualrepresentation.InR.R.Cocking&K.A.Renninger(Eds.),Thedevelopmentandmeaningofpsychologicaldistance (pp.91107).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Dewey,J.(1896).[ReviewofStudiesintheevolutionarypsychologyoffeeling].PhilosophicalReview,5,292299. Dewey,J.(1985).Contextandthought.InJ.A.Boydston(Ed.)&A.Sharpe(TextualEd.),JohnDewey:Thelaterworks,19251953(Vol.6,19311932pp.3 21).Carbondale,IL:SouthernIllinoisUniversityPress.(Originalworkpublished1931) Eilan,N.(1995).Consciousnessandtheself.InJ.Bermdez,A.J.Marcel,&N.Eilan(Eds.),Thebodyandtheself(pp.337357).Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Fischer,K.W.,&Bidell,T.R.(1992,Winter).Everyoungerages:Constructiveuseofnativistfindingsaboutearlydevelopment.SRCDNewsletter,1,1011,14. Frege,G.(1949).Onsenseandnominatum(H.Feigl,Trans.).InH.Feigl&W.Sellars(Eds.),Readingsinphilosophicalanalysis(pp.85102).NewYork: Appleton,Century,Crofts.(Originalworkpublished1892) Freud,S.(1938).Theinterpretationofdreams.InS.Freud,ThebasicwritingsofSigmundFreud(A.A.Brill,Trans.).NewYork:TheModernLibrary.(Original workpublished1901) Frye,D.(1981).Developmentalchangesinstrategiesofsocialinteraction.InM.E.Lamb&L.R.Sherrod(Eds.),Infantsocialcognition(pp.315331).Hillsdale, NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates: Frye,D.(1991).Theoriginsofintentionininfancy.InD.Frye&C.Moore(Eds.),Children'stheoriesofmind:Mentalstatesandsocialunderstanding(pp.15 38).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Frye,D.,Zelazo,P.D.,Brooks,P.,&Samuels,M.(1996).Inferenceandactioninearlycausalreasoning.DevelopmentalPsychology,32,120131. Frye,D.,Zelazo,P.D.,&Palfai,T.(1995).Theoryofmindandrulebasedreasoning.CognitiveDevelopment,10,483527. Goethe,J.W.(1972).Faust(B.Fairley,Trans.).Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress.(Originalworkpublished1808) GoldmanRakic,P.S.(1990).Theprefrontalcontributiontoworkingmemoryandconsciousexperience.InJ.C.Eccles&O.Creutzfeldt(Eds.),Theprinciplesof designandoperationoftheBrain(pp.389407).NewYork:SpringerVerlag. Gopnik,A.,&Astington,J.W.(1988).Children'sunderstandingofrepresentationalchangeanditsrelationtotheunderstandingoffalsebeliefandtheappearance realitydistinction.ChildDevelopment,59,2637. Grant,D.A.,&Berg,E.A.(1948).AbehavioralanalysisofdegreeofreinforcementandeaseofshiftingtonewresponsesinaWeigltypecardsortingproblem. JournalofExperimentalPsychology,38,404411. Gray,J.A.(1998).Abnormalcontentsofconsciousness:Thetransitionfromautomatictocontrolledprocessing.InH.H.Jasper,L.Descarries,V.F.Castellucci,& S.Rossignol(Eds.),Consciousness:Atthefrontiersofneuroscience,advancesinneurology(Vol.77,pp.195212).NewYork:LippincottRavenPress. Jacques,S.(1995).Thedevelopmentofruleuseduringthepreschoolperiod.Unpublishedmaster'sthesis,UniversityofToronto,Ontario,Canada.

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Jacques,S.,Zelazo,P.D.,Kirkham,N.Z.,&Semcesen,T.K.(inpress).Ruleselectionandruleexecutioninpreschoolers:Anerrordetectionapproach. DevelopmentalPsychology. James,W.(1950).Theprinciplesofpsychology,Vol.1.NewYork:Dover.(Originallypublished1890) Jenkins,J.M.,&Astington,J.W.(1996).Cognitivefactorsandfamilystructureassociatedwiththeoryofminddevelopmentinyoungchildren.Developmental Psychology,32,7078. Kagan,J.(1972).Doinfantsthink?ScientificAmerican,226,7482. Kagan,J.(1981).Thesecondyear.Cambridge,MA:Harvard. Leslie,A.M.(1987).Pretenseandrepresentation:Theoriginsof"theoryofmind."PsychologicalReview,94,412426. Lewis,M.,&BrooksGunn,J.(1979).SocialcognitionandtheacquisitionofselfNewYork:PlenumPress. Luria,A.R.(1961.Theroleofspeechintheregulationofnormalandabnormalbehaviour(J.Tizard,Ed.).NewYork:PergamonPress. Marcovitch,S.,&Zelazo,P.D.(inpress).TheAnotBerror:Resultsfromalogisticmetaanalysis.ChildDevelopment. Meldon,A.I.(1964).Action.InD.F.Gustafson(Ed.),Essaysinphilosophicalpsychology(pp.5876).GardenCity,NY:Doubleday. Meltzoff,A.N.(1995).Understandingtheintentionsofothers:Reenactmentofintendedactsby18montholdchildren.DevelopmentalPsychology,31,838850. Meltzoff,A.N.,&Moore,M.K.(1995).Infants'understandingofpeopleandthings:Frombodyimitationtofolkpsychology.InJ.Bermdez,A.J.Marcel,&N. Eilan(Eds.),Thebodyandtheself(pp.4369).Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Moore,C.&Corkum(1994).Socialunderstandingattheendofthefirstyearoflife.DevelopmentalReview,14,349372. Nagel,T.(1974).Whatisitliketobeabat?ThePhilosophicalReview,83,435450. Perner,J.(1991).Understandingtherepresentationalmind.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Piaget,J.(1952).Theoriginsofintelligenceinchildren(M.Cook,Trans.).NewYork:Vintage.(Originalworkpublished1936) Piaget,J.(1967).Sixpsychologicalstudies(D.Elkind,Ed.A.Tenzer,Trans.).NewYork:Vintage.(Originalworkpublished1964) Russell,B.(1921).Analysisofmind.London:Allen&Unwin. Russell,B.(1949).Ondenoting.InH.Feigl&W.Sellars(Eds.),Readingsinphilosophicalanalysis(pp.103115).NewYork:Appleton,Century,Crofts. (Originalworkpublished1905) Searle,J.(1983).Intentionality.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Searle,J.(1990).Consciousness,explanatoryinversion,andcognitivescience,BehavioralandBrainSciences,13,585642. Sigel,I.(1993).Thecentralityofadistancingmodelforthedevelopmentofrepresentationalcompetence.InR.R.Cocking&K.A.Renninger(Eds.),The developmentandmeaningofpsychologicaldistance(pp.91107).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Skinner,B.F.(1969).Contingenciesofreinforcement:Atheoreticalanalysis.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall. Trevarthen,C.(1979).Communicationandcooperationinearlyinfancy:Adescriptionofprimaryintersubjectivity.InM.Bullowa(Ed.),Beforespeech:The beginningofinterpersonalcommunication(pp.321347).Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Tulving,E.(1985).Howmanymemorysystemsarethere?AmericanPsychologist,40,385398. Vygotsky,L.S.(1962).Thoughtandlanguage(E.Hanfmann&G.Vakar,Trans.).Cambridge,MA:MITPress.(Originalworkpublished1934) Zelazo,P.D.(1996).Towardsacharacterizationofminimalconsciousness.NewIdeasinPsychology,14,6380. Zelazo,P.D.(1998).Thedevelopmentofconsciousness.Manuscriptinpreparation.

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Zelazo,P.D.(inpress).Selfreflectionandthedevelopmentofconsciouslycontrolledprocessing.InP.Mitchell&K.J.Riggs(Eds.),Children'sreasoningandthe mind.Hove,UK:PsychologyPress. Zelazo,P.D.,Carter,A.,Reznick,J.S.,&Frye,D.(1997).Earlydevelopmentofexecutivefunction:Aproblemsolvingframework.ReviewofGeneral Psychology,1,198226. Zelazo,P.D.,&Frye,D.(1997).Cognitivecomplexityandcontrol:Atheoryofthedevelopmentofdeliberatereasoningandintentionalaction.InM.Stamenov (Ed.),Languagestructure,discourse,andtheaccesstoconsciousness(pp.113153).Amsterdam&Philadelphia:JohnBenjamins. Zelazo,P.D.,&Frye,D.(1998).II.Cognitivecomplexityandcontrol:thedevelopmentofexecutivefunctioninchildhood.CurrentDirectionsinPsychological Science,7. Zelazo,P.D.,Frye,D.,&Rapus,T.(1996).Anagerelateddissociationbetweenknowingrulesandusingthem.CognitiveDevelopment,11,3763. Zelazo,P.D.,Helwig,C.C.,&Lau,A.(1996).Intention,act,andoutcomeinbehavioralpredictionandmoraljudgment.ChildDevelopment,67,24782492. Zelazo,P.D.,&Jacques,S.(1997).Children'sruleuse:Representation,reflection,andcognitivecontrol.InR.Vasta(Ed.),Annalsofchilddevelopment,vol.12. (pp.119176).London:JessicaKingsleyPress. Zelazo,P.D.,&Reznick,J.S.(1991).Agerelatedasynchronyofknowledgeandaction.ChildDevelopment,62,719735. Zelazo,P.D.,Reznick,J.S.,&Pion,D.E.(1995).Responsecontrolandtheexecutionofverbalrules.DevelopmentalPsychology,31,508517. Zelazo,P.D.,Reznick,J.S.,&Spinazzola,J.(1998).Representationalflexibilityandresponsecontrolinamultistep,multilocationsearchtask.Developmental Psychology,34,203214. Zelazo,P.D.,Sommerville,J.A.,&Nichols,S.(inpress).Agerelatedchangesinchildren'suseofexternalrepresentations.DevelopmentalPsychology. Zelazo,P.R.(1982).Theyearoldinfant:Aperiodofmajorcognitivechange.InT.Beaver(Ed.),Regressionsinmentaldevelopment:Basicphenomenaand theoreticalalternatives(pp.4779).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Zelazo,P.R.,&Kearsley,R.(1980).Theemergenceoffunctionalplayininfants:Evidenceforamajorcognitivetransition.JournalofAppliedDevelopmental Psychology,1,95117. Zelazo,P.R.,&Leonard,E.L.(1983).Thedawnofactivethought.InK.Fisher(Ed.),Levelsandtransitionsinchildren'sdevelopment(pp.3750).San Francisco:JossesBass. Zelazo,P.R.,&Zelazo,P.D.(1998).Theemergenceofconsciousness.InH.H.Jasper,L.Descarries,V.F.Castellucci,&S.Rossignol(Eds.),Consciousness: Atthefrontiersofneuroscience:Advancesinneurology(Vol.77,pp.149165).NewYork:LippincottRavenPress.

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Chapter7 DevelopmentofIntention: TheRelationofExecutiveFunctiontoTheoryofMind

DouglasFrye UniversityofPennsylvania Therearemanyreasonstothinkthattheoryofmindandexecutivefunctionwouldbeunrelated.Theyseemverydifferent.Itisnotapparentwhythedevelopmentof mentalstateunderstandingwouldbeconnectedtothecontrolofone'sownactions.Theoreticalgroundsexistforexpectingthemtobeindependent.Indeed,the rationaleofdomainspecificaccounts(BaronCohen,1994Gopnik&Wellman,1994)isthatthedevelopmentoftheoryofmindshouldbeautonomous.Nonetheless, relationsbetweenthedevelopmentoftheoryofmindandexecutivefunctionhavebeendetectedforindividualswithautism(Ozonoff,Pennington,&Rogers,1991),in studiesofdeception(Russell,Mauthner,Sharpe,&Tidswell,1991),andfortypicallydevelopingpreschoolers(Frye,Zelazo,&Palfai,1995).Recentstudies (Carlson,1997Hughes,1998Ozonoff&McEvoy,1994)haveconfirmedtheseconnections. Theconfirmationofanempiricalconnectionbetweentheoryofmindandexecutivefunctioninvitesthequestionofthenatureofthetheoreticallinkbetweenthetwo. Thisquestionisofinterestbecauseallofthelogicalpossibilitiesareavailable.Theoryofmindcouldsubsumeexecutivefunction,executivefunctioncouldsubsume theoryofmind,orthetwocouldbedistinctandirreducibletoeachother.Astheexampleofdomainspecificityhasalreadyshown,thesepossibilitiescarrydifferent implicationsforwhattheoryofminditselfisunderstoodtobe.Theyalsocarrydifferentimplicationsforexecutivefunction.Historically,theconstructofexecutive functionhassufferedfromitsreadyuseasacoveringtermforahetero

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geneouscollectionofdifferentabilities(Zelazo,Carter,Reznick,&Frye,1997).Clarifyingtherelationbetweenexecutivefunctionandtheoryofmindcouldhelpto revealtherelativeimportanceofthesedifferentabilities.Theviewtakenhereisthattheoryofmindandexecutivefunctionaredistinct,butsocloselyrelatedthateach essentiallyimpliestheother.Thisviewhastheconsequenceofdrawingtheoryofmindmuchclosertoaction,andofshiftingtheemphasisinexecutivefunctionfrom responseinhibitiontoplanning. ProposalsfortheRelation Itisfortunatethatallofthelogicalpossibilitiesfortherelationbetweentheoryofmindandexecutivefunctionexistbecausetheyhaveallbeenclaimed.Perner (1998)hasadvocatedthepositionthattherelationobtainsbecausetherelevantexecutivefunctiondependsontheoryofmind.Perner's(1991b)metarepresentational accountiswelladaptedtoitsoriginalpurpose,theexplanationoftheoryofmindandespeciallyfalsebelief.Itiseasytoseehowunderstandingrepresentation(as representation)appliestounderstandinghowweformbeliefsabouttheworld.Theaccountapplieslessnaturallytodesiregiventhatourdesiresdonotrepresentthe worldasmuchasindicatehowwewouldliketheworldtobe(Astington,1991Perner,1991a).Thesamecomplicationariseswithexecutivefunctioninthatcontrol ofactioninvolvesalteringtheworldratherthansimplyrepresentingit.However,Perner(1998Perner,Stummer,&Lang,chap.8,thisvolume)hastheorizedthat metarepresentationisnecessaryforexecutivefunction,particularlywhenanewactionmustbetakeninasituationinwhichanotheractionhasbecomewellestablished. Hearguesthatthechildmustbeabletounderstandhowtheoldactionisrepresented(i.e.,metarepresentit)inordertolessenitsprobabilitysothatthenewactioncan becarriedout. Russell(1996)hastakentheoppositestance,speculatingthatchangesinexecutivefunctionmayexplainimprovementsintheoryofmind.Russellreachedthis conclusionfromthestudyofdeception.Deceptiondependsonactionbecausewemustdosomething(orrefrainfromactingwhenitisexpected)inordertomislead someone.Earlyon,itwasrecognizedthatdeceptionandtheoryofmindareempiricallyrelated(Wimmer&Perner,1983)however,theconceptualsimilaritythatthey bothinvolvefalsebeliefcouldberesponsible,giventhatdeceptioncanbedefinedasactingtogivesomeoneafalsebelief.Russelletal.(1991)deviseda straightforwardtestinwhichchildrencoulddeceiveacompetitormerelybypointingtotheincorrectlocationofacandy.Threeyearoldsproducedahighfrequency ofperseverativepointingtotheactuallocation,aresponsepatternthatis

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characteristicoffailuresinexecutivefunction.Theresultsofasubsequentstudy(Russell,Jarrold,&Potel,1994)openedthequestionofwhetherdeceptionwas indeedtheproblembecauseperseverationoccurredevenwithoutthepresenceofacompetitor. Theseresultsfavorthepossibilitythatyoungchildren'sdifficultywithdeceptionisnotconceptualbuttheconsequenceofpoorexecutivecontrol.Inthisregard,Russell (1996)introducesavaluabledistinctionbetweenexecutivecompetenceversusexecutiveperformancefailures.Executivecompetencereferstoactualabilitiesto controlactionthatmaybelackingbecausetheyhavenotyetbeendeveloped.Executiveperformance,incontrast,referstomoresuperficialdifficultiesincarryingout actionsthatmayconsequentlymaskchildren'srealabilities.Russellproposesanexecutivecompetenceexplanationoftherelationbetweenexecutivefunctionand theoryofmind.Inbothdeceptionandfalsebelief,youngchildren'sinabilitytocontroltheirownthinkingsufficientlymakesitdifficultforthemtopulltheirthoughts awayfromrealityinordertodeterminehowsomeoneelsecanbemadetoorwillmistakenlyseethesituation. Carlson,Moses,andHix(1998)haverecentlyformulatedanexecutiveperformanceaccountoftherelationbetweentheoryofmindandexecutivefunction.They verifiedthat3yearoldshavedifficultypointingawayfromthelocationofanobjectevenwhenthepersontobedeceivedwasnotpresent.Theyalsofound,however, thatthechildrenweremoresuccessfulwhentheyjusthadtoattachapictorialcuetotheemptylocationratherthanpointtoit.Thisfindingindicatedthatpointing, whichiswellestablishedasawayofindicatingthelocationofsomething,maybeaprepotentresponse.Ifyoungchildrenlacktheresponseinhibitiontorefrainfrom pointingtotheobject'sactuallocation,theywillappeartobepooratdeceptioneventhoughtheymayunderstanditperfectlywell.Thisexecutiveperformancefailure mayalsoextendtotheoryofmindbecausemanychildrenrespondbypointinginthechangeoflocationfalsebelieftask.Thisaccounttakestheposition,then,that theoryofmindandexecutivefunctioneachexistintheirownrightbutthattheoryofmindsuccessmaybemaskedbytheexecutiveperformancefailureofinadequate behavioralinhibition.OnelastpossibilityissetoutbyCognitiveComplexityandControl(CCC)theory(Fryeetal.,1995Zelazo&Frye,1997).Thisaccount acceptsthattheoryofmindandexecutivefunctionaredistinct.Onecannotbereducedtotheother.However,itsuggeststhatitmaybepossibletodiscoveraformal relationbetweenthetwo.Althoughitisnotapparentinthecharacterizationstheypreviouslyhavebeengiven,thetwomayrestonthesamesetofembeddedrules. Ruleusedevelopsoverthecourseofthepreschoolperiod(Zelazo&Jacques,1996)withembeddingfirstoccurringatabout4yearsofage.Thesameembedded rules,employedinslightlydifferentways,guidetheinferencesnecessaryfortheoryofmindandallow

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theformulationofactionthatresultsinimprovedexecutivecontrol.Asaconsequence,theapproachtakesanexecutivecompetenceviewthatplacesmoreemphasis onplanninganddeliberativeactioninexecutivefunction(Zelazo,Carter,etal.,1997)ratherthanonjustresponseinhibition.Inlinewiththatemphasis,itproposesthat youngchildren'sdifficultywithdeceptionmayrelatemoretoplanningthantoexecutingactions(Brooks,Frye,&Samuels,1997).Theapproachalsofurnishesan interpretationofactionthatgivesadifferentinsightintowhatitcouldsharewiththeoryofmind. SimilaritybetweenTheoryofMindandExecutiveFunction MuchoftheresearchonpreschoolexecutivefunctionwithintheCCCapproachhasinvestigatedaseeminglyuncomplicatedcardsortingtask(Fryeetal.,1995 Zelazo,Frye,&Rapus,1996).Thetasktapsexecutivefunctionbecauseitrequireschildrentoactaccordingtostatedrules.Childrenareshowncardswithpictures thatvaryontwodimensions.Thus,forthedimensionsofcolorandshape,theremightbecardspicturingayellowflowerandothersshowingabluecar.Thechildren areaskedtomatchthesetotwotargetcards(ablueflowerandayellowcar),firstforonedimensionandthentheother.Theyareexplicitlytoldtherelevantdimension andcorrectruleeverytime.(''Rememberthisisthecolorgame.Inthecolorgame,ifitisyellow,itgoeshere.Ifitisblue,itgoesthere.Wheredoesthisyellowflower go?")Becauseofthecardsused,thereisalwaysaconflictpresent.Thetargetthatatestcardmatchesforonedimensionwillnotbetheoneitmatchesfortheother dimension. Theprocedureproducesaveryclearagepattern.Threeyearoldscansortbywhicheverdimensionispresentedfirst,butthencontinuetosortbythatdimensioneven whentheyareaskedtoemploytheotherone.Theirperseverativerespondingischaracteristicofafailureinexecutivefunction.Fiveyearoldstypicallysortwithout errors,switchingeasilyfromonedimensiontotheother.Aswasindicatedpreviously,children'ssuccessinswitchingiscorrelatedwithsuccessinunderstandingfalse beliefandothertheoryofminddevelopmentsevenaftertheeffectsofagehavebeenremoved(Fryeetal.,1995Carlson,1997). Aplausibleinterpretationoftheseresultsisthat3yearoldshaveweakerresponseinhibition.Whentheysortbyonedimensionseveraltimes,thoseresponses becomeprepotent.Switchingtoanewdimensionisdifficultbecausetheprepotentresponsesmustbeinhibitedbeforethenew,correctonescanbemade.Fiveyear oldswithbetterdevelopedresponseinhibitionareabletorefrainfrommakingtheoldresponses,andconsequentlyare

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abletoswitchtosortingbythenewdimension.Otherexplanationscanbegivenforthischange.CCCtheoryoffersanalternativethatisdescribedinmoredetaillater. Aseriesofstudiesdesignedinparttocomparethetwoaccountsisalsoreviewed.However,adifferentstrategyfortryingtounderstandhowyoungchildrenapproach thisproblemistoconsiderhowtheexecutivefunctionaspectsofcardsortingmightbeliketheoryofmind,giventhetwoareempiricallyrelated. Allofthecharacteristic3to5yeartheoryofmindproblemsinvolveasituationorobjectthatcanbeseenintwodifferentwaysand,asFlavell(1988)hasargued,the twoviewsareinconflictwitheachother.Theclearestexamplemaybethefamiliarrockspongetaskinwhichchildrenmustcontendwithaspongethathasbeen paintedtoresemblearock(Gopnik&Astington,1988).Thetwoviewsordescriptionsoftheobject,rockversussponge,arealwayseachassociatedwithadifferent perspectiveinthetheoryofmindproblemsotherversusselfinfalsebelief,earlierselfversuspresentselfinrepresentationalchange,andhowitlooksnowversus whatitreallyisnowforappearancereality.Ofcourse,thepatternineachofthesecontrastsisfor3yearoldstoadoptonlyoneofthesedescriptions,usuallywhat theobjectactuallyisbutnote,forexample,theoccurrenceofphenomenalismerrorsintheappearancerealitytask(Flavell,Flavell,&Green,1983)andgiveitfor bothperspectives.Fiveyearolds,incontrast,changetheirjudgmentdependingonwhichperspectiveisbeingconsidered. Itiseasytoseethattherockspongetaskrevealssomethingimportantaboutthechild'sunderstandingbecauseitinvolvestheidentityoftheobject.Thechildisbeing asked"Whatdoyouthinkitis?"and"Whatwillyourfriendthinkitis?"Incomparison,thecardsortingtaskhasmoreoftheflavorofamechanicalprocedure.The childmerelyhastogetthecardsintherightplace.However,itispossibletoimaginethereismoreinvolvedinthecardsort.Whenthetaskbegins,thesorting procedurerequiresthechildrentomakeajudgmentaboutsomeaspectoftheobjectforexample,forcolor,theyhavetoidentifyeachpictureasbeingyellowor blue.Whenthechangeindimensionisannounced,thesortingprocedurenowrequiresajudgmentaboutadifferentaspectofthecard.Theymustjudgewhetherthe pictureisafloweroracar.Eventhoughtheymustjudgeshape,youngchildren'ssortingresponse,becausetheycontinuetousetheolddimension,indicatesaverdict ofsomethinglike"yes,itisayellowone."Thismistakeseemsmuchlikewhathappenswhenyoungchildrenrepeatthereply"itisasponge"tothequestionsofwhat theirfriendwillthinktherock/spongeis,whattheythoughtitwas,andwhatitlookstobe. Thetheoryofmindandcardsortingresultscanbegivenasimilarreadingbecausetheyhavethesameformalstructure.Bothinvolvesomethingthatcantaketwo differentdescriptionsrockorspongeforthe

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objectinthetheoryofmindproblemsandashapeoracolorforagiventestcardinthesortingtask.Inordertojudgewhichdescriptionisappropriate,thechoicehas tobeconditionalizedontheadditionaldeterminantofthespecificperspectiveinthetheoryofmindproblemsandtherelevantdimensioninthecardsort.Fiveyear oldsareabletoincorporatetheadditionalconditiontochoosebetweendescriptionsappropriately.Threeyearoldsappeartohavemuchmoredifficultywiththe ambiguityofthedescriptions.Intheircharacteristicpatternoferrors,theyseemtoignoretheadditionalconditionandconsistentlyadoptonedescriptionattheexpense oftheother. Thisanalysisisnotlimitedtotheseexamples.Theimportantfeaturesofothercommontheoryofmindproblemscanbecapturedwiththesameterminology.For example,theoriginalchangeinlocationversionofthefalsebeliefproblem(Wimmer&Perner,1983)canbeaccommodatedbytreatinglocationasanaspectorpart ofthedescriptionofthehiddenobject.Itmaybemoreinterestingtoconsidertheapproach'simplicationsforexecutivefunction,however.Thecardsortingtask assessesexecutivefunctionbecauseitinvolvesaction.Thechildisgiventhegoalofsortingthecardsonaparticulardimensionandmustchoosetheactionsthatwill fulfillthatgoal.Perhapstheambiguityindescriptionsthatcharacterizesthecardsortdoesnotjustapplytodescribingthecardsthemselves,butalsoextendstothe underlyingactionsthatareinvolved. Thereisawellestablishedrecognitioninphilosophythatintentionalactionstakedifferentdescriptions.InSearle's(1983)memorableexample,GavriloPrincip'saction canbevariouslydescribedas"hepulledthetrigger,""heshottheArchdukeFranzFerdinand,""hestartedWorldWarI,""hedisturbedanumberofairmolecules," andsoon.Althoughallofthesedescriptionsapplytotheaction(justasrockandsponge,yellowandflowerallalsoapplyinthepreviousexamples),notallofthemfit asadescriptionofwhatGavriloPrincipwastryingtodo.Inotherwords,theactionisintentionalonlyundercertaindescriptionsbecausetheactorhadonlysomeof themasagoal,orcouldonlyreasonablybeexpectedtoanticipatesomeofthemasanoutcome.GavriloPrincipwastryingtoshoottheArchduke,butheprobably wasnottryingtostartWorldWarIordisturbairmolecules.Thisexampleillustratesthatthereisalwaysapotentialambiguityinthedescriptionofintentionalactions. Whatifyoungchildrenhavetroubleappreciatingpotentiallyconflictingdescriptionsofintentionalaction,justastheyhavetroubleappreciatingconflictingdescriptions ofwhatanobjectisthoughttobe?Thisproblemwouldtendtohavetheeffectofmakingyoungchildrenthinkthatanactionhasonlyonepurposeinagivensituation. Olderchildren,incontrast,willappreciatethatthesameactioncanbeusedfordifferentpurposesinthesamesituation.Inthecardsort,thisinterpretationwouldimply that

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whenyoungchildrenhavetochangegoalsfrommatchingtoshaperatherthancolor,theirpreviouslysuccessfulmatchingmakesitsothattheyhavedifficultyseeing thatsortingcouldbeusedtoproduceadifferentoutcome.Fiveyearolds,ontheotherhand,recognizethatsortingcanleadtodifferentoutcomesinthissituation,just astheyseethatobjectscanbeidentifieddifferently,andtheyareabletoreconstruetheactiontomeetthenewgoal. Anothersituationinwhichthisapproachtoactioncanbeinformativeisfordeception.Deceptionrequirestheintentionalactionofmisleadingsomeone.Thetestsdone withyoungchildren(e.g.,Russelletal.,1991)typicallyaskthechildtomakearesponselikepointingtomisleadsomeonetosearchinthewrongplaceforanobject. Lookingatitasaninstanceofintentionalaction,deceptioninvolvestakinganormallyhelpfulaction(pointingusuallyhasthegoalofshowingwheresomethingis)and puttingittothenewpurposeofsendingsomeonetothewrongplace.Thisconflictshouldbepreciselywhatisproblematicforyoungchildreniftheyhavedifficulty seeingthatthesameactioncanbeputtodifferentpurposeswithinthesamesituation.Olderchildren,incontrast,oughttobeabletoappreciatethattheintentional actionofpointingcanbeputtodifferentusesinordertoproducedifferentoutcomes. Reinterpretingsomeofyoungchildren'sexecutivefunctiondifficultiesinthisfashiongivesadifferentslanttotheproblemsinvolved.Itisnothardtoimaginethattheory ofmindwouldbeachallengeforyoungchildrengiventheamountofthinkingthatisdemanded.Action,ontheotherhand,hastheconnotation,similartothetendency toseethecardsortasamechanicalprocedure,ofbeingsomethingthatisrelativelystraightforward,perhapsautomaticaresponse.However,thenecessityfor planningandproblemsolvingbecomesapparentwhentherelevanceofintentionalactiontoexecutivefunctionisacknowledged(Zelazo,Carter,etal.,1997).Finding anactionthatcanbeputtoanewusetoproduceanintendedoutcomecanrequireeverybitasmuchthoughtasinferringhowsomeoneelseislookingatasituation, andmaybesubjecttothesameerrors. CognitiveComplexityandControl(CCC)Theory Theprecedingdiscussionhelpstoshowthatthereisanequivalencebetweentheoryofmindandexecutivefunctioninpreschool,andthatthetwomaybesimilar becausethedifficultiesyoungchildrenhaveunderstandingambiguityindescriptionsofsituationscanalsoapplytointentionalaction.Forthisaccounttobeuseful,itis importanttobeabletomodelthesourceofthesedifficulties.TheembeddedrulesinCCCtheoryprovide

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onecharacterizationofhow5yearoldsareabletocontendsuccessfullywiththeidentifiedambiguities.Theoryofmindandexecutivefunction,orinferenceofmental statesandplanningaction,arerelatedinthattheydependondifferentapplicationsofthesesamereasoningrules.Threeyearoldserrincharacteristicwayswhen inferringmentalstatesandplanningactionbecausetheyrelyonasimplerversionoftherules. Embeddedrulesallowthesolvingofthepreschooltheoryofmindproblemsbecausetheygoverntheswitchingbetweenambiguousdescriptionsoftheobject accordingtosettingconditions.So,forexample,intherockspongefalsebelieftask,theobjectcanbeseenaseitherthing,butwhichischosenforselfisdifferent fromwhichhastobechosenforother.Embeddedrulesontheorderof"ifself,ifjudgingwhatobjectis,thensponge"and"ifother,ifjudgingwhatobjectis,then rock"areneeded.Embeddingwithinthesettingconditionsofselfandotheriswhatmakesitpossibleforthejudgmentabouttheobjecttoproduceconflictinganswers. Although3yearoldscanmakerulebasedjudgments,theyarenotyetabletoembedthemwithinanotherrule.Hence,whentheyareconfrontedwithaproblemas complexasfalsebelief,theyreducethecomplexitybyignoringthesettingconditionandjudgeaccordingtosimpleifthenrules(seealsoHalford,Wilson,&Phillips,in press).Thissimplificationresultsinthesamejudgmentbeinggivenforselfandother. Thetheoryofmindproblemsareinferenceproblemsbecausechildrenusetheembeddedrulestoreasonfromtheantecedentstotheconsequent.Infalsebelief,they havetoconsiderwhichperson(antecedent)andtheobjectorsituation(antecedent)inordertoinfertheresultingmentalstate(consequent).Therulesmakeitpossible tobemoreexplicitabouttherelationbetweentheoryofmindandexecutivefunction.Intheexecutivefunctionoractiontasksthathavebeendiscussed,childrenmust solveforadifferenttermintheembeddedrules.Theyaregiventheconsequent,andoneoftheantecedents,butmustsolvefortheother.Thus,inthecardsort,they aregiventheconsequentofhavingthecardsmatch,theantecedentoftherelevantdimension(e.g.,shape),buttheyhavetodeterminetheactiononthesituation(putit here)thatwillproducetheconsequent.Similarly,indeception,theconsequentofinfluencingthesearchoftheotherpersonisspecified,andsoisthefactthattheother personisacompetitor,butthechildmustformulatetheaction(e.g.,pointhere)thatwillbeeffective. Althoughtheembeddedruletermbeingsolvedforisdifferentintheinferenceversusactionproblems,3yearolds'useofsimpleifthenruleshasthesamedetrimental effect.Inthecardsort,absentembedding,youngchildrenwillignorethesettingconditionofthenewdimensionandsatisfytheconsequentofmatchingthecardsby selectingthe(nowincorrect)actionthathadpreviouslysucceeded.Indeception,whenthesettingcon

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ditionthattheotherpersonisacompetitorisignored,theconsequentofinfluencingtheother'ssearchwillbeaccomplishedbytheusualruleofpointingwherethe objectis.Justasintheinferenceproblems,consideringconflictingdescriptionsisnotsustainableinthemissingtermoftheactionproblemswithoutsettingconditions.It willnotbepossibletoputanormallyhelpfulactionlikepointingtotheoppositepurpose,unlessthatchoicecanbeembeddedunderasettingconditiontopartitionit fromthewayitistypicallyunderstood. Finally,theassumptionthat3yearoldsemploysimplerulesinthesesituationspredictsthattheirperformancewillhaveabias(Fryeetal.,1995,p.504Frye,Zelazo, Brooks,&Samuels,1996,p.130Zelazo&Frye,1997,pp.129,141).Thebiasisaresultoftheuseoftheruleswhentheyarenolongerappropriate.Itisassumed thatanybiascomesstrictlyfromexperience.Thecardsortisthemostinterestingcaseinthisregardbecauseitisdesignedsothatthebiasisestablishedwithinthe task.Threeyearoldscansortbyeithercolororshape,butoncetheyhavebeengivenexperiencewithone,theyarethenpredisposedtoitinthatsituation.Children arriveatthetheoryofmindanddeceptiontasksandcertaincausalreasoningproblems(Fryeetal.,1996)withbiasesthatdependonpreexperimentalexperience. Theyareaccustomedtonamingobjectsaccordingtowhattheyactuallyareandpointingtodirectpeopletothings.Thus,contrarytosomereadings(Russell,1996,p. 273),thetheoryexpectstheretobearealitybiasintheoryofmind,andsuggeststhatitwillonlybeovercomewhenthesettingconditionsofembeddedrulesgivea meansofisolatingexceptionstothewaythingsusuallyoccur. EmpiricalImplicationsoftheApproachforExecutiveFunction Embeddedrulesmakeexplicithowtheoryofmindcouldberelatedtoexecutivefunction.Thetwoaredistinctandneitherunderliestheother,yetinasensetheyare twosidesofthesamething,becausetheybothrelyondifferentuseofthesamesetofrules.Aclearimplicationisthattheoryofmindandexecutivefunctionoughtto beempiricallyrelated.Moreover,therelationshouldnotbeboundedbyconceptualsimilarity(e.g.,alinkingoftheoryofmindanddeceptionbecausetheyboth involvefalsebelief),butshouldextendtodevelopmentsthatrelyonthesamerules.Theempiricalrelationsthathavebeenfoundbetweentheoryofmindandother executivefunctionproblemslikethecardsortestablishthispoint.Theseproblemsarerelatedtotheoryofmind,donotinvolvetheunderstandingofmentalstates,and yetarguablybothrelyonasinglesetofrules.Indeed,Carlson's(1997)resultsshowthattheexecutivefunctiontasksthatwould

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bestfitthespecificationgivenhere,thosethatpresentaresponseconflict,weretheonesthatweremoststronglycorrelatedwiththeoryofmind. Inadditiontotheempiricalpredictionsitmakesabouttherelationoftheoryofmindandexecutivefunction,thecurrentapproachalsomaintainssomedifferent expectationsforthedevelopmentofexecutivefunction.Gainsinexecutivefunctioninchildhoodhaveoftenbeenexplainedintermsofimprovementsinresponse inhibition(e.g.,Carlson,Moses,&Hix,1998Dempster,1992Diamond&Gilbert,1989Harnishfeger&Bjorklund,1993Hughes,1998Russelletal.,1991 Welsh&Pennington,1988).Responseinhibitionisundoubtedlyimportant,butitmaynotbewhatispredominantlyinvolvedinthepreschooldevelopmentsunder discussion.TheheavieremphasisthatCCCtheoryplacesonintentionalactionandplanningsuggestschangesmayoccurbecausechildrenbecomeabletoemploy embeddedrulestoselecttheappropriateactions,ratherthanjustincreasingtheirabilitytoinhibitinappropriateones.Thisdistinctioncarrieswithitdifferencesin empiricalpredictionsforpreschoolexecutivefunction. CardSort Aswasoutlinedearlier,youngchildren'sperseverativerespondinginthedimensionalchangecardsortcouldbetheresultofinadequateresponseinhibition.Sortingthe cardsrepeatedlybyonedimensionshouldproduceprepotentresponses.Difficultyinhibitingtheseresponseswouldpreventexecutingthenewoneswhentheother dimensioncameintoeffect.Onetestofthispossibilityistodeterminewhetherextensivetrainingwiththepreswitchrulesisrequiredtoproduceperseveration.If inhibitionofprepotentresponsesistheproblem,thenthelikelihoodofperseverationoughttoincreaseasafunctionofthenumberofpreswitchtrials.Incontrast,if3 yearoldsaresimplyunabletorepresentahigherorderruleforselectingbetweenrulepairs,thentheyoughttoperseverateeveninthepresenceofminimal interference.Zelazo,Frye,andRapus(1996,Experiment2)foundthatasinglesuccessfulsortingtrialonthefirstdimensionwassufficienttocausethemajorityof3 yearoldstoperseveratewhenthedimensionchanged,indicatingthatoverlearningisnotrequired. TheresponseinhibitionandCCCaccountsalsomakedifferentialpredictionsfortheimportanceoftheresponseitself.Accordingtoaninhibitionapproach,specific responsespresumablybecomeprepotent,whereasCCCtheorywouldsuggestthatthelackofembeddedrulescouldaffectavarietyofdifferentresponses.To explorethisquestion,Zelazoetal.(1996,Experiments3&4)investigatedtheimportanceofresponsemodalityforperseverationinthecardsort.Anewversionof thetaskwaspresentedinwhichchildrenindicatedtheirsortingresponsesverballyratherthanmanually.Classicinhibitionapproaches(e.g.,Luria,1961)have theorizedthat

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thereismoreflexibilityinlinguisticresponsesthanmotoricones.Nonetheless,3yearoldsperseveratedinthispurelyverbalversion. Thestrategyofmanipulatingtheresponsetoevaluatethecontributionofinhibitioninthecardsorthasbeentakenonestepfurther.Jacques,Zelazo,Kirkham,and Semcesen(inpress)testedwhether3yearoldscouldmasterthecardsortingtaskiftheydidnothavetosortatall.Toeliminatetheneedtoexecuteasorting response,childrenweresimplyaskedtoevaluatethesortingofapuppet.Inoneinstance,thepuppetperseveratedonthepostswitchtrials.Inanother,thepuppet switchedtosortingcorrectlybythenewdimension.Threeyearoldsjudgedthatthepuppetwasrightwhenperseverating,andwrongwhensortinginaccordancewith thenewdimension.Inaddition,theirownsortingonanindependenttestcloselyagreedwiththeirappraisalsofthepuppet'sperformance.Withtheneedtomakeand changethesortingresponseremoved,itishardtoescapetheimpressionthat3yearoldsarethinkingaboutthetaskinthewrongway,ratherthanbeingcaughtinthe wrongresponse.Iftheirlackofembeddedrulesleavesthemthinkingthatmatchingonthefirstdimensionisthecorrectactiontotakeevenafterthechange,thenthey willthinktheperseverativeresponsesarecorrectwhethertheyoranothermakethem. Deception Carlson,Moses,andHix's(inpress)newdataappeartofavoraresponseinhibitionexplanationoftheexecutivefunctiondifficultiesindeception.Childrenwerefound tobeworseatdeceptionwhenanemptylocationhadtobeindicatedbythefamiliarresponseofpointing,thanwhenthemorenovelresponsesofapictorialcueor pointerhadtobeused.Theauthorsconcludedthatdeceptionwasmoredifficultwiththefamiliargesturebecauseithadaprepotentresponsehistory,andhencemore inhibitionwouldbenecessarytopreventitstypicaluse.TheyreasonedthattheseresultswouldnotbeconsistentwiththeapproachtakenbyCCCtheorybecauseit oughtnottopredictdifferencesforthesedifferentresponses. ThepresentreviewofCCCtheoryindicatesthattheCarlsonetal.(1998)findingsmaynotdistinguishthetwoexplanationssharply.CCCtheorydependsonthere beingbiasesinconflictsituations,andthosebiasesarestipulatedtocomefromexperience,sofamiliargesturesshouldpresentmoreofaproblem.Consistentwith CCCtheory,theagegroupcomparisoninCarlsonetal.showedthatalthough3yearoldswerebetteratdeceptionwithpicturescomparedtopointing,theywerestill significantlyworsethan4yearoldsonboth.Thisfindingsuggeststhatprepotencyofthepointingresponsecannotbetheentireexplanationof3yearolds'difficulty withdeception.

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Finally,Brooksetal.(1997)provideddatathatseemtofavorCCCtheory'sapproachoverresponseinhibition.Brooksetal.testedastrategyjudgmentprocedure fordeceptionthatbearssomeresemblancetotheerrorjudgmentprocedureJacquesetal.(1997)institutedforcardsorting.Ratherthanhavingchildrenproducetheir owndeceptivestrategyinagivensituation,adeceptiveandnondeceptiveresponsewasdemonstrated,andthechildrenmerelyhadtochoosetheonethatwouldbe effective.Despitenothavingtomaketheresponse,3yearoldswerestillnotabletoselectthedeceptivestrategyreliably.Thisfindingagainarguesthatyoung children'sproblemswithdeceptionarenotjustinexecutingaresponse,butthattheyhavedifficultychoosinganactionforanewpurposewhenithaspreviouslybeen usedforaconflictingone. Conclusion Sufficientempiricalresultsnowexisttopressthequestionoftherelationbetweentheoryofmindandexecutivefunction.Theimportanceofintentionfortheoryofmind isapparent.Ifthereisanypointtounderstandingbeliefanddesire,itistomakesenseoftheothers'intentions.Theroleofintentioninpreschoolexecutivefunctionhas lessoftenbeenrecognized,presumablybecauseoftheprevailingemphasisonresponseinhibition.Whenexecutivefunctioniscastintermsofintentionalaction,its relationtotheoryofmindbecomesmuchmorecomprehensible.Inparticular,thecharacteristicerrorschildrenmakeareseentobeverysimilar.Youngchildrenhave difficultyappreciatingthatconflictingdescriptionscanapplytoobjectsandtheyhavesimilardifficultygraspingtheirapplicationtointentionalactions.CCCtheory offersaspecificexplanationforthiscorrespondenceintermsofhowembeddedrulesareusedininferringmentalstatesononehandandformulatingactionsonthe other.Thisexplanationhastheadvantageofmaintainingthedistinctionsbetweentheoryofmindandexecutivefunctionwhilebringingthembothunderthesame theory. Acknowledgment ThankstoP.D.Zelazoforhiseditorialcomments. References Astington,J.W.(1991).Intentioninthechild'stheoryofmind.InD.Frye&C.Moore(Eds.),Children'stheoriesofmind(pp.157172).Hillsdale,NJ:Lawrence ErlbaumAssociates.

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BaronCohen,S.(1994).Howtobuildababythancanreadminds:Cognitivemechanismsinmindreading.CahiersdePyschologieCognitive,83,513552. Brooks,P.J.,Frye,D.,&Samuels,M.C.(1997).Thecomprehensionandproductionofdeceptionforselfandother.Manuscriptinpreparation. Carlson,S.M.(April,1997).Individualdifferencesininhibitorycontrolandchildren'stheoryofmind.MeetingsoftheSocietyforResearchinChild Development,Washington,DC. Carlson,S.M.,Moses,L.J.,&Hix,H.R.(1998).Theroleofinhibitoryprocessesinyoungchildren'sdifficultieswithdeceptionandfalsebelief.Child Development,69,672691. Dempster,F.N.(1992).Theriseandfalloftheinhibitorymechanism:Towardaunifiedtheoryofcognitivedevelopmentandaging.DevelopmentalReview,12,45 75. Diamond,A.,&Gilbert,J.(1989).Developmentasprogressiveinhibitorycontrolofaction:Retrievalofacontiguousobject.CognitiveDevelopment,4,223249. Flavell,J.H.(1988).Thedevelopmentofchildren'sknowledgeaboutthemind:Fromcognitiveconnectionstomentalrepresentations.InJ.W.Astington,P.L. Harris,&D.R.Olson(Eds.),Developingtheoriesofmind(pp.244267).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Flavell,J.H.,Flavell,E.R.,&Green,F.L.(1983).Developmentoftheappearancerealitydistinction.CognitivePsychology,15,95120. Frye,D.,Zelazo,P.D.,&Brooks,P.J.,&Samuels,M.C.(1996).Inferenceandactioninearlycausalreasoning.DevelopmentalPsychology,32,120131. Frye,D.,Zelazo,P.D.,&Palfai,T.(1995).Theoryofmindandrulebasedreasoning.CognitiveDevelopment,10,483527. Gopnik,A.,&Astington,J.(1988).Children'sunderstandingofrepresentationalchangeanditsrelationtotheunderstandingoffalsebeliefandtheappearancereality distinction.ChildDevelopment,59,2637. Gopnik,A.,&Wellman,H.(1994).Thetheorytheory.InL.A.Hirschfeld&S.A.Gelman(Eds.),Mappingthemind:Domainspecificityincognitionand culture(pp.257293).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Halford,G.,Wilson,W.H.,&Phillips,S.(inpress).Processingcapacitydefinedbyrelationalcomplexity:Implicationsforcomparative,developmental,andcognitive psychology.BehavioralandBrainSciences. Harnishfeger,K.K,&Bjorklund,D.F.(1993).Theontogenyofinhibitionmechanisms:Arenewedapproachtocognitivedevelopment.InR.Pasnak&M.Howe (Eds.),Emergingthemesincognitivedevelopment(pp.2849).Lincoln:UniversityofNebraskaPress. Hughes,C.(1998).Executivefunctioninpreschoolers:Linkswiththeoryofmindandverbalability.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,16,233253. Jacques,S,.Zelazo,P.D.,Kirkham,N.Z.,&Semcesen,T.(inpress).Ruleselectionversusruleexecutioninpreschoolers:anerrordetectionapproach. DevelopmentalPsychology. Luria,A.R.(1961).Theroleofspeechintheregulationofnormalandabnormalbehavior(J.Tizard,Trans.).NewYork:Pergamon. Ozonoff,S.,&McEvoy,R.E.(1994).Alongitudinalstudyofexecutivefunctionandtheoryofminddevelopmentinautism.DevelopmentandPsychopathology,6, 415431. Ozonoff,S.,Pennington,B.,&Rogers,S.(1991).Executivefunctiondeficitsinhighfunctioningautisticindividuals:Relationshiptotheoryofmind.JournalofChild PsychologyandPsychiatry,32,10811105. Perner,J.(1991a).Onrepresentingthat:Theasymmetrybetweenbeliefanddesireinchildren'stheoryofmind.InD.Frye&C.Moore(Eds.),Children'stheories ofmind(pp.115138).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Perner,J.(1991b).Understandingtherepresentationalmind.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Perer,J.(1998).Themetaintentionalnatureofexecutivefunctionsandtheoryofmind.InP.Carruthers&J.Boucher(Eds.),Languageandthought(pp.270 283).Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress.

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Russell,J.(1996).Agency.Itsroleinmentaldevelopment.Hove,England:Erlbaum(UK)Taylor&Francis. Russell,J.,Jarrold,C.,&Potel,D.(1994).Executivefactorsinpreschoolers'strategicdeception.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,9,301314. Russell,J.,Mauthner,N.,Sharpe,S.,&Tidswell,T.(1991).The'windowstask'.asameasureofstrategicdeceptioninpreschoolersandautisticsubjects.British JournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,9,331350. Searle,J.R.(1983).Intentionality:Anessayinphilosophyofmind.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Welsh,M.,&Pennington,B.(1988).Assessingfrontallobefunctioninchildren:Viewsfromdevelopmentalpsychology.DevelopmentalNeuropsychology,4,199 230. Wimmer,H.,&Perer,J.(1983).Beliefsaboutbeliefs:Representationandconstrainingfunctionofwrongbeliefsinyoungchildren'sunderstandingofdeception. Cognition,13,103128. Zelazo,P.D.,Carter,A.,Reznick,J.S.,&Frye,D.(1997).Earlydevelopmentofexecutivefunction:Aproblemsolvingframework.ReviewofGeneral Psychology,1,198226. Zelazo,P.D.,&Frye,D.(1997).Cognitivecomplexityandcontrol:Atheoryofthedevelopmentofdeliberatereasoningandintentionalaction.InM.Stamenov (Ed.),languagestructure,discourse,andtheaccesstoconsciousness(pp.113153).Amsterdam&Philadelphia:JohnBenjamins. Zelazo,P.D.,Frye,D.&Rapus,T.(1996).Anagerelateddissociationbetweenknowingrulesandusingthem.CognitiveDevelopment,11,3763. Zelazo,P.D.,&Jacques,S.(1996).Children'sruleuse:Representation,reflection,andcognitivecontrol.InR.Vasta(Ed.),Annalsofchilddevelopment(Vol.12, pp.119176).London:JessicaKingsleyPress.

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Chapter8 ExecutiveFunctionsandTheoryofMind: CognitiveComplexityorFunctionalDependence?

JosefPerner SandraStummer BirgitLang UniversityofSalzburg Thereistheintuitionthatbetterunderstandingofone'sinnerlifewillgivebetterselfcontrol.Onthisintuitiononeexpectsthatchildren'sprogressindevelopingatheory ofmindshouldshowitselfinincreasedselfcontrol(Wimmer,1989).Tenyearsagotherewasjustcircumstantialevidencethattheoryofmindachievementsat particularageswereparalleledbysignsofgreaterselfcontrol(Perner,1991).Nowthereisrapidlyincreasingevidencethattheoryofminddevelopment,especially aroundtheageof4years,isrelatedtogainsinexecutivecontrolonsocalledexecutivefunctiontasksatthisage(e.g.,Carlson,1997Frye,Zelazo,&Palfai,1995 Hughes,1998,inpressRussell,Mauthner,Sharpe,&Tidswell,1991Russell,Jarrold,&Potel,1994).This,however,cannotbeinterpretedasevidenceforthe originalintuitionbecausetherearenowalsoseveralalternativeexplanationsforthisdevelopmentalrelation.Inthischapterweevaluatesomeofthesealternative accounts. Themostfrequentlyusedmeasureonwhichthesecorrelationsarebasedisthefalsebelieftest.Thestandardversionistheunexpectedtransferstory(Wimmer& Perner,1983)inwhichaprotagonistputsanobjectintolocationA.InhisabsencetheobjectisunexpectedlytransferredintolocationB,sothathemistakenly believesthattheobjectisstillinlocationA.Toassesstheirunderstandingoftheprotagonist'sbelief,childrenareeitheraskedwheretheprotagonistthinkstheobject is,orwheretheprotagonistwilllookfortheobject.Thetypicaldevelopmentaltrendisthatat3yearsalmostallchildrenanswerwronglywithactuallocation(B)of

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theobject,whereasmostchildrenolderthan4years,anddefinitelyaclearmajorityof5yearolds,answercorrectlywithlocationA.Anotherversionisthedeceptive containertask(Hogrefe,Wimmer,&Perner,1986Perner,Leekam,&Wimmer,1987).Forinstance,childrenareshownaSmartiescontainerandaskedabout itscontent.Practicallyallchildrensay,''Smarties."Theyarethenshownthatitcontainsapencil.Withthepencilbackintheclosedcontainertheyareaskedwhat anotherperson,whohasnotyetseenwhatisinside,wouldthink(orsay)wasinside.Asmallbutimportanttwistonthisprocedureturnsthetaskintothememoryfor earlierfalsebelieftest(Gopnik&Astington,1988).Thechildissimplyaskedwhatheorsheherselfhadthoughtwasintheboxwhenfirstshown.Finally,Flavell, Flavell,andGreen(1983)pioneeredtheappearancerealitytest.Forinstance,childrenareshownatrickobjectthattheyidentifyreliablyasarock.Manual manipulationrevealsthatitisjustsponge(thatlookslikearock).When3yearoldsareaskedtherealityquestionaboutwhattheobjectreallyistheytendtoanswer "asponge,"andwhenaskedaboutwhattheobjectlooksliketheytendtoanswerwronglywith"asponge." Theexecutivefunctiontasksonwhichchildrenaroundthisagemarkedlyimprovetypicallyrequiretheinhibitionofsomeresponsestrategyorcognitiveset.Thetasks repeatedlyusedtoestablishthelinkwiththeoryofmindareaversionofLuria's(Luria,Pribram,&Homskaya,1964)handgameinwhichthechildhastofirstrepeat twohandgestures(e.g.,fistorflathandontable)shownbytheexperimenter,thatis,fist/fistflat/flat,andthenswitchtodoingtheoppositegestureasthe experimenter,thatis,fist/flatflat/fist.AnotherparadigmisthedaynightStrooptask(Gerstadt,Hong,&Diamond,1994)wherechildrenhavetosay"day"whenthe darkpicturewiththemoonisshown,and"night"whenthebright,sunlitsceneisshown.ThemostfrequentlyusedtaskisamodificationoftheWisconsinCardSorting Test(WCSTusedtodiagnoseexecutivedysfunctioninfrontallobepatients)byFryeetal.(1995).Childrenaregiventwotargetcards,forinstance,agreencarand ayellowflower,andtheyhavetoplaceapackof5cardsshowingeitherayellowcaroragreenfloweraccordingtooneoftwopairsofrules.Forinstance,ifthe colorrulesareusedthentheyellowcarhastobeplacedwiththeyellowflowertargetandthegreenflowerwiththegreencartarget.Childrenabovetheageof3 yearsusuallyhavenoproblemfollowingtheseinstructions.Theirexecutiveproblemsemergewhentheruleschangeandtheyareinstructedtosortbyshape,thatis, carstocarandflowerstoflowerdespitetheirdifferentcolors(seeFrye,chap.7,thisvolumeseeZelazo,chap.6,thisvolume). Severalstudies(e.g.,Carlson,1997Fryeetal.,1995Hughes,1998,inpressseePerner&Lang,inpress,forreview)haveshownthattheabilitytomasterthese executivefunction(EF)tasksemergesatthesametimeaschildrenpassthementionedtheoryofmind(ToM)tasks.Thisisre

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flectedincorrelationsbetweenEFtasksandToMtasksintheagerangeof3to6yearsofr=.30to.60.Andevenafterpartiallingoutage,thesecorrelationstendto remainpositivebetween.15to.50. Welookattwoclassesofexplanationsforthisrelation.OnetypeofexplanationassumesacommonlogicalstructureunderlyingtherelevantToMandEFtasksthat demandsacertaincognitivecapacity(cognitivecomplexityandcontrol:CCCtheory).Theotherclassseesafunctionalrelationbetweentheoryofmindandexecutive function. TheCCCTheory ZelazoandFrye(1997)suggestedthatchildren'scontrolproblemsareaconsequenceofthecognitivecomplexityposedbytheexecutivefunctiontasksintermsof doublyembeddedconditionalactionrules.Moreover,thesamecomplexrulesarerequiredforsometheoryofmindtaskslikethefalsebelieftask.Forthisreason childrenpassallthesetasksatthesameage.Allthesetasksarecharacterizedbyconditionalrelationsfromdifferentantecedents(a1)toconsequents(c1)thatchange accordingtosettingcondition(sk).Theclassictaskonwhichtoillustratethisanalysisisthedimensionalchangecardsort(DCCS)usedby,forinstance,Fryeetal. (1995).Inthistask,inonesetting(s1:sortbycolor)thegreencar(a1)goesintotheboxmarkedwithagreenflower(c1)andtheredflower(a2)intotheboxwiththe redcar(c2),whereasundertheothersetting(s2:sortbyshape)thegreencar(al)goesintotheboxmarkedwitharedcar(c2)andtheredflower(a2)intothebox withthegreenflower(c1).Thetaskcanbeschematicallyrenderedthus: IFcolorgame(sl) THENIFgreencar(a1) IFredflower(a2) IFshapegame(s2) THENIFgreencar(a1) IFredflower(a2) THENputittogreenflower(cl), THENputittoredcar(c2) THENputittoredcar(c2), THENputittogreenflower(c1).

AsimilartaskusedbyFryeetal.(1995)involvedacoveredrampandaballthatcouldbeputatthetopintoeitheraleftorrightholefromwhereitthenrolleddown intooneoftwoboxes(leftorright).Atonesetting(s1),visiblymarkedbyalightturnedon,therampconnectedupperlefthole(a1)withlowerleftbox(c1)andupper righthole(a2)withlowerrightbox(c2),thatis,leftleft,rightright.Attheothersetting(s2:lightoff),theconnectionswerecrossedover,thatis,leftright,rightleft. Childrenwereshownthemechanismandthenhadtopredictinwhichbox

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theballcouldbefound.Tosolvethistaskthesamecognitivecomplexityintermsofunderstandingembeddedconditionalsisrequired. Thesetwotasksevidentlyalsoqualifyasexecutivefunctiontasks(theDCCSisinfactamodificationoftheWCSToftenusedonfrontallobepatients)becausethe antecedentconditionconsequentactionlinks(a1cl,a2c2)establishedundersettings1interferewiththelinksrequiredunders2,thatis,a1c2,a2c1.Hencethe associationestablishedunderonesettingleadingfroma1toc1hastobemonitoredandinhibitedundertheothersetting. Fryeetal.(1995)arguedthatthefalsebelieftaskitselfrequiresreasoningwithembeddedconditionalsand,therefore,itisthedevelopingabilitytoengageinsuch reasoningthatunderliesthedevelopmentallinkbetweenfalsebelieftestperformanceandperformanceonexecutivefunctiontaskslikecardsortingandtheramptask. Frye(inpress)hasgiventheclearestanalysisforthetraditionalfalsebelieftask,wherethechocolateistransferredfromheretothereandthechildistopredictwhere Maxiwillgoforhischocolate: IFme(s1) THENIFlookingforchocolate(a1) IF...(a2) IFMaxi(s2) THENIFlookingforchocolate(a1) IF...(a2) THENthere(c1), THEN...(c2) THENhere(c2), THEN...(c1).

Thea2conditionhasbeenleftout,butcouldbeeasilyfilledinwiththeassumptionthattwoobjects,chocolateandsomethingelse,arebeingswitchedfromhereto thereandviceversa.Thisisnotthecrucialdifficultywiththisanalysis.Therearethreeothernontrivialdifficulties:(a)theanalysisdoesnotcapturetherulesbywhich thetaskissolved,(b)theanalysisseemsoftenarbitrary(toomanyfreeparameters),and(c)theapplicationtothefalsebeliefcasealsofitsothertasksonwhich childrenexcelatamuchearlierage. APrioriProblemsWiththeCCCAnalysis 1.WhatDoestheAnalysisCapture? TheififthenstructureintheDCCSandtherampproblemsclearlydescribestherulesthatonehastoknowinordertosolvethetask.Inthecaseofthefalsebelief taskthestatedconditionalssurelycannotbetherulesthatonebringstobearonthetask.Icannothavearule"IfMaxi,theniflookingforchocolate,thenhere."Sucha ruleseemspossibleonlyifchildrenweregivenrepeatedexposurestothesamebehavioralsequenceofMaxigoingtotheemptycupboard.

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Onlythencouldtheyformsucharulethatcapturessuchaspecificbehavioralregularity.Thebelieftask,however,istocaptureadeeperunderstandingthatallows behavioralpredictionswithoutknowledgeofbehavioralregularitiesinspecificsituations.Thatis,thechildwhounderstandsbeliefhastoapplyknowledgeofthesort, "Peoplelookforobjectswheretheythinktheobjectis."Therefore,therelevantrulestoapplytothefalsebelieftaskwouldbe: IFaskedwhereIwilllookforthechocolate, THENgivethatlocationwhereIthinkitis IFaskedwhereMaxiwilllookforthechocolate, THENgivethatlocationwherehethinksitis. Thisconstitutesonlyasimplepairofrules.Evidentlymorereasoningisrequired.Whetherthespellingoutofthisfurtherreasoningresultsintherequiredembedded conditionalstructureremainstobeshown. 2.Arbitrariness Theapplicationoftheififthenanalysistothefalsebelieftaskhighlightsawiderproblemwiththiskindofanalysis,namelythatitsuffersfromadangerousarbitrariness inhowonechoosestodescribetheproblem.Forinstance,itisunclearwhyonecouldnotproposethefollowinganalysis: IFIamlookingforthechocolate(al)THENthere(cl) IFMaxiislookingforthechocolate(a2)THENhere(c2). Putinthismorenaturalway,thetaskreducestosimpleconditionals,whichoughttobewithintheabilityofchildrenoneyearyounger,thatis,3yearolds(Zelazo& Frye,1997),andshouldbenoticeablyeasierthanthefalsebelieftask.NoprincipledrulehasbeenstatedforwhyFrye's(inpress)analysisofthefalsebelieftaskisto bepreferredoverthisalternativeanalysis. 3.ConflictingData Evenifprinciplesofanalysiscouldbespecified,wesuspectthatitsapplicationwouldleadtowrongpredictionsonothertasks.Forinstance,RepacholiandGopnik (1997)showedthatasearlyas18months,butnotbefore,infantsunderstanddivergentfoodpreferences(seealsoMeltzoff,Gopnik,&Repacholi,chap.2,this volume).AnififthenanalysiscloselymodeledonFrye's(inpress)analysisofthefalsebeliefproblemcanbegivenofthistask: IFme(sl) THENIFwantingtoeat(a1) IF...(a2) THENcrackers(cl), THEN...(c2)

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IFOther(s2) THENIFwantingtoeat(a1) IF...(a2)

THENbroccoli(c2), THEN...(c1).

Becausechildrenareabletorespondcorrectlyattheageof18months,eitherthetaskanalysismustbeflawedorthereissomethingseriouslywrongwithFryeetal.'s (1995)developmentalclaimthattheabilitytoreasonwithembeddedconditionalsemergesattheageof4years(thetimetheytypicallymasterthefalsebelieftask). AnothertaskthatyoungchildrentendtobefairlygoodatandwhichisnotonlyinFrye'sanalysisbutalsoonintuitivegroundsverysimilartothefalsebeliefproblems ischildren'sunderstandingofpretense.Inparticular,HarrisandKavanaugh(1993)andLeslie(1994)investigatedchildren'sabilitytodrawconsequencesfrom pretendassumptions.Forinstance,teddybearpretendsthatthereisteainthecup.Teddypourstheteaoverapieceofchocolate.Childrenareaskedwhatteddydid, andthenwhetherthechocolateisnowwetordry.HarrisandKavanaugh(1993)foundthatattheageofabout21/2yearstherewasmarkedimprovementin answeringthatthechocolateisnowwet.Ananalysisintermsofdoublyembeddedconditionalssuggestsitself.Realityandpretensearetwodifferentsettingconditions andwithineachthesameconditionalantecedent(a1:tiltthecup)leadstodifferentconsequences:chocolatebeingdry(c1)inrealityandbeingwet(c2)inpretense.As inthefalsebeliefscenario,realityisopposedtosomethingthatisn'ttrue(falsebelief,pretense)henceonewouldexpectchildrenofuptotheageof4yearsto respondintermsofrealitythatthechocolateisstilldry.Again,CCCtheorydoesn'tprovideaclearexplanationforwhychildrenrespondaccordingtothepretend assumptionsoverayearearlierthantheyareabletorespondaccordingtosomeone'sfalsebelief. EmpiricalTestsofCCCTheory ApartfromtheseaprioriproblemsinapplyingCCCtheory,wealsotriedtoassessitwithempiricaltests.Perner,Lang,andStummer(1998)tested57childrenon4 relevanttasks:afalsebelieftasktheDCCStaskusedbyFryeetal.(1995)Luria'shandgame(aftermimickingtheexperimenter'ssequenceofflathandfistflat hand,etc.,thechildrenwereinstructedtoalwaysproducetheoppositehandshape,i.e.,makeafistwhentheexperimenterputstheflathanddown)andatestof understandingtheinvoluntarynatureofthekneejerkreflex.Thislasttaskisparticularlyrelevant.Shultz,Wells,andSarda(1980)reportedthat3yearolds,whoare otherwisequiteproficientinjudgingaccidentsasunintentional,hadahardtimerealizingthattheirreflexivekneemovementsareinvoluntary.Perner(1991,pp.217 220)speculatedthattheonsetofthisrealizationshouldrelateto

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children'smasteryoffalsebeliefbecausebothtasksrequireanunderstandingofmentalstatesascausallyeffectiverepresentationalstates:Thebeliefmakestheactor lookinthewrongplaceeventhoughhedoesn'twanttolookinanemptyplace(unlikeinpretendplay)andinthecaseofthekneejerkreflex,thekneemovesinthe absenceofanintentiontomoveit. Whenscoringchildrenaspassingiftheyperformedperfectly(5of5trials)ontheEFtasks(DCCSandhandgame),thenallfourtaskswereofcomparabledifficulty: between52%and59%ofchildrenpassed.Table8.1presentsananalysisofhowmuchvarianceoffalsebeliefperformanceisexplainedbythevariousothertasks. ThefirsttworowsofTable8.1showthatallthesetasksarestrongpredictorsofperformanceonthefalsebelieftask:Ageandverbalintelligence(theKABCtest) explain1/4ofthevariance.ThetwoEFtasksbothexplainhighlysignificantamountsofvariance.Thekneejerkreflextest,however,explainsagoodhalfofallthe varianceconsiderablymorethantheEFtasks.Thesecondrowshowsthatafterintroducingageandverbalintelligenceintothemodel,eachofthetwoEFtasksand thekneejerkreflexstillexplainasignificantamountofadditionalvariance.Thethirdrowbringsoutaninterestingasymmetry.Whenthekneejerkreflexisintroduced intothemodel,theadditionalvarianceexplainedbytheEFtaskssinkstobelow10%,whereasifthetwoEFtasksareintroducedfirst(row6),understandingthe kneejerkreflexstillexplainsarespectable14%ofthevarianceoffalsebelieftestperformance. Undertheassumptionthatthekneejerkreflextaskdoesnotcontainanyobviousconditionalreasoningrequirements,itislikelythataconceptualadvancein understandingthecausalsignificanceofmentalstatesisreflectedintherelationbetweenfalsebelieftaskandkneejerkreflextask.Thisunderstanding(orwhatever elsemightmakethesetaskssosimilarindifficulty)accountsfor30%ofthefalsebeliefvarianceandmostofthecovarianceoffalsebeliefwithEFtasks(afterageand verbalintelligence).
TABLE8.1 PercentofVarianceofFalseBeliefPerformanceExplainedbyLast FactorinModel(SPSSLogisticRegressionWithNagelkerke'sR2)

InitialFactorsinModel None Age+KABC Age+KABC+KneeReflex Age+KABC+DCCS Age+KABC+HandGame Age+KABC+HG+DCCS Note.DatafromPerner,Lang,andStummer(1998). *p<.05.**p<.01. Age+KABC 25.5**

LastFactorAddedtoModel KR 55.8** 30.4** 17.0** 23.3** 14.0** DCCS 41.4** 21.6** 8.4* 15.8* HG 20.3** 12.3* 5.2* 6.5*

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Lessthan10%mightbeattributabletoproblemsofconditionalreasoningthatthekneejerkreflextaskcannotaccountfor.Moreover,evenifoneallowsforthe possibilitythatthekneejerkreflextaskalsorequiresembeddedconditionals,thispatternofresultsstillsuggeststhatthecommonvariancebetweenfalsebelieftask andkneejerkreflextaskcannotbeexplainedwithacommonconditionalreasoningstructure.Whywouldthisrelationsurvivewhenallvarianceduetoconditional reasoningstructure(DCCSandhandgame)hasbeenaccountedfor?Thesedata,ofcourse,donotruleoutthatmasteryofembeddedconditionalsisaprerequisite forthefalsebelieftaskandtheexecutivefunctiontasks.Itonlyshowsthataparticularconceptualadvanceunderliesthefalsebelieftask,thekneejerkreflextask,and theEFtasks,andcanaccountformoreofthecommonvariancethantheCCCtheory. Oneshouldalsopointoutthatthekneejerkreflextask,too,mayrequiretheconditionalreasoningstructurepositedbyCCCtheory(P.D.Zelazo,personal communication,July11,1998).Toseethis,oneneedstothinkofthesettingconditionsashowbodilymovementsofactionsarenormallylinkedtointentions(s1)and howtheyarelinkedinthisspecialcase(s2)ofareflexmovement.Hencewecanseethesameififthenstructure: IFnormalcase(sl) THENIFIintendtomoveleg(a1) IFIdonotintendtomove leg(a2) IFreflexinvolved(s2) THENIF...(a1) IFIdonotintendtomove leg(a2) THENlegmoves(c1), THENlegdoesn'tmove(c2) THEN...(c2), THENlegmoves(c1).

Thisproposalsuffersfromtheproblemsoutlinedabove.Itishardtoseehowthisrulestructurecanunderliethechild'sunderstandingoftheproblem.Atbestitcanbe theresultofanunderstandingofreflexes.Also,thereareconflictingdata.Shultzetal.(1980)showedthatchildrenwerequiteabletodifferentiateintendedfrom nonintendedactionswhentheycouldcomparewhattheywereinstructedtoachievewithwhattheyactuallyachieved.Forinstance,ifwheninterlacingone'sfingers oneisinstructedtomoveaparticularfinger,thenonetendstomakeerrors.Threeyearolds,whoallmisjudgedtheirkneereflexmovementasintentional,judgedthe movementofthewrongfingercorrectlyasunintentional.However,accordingtothekneereflexanalysis,theyshouldnotbeabletodothis.Ifyousubstitute"that finger"for"leg,"thenormalcase(s1)makesthechildjudgemovementofthatfingerasintended. Onecanredescribetheproblemintermsofwhetherthefingermovementmatchesormismatchestheinstructionssothattherequiredcomplexityfits

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theobserveddevelopment(i.e.,sothattherequiredstructureinvolvesonlysimpleconditionals,whichshouldbemasteredattheageof3years): IFfingermovedmatches(a1) IFfingermovedmismatches(a2) THENImeanttomoveit(c1) THENIdidn'tmeantomoveit(c2).

This,however,raisesthequestionofarbitrariness.Apriorirulesareneededforproblemanalysis.Judgingbytheexampleofthekneereflexandfingermovement,an embeddedconditionalsanalysishastointeractwithwhatthechildknowsaboutthedomainofknowledgeinquestion,forinstance,theirtheoryofminddevelopment. Thereisanothersetofdata,originallycarriedoutfromaquitedifferentvantagepoint,thatspeakstotheissueoftheoryofmind,executivefunction,andCCCtheory. PernerandStummer(1998)followedupaparadigmusedbyDohertyandPerner(1998)totestthetheorythatunderstandingfalsebeliefandunderstandingsynonyms relatedevelopmentallybecausebothtasksrequireanunderstandingofrepresentation.Inthe"production"versionofthesynonymsparadigm,childrenarefirsttested fortheirknowledgeofsynonymsforinstance,theyaretestedtoseeiftheyidentifythecorrectreferent(femaleperson)underthedescription"woman"aswellas under"lady."Thenapuppetnamestheitemusingoneofthesynonymsandchildrenareinstructedtousetheothernameforit.Inthetestphaseassessingchildren's graspoftheseinstructions,youngerchildrentendsimplytorepeatwhatthepuppethadsaid.Theabilitytousethesynonymemergedwiththeabilitytopassthefalse belieftask.Thetwotaskscorrelatedstrongly,r=.71inoneexperiment,andr=.65inasecondexperiment.Evenafterverbalintelligence,age,andothercontrol variableshadbeenpartialledout,thesecoefficientsstayedhigh,.68and.60,respectively. Aftervaryingthematerialofthistaskfromsynonymstosuperordinatebasiccategories(e.g.,animaldog),werealizedthattheoriginalsynonymstaskandthesenew variants,whichcanbecalled"saysomethingdifferent"tasks,canalsobedescribedasexecutivefunctiontasksandastasksrequiringtheififthenstructuresuggested byFryeforthefalsebelieftask.Forinstance: IFpuppetsays"lady"(sl) THENIFaskedtonamepicture(a1) IF...(a2) IFpuppetsays"woman"(s2) THENIFaskedtonamepicture(al) IF...(a2) THENsay"woman"(c1), THEN...(c2) THENsay"lady"(c1), THEN...(cl).

Thetaskscanalsorequireexecutivecontrolonthefollowinggrounds.Wecanassumethatthereisawellestablishedquestionansweringschemathat,oncetriggered bythequestion,looksautomaticallyforasuitable

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answer.Ifthereareseveralpossibleanswers,itwillproducetheonethatfirstcomestomind.Forinstance,ifaskedwhatthis(femaleperson)is,theanswerwillbe morelikely"awoman"than"alady,"becausewomanisthemorecommonexpressionandisthusmoreprevalentinthechild'smind.Thisprevalencecanbechangedif thepictureislabeledbytheexperimenter"alady"justbefore.Thentheanswerschemaismorelikelytoencounter"lady"asafirstsuitableanswer.Thesaysomething differenttaskrequiresexecutivecontrolinordertomodulatetheresponsegivenbytheautomaticansweringschema,becausetheanswerthattheschemawould choosebyitselfisnottobegiven,butthealternative. Totestamongalternativetheories,weintroducedfurthervariationsofthesaysomethingdifferenttaskbesidessynonyms(ladywoman)andcategories(animaldog). Inthecolor/colortask,thepuppetnamedoneofthetwocolorsofanobjectandthechildhadtonametheother.Inthecolor/nametask,ifthepuppetnamedthecolor ofanobject,thechildhadtosaywhattheobjectwasorviceversa.Table8.2summarizeschildren'sperformanceonthefalsebelieftaskandthesefoursay somethingdifferenttasks.Acrossallfourexperiments,performanceonthreeofthefoursaysomethingdifferenttaskswasverysimilartoperformanceonthefalse belieftaskintermsofpercentageofchildrenpassingeachtask(upperpanel)andintermsofcorrelationwiththefalsebelieftask(lowerpanel).Theonetaskthatdid notconformtothispatternwasthecolor/name
TABLE8.2 ResultsFromFourExperimentsbyPernerandStummer(1998)

Tasks Experiment1

Experiment,AgeRangeandSampleSize Experiment Experiment 2 3 3449 (n=40) 2957 (n=30) Experiment4

3061 (n=36)

3150 (n=39)

%ChildrenCorrectonAllItems Falsebelief(FB) Saysomethingdifferent Synonyms Categories Color/color Color/name 61 73 50 54

67 64 94

73 95 Correlations

53 50 83

62 64 90

FBsynonyms FBcategories FBcolor/color FBcolor/name *p<.05.**p<.01.

.64 .59 .38

.77 .37

.93 1.00 .39

.74 .70 .36

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taskbecauseitwasmasteredbyevenmostoftheyoung3yearoldsandperformancebyallchildrenwasclosetoceiling(above90%)whenperformanceonthe othertaskshoveredaround60%. Thegoodperformanceonthecolor/nametaskposesaproblemforCCCtheorybecausetheconditionalstructurefortheothersaysomethingdifferenttasksseemsto bethesameinFrye's(inpress)analysisastheconditionalstructureforthefalsebelieftask.Ifrequestedtosaysomething(antecedent),theanswer(consequent) differsdependingonthesettingcondition(whatthepuppetchoosestosay).Itisimportanttoseethatinallthesetasksthestimuluspromptforthechildremainedthe sameinbothsettingconditions:Afterthepuppetgaveitsanswer,thechildwaspromptedwith"Nowsaytheotherthing!"Thatis,inthecaseofayellowbird: IFpuppetsays"yellow"(s1) THENIFaskedtosayotherthing(a1) IF...(a2) IFpuppetsays"bird"(s2) THENIFaskedtosayotherthing(a1) IF...(a2) THENsay"bird"(c1), THEN...(c2) THENsay"yellow"(c2), THEN....(c1).

Theonlydifferenceinthecolor/colortaskswasthatthepromptinbothcaseswas"Saytheothercolor!"Andyet,thechangeintaskhadalargeimpactontask difficulty. Theexecutivefunctionaccountoftheoriginalsynonymstaskoutlinedpreviouslycanaccountforthisfinding.Thecolor/nametaskcanbeeasyaccordingtoEFtheory becausetheanswerhighlightedbypuppet(e.g.,"It'sblack")isnotanadmissibleresponseforthechildwhoisaskedwhatkinditisortonameit.Inotherwords,there isnoautomaticansweringroutinetriggeredthatneedsexecutivecontroltopreventitdeliveringthefirstsuitableanswerthatcomestomind. Insum,wehavehighlightedseveraltheoreticalandempiricalproblemswiththeCCCtheoryasanaccountforwhyexecutivefunctiontasksaremasteredatthesame ageasfalsebelieftasksandwhytheyarerelatedtotheoryofmindtasks.Wenowdiscussbrieflythreetheoriesthatattributetheobserveddevelopmentallinkto functionaldependenciesbetweentheoryofmindandexecutivecontrol. FunctionalDependencybetweenTheoryofMindandExecutiveFunction ExecutiveComponentsinTheoryofMindTasks Russelletal.(1991)andHughesandRussell(1993)suggestedthatthetypicaltheoryofmindtasksusedattheageoffouryearscontainan

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executivecomponent.Althoughtherearedirectdatasuggestingthatthisisindeedthecasefordeceptionasameasureofunderstandingfalsebelief(Carlson,Moses, &Hix,1998),wherethenaturaltendencyofpointingtotheobject'sactuallocationhastobeinhibited,theclaimthatsimilarinhibitionisrequiredforthefalsebelief taskhasreceivedlittleempiricalconfirmation(seePerner,1995,andPerner&Lang,inpress,formoreextensivediscussion).Forinstance,onelineofevidence supportingthisclaimwasthattheexplanationtaskbyBartschandWellman(1989),whichdoesnotrequireinhibitionofanaturalansweringtendency,iseasierthan thetraditionalpredictiontask.However,contrarytotheseauthors'originalclaims,thereislittleevidenceforthisclaimoncemethodologicalproblemsandambiguityin interpretationofchildren'sanswersareclearedup(Wimmer&Mayringer,1998).Mostrelevantlyforpresentpurposes,Hughes(1998)alsofoundnodifferencein difficultybetweenpredictionandexplanationtasksandfoundthatthepredictiontask(whichlackstheallegedexecutivecomponentofthepredictiontask)correlated withameasureofinhibitoryabilityasstronglyasthepredictiontask. ExecutiveFunctionasaPrerequisiteforDevelopingaTheoryofMind Russell(1996)arguedthatactionmonitoringisaprerequisiteforarudimentaryselfawareness,whichinturnisanecessaryrequirementforbuildingatheoryofmind. Pacherie(1998)hasmadeasimilarproposalemphasizingtheroleofmotorimages(laJeannerod,1997).Theseproposalsleaveitopenwhyspecifictheoryofmind tasks(i.e.,falsebelieftasks)areexpectedtobemasteredatthesameageasspecificexecutivefunctiontasks(thoserequiringinhibitionofexistingresponse tendencies).However,thegeneralmessageisclear:Executivecontrolisaprerequisitefortheoryofmindthatis,withoutexecutivecontroltherecannotbeatheoryof mind. TheoryofMindasanIntegralPartofExecutiveControl Perner(1998)hasarguedthattheessenceofexecutivecontrolistodirect(excitatoryorinhibitory)controltoactionschemataviaaspecificationofwhatthese schemataaretoachieve(theirrepresentationalcontent).Thisdistinguishesitfromautomaticcontrol,orinNormanandShallice's(1986)terms,contention scheduling,whichdoesnotrequirecontrolviarepresentationalcontent.Inordertoenablecontrolbycontentonehastorepresentthecontentoftheschemataas somethingdesiredorundesired.Becausesuchrepresentationinvolvesconceptssuchasdesire,itinvolvesarudimentarytheoryofmind.Theargumentcontinues:To understand

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theneedforinhibitingunwantedinterferencefromexistingschemata,thechildhastounderstandnotonlythatparticularactionsareunwanted(inthatcase,do nothingdonotwanttoactthatway),butthatthereareexistingschematathatmakeoneactinthatunwantedwayunlessoneactivelyinhibitsthoseactions.That makesclearwhyforsomeunwantedactionsonehastoactivelyinhibitthemandnotjustrefrainfrominitiatingtheseactions.Now,tounderstandtheexistenceof schemataasentitiesthatmakeyouactacertainwayistounderstandthemasrepresentations(representationalvehicles)withcausalpowers.Thisunderstandingcan, therefore,bedubbedmetarepresentational Becauseinhibitoryexecutivecontrolisrequiredforthoseexecutivefunctiontasksthatposeaproblemforchildrenupto4or5years,wecanunderstandwhythey correlatewiththefalsebelieftask.Perner(1991)hasarguedthatunderstandinginternalstatesasrepresentationswithcausalpoweriswhatisrequiredfor understandingfalsebeliefbasedactionthatis,thefalsebeliefmakesonelookinthewrongplaceeventhoughthatactiondoesnotserveone'sgoalandonedoesnot wanttolookinanemptyplace.Italsohelpsoneunderstandthegoodcorrelationwiththekneejerkreflextask,becausethattaskrequiresunderstandingthatreflex movementsdifferfromintentionalactionbytheirlackofaninternalrepresentation(intention)thatinitiatesone'smovement. Acentralfeatureofthistheoryisthatinhibitorycontrolisnotachieveduntilthecausal/representationalnatureofmentalstatesisunderstood.Asstated,thisistoo simple.AsZelazo,Carter,Reznick,andFrye(1997)pointout,inhibitoryabilitiesdevelopatdifferentagesandoneshouldresistidentifyingexecutivefunctioningwith ageneralinhibitoryability.Indeed,whatshouldaccordingtoourtheorydeveloparound4yearsofageisnotageneralabilitytoinhibitbutexecutiveinhibition, thatis,inhibitorycontroldirectedatactionschemataonthebasisoftheirrepresentationalcontent.Criticallyimportantquestions,therefore,arewhichtasksrequire executiveinhibitionandwhenisautomaticinhibition(contentionscheduling)sufficient. ExecutiveInhibition Automaticinhibitionisanaturalconsequenceofcompetingactionschemata.Thatis,amorehighlyactivatedschemainhibitslessactivatedcompetitors.Thiscan explainsubsidenceoftheAerror(searchingforanobjectwhereithadpreviouslybeenhiddenratherthanwhereithasbeenvisiblyputonthistrial)intheAnotB taskininfancy.AlthoughDiamond(1991)claimedthatthisisduetoimprovedinhibitionoftheprepotentresponseofsearchinginlocationA,thisisnotobvious.The AerrordoesnotoccurimmediatelybutonlywhentheinfantisrestrainedfromsearchingcorrectlyunderB.Moreover,Harris(1989)pointedouthowshifting attentionfromtheBtotheAlocationcanexplain

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thefindingsinavarietyofdifferentexperimentalconditions.Thus,thedevelopmentallyincreasingresistancetocommittingAerrorswithlongerandlongerdelaysmay reflectanincreaseintheabilitytosustainattentionontheBlocation(executivecontrolintermsofboostingdesirableactionschemata),whichthenautomatically inhibitssearchinA,ratherthantheonsetofexecutiveinhibitionoftheundesirablesearchinA. Asexecutivecontrolofboostingdesirableactionschemataincreases,childrenbecomeincreasinglyabletofollowverbalinstructions(Zelazo&Jacques,1997).In particularbytheageof3yearschildrenareabletofollowapairofrules(Zelazo&Reznick,1991):''Ifitissomethingfoundinsidethehouse,putitintothisboxifit isfoundoutsidethehouse,putitintothatbox."Aftersorting,forinstance,anindoorsitemcorrectlyintothisbox,oneneedstoinhibitthetendencytoputthenext itemintothesamebox.However,thisinhibitioncanbeachievedautomaticallybythedesiredschemaofputtingtheoutdoorsitemintothatbox.Noexecutive inhibitionisrequired.NowconsiderLuria'stwolightgo/nogotask(seeZelazo&Jacques,1997,pp.129137),whichstructurallyalsorequiresbutapairofrules:"If theredlightcomeson,pressthebulbifthegreenlightgoeson,donotpress."Oneimportantdifferenceisthatonlyoneresponseschemaisdefined("ifredpress"). Theotherruledoesnotestablishacompetingactionschemabutdesignatesthelackofaschemafortheotherstimulus.Sointhiscase,whenthegreenlightcomeson, becauseitisalightitwillactivatetosomedegreethepositiveactionschema"ifredpress,"butitwillnotactivateacompetingactionschema(e.g.,"ifgreendoX"), whichwouldthenautomaticallyinhibittheundesirableactionschema"ifredpress."Becausethereisnoautomaticinhibition,executiveinhibitionisneeded.The originalRussianstudiesandWesternreplicationsinthe1960sand1970sdoshowthatthetendencytopressonthewrongstimulusdeclinesbetween3and5years (seereviewbyZelazo&Jacques,1997). ThisanalysisraisesthequestionwhytheififthentasksusedbyFryeetal.(1995)needexecutiveinhibitionasclaimedbythetheory.Inordertoanswerthisquestion, weneedtolookbrieflyintothelogicalstructureofthesetasks.AccordingtoZelazoandFrye(1997),thesetasksarecharacterizedbytheirlogicalstructureas embeddedconditionals:"IFsTHEN(IFaTHENc)."Onstandardpropositionalcalculusthisislogicallyequivalent(sametruthfunction)to"IF(sANDa)THENc." BecauseANDiscommutativeandbecauseitcanbeturnedbackintoanembeddedconditional,theoriginalembeddedconditionalruleisequivalentto"IFaTHEN (IFsTHENc)."Inotherwords,therearenologicalgroundsfordesignatingonekindofconditionassettingsandtheotherasantecedenta.Additionalcriteriaforthis designationarerequired.Intuitively,thedifferenceisthatthesettingconditionsareinthebackgroundwhereas

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theantecedentsareintheforeground.Theyaretheconditionsthatcurrentlyvaryandtowhichprimeattentionisdrawn.Forinstance,inthecaseoftheramptaskused byFryeetal.(1995),theinformationofwhethertherampconnectsstraightdownorcrossesoveristhebackgroundsetforseveraltrials,whereasthechoiceofinput hole(leftorright)variesandisbroughtprominentlyintothechild'sattention.Asaresult,thesekindsoftasksposethefollowingproblem:Theyhighlightstimuli(e.g., inputhole)thattriggertwoincompatibleactionschemata,thewrongonebetterestablishedthroughprevioususeandthecorrectonedependingexclusivelyonrecent verbalinstructions.Theadditionalstimulusinformationthatisrequiredtotriggerthecorrectschemahasbeenbackgrounded.Hencetheconditionsforautomatic inhibitionofthepreviouslyusedschemaareinsufficient.Additional,executiveinhibitionisneeded.1 Thisanalysismakesclearthatexecutiveinhibitionisnotusedsomuchforreplacingapreviousactionbyanalternativeactionrather,itisusedwhenthereiseitherno clearalternativeactionyieldingautomaticinhibitionoftheoriginalaction(seeLuria'stwolightgo/nogotask)orwhenthecriticaltriggerforthenewactionhasbeen backgrounded.AgoodillustrationofthiscanbefoundinthefindingbyFrye,Zelazo,Brooks,andSamuels(1996)withtheramptask.When,forinstance,onlythe leftinputholeisused,3yearoldscaninhibitthenaturaltendencyofpredictingthatthemarblewillrollstraightdowntotheleftoutputhole.Thatis,whenthelight indicatesacrossoverconnection,theypredictcorrectlythatthemarbleistobefoundintherightoutputhole.Inthiscase,however,thelightindicatingastraightdown oracrossoverconnectionbecomesthedirectfocusandtheinputhole(duetonovariation)becomescompletelybackgrounded.Noexecutiveinhibitionisneededto suppressbackgroundedstimulusinformation. Thecasesdiscussedpreviouslyconcerninhibitioninordertopreventstimulifromtriggeringunwantedschemata.Asomewhatdifferentcaseobtainswhenanexisting schemaisbeingtriggeredbutitsexecutionhastobeinfluenced.Acaseinpointmaybedeception.Thequestion,"WhereisX?"triggersaquestionansweringschema that,whenlefttoitsowndevices,willproduceaveridicalverbalanswerorapointingtowhereX
1

Wehavesofaremphasizedexecutiveinhibitionforwhichanunderstandingofmentalfunctioning(thecausal/representationalnatureofmentalstates)isrequired.Thisanalysis oftheififthentaskspresentsanotherwayinwhichthisunderstandingmighthelp.Insteadofhavingtounderstandthatanexistinginterferingschemaneedstobeinhibited,it maybeequallyhelpfultounderstandsomethingabouthowstimulitriggerandboostthedesiredactionschemata.Inthisparticularcase,itishelpfultounderstandthat backgroundedstimulidonotplayasmucharoleintriggeringandboostingthedesiredschemaasisrequired.Thisunderstandingmakesitpossibletoputspecialeffortinto highlighting(e.g.,consciouslyrehearsing)thebackgroundedinformation.

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actuallyis.Inordertodeceive,onehastogiveananswerbuthastochangethatanswerfromtheusualveridicalanswer.Carlson,Moses,andHix(1998),Moore, Barresi,andThompson(1998),andRusselletal.(1991)reportthatthismaybeindeedaseriousproblemforchildrenyoungerthan4years(butseeSamuels, Brooks,&Frye,1996,foramuchweakertrendaroundthisage).Theneedofexecutivecontrolforsteeringtriggeredschemataisalsoindicatedintheearlier mentionedfindingbyPernerandStummer(1998)that3yearoldsfinditdifficulttoprovidealternativeanswerstothesamequestion(e.g.,color/colortask)buthave nodifficultyansweringanalternativequestion(color/nametask). AfinalquestionthatneedstoberaisedinthiscontextiswhyexecutiveinhibitionisnotrequiredforthepersonalpreferencetaskusedbyRepacholiandGopnik (1997)with18montholdbabies.Earlierinthechapter,weusedtheearlymasteryofthistasktoargueagainstthesuggestionbyFryeetal.(1995)thatififthen tasks(togetherwiththefalsebelieftask)arenotmasteredbeforetheageof4years.Nowwearguethatififthentasksdorequireexecutiveinhibition,whichisnot acquiredbeforethefalsebelieftaskismasteredaround4yearsofage.ThesolutionisthattheRepacholiandGopniktaskisnotanififthentaskifoneassumesthat children'sunderstandingofpeople'spreferenceschangesat18months.Theyoungerchildmayhaveanactionrulebasedon"objectivegoodness":"Ifaskedbya persontohandherfood(a1),thenhandherthegoodtastingone(c1)."Ifbyexperiencethechildfoundoutthatthatparticularpersonwantstobehandedthebad tastingfood,thendifferentsettingconditionsforself(andothernormalpeople)andforthisaberrantpersonwouldhavetobeintroduced.Thenaturalinterpretationof thedata,however,isthatchildrenacquireanewunderstandingofsubjectivepreference.Withthistheiractionrulechanges:''Ifaskedbyapersontohandherfood (a1),thenhandhertheoneshelikes(c1)."WiththischangeinunderstandingthetaskbyRepacholiandGopnikdoesnotrequireembeddedconditionals,doesnot requireexecutiveinhibition,andconsequentlycanaccordingtotheorybemasteredbychildrenwellbeforetheypassthefalsebelieftask. Withthislengthydiscussionofexecutiveinhibition,wehaveshownthattheinhibitionrequiredbythoseEFtasksthataremasteredaroundtheageof4yearsis executiveinhibition,oratleastthatthesetasksaremoreseriouslydependentonexecutiveinhibitionthantasksmasteredearlier. EvaluatingtheFunctionalRelatednessTheories PernerandLang(inpress)reviewedmuchliteraturefromnormalandabnormaldevelopmentandfoundthatmostoftheavailabledataarecompatiblewiththeselast twotheories.Thereissometentativesuggestion

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fromdataonchildrenwithWilliamsandPraderWillisyndromethatsomeofthesechildrenconsistentlyfailexecutivefunctiontasksbutpassfalsebelieftasks(Tager Flusberg,Sullivan,&Boshart,1997).Asitstands,theinterpretationofthesedatahingesonhowpasscriteriaforEFtasksareset.If,however,theexistenceofsuch casesshowingintacttheoryofmindintheabsenceofexecutivecontrolcanbeconfirmed,thenthiswouldposeaseriousproblemforthepositionthatexecutive functionisaprerequisiteforatheoryofmind. OneveryrecentstudybyHughes(inpress)appearedtoprovidedifficultdataforthepositionthattheoryofmindisanintegralpartofexecutivefunctioning.Agroup of50childrenwastestedattheaverageageof3years7monthsandagainattheageof5yearsonseveralexecutivefunctiontasks(e.g.,Luria'shandgame)and severalfalsebelieftasks.ThefindingofinterestwasthatperformanceontheEFtasksattime1correlatedwithperformanceonthefalsebelieftasksattime2(e.g.,for thehandgame,r=.41)somewhatmorestronglythanfalsebeliefattime1correlatedwithEFtasksattime2(e.g.,forthehandgame,r=.26).Fortheother executivefunctiontaskstherewasthesameasymmetryindicatingthatexecutivefunctionisprimarytotheoryofmindbecauseearlyvariationsinexecutivecontrol predictlatertheoryofmindcompetencebutnottheotherwayaround.Thisasymmetrywouldonlyspeakagainstthepositionthattheoryofmindisanintegralpartof executivefunctioningundertheassumptionthatToMtestsprovideprivilegedaccesstoachild'stheoryofmind.However,thatisnotso.Theyonlydemonstratethe existenceofcertainToMcapabilities.ItremainsanopenquestionwhetherthemethodsusedinToMtasks(e.g.,predictionofhowpeopleincludingoneselfwould act)taptheexistenceofToMmoredirectlyandefficientlythanexecutivefunctioning(providedaToMisindeedanintegralpartofsuchfunctioning).Infact,iftheory ofminddoesnotjustmatureasafunctionalmodule(asLeslie,1987,1994,suggested)butneedsconstantexercisingtodevelopfurther,thencontrolofone'sown action(inhibitionofintrudingactionsequences)isbyfarthemoreimportantexercisegroundforbuildingarepresentational/causalunderstandingofmindthantryingto understandotherpeople'sandone'sownfalsebeliefs. Although,onthisview,itisinprinciplepossibletodevelopatheoryofmindwithoutexecutivecontrolinsomepathologicalcases,innormaldevelopmentthetheoryof mindcapacitymayshowitselfinexecutivecontrolbeforeitemergesinsocalledtheoryofmindtests.Thereisalsoanotherreasonforthistiming.ClementsandPerner (1994,1997)showedthatan"implicit"understandingoffalsebelief,whichshowsitselfinlookingbehaviorandinspontaneousactions(movingamattowherethe mistakencharacterwillappeartosearchforanobject),precedesbyaboutayearexplicitunderstandingintermsofansweringquestionsastowherethe

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characterwillappear.Ifthisearlierimplicitunderstandingofanotherperson'sfalsebeliefcanguideaction,thensimilarimplicitunderstandingofone'sownaction tendenciesmightprovideanearlierformofexecutivecontrol. Conclusion Welookedatdifferentexplanationsforthefindingthattheoryofminddevelopmentaroundtheageof4yearsrelatestogainingexecutivecontrolontasksthatrequire inhibitionofinterferingresponsetendencies.CCCtheoryexplainsthisdevelopmentalrelationbyacommoncognitivecomplexityrequiredforexecutivecontroland understandingfalsebelief.Ourconclusionisthatalthoughtheanalysisintermsofembeddedconditionalsmaycapturesomecommonalityacrossthesedifferent domains,therulesofapplyingtheanalysistospecificproblemsneedstobesharpened.Asitstandsitsuffersfromtoomanydegreesoffreedomforfittingtheanalysis inordertosuitthedevelopmentalpredictions. Wethenlookedatthreeexplanationsintermsofdirectfunctionaldependenciesbetweentheoryofmindandexecutivefunction.Oneofthemlocatesthedependency atthesuperficialleveloftheoryofmindtasksasameasuringinstrument.Areviewofavailabledatamakesitunlikelythatalltheoryofmindtasksthatshowarelation withexecutivefunctiontaskshavethemselvesastrongexecutivecomponent,althoughsome(deceptivepointing)mayhaveasubstantialcomponent. Availabledataarebyandlargecompatiblewiththepositionthatexecutivefunctioningisaprerequisitefordevelopingatheoryofmindandwiththepositionthata theoryofmindisanintegral(constitutive)partofexecutivefunctions.Infactthelattertheory,inallplausibility,impliesaweakversionoftheformer.Iftheoryofmind isintegraltoexecutivefunctioningandtheoryofmindneedstobeformedbyexercisingit,thenexecutivefunctioningisprobablyessentialbecauseitisthemain groundsfordevelopingatheoryofmind.Henceexecutivefunctionisarequirementfornormaldevelopmentoftheoryofmind.Executiveproblemsshouldleadto delayedacquisitionofatheoryofmind.However,thepossibilityremainsthatdelayeddevelopmentispossibledespitecompletelackofexecutivecontrol. References Bartsch,K.,&Wellman,H.M.(1989).Youngchildren'sattributionofactiontobeliefsanddesires.ChildDevelopment,60,946964. Carlson,S.M.(1997,April).Individualdifferencesininhibitorycontrolandchildren'stheoryofmind.PosterpresentedatthebiennialmeetingoftheSociety forResearchinChildDevelopment,Washington,DC.

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Carlson,S.M.,Moses,L.J.,&Hix,H.R.(1998).Theroleofinhibitoryprocessesinyoungchildren'sdifficultieswithdeceptionandfalsebelief.Child Development,69,672691. Clements,W.A.,&Perner,J.(1994).Implicitunderstandingofbelief.CognitiveDevelopment,9,377397. Clements,W.A.,&Perner,J.(1997).Whenactionsreallydospeaklouderthanwordsbutonlyimplicitly:Youngchildren'sunderstandingoffalsebeliefin action.Unpublishedmanuscript,UniversityofSussex,Falmer,EastSussex,UK. Diamond,A.(1991).Frontallobeinvolvementincognitivechangesduringthefirstyearoflife.InK.R.Gibson&A.C.Peterson(Eds.),Brainmaturationand cognitivedevelopment.(pp.127180).NewYork:AldineDeGruyter. Doherty,M.J.,&Perner,J.(1998).Metalinguisticawarenessandtheoryofmind:Justtwowordsforthesamething?CognitiveDevelopment,13,279305. Flavell,J.H.,Flavell,E.R.,&Green,F.L.(1983).Developmentoftheappearancerealitydistinction.CognitivePsychology,15,95120. Frye,D.(inpress).Theoryofmind,domainspecificity,andreasoning.InP.Mitchell&K.J.Riggs(Eds.),Children'sreasoningandthemind.Hove,England: PsychologyPress. Frye,D.,Zelazo,P.D.,Brooks,P.J.,&Samuels,M.C.(1996).Inferenceandactioninearlycausalreasoning.DevelopmentalPsychology,32,120131. Frye,D.,Zelazo,P.D.,&Palfai,T.(1995).Theoryofmindandrulebasedreasoning.CognitiveDevelopment,10,483527. Gerstadt,C.L.,Hong,Y.J.,&Diamond,A.(1994).Therelationshipbetweencognitionandaction:Performanceofchildren3andahalfto7yearsonaStroop likedaynighttask.Cognition,53,129153. Gopnik,A.,&Astington,J.W.(1988).Children'sunderstandingofrepresentationalchangeanditsrelationtotheunderstandingoffalsebeliefandtheappearance realitydistinction.ChildDevelopment,59,2637. Harris,P.L.(1989).Objectpermanenceininfancy.InA.Slater&G.Bremner(Eds.),Infantdevelopment(pp.103121).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaum Associates. Harris,P.L.,&Kavanaugh,R.D.(1993).Youngchildren'sunderstandingofpretence.SocietyforResearchinChildDevelopmentMonographs,58(1,Serial No.237). Hogrefe,J.,Wimmer,H.,&Perner,J.(1986).Ignoranceversusfalsebelief:Adevelopmentallaginattributionofepistemicstates.ChildDevelopment,57,567582. Hughes,C.(1998).Executivefunctionsinpreschoolers:Linkswiththeoryofmindandverbalability.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,16,233253. Hughes,C.(inpress).Findingyourmarbles:Doespreschoolers'strategicbehaviorpredictlaterunderstandingofmind?DevelopmentalPsychology. Hughes,C.,&Russell,J.(1993).Autisticchildren'sdifficultywithmentaldisengagementfromanobject:Itsimplicationfortheoriesofautism.Developmental Psychology,29,498510. Jeannerod,M.(1997).Thecognitiveneurosciencesinaction.Oxford:Blackwell. Leslie,A.M.(1987).Pretenseandrepresentation:Theoriginsof"theoryofmind."PsychologicalReview,94,412426. Leslie,A.M.(1994).Pretendingandbelieving:issuesinthetheoryofToMM.Cognition,50,211238. Luria,A.R.,Pribram,K.H.,&Homskaya,E.D.(1964).Anexperimentalanalysisofthebehaviouraldisturbanceproducedbyaleftfrontalarachnoidal endothelioma(meningioma).Neuropsychologia,2,257280. Moore,C.,Barresi,J.,&Thompson,C.(1998).Thecognitivebasisoffutureorientedprosocialbehavior.SocialDevelopment,7,198218. Norman,D.A.,&Shallice,T.(1986).Attentiontoaction.Willedandautomaticcontrolofbehavior.InR.J.Davidson,G.E.Schwartz,&D.Shapiro(Eds.), Consciousnessandselfregulation(Vol.4,pp.118).NewYork:Plenum. Pacherie,E.(1998).Motorimages,selfconsciousnessandautism.InJ.Russell(Ed.),Autismasanexecutivedisorder(pp.215255).Oxford,England:Oxford UniversityPress.

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Perner,J.(1991).Understandingtherepresentationalmind.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Perner,J.(1995).Themanyfacesofbelief:ReflectionsonFodor'sandthechild'stheoryofmind.Cognition,57,241269. Perner,J.(1998).Themetaintentionalnatureofexecutivefunctionsandtheoryofmind.InP.Carruthers&J.Boucher(Eds.),Languageandthought(pp.270 283).Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Perner,J.,&Lang,B.(inpress).Theoryofmindandexecutivefunction:Isthereadevelopmentalrelationship?InS.BaronCohen,H.TagerFlusberg,&D.Cohen (Eds.),Understandingotherminds:Perspectivesfromautismanddevelopmentalcognitiveneuroscience.Oxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress. Perner,J.,Lang,B.,&Stummer,S.(1998).Theoryofmindandexecutivefunction:Whichdependsonwhich?Unpublishedmanuscript,UniversityofSalzburg, Salzburg,Austria. Perner,J.,Leekam,S.R.,&Wimmer,H.(1987).Threeyearolds'difficultywithfalsebelief:Thecaseforaconceptualdeficit.BritishJournalofDevelopmental Psychology,5,125137. Perner,J.,&Stummer,S.(1998).SaysomethingdifferentToM,Metalinguisticawareness,embededconditionalsorexecutivefunction?Unpublished manuscript,UniversityofSalzburg,Salzburg,Austria. Repacholi,B.M.,&Gopnik,A.(1997).Earlyreasoningaboutdesires:Evidencefrom14and18montholds.DevelopmentalPsychology,33,1221. Russell,J.(1996).Agency:Itsroleinmentaldevelopment.Hove:Erlbaum(UK)Taylor&Francis. Russell,J.,Jarrold,C.,&Potel,D.(1994).Whatmakesstrategicdeceptiondifficultforchildrenthedeceptionorthestrategy?BritishJournalofDevelopmental Psychology,12,301314. Russell,J.,Mauthner,N.,Sharpe,S.,&Tidswell,T.(1991).The"windowstask"asameasureofstrategicdeceptioninpreschoolersandautisticsubjects.British JournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,9,331349. Samuels,M.C.,Brooks,P.J.,&Frye,D.(1996).Strategicgameplayinginchildrenthroughthewindowstask.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,14, 159172. Shultz,T.R.,Wells,D.,&Sarda,M.(1980).Thedevelopmentoftheabilitytodistinguishintendedactionsfrommistakes,reflexes,andpassivemovements.The BritishJournalofSocialandClinicalPsychology,19,301310. TagerFlusberg,H.,Sullivan,K.,&Boshart,J.(1997).Executivefunctionsandperformanceonfalsebelieftasks.DevelopmentalNeuropsychology,13,487493. Wimmer,H.(1989).CommonSenseMentalismusundEmotion:EinigeentwicklungspsychologischeImplikationen[Commonsensementalismandemotions:Some implicationsfordevelopmentalpsychology].InE.Roth(Ed.),DenkenundFhlen[Thinkingandfeeling](pp.5666).Berlin:SpringerVerlag. Wimmer,H.,&Mayringer,H.(1998).Falsebeliefunderstandinginyoungchildren:Explanationsdonotdevelopbeforepredictions.InternationalJournalof BehavioralDevelopment,22,403422. Wimmer,H.,&Perner,J.(1983).Beliefsaboutbeliefs:Representationandconstrainingfunctionofwrongbeliefsinyoungchildren'sunderstandingofdeception. Cognition,13,103128. Zelazo,P.D.,Carter,A.,Reznick,J.S.,&Frye,D.(1997).Earlydevelopmentofexecutivefunction:aproblemsolvingframework.ReviewofGeneral Psychology,1,198226. Zelazo,P.D.,&Frye,D.(1997).Cognitivecomplexityandcontrol:Atheoryofthedevelopmentofdeliberatereasoningandintentionalaction.InM.Stamenov (Ed.),Languagestructure,discourseandaccesstoconsciousness(pp.113153).Amsterdam&Philadelphia:JohnBenjamins. Zelazo,P.D.,&Jacques,S.(1997).Children'sruleuse:representation,reflectionandcognitivecontrol.InR.Vasta(Ed.),Annalsofchilddevelopment(Vol.12, pp.119176).London:JessicaKingsley. Zelazo,P.D.,&Reznick,J.S.(1991).Agerelatedasynchronyofknowledgeandaction.ChildDevelopment,62,719735.

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Chapter9 TheTheoryofAscriptions
DavidR.Olson DeepthiKamawar OntarioInstituteforStudiesinEducationoftheUniversityofToronto ThetitleofthischapterisaplayonthefamousRussellFregetheoryofdescriptionsthatattemptedtoaccountfornaming(Kripke,1972)butthatalsolaidthe foundationformuchofthecurrentinterestinrepresentations.Cognitivescience,asiswellknown,isthescienceofmentalrepresentations,theirstructure,theirrolein behavior,andforus,theirdevelopment.Inthischapterweexploretheroleofascriptionsinthedevelopmentofmentalrepresentationandtherelationbetween ascriptionofintentionandepistemologicalunderstanding.Byascription,wemeantheabilityorpracticeofattributingparticularstatesorpropertiestopersons, objects,orevents.Ascriptionsdifferfromdescriptionsintheirontologicalcommitments.Descriptionspurporttobeobjectivethatis,theyassumetherealityofthe thingdescribedandhenceitsavailabilitytoanyobserver.Ascriptionsaredescriberrelative:Theymayormaynotassumetherealityofthepropertyoritsavailability tootherobservers.Ascriptions,then,arecharacterizationsofthingsfromanascriber'spointofview.RecalltheunfortunatePolonius'eagernesstoaccommodateto Hamlet'sascriptions:"Doyouseeyondercloudthat'salmostinshapeofacamel?" Inthecurrentliterature,theissueofthenatureandfunctionofmentalrepresentations,specificallybeliefs,desires,andintentions,istakentobeadifferentenquirythan theissueoftheascriptionsofthesestatestoothers.Thislatterissueisseenastheproblemofmetarepresentation,oftherecognitionandunderstandingofbeliefsquite independentlyofthepossessionofthosebeliefs.Ascriptionofbeliefsisseenasanaspectofsocial

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behaviorthatpresupposestherealityofthebeliefsascribed.Thealternative,whichweshallconsiderhere,isthatascriptionofmentalstatesisacriticalingredientinthe possessionofthosestates.Whatbeginsasascriptionresults,throughsocialization,asdescribablementalstates.Ofcourse,thatiseasiersaidthandone.Ascribing mentalstatestocomputershaslittleeffectonthecomputersascribingthemtochildren,itcanplausiblybeargued,does.Sowhatmakestheuptakeofsuchascriptions possible?Wereturntothisissueinthesecondpartofthechapter. Notethatourpointisnottheequallyimportantpoint,namely,thattheascriptionofmentalstatestoothersiscloselytiedtotheascriptionofthosestatestooneself. Thatconceptsofbeliefapplyequallytoselfandotherisbothanempiricalfact(Gopnik&Astington,1988)andatheoreticalnecessity(Baldwin,1897/1973Barresi &Moore,1996).Here,weexplorethepossibilitythattheabilitytoascribementalstatesisrelevanttothepossessionofthesestates.Wesecondthesuggestionearlier madebyDavidson(1975,1985)thattohaveabeliefonemusthaveaconceptofbelief. Davidson(1985)madethreepointsinhisargumentforthisclaim.Hebeganbyclaimingthatasinglebeliefcannotexistinisolationthatis,acreaturecannotbesaidto possessjustonebelief.Rather,inorderforsomethingtobeabelief,thatsomethingmustbesituatedwithinacomplexsetofinterconnectedbeliefsitisthebelief's positionwithinthislargerlogicalnetworkthatprovidesitwithidentityandcontent.Forexample,Davidsondescribesasituationinwhichadogisobservedchasinga catthatitlosessightof.Thisresultsinthedogbarkingupthewrongtree,anoaktreeinthiscase(thecatisinanearbytree).Thecasualobservermightwantto attributetothedogthebeliefthatthecatisintheoaktree(inordertoexplainwhyheisbarkingupthattree).However,inordertoattributethatbelieftothedogit wouldbenecessarytoattributeotherbeliefstothedog(e.g.,thatthecatwentupthesametreethelasttimethedogchasedit,thattreesarealive,etc.).Itdoesnot makesensetosaythatthedoghasabeliefaboutatreeifwecannotattributeanyotherbeliefstothedog.AlthoughDavidsondidnotexplicitlyextendthisexampleto coveryoungchildren,itseemsnaturaltodoso. ThesecondpointDavidsonmadeconcernstherelationbetweenthephenomenonofsurpriseandpossessionoftheconceptofbelief.Davidsonpointedoutthatin ordertobesurprised,onemustbeabletocompareone'spresentbeliefs(basedonreality)withone'spriorbeliefs(whichturnedouttobewrong).Thatis,inorderto besurprised,onemusthaveabeliefaboutabelief(e.g.,Inowbelievethatmypreviousbeliefwasfalse)andbeabletounderstandthatbeliefscanbetrueorfalse (i.e.,haveaconceptofobjectivetruth).Therefore,inordertobesurprised,onemustpossesstheconceptofbelief.

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ThusfaritiseasytoagreewithDavidson:Beliefsdon'texistinisolationandtobesurprisedinvolvestheconceptofbelief.Thenextsteprequiresabitofaleap.The thirdpointofDavidson'sargumentheldthat"onecannothaveageneralstockofbeliefsofthesortnecessaryforhavinganybeliefsatallwithoutbeingsubjectto surprisesthatinvolvebeliefsaboutthecorrectnessofone'sownbeliefs"(p.479).Inotherwords,onceone'snetworkofbeliefsiscomplexenoughfortheindividuated itemswithinittocountasbeliefs,oneissubjecttobeingsurprisedaboutatleastsomeofthosebeliefs.Therefore,onecannothaveabeliefwithoutalreadyhavingthe conceptofbelief.Putanotherway,tohaveabeliefistobeabletorepresentpsychologicalstatesandprocessesasbeliefsandtobeabletoascribebeliefs(e.g., surprise)tooneselfandothers. BeliefsandIntentionsasAscribableMentalStates AscriptiontheoryistraceabletoSellars'(1963)famousstory"TheMythofJones."Accordingtothatstory,Jonesdiscoversthathecanbetteranticipatetheactionsof anotherbyattributingorascribingsuchmentalstatesasbeliefsandfeelingstothatperson.Buthavingworkedoutthatthatcharacterizationisusefulforunderstanding thatotherperson,Jonesdiscoversthatthesameaccountmaybeusefullyappliedtohimself.Inrecentyears,thestoryhasbeenimprovedonby,amongothers,Barresi andMoore(1996)whoabandonedtheorderingofacquisitionassumedbySellars:Namely,firstunderstandothersandthenunderstandselfbymeansofthesame model,andofferinitsplacethecompellingnotionthatcombininginformationabouttheselfandotherisnecessarytoformaconceptofbelief.Thetwocapture differentsortsofinformation.Thefirstpersoninformationabouttheselfmustbecoordinatedwiththethirdpersoninformationabouttheotherinordertoderivethe firstpersoninformationfortheotherandhenceallowpredictionoftheother'sactions. Considerhowonewouldcometounderstandhowperceptionleadstoknowledge.Children,whosementallivesweareattemptingtoexplain,alreadyknowa procedureforgainingknowledge.Iftheywanttoknowwhatisinabox,theylookintothebox.Buttheycandosowithoutunderstandingthecausalrelationsbetween lookingandknowing.Tounderstandtherelationbetweenlookingandknowing,childrenhavetocoordinateinformationabouttheirownfirstpersonexperience, namely,"Iknowwhatisinthebox,"withthethirdpersoninformationaboutwhattheotherisdoing,"Heislookingintothebox."Puttingthetwotogetherallowsthem tograspthecausalrelationbetweenthetwo,namely,thatitisthe"looking"thatcausesthe"knowing.''Thisknowledgethenallowstheascriptionoffirstperson informationtotheother:"Henowknowswhatisinthebox[becausehelookedintothebox]."Italsoallowsthecomplementaryattitudetooneself,

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whatBarresiandMoorecalledthethirdpersonstancetooneself,namely,"ThereasonIknowwhatisintheboxisbecauseIlookedintothebox."Tounderstand falsebeliefonehas,inaddition,torecognizetheimplicationofthenegation,"Hedidnotlooksohedoesnotknow,"anddrawtheinferencethatbecausehedidnot see,hewillbasehisjudgmentoractiononwhathesawpreviously(Artuso,1998). Thestandardcounterargumenttotheascriptivistproposalisthatchildrenmayhavebeliefseveniftheycannotascribethem.Insomesensechildrenmayknowwhatis intheboxeveniftheyareunabletoascribetheappropriatebelieftotheother,andiftheyknow,onemayarguetheyhaveabelief.Wedonotwishtodenytheyarein acognitivestatewhentheyactthequestionisthestatusofthatknowledgethatthesubjectcanneitherascribe,acknowledge,noravow. Thispointcouldeasilyturnintoasemanticquibbleovertheuseofthewordbelief.Ourpurposeisnottodenyinternalcognitivestatestoinfantsandnonhumananimals butrathertoarguethattoascribesuchstatesasbeliefsincasesinwhichtheyareincapableofascribingthemtothemselvesissuspect.Althoughtherearecognitive states,theymaybemoreappropriatelycharacterizedinnonintentionalisttermssuchasexpectanciesorattunement,namely,thoseavailableinsubsymbolic connectionistmodels(Shultz&Mareschal,1997). Theproblemisinthepeculiarityoftheclaimthatthechildknows.Thatclaimis,obviously,anascription.Weadultsascribeknowledgetothechildthatthechild cannotascribetohimself:"Doyouknowwhatisinthebox[whenyouhavenotlooked]?"Childrenoftenclaimtoknowincaseswhereweadultsascribeignorance. Andconversely,whenasked,"Whatdidyouthinkwasinthe[Smarties]box?"childrenanswer,incorrectly,"Pencils.''Insuchcases,itiswe,theascribers,who attributetothechildthebeliefthathethoughttherewereSmartiesinthebox,becausehehadearlieracknowledgedthatfact,evenifnow,whenasked,hesays, "Pencils."Thatis,weadultscharacterizethechild'sactionsintermsofbeliefs,desires,andintentionsevenifthechild,atthisage,eitherdoesnotordoesso incorrectly. Thereisafurtherproblem.ThechildisinjustthesamepositionasthecomputerintheTuringtestorthechimpanzeewhohideshisfoodinthepresenceofadominant male.Ineachcase,itisthetheoristwhoascribesthebelieftochild,animal,ormachine.Thechildappearstohaveabeliefthecomputeractsasifithadabeliefthe chimpanzeeactsasifithadabelief.Thesedebateshavegoneincircles,someclaimingthattheydo,othersthattheydonot.Thebehaviorofchimpanzeesand computerscanatleastplausiblybeexplainedwithoutthenecessityofappealingtointentionalmentalstates(seePovinelli,chap.11,thisvolume).Ascribingmental statessuchasbeliefappearstohavebecomeamatteroftheoretical

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preference.Wearefreetochoosetoadoptthe"intentionalstance"asDennett(1978)callsit(seealsoOlson,1993),butthereisnofacttobedescribed.Thereis, rather,acharacterizationtobeascribedbyusasadults,ifwechooseto. Thestorychangesabruptlywhenchildrendeveloptheabilitytoascribementalstatestothemselvesandothers.Thenthequestionastowhetherthechildhasbeliefs maybeansweredaffirmatively.Thechildnowjoinsinthegame.Thechildinascribingbeliefshasgainedanunderstandingofand,arguably,somecontroloverthe conditionsofknowing.Thatis,oncethechildunderstandshowknowledgeiscaused,heisinthepositiontodeliberatelyaltertheknowledgestatesofhimselfand others.Onemanifestationisthenowwellknowncaseofdeception(Peskin,1992). Anotherlandmarkofinterestisthechild'sabilitytocorrectlyascribepropositionalattitudes(e.g.,ShethinksthatXIknowthatY).Thetypeofsituationwediscuss hereisareferentially(Quine,1955)orsemanticallyopaque(Davidson,1985)context.Suchcontextscanbedefinedasthosestatementsthatmaychangefromtrueto falsewhenthewordsthatareusedtopickouttheobjectoftheattitudearesubstitutedwithanalternatereferringexpression(Davidson,1985).Forexample,although itmightbetruethat'Johnthinksthebirdisintheoaktree,"itmightnotbetruethat"Johnthinksthebirdisintheoldesttreeinsight,"eventhoughtheoaktreeisthe oldesttreeinsight,becausehemightnotknowanythingelseaboutthetrees.Thus,whenattributingpropositionalattitudestoanother,theother'sbeliefsmustbetaken intoaccount. LetusturnbacktoDavidson'searlierexampleofadogchasingacatupatree.Thecasualobserverinthatexamplewaswillingtosaythatthedogbelievesthatthe catwasintheoaktree.Iftheoaktreewastheoldesttreeinsight,shouldtheobserverbewillingtosaythatthedogbelievesthatthecatisintheoldesttreeinsight?In thecaseofadog(orayoungchild),suchquestionsseemproblematic.Butifoneiswillingtousesuchattitudesasbelieve,think,andknowwhiledroppingthefeature ofsemanticopacity(thatofnonsubstitutability),thenoneisnotusingthosewordstoascribepropositionalattitudes(thoughts).Ourresearch(Kamawar&Olson, 1997)intochildren'ssensitivitytosuchcontextsshowedthatthereisarelationbetweenthedevelopmentofatheoryofmindandsensitivitytoopaquecontexts,even withageremovedasafactor.Itwasfoundthatchildrenwhohavenotyetacquiredatheoryofmindarethesamechildrenwhoareunabletocorrectlyattribute propositionalattitudes(thoughts)toanother.Furthermore,thosechildrenwhoareabletocorrectlyascribethoughtstoanotherarethosethatwerealsosuccessfulon taskstakentomeasuretheconceptofbelief(i.e.,theoryofmindtasks).Awarenessoftheconstraintsofsubstitutionwithinsemanticallyopaquecontextsthusprovides evidenceoftheacquisitionoftheconceptofbelief(andhencebeliefs).

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Thisunderstandingof,andhencecontrolof,one'sownmentallifeisaformofmetacognition,knowingabout"knowing."Thequotesheremarktheuncertainstatusof theearlierknowing.However,thelandmark,ifthisviewiscorrect,istheappearanceofthechild'scorrectascriptionofmentalstates. Whetherornotinfants,otheranimals,orcomputers"have"mentalstates,then,isnotdecideableitdependsuponthehabitsandpreferencesoftheascribers.Skinner (1983),itwillberecalled,withheldsuchascriptionsevenfromhumanadults.Butoncethechildbecomesanascriber,mentalstatesbecomepartofthecognitive economy.Beliefs,inthisview,areabstractcharacterizationsofrelationsbetweencognitivemechanismsandexternalstatesofworld,whichareusefulforboth understandingandorganizingthoserelations.Beliefs,ratherthanbeingintrinsicstructuresofacomplexbrain,areaswesay,"socialconstructions"that,whengrasped orinternalized,functioncognitively.Thesearenotmerelyconvenientfictions,butfictions,thatis,constructions,treatedasrealinjustthesamewaythat,inpretense,a childcan"let"abananabeatelephone. Perhapsevenwhenchildrenhavebecomeascribers,theyaremistaken.Theyonlythinktheyhavebeliefs,aviewwhichhascometobecalled"eliminativism"(Stich, 1984).Thecriticismcutstoodeeplyinthatalthoughitmaybehelpfultoshowthatthebehaviorofyoungchildren,likethatofcomputersandsomeotherprimates, maybeadequatelyexplainedwithoutappealtobeliefsandintentions,itfailstoacknowledgetheroleofbeliefsandothernormativestructuresinsocialinteractions. Holdingandascribingbeliefsallowsforawayofthinkingofoneselfandothersascapableofplanning,ofacceptingresponsibility,andoftreatingothersaspartnersin asocialworld,aswellasofcreatingandunderstandingpublicrepresentations. Inadditiontothelogicalreasonsjustofferedforgrantingthe"ascriptivist"viewofbeliefs,therearesomeempiricalones.Ifbeliefsarepartoftheintrinsicstructureof mindofacertainlevelofcomplexity,aviewsharedbysuchotherwisediscrepantwritersasSearle(1983)andFodor(1992),weshouldexpectconceptsofmindto emerge,ratherthanbelearned.If,onthecontrary,understandingbeliefsisawayofviewingpeopleinrelationtoaworld,thenthatunderstandingmayhavetobe taught.Thereisnowaconsiderablebodyofevidencelinkinglanguagedevelopmenttotheoryofmind(Artuso,1998Fletcheretal.,1995Frey,1997Gale,de Villiers,deVilliers,&Pyers,1996Jenkins&Astington,1996).Itappearsthattheunderstandingofbeliefsistiedextremelycloselytotheacquisitionofalanguagefor attributing,thatis,ascribing,beliefstoselfandothers.Acquiringatheoryofmindisnoteasilydistinguishedfromacquiringalanguagefortalkingaboutthemind,and usingthelanguagecorrectlyisamatterofcorrectlyascribingmentalstates.

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Theimportanceoflanguagesuggestsalink,aswell,betweenascriptionanddescription,mentionedearlier.Itistheascriptionofbeliefsandintentionstothechildby theadultandtheoverhearingofsuchascriptionsbyotherstoothers,thatmayallowthechildtocometoconsiderhimorherselfasabelieverandintender.Oncethese ascriptionsareadopted,thechildcanbecorrectlydescribedasabeliever.Whatbeganasascriptionwouldhavebecomedescription.AsDavidson(1975)suggested, itisamistaketoaskifmentalstatessuchasbeliefsarereal.Theyareandtheyarenot.Theyare"representations,"not"reals,"andyetbyascriptionwetreatthemas realsinmuchthesamewayasbytheritualofnamingwebecomewhoweare.Socialconstructions,too,areakindofrealentity,realbyvirtueofouragreementto treatthemso. Therearelimitstoascriptivism.Tolearntoascribebeliefstooneselfandothersrequiresmuchmorethansociallearningofalanguage.Onemusthavesomefirst personexperiencethatonecancontributeasabasisforascriptivepractice.Theseexperiencesprovidethesubjectivesideoftheexplicitknowledgeneededfor ascription.Beliefsaretheproductofcombiningsomefirstpersonexperiencewiththeperceptionofthethirdpersonexperienceoftheotherandcombiningthemto produceaconceptoranunderstandingofbelief.Butiftheproductisabelief,thatfirstpersonexperience,itself,cannotalreadyhavebeenabelief.Todescribethis firstpersonexperiencewewillappealtotheconceptof"feeling."Babiesmaynothavebeliefsbuttheydohavefeelingsandalthoughonecansometimesrecognize thosefeelings,oneisatalosstoknowtheirthoughts."Onecannomorethinklikeababy,thanonecanthinklikeabee,"wroteRichardHughes,authorofAHigh WindinJamaica(1928,p.119).Foralearnertounderstandwhattheexperienceofanotherislike,itisessentialthatthechildhavehadsomesimilarexperience.I knowwhatitisliketogetknockedoffabicyclebecauseithashappenedtome.IfIhadnosuchexperienceIwouldhavealimitedunderstandingofwhatitislike.As childrengetolderanddevelopalifeoftheimagination,theycometohavesomeideaofwhatitislikeevenwithouttheexperience,butsuchfantasiesneverapproach realities.AnthonyBurgess(1980)inEarthlyPowerscreatesacharacter,awriter,whogetsmugged.Thecharacterthenpointsoutthatinhiswritinghehadoften describedinintimatedetailfictionalmuggingsandinfactthoughtheknewjustwhatitwouldbelike.Hiscomment,afterhewasactuallymugged,wasthatitwas nothinglikehehadimagineditatall.Knowledgeofwhatanexperienceislikeislimitedbytheexperienceoftheascriber.Adultsmaygosomewhatbeyondexperience bymeansofimaginationbutthisisaroutethatislimitedorunavailabletoinfants. Sowhatisitthatthechildbringsfromhisfirstpersonexperiencethatisusefullyaddedtohisperceptionoftheother'sthirdpersonexperience?

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Oursuggestionisthatitisasetoffeelings,includingafeelingofknowingorafeelingofunderstanding.Becausethechildknowswhatitfeelsliketoknowsomething onlookingintoabox,thechildcanattributethatfeelingtotheotherwhentheotherpeersintoacontainer.Thusthelimitingconditiononascriptionisthatthechildhas tohavehadsomepersonalfirstpersonfeelingthathethencanascribetootherswhentheotherhasaccesstoinformation.Withoutthatfeelingthechildwouldhaveno ideaof"whatitislike"tolookintoacontainer.ThisisthesenseinwhichwethinkPaulHarrisiscorrectinarguingforwhathecallsthe"simulationtheory"(Harris, 1992). Thenotionof"whatitislike"isborrowedfromThomasNagel(1974)whousesittoexplorethelimitsofhumanknowledge.Wehavenoideaofwhatitisliketobea batnavigatingbyaformofradar.Andwecannotlearnwhatitislike.Ourexperienceputsalimitonwhatwecanascribetoothers.Learningtoascribebeliefs,then, restsontheabilityofthelearnertoascribetoothersthefeelingthathehimselfhashadonoccasionssimilartothosenowobservedintheother.Thatfeeling,wehave urged,wasnotitselfabelief.Thebeliefistheproductofrelatingthefeelingthatoneknowsinoneselftotheperceivedoccasionorsituationoftheother.More concrete,combiningthefeelingofknowingattributedtotheotheronthebasisofone'sownexperiencewiththeperceptionoftheother'sactionsoflookingintothe containerproducestherelationbetweenseeingandknowing,itselfthefundamentalunderstandingunderlyingtheconceptofbelief. ThisisclosetothestoryadvancedbyBarresiandMoore(1996)withthreeminorrevisions.First,weseenocompellingreasontopostulatean"intentionalschema" withthefunctionofproducingtherelationbetweenfirstpersonandthirdpersoninformationforbothselfandother.Second,moreimportant,welimitwhatthechild canascribetowhatthechildknowsof"whatitislike."Whatitislikeprovidesalearningmechanisminitsownrightlearningbyrelatingfeelingsprovokedbysimilar events.Third,thenotionoffeelingstiesthisearlylearningnotexclusivelytocognitionbuttoaffect. Davidson(1985)offersanotherwayinwhichtoviewtheimportanceoffirstandthirdpersoninformationtothedevelopmentofbeliefsandtheconceptofbelief.He maintainsthattheinteractionoftwocreatures(people)isnecessaryforeitherofthemtodevelopaconceptofthewaythingsexistobjectively(whichinturnis importantinunderstandingthatbeliefscanbetrue/false).Davidson,usingthemetaphoroftriangulation(twoperspectivesandoneobject),holdsthatitisthrough languagethattwocreaturescancreateacommongroundofanobjectivereality,andthatthissharingofaconceptoftruthiswhatmakessenseoftheclaimthatthe creatureshavebeliefsandcanassignobjectsaplaceinthepublicworld.

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Ascriptiontheoryisbasedontheassumptionthatconceptslikebelief,desire,andintention,ratherthanactingaspointerstoactualcognitivestructuresare representationalinventionsthatareacquiredbecausetheyarehandy,thatis,instrumentalinaccountingfortalkandaction.Butinourview,itgoesastepfurthertoask whatthelimitsofsuchascriptionare.Contrarytothestrong"theorytheory"view,theviewthattheseconceptsarethefreeinventionofyoungchildrenfacedwith complexsocialinteractions(Gopnik&Wellman,1994Sellars,1963),itsuggeststhattheconceptsarelimitedbysomemorefundamentalexperiencesofthechild thatwehavecharacterizedasfeelings.Babiesmaynothavebeliefsbuttheydohavefeelings.Feelingsofknowing,ofcourse,areoftenwrong.Butiftheywerealways unreliable,onewouldhavenofirstpersonfeelingstobringtothelearningsituation. Someindicationoftheunderstandingofinternalstatesthatchildrenbringtothetaskofacquiringatheoryofmindcomesfromtheirlearningofmodalauxiliariessuchas mightbe,mustbe,couldbe,andshouldbe,whichMoore,Pure,andFurrow(1990)foundtobecloselyrelatedtotheunderstandingofmentalstates.Astingtonand Olson(1990)pointedoutthatmodalsusedinafirstpersonsenseareequivalenttotheattributionofbeliefthus:"Itmustbeinthecupboard"isequivalentto"Ithinkit isinthecupboard."Butthisformisnotgeneralizabletoothers:"Itmustbeinthecupboardforhim"isunacceptable,whereas"Hethinksitmustbeinthecupboard"is acceptable.Onlythelatterexpressionsattributethepropertytothemind.Modalsattributethepropertytothestructureoftheworld.Asimilarpointmaybemade abouttheappearancerealitydistinction.Ifonesaysthataspongelookslikearock,theproblemisattributedtotheworld,therock.Butifonesaysthat''Ithoughtit wasarock,"oneisattributingittoamentalstate.Inbothcases,itisamovefromrespondingtotheworldinaparticularway,whichpresumeschildrenknow"howit feels,"totheattributionofthefeeling,nowintheformofabelief,ascribedtoothers. Therefore,ascriptionsaretheproductofrepresentinggenerallywhatonealreadyexperiencedasafeeling.Ascriptionsallowustofurnishoursocialworldswith sharedideas,hypotheses,beliefs,andarguments.Inaddition,theyallowustoformanexplicitepistemology,anunderstandingoftheconditionsofknowledge,andthe abilitytocontributetothe"archivalstore"ofknowledge(Olson,1994).Tothissecondroleofascriptiontheorywenowturn. Howdoascriptionsallowustofunctionepistemologically?Ascriptiontheoryspecifiesnotonlythatonehasbeliefsbutalsothecauses1ofthose
1

By"cause"here,werefertointentionalcauses,whichistosay"reasons,"notthemechanicalcausesofthesciences.

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beliefs.Onceunderstood,oneisinapositiontoanswersuchquestionsas"Howdoyouknow?"andalsotoarrangethingssothatoneknows,thatis,tocollectand understandevidence.Oneisinapositiontoassessargumentsandprovideevidenceforclaims. Acquiringanunderstandingofthegroundsforascriptionsofbelieftoselfandothers,then,iscentraltochildren'sepistemologicaldevelopment.Indeed,therecent concernwithmetacognitioncanbeseen,inlargepart,asaconcernwiththeassignmentandevaluationofthebasisforone'sownbeliefs.And,asnotedearlier, evaluatingandassigningbeliefstooneselfiscloselyrelatedtotheevaluationandassignmentofbeliefstoothers.Thatis,questionsofhowoneknowsapplyequallyto selfandother.Whereasitmaybesomewhateasiertocriticizethebeliefsofothersthanthoseofoneselfandeasiertoadjustone'sownbeliefsthantocriticizethose beliefs,theproceduresforevaluatingbeliefsarethesamewhethertheyareone'sownorthoseofanother.Epistemologicaldevelopmentisamatteroflearninghowto recognizeandcategorizetypesofclaimsandotherstatementsandthewaysthatthosestatementscanbecriticized.Thecriticalrolefallsontheconceptofevidence: "Howdoyouknow?"GopnikandGraf(1988)showedthatchildrenwholackedatheoryofmindhaddifficultyincorrectlyattributingknowledgetotheappropriate source.Ourconcernhereiswiththeirunderstandingthatknowledgeiscausedbyexperienceatall,notsomuchwithdistinguishingsources. Inourlaboratoryforsomeyearswehavepursuedthequestionofchildren'sunderstandingofevidenceforabelief.Inatypicalstudy(Kamawar&Olson,1998), childrenaretoldastoryaboutasubject(John)whoattemptstoopenadoorbutfailsandincorrectlyinfersoutloudthatthedoormustbelocked.Hethengoesaway tofindakey.Inhisabsence,thechildrenareshownthattheactualcauseofthefailuretoopenthedoorisawedgeunderthedoorratherthanbecauseitislocked. Thusfarthisisafalsebeliefstory.Butherethescenariochanges.Thechildrenareaskedthreequestions:(a)aquestionaboutthecauseofthestateofaffairsinthe world,forexample,"Whywillthedoornotopen?"(correctanswer:becauseofthewedge)(b)aquestionaboutthecharacter'sthoughts,forexample,"Whydoes Johnthinkthatthedoorwon'topen?"(correctanswer:becausehecouldn'topenthedoor)and(c)aquestionabouthowthecharacterknowsthestateofaffairs,for example,''HowdoesJohnknowthatthedoorwon'topen?"(correctanswer:becausehetriedanditwouldn'topen). Althoughthisworkisstillongoing,previousfindings(Sa&Olson,1996)werethatchildrenunder5or6yearsconflatethethreequestions,answering,ineachcase, "Becauseofthewedge."Inaddition,theyalsooftenrespondwithanswerswedescribeasshowing"reverselogic"forexample,whenasked"WhydoesJohnthink thatthedoorwon'topen?"someoftheyounger

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childrensaythatJohnthinksthatthedoorwillnotopen"becauseitislocked,"ratherthan"Hethinksthedoorislockedbecauseitwon'topen."Weinferthatchildren haveanimperfectunderstandingoftheconditionsofknowing,treatingcausesofeventsasthereasonsforknowingaboutthem.Althoughworkinginasomewhat differenttheoreticalframework,Ramadas(1994)andAstingtonandHomer(1995)havebothreportedsimilarresults.Inthesecases,theoryofmindviewedasan ascriptivetheorymaybeseenasdirectlytiedtothisaspectofepistemologicaldevelopment. Asecondlineofresearchrelatingtheoryofmindtoepistemologicaldevelopmentexaminestheroleoftheunderstandingofintentioninconceptualchange.Conceptual changeisevokedwhenknowledgeacquisitionisnotonlyaugmentedbutinterpretedwithinaquitedifferentconceptualframework.Intentionalityprovidesonesuch framework.Ithasbeenobserved(Roth&Anderson,1988Shapiro,1994)thatwhenaskedhowlightpermitsustoseeanobject,childrentendtosay,"Thesun shinesonthetreeandwelookatthetree,"whereastheschoolattemptstoteachthemthatthesunshinesonthetreeandthetreereflectsthelightintooureyes. Furthermore,whenaskedwhytheycannotseesomethingbehindabrickwall,theysay,'Youcannotseethroughabrickwall,"whereastheschoolattemptstoteach themtosaythatlightcannotpassthroughabrickwall.Whatistheproblem? First,evenadultsacceptbothmodesofexplanation:"Wecannotseethroughthebrickwall"and"Lightcannotpassthroughthebrickwall."Indeed,mostadultsseeno differencebetweenthesetwostatements.However,inthefirstcase,thereistheimplicitassumptionthatinlookingandseeing,thelightpassesfromtheeyethroughthe wallratherthanlightfailingtopassthroughthewalltotheeye.Consequently,wereadilyimaginethefeasibilityofSuperman'sXrayvision.Thesedirectionsare indicatedinFig.9.1(adaptedfromRoth&Anderson,1988,butlabeledintermsoftheviewdevelopedherein).FollowingCareyandSpelke(1994),wesuggestthat childrenarecaughtbetweenacausalframeofreference,suitableforphysicalphenomena,andanintentionalframeofreference,appropriateforpsychologicalones. Youngchildrentendtobetiedtoanintentionalmodeofexplanationintermsofwhichpeopleandotherthingsdoortrytodo,whereasschooledandolderchildren andadultscan,ifrequired,shifttoacausalmodeofexplanationintermsofmechanicalprocessesandcausalregularitiesoflight.Thefirsttheoryistheintentional theorypremisedontheactionsofthelooker,thesecond,Newton'scausaltheoryoflight. Evenadultsarenotimmunetotheintentionalisttheoryoflight.Asmentionedevenadultscommonsensicallysaythatwecannot"seethrough"awall,implyingthatthe seeingbeginswiththeeye.N.Poussin,arenowned17thcenturyFrenchpainter,wrotethefollowing:"Onceyouhavereceivedyourpainting...adornitwithsome framing,foritneedsitsothatwhen

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Fig.9.1. Modesofexplanation.

gazingatitinallitsparts,theraysoftheeyeareretainedandnotscatteredoutside"(Poussin,1911).The"raysoftheeye"arejustwhatchildrenseemtoassumein explainingvision.Thesesupposedrayswouldalsoexplainwhypeopleoftenfeeltheycantellwhensomeoneislookingatthem,evenwhentheycannotseethat person,andtheircredulitywhenconfrontedwithSuperman's"enhanced''vision. Thelinktoascriptivetheoryisasfollows.Inlearningtoascribebeliefsandotherintentionalstatestoothers,thechildismovingfromanonintentionalstancetoan intentionalone.Thattransitioniswellstudiedandwellknown.Intheepistemologicalcase,thetransitionisjustintheoppositedirection.Oncechildrenunderstandthat intentionsareascribedbytheviewer,theyareinapositiontograspthatsuchascriptionsareinappropriateinsomecontexts,suchasthatofunderstandinglight.Once thatisunderstood,theyareinapositiontobeginadeeperunderstandingofphysicalmatterincludinglight.Thishypothesisneedstobetestedexperimentally.As mentioned,Skinner'sabilitytorecognizethatonecouldresistthetemptationtoascribeintentionstopersonswaswhatallowedhimtoproduceaquitenovel,ifnow widelydismissed,explanationofbehavior.Modernconnectionistshavetakenasimilargoal,albeitwithquitedifferentmeans. WehavenotventuredfarfromthewellknownpositionsetoutbyDennett(1978)inwhathascometobeknownasinstrumentalism.Onthatview,mentalstates, suchasbeliefs,arenotreal,causalstatesoforganisms,butratherwaysofcharacterizingactionandinteractionfromaparticular,

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outsider's,pointofview.Ourascriptionsofmentalstatesareusefultousasascribersinaccountingforthetalkandactionofothers,and,followingSellars(1963),of bothunderstandingourselvesandgainingsomecontrolofourbehaviorand,ultimately,ourknowledge. References Artuso,M.(1998).Informationprocessingconstraintsontheacquisitionofatheoryofmind.UnpublishedPhDdissertation,UniversityofToronto. Astington,J.,&Homer,B.(1995,April).Children'sunderstandingofsecondorderbeliefanditsrelationtotheirabilitytodistinguishbetweencausesand reasons.PaperpresentedattheannualmeetingoftheAmericanEducationalResearchAssociation,SanFrancisco,CA. Astington,J.,&Olson,D.(1990).Metacognitionandmetacognitivelanguage:learningtotalkaboutthought.AppliedPsychology:AnInternationalReview,39, 7787. Baldwin,J.M.(1973).Socialandethicalinterpretationsinmentaldevelopment.NewYork:ArnoPress.(Originalworkpublished1897) Barresi,J.,&Moore,C.(1996).Intentionalrelationsandsocialunderstanding.BehavioralandBrainSciences,19,107154. Burgess,A.(1980).Earthlypowers.NewYork:Simon&Schuster. Carey,S.,&Spelke,E.(1994).Domainspecificknowledgeandconceptualchange.InL.A.Hirschfeld&S.A.Gelman(Eds.),Mappingthemind:Domain specificityincognitionandculture(pp.169200).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Davidson,D.(1975).Inquiriesintotruthandinterpretation.Oxford,England:Clarendon. Davidson,D.(1985).Rationalanimals.InE.LePore&B.McLaughlin(Eds.),Actionsandevents:PerspectivesonthephilosophyofDonaldDavidson(pp. 473480).Oxford,England:BasilBlackwell. Dennett,D.(1978).Brainstorms.Montgomery,VT:Bradford. Fletcher,P.C.,Happe,F.,Frith,U.,Baker,S.C.,Dolan,R..,Frackowiak,R.S.J.,&Frith,C.D.(1995).Othermindsinthebrain:Afunctionalimagingstudyof 'theoryofmind'instorycomprehension.Cognition,57,109128. Fodor,J.(1992).Atheoryofthechild'stheoryofmind.Cognition,44,283296. Frey,R.(1997).Generallinguisticcompetencyinthedeaf:Aprerequisitfordevelopingatheoryofmind?UnpublishedPhDdissertation,Universityof Toronto. Gale,E.,deVilliers,P.,deVilliers,J.,&Pyers,J.(1996).Languageandtheoryofmindinoraldeafchildren.InA.Stringfellow,D.CahanaAmitay,E.Hughes,&A. Zukowski(Eds.),ProceedingsoftheBostonUniversityConferenceonlanguagedevelopment(pp.213224).Boston:CascadillaPress. Gopnik,A.,&Astington,J.(1988).Children'sunderstandingofrepresentationalchangeanditsrelationtotheunderstandingoffalsebeliefandtheappearancereality distinction.ChildDevelopment,59,2637. Gopnik,A.,&Graf,P.(1988).Knowinghowyouknow:Youngchildren'sabilitytoidentifyandrememberthesourcesoftheirbeliefs.ChildDevelopment,59, 13661371. Gopnik,A.,&Wellman,H.M.(1994).Thetheorytheory.InL.A.HirschfeldandS.A.Gelman(Eds.),Mappingthemind:Domainspecificityincognitionand culture(pp.257293).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Harris,P.(1992).Fromsimulationtofolkpsychology:Thecasefordevelopment.MindandLanguage,7,120144. Hughes,R.(1928).AhighwindinJamaica.NewYork:Harpers.

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Jenkins,J.,&Astington,J.(1996).Cognitivefactorsandfamilystructureassociatedwiththeoryofminddevelopmentinyoungchildren.DevelopmentalPsychology, 32,7078. Kamawar,D.,&Olson,D.R.(1997,June).Theoryofmindandreferentialopacity.Representationandmeaning.Paperpresentedattheannualmeetingofthe CanadianPsychologicalAssociation,Toronto,Canada. Kainawar,D.,&Olson,D.R.(1998).Children'sunderstandingofevidence.Manuscriptinpreparation. Kripke,S.(1972).Namingandnecessity.InD.Davidson&G.Harman(Eds.),Semanticsofnaturallanguage(pp.254355).Boston:Reidel. Moore,C.,Pure,K.,&Furrow,D.(1990).Children'sunderstandingofthemodalexpressionsofspeakercertaintyanduncertaintyanditsrelationtothe developmentofarepresentationaltheoryofmind.ChildDevelopment,61,722730. Nagel,T.(1974)."Whatisitliketobeabat?"PhilosophicalReview,83,43551. Olson,D.R.(1993).Thedevelopmentofrepresentations:Theoriginsofmentallife.CanadianPsychology,34,293306. Olson,D.R.(1994).Theworldonpaper.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Peskin,J.(1992).Ruseandrepresentation:Onchildren'sabilitytoconcealinformation.DevelopmentalPsychology,28,8489. Poussin,N.(1911).CorrespondencedeNicholasPoussin(C.Jouanny,Ed.).Paris:Ecrits. Quine,W.V.O.(1955).Quanitifiersandpropositionalattitudes.InJ.L.Garfield&M.Kiteley(Eds.),Meaningandtruth:Theessentialreadingsinmodern semantics.NewYork:ParagonHouse. Ramadas,1.(1994).Children'sscientificthinking.Vivek,8,110. Roth,K.,&Anderson,C.(1988).Promotingconceptualchangelearningfromsciencetextbooks.InP.Ramsden(Ed.),Improvinglearning:Newperspectives (pp.109141).London:KoganPage. Sa,W.,&Olson,D.R.(1996).Howdoyouknow?Children'sconceptionofevidence[Mimeo].Toronto,Ontario:InstituteforStudiesinEducation,Universityof Toronto. Searle,J.(1983).Intentionality.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Sellars,W.(1963).Science,perceptionandreality.London:Routledge&KeganPaul. Shapiro,B.L.(1994).Whatchildrenbringtolight:Aconstructivistperspectiveonchildren'slearninginscience.NewYork:TeachersCollegePress. Skinner,B.(1983).Amatterofconsequences:Partthreeofanautobiography.NewYork:AlfredKnopf. Shultz,T.,&Mareschal,D.(1997).Rethinkinginnateness,learning,andconstructivism:Connectionistperspectivesondevelopment.CognitiveDevelopment,12, 563568. Stich,S.(1984).Fromfolkpsychologytocognitivescience.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.

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PARTII COMPARATIVEPERSPECTIVESONINTENTIONALITY

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Chapter10 PrimateRepresentationsandExpectations: MentalToolsforNavigatinginaSocialWorld

MarcD.Hauser HarvardUniversity
Weare,itseemstome,atanobviouscognitiveadvantage,notonlywithrespecttorocksandreflexmachines,butalsowithrespecttoeveryotherkindofcreaturethatwehaveso farencountered....Wearepatentlyfarclevererthananybodyelse,andthatwearecriesoutforanexplanation....[A]goodtheoryofthemindmightreasonablybeexpectedto saywhatitisthat'ssoexceptionallygoodaboutourminds....Ithinkthereismuchtobelearnedfromanaccountofmentalrepresentationthatstressesconnectionsbetween contentandcausation. Fodor(1994,pp.9192)

Thereisaproblemthathasbeenbrewingforthelasttwentyorsoyearsincognitivescience.Itisaproblemthatoriginallyappearedtobelikemotoroilandwater,but hasturnedouttobemorelikemixingexpensiveoliveoilandbalsamicvinegar,asomewhatsolublesolutionwithtastyconsequences.Theprobleminvolvesintegrating theideathatmentalstatesareintentionalwiththeideathatmentalstatesarecomputational(Fodor,1994).Whatiscriticaltobothofthesepositions,butespeciallythe first,isthatmentalstateshavecontent.Representationsofbeliefs,desires,andintentionsarealwaysaboutorforsomethingorsomeone.Ifwewanttodevelopa theoryofmentalstates,therefore,weneedtoworkoutwhatkindsofrepresentationalsystemsarepossiblebecausetheseformthefoundationforthekindsofcontent thatcanbeoperatedonbyourmentalstates,orforthatmatter,anyorganisms'mentalstates(Allen&Bekoff,

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1997Cheney&Seyfarth,1990bDennett,1996Dretske,1995Fodor,1994Millikan,1993). Inthischapter,Iexplorethecontentofprimaterepresentation.TheargumentIdevelopisthatwecanlearnabouttherepresentationsofnonlinguisticcreaturesby creatingsituationsthateitherviolatecertaincoreprinciplesfromwithinthephysicalorpsychologicaldomain,orareconsistentwiththem.Thisargumenthasbeenused instudiesofinfantcognitivedevelopment(Baillargeon,1995Carey&Spelke,1994)withgreatsuccess,andIseenoapriorireasonforthinkingitwouldbe inappropriatelyappliedtootherspecies(Hauser,1997b).Thisisanassumption,onethatwecanreadilytest. Istartwithworkonvocalcommunication,focusingonhowexpectationsarederivedfromthemeaningoftheutteranceproduced.Ithenexaminewhethernonhuman primatesmakeadistinctionbetweenanimateandinanimateobjects,andifso,whethertherepresentationunderlyingthisdistinctioniscalledontopredictobject trajectories.Finally,Iexplorethepossibilitythatprimatesrepresentotherminds,andbasedontheserepresentations,establishexpectationsforsocialinteraction. Communication,Meaning,andExpectations Expectationsabouttheworkingsoftheworldwillbespecifiedinnatelywhenevertherelevantproblemisconfrontedwithsufficientregularitythatallmembersofthe speciesencounteritinthesameway,andinapproximatelythesamewaythattheirancestorsdidbeforethem(Cosmides&Tooby,1994Pinker,1997).Thisisnot tosaythatexperienceplaysnoroleinshapingtherepresentation,butthataninnatemechanismisputinplacethatguidesthekindofexperiencethatanindividual attendsto,aswellasthetimingofsuchattentionalfocus.Forexample,allanimalsarelikelytobeequippedwithsimilarexpectationsaboutthephysicalpropertiesof objects,including:twoobjectscannotoccupythesamespaceatthesametime,objectsfollowspatiotemporallycoherenttrajectoriesastheymove,andobjects adheretotheprinciplesofgravity(Baillargeon,1995Carey&Spelke,1994Hauser&Carey,1998Hood,1995Spelke,1985,1994Spelke,Vishton,&von Hofsten,1995).Suchexpectationsfunctionasimportantguidelinesforthosethatarefurtherconstructedoverthecourseofalifetime,asparticularexperiencesforge causalrelationsbetweenobjects,events,andtheirconsequences.Forinstance,younganimalsresponddifferentlytoanimateandinanimateobjectsintheabsenceof significantexperience(e.g.,sensitivitytofaces,biologicalmotion,artifactualkinds).Duringthecourseofdevelopment,however,theylearnaboutmorespecific aspectsofthisdistinction,includinganunderstandingofdominancerelationships,differ

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entpredatorytypes,andpotentiallyavailable,asopposedtounavailable,matingpartners(Cheney&Seyfarth,1990aGelman,1990Hauser&Carey,1998Leslie, 1994D.Premack,1990D.Premack&A.J.Premack,1995).Developmentallyandevolutionarily,theinterestingcognitivemovecomesfromthecapacitytothink aboutcounterfactualsforagivenexpectation.Inessence,tobeawareofone'sexpectations,ratherthanmerelyguidedbythem,onemustbeabletorunathought experiment,assessinghowcertainkindsofevidenceviolatetheexpectation.Detectingviolationsisafirststep.Understandingwhytheyareviolationsisaleap,one thatourownspeciesmaybealoneintaking.Butthatis,astheysay,anempiricalquestion,onethatwevisitoverthecourseofthischapter. Communicationprovidesausefularenaforexploringthenatureofanimalexpectationsbecausethesignalproducedisdesignedtomanipulatethebehaviorof receivers,whereasreceiversaredesignedtoassesstheveridicalityofthemessageconveyedwithwhattheyexpectinsuchsituations.Whenananimalproducesa signal,itmust,atsomelevel,expectthesignaltoplayafunctionalrole.Weknow,however,fromseveralstudiesofanimalcommunication,thattheconsequencesofa particularsignalareoftenunpredictable,indicatingthatthereisadegreeofuncertaintytoallcommunicativeinteractions(Caryl,1979Dawkins&Krebs,1978Krebs &Dawkins,1984reviewedinHauser,1996).Consequently,therewillbestrongselectiononperceiverstorecognizedishonestmessages,signalsthatviolatecurrent expectations.Thisbringsustothetopicofdeception. Tosaythatoneanimaldeceivedanotheristosaythatthedeceiversetupasituationthatviolatedwhattheotherexpected(Hauser,1997aMitchell,1986).Ifalarm callsaretypicallygivenwheneaglesarearound,thenwhenanalarmcallisproduced,listenerswillexpecttofindaneagle.Ananimalhasbeendeceivedif,onhearing thealarmcallofthedeceiver,theyrespondasiftheeaglewerenearby,wheninfactitisnot.Inthissituation,thelistener'sexpectationshavebeenviolated(Munn, 1986).Ifwearetomakesenseofprimatedeception(Byrne&Whiten,1990Whiten&Byrne,1988),thenweneedtobetterunderstandthemeaningoftheirsignals (Cheney&Seyfarth,1990b).Specifically,whenasignalhasbeenemittedandthendetected,weneedtodeterminethekindsofrepresentationsthataresetup, includinghowsuchrepresentationsleadtoexpectationsaboutaction(D.Premack&Woodruff,1978).Letmedevelopthesepointsfurther. Whathappensinthechildren'sfablewhentheboycries"wolf"butthereisnowolf?Onhearingthefirstcry,thetownspeoplelistenandrespondwithconcernbecause theyclearlyexpectsomekindofdanger.Wolvesareassociatedwithdangerandwhensomeonecriesout"wolf,"itisshorthandfor"danger."Withrepeatedfalse alarmsof"wolf''withoutdangerpublicinterestislost,theorientingresponsedropsfromsight,

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andthechild'scryforhelpfallsondeafears.If,however,anewboycrieswolf,oriftheoldboycries"CrazyIndianJoe,"thentherecertainlywillbearevivalin response.Justbecauseoneboyliesaboutwolvesdoesnotmeanallboyslieaboutwolves.Furthermore,justbecausetheboyliedaboutwolvesdoesnotnecessarily meanthathewilllieaboutallsourcesofdanger,althoughherehewouldcertainlybetreadingonthinice.Thepointthenisthatbecauseourwordshavequitespecific meanings,andbecauselistenersgenerallyexpectanappropriatemappingbetweenwordusage,meaning,andthecurrentstateoftheworld,thereisacritical connectionbetweencommunicationandtruth. Recentplaybackexperimentsonvervetmonkeysandrhesusmacaqueshavetappedintothelogicofthecrywolffable,usingahabituationdiscriminationprocedureto establishhowcallmeaningcausallyconnectswithlistenerexpectations.Invervets,individualsfromonesocialgroupproduceacousticallydistinctivecalls(wrrsand chutters)whentheydetectanothergroup(Struhsaker,1967).Althoughchuttersappeartobegivenbyanimalswhoareslightlymoreaggressivethanthoseproducing wrrs,bothcallsappeartosharethesamegeneralmeaning,somethinglike"aggressiveneighborinview."CheneyandSeyfarth(1988,1990a)designedanexperiment todeterminewhetheranindividualwhounreliablysignaledthepresenceofaneighboringgroupbygivingwrrswouldbeconsideredunreliableaswellifsheswitched tochutters.Similarlyifoneindividualunreliablysignaledthepresenceofaneighboringgroupwithwrrs,andthenanotherindividualwrredorchuttered,would listenersgeneralizeacrosscallersandcalltypes?Resultsshowedthatwhencalleridentitywasheldconstantwithinaplaybacksession,subjectstransferredthelevelof habituationfromwrrstochutters,aswellasfromchutterstowrrs.Thus,ifmonkeyAunreliablyannouncesthepresenceofaneighboringgroupwithwrrs,changingto chuttershaslittleeffectonthelistener'sexpectations.Aisstillunreliable.Incontrast,ifthetesttrialinvolvesashiftincalleridentity,thenlistenersrespond.AlthoughA maybeunreliablewithrespecttoidentifyingthreatsfromaneighboringgroup,listenersapparentlydonotexpectallindividualsinthegrouptobeunreliable. OntheislandofCayoSantiago,PuertoRico,rhesusproduceoneormoreoffiveacousticallydistinctivevocalizationswhentheyfindfood(Hauser&Marler,1993a, 1993b).Threeofthesecalls(warble,harmonicarch,andchirp)aregiventohighqualityrarefooditems,whereastheremainingcalls(cooandgrunt)aregivento lowerqualitycommonfooditemssuchastheprovisionedmonkeychowprovidedeachday.Experimentswereconductedtofurtherclarifythenotionofunreliability justdiscussed,usingthewarble,harmonicarch,andgruntasbothhabituationandteststimulicalleridentitywasheldconstantwithinsessions(Hauser,1998b). Followinghabituationtowarbles,subjectstransferredthelevelof

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habituationtoharmonicarcheseventhoughthesetwocalltypesareacousticallydiscriminable(Fig.10.1).Similarly,followinghabituationtoharmonicarches,they transferredhabituationtowarbles.Theseresultssuggestthatwarblesandharmonicarchesareperceivedbylistenersasconveyingsimilarinformation.Ifanindividual isunreliablycallingaboutthediscoveryofhighqualityrarefood,shiftingfromwarblestoharmonicarchesdoeslittletochangethelistener'sexpectations. Whenwarblesorharmonicarcheswereusedashabituatingstimuli,subjectsrespondedtogruntsinthetesttrial,butthemagnitudeoftheresponsewassmall(Fig. 10.2).Incontrast,whengruntswereusedashabituatingstimuli,themagnitudeoftheresponsetowarblesorharmonicarcheswaslarge.Moregenerally,ifan individualhasbeenunreliablycallingaboutthediscoveryofhighqualityrarefood,ashifttolowqualitycommonfoodismeaningful,butnotthatinteresting.In contrast,having

Fig.10.1. Resultsfromahabituationdiscriminationexperimentusingtherhesusmonkey's highqualityrarefoodcalls.Subjectswerehabituateduntiltheyfailedtorespond (i.e.,looktothespeaker)ontwoconsecutivetrials.(a)Habituationtodifferent exemplarsofthe'harmonicarch'followedbyatestwithoneexemplarofthe warble.Soundspectrogramsofeachcalltypeillustrated.(b)Habituationto differentexemplarsofthewarblefollowedbyatestwithoneexemplarofthe harmonicarch.Meanresponseduration(seconds)andstandarddeviationsshown.

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Fig.10.2. Resultsfromahabituationdiscriminationexperimentusingtherhesusmonkey's highqualityrareandlowqualitycommonfoodcalls.Subjectswerehabituated untiltheyfailedtorespond(i.e.,looktothespeaker)ontwoconsecutivetrials. (a)Habituationtodifferentexemplarsofthegruntfollowedbyatestwithone exemplarofthewarbleorharmonicarch.Soundspectrogramsofeachcalltype illustrated.(b)Habituationtodifferentexemplarsofthewarbleorharmonic archfollowedbyatestwithoneexemplarofthegrunt.Meanresponseduration (seconds)andstandarddeviationsshown.

habituatedtoanindividualcallingaboutlowqualitycommonfood,ashifttohigherqualityrarefoodisnotonlymeaningful,butinteresting. Thehabituationprocedureusedintheseexperimentscreatesananomaloussituation,aviolationofthepresumedexpectationformedbylisteners.Everytimethecallis playedback,theputativereferentorexpectedcontextismissing:intergroupcallswithoutcompetitors,andfoodcallswithoutfood.Giventhatthelistener's expectationshavebeenviolatedduringthehabituationseries,testtrialsaredesignedtodeterminewhetherparticularchangesinastimulusclasswillreinstateinterestin themessageconveyed.Althoughthetesttrialdoes,ofcourse,representanotherviolation,ithasthepotentialtocapture,albeitmomentarily,thesubject'sattention. Andthisissufficienttodeterminewhetherthehabituatingandteststimulidifferinmeaningandthus,differwithrespecttowhatlistenersexpectwhentheyhearsuch calls. AmoreformaltestoftherelationbetweencallmeaningandexpectationhasrecentlybeenconductedbyCheney,Seyfarth,andSilk(1995)usingthevocalizationsof wildbaboonsandanextremelysimple,yeteleganttest.

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Dominantfemalebaboonsoftengruntwhentheyapproachasubordinatemotherandinfant.Inresponse,thesubordinatemotheroftenbarksbackatthedominant female,agestureofsubmission.Thus,thevocalsequence"dominantgrunt subordinatebark"shouldbefamiliar.Incontrast,thesequence"subordinategrunt dominantbark"shouldbeunfamiliarorinconsistentwiththedominancerelationshipsofthecallers.Playbackexperiments,usingtwodifferenttestsequences,wererun toassesswhetherbaboonsgeneratecomparableassessments.Thefirstsequenceconsistedofasubordinategruntfollowedbyadominantbarkthisrepresentsa violationofthetypicalcallorderofbaboonvocalizations.Incontrast,thesecondtestsequence,althoughstartingwith"subordinategrunt dominantbark,"ended withagruntfromamoredominantfemalethisvocalinteractionisnowconsistentwithbaboonsocialrelationshipsbecausethefemale'sbarkistemporallyassociated withthemoredominantfemale'sgruntattheendofthesequence.Subjectsconsistentlylookedlongerinresponsetothefirsttestsequence,suggestingthatbaboons formexpectationsaboutvocalinteractionsbasedonthemeaningofthecall,theidentityofthecaller,andthedominancerelationshipamongtheinteractants. Inallthreeexperiments,theamountoftimespentlookingatthespeakerhasbeenusedasatooltoexplorethenatureofprimaterepresentationandexpectation.Is lookingtimeavalidmeasure?Manyethologistsbelievethatitisoneofmanyvalidmeasures,andsodootherresearchersworkingwithorganismswhoareequally limitedfromalinguisticperspective:humaninfants.Tosupportthisclaim,Inowturntotwootherexperiments,eachdesignedtoprovideamorecompletepictureof therelationbetweenprimaterepresentationandexpectation.InthefinalsectionIreturntothelookingtimemeasureandcriticallyassessitsvalidity. SelfPropelledMotionandAnimacy IntheDisneyanimationAladdin,thereisasegmentoftechnologicalandpsychologicalgenius.AladdinandhismonkeyAbuareinsidethecaveoftreasures. Suddenly,theynoticethatthereisacarpetsneakinguponthemandthenturntoscoldit.Thecarpetsulks,doesanaboutface,andmovesaway.Themovementis dramatic.Withonlytasselsandaflexible"body,"thecarpetslinksaway,apparentlyupsetandhurtbyAladdin'sverbalchastisement.Althoughtheaccompanying musiccertainlyhelps,ourmindsareinevitablyledtointerpretthecarpet'sactionsasintentional,emotional,andgoaldirected.Weofcourseknowthatitisacarpet, butnonethelessautomaticallyattributecomplexemotionsandmentalstates.Andoneoftheprimaryfactorsguidingourattributionsinthiscaseisthecarpet'smotion,in particular,itsselfpropelledmotion.

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Animatorshavelongknownaboutsuchtricks,ofhowtoturnsomethingthatisinanimateintosomethingthatappearsanimate.Inexperimentalpsychology,workby HeiderandSimmel(1944),aswellasMichotte(1962),demonstratedthatadultsattributecausalproperties,includingmentalstates,tosimplegeometricshapesas longastheymoveinaparticularway.Recently,severalcognitivepsychologistshavearguedthatbeforehumaninfantsacquireatheoryofmind,theymustbeableto distinguishbetweenobjectsthatrequireanexternalagenttomoveandthosethatmoveontheirownbecausetheyareselfpropelled(Gelman,1990Leslie,1994D. Premack,1990).Fromanadaptiveperspective,objectsthatareselfpropelledaremoreinterestingthanthosethatarenotbecauseoftheirpotentialforselfinitiated interactionwithotherobjects.ZenonPylyshyn(citedinFodor,1994)capturedthisintuitionwhenhemusedthatrocksaresmarterthancatsbecausetheyhavethe sensetomoveawaywhenkicked.Ofcourse,nothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruth! Todeterminewhetherinfantsgenerateappropriatepredictionsaboutobjectmotion,developmentalistshavereliedontheexpectancyviolationprocedure(Hauser& Carey,1998Spelke,1985).Inparallelwiththeplaybackexperimentsdescribedintheprevioussection,thisprocedureassumesthatifparticipantsdetectaphysical orpsychologicalviolation,thentheywilllooklongerattheeventthanwhenthereisnoviolation.Toremovethepotentialeffectsofnovelty,however,subjectsarefirst habituatedto,orfamiliarizedwith,theobjectsandeventstobedisplayedinthetesttrials.Thisisimportantbecausenoveltyalonecandrivethelookingtimeresponse. ThismethodologicalandconceptualapproachwasimplementedbyGergelyandcolleagues'(Gergely,Ndasdy,Csibra,&Br,1995)experimentswith1yearold humaninfants.Participantswerehabituatedtoananimationthatstartedwithalargeballononeendofatable,asmallballattheotherend,andatallbarrierin betweenthetwoballs(Fig.10.3).Thelargeballpulsatesandthenthesmallballpulsates,givingtheappearanceofaninteraction.Thesmallballthenmovesuptothe barrierandthenrollsback,movesup,rollsback,andsoon.Eventuallyitapproachesthebarrierandhopsover,rollingtojointhelargeball.Onceparticipants habituatetothisdisplay,theyareexposedtoarandomlyrepeatingsequenceoftesttrials.Bothtesttrialsconsistofthesametwoballs,butnowthebarrierhasbeen removed.Theonlydifferencebetweenthetwotesttrialsisthatinone,theballrepeatsthesamepatternoflocomotionasinthehabituationtrial(eventhoughthereis nolongerabarriertohopover)whereasintheother,thesmallballrollsstraightovertothelargeball.Thefirsttestsequenceishighlyfamiliar,andshouldbeexpected ifparticipantsarepredictingthatthesmallballwillalwaysfollowthesamepathnomatterwhatthepathislike(i.e.,independentlyofthebarrier).Incontrast,the secondsequenceshouldbeexpectedifparticipantspredict

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Fig.10.3. MethodologyusedbyGergelyetal.(1995)totestforhumaninfants' understandingofobjectmotionandintentionality.Participantswere firsthabituated(toprow)tothesequenceshown.Thentheywere presentedwitheitheran"irrational"sequence,representingaviolationof presumedexpectations,ora"rational"sequence,representinganonviolation.

thatthesmallballwillpursuetheshortestpathtoitstarget(i.e.,thelargeball).Inotherwords,becausethebarrierhasbeenremoved,rollingstraightaheadshouldbe expected.Infantsconsistentlylookedlongerwhenthesmallballrepeatedthemotiondisplayedinthehabituationseries,eventhoughthealternativepatternofmotion wasnovel. Gergelyandcolleaguessuggestthatbytheageof1year,infantsidentifyobjectsasrationalorirrationalbasedonthepatternsofmotiontheyperceive.Thus,intheir animations,thesmallballisactingirrationallywhenitappearstojumpoveraninvisiblebarrier,butrationallywhenitfollowsastraightpath.Thishypothesis,although conceptuallyfascinating,isunderminedbytheavailabilityofasimplerinterpretation,onethatconsidersinfantstobequitesophisticatedwhenitcomestopredictingan object'sgoals,butnotwhenitcomestopredictinganobject'sbeliefs(D.Premack&A.J.Premack,1997a,1997b).Thus,thesmallballisgoaldirectedandsimply takestheshortestpathtoitsgoal,thelargeballsitting

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attheotherendofthetable.Underthisscenario,whichthePremackshavedevelopedinfargreaterdetail,infantsarehighlysensitivetothepatternsofobjectmotion, usingthemasguidelinesformakinginferencesaboutgoalsandpossibly,emotions. Atsomelevel,allanimalsmusteventuallycarveacategoricaldivisionbetweenobjectsthatareselfpropelledandthosethatarenot.Thequestionis,atwhatleveland when?Inowturntoaseriesofexperimentsdesignedtoaddressthisproblem. Anexpectancyviolationprocedurewassetupusingcaptivecottontoptamarinsassubjects(Hauser,1998a).AlthoughthisNewWorldmonkeyspeciesismore distantlyrelatedtousthanvervets,rhesus,orbaboons(allOldWorldmonkeys),wewerelessconcernedwiththeestablishmentofhomologiesthanwiththe conditionsthatfavoraparticularcognitiveprocess.Inparticular,theexperimentwasdesignedtoassesswhetherthekindofobjectatamarinperceives,andthen representsinmemoryasitmovesoutofsight,affectsthekindsofexpectationsgeneratedwithrespecttoobjectmovementordisplacement. Subjectswerefirstpresentedwiththetestapparatus,atwochamberedboxseparatedbyapartitionthecenterofthepartitionwascutout,providingapassageway fromonesidetotheother.Thetamarinswereallowedtoenterandexplorethetestboxbeforetheexperimentcommenced.Asessionstartedwithfourfamiliarization trials,designedtoremovetheeffectsofnovelty(Fig.10.4).Infamiliarizations1and2,subjectswatchedasanobjectwasloweredintoonechamberandlookingtime scoredduringa10secondperiod.Infamiliarizations3and4,subjectswatchedasanobjectwasloweredbehindascreenintoonesideofthetestbox.Whenthe screenwasremoved,lookingtimewasscoredduringa10secondperiodtheobjectalwaysappearedonthesamesidethatitwasplaced.Innoneofthese familiarizationtrialsdidsubjectsseethetestobjectpassfromonechambertotheotherthroughthewindowinthecenterpartition.Havingreceivedallfour familiarizationtrials,subjectswerepresentedwithtwotesttrials.Intesttrial1,anobjectwasloweredintoonechamberandthenthescreenputinplace,blockingthe tamarin'sviewoftheobjectandtestbox.Afterapproximately5seconds,thescreenwasremovedrevealingtheobjectinthesamechamber.Testtrial2wassimilar, exceptthattheobjectappearedintheoppositechamberwhenthescreenwasremoved.Bothtesttrialsrequirethetamarinstogenerateanexpectationaboutthe object'slocationbeforethescreenisremoved.Onlythesecondtest,however,representsapotentialviolationofexpectancy.Specifically,onlyobjectsthatcanmove ontheirownhavethepotentialtotravelfromtheoriginalchambertotheoppositeone. Inthefirstexperiment,wecontrastedthetamarins'lookingtimeresponses(calculatedoutofatotalof10seconds)toalivemouseanda

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Fig.10.4. Methodologyusedtotestforthecottontoptamarins' understandingofobjectmotionfollowingocclusionfromview. Allsubjectswerepresentedwiththefourfamiliarizationtrials illustratedthemouseisillustratedhere,butallfamiliarization trialswerethesamefortheotherobjectsexceptthattheclay ballwasrolledintothechamber.Subjectsthenreceivedtwo testtrials,counterbalancedfororderofpresentation.

clusterofFrootLoops ,thechildren'sbreakfastcerealthetamarinshaveseenmicebeforeandreceiveFrootLoopsasfoodrewardsinotherexperiments.If tamarinsarelikeus,theyshouldexpecttheFrootLoopstoremainintheoriginalchamber,ratherthanmoveontheirowntotheoppositechamber.Consequently,they shouldlooklongerintest2thanintest1.Incontrast,becausemicecanmoveontheirown,thereshouldbenodifferenceinlookingtimebetweentests1and2. Resultsshowedthatonthefirstfamiliarizationtrial,lookingtimewaslongerinresponsetothemousethantotheFrootLoops(Fig.10.5a).Thismakessensesincethe mouseisaliveandmoves,whereastheFrootLoopsareneitheralivenordotheymove.Bythefourthfamiliarizationtrial,however,therewerenodifferencesin lookingtimebetweenthemouseandFrootLoops.Intest1,whenboththemouseandFrootLoopsstayedintheoriginalchamber,therewasnodifferenceinlooking timefromthefinalfamiliarizationtrial.Similarly,therewasnodifferenceinlookingtimewhenthemouseappearedintheoppositechamberfromwhichitwasoriginally placed(test2).However,whentheFrootLoopsappearedintheoppositechamber,therewasastatisticallysignificantincreaseinlookingtime.Theseresultssuggest thatthepatternofmovementobservedforthemousewasexpected,thatitsappearanceinanovelloca

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Fig.10.5. Resultsfromtestsonobjectmotionfollowingocclusion. (a)TestsinvolvingalivemouseandaclusterofFrootLoops.(b) Testsinvolvinganexternallypropelledclayballandaselfpropelled clayface.(c)TestsinvolvingaliveIndonesiantreefrogandfurrytoy monkeythatvibratedinplace.Opensymbolsrefertocaseswherethe objectremainedintheoriginallocationclosedsymbolsrefertocases wheretheobjectappearedtomovefromitsoriginallocationtothe oppositechamberofthebox.Meanlookingtime(yaxis)wasscored framebyframeandthenconvertedtosecondsstandarddeviations shown.Plevelsindicatedinparentheses.

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tionfollowingocclusionfromviewwasconsistentwiththetamarins'expectations.Incontrast,whentheFrootLoopsappearedtomovebehindthescreen,thelooking timedatasuggestthatthetamarins'expectationswereviolated.AlthoughthetamarinsareclearlymakingadistinctionbetweenthemouseandFrootLoops,thenature ofthisdistinctionisunclear.Consequently,theconnectionbetweenobjectrepresentationandexpectationremainsunclear. Toreducethenumberoffactorsthatcouldbeguidingthetamarins'expectations,fourmoreconditionswererun.Thefirsttwoinvolvedacontrastbetweenaballof claypropelledintoonechamberbyahumanexperimenterandaclayfacethatcouldmoveonitsownduetoamagnetembeddedinsideandasecondmagnet concealedbelowtheboxandoperatedbyahiddenexperimentertheclayfacewasdefinitionallyselfpropelledbecauseitalwaysmovedfromarestingpositionandin theabsenceofanexternalagent.Althoughtheclayballmoved,thetamarins'responsesuggestedthattheydidnotexpectittobeintheoppositechamber.Specifically, lookingtimedroppedfromthefirsttothefourthfamiliarizationandstayedlowwhentheclayballappearedintheoriginalchamberduringthetesttrial(Fig.10.5b). Whentheclayballappearedintheoppositechamber,however,lookingtimeincreasedsignificantly.Interestingtonote,thesamepatternofresultswereobtainedfor theclayface,anunanticipatedfindinggiventhattheobjectwasselfpropelledandthus,couldreadilymovefromonechambertotheother. Giventhatthetamarins'expectationswerenotdeterminedbyselfpropelledmotionalone,twofinalconditionswererun.Specifically,wewereinterestedintestingthe hypothesisthattamarinsgeneratedifferentexpectationsaboutanimateandinanimateobjects.Ifthishypothesisiscorrect,thanallanimateobjectsshouldbeclustered intoonecategoryandallinanimateobjects,includingthosethatmoveontheirown,shouldbeclusteredintoadifferentcategory.Thetwofinalobjectswerean Indonesiantreefrogandafurrytoymonkeythatmovedinplace.Thetreefrogobviouslylookeddifferentfromthemouse,butimportantly,alsomoveddifferently, takingadvantageofallthreeplanesofthechamber.Thetoymonkeyappearedmoreanimatethantheclayface,butratherthanmovingonitsownaroundthechamber walls,itmerelyvibratedinplace.AspointedoutbyD.PremackandA.J.Premack(1995),althoughtheobjectisselfpropelled,itisnotgoaldirected,andthus, shouldleadobserverstodifferentexpectations. Thetamarinsrespondedtothefroginthesamewaythattheyrespondedtothemouse(Fig.10.5c).Followingfamiliarization,lookingtimestayedthesameor decreasedslightlyinresponsetothefrogappearingineithertheoriginalortheoppositechamberofthetestbox.Incontrast,lookingtimeincreasedwhenthefurrytoy monkeyappearedintheoppositechamber,butstayedthesamewhenitappearedintheoriginalchamber.

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Theseexperimentsrepresentonlyafirststepinourunderstandingoftherelationbetweenobjectrepresentationandthegenerationofexpectationsconcerning displacement,especiallygiventherelativelysmallnumberofstimuliusedineachobjectcategory.Tamarinsappeartosetupdifferentexpectationsdependingon whethertheobjectisanimateorinanimate.Ifanobjectisanimate,theyapparentlyassumethatitcanmoveonitsown.Incontrast,evenifanobjectisselfpropelled, butinanimate,theydonotexpectittomovetoanewlocationwhenoutofsight.Thereareseveralremainingpuzzles,however.Forexample,whatkindsof expectationsdotheyformforanimmobile,butanimateobject,somethinglikeananesthetizedmouse?Whataboutananimateobjectthatalwaysmovesawayfrom thepartitionwhenplacedinthetestbox?Inthiscase,subjectswitnessanobjectwithanimacy,selfpropelledmotion,andgoaldirectedness.Butifitsgoalistorunto thewalloppositethepartition,thenfollowingocclusion,itwouldbesurprisingtoseetheobjectintheoppositechamber.Conversely,whatexpectationswouldbe generatedforaninanimateobjectthatonlymovestowardthecenterpartition,andthus,appearstohaveasitsgoalmovingtotheotherchamber?Finally,dotamarins generateexpectationsfrommotionthatisrelatedtoparticulartypesofgoals?Forexample,ifanobservertamarinwitnessedanactortamarinenteraboxwithboth desirablefoodandaplasticcube,theobservershouldexpecttheactortoremovethefoodbutleavethecubealone.Conversely,ifaballrolledintothebox,one wouldexpectboththefoodandcubetoremaininplace.Suchobservationswouldindicatethatthetamarinsgenerategoalappropriateexpectationsaboutother animateobjects,perhapsespecially,membersoftheirownspecies.Recentexperimentsbymygraduatestudent,LaurieSantos(1997),providesomesupportfor thesepredictions. ExpectationsaboutMentalStates Acentralproblemincurrentstudiesofcognitivedevelopmentandcognitiveevolutioniswhenthechildacquiresthecapacityforattributingmentalstates,aswellas whenthehumanspeciesacquiredit.Asseveralchaptersinthisvolumepointout,therearedifferentcomponentstothisproblem,withdifferentdevelopmentaland evolutionarytrajectories(BaronCohen,1995Carruthers&Smith,1996Gopnik&Meltzoff,1997Leslie,1994Whiten,1994).WhatIfocusoninthislastsection isamethodologicalpointthatmayhavesignificantconceptualramificationsforresearchonmentalstateattributioninhumansandanimals. Mostexperimentalworkonprimateshasfailedtofindconvincingevidenceofmentalstateattribution(Cheney&Seyfarth,1990a,1990bHeyes,

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1998Povinelli&Eddy,1996D.Premack&Woodruff,1978Tomasello&Call,1997forpotentialexceptions,seeGomez,1998Whiten,inpress).Incontrast, observationsfromthelabandfieldsuggestthatprimates,especiallythegreatapes,readilyengageinbehaviorsthatappeartorequiremindreading(Byrne&Whiten, 1990Cheney&Seyfarth,1990a).Asseveralauthorshaveargued(Cheney&Seyfarth,1990aHeyes,1998Povinelli,1993Tomasello&Call,1997Whiten,in press),however,otherexperimentsareneededbeforeweclosethedooronthischapterofthehumanevolutionstory.Tothisend,workinourlabhaspickedupthe threadfromworkonhumaninfantsandchildren,usingtheexpectancyviolationprocedureasatool.Onepotentialadvantageofthisprocedureoverpreviously publishedstudiesoftheoryofmindinprimatesisthatitinvolvesnotraining,andthus,iscomparabletostudiesrunonhumanchildrenforarecentdiscussionofthis point,andacomparablesetofexperiments,seeGomez(1998)andWhiten(inpress). TheclassictheoryofmindtestisWimmerandPerner's(1983)falsebeliefprocedure.Althoughthistasktypicallyrequireslanguage,arecentsetofstudiesby ClementsandPerner(1994Perner&Clements,inpress)suggestanotherrouteintothechild'sknowledge.Specifically,inthefirstexperiments,ClementsandPerner ranseveralversionsoftheSallyAnnepuppetshow(Wimmer&Perner,1983).InadditiontoaskingthechildaboutSally'ssearchpatterns,theyalsofilmedthechild's eyes.Thekeyfindingwasthat3yearoldslookedtothecorrectboxfirst,butthenverballyindicatedthewrongbox.Thatis,theylookedtotheboxwhereSallyleft herball,butthenreportedthatshewouldsearchintheoppositebox,theonewhereAnneplacedit.Basedontheseresults,andaseriesoffollowupexperiments, ClementsandPernersuggestedthatattheageof3years,children'snonverbalresponses(eyegaze,reaching)indicateimplicitunderstandingoffalsebeliefs.Itisnot until4years,however,thattheyhaveanexplicitunderstandingasrevealedbytheirlinguisticresponses.Althoughitisunclearwhethertheimplicitexplicitdistinction representsthemostappropriateaccountofthedata,onepointisclear:Thechild'seyesrevealsomethingdifferentfromhervoice.Andgiventhattheeyesreveal somethingaboutwhatthechildknowsorexpects(D.Premack&A.J.Premack,1995),wenowhaveatooltousewithnonhumanprimates,andforthatmatter,any nonhumananimalthatwillsitandwatchadisplay. Atestusingthelogicoftheexpectancyviolationprocedurewasrunwith10adultcottontoptamarins(Hauser&Santos,1998).Theaimofthisexperimentwasfirst, tofollowthekeydesignelementsoftheSallyAnnetest,andsecond,todeterminewhethertamarinsformdifferentexpectationsabouthumanactionbasedonwhat theyandthehumanactorappeartoknowknowledgeinthissituationmaycomefromattributingmentalstates,fromtrackingbehavioralcontingencies,orfromsome com

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binationoftheseandotherfactors.TheexperimentalroomconsistedofaPlexiglastestboxwithatamarinsubject,atablewithtwoboxes,ahumanexperimenter,and ahumanactor(Fig.10.6a)avideocamerafilmedthetamarin'sfaceandthus,thevisualrecordofthetrialexcludedinformationabouttheconditionandobjects displayed.Lookingtimewasscoredoutofa10secondperiod.Twoobserversscoredthetapesusingframebyframeanalyses,andachievedaninterobserver reliabilityscoreof0.92. Inallthreeconditionsofthefirstexperiment,theactorwalkedintotheroom,satdownatatablewithaboxoneachside,tookthreebitesfromanappleandthen handedapieceofappletothetamarin.Theactorthenplacedtheappleintooneoftheboxes.InconditionA,theboxeswere

Fig.10.6. Lookingtimeexperimentofexpectedaction.(a)Experimental setupforthetest.(b)Meanlookingtime(seconds)resultsfromfirst experiment:conditionA(transparentbox,actorleavesroomduringapple transfer),conditionB(opaquebox,actorleavesroomduringappletransfer), andconditionC(opaquebox,actorstaysinroomduringappletransfer) standarddeviationsshown.(c)Meanlookingtimeresultsfromsecond experiment:conditionA(opaquebox,actorstaysinroombutturnshis backduringappletransfer),conditionB(opaquebox,actorstaysinroom andcloseshiseyesduringappletransfer),andconditionC(transparentbox, actorleavesroomduringappletransfer).Opensymbolsrefertotrialswhere theactor'ssearchpatternsshouldbeconsideredexpectedbasedoneitherhis currentbeliefsorhisprioractions.Closedsymbolsrefertotrialswherethe actor'ssearchpatternsshouldbeconsideredunexpected.

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transparent,exceptforaredcapononeandabluecapontheother.Aftertheactorplacedtheapplein,forexample,theredbox,helefttheroom.Whileoutofthe room,theexperimenterremovedtheapplefromtheredboxandplaceditintheblueboxacrosssubjects,wevariedthesideandboxinwhichtheapplewasfirst placed.Theactorthenreturnedtotheroom,satdown,andsearchedineithertheredorbluebox.Althoughtheactorfailedtowitnesstheapple'stransfer,theapple's currentlocationisunambiguousgiventhetransparencyoftheboxes.Therearethreepossibleoutcomesforthiscondition.First,iftamarinsaresimplyinterestedinthe apple,thentheymightbeexpectedtolooklongerwhentheactorsearchesintheblueboxbecausethissearchpatternismostlikelytoleadtofood.Second,ifthe tamarinshaveformedanexpectationaboutwheretheactorwillsearch,inferringfrompreviousbehaviorthathewillgotowheretheapplenowis(i.e.,thebluebox), thenlookingtimeshouldbehighestwhentheactorsearchesintheredboxaviolationoftheirexpectationsthesamepatternwouldalsoemergeifthetamarins attributebeliefstotheactor.Finally,tamarinsmaylookequallylonginresponsetobothsearchoutcomes,possiblyfordifferentreasons.Resultsfailedtoreveala statisticallysignificantdifferencebetweenthetwotesttrialsofthiscondition(Fig.10.6b). InconditionsBandC,opaqueboxes(oneorange,onepink),replacedthetransparentones.InconditionB,theactorlefttheroomafterplacingtheapplein,for example,theorangebox.Inhisabsence,theexperimentertransferredtheappletothepinkbox.Theactorreturnedandeithersearchedintheorangeboxorinthe pinkbox.UsingthesamelogicasforconditionAabove,ifthetamarinissimplyinterestedintheapple'slocation,thentheyshouldlooklongerwhentheactorsearches inthepinkboxthispredictionassumesthatthetamarinpaysnoattentiontowhattheactorcanseeduringthetestsession.Thesamepatternoflookingmay,however, emergeiftamarinsgenerateexpectationsabouttheactor'sgoals.Specifically,theactorshouldsearchintheorangeboxbecauseheleftitthere,andhasnoknowledge thatitwastransferredtothepinkbox.Therefore,whentheactorsearchesinthepinkbox,thetamarin'sexpectationshouldbeviolated.Finally,thetamarinsmay shownodifferenceinlookingtimebecausebothsearchpatternsareequallyinterestingorequallyuninteresting.Resultsshowedthatthetamarinsconsistentlylooked longerwhentheactorsearchedintheboxcurrentlyholdingtheapple,eventhoughhecouldnotpossiblyknowthattheapplehadbeenmovedthere(Fig.10.6b).To reiterate,thispatternispredictedonthebasisofboththetamarin'sinterestintheapple,inadditiontothefactthattheactorsearchedinanunexpectedlocationgiven thattheyfailedtoseethetransfer.ConditionCwasthesameasBexceptthattheactorstayedintheroomandwatchedastheexperimentertransferredtheapple fromoneboxtotheother.Withrespecttopredictions,thisconditionparallels,to

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someextent,conditionA.Specifically,ifthetamarinssimplywanttheapple,thentheyshouldlooklongerwhentheactorsearchesintheboxwheretheapplenowis, ratherthanwhereitwas.Incontrast,ifthetamarinsthinkthattheactorwillsearchintheboxcurrentlyholdingthapplebecausehesawthetransfer,thensearchingin theoriginalboxrepresentsaviolation.Thus,theonlydifferencebetweenconditionsBandCisthatinC,theactorwitnessestheapple'stransferandinBhedoesnot. Resultsshowedthatthetamarinsconsistentlylookedlongerwhentheactorsearchedintheoriginalbox,theboxwithoutanapple(Fig.10.6b).Thisresultappearsto ruleoutthepossibilitythattamarinssimplylooklongerwhentheactorsearchesintheboxholdingtheapple,independentlyofhisprioractions.Thedifferencesin lookingtimenotedwerestatisticallysignificantusingbothparametricandnonparametrictests. GiventhesignificantdifferencesobtainedinconditionsBandC,itwasimportanttodeterminethefactorsthatmightcausetamarinstofail,andtodeterminemore preciselythebasisforthetamarins'expectations.ResultsfromPovinelliandEddy's(1996)workonchimpanzees,CheneyandSeyfarth's(1990a,1990b)studiesof macaques,andsomeofourownunpublishedworkwiththetamarins(Santos,1997)suggestthatprimatesmaynotunderstandthedistinctionbetweenseeingand knowing,eventhoughtheydofollowthedirectionofeyegaze.WethusrerantwodifferentversionsofconditionC.Inthefirst,theactorplacedtheappleinthe orangeboxandthenturnedaround180degreessothathisbackfacedthetamarins.Theapplewasthentransferredbytheexperimentertothepinkbox,theactor turnedaround,andthensearchedineithertheoriginalorangebox,orthepinkboxholdingtheapple.Inthesecondversion,theactorplacedtheappleintheorange boxandthenclosedhiseyesastheexperimentertransferredtheappletothepinkbox.Theactoropenedhiseyesandsearchedfortheappleinoneofthetwoboxes. Inaddition,weranthetransparentboxcondition(A)again,butafterthebackturnedandeyesclosedconditionsouraimherewastodeterminewhetherthelackofa significantdifferenceinthepreviousrunwasduetoaceilingeffect,correspondingtothefirsttwotrialsofthesession.Innoneoftheseconditionsdidwefinda significantdifferenceinlookingtimebetweentests,althoughtherewasaslighttendencyinthetransparentboxconditionforsubjectstolooklongeronthetestinwhich theactorsearchedinthevisiblyemptybox(Fig.10.6c). Howarewetointerpretthesefindings?LetusstartwithconditionsBandCofthefirstexperiment,leavingasidethetransparentboxcondition.Torepeat,theonly criticaldifferencebetweentheseconditionswaswhethertheactorwaspresentorabsentwhentheexperimentertransferredtheapplefromoneboxtotheother. Althoughtheactor'ssearchpatternswerealwaysthesame,lookingintheboxwhereheplacedtheappleorthealternative,

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thetamarinsshowedstrikinglydifferentlookingtimesbetweenconditionsBandC.InconditionB,theactorshouldexpecttofindtheappleintheboxwherehe placedit.Heshouldthussearchinthisbox.However,becausetheexperimentermovedtheappleinhisabsence,theactorholdsafalsebelief.Incontrast,theactor witnessesthetransferinconditionC,andthusshouldalterhisbeliefabouttheapple'slocation.Here,wehaveinterpretedtheactor'sbehaviorintermsofhismental states,histrueandfalsebeliefs.Thetamarins'lookingtimeresponsesinconditionsBandCofExperiment1areconsistentwithsuchaninterpretation,butthereareat leasttwoalternativeaccounts,eachimputingdifferentcomputationalcapacities. Letusrerunthevideoontheexperiment.Hereiswhatthetamarinsees.Anactorenterstheroomandplacestheappleinonebox.InconditionBheleaves.Whenhe returns,aplausibleexpectationwouldbefortheactortoreturntotheboxthatwaslastattendedtoandphysicallyactedon,inthiscase,theboxwhereheleftthe apple.Similarly,inconditionC,heshouldsearchintheboxthatwaslastattendedtoandphysicallyactedon,butinthiscase,itistheboxthatholdstheapplebecause theexperimentermoveditwhiletheactorwatched.Iftheactorsearchesinadifferentbox,thenthiscreatesamismatchbasedontheactor'spriorattentionaland behavioralfocus,nothismentalstates.Inbothcases,expectationsareformed,buttheyarederivedfromcuesthataredirectlyobservablethiscontrastswiththe humanadult'scapacitytogenerateexpectationsbasedonunobservablementalstates.ForconditionsBandCofthefirstexperimentthen,wecannotdistinguish betweenamentalisticinterpretationandabehavioristicone.Wearenowintheprocessofrunningasecondsetofexperimentswhereattentionalandbehavioralcues aregenerallyruledout.Specifically,aftertheactorplacestheappleinonebox,hephysicallytouchesandlooksatbothboxesbeforetheappleistransferred.Thus, thetamarinscannolongerusetheactor'slastattentionalorbehavioralfocustogenerateexpectationsaboutsubsequentactions. Inthesecondsetofexperiments,theactorfailstowitnesstheapple'stransfereitherbecausehisbackisturnedorbecausehiseyesareclosed.Underthese conditions,therearenosignificantdifferencesinlookingtimebetweentesttrials.Ifthetamarinsweresimplyusingtheactor'sattentionalorbehavioralfocuspriorto theapple'stransfer,thentheyshouldhavelookedlongerwhenhesearchedintheboxcurrentlyholdingtheapplethisisthesamepredictionaswemadeforcondition Bofexperiment1.Inbothtests,theactorattendstoandtouchestheboxwhereheplacedtheapplepriortoclosinghiseyesorturninghisback.Ifthetamarinsuse theactor'sattentionorbehaviortopredictsubsequentaction,thensearchingintheboxwheretheapplenowisrepresentsamismatch.Furtherworkistherefore neededtoclarifytheroleofeyegaze,asopposedtoactioncuesprovidedbytheheadandeyes.

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Thetransparentboxconditionisdifficulttointerpret.Aceilingeffectduetoorderofpresentationisreallynotlikely,giventhatthesamegeneralpatternswereobtained whenthisconditionwasrunfirstinthesessionaswellaslast.Furthermore,subjectsdidnotlookfortheentire10secondobservationperiod.Whatisclear,and somewhatsurprising,isthatsubjectslookedaslongwhentheactorsearchedintheemptyboxaswhenhelookedintheboxwiththeapple.Giventhattheactor previouslyhandedthetamarinsomeapple,searchinginthetransparentboxwiththeappleiscertainlyofinterest.Incontrast,wecanonlyguesswhythetamarinsmight beinterestedintheactor'ssearchintotheemptybox.Specifically,thisrepresentsaviolationofwhattheactorismeanttobelookingfor,eitherbecauseofhisbeliefs orbecauseofhispriorattentionalandbehavioralfocus.Atpresent,wecannotresolvethisproblem. Tosummarize,IarguethatExperiment1showsthatthetamarinsformsomeexpectationsaboutahumanactor'sgoals.Thisconclusiondepends,ofcourse,onthe abilitytomakeinferencesaboutanindividual'sexpectationsfromthelookingtimemeasure.Whentheactorisoutoftheroom,theyexpectonething,andwhenheis intheroomandtrackingthemovementoftheapple,theyexpectanother.InExperiment2,however,therewerenodifferencesacrosstests.Theseconditions(back turned,eyesclosed)areintermediatebetweenthosepresentedinthefirstexperimentinthattheactorispresent,butnottrackingthemovementoftheapple.I tentativelyconcludewithacommentaboutthedifferencebetweenexpectationandbelief.Thecontentofanexpectationissimplytherelationbetweensomecontextor condition(anappleplacedinabox),anactionorevent(experimentertransfersappletonewboxinactor'sabsence),andapredictableoutcome(actorsearchingin boxwhereheleftapple).Assuch,expectationsdifferimportantlyfrombeliefsinthattheylackexplicitpropositionsastheircontent(''theappleisinthepinkbox") beliefsdonotdependonactionsorconsequences,althoughonecancertainlysetthemupinthisway(e.g.,"BecauseIlefttheappleinthepinkbox,IbelievethatI willfinditthereifIsearch").Giventhisdistinction,webelievethatourexperimentsprovideevidencethattamarinsgeneratecorrectexpectationsaboutanactor's behaviorbasedoncoarsegrainedcuesassociatedwithknowledge,betheyattentionalorbehavioral.Thesetestsaresilent,however,aboutmentalstatessuchas beliefs. ExpectancyViolation,LookingTime,andKnowledge ReturningtothequotetakenfromhisbookTheElmandtheExpert,Fodor(1994)attemptstodetailwhatmakesourmindssoclever,dividinghistaskintoan analysisofinformationalsemantics,conceptualcontent,mentalstates,andcausality.ItwouldbefoolishtodebateFodor'sevolutionary

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pointaboutourmentalsophistication.Howcouldanyonedisagree?Rather,theinterestingchallengeistoworkouttheextenttowhichhumansandnonhumansdiffer withrespecttothecausalrelationsbetweenrepresentationandexpectation.Inthisessay,IhavediscusseddatafromthreeempiricaldomainsthatIbelievebearon thisissue,andthataddtothegrowingliteratureinthearea(e.g.,Cheney&Seyfarth,1990bPovinelli,1993Tomasello&Call,1997Whiten,1994).Iendwitha fewconceptualandmethodologicalcomments. WhatIhaveargued,anddefendedusingdifferentkindsofempiricalfindings,isthatwecanlearnagreatdealaboutanimalrepresentationbylookingatthekindsof eventsthatviolatetheirexpectations.Thisisnotanewidea.Yearsago,DavidPremack(1986)raisedtheintriguingpossibilitythatanantmightfinditoddtoseeaball rolloffatableandthenshootstraighttotheceiling.Althoughabitheretical,onemightevenarguethattheSkinneriansforesawthisideaindescribingthebehaviorof pigeonsthatdeveloped"superstitious"responseswhenreinforcedunderacompletelyrandomschedule.Weretheylookingforsomethingthatwasconsistentwith reinforcement,somethingthatcouldbeexpected,predicted?Independentlyoftheirsignificance,theconnectionbetweenexpectationandrepresentationhasonly recentlybeenputtoexperimentaltestusingtheexpectancyviolationprocedureasacriticaltool. ASkinnerianmightleapupandarguethatwhatIhavereferredtoasrepresentationandexpectationismerelyastimulusresponseconnection.Consider,asone example,theexperimentonobjectdisplacementfollowingocclusion.Whatweneedtoexplainiswhy,whentheobjecthasapparentlymovedfromonechamberto theother,lookingtimeislongerforsomeobjectsbutnotothers.Onthestimulusresponseaccount,onemightarguethatforsomeobjects,movementtoanovel locationhasbeenobserved.AlthoughallobjectsexceptthemouseandFrootLoopswerenovel,perhapsthetamarinssimplygeneralizedtootherobjects.Whatis mostinteresting,ofcourse,istheprocessofgeneralization,especiallyintheabsenceoftraining.Inparticular,whatfeatureswereusedtoclusterthemouseandfrog intoonecategoryandalltheotherobjectsintoanother?Simplefeaturessuchascolor,shape,andtextureclearlyfailtoaccountforthelookingtimedata.Sotoodo othermorecomplexpropertiessuchasmotionorevenselfpropelledmotion.Theclayfacewasselfpropelledbutthetamarinslookedlongerwhenitappearedinthe novelchamber.Althoughconsiderablymoreworkisnecessary,theresultssuggestthatananimateinanimatedistinctionunderliesthedifferencesinlookingtime.This distinctionisconceptuallyabstractanditisunclearontheSkinnerianaccounthowitwouldbeconstructedorusedtopredictobjectlocation. Acriticalassumptionunderlyingtheworkpresentedhereisthatthelookingtimemeasuretellsussomethingimportantaboutwhatanorganism

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knows,andmorespecifically,howitusessuchknowledgetogenerateexpectations.Theproblemlies,ofcourse,inworkingoutthenatureofsuchknowledge.In someexperiments,longerlooksindicatethattheorganismhasdetectedaviolation,whereasinotherexperimentsitindicatesthattheorganismhasdetectedapossible orconsistentevent.Letmeillustratewithafewexamples.InseveralexperimentsbyKuhlandMeltzoff(1988),gazedirectionandlookingtimearescoredwhile infantsarepresentedwithinformationfromtwomodalities.Forexample,when3montholdsseetwofacesonamonitorproducingarticulatorygestureswhilea speakerplaysonesound,infantslooktothefacethatisarticulatingthesoundplayedinessence,theylookforanaudiovisualmatch.Whenaninfantsucksona pacifierwithaparticularconfiguration,theylooklongeratthepacifierthatmatchesthisconfigurationthanonesthatdonot(Meltzoff&Borton,1979).Inan experimentbyDodd(1979),infantslookedlongerwhenatalkingfacewassynchronizedtothevoicetrackthanwhenitwasdesynchronizedinfact,infantstendedto lookawayfromtheasynchronousdisplay.Similarly,infantswilllooklongerwhenthenumberofdotsonascreenmatchesthenumberoftonespresented,orwhenthe soundofabouncingballhittingasurfaceissynchronizedtoananimatedsequenceofabouncingball(Spelke,1979Starkey&Cooper,1980Starkey,Spelke,& Gelman,1990). Incontrasttomoststudiesofcrossmodalperception,studiesthatfocusonasinglemodalitytendtofindthatinfantslooklongerwhenaviolation(i.e.,mismatch)has beendetected.Atpresent,itisunclearwhethersuchapparentdifferencesbetweenuniandmultimodalstudiesarereal,andifso,whattheunderlyingmechanismsare. Themainpoint,however,isthatlookingtimeisbeingusedtoinferdifferentkindsofknowledgeorunderstanding. Inadditiontodifferencesintheinterpretationoflookingtimedataaredifferencesbetweenstudiesusinglookingtimeasopposedtosomeotherresponseassay, typicallyoneinvolvingamotorresponsesuchasreaching.Thus,avarietyofexpectancyviolationexperimentshavesuggestedthatinfantsunderstandobject permanenceatafarearlieragethanrevealedbyreachingprocedures(Baillargeon,1995).AsGopnikandMeltzoff(1997)argued,however,itisunclearwhetherthe differenceliesinwhatthechildknowsorwhattheexperimentiscapableofextracting,orsomecombinationofthetwo.Theseproblemshaveyettoberesolved. Acommonquestionraisedforlookingtimestudiesiswhyitisnecessarytorunfamiliarizationorhabituationtrialsinordertodemonstratethedetectionofaviolation. Althoughtheargumentforrunningfamiliarizationorhabituationtrialsis,asmentionedearlier,toremovetheeffectsofnovelty,itshouldbepossibletorunthemwithout suchtrials.Thetamarinexperimentsmostrecentlydiscussedrepresentonepossibility.Asecond

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possibilitythatwehavepilotedinourlabistohabituateonegroupofindividualstotrialsthatrepresenteventsconsistentwithphysicalorpsychologicalprinciplesof theworldandhabituateanothergrouptotrialsthatrepresentviolations.Thepredictionhereisthatsubjectsshouldlooklongeronthefirsttrialofadisplayshowinga physicalorpsychologicalviolation,andshouldtakelongertohabituatethansubjectspresentedwithdisplaysthatareconsistentwithsuchprinciples.Inatestofsimple arithmetic,comparing1+1=2versus1+1=1,wefoundsupportforthesepredictions(Hauser,1997b).Duetoitssimplicity,thisapproachhasseveralmerits, especiallyincaseswheretheorganism'sattentionspanisshort.Furthermore,thehabituationprocedureisapotentiallypowerfultoolforexploringtherelativeplasticity ofanorganism'sexpectations.Incaseswheretheexpectationisbasedonaninnatelyspecified,coreprinciple,onemightexpectthetimecoursetofullhabituationto belong.Incontrast,wheretheexpectationisbasedonarecentlylearnedexperience(e.g.,allredcupsholdliquid),onemightexpectthetimecoursetohabituationto beshort.Thus,followingtheleadofseveralevolutionarypsychologists(Cosmides&Tooby,1994Pinker,1997),weshouldbegintolookatthekindsofregularities thatbothhumanandnonhumananimalshaveconfrontedovertheirevolutionarypastforhereinliesomeofthebestkeptsecretsforunravellingthedomainsof knowledgethatareinnatelyspecified.Giventheworkreviewedhere,andinthechaptersbyTomasello(chap.4,thisvolume)andPovinelli(chap.11,thisvolume),I suggestthathumanssharewithawidevarietyofanimalssomeofthecoreprinciplesunderlyingobjectandspatialknowledge.Theydiffer,however,whenitcomesto socialknowledge,knowledgethatinhumansatleasthasbeenrefinedbyacapacitytoattributementalstatestoothers. Finally,Ireturntoaproblemraisedearlier,ofunderstandingwhyaviolationhasoccurredasopposedtosimplydetectingaviolation.Itseemsclearthatlookingtime datawillnothelpresolvethisdistinction.Whenwewatchamagicianviolatingphysicalprinciples,wearenotonlyawed,butcuriousaboutthegimmick.Ifwewere alloweduponstage,wewouldpresumablywanttosnooparound,tofigureouthowthetrickwaspulledoff.Toworkoutwhetherotherorganismsareinspiredby similarcuriosities,otherexperimentswillbenecessary.Byaskingsuchquestions,wearecertainlymorecleverthanthey,butweneedtobetterunderstandthenature ofsuchcleverness,andhowitevolved. References Allen,C.,&Bekoff,M.(1997).Speciesofmind.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Baillargeon,R.(1995).Physicalreasoningininfancy.InM.Gazzaniga(Ed.),Thecognitiveneurosciences(pp.181204).Cambridge,MA:MITPress.

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BaronCohen,S.(1995).Mindblindness.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Byrne,R.,&Whiten,A.(1990).Tacticaldeceptioninprimates:The1990database.PrimateReport,27,1101. Carey,S.,&Spelke,E.S.(1994).Domainspecificknowledgeandconceptualchange.InL.Herschfeld&S.Gelman(Eds.),Mappingthemind:Domain specificityinCognitionandculture(pp.169201).Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Carruthers,P.,&Smith,P.K.(1996).Theoriesoftheoriesofmind.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Caryl,P.G.(1979).Communicationbyagonisticdisplays:Whatcangamestheorycontributetoethology?Behaviour,68,136169. Cheney,D.L.,&Seyfarth,R.M.(1988).Assessmentofmeaningandthedetectionofunreliablesignalsbyvervetmonkeys.AnimalBehaviour,36,477486. Cheney,D.L.,&Seyfarth,R.M.(1990a).Attendingtobehaviourversusattendingtoknowledge:Examiningmonkeys'attributionofmentalstates.Animal Behaviour,40,742753. Cheney,D.L.,&Seyfarth,R.M.(1990b).Howmonkeysseetheworld:Insidethemindofanotherspecies.Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress. Cheney,D.L.,Seyfarth,R.M.,&Silk,J.(1995).Theresponsesoffemalebaboons(Papiocynocephalusursinus)toanomaloussocialinteractions:Evidencefor causalreasoning?JournalofComparativePsychology,109,134141. Clements,.W.A.,&Perner,J.(1994).Implicitunderstandingofbelief.CognitiveDevelopment,9,377395. Cosmides,L.,&Tooby,J.(1994).Originsofdomainspecificity:Theevolutionoffunctionalorganization.InL.A.Hirschfeld&S.A.Gelman(Eds.),Mappingthe mind:Domainspecificityincognitionandculture(pp.85116).Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Dawkins,R.,&Krebs,J.R.(1978).Animalsignals:Informationormanipulation.InJ.R.Krebs&N.B.Davies(Eds.),Behaviouralecology(pp.282309). Oxford,England:BlackwellScientificPublications. Dennett,D.(1996).Kindsofminds.NewYork:BasicBooks. Dodd,B.(1979).Lipreadingininfants:Attentiontospeechpresentedinandoutofsynchrony.CognitivePsychology,11,478484. Dretske,F.(1995).Naturalizingthemind.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Fodor,J.A.(1994).Theelmandtheexpert.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Gelman,R.(1990).Firstprinciplesorganizeattentiontoandlearningaboutrelevantdata:numberandtheanimateinanimatedistinctionasexamples.Cognitive Science,14,79106. Gergely,G.,Ndasdy,Z.,Csibra,G.,&Bir,S.(1995).Takingtheintentionalstanceat12monthsofage.Cognition,56,165193. Gomez,J.C.(1998).Assessingtheoryofmindwithnonverbalprocedures:Problemswithtrainingmethodsandanalternative'key'procedure.BehavioralandBrain Sciences,21,119120. Gopnik,A.,&Meltzoff,A.(1997).Words,thoughts,andtheories.Cambridge:MITPress. Hauser,M.D.(1996).Theevolutionofcommunication.Cambridge:MITPress. Hauser,M.D.(1997a).Mindingthebehaviorofdeception.InA.Whiten&R.W.Byrne(Eds.),MachiavellianintelligenceII(pp.112143).Cambridge,England: CambridgeUniversityPress. Hauser,M.D.(1997b).Tinkeringwithmindsfromthepast.InM.Daly(Ed.),Characterizinghumanpsychologicaladaptations(pp.95131).NewYork:Wiley. Hauser,M.D.(1998a).Expectationsaboutobjectmotionanddestination:Experimentswithanonhumanprimate.DevelopmentalScience,1,3138. Hauser,M.D.(1998b).Functionalreferentsandacousticsimilarity:Fieldplaybackexperimentswithrhesusmonkeys.AnimalBehaviour,55,16471658.

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Hauser,M.D.,&Carey,S.(1998).Buildingacognitivecreaturefromasetofprimitives:Evolutionaryanddevelopmentalinsights.InD.Cummins&C.Allen(Eds.), Theevolutionofmind(pp.52106).Oxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress. Hauser,M.D.,&Marler,P.(1993a).Foodassociatedcallsinrhesusmacaques(Macacamulatta).I.Socioecologicalfactorsinfluencingcallproduction. BehavioralEcology,4,194205. Hauser,M.D.,&Marler,P.(1993b).Foodassociatedcallsinrhesusmacaques(Macacamulatta).II.Costsandbenefitsofcallproductionandsuppression. BehavioralEcology,4,206212. Hauser,M.D.,&Santos,L.R.(1998).Aremonkeysmentalistsorsophisticatedbehaviorists?Resultsfromanonlinguisticfalsebelieftest.Manuscriptin preparation. Heider,F.,&Simmel,M.(1944).Anexperimentalstudyofapparentbehavior.AmericanJournalofPsychology,57,243259. Heyes,C.M.(1998).Theoryofmindinnonhumanprimates.BehavioralandBrainSciences,21,101114. Hood,B.(1995).Gravityrulesfor24yearolds?CognitiveDevelopment,10,577598. Krebs,J.R.,&Dawkins,R.(1984).Animalsignals:Mindreadingandmanipulation.InJ.R.Krebs&N.B.Davies(Eds.),Behaviouralecology(pp.380402). Oxford:Blackwell. Kuhl,P.K.,&Meltzoff,A.N.(1988).Speechasanintermodalobjectofperception.InA.Yonas(Ed.),Peceptualdevelopmentininfancy(pp.235256). Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Leslie,A.M.(1994).ToMM,ToBy,andAgency:Corearchitectureanddomainspecificity.InL.A.Hirschfeld&S.A.Gelman(Eds.),Mappingthemind: Domainspecificityincognitionandculture(pp.119148).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Meltzoff,A.N.,&Borton,R.W.(1979).Intermodalmatchingbyhumanneonates.Nature,282,403404. Michotte,A.(1962).Theperceptionofcausality.NewYork:BasicBooks. Millikan,R.(1993).WhiteQueenpsychologyandotheressaysforAlice.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Mitchell,R.W.(1986).Aframeworkfordiscussingdeception.InR.W.Mitchell&N.S.Thompson(Eds.),Deception:Perspectivesonhumanandnonhuman deceit(pp.340).Albany,NY:SUNYPress. Munn,C.(1986).Birdsthat'crywolf.'Nature,319,143145. Perner,J.,&Clements,W.A.(inpress).Fromanimplicittoanexplicit"Theoryofmind".InY.Rossetti&A.Revonsuo(Eds.),DissociationBUTinteraction betweenconsciousandnonunconsciousprocessing.Amsterdam:JohnBenjamins. Pinker,S.(1997).Howthemindworks.NewYork:Norton. Povinelli,D.J.(1993).Reconstructingtheevolutionofmind.AmericanPsychologist,48,493509. Povinelli,D.J.,&Eddy,T.J.(1996).Whatyoungchimpanzeesknowaboutseeing.MonographsoftheSocietyforResearchinChildDevelopment,247(55, SerialNo.242). Premack,D.(1986).Gavagai!orthefuturehistoryoftheanimallanguagecontroversy.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Premack,D.(1990).Theinfant'stheoryofselfpropelledobjects.Cognition,36,116. Premack,D.,&Premack,A.J.(1995).Originsofhumansocialcompetence.InM.Gazzaniga(Ed.),Thecognitiveneurosciences(pp.205218).Cambridge,MA: MITPress. Premack,D.,&Premack,A.J.(1997a).Infantsattributevalue+/tothegoaldirectedactionsofselfpropelledobjects.JournalofCognitiveNeuroscience,9, 848856. Premack,D.,&Premack,A.J.(1997b).Motorcompetenceasintegraltoattributionofgoal.Cognition,63,235242. Premack,D.,&Woodruff,G.(1978).Doesthechimpanzeehaveatheoryofmind?BehavioralandBrainSciences,4,515526. Santos,L.(1997).Precursorstoatheoryofmind:Insightsfromanonhumanprimate.UndergraduateHonorsThesis,HarvardUniversity,Cambridge,MA.

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Spelke,E.S.(1979).Perceivingbimodallyspecifiedeventsininfancy.DevelopmentalPsychology,15,626636. Spelke,E.S.(1985).Preferentiallookingmethodsastoolsforthestudyofcognitionininfancy.InG.Gottlieb&N.Krasnegor(Eds.),Measurementofaudition andvisioninthefirstyearofpostnatallife(pp.85168).Norwood:Ablex. Spelke,E.S.(1994).Initialknowledge:Sixsuggestions.Cognition,50,431445. Spelke,E.S.,Vishton,P.,&vonHofsten,C.(1995).Objectperception,objectdirectedaction,andphysicalknowledgeininfancy.InM.Gazzaniga(Ed.),The cognitiveneurosciences(pp.165179).Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Starkey,P.,&Cooper,R.(1980).Perceptionofnumbersbyhumaninfants.Science,210,10331035. Starkey,P.,Spelke,E.S.,&Gelman,R.(1990).Numericalabstractionbyhumaninfants.Cognition,36,97127. Struhsaker,T.T.(1967).Auditorycommunicationamongvervetmonkeys(Cercopithecusaethiops).InS.A.Altmann(Ed.),Socialcommunicationamong primates(pp.281324).Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress. Tomasello,M.,&Call,J.(1997).Primatecognition.Oxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress. Whiten,A.(1994).Gradesofmindreading.InC.Lewis&P.Mitchell(Eds.),Children'searlyunderstandingofmind:Originsanddevelopment(pp.4770). Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Whiten,A.(inpress).Chimpanzeecognitionandthequestionofmentalrerepresentation.InD.Sperber(Ed.),Metarepresentation.Oxford,England:Oxford UniversityPress. Whiten,A.,&Byrne,R.W.(1988).Tacticaldeceptioninprimates.BehavioralandBrainSciences,11,233273. Wimmer,H.,&Perner,J.(1983).Beliefsaboutbeliefs:Representationandconstrainingfunctionofwrongbeliefsinyoungchildren'sunderstandingofdeception. Cognition,13,103128.

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Chapter11 SocialUnderstandinginChimpanzees: NewEvidenceFromaLongitudinalApproach

DanielJ.Povinelli UniversityofSouthwesternLouisiana Behavior,itwouldnowseem,isnotnecessarilyanopenwindowintothemind.Ifitwere,humanity'squesttoenditsintellectualandspiritualisolationfromtherestof thenaturalworldwouldhaveendedwithRomanes'(1882)publicationofAnimalIntelligenceoverahundredyearsago.Forthere,RomanestookupDarwin's (1871/1982)claimthattherewas"nofundamentaldifference"(p.445)inthementalfunctioningofhumansandotherspecies.Romanes(1882)proceededto catalogueexamplesofanimalsbehavinginwaysthatsuggestednotonlythattheanimalshadminds,butthattheywerealsoreasoningaboutmindsinboththemselves andinothers.Inlieuofbeingabletopinpsychologicalstructuresofanimalsonthedissectingtable,Romanes(1883)soughtwhathesawasthenextbestalternative: collectandcataloguetheirbehaviors.Thesebehaviors,Romanessurmised,couldserveasbehavioralambassadorsofthehiddenpsychologicalstructuresofanimals. Afterall,hereasoned,weknowthementalactivitiesthataccompanytheproductionofourownbehavior,andso,throughanalogyweoughttobeabletoinferthe mentalactivitiesofanimals.Similarityinbehavior,Romanesconcluded,wasevidenceofsimilarityinmind. Ofcourse,DarwinandRomaneswerereallyjustputtingintopracticewhatHume(17391740/1978)hadproclaimedacenturyearlier:Wherehumansandanimals displaysimilarbehavior,sotoomusttheyexperiencesimilarmentalstates."'Tisfromtheresemblanceoftheexternalactionsofanimalstothoseweourselves perform,"Humeobserved,"thatwejudge

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theirinternal[actions]likewisetoresembleours..."(p.176).Inthischapter,IreturntotheproblemthatHume claimedtohavesolved,namely,howtoassessthe mentalstatesthataccompanysimilarbehaviorsindifferentspecies.Iexamineseveralcasesfromourresearchprograminwhichchimpanzeesandhumanchildren exhibitstrikinglysimilarbehavior,andaskwhethersuchbehavioralsimilarityjustifiesaninferenceofcomparablepsychologicalsimilarity.Despitetheconfidenturgings ofHume,Darwin,andRomanes,Iprovideasimple,theoreticalframeworkforsuspectingthatitdoesnot. ChimpanzeeSocialUnderstanding Chimpanzeesareremarkablysocialcreatures.Evencasualobservationsoftheirinteractionswitheachotherrevealacomplexityandsubtletythatstartlesthe uninitiated.Forexample,considertheactionsofoneofourfemalechimpanzees,Brandy,whodiscoversabananapokingoutofsomestrawinasecludedareaofher compound.Justassheisabouttoseizethebanana,inthedistanceshenoticesthealphamaleofthegroup,Apollo,approachingher.Insteadofreachingforthe banana,Brandyturnsherbackonit.Apollogreetsherwithachimpanzeehug,glancesaround,andthendeparts.Onceheisoutofsight,Brandyremovesthebanana fromitshidingplaceandconsumesit,quietlyfoodbarkinginpleasure.Menzel(1974)describedthemicrogenesisofsuchbehaviorsmanyyearsagoduringa landmarksetofstudiesofyoungchimpanzees,andintheensuingdecadesmanyprimatologistshaveurgedustoconsidersuchepisodesasevidencethatchimpanzees seeoneanotherasmorethanjusthairycollectionsoflimbs,torsos,andfacialexpressionsmovingthroughspace.Surely,theymightinsist,BrandyseesApolloasa subjectivebeing,alertwithhisownfirstpersonexperiencesofattending,wanting,knowing,andbelieving.Indeed,herreactionswouldseemtoprovideprimafacie evidencethatshenotonlyunderstandsthatApollopossessesmostorallofthesementalstates,butthatshecanmanipulatehismentalstatesthroughheractions.With Hume'stwocenturyoldproclamationstillechoing,weareencouragedtobelievethatitcouldnotbeotherwise.Similarityinbehaviorguaranteessimilarityinmind. I,too,wasonceconvincedbysuchobservationsthatchimpanzeespossessamentalisticunderstandingofothersverysimilartoourown.Indeed,the
1

Russell(1948)isperhapsbetterknownforhisexpositionoftheargumentbyanalogy,althoughhedevelopeditnottojustifyourbeliefinthemindsofotherspecies,buttojustify ourbeliefinthemindsofotherhumans.Thelogicalstructureofhisargument,however,parallelsHume's.ThroughintrospectionwecanknowthatourownmentalstateoftypeA causedourownbodilyactoftypeB,andthereforeifweseeanotherpersonengageinabodilyactB,wecanreasonablyinferthepresenceofmentalstateA.

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descriptionofchimpanzeesocialmaneuveringindeWaal's(1982)ChimpanzeePoliticswasenoughtoconvinceeventheskepticsthatchimpanzeesnavigatedtheir waythroughacomplexsocialmilieubyreasoningaboutthementallivesofthosearoundthem(seealsodeWaal,1986Goodall,1986).Soon,reportssurfacedof variousspeciesofmonkeysactingindeceptiveways,andby1988WhitenandByrnehadpublishedareportintheBehavioralandBrainSciencesthatamountedto averitabletaxonomyof"tacticaldeception"inprimates.Indeed,primateswerenotaloneinthisregard,andnumerousothertaxarangingfromavianstoelephantshave beenshowntomanipulateeachother'sbehaviorinsomesenseoranother(seeMitchell&Thompson,1986). Thefloodofspeciesthatweresoonreportedtoengageinsocialdeceptionleftme,andothers,questioningtheutilityofspontaneousbehaviors(anecdotes)as evidenceofanimals'appreciationofmentalstates.Butthenatureofthesecritiqueswereoftenmorepolemicalthantheoretical.Somecritiquessoughttoshowhow suchbehaviorscouldemergethroughvariousformsofsimplelearning,othersadmonishedprimatologistsfortreatinglearningassomethingthatonlyoccurredin psychologicallaboratories,andstillothersappealedtoparsimonytoresolvetheissue(seecommentariesfollowingWhiten&Byrne,1988).Few,however,directly grappledwiththemorefundamentalphilosophicalproblemthatHumeclaimedtohavesolved(foranexception,seeThomas,1988).Indeed,Hume'ssolutionwasa generalone.Hedidnotclaimthatcertainkindsofparticularlydramaticbehavior(suchasdeception)couldbetakenasevidenceforunderstandingthementalstatesof animalsrather,theargumentbyanalogyheldthatthementalstatesthatattendourbehaviorcausethem,andthatwecanthereforeusethepresenceofaparticular behaviortoinferthepresenceofaparticularmentalstate(seealsoRomanes,1882,pp.12Russell,1948,pp.482486).Deceptionmighttemptresearchersmore thanotherkindsofsocialinteractions,butasfarasHume'sargumentwasconcerned,thehestitancytoextendsuchattributionsintoallaspectsofanimalbehavior simplyreflectedaweaknessattheknees. Therewereatleasttwopossiblereactionstothemountingevidenceofdeception(andotherformsofbehavioralsimilarity)betweenhumansandotherprimates.On theonehand,itwaspossibletofollowHumeintobelievingthatallofthesespecieswerereasoningaboutmentalstates(excluding,perhaps,suchdistantlyrelated speciesasbeesandcockroachesatwhichourintuitionsmightbalk).Butthisseemedarbitraryanddissatisfying.Ontheotherhand,itwaspossibletoexplainawaythe impressivenaturalsocialinteractionsofanimalsbyinvokingsuchphrasesas"innatedispositions,""hardwiredbehaviors,""sociallearning,"and"parsimony.''AlthoughI recognizedthatthiswasproblematic,Inonethelessblithelyassumedthatonedaywewoulddiscoverasimpleonetoonecorrespon

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dencebetweentheevolutionaryemergenceofsocialunderstandingandsomeasofyetunidentifiedclassofsocialbehaviors.Inthemeantime,experimentalmethods wereneededtoprynatureapartattheseamsanddiscoverhowthemindsofchimpanzees(andotheranimals)reallyworked. Butslowly,undertheweightofliterallydozensofexperimentsthatwehaveconductedtodiagnosethenatureofchimpanzeesocialunderstanding,Ihavebegunto changemyopinionabouttherelationbetweenlaboratorybasedassessmentsofchimpanzeesocialunderstandingandtheirspontaneoussocialinteractions.Thishas notbeencompletelyanempiricalconversion.Rather,Ihavebeguntoconsiderthemeritsofadifferentviewoftherelationbetweentheevolutionofcomplexsocial behaviorandtheevolutionofsocialunderstanding.This,inturn,hasledmetorethinktherelationbetweenthespontaneoussocialbehaviorofanimalsandtheir behavioralreactionsincarefullydesignedexperiments.Finally,thishasledmetoconstructaframeworkthatreconcilesthetwo,andsimultaneouslydemonstrateswhy usingthespontaneousbehaviorofanimalstoinfertheirunderstandingofmentalstatesisproblematic.Inshort,thisframeworkprovidesaprincipledalternativetothe argumentbyanalogyinthecaseoftherepresentationofmentalstates.Thisframeworksuggeststhattheremaybeafarmorecomplexandsubtlerelationbetween behaviorandcognitionthanHume,Darwin,orRomaneseversuspected. Sohereistheproblemthatshalloccupymefortheremainderofthischapter:Ahumanandamemberofsomeotherspeciesengageinaparticularbehaviortocope withasocialsituationthebehaviorsaccomplishthesameendresult,andtheorganismseventailorthebehaviorssimilarlytorespondtosimilardynamicfeaturesofthe situation.Giventhisdegreeofsimilarity,arewejustifiedinassumingthatthesecondordermentalstatesthatoftenaccompanythehumanexecutionofthebehaviorare presentintheotherspecies?Doessimilarityinbehaviorguaranteecomparablesimilarityinpsychology?Theproblemisageneralone,butthecaseofhumansand chimpanzeesisespeciallypoignantbecauseherethefunctionalandstructuraldimensionsofsimilarityconverge.Afterall,notonlydothesetwospeciespossesssimilar behaviorsthatservesimilarfunctions,butalso,becauseoftheirclosephylogeneticrelationship,theylookverysimilarastheyexecutethem. WhatChimpanzeesUnderstandaboutSeeing ThedimensionsofbehavioralsimilarityIexplorerevolvearoundactionsthatinhumansareoftendescribedas"referential"actionssuchaspointingandgazing.Fora numberofyears,mycolleaguesandIhavebeenexamininghowchimpanzeesunderstandsuchbehaviors.Thesubjectsofmostofthese

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studieshavebeensevenchimpanzeesthatwereraisedtogetherfrombirthinanursery.Admittedly,asfarasapesgo,ourchimpanzeesliveafairlyuniquelifestyle. Theyplay,groom,fight,nap,andotherwisesocializewitheachotheralldaylongintheirindooroutdoorcompound,andatthesametimetheyareconstantlyexposed tocaretakers,staff,andstudentswhointeractandplaywiththeminavarietyofways.Embeddedintothisspontaneoussociallifewithotherchimpanzeesandhumans, eachofthemisalsotestedtwoorthreetimesadayinaspeciallydesignedtestingfacilitythatisconnectedtotheircompound.Thisfacilityallowsustotesteachapein turnfor1020minutesatatime.Whiletheothersplay,oneofthemistransferredintoanoutsidewaitingarea,whichisconnectedbyashuttledoortoanindoor testingroom.Typically,thisanimalwaitsoutsideasatrialissetupindoors.Whentheshuttledoorisopened,theanimalisfreetoenterthelabandrespondtothe task.APlexiglaspanelseparatestheapesfromthehumans.Thisroutineofcomingoutofthegrouptobetestedwasestablishedwhenourapeswerequiteyoung,and theyhavenowparticipatedinthisroutinesomanytimesthatitblendsseamlesslyintotheotherpredictableroutinesoftheirdaysuchaseatingandsleeping. Althoughwehaveinvestigatedtheirpotentialunderstandingofawiderangeofmentalstates,themostdetailedworkwehaveconductedconcernstheirunderstanding oftheattentionalaspectofgazeor"seeing."Ourinterestinthistopicemergedfromseveraldirections,butperhapsnoonehasgiventhisissuemorecareful experimentalconsiderationthanFlavellandhiscolleagueswhoconductedanextensiveseriesofstudiesinvestigatingthetimingofyoungchildren'sdeveloping understandingofseeing(e.g.,Flavell,Everett,Croft,&Flavell,1981Flavell,Shipstead,&Croft,1978Lempers,Flavell,&Flavell,1977).Whatchimpanzees(and othernonhumanprimates)understandaboutseeingisofcentralimportancetotheproblemofthischapter,becauseinsomesenseoranother"attentionalstructure"isa definingfeatureofprimatesocialorganization.Manyyearsago,Chance(1967)notedthatprimatedominancehierarchiesrevolvearoundwhoispayingattentionto whom.Socialprimatesseemtoconstantlymonitorthebehaviorsofothersupthedominancehierarchy,apparentlycomputingwhomthemoredominantanimalsare approaching,threatening,orevenatwhomtheyarelooking.Thus,bothmonitoringthegazeofothersandlookingintotheeyesofothersareapartofthesociallifeof manyprimates,althoughthenatureandconsequencesoftheseexchangesrangefromextremelyhostile(asinmanyspeciesofOldWorldMonkeyssuchasmacaques seePerrettetal.,1990),toextremelyaffiliative(asinchimpanzeesseedeWaal,1989). Werecentlyprovidedthefirstempiricaldemonstrationofgazefollowinginnonhumanprimates(seeFig.11.1).Becauseoftheimportancethathasbeenplacedonthe emergenceofgazefollowinginhumaninfants(see

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Fig.11.1. Gazefollowingina6yearoldchimpanzeeinresponsetomovementofeyes+head.

BaronCohen,1994Butterworth&Cochran,1980Butterworth&Jarrett,1991Corkum&Moore,1994),weconductedaseriesofstudiestoexaminefirst, whetherourapesfollowgazeatall,andsecond,thelevelofsophisticationofwhatevergazefollowingsystemwaspresent(seePovinelli,Bierschwale,&Cech,in pressPovinelli&Eddy,1996a,1996c[Experiment12],1997).Thisresearchhasdemonstratedastrongsimilarityinthegazefollowingsystemofhumansand chimpanzees.First,chimpanzeesdisplaythegazefollowingresponsewhetheritisinstantiatedbymovementsoftheheadandeyesinconcert,orsimplytheeyesalone. Second,chimpanzeeswilluseanother'sgazetovisuallysearchintospaceoutsidetheirimmediatevisualfieldinresponsetoeyeplushead/uppertorsomovement,eye plusheadmovement,orjusteyemovementalone.Furthermore,chimpanzeesdonotevenneedtowitnesstheshiftinanother'sgazedirection

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inordertofollowitintospaceoutsidetheirimmediatevisualfield.Rather,thegazefollowingresponsecanbetriggeredwhenchimpanzeesencounteranother'shead andeyedirectionthatisstaticallyorientedaboveandbehindthem.Third,chimpanzeesextractspecificinformationaboutthedirectionofgazefromothers(atleast whenthatgazeoccursinconcertwithheadanduppertorsomovement).Finally,chimpanzeesmayalsopossessatleastatacitunderstandingofhowanother'sgazeis interruptedbysolid,opaquesurfaces.Ingeneral,thesefindingsrevealthatchimpanzeesfollowgazewithasophisticationcomparabletothatexhibitedby18month oldhumaninfants(seeButterworth&Cochran,1980Butterworth&Jarrett,1991Corkum&Moore,1994).Morerecently,otherresearchershavedemonstrated atleastageneralcapacityforgazefollowinginothernonhmanprimates(Emery,Lorincz,Perret,Oram,&Baker,1997Tomasello,Call,&Hare,inpress). Althoughthesophisticationofgazefollowinginchimpanzeesandothernonhumanprimatesmaysatisfythepartofusinterestedinthedynamicsofsocialcomplexity, thephilosopherandpsychologistinusremainscurious,wantingtoknowwhatthesephenomenarevealaboutthesespecies'understandingofattentionasaninternal mentalstate.Aswehaveseen,Humewouldhaveconsideredtheproblemansweredassoonaswedescribedthebehavior:Totheextentthathumansreasonabout attentioninsuchsituations,sodootherorganismswhoexhibitthebehavior.Butintruththereareatleasttwoverydifferentpossibilities.First,chimpanzeeswhofollow gazemaydosobecausetheyappreciatetheunderlyingattentionalstates.Ontheotherhand,itispossiblethatchimpanzeesaremerelylookingwhereothersare looking,withoutentertainingtheideathatthegazeoftheotherorganismisconnectedtointernalvisualorattentionalexperiences(seePovinelli&Eddy,1996a). AlthoughIruntheriskofbeingmisunderstood,thereisaneedtohavesuccinctlabelsforthesealternativeaccountsandsoIhereafterrefertothemasthelowand highlevelmodels,respectively.Tosummarize,thehighlevelmodelstipulatesthatchimpanzeesformconceptsaboutinternalmentalstates(suchasattention)anduse theseconceptstoassistthemininterpretingthebehaviorsthatunfoldaroundthem.Incontrast,thelowlevelmodelstipulatesthatchimpanzeesreasonabout behavioralpropensities,notmentalstates. DoChimpanzeesKnowThatOthersSee?ALongitudinalProject Wehaveaddressedtheproblemofwhatchimpanzeesunderstandaboutseeingfromanumberofdifferentperspectives,butintheinterestsofspace,Ifocusonone particularprocedurethatwehaveusedtodiagnoseouranimals'understandingofseeingoveraperiodspanningtheirlate

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juvenile,adolescent,andyoungadultyears.Inwhatfollows,Ihighlightsomeofthemajorfindingsofthisproject(seePovinelli,1996Povinelli&Eddy,1996c Reaux,Theall,&Povinelli,inpress). Year1:GenuineVersus"AsIf"Understanding WedevelopedtheprocedureIshallbediscussinginordertodetermineifchimpanzeescouldappreciatethedifferencebetweensomeonewhocouldseethemversus someoneelsewhocouldnot.Thisprocedureevolvedfromourobservationsoftheirspontaneousplaybehavior.Wehadrepeatedlyobservedourapesengagingin behaviorsinwhichtheyusedbuckets,burlapsacks,piecesofcardboard,oreventheirownhandstoobscuretheirvisionastheymovedaroundtheircompound.The animalsengagedinthisbehaviorsofrequently,andseemedtoenjoyitsomuch,thatitwastemptingtoassumethattheyknewpreciselywhattheyweredoing: preventingthemselvesfromseeing.Thisraisedtheratherstraightforwardquestionofhowthechimpanzeeswouldreactwhenconfrontedwithfamiliarcaretakersand studentswhoengagedinsimilarbehaviors. Inordertotesttheanimals,wecapitalizedontheirnaturalbegginggesture,whichtheyfrequentlyuseto"request"foodorotherdesirableobjectsfromus.Thegesture consistsofanoutstretchedarmwithpalmupa"gimme"gesture.Humansnaturallyrespondtothisgesturebyhandingthesubjectswhattheywant(e.g.,fruit, cookies,orsomeotherdesirableobject).Weformalizedthisroutinebyestablishingthefollowingtrainingprocedure.First,withanapewaitingoutside,wesetupa trialindoorsbyhavingafamiliarpersonstandorsitjustoutofreachinfrontofaholeontherightorleftsideofthePlexiglaspartition.Next,theshuttledoorwas opened,allowingthesubjecttoenterthetestunitandgesturetothepersonforatreat(Fig.11.2).Iftheapegesturedthroughthecorrecthole(theonedirectlyinfront oftheexperimenter),theexperimenterpraisedtheapeandhandedhimorheratreat.Thisprocesswasrepeateduntilthesubjectswerevirtuallyflawless,thussetting thestageforaskingtheapesabouttheirunderstandingofthevisualexperiencesofthepeoplewithwhomtheywereinteracting. Wetestedtheapesbycarefullychoreographingseveralexperimentalconditionsthatinstantiatedthecontrastbetweenseeingandnotseeinginthemostobvious mannerpossible,whilestillmodelingtheseconditionsafterthebehaviorsinwhichwehadseentheapesengage.Intheinitialstudy,weconstructedfourconditions: blindfolds,buckets,handsovertheeyes,andback/front(seeFig.11.3a).Theseconditionswereembeddedasprobetrialsintosessionsconsistingoftheeasy,one experimentertrialsdescribedpreviously.Ourcentralquestionwas:Whomwouldtheanimalsgesturetowhenconfrontedwithonepersonwhocouldseethem,and

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Fig.11.2. Chimpanzeeenteringtestunitandusingspeciestypicalbeg ginggesturetorequestfoodfromafamiliarexperimenter.

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Fig.11.3. (a)Conditionsusedtotestchimpanzeesfortheirunderstandingof seeing/notseeing(blindfolds,buckets,handsovereyes,back/front). (b)Resultsoffirstfourtrialsofblindfolds,buckets,handsovereyes, andback/frontconditions.Thedottedlineindicateslevelofperfor manceexpectedbychanceresponding.**p<.01.

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anotherwhocouldnot?Thehighlevelmodelpredictedthatthesubjectswouldgesturetothepersonwhocouldseethemfromtheveryfirsttrialforwardthelow levelmodelpredictedthatthesubjectswouldinitiallyrespondatrandom,andonlygraduallylearntochoosethecorrectperson. Figure11.3bpresentstheresultsoftheseinitialstudies.Ascanbeseen,thesubjectsrespondedaccordingtothelowlevelmodelinthreeofthefourconditions (blindfolds,buckets,handsovertheeyes).Theanimalsenteredthetestunit,measurablypaused,andthengesturedtooneoftheexperimenters.However,muchto oursurprise,theywerejustaslikelytogesturetothepersonwhocouldnotpossiblyseethem,astotheonewhocould!Indirectcontrast,theanimalsperformed excellentlyfromtrial1forwardontheback/frontcondition.Here,theanimalshadnotroublegesturingtothepersonfacingforward.Twopossibleexplanationsforthis discrepancypresentedthemselves.Onewasthattheback/frontconditionwassimplythemostobviouscaseofseeingandnotseeingtheoneeasiestfortheapesto recognize.However,amoremundanepossibilitypresenteditselfaswell.Theapesmighthavebeengesturingtothepersonfacingforwardbecausethiswasprecisely whatwehadtaughtthemtodointhetrainingphase:Enterthetestunit,approachapersonwhohappenstobefacingforward,gestureinfrontofhimorher,andgeta reward. Weattemptedtodistinguishbetweenthesepossibilitiesbyconfrontingtheapeswithanother,equallynaturalposturethattheyexperiencewithusandeachotherdaily: someonelookingovertheshouldertowardthem(seeFig.11.4a).Thisallowedaprecisetestofthehighandlowlevelexplanationsoftheback/frontresultsfromthe firstexperiment.Inthisnewconditionthegeneralfrontalaspectofbothexperimenterswasnotvisible,butoneofthetwocouldclearlyseetheanimal.We administeredthiscondition,alongwiththeback/frontconditionasacontrol,usingourstandardprobetrialtechniques.Again,theanimalsenteredthetestingunit, pausedinreactiontothenovelpostures,butthenproceededtogesturetothepersonlookingawayfromthemasoftenastothepersonlookingovertheshoulderin theirdirection(seeFig.11.4b). Weconductedanextendedseriesofstudieswhichfolloweduponthesesurprisingresults.Wecreatedseveralnewconditionsforthesestudiesincludingoneinvolving someoneholdingascreeninfrontofthefaceversussomeoneelseholdingoneovertheshoulder(seeFig.11.5a).Despiteanextendedamountofinitialexperience withthescreensinthecontextofplay,theanimalsinitiallyperformedrandomly.Slowly,however,aswecontinuedtoadministerthesescreentrials,theirperformances begantoimprove,untilfinallytheywereperformingatlevelsexceedingchance(seeFig.11.5b).Ourtwomodelsexplainedtheseresultsinverydifferentways.The highlevelmodelcouldexplaintheseresultsbyarguingthatthesubjectshadfinallylearnedtoselecttheexperimenterwhocouldseethem.

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Fig.11.4. (a)Lookingovertheshouldercondition.(b)Resultsoffirstfourtrials oflookingovertheshouldercondition.Thedottedlineindicateslevel ofperformanceexpectedbychanceresponding.

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Fig.11.5. (a)Screenscondition.(b)Resultsofscreensconditionwithrepeatedexperience. Thedottedlineindicateslevelofperformanceexpectedbychanceresponding.

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Incontrast,thelowlevelmodelarguedthatthesubjectshadsimplylearnedarulesuchas,''Gestureinfrontofthepersonwhosefaceisvisible." Inordertotestthesecompetinginterpretationswereadministeredalloftheconditionstothesubjects.Bothmodelsconvergedinthattheypredictedthattheapes wouldperformwellinthebuckets,handsovertheeyes,andback/frontconditions,buttheydifferedintheirexpectationsabouttheblindfoldscondition.Thehigh levelmodelexpectedthattheapeswoulddowellonthisconditionbecauseitwasanotherparticularlysalientexampleofseeing/notseeing.Butifthelowlevelmodel werecorrect,andthesubjectsweremerelyselectingtheexperimenterwhosefacewasvisible,theyoughttocontinuetorespondrandomlyontheblindfoldscondition afterall,inthisconditionanequalamountofthetwofaceswerevisible(seeFig.11.3).And,infullsupportofthelowlevelmodel,thisisexactlywhatourapesdid. Finally,weconductedseveraladditionaltestscontrastingpredictionsofthelowandhighlevelmodels(suchasoneinvolvingadistractedexperimenterversusan attendingone,someonewitheyesopenversuseyesclosed,andseveralconditionsdesignedtoexaminetherelativeimportanceoftheeyesversustheface).Asbefore, thelowlevelmodelcontinuedtogeneratethemostaccuratepredictionsconcerningtheanimals'responses.However,eveninthesenewconditionstheanimals showedevidenceoflearning.Indeed,bytheendoftheinitial14experimentsweconducted,thesubjectswereabletolearnnewconditionswithin34trialsinvolving differentialfeedback.Indeed,severalofthefinalexperimentsprovidedconfirmationforourideathattheapeswererelyingonaseriesofhierarchicalrulesrelatedto thefront,face,andeyesoftheexperimenters.First,theysoughttoapproachandgesturetosomeonefacingforward.Clearly,theback/frontconditioneasilyallowed themtosatisfythisrule.Ontheotherhand,ifthiswerenotpossible(e.g.,ifbothpersonswerefacingforward),thentheapesmovedontothenextmostimportantrule whichwastogesturetothepersonwhosefacewasvisible.Inthecaseofbucketsandscreens,thisrulewaseasilysatisfied.Ofleastimportancewastheeyesrule, andindeed,atthispointtherewasonlylimitedevidencethattheywereevenusingit.Theydidperformwellontheblindfoldscondition(whichcouldbesolvedbythe eyes,butnotthefacerule),buttheyshowedmuchweakerevidenceofunderstandingtheeyesopen/closedcondition.Nonetheless,bytheendofthesestudiesour sevenyoungchimpanzeeswerebehavingexactlyasiftheyunderstoodsomethingaboutseeingasamentalevent.Theywouldapproachtwofamiliarcaretakers,look carefullyateachone,andthengestureinfrontofthepersonwhocouldseethem.Indeed,bytheendoftheseexperiments,ourapeswereperforminginmuchthe samemannerasthe2,3,and4yearoldchildrenthatwetestedonthesesameprocedureshadperformedontheirveryfirsttrials(seePovinelli&Eddy,1996c, Experiment15).

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WehavenowarrivedattheheartoftheproblemIpromisedtoaddressinthischapter:Doesthefactthattwospeciesengageinsimilarbehaviorimplysimilar accompanyingmentalstates?Anddoesitmatterhowthebehaviorarises?Forexample,isthereapsychologicaldistinctionbetweena2or3yearoldchildwho arrivesatourlaboratory,participatesinourseeing/notseeingtest,andperformsperfectlyfromtrial1forward,andourchimpanzees,who,aftermonthsofdifferential feedback,finallylearnedtodolikewise?Itisimportantnottotrivializewhatourchimpanzeeshadlearned.Althoughourinvestigationoftheirunderstandingofseeing wasbestpredictedbythelowlevelmodel,bytheendoftheseteststheapeswereusingthedirectionofthefaceandthepresenceorabsenceoftheeyesasthebases fortheirchoices.Althoughthelowlevelmodelexplainedtheiruseofthesefeaturesintermsofapsychologicalsystemthatreasonsaboutphysicalpostures,herethe lowandhighlevelmodelsconverge.Afterall,eventhoughthehighlevelmodelenvisionstheoperationofapsychologicalsystemthatinterpretstheseposturesin termsofunderlyingmentalstates,eventhissystemmustmaketherelevantposturaldiscriminationsinthefirstplace.Anotherwayofthinkingaboutthisistorealizethat whatevertheunderlyingdifferencesininterpretation,ourchimpanzeesand2to3yearoldchildrenwereattendingtothesamephysicalstimuliwhentheywere makingtheirdecisions. Perhapstheproblemisbeststatedfromthepointofviewofthechildren.Priortovisitingourtestingcenter,thesechildrenhavehadnumeroussemistructured experiencesofseeing/notseeing(inthecontextofplayingwithparentsandpeers).Thus,longbeforeparticipatinginourtests,thechildrenhavebeenconfrontedwith games,andeven"real"socialexperiences,involvingthedistinctionsbetweenseeingandnotseeing.Althoughtheirreactionstothesesituationswerenotyokedto receivingornotreceivingasticker,surelytherangeoftheirresponseswerelinkedtoarangeofconsequencesfromtheirparentsandpeers.ThequestionIraiseis simple.Howdothesekindsofexperiencesreceivedbychildrencomparetothekindsofexperiencesreceivedbyourchimpanzeesintestingsituations?Andeven moredirectly,whatcansuchcomparisonstellusaboutthepsychologicalstructuresthatcauseand/oraccompanythefinalbehavioraloutcomes? Atthisjuncture,twoseparateargumentspresentthemselves.Ontheonehand,itispossibletoquestionwhetherthe2to3yearoldchild'sperformanceonourtask reallyreflectsanunderstandingofseeing/attentioninthefirstplace.Afterall,ourtestswiththechildrenwerenotnearlyasextensiveasthosewiththeapes,primarily becauseeventheyoungestchildrenperformedwellfromtrial1forward.However,thoseinitialtestsconsistedoftheconditionsthatcouldbesolvedbythefacerule. Perhapsalowlevelmodeloftheirbehaviorwouldbetterpredicttheirreactionson

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morecomplicatedtests.Althoughpossible,thereareindependentconfirmationsofthe2to3yearold'sunderstandingofseeing/attention(seeBaldwin,1991,1993 Gopnik,Meltzoff,&Esterly,1995Lempers,Flavell,&Flavell,1977).So,perhapstoohastily,Imovetothesecondargument,whichisofmorecentralimportance tothischapter.Giventheamountofexperiencethatchildrenhavewithexplicitlycreatedinstancesofseeing/notseeingbytheirparentsandsiblings,howdoweknow thatitisnotpreciselythisexperiencethatallowsthechildtocreatetheideaofvisualattentioninthefirstplace?Ifso,thenperhapsourapes'finaltrialsonourtests aremorecomparabletothechildren'sveryfirsttrials.Inotherwords,perhapschimpanzeessimplyneedsufficientexperiencetoallowthemtoconstructaconceptof seeingasattention.Thus,althoughthelowlevelmodelbestpredictedourapes'behaviorateachcriticaltestingjuncture,thismighthavebeenthecaseonlybecause ourtestswerechasingtheapes'concurrentconstructionoftheideaofattention. Extrememodularitytheoristswillobjectimmediately,claimingthattheinsularizednatureofsocialunderstandingexcludesthispossibility.Yes,theyadmit,childrenhave suchseeing/notseeingexperiencesinplay,buttheseexperiencesareincidentaltotheontogeneticunfoldingoftheirunderstandingofmentalstatesinothers.Inthis view,theirknowledgeofthementalstateofattentionmaturesbiologicallyitisnotconstructedthroughexperience.Thus,onlytheapes'initialtrialsarediagnosticwhat theylearnthroughtrialanderrorisnotrelevanttothequestionofcognitivedevelopment.Apeseithernaturallyandspontaneouslydevelopanunderstandingofseeing, ortheydonotchangesintaskperformancethatoccurastheresultoffeedbackshouldbeassignedtoan"asif"categoryofunderstanding. Butsuchobjectionsderivemostoftheirforcethroughempiricallyunderdeterminedtheoreticalpositions.Althoughtherearegoodreasonsforconsideringstrongerand weakerversionsofmodularityinthedevelopmentofcognitivestructures,thereisnothingaboutourknowledgeofcognitivedevelopmentthatforcesthemodularity view.Indeed,severaltheoristshavearguedthatexperiencedoesplayacrucialroleincognitivedevelopment.Forexample,Premack(1988)arguedthattraining chimpanzeestouseasymbolforsame/differentjudgmentsaboutobjects,alteredthenaturalstateofthespecies'cognitivestructuresinsuchamannerthattheycould nowengageinabstractanalogicalreasoning.Morerecently,Tomasello(1995)hasresurrectedtheargumentthatexposuretohumanculturedramaticallyaffectsthe cognitivedevelopmentofapesinthiscase,theapes'understandingofjointattention(seeTomasello,chap.4,thisvolume).Ifopinionsmatter,Icertainlyfavor accountsofcognitivedevelopmentthatemphasizethecomplexepigeneticinteractionsthatoccurduringdevelopment.Butinthefinalanalysis,theanalogybetweenthe constructionofbodilystructures(includingthebrain)ontheonehand,andtheconstructionofconcepts

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relatedtomentalstates,ontheotherhand,remainsunclear.Infact,theambiguityofthisanalogymanifestsitselfinthecontextofinterpretingtheresultsofour seeing/notseeingexperiments.Forexample,somehaveinterpretedourresultsasevidencethatapesdonotunderstandseeing,whereasothershaveconcludedthat ourapes'finalperformancedemonstratesthattheydo.Withrespecttothelatterclaim,ourapes'abilitytolearntogesturetothepersonwhocouldseethemcanbe takenasevidencethattheyunderstandtheattentionalaspectofseeinginoneoftwoways:(a)theyfinallyfiguredoutwhatwewere(awkwardly)askingthem,or(b) theyfinallyconstructedanexplicitconceptofseeing(whichtheynormallydonotneedinordertogetalonginchimpanzeesociety).Ineithercase,ourresultscanbe interpretedtoshowthatreasoningaboutthementaldimensionofseeingisnotbeyondthecapacityofchimpanzees. Insummary,then,thereareatleastthreedistinctwaysinwhichtocharacterizethenatureofthesocialunderstandingconnectedwithourchimpanzees'final,successful performancesontheseeing/notseeingteststhatwegavethem. 1.Afirstpossibilityisthatbeforeparticipatinginourtests,ourapesdidnotpossessaconceptofattention.However,throughthedifferentialfeedbacktheyreceived, andthethroughourrefinementofthetests,theycametoconstructsuchaconcept,andindeed,learnedoneofitssensorybases(e.g.,seeing). 2.Asecondpossibilityisthatourapesenteredthetestswithageneral,amodalconceptionofattention(perhapsinterpretingattentionasbeinggovernedbyproximity, asopposedtosensorychannelssuchasseeing,hearing,touching,etc.).However,againthroughthefeedbackthatourtestsprovided,theyconstructedthenotionof visualattention. 3.Afinalpossibilityisthatourapesneitherenterednorexitedfromourtestswithanunderstandingofthementalstateofattention.Rather,theyconstructedan"asif" understandingofseeingasattention.Onthisview,ourfeedbackproceduressculptedtheirbehaviorsintoaformthatmatchedourown. Althoughtheremaybetheoreticalreasonsforfavoringoneaccountoveranother,wefoundverylittleinourempiricalresultstoexcludeanyofthesepossibilities (Povinelli&Eddy,1996c,p.134). Year2:FailureofRetention Thirteenmonthsafterwecompletedtheinitialseriesoftestsdescribedpreviously,atleastonemeansofdistinguishingbetweenthesealternativesserendipitously presenteditself.Inthecontextofpreparingourapesfora

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differentsetofexperimentsconcerningtheirunderstandingofjointattention,wereturnedtoourseeing/notseeingprotocols,andtestedthemontheeyesopen/closed procedure.Tooursurprise,ratherthanfindingthiseasy,theanimalswerejustaslikelytogesturetothepersonwhohadtheireyesopenastothepersonwhohad theireyesclosed.Indeed,evenafter48trialsofthiscondition,thesubjectswerestillnotrespondingabovechance(seeFig.11.6).Atfirst,weassumedthatthiswas becauseeyesopen/closedwasthemostsubtleconditionofallofthosewehadpreviouslyused,andthereforetheanimalsmayhaveneverdevelopedarobust understandingofit.Intrigued,wedecidedtotesttheapesontheconditionwithwhichtheyhadreceivedthemostpreviousexperience:screens.Againtooursurprise, however,theirperformanceonlygraduallycreptupacrossthe12trialsweadministeredtolevelsjustabovechance(57%correctseeFig.11.6).Wewerethus forcedtoconsiderthepossibilitythatdespitethefactthatourapeshadbeen89%correctontheirfinalseriesofthescreenstrialsayearearlier,theyhadapparently notconsolidatedthisunderstandingintoaformthatwouldendureayearofparticipatinginothertests. Letmeemphasizethesignificanceofthisfailureofretentionbypointingoutthatourapeswerenotsimplylounginginthesunduringtheyearthatintervenedbetween thesetwolongitudinaltimepoints.Onthecon

Fig.11.6. ResultsfromtestsconductedduringYear2for eyesopen/closed,screens,andback/frontconditions.

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trary,theyhadparticipateddailyinatleastadozenotherexperiments,allofwhichweredesignedtoprobetheirpotentialunderstandingofattention(orothermental statesseePovinelli&O'Neill,inpressPovinelli,Bierschwale,&Cech,inpressPovinelli,Davidson,&Theall,1997Povinelli&Eddy,1996a,1996b,1997 Povinelli,Perilloux,Reaux,&Bierschwale,1998).Indeed,inmanyofthesestudies,theroleofvisualattentionplayedaprominentrole.Althoughthesetestsprovided nobetterevidencethatourapespossessedagenuineunderstandingofattention(oranyothermentalstate),ourfortuitousfindingsonthelongitudinalseeing/notseeing taskraisedamuchbroader,andmuchmoreinteresting,question:Howdidtheexperiencesonthesevarioustestsinteractwitheachother? Onemightnaturallyassumethatmuchlikeyoungchildrenattendingschool,suchtestingexperienceswouldbuildcumulatively,mutuallyreinforcingeachotherina mannerthatwouldassistourapesinhominginon,andbetterunderstanding,thequestionswewereposingtothem(usingavarietyofprocedures).Indeed,we carefullyplannedthenatureandsequenceofourtestswiththisassumptioninmind.Tosomeextent,ofcourse,thismustbetrue.Butouranimals'failuretorapidly understandeventheeasiestseeing/notseeingtasksatthesecondlongitudinaltimepointcausedustorealizethatweneededtomoredirectlyconfronttheexactmanner inwhichtheirtestingexperiencesinteractwitheachother. Certainlyskillsaccumulate.Wehaveampleevidencethatabilitiestheapeslearnedatonetimepointwereretainedyearslater:Oncetheylearnhowtodosomething, theyrememberforaverylongperiodoftime.Butthenwhydidtheyexhibitsuchpoorretentionontheseeing/notseeingtests?Thereareseveralpossibleexplanations. Oneisthatdespiteafullyearofexperiencesonteststhatshouldhavehelpedtoclarifythecentralconstructthatwewereaskingthemabout(i.e.,thementalstateof attention),ourapesfailedtointegratethesenewexperienceswiththeirolderones.Moreintriguingstill,thesenewexperiencesmightactuallyhaveinterferedwithwhat theyhadlearnedayearearlier.Ifourapeshadneverdeeplyunderstoodwhytheywererewardedaftergesturingtothepersonwiththebucketontheshoulderas opposedtothepersonwiththebucketoverthehead,forexample,thensuchrulesmightneverhavebeenwellconsolidatedespeciallygiventhatwedidnot overtrainthemonanyoftheconditionsthemaximumnumberoftrialstheyreceivedinanyoftheconditionswas28(inthescreenscondition).Giventhisratherweak understandingtobeginwith,rulesorrelationslearnedduringinterveningtestsmayhavedisplacedorinterferedwiththeseolderstructures.Inmorestarkterms,ifour apeshadnoconceptofattention,thenallofourtestsmusthaveseemedlikeabizarrecollectionofarbitraryreactionstocertainsocialstimuliwithnothingmore concretethanourreinforcementproceduresunitingthem.

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Year3:PryingApartChimpanzees'UnderstandingofSeeing Weweresostruckwithourapes'absenceofretentionat7yearsofage,thatwereturnedtothesetestswhentheywere8to9yearsofage(seeReauxetal.,in press).Atthispoint,theyhadreachedtheendofadolescenceindeed,withinayear,thefirstbabywouldbeborntotheoldestfemaleinourgroup.Itseemed reasonabletosupposethatifchimpanzeesdevelopanotionofseeingitoughttohaveemergedbythispoint.Ourstrategyforthesefinallongitudinaltestswastwofold. First,weexposedtheanimalstothemainconditionswehadadministeredtwoyearspreviously(screens,buckets,blindfolds,eyesopen/closed,distracted/attending, andback/front).Wedidthistodetermineiftheywouldunderstandtheseconditionsimmediately(perhapsindicatingaqualitativechangeintheirunderstanding),or whethertheywouldbeforcedtorelearnthem.Second,weintendedtodesignsomenoveltransferteststhatwouldallowustomakesomefinalinferencesabout whethertheyhaddevelopedanappreciationoftheattentionalaspectofseeing. First,theresultsoftheirfirstfourtrialsofeachoftheoldconditions(screens,buckets,blindfolds,eyesopen/closed,distracted/attending)aredepictedinFig.11.7. Perhapsthemoststrikingaspectoftheseresultsisthat,inthemajorityoftheseconditions,theapesdisplayedlittleevidencethattheypreferredtorequestfoodfrom thepersonwhocouldseethem.However,theapesdidperformatlevelsexceedingchanceinthebucketscondition(and,asusual,wereperfectontheback/front trials).Therewasnoeasywaytocharacterizetheseresults.Theresultsofthebucketsconditionmightsuggestthattheapeswereabletousethefacerule,buttheir poorperformanceonthescreenscondition(inwhichthefacerulecouldworkjustaswell)didnotfitwiththisidea. Next,weadministeredeightmoretrialsofeachoftheseconditions.AscanbeseenfromthefilledbarsinFig.11.7,thisexperiencehelpedatleastformostofthe conditions.Withthisadditionalexperience,theanimals'performanceimprovedtolevelsexceedingchancein5ofthe6conditions.Theexceptionwastheeyes open/closedcondition.(Whytheanimalshadgreaterdifficultyoneyesopen/closedisunclear.Perhapsitwassimplyamoresubtlediscrimination.Ontheotherhand,it ispossiblethattheapesthoughttheeyesmightopenatanymoment).Atanyrate,onthewholetheseresultsseemedtofittheproceduralrulemodelthathadcaptured theapes'performancesoverthetwopreviousyears.Theapesseemedtohaveconstructedahierarchicalrulestructureinwhichthefront,face,andeyesofthe experimenters(indescendingorderofimportance)servedasthebasesforwheretheapesdirectedtheirbegginggestures.Recallthatthismodelenvisionedthatthe apesweretryingtosatisfycertainrulestructures.First,theysoughttoapproachandgesture

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Fig.11.7. ResultsfrominitialtestsduringYear3forscreens,buckets,blindfolds,eyes open/closed,distracted/attending,andback/front.Thedottedlineindicates levelofperformanceexpectedbychanceresponding.*p<.05,**p<.01.

tosomeonefacingforward.Clearly,theback/frontconditioneasilyallowedthemtosatisfythisrule.Ontheotherhand,ifthiswerenotpossible(e.g.,ifbothpersons werefacingforward),thentheapesmovedontothenextmostimportantrulewhichwastogesturetothepersonwhosefacewasvisible.Inthecaseofbucketsand screens,thisrulewaseasilysatisfied.Ofleastimportancewastheeyesrule,andindeed,atthispointtherewasonlylimitedevidencethattheywereevenusingit.They didperformwellontheblindfoldscondition(whichcouldbesolvedbytheeyes,butnottheface,rule).ButwiththeexceptionofafemaleapenamedMegan,the animalsdidnotappeartounderstandtheeyesopen/closedconditionyet.Furthermore,thesubjectshadrelearnedthedistracted/attendingcondition,whichcouldnot besatisfiedwithanyoftheserules(becauseinthisconditionbothoftheexperimenters'eyesandfaceswerevisible). Collectively,theseresultssuggestedthattheapeswereintheprocessoflearningasetofhierarchicalrules,butbecausetheserulesdidnotworkallofthetime(e.g.,in thedistracted/attendingcondition),theywerealso

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learningconditionspecificrules,whichstrictlyreliedonadiscriminationbetweenthetwopostureswithinthoseconditions.Afterreflectingonsuchconditionspecific learning,weattemptedtodeterminehowthesubjectswerereasoningaboutthoseconditionsonwhichtheywerealreadyperformingwell.Ourfirstapproachwasto mixtogetherthecorrect(seeing)andincorrect(notseeing)optionfromeachofseveralofthedifferentconditions(seeFig.11.8a).Wereasonedthatiftheapeshad learnedasetofconditionspecificrelationalrules,thentheirperformancewouldbeexpectedtodeclineifacorrectoptionfromoneconditionwasmixedwithan incorrectoptionfromanother.Ontheotherhand,iftheapeshadextractedacontextindependentunderstandingthatcertainconfigurationswerecorrect(e.g.,"gesture tothepersonholdingascreenovertheshoulder"),theycouldbeexpectedtoperformwellonthesemixedconditions.Finally,weconsideredtheconditionsthatthe majorityofthesubjectsdidnotyetunderstand,suchaseyesopen/closed.Wereasonedthatbymixingtheincorrectoptionfromtheeyescondition(eyesclosed)with thecorrectoptionfromoneoftheconditionsonwhichtheywereperformingwell(blindfolds),wemightuncoverwhethertheapesunderstoodthesecorrectoptionsas abstractlycorrect,orwhethertheywereunderstoodascorrectonlywithinthecontextofotheroptionsknowntobeincorrect. TheresultsofthesetestsaredepictedinFig.11.8b.Themoststrikingaspectisthatthemixtureofcorrectandincorrectoptionsfromconditionsonwhichtheywere performingwellposednoproblemfortheanimalsinthesecasestheyperformedatlevelsexceedingchance(seeresultsfor+screens/bucketsand+screens/ distractedinFig.11.8b).Indirectcontrast,whenwemixedthecorrectoptionfromaconditiononwhichtheywereperformingwell,withtheincorrectoptionfromthe oneonwhichtheywerenot,theirperformancewasrandom(seeresultsof+blindfolds/eyesand+buckets/eyesinFig.11.8b).Together,theseresultsprovided furtherevidencethattheapeswerelearningaruleaboutgesturingtoapersonwhosefacewasvisible,andthatthisrulecouldbeflexiblydeployedwhenwemixedthe differentoptionsfromsuchconditionstogether.However,theirinabilitytomovebeyondthisruleonthemixedconditionsthatinvolvedtheincorrect,eyesclosed option,suggestedthattheapesweretreatingtheconditionsasproblemstobesolvedbycomparingphysicalpostures,notbyreasoningaboutwhocouldseethem. Megan,however,didnotfitthispattern.Sheperformedreasonablywellonboththefinalseriesofeyesopen/closedtrials(6/8correct)aswellasthemixedconditions involvingeyesclosed(6/8correct),aperformancesignificantlyabovechance(12/16,binomialtest,p=.038). Megan'sperformanceintriguedusbecauseshe,unliketheothers,hadclearlylearnedtheeyesopen/closedconditionduringthefirsttimepointinthislongitudinal project(seePovinelli&Eddy,1996c,Experiment13,

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Fig.11.8. (a)MixedconditionsusedinYear3.(b)ResultsofmixedconditionsinYear3. Thedottedlineindicateslevelofperformanceexpectedbychanceresponding.

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p.100)althoughshedidnotlearnitatthesecondtimepoint,andshowedalearningcurveduringthefinaltimepoint.Suchasubtlediscriminationwasimpressive, andweknewthatsomeresearchersmightinterpretthisasevidencethatshe,atleast,hadlearnedsomethingaboutseeingperse.Herperformancethusprovideda focalpointforourfinaltestbetweenthelowandhighlevelmodels.Recallthatthelowlevelmodelstipulatedthattheapeswerelearningasetofproceduralrulesin whichthefront,face,andeyesservedasthebasesfortheirchoicesindescendingorderofimportance.Ifthisweretrue,thenevenforMeganthefrontalaspectofa personwouldbemoreimportantthanwhetherhisorhereyeswereopen.Tothisend,weconstructedthenewconditionshowninFig.11.9a,inwhichthecorrect optionfromlookingovertheshoulder(afacerulecondition)wascombinedwiththeincorrectoptionfromeyesopen/closed.Thispresentedtheanimalswitha choicebetweensomeonefacingforward(butwhocouldnotseethembecausetheeyeswereclosed)versussomeonefacingawayfromthem,butlookingoverthe shoulderwitheyeswideopenlookingintheirdirection.Wealsotestedtheapesonthreeotherconditions:back/front,eyesopen/closed,andlookingoverthe shoulder(aconditiontheapeshadnotexperiencedin21/2years).Thelowlevelmodelpredictedthatthesubjectswouldsucceedonthelookingovertheshoulder conditionbecausetheycouldusethefacerule.However,thelowlevelmodelalsopredictedthatonthenewmixedconditionthesubjectswouldprefertheincorrect option!Thereasonforthiscounterintuitivepredictionisbecauseofthepostulateddominanceofthefrontrule:Inthisconditionthesubjectswouldapplythefrontrule, andbecauseitcouldbesatisfied,wouldproceedtogesturetothepersonfacingforward,eventhoughtheeyeswereclosed,andnottothepersonlookingoverthe shoulderwithclearlyvisibleeyesandface. TheresultsofthisfinaltestaredepictedinFig.11.9b,andprovidestrikingconfirmationforthelowlevelmodel.First,asexpected,thesubjectstendedtopreferthe correctpersononthelookingovertheshouldertrials.Second,andmostimportant,thesubjectsperformedsignificantlybelowchanceinthemixedcondition,meaning thattheypreferredtogesturetothepersonwhowasfacingforwardbutcouldnotseethemexactlyasthelowlevelmodelhadpredicted.Althoughthiswasstriking enough,thereareadditionalaspectsofthedatasetthatareequallyrevealing.Megan,aswellasBrandyandKara,werealmostperfectonthelookingoverthe shoulderandeyesopen/closedconditions(8/8,8/8,and7/8,respectively,inthetwoconditionscombined).Thus,thesethreeanimalsexhibitedastrongunderstanding oftheconditionsfromwhichthenovel,mixedconditionhadbeencomposed.Yetwhenconfrontedwiththeseconditionsmixedtogether,Megan,Brandy,andKara exhibitedastrongpreferencefortheincorrectoption,selectingthepersonwitheyesclosedon4/4,4/4,and

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Fig.11.9. (a)FinalconditionusedinYear3consistingofeyesclosed()and lookingovertheshoulder(+)options.(b)Resultsfromeyesclosed ()andlookingovertheshoulder(+)condition.Thedottedlineindicates levelofperformanceexpectedbychanceresponding.

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3/4trials,respectively.Howeveronechoosestointerprettheseresults,theycertainlydonotsupporttheideathatMegan,oranyoftheotheranimals,selectedthe eyesopenoptionbecausetheyunderstoodthatthispersoncould''see"them. TheReinterpretationHypothesis Chimpanzeesmayormaynotpossessamentalisticappreciationofcertainaspectsofbehavior.Tobesure,theirspontaneousbehavioralpatternsmirrorourownso closelythatwearetemptedtoassumethattheirgeneralunderstandingofothersissimilartoourown.ButtheresultsthatIhavereviewedherecounselcautionin followingHume,Darwin,andRomanesintoassumingthatbehavioralsimilarityguaranteespsychologicalsimilarity.Intheremainderofthischapter,Ioutlinean alternativeviewoftherelationbetweentheevolutionofspontaneoussocialbehaviorandtheevolutionofsocialunderstandingthatwehavelabeledthe "reinterpretationhypothesis."(Intheinterestsofspace,theindictmentoftheargumentbyanalogyiskeptbroad,butadetailed,formalcritiquecanbefoundinPovinelli &Giambrone,inpress.) InordertoappreciatethealternativethatIamabouttooutline,itisnecessary,curiously,toconceptuallydecoupletheevolutionofbehavioralcomplexityfromthe evolutionofcognitiveabilitiesrelatedtotheoryofmind.Recentthinkinginthisareahasbeenintheoppositedirection,withmanytheoristssupposingthattheoryof mindevolvedinordertocopewithonlinesocialproblemsthesocalledsocialintelligencehypothesis(forvarioustreatmentsofthesocialintelligencehypothesis, seeBaronCohen,1995Byrne,1995deWaal,1982Gallup,1982Humphrey,1976Jolly,1966Whiten,1996Whiten&Byrne,1988seealsocontributionsto Byrne&Whiten,1988).ButIexploreanalternativepossibility,namely,thatalthoughintensesociality(characteristicofmanyspeciesofprimates)drovetheevolution ofincreasinglycomplicatedsocialbehaviors,thesebehaviorsweregovernedbypsychologicalsystemsessentiallynodifferentfromtheearliestmammals.Tobesure, variouslineagesofprimatesmayhaveevolvedcognitivespecializationsinvariousdomainstocopewiththeuniquechallengesposedbytheirwayoflife.ButIsuppose thatsocialcomplexitymediatedthroughandmanifestedbygazefollowing,deception,selectiveretaliation,reconciliation,andappeasementallevolvedlongbefore abilitiesrelatedtotheoryofmind.Thus,Iwishtodrawadistinctionbetweentheemergenceofbehavioralcomplexitygeneratedthroughfairlylowlevelpsychological mechanisms,andanunderstandingorinterpretationofsuchbehaviorsintermsofmentalstatessuchasattention,desire,knowledge,andbelief.

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Next,letusconsidertheevolutionoftheoryofmind.Itispossiblethatonlyonespecies,ourown,evolvedacognitivespecializationintheoryofmind.Perhapsit evolvedasaseparate,domaingeneralfacultyontheotherhand,itmayhaveevolvedasamorespecificsystemtoaideinalreadycomplicatedsocialcomputations. Finally,andperhapsmostlikely,itmayhaveevolvedinconnectionwiththeevolutionofaspecializedlanguagecapacity.But,nomatterhowitarose,thisnew psychologymaynothavereplacedthepsychologicalstructuresthatpredatedit.Afundamentallynewspecializationintheoryofmindmayhavebeencreatedwithout destroyingthericharrayofsocialbehaviorsthathasemergedduringthecourseofprimateevolution.Psychologicalstates(ultimatelyreducibletobrainstates)may,in acomplicatedandinterdependentmanner,carrytheancientalongsidethenew.JustasdevelopmentalconstraintsthatwereestablishedintheCambrianarereflectedin thebodilystructuresofmodernlineages,so,too,mightwesupposethatinnovationsinpsychologicalstructuresaccommodatedtheold.Iftrue,thisnewpsychological systemmayhaveallowed(indeed,forced)humanstoreinterpretancientsocialbehaviors(behaviorsthatevolvedlongbeforewedid)inexplicitlymentalisticterms. Gazefollowingisanexcellentcaseinpoint.Thisisaphenomenonsharedbyhumans,chimpanzees,andmany(perhapsmost)speciesofmonkeys.Humansare certainlycapableofinterpretingtheshiftingazeofothersinanexplicitlymentalisticmanner.Thatis,ashiftingazecanbeequatedwithashiftinattentionalor referentialfocus.Indeed,someresearchershaveinterpretedgazefollowingby9to12montholdhumaninfantsasreflectingpreciselythiskindofunderstanding(see BaronCohen,1994).Othershavedemandedmorerigorousdemonstrations,butevenusingthesemethodstheyhavearguedthatby18monthsorsothereis evidenceforsuchunderstanding(seereviewbyBaldwin&Moses,1994).AlthoughIhavereservationsaboutbothpositions,surelythereissomeperiodduringthe preschoolyearsinwhichamentalisticunderstandingofgazeisconsolidated.Thatis,atsomepoint,gazeisunderstoodasabehavioralambassadorforthementalstate ofattention. Thisraisestwoproblemsfortheargumentbyanalogy,onedevelopmental,theotherevolutionary.Fromthedevelopmentalperspective,wemayhavealready identifiedacasewheresimilarityinbehaviordoesnotguaranteesimilarityinattendingpsychologicalstates:gazefollowingin9to12montholdinfants.Althoughitis truethateveninadultstheremayalsobemanycasesinwhichthebehaviorofgazefollowingistriggeredbeforetherepresentationoftheotherperson'sattentional state,theremayalsobeothercasesinwhichtheadult'sgazefollowingbehaviorisdirectlycausedbytherepresentationoftheother'sinternalstate(e.g.,"Whatisshe lookingat?").Incontrast,itisatleastpossiblethatthe9to

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12monthold'sgazefollowingbehaviormayneverbetriggeredbyarepresentationofattentionperhapsbecausetheycannotyetrepresentthebehaviorin mentalisticterms.Indeed,fromthedevelopmentalperspective,thisargumentmayreallyjustbeageneralstatementofKarmiloffSmith's(1992)notionof "representationalredescription."Shearguesthatthedissociationsoftenfoundinhumandevelopmentbetweenchildren'sabilitytoproduceandtheirinabilityto understandit,areevidenceforaprocesswherebyproceduralinformationisprogressivelyredescribedinincreasinglyexplicitways. Thesecondcaseistheevolutionaryproblem.Insteadofcomparinganinfanthumantoanadulthuman,letuscompareanadultchimpanzeetoanadulthuman. AlthoughIhaveonlypresentedasmallportionofourworkinthischapter,collectivelyitsuggeststhatdespitetheirsophisticatedgazefollowingabilities,chimpanzees havelittleornounderstandingthatgazeislinkedtointernalmentalstates.Thus,althoughachimpanzeewhofollowsyourgazetugsonaHumeaninclinationtoassume thatheorsheistryingtofigureoutwhatyouare"lookingat,"thereisconsiderablereasontosupposethatheorshedoesnotunderstandtheconceptof"lookingat"in thefirstplace.Furthermore,thelongitudinalprojectIhavedescribedinthischapterrevealsthatalthoughwecangetourchimpanzees(like2to3yearoldchildren) toselectivelygesturetowardsomeonewhocanseethemasopposedtosomeonewhocannot,thissimilaritybetweentheirbehaviorbeliesprofoundunderlying differencesintheattendingpsychologicalinterpretationoftheact. Thishypothesishasatleastoneclearadvantageoverthesocialintelligencehypothesis:Itneatlyreconcilestheevolutionofsocialcomplexitywiththedatasummarized inthischapter.Thesuperficiallyconfusingmosaicofsimilarityanddifferencenolongerneedbeseeninconflict.IntheviewthatIamofferinghere,ancientsocial behaviorsaresharedincommonbyhumansandotherprimatessuchaschimpanzees.Thus,weexpectandseeanastoundingdegreeofspontaneousbehavioral similarity.Buthumansdomore.Humansinterpretthisbehavior.ItmayseemasifIamadvocatingaformdualisminwhichtherepresentationofmentalstates accompany,butplaynocausativerolein,behavior.Onthecontrary,Iassumethathumansevolvedthecapacitytorepresentthementalstatesofselfandother becauseofitsuseful,causalconnectiontobehavior.Butasthecaseofgazefollowingshouldmakeclear,twospeciesmayshareaverysimilarbehavior,controlledby similarlowlevelmechanisms,butinterpretthatbehaviorinverydifferentways.Doesthismeanthatthehumantraitofrepresentingtheattentionalaspectofgazeis superfluous?No,becausealthoughitmaynotbedirectlylinkedtotheactoffollowinggaze,therepresentationofattention(andothermentalstates)mayplaya profoundroleatahigherlevelofbehavioralorganization.Oncehumansevolvedthecapacitytorepresentotherorgan

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ismsnotjustasbehavingbeings,butasbeingswhoattend,want,andthink,itbecamenecessarytousealreadyexistingbehaviorstorespondtotheworldofthemind, aswellastheworldofbehavior.Thisdistinctionmaybeespeciallyimportantinthosepsychologicalarenasinwhichweseemtodiffermostfromotherspeciessuchas culture,pedagogy,andethics.Determiningthecorrectcausalconnectionsbetweenindividualbehavioralelementsandthementalstatesthatultimatelycontroltheir expressionmaysimplybeaprojectbeyondthereachofintrospectionalone(foramorethoroughdescriptionofthecausalroleIascribetohigherorderintentional states,seePovinelli&Giambrone,inpress). Thus,theerrorintheargumentbyanalogyappearstwofold.First,theargumentmistakenlyassumesthatanaccurateintrospectiveassessmentofsecond(orhigher) orderintentionalstatesthataccompanyourownbehaviorsislikelytoyieldanaccurateinferenceastotheircause.Second,theerroriscompoundedbythe assumptionthatbecausementalstatesaccompanyourbehavior,similarmentalstatesmustaccompanysimilarbehaviorinotherspecies.Althoughhumansforminternal representationsofmentalstatessuchasdesires,knowledge,andbeliefs,andtheserepresentationsarenowconnectedincausalwaystoourbehaviors(albeitinways toocomplicatedforintrospectiontoreveal),ourbasicbehavioralrepertoireevolvedlongbeforethosehigherlevelrepresentationswerepossible. Acknowledgments ThisresearchwassupportedbyNSFYoungInvestigatorAwardSBR8458111toD.J.Povinelli.Thisresearchwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthetalentsof numerousstaffandstudentswhohaveassistedinthetrainingandtestingofthechimpanzeesoverthepastfiveyears,inparticularAnthonyRideaux,JamesReaux, DonnaBierschwale,LauraTheall,andTimothyEddy.PhotographsarebyDonnaT.BierschwaleandCoreyG.Porch. References Baldwin,D.A.(1991).Infants'contributiontotheachievementofjointreference.ChildDevelopment,63,875890. Baldwin,D.A.(1993).Earlyreferentialunderstanding:Infants'abilitytorecognizereferentialactsforwhattheyare.DevelopmentalPsychology,29,832843. Baldwin,D.A.,&Moses,L.J.(1994).Earlyunderstandingofreferentialintentandattentionalfocus:Evidencefromlanguageandemotion.InC.Lewis&P.Mitchell (Eds.),Children'searlyunderstandingofmind(pp.133156).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. BaronCohen,S.(1994).Howtobuildababythatcanreadminds:Cognitivemechanismsinmindreading.CurrentPsychologyofCognition,13,513552.

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Perrett,D.,Harries,M.,Mistlin,A.,Hietanen,J.,Benson,P.,Bevan,R.,Thomas,S.,Oram,M.,Ortega,J.,&Briery,K.(1990).Socialsignalsanalyzedatthesingle celllevel:Someoneislookingatme,somethingtouchedme,somethingmoved!InternationalJournalofComparativePsychology,4,2555. Povinelli,D.J.(1996).Growingupape.MonographsoftheSocietyforResearchinChildDevelopment,61(2,SerialNo.247). Povinelli,D.J.,Bierschwale,D.T.,&Cech,C.G.(inpress).Comprehensionofseeingasareferentialactinyoungchildren,butnotjuvenilechimpanzees.British JournalofDevelopmentalPsychology. Povinelli,D.J.,Davidson,C.A.,&Theall,L.A.(1997).Chimpanzeesdeployattentiongettingbehaviorsindependentoftheattentionalstatesofothers. Manuscriptsubmittedforpublication. Povinelli,D.J.,&Eddy,T.J.(1996a).Chimpanzees:Jointvisualattention.PsychologicalScience,7,129135. Povinelli,D.J.,&Eddy,T.J.(1996b).Factorsinfluencingyoungchimpanzees'recognitionofattention.JournalofComparativePsychology,110,336345. Povinelli,D.J.,&Eddy,T.J.(1996c).Whatyoungchimpanzeesknowaboutseeing.MonographsoftheSocietyforResearchinChildDevelopment,61(2,Serial No.247). Povinelli,D.J.,&Eddy,T.J.(1997).Specificityofgazefollowinginyoungchimpanzees.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,15,213222. Povinelli,D.J.,&Giambrone,S.(inpress).Inferringotherminds:Flawsintheargumentbyanalogy.PhilosophicalTopics. Povinelli,D.J.,&O'Neill,D.K.(inpress).Dochimpanzeesusegesturestoinstructeachotherduringcooperativesituations?InS.BaronCohen,H.TagerFlusberg, &D.J.Cohen(Eds.),Understandingotherminds:Perspectivesfromautism2ndedition.Oxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress. Povinelli,D.J.,Perilloux,H.K.,Reaux,J.E.,&Bierschwale,D.T.(1998).Youngandjuvenilechimpanzees'reactionstointentionalversusaccidentalandinadvertent actions.BehavioralProcesses,42,205218. Premack,D.(1988).Mindswithandwithoutlanguage.InL.Weiskrantz(Ed.),ThoughtwithoutLanguage(pp.4665).Oxford,England:ClarendonPress. Reaux,J.E.,Theall,L.A.,&Povinelli,D.J.(inpress).Alongitudinalinvestigationofchimpanzees'understandingofvisualperception.ChildDevelopment. Romanes,G.J.(1882).Animalintelligence.London:KeaganPaul. Romanes,G.J.(1883).Mentalevolutioninanimals.NewYork:Appleton. Russell,B.(1948).Humanknowledge:Itsscopeandlimits.London:UnwinHyman. Thomas,R.K.(1988).Misdescriptionandmisuseofanecdotesandmentalstateconcepts.BehavioralandBrainSciences,11,265266. Tomasello,M.(1995).Thepowerofculture:Evidencefromapes.HumanDevelopment,38,4652. Tomasello,M.,Call,J.,&Hare,B.(inpress).Fiveprimatespeciesfollowthevisualgazeofconspecifics.AnimalBehavior. Tomasello,M.,Kruger,A.C.,&Ratner,H.H.(1993).Culturallearning.BehavioralandBrainSciences,16,495552. Whiten,A.,&Byrne,R.W.(1988).Tacticaldeceptioninprimates.BehavioralandBrainSciences,11,233244. Whiten,A.(1996).Whendoessmartbehaviourreadingbecomemindreading?InP.Carruthers&P.Smith(Eds.),Theoriesoftheoriesofmind(pp.277292). Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress.

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PARTIII THESOCIOCULTURALCONTEXTOFINTENTIONALITY

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Chapter12 MakingSenseoftheSocialWorld: Mindreading,Emotion,andRelationships

JudyDunn InstituteofPsychiatry,London,England Inthedecadesincethe1986meetinginToronto(Astington,Harris,&Olson,1988),interestinchildren'sunderstandingofmindblossomedinanextraordinaryway:It dominatesdevelopmentalpsychologytoanextentthatmustsurpriseeventheorganizersofthatTorontooccasion.Interestinchildren'smindreadingbroughttogether theoristsandideasfromverydifferentarenasfromphilosophy,psychology,evolutionarytheory,neurobiology,psychopathologyechoingBaldwin's(1895) insistencethatthesedisciplinaryboundariesmustbedoneawaywith.Thischapterisframedaroundtwoissues:whatwenowknow,afteradecadeofthisenergetic researchintomindreading,andwhatweneedtoknowaboutchildren'sunderstandingofmind,emotion,andthesocialworld. WhatWeNowKnow Thechieffocusofresearchhasbeenonthedelineationofnormativeagechangesinchildren'sgraspofwhattheminddoes.Wenowhaveapictureofwhatchildren understandoftheirownandothers'mentalstatesinthepreschoolyearsoftheirgrowingabilitytodistinguishthoughtsandthingsandtoreflectonandplaywith hypotheticaleventsandoftheirpropensitytotalkaboutwhattheyandotherpeoplewant,feel,andsee.Then,astheyreach4years,theirburgeoninginterestin talkingaboutthinking,knowing,andrememberingisdocumented(Bartsch&Wellman,1995).Wehave

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learnedmuchaboutthenatureofchildren'sunderstandingofmentalrepresentation,andtheirgraspofthelinksbetweenpeople'sactionandtheirrepresentationofthe worldwhichmaybemistaken.ThisresearchissummarizedbyAstington(1993)inherwonderfullylucidbookTheChild'sDiscoveryoftheMind,andIdonot discussithere.Rather,myfocusisonwhatwenowknowofhowthisunderstandingbecomesapparentinchildren'ssociallives,andwhatsocialprocessesmaybe implicatedinthedevelopmentofthisunderstanding,issuesthathavereceivedmuchlessattention. Iexaminetherelationoftheseextraordinarydevelopmentsincognitiontothesocialandemotionalcontextofchildren'slives,andthepragmaticsoftheir communicationwithothers.Ifweareconcernedaboutanyofthefollowingthenatureofchildren'sunderstandingofmindanditslinkstohumanaction,development andchangeinthatunderstanding,theprocessesormechanismsbywhichitchanges,ortheuseofthatunderstandinginchildren'slivesthenwehavetotakeseriously therelationsofemotionandsocialcontexttotheunderstandingthatweareinvestigating.Otherwiseweruntheriskofmisrepresentingthefirsttwo,andfailingtomake progressinunderstandingthesecondtwo.Sowhathavewelearnedaboutthelinksbetweenunderstandingandsocioemotionalcontext? MindreadingBeginsintheFamily First,acommonplace.Thedailylivesofyoungchildrenarefullofemotionaldrama.Theroutineeventsoffamilylifecanbeeventsofmajoraffectivesignificanceto children(aswellastoadults).Theyarenotsituationsofemotionalneutralitybutsettingsinwhichchildrenareemotionallyreadytoattendtoandlearnabouttheother personsintheirworld(Dunn,1988).Evenintheearliestexchangesbetweenparentandchildinthefirstyear,emotionsplayacentralrole.Brunerandothers highlightedthekeyplacethatmothers'attributionofintentiontoveryyoungbabiesmayplayinthedevelopmentofcommunication(Bruner,1983).Whenbabiescryin distress,theymayhavenointentiontocommunicate,yettheirparentstreatsuchevidenceofdistressasintentionalcommunication.Itiswithinthissituationthatchildren begintounderstandthemeaningoftheircryingforothers:Theargumentisthatchildrengraduallyacquiretheabilitytocommunicateintentionallywiththeconventions oftheculturetheysharewiththeirparents,throughtheinterpretationsofferedbyadultsinsuchexchanges(seealsoReznick,chap.13,thisvolume). Acentralpointisthatsuchinteractionsarerarelyemotionallyneutral.Akeythemeinthischapteristhatweshouldtakeseriousaccountoftheplaceandroleof emotionsintheearlieststagesofcommunication,andinthegrowthofintentionalityandunderstandingofintentions.Intheseearlyexchanges,parentssetbothsidesof theconversationwithexplicit

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commentsonwhatthebabywantsorfeels:"Oh,youarefeelinghungry,Iknow!"or"Ohallright,weknowwhatyouwant!"Thusparentsframethebeginningsof intentionalcommunicationforthebabytheirattributionsofintentions,feelings,anddesirestothebaby'sgrimacesandwailingandflailinggesturesareattemptsto maketheworldmoreintelligibletothebaby,andthebabymoreintelligibletothem.Indeed,parentalinterpretationofthebabyiscenteredonthebaby'sexpressionof emotionhisorherdistress,frustration,anger,andalittlelater,happinessandpleasure.Intheseincidents,thebaby'sexpressionofemotioniscrucialinparents' attributionofintentions,andIsuggestthatemotionsarecrucialinhowtheintentionalstanceisappliedmuchmoregenerally.Ifwearetounderstandbabies'growing appreciationofintentions,wecannotignorethesignificanceofemotionsinthatappreciation. Earlysignsofmindreading(evidentinthesecondyear)arerevealedinfamilyinteractionsinwhichemotionsoftenplayacentralpart.Examplesofteasing,which reflectssomegraspofwhatwillannoyorupsetanother,jokesthatindicatesomeanticipationofwhatanotherwillfindfunny,andcomforting,whichreflectsagrasp ofwhatwilldecreasesomeoneelse'sdistress(Dunn,1988Reddy,1991),areallevidenceforgrowingunderstanding.Thesituationsinwhichchildrenrevealthese earlypowersofunderstandingallhaveaparticularemotionalvalencefrustration,amusement,desire.Rarelyarethesesituationsaffectivelyneutral.Inthethirdand fourthyearsofchildren'slives,fourkindsofinteractiveeventsrevealparticularlyvividlychildren'smindreadingabilitiesandemotionsare,heretoo,especiallysalient. Thesefourcategoriesofinteractionareimportantbecausetheyalsosuggestprocessesormechanismsthatmaybeimplicatedinthedevelopmentofchildren's mindreadingabilities.Theyareconversationsaboutinnerstates,jointpretendplay,earlynarratives,andearlydeception. ConversationsAboutInnerStates Childrenshowaveryearlyandrapidlygrowingcuriosityaboutandinterestininnerstates.Overthethirdyear,ourstudiesshowed,theirquestionsaboutother people'sfeelingsandwants,andaboutwhytheyactthewaytheydo,increasemarkedlyinfrequency(Dunn,1988).Frequentlytheirquestionsaboutothersare focusedonhurtorupset:"Areyouallright?""Whyareyoucrying?"and"What'sthatfrightenyou,Mum?"Livelycuriositywasalsoshowninourstudiesaboutthe observer'slikesanddislikes.Questionswewereaskedincluded:"Doyoulikemonsters?""Doyoulikedogs?''"Wantalittlebitofbiscuit?""Doyougetcross?"and "Youlikeyourbaby?"Children'squestionsaboutotherpeopleduringthethirdyearincludedquestionsaboutstorybookcharactersaswellasfamiliarfriendsand familymembers.Polly,intheexamplethatfollows,ispuzzlingovertheactionsofarabbitinthestoryhermotherisreadingtoher,andoffersaglossontherabbit's reactiontomissingabus:

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Polly(36months)andhermotherarelookingatthebook.Polly'smotherquotestherabbitinthestoryassaying,"Waitforme!":
Polly:Whysaying,"Waitforme"? Mother:Catchingthebus. Polly:Anditdoesannoyrabbithedon'tgotthebus.

Threedifferentlongitudinalstudieshavenowshownlinksbetweenengagementinconversationsaboutinnerstatesandlaterdifferencesinthesophisticationand maturityofchildren'sunderstandingofmindandemotion(Dunn,Brown,&Beardsall,1991Dunn,Brown,Slomkowski,Tesla,&Youngblade,1991Hughes& Dunn,1998).Itisinterestingtonotethatexperimentalstudiesusingtheoryofmindscenariosshowthatchildren'ssuccessonthesetasksisenhancedifchildrenhave theopportunitytoengageinconversationsaboutthetaskandthebehavioroftheprotagonists(Appleton&Reddy,1996). Whatprecipitatesconversationsaboutinnerstates,innaturalsettings?Twothemesstandoutfromournaturalisticstudies.Thefirstthemeconcernsemotion.Itisclear thatchildren'saffectiveexpressionsareimportantinthegenesisoftalkaboutfeelingsduringthesecondandthirdyears.InourPennsylvanianstudy(Dunn,Brown, Slomkowski,Tesla,&Youngblade,1991),themothersweremorethantwiceaslikelytotalkaboutfeelingswiththeirchildrenwhenthechildrenwereexpressing distressorangerthanwhenthechildrenwerehappyorexpressingneutralfeelings(Dunn&Brown,1994).Also,thechildrenweremorelikelytoengageincausal discussionoffeelingswhentheyweremildlyangryorupsetthefrequencyofsuchcausalconversationswascorrelatedovertimewithlateremotionunderstandingin testsituations(Dunn&Brown,1993). Thesecondkeythemethatstoodoutfromtheseanalysesofconversationsaboutinnerstateswasthesignificanceoftheparticularpragmaticcontext,notjustthe content,ofthetalk.Forexample,whenmothers'causaltalkwasinthecontextofsharedplayorjoking,childrenweremostsuccessfulinthelaterstandardized assessmentsofsocialunderstanding(Dunn&Brown,1993)thecorrelationswithtestperformanceofearliercausaltalkinthecontextofcontrolandconflictwere,in contrast,negative.Itisclearlyimportanttoexaminewhattheinterlocutorsaretryingtodointheconversationthe"contextsofpractice"towhichBruner(1983, 1990)hasdrawnourattentioninthestudyoflanguageacquisition.Thesignificanceoffamilytalkaboutinnerstatesdoesnotliejustinanaffectivelyneutral"meetingof minds." Therecentresearchonchildren'sinteractionswithotherchildrenhighlightsthepotentialofquitedifferentpragmaticcontextsfromthoseofmostparentchild conversations.Children'ssocialworldsincludeothers,aswellasthoseexpert,didacticadults,whoserole,withinaVygotskianframework,hasbeenseenascrucial forchildrenasapprentices.Fromearly

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childhoodonwardinmostcultures,includingourown,childrenspendmoretimeinteractingwithsiblingsandpeersthantheydowithadults.Acloseexaminationof thesechildchildinteractions,whichpresentquitedifferentchallengesandrewardsfromthoseofcommunicatingwithparentsorsympatheticadults,revealsevidence fortheirpotentialasinfluencesonsocialunderstanding. Threelinesofevidencehighlightthispoint.First,childrenwithsiblingsdobetterontheoryofmindtasksthanthosewithoutsiblings(Perner,Ruffman,&Leekam, 1994).Second,thenumberofsiblingsandotherkinwithwhomchildreninteractdailyispositivelycorrelatedwiththeoryofmindsuccess(Lewis,Freeman, Kyriakidou,MaridakiKossotaki,&Berridge,1996).Third,akeycontributortosuccessontheoryofmindtasksistheexperienceofearlierpositivecooperative relationswithasibling(Dunn,Brown,Slomkowski,Tesla,&Youngblade,1991). Whatcommunicativeexperiencesbetweenchildrenmightbeimplicatedinthegrowthofearlyunderstandingofmindandemotion?Akeyfindingfromourresearch thatincludedobservationsofthesamechildrenwiththeirparents,theirsiblings,andtheirfriendsisthatthechildren'sconversationsaboutinnerstateswerefarmore frequentwiththeirfriendsandsiblingsthanwiththeirmothers(Brown,DonelanMcCall,&Dunn,1996).Whereastheirreferencestomentalstatesinconversation withtheirmotherswerechieflyreferencestotheirownthoughtsandbeliefs,withtheirsiblingsandfriendstheyweremorelikelytotalkaboutsharedthoughtsand ideas,andthesereferencestosharedthoughtswerecorrelatedwiththeirownperformanceontheoryofmindtasks.Thesereferenceshappenedchieflyinpositive cooperativeplay:Theirfrequencywaspositivelyrelatedtotheobservers'ratingofthepositivequalityofthefriendship,tothedurationofthefriendship,andtothe frequencywithwhichthefriendsplayedtogether.Thatis,thequalityofthefriendshipwascloselyrelatedtotheextentoftheirdiscourseaboutinnerstates.Andthe discussioninvolvingmentalstatetermsservedimportantpragmaticfunctions,facilitatingcollaborationbyclarifyingintentions,sustainingthejointnarrativethemental statetalkwasintheserviceofthecollaborativeenterprise,thegoalofkeepingtheexcitingplaygoing.Theinteractionalcontextinwhichnegotiationofbeliefsand suppositionsareparticularlyrelevantis,ofcourse,jointpretend. JointPretend Fourindependentstudieshavenowshownthatindividualdifferencesinchildren'sexperiencesofsharingapretendworldwithanotherchildareassociatedwiththeir successontheoryofmindandemotionunderstandingassessments(Astington&Jenkins,1995Dunn&Cutting,1998Hughes&Dunn,1997Youngblade&Dunn, 1995).Plainly,thisplayinwhichrolesaretakenupandastorylinejointlyplannedshouldbe

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greatlyfacilitatedbytheabilitytotakeaccountofanotherchild'sthoughtsandintentionsinturn,effortstocollaborateonsharingandshapingaworldofpretend identitiesappearlikelytofosterthisability.Thegeneralpointofimportanceisthatthesedatashowusthatchildrenbegintoentertainmultiplehypotheticalrealitiesand "decouple"realityfromfantasynotassolitarycognitiveenterprises,butthroughnegotiatingsocialinteractionsinwhichthesecognitivestatesareshared(avery Baldwinianidea). Animportantcautionarynoteisthatwecannotmakecausalinferencesfromsuchcorrelationaldata:Thepatternsovertimeinourstudiescouldwellreflectacommon causalfactor,suchascontinuingcharacteristicsofchildrenthatarereflectedbothintheirperformanceonmindreadingtasksandintheirpropensitytoengageinjoint pretendplay.Butthereisclearlyaplausiblecasetobemadeforthepotentialofjointpretendwithanotherchildasacontextinwhichmindreadingcanbefostered.It isinterestingthatBaldwin(1895),observingtheextendedpretendplayofhistwodaughtersaged2and4,commented,"Theprolongedsituations,maintained sometimeswholedaysorpossiblyweeks,givestrengthtotheimagination....Thesenseofessentialreality,anditsdistinctionfromtheunreal...ishelpedbythissort ofsymbolicrepresentation"(p.346). EarlyNarratives Thethirdkindofcommunicativeeventthatrevealsandpossiblyfosterschildren'searlyunderstandingofthelinksbetweenmind,emotion,andhumanactionistheir engagementinnarratives.BrunerandFeldman(1993)arguedpowerfullyforthesignificanceofnarrativeasaprocessthroughwhichthedevelopmentofunderstanding ofmindandemotionmaybeinfluenced.Patternsofnarrative,theypropose,scaffoldthekindofmetacognitionaboutintentionsthatliesatthecoreoftheoriesofmind. Inourstudiesofthesecond,third,andfourthyears,wefoundthatdevelopmentofchildren'sunsolicitednarrativesaboutthepastparallelsthatoftheircommentson psychologicalissuesmoregenerally.Buttheseearlynarrativeswerenotemotionallyneutralexamplesofcognitivesophistication.MycolleagueJaneBrown'selegant studyofchildren'searlytalkaboutthepasthighlightedtwokeyissuesconcerningtheseearlynarratives(Brown,1995Dunn,1988). Thefirstissuewasthatthechildrenmusteredtheirmostsophisticatedlinguisticskillsreferringtoinnerstates,sequencingeventstemporallyandcausallywhenthey reportedeventsinvolvingfear,anger,ordistress.Inthefollowingexample,a47montholdrunsbackfromthegardentothehousetotellhersiblingaboutasequence ofevents,andinherstoryshelinkstheseeventstoherfeelingsandsubsequentaction:
Childtosibling(assherunsintohousefromthegarden):Icamerunningback'causeIsawtwosnakesandIwasscaredandIrunnedback!

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Itwastheemotionaldramasintheirlivesthatpromptedthechildrentoembarkontellingcoherentstoriesaboutthepastandespeciallyabouttheirnegative experiences.AsBrown(1995)noted,"Whenchildrentalkedaboutnegativeevents,andinparticular,whentheydidsoineffortstogetanothertoactontheirbehalf, theymusteredtheirmostsophisticatedlanguageskills."Hudsonandhercolleagues(Hudson,Gebelt,Haviland,&Bentivegna,1992)haveparallelfindings,showing thatchildrenweremorelikelytouseaplottedstorystructureandfocusoncausesandconsequenceswhentellingastoryinvolvingangerorfearthanwhentellingone involvinghappiness.Happystoriestendedtobesimpler,focusingontheemotionaltoneofthemomentintime.Hudsonandcolleaguesarguedthatthesedifferences maywellreflectdifferencesinhowweconceiveofandrememberemotionalexperience.Negativeemotionalexperiencesfrequentlyinvolveblockedgoalsandthusa complicatingactionso,theylendthemselvestoacausallyortemporallysequencedstructure.Happyexperiences,incontrast,areoftensimplyconveyed,aswhenone ofthechildreninourstudiesexclaimedtoherolderbrother,"Ipeedbymyself,Ryan!"(Brown,1995). ThesecondissuetowhichBrown(1995)drewattentionconcernedpragmatics.Sheshowedthattalkaboutnegativepasteventspredominatedwhenchildrenwere attemptingtoinfluenceanother'sbehavior.Incontrast,talkabouthappyorneutraleventsoccurredmostoftenwhenchildrenwerenottryingtogetsomeonetodo something. Thisevidencefortheinstrumentalcontextofnarrativesisimportant.Familiesandfriendsengageinfrequentnegotiationsaboutwhoserightswereviolatedina transgression,orwhowasresponsiblewhenanaccidenthappened.Theirdiscussionofthepastoftenconcernstherecentpast,whichwasexperiencedjointlybutfrom differentandoftencompetingperspectives.Achild'sabilitytoconstructherowncompellingandbelievableaccountofwhathappenedmaybecalledontoagreater degreeinthecontextofadisputethaninothersettings.This"communicationpressure,"touseMannleandTomasello's(1987)phrase,andtheurgencytohavehisor herownneedsmetareprobablycontributorstothedevelopmentofachild'scommunicativecompetence.Ourdataalsoshowedthatchildrenhavemultiple opportunitiestolearnhowbesttotellwhathappenedfromlisteningtotheexchangesbetweentheiroldersiblingsandparentsoldersiblingsfrequentlywinarguments becauseoftheirmoresophisticatednarrativeaccounts(Brown,1995).Theyoungerchildrenwitnessingtheseargumentsaregivenclearopportunitiestolearnfrom morecompetentotherswhoseinterestswereoftenatoddswiththeyoungerchildren'sown. AgainwecomebacktothelimitationsofaVygotskiantraditionthatfocusesonlyonrelativelydidacticinteractions.Itisimportantnottolosesightofthehighly chargedemotionalcontextsinwhichchildren'scognitive

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skillsdevelopandtherelationshipgoalsthatshouldsurelybeincludedinourinvestigations.AsGoodnow(1990)pointedout,thepictureofchildren'sworldsthatis paintedinmuchresearchwithinaVygotskianperspectiveisofa"benignandrelativelyneutralworld"thatignorestheaffectiveaspectsofcognitivedevelopment. EarlyDeception Thefourthkindofcommunicativeeventofevidentrelevancetochildren'sgrowingunderstandingofmindisdeception.Incidentsofapparentattemptstodeceive parents,toshiftblameformisdeedsontoabrotherorsister,ortogivefalseexcusesforwrongdoingaresostriking,socommon,andseensoearlyinchildren's development,ifweobservechildrenintheirfamilyworld(Dunn,1988).Thequestionofwhetheryoungchildrenof3,4,or5yearsofageintentionallydeceiveothers isrightatthecenterofaccountsofthedevelopmentofunderstandingotherminds.Anditisaverycontentiousissue:Experimentalstudiesvaryverymuchinthe accountsofthedevelopmentofdeceptionthattheygenerate(Chandler,Fritz,&Hala,1989Sodian,1991Strichartz&Burton,1990).However,Newton(1994) carriedoutaseriesofstudiesofnaturallyoccurringincidentsinwhichchildrenapparentlyattemptedtodeceiveotherfamilymembers.Thesestudiesshowedfirstthat 3yearoldsengageintypesofdeceptionsimilartothoseof4yearolds,althoughnotasfrequently.Thatis,the3yearoldswerealreadyattemptingtomanipulate whatotherfamilymembersthoughtorexpected.Second,evenchildrenwhofailedthetheoryofmindtestswereobservedtoattempttodeceiveothers.Andthird, children'sattemptstodeceiveweremostfrequentlymade"insituationsofconflictwhenthechildisinanemotionallychargedstateofoppositiontoparental control"(Newton,1994).Interestingtonote,children'smotivationtodeceiveappeared,accordingtoNewton,tobefarmoresubtlethansimplytheavoidanceof punishment.Examplesoffalseboasting,andbravadointhefaceofpainfulpunishmentdemonstratedthateven3and4yearoldsengagedinimpressionmanagement. Thesefindingsareachallengetotheaccountsbasedonexperimentalsettings,andreinforcetheargumentthatifattheendofthedaywewanttoexplainreallife behavior,wesimplycannotignoretherealityofchildren'ssocialbehaviorinsituationsthatmattertothem,ortheirinteractivegoalsintheircloserelationships. WhatWeNeedtoKnow Wehavelearnedmuchoverthelastdecadeaboutthekeysignificanceoftheemotionalcontext,andofwhatchildrenandthoseinteractingwiththemaretryingtodo whentheycommunicate,forchildren'sgrowing

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socialunderstanding.Thislastsectionfocusesonthreesetsofquestionsthatstandoutasissuesforfutureresearchagenda. Causes Oneofthemostintractableofquestionsconcernsthecausesofdevelopmentalchangesinunderstanding.Theemphasishereisonthepotentialpowerofsocial experiencesasinfluencesonchildren'smindreading.Otheraccounts,ofcourse,emphasizeverydifferentpossibilities:theroleofbiologicalmaturationandinnate mechanisms,asinLeslie's(1987)argumentforamodulewithinthebrainthatconstrainsthedevelopmentofunderstandingofmindthepowerofchildren's introspectioninconstructingtheirunderstanding(e.g.,Harris,1991)andthemostwidelyacceptedtheviewthatchildrenformchangingtheoriesaboutwhypeople behaveastheydo.Howshouldweweighthesedifferentaccounts?Shouldweconsiderthepossibilitythatdifferentchildrenreachthesedevelopmentalachievements bydifferentroutes?Orthatcombinationsofalloftheseprocessesareimportant?Orthatfordifferentaspectsofsocialunderstanding,differentprocessesmaybe implicated?Theissuesofdifferentiationbetweenvariousaspectsofsocialunderstanding,andofindividualdifferencesinchildren'smindreadingabilitiesarenow considered. First,noteoneimplicationofthegeneraldevelopmentalaccountthatresearchonchildren'stalkaboutthemindhassuggested(e.g.,Bartsch&Wellman,1995). Accordingtothisaccount,veryyoungchildrenexplainpeople'sactionsinitiallyintermsoffeelingsanddesires,andthroughtheirsocialexperiencesparticularlythose thatinvolveaffectiveissuestheycometoincorporatethenotionofbeliefintheirunderstandingofpeople'sactions.Oneimplicationofthisaccountisthatan understandingofcognitivestatesarisesfromanearlierunderstandingofemotional(noncognitive)states.Ifthisisso,thenasBartschandEstes(1996)noted,it suggeststhat"acomprehensiveaccountofmetacognitionwillhavetobeanchoredinamuchbroaderunderstandingofdevelopmentandwillrequireabetter understandingoftherelationshipbetweencognitiveandnoncognitivepsychologicalphenomena"(p.299).Weneedtobethinking,then,aboutdevelopmentalissuesof aconsiderablywiderspanthanthatsuggestedbyaconventionalcognitiveapproach. Differentiation Thesecondsetofquestionsconcernsdifferentiation.Infocusingonchildren'sdiscoveryofthemind,areweinvestigatingsomegeneralaspectofcognitive developmentsomedomaingeneralunderstanding?Orshouldthevariousfeaturesofsocialunderstandingunderstandingemotions,be

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liefs,mentalrepresentation,forinstancebedifferentiated?Howarechildren'sabilitiesto"readminds"relatedtotheirpowersofmemory,tolanguage,toexecutive function,totheirunderstandingofemotionorprosocialcommunication? Herewefaceakeyissueamatterofcentraldisputebringingintheevidenceforandagainstmodularityofbrainfunction.ItwasarguedconvincinglybyMoore (1996)thatmindreadingisdomaingeneralintermsofadaptivefunction,butthatdifferentiationofaspectsofmindreadingmaywelltakeplacedevelopmentally.The parallelisdrawnwithKarmiloffSmith's(1992)argumentthatmodularityinadultinformationprocessingcanarisethroughdomaingeneralcognitivemechanisms workinginparticularenvironmentalcontexts. Thisbringsusbacktoemotion.Doesthesignificanceofemotionandsocialcontextvaryforthedevelopmentofdifferentaspectsofunderstanding?Itisclearthatthe emotionalandsocialcontextiscentrallyimportantfortheusechildrenmakeoftheirunderstandingofothermindsouranalysesofchildren'sunderstandinginaction (theirengagementinjointpretendroleplay,theirdiscourseaboutmentalstates,andtheirmanagementofconflict)inthecontextoftheirdifferentrelationshipswith mother,sibling,andfriendshowedthattherewerenosignificantcorrelationsacrosstheserelationships.Theusechildrenmadeoftheirunderstandingoftheirpartner's innerstateswascruciallyrelatedtotheemotionalcontextoftheinteraction(Dunn,1996).Beyondthispointaboutthesignificanceofemotionalcontextforuseof understanding,therearenowtwoexcitingnewasyettentativefindingsondevelopmentalpatternslinkingemotionandunderstanding.First,therearefindingsthat implythatthesequelaeofearlysophisticationinemotionunderstandingandinmindreadingmaywelldiffer(Dunn,1995).Second,thereareimportantstudiesthat indicatethatdifferencesinearlyattachmentrelationshipsmayberelatedtosome,butnotnecessarilyall,aspectsofunderstandingmentalstates(e.g.,Meins, Fernyhough,Russell,&ClarkeCarter,1998). Moregenerally,ahostofdevelopmentalquestionsarisewhenwefocusonlinksbetweenemotionandsocialunderstanding.Doesemotionbecomelessimportantin thewaychildrenusetheirpowersofunderstandingothers,astheygrowup?Howdorelationsbetweenemotionandcognitionchangewithdevelopment?As children'spowersofmetacognitiondevelop,dotheybecomelessatthemercyoftheirownemotions?Atpresentwehardlyknow.Thepreoccupationofresearchers tillnowwithchildrenunder5yearsoldmeansthatwehavenotbeguntoexplorethechangesintheskillsandunderstandingofolderchildren.Thereisamarvelous passageinTheMillontheFlossinwhichGeorgeEliot,describingheryoungheroine'sdesperationafterahumiliatingincident,referstothe"perspectiveless conceptionoflife"(p.122)ofyoungchildren,whichgivestheiremotional

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experiencesacrucialintensity.Itisthechangesinthenatureofthatconceptionanditsrelationtoemotionalexperiencethatweurgentlyneedtounderstand. Differences:IndividualandCultural Therecentincreaseininterestinindividualdifferencesinchildren'sunderstandingofmindisprovingtremendouslyfruitfulforexamininglinksbetweensocial experiencesandmindreading(Astington,1993).Andawholerangeofissueshasbeenraisedconcerningsuchdifferences.Forinstance,dopatternsofdevelopment andlinksbetweencognitiveandsocialdevelopmentdifferforchildrenwithinthenormalrange,andthoseattheextremes?Thereareforinstancehintsthatamong childrendesignatedashavingattentionorbehavioralproblems,patternsofmindreadingandexecutivefunctionmaydifferfromthoseofchildrenwithinthenormal range.Thesedifferencesmaycontributetotheproblemsthesechildrenhaveintheircloserelationships.Thus,Hughes'(Hughes,Dunn,&White,1998)researchon childrenclassedashardtomanagebytheirpreschoolteacherssuggestedbothinterestingdifferencesinthenatureofthechildren'sunderstandingofmind,and intriguingconnectionsbetweentheirantisocialbehaviorandtheircognitiveabilities,asreflectedintheoryofmindtasks,executiveplanning,andlanguage.Thus,when givenfalsebelieftasksthatinvolvedemotions(anicesurpriseandanastysurprise)significantlymoreofthehardtomanagechildrenpassedthetestwhenanasty surprisewasinvolvedthanwhenanicesurprisewasthefocusofthestory.Forthecontrolchildren,nosuchtaskeffectwasfound.Second,thosewhoseantisocial actsinvolvedteasingweremarginallybetteratthedeceptiontasksthantheotherchildren,whereasthosewhosebehaviorinvolvedaggressionandsnatchingwere particularlypoorattheexecutivefunctiontasksthatinvolvedplanning. Finally,anoteonculturaldifferences.Thefocusonfamilyandfriendinteractionsanddiscourseshouldnotleadustoignorethesignificanceofculturalmessagesabout whypeoplebehavethewaytheydo,forchildren'sgrowingunderstanding.Wenowknowthatsuchculturalmessagesreachchildrenveryearlyindeed,throughthese veryconversationsaboutpeople'sactionsandfeelings,throughprescriptivemessages,andthroughsharedpretendplay.Inourowncomparisonsoftheprescriptions reaching3yearoldsinCentreCountyPennsylvaniaandinCambridgeshire,England,wefounddifferencesinahostofaspectsofthesemessages(Dunn&Brown, 1991).First,thetopicofsuchprescriptionsvaried(intheUnitedKingdom,thefocuswasoftenonpolitenessandacceptablemealtimebehavior,whereasintheUnited States,itwasfrequentlyonappearance).Second,theformoftheprescriptiondiffered(intheUnitedStates,pro

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hibitionswerechieflyintheformofdirectprohibitionsofindividualactionintheUnitedKingdom,therewerealsomessagesaboutnormativebehavior,andindirect suggestionsforwhatwasgenerallyacceptablebeyondthefamily).Third,evaluativemoralmessagesmoreoftenwereattachedtoprescriptionsintheUnitedKingdom, whereasreferencestofeelingsweremorecommonlymadeintheU.S.families. Culturaldifferenceswereevidentinthechildren'sfantasies,andintheirnarratives,too.TheBritishchildren'snarrativeswereunlikethoseofAmericanchildreninthat theymoreofteninvolvedotherpeopleraisingthepossibilitythattheseEnglishchildrenweregrowingupwiththeexpectationthattheirlivesandexploitswouldbethe subjectofpublicscrutiny.Insummary,evenat3or4yearsold,theimpactofthewiderworldbeyondthefamilywasclearbutthesedifferencesweremediated throughthefamilydiscourseandrelationships. Conclusion Thediscoveriesofthelast10yearsaboutthenatureofchildren'sunderstandingofthemindhavebeenextremelyexciting.However,itisnowtime,surely,topursue thedevelopmentalquestionsthatsopreoccupiedBaldwin,andtorecognizethatwecannotmakeprogressinansweringthesequestionswithoutpayingattentionto children'suseoftheirunderstandingintherealworld,andtotheextraordinaryforcesonchildrentobecomeeffectiveparticipantsintheirsocialworlds.Afocusonthe dailydramasofchildren'sliveshighlightsfirst,thesophisticationofchildren'sunderstandingoffamiliarothers,andsecond,thesignificanceoftheemotionalqualityof theseinteractionsandtheintentionsoftheinterlocutors.Todescribethedevelopmentofchildren'sdiscoveryofthemind,weneedtopayattentiontotheconnections betweenchildren'ssocialandintellectuallivesthatarerevealedinthosedailydramas,apointsuccinctlymadebyBaldwin(1895)himself:"Thebestschoolinthe humanitiesforeverymanisinhisownhouse"(p.348). References Appleton,M.,&Reddy,V.(1996).Teaching3yearoldstopassfalsebelieftests:Aconversationalapproach.SocialDevelopment,5,275291. Astington,J.W.(1993).Thechild'sdiscoveryofthemindCambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Astington,J.W.,Harris,P.L.,&Olson,D.R.(Eds.).(1988).DevelopingtheoriesofmindCambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress.

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Astington,J.W.,&Jenkins,J.M.(1995).Theoryofminddevelopmentandsocialunderstanding.CognitionandEmotion,9,151166. Baldwin,J.M.(1895).Mentaldevelopmentinthechildandtherace.NewYork:Macmillan. Bartsch,K,&Estes,D.(1996).Individualdifferencesinchildren'sdevelopingtheoryofmindandimplicationsformetacognition.LearningandIndividual differences,8,281304. Bartsch,K.,&Wellman,H.M.(1995).Childrentalkaboutthemind.Oxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress. Brown,J.R.(1995).Whathappened?:Emotionalexperienceandchildren'stalkaboutthepast.Unpublishedmanuscript. Brown,J.R.,DonelanMcCall,N.,&Dunn,J.(1996).Whytalkaboutmentalstates?:Thesignificanceofchildren'sconversationswithfriends,mothersandsiblings. ChildDevelopment,67(3),836849. Bruner,J.S.(1983).Child'stalkOxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress. Bruner,J.S.(1990).Actsofmeaning.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Bruner,J.,&Feldman,C.(1993).Theoriesofmindandtheproblemsofautism.InS.BaronCohen,H.TagerFlusberg,&D.Cohen(Eds.),Understandingother minds:Perspectivesfromautism(pp.267291).Oxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress. Chandler,M.,Fritz,A.S.,&Hala,S.(1989).Smallscaledeceit:Deceptionasamarkeroftwo,threeandfouryearolds'theoriesofmind.ChildDevelopment, 60,12631277. Dunn,J.(1988).ThebeginningsofsocialunderstandingCambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Dunn,J.(1995).Childrenaspsychologists:Thelatercorrelatesofindividualdifferencesinunderstandingofemotionsandotherminds.CognitionandEmotion,9, 187201. Dunn,J.(1996).Children'srelationships:Bridgingthedividebetweencognitiveandsocialdevelopment.JournalofChildPsychologyandPsychiatry,37,507 518. Dunn,J.,&Brown,J.(1991).BecomingAmericanorEnglish:TalkingaboutthesocialworldinEnglandandtheU.S.InM.Bornstein(Ed.),Crosscultural approachestoparenting(pp.155172).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Dunn,J.,&Brown,J.(1993).Earlyconversationsaboutcausality:Content,pragmatics,anddevelopmentalchange.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology, 11,107123. Dunn,J.,&Brown,J.(1994).Affectexpressioninthefamily,children'sunderstandingofemotions,andtheirinteractionswithothers.MerrillPalmerQuarterly,40, 120137. Dunn,J.,Brown,J.,&Beardsall,L.(1991).Familytalkaboutfeelingstatesandchildren'slaterunderstandingofothers'emotions.DevelopmentalPsychology,27, 448455. Dunn,J.,Brown,J.,Slomkowski,C.,Tesla,C.,&Youngblade,L.(1991).Youngchildren'sunderstandingofotherpeople'sfeelingsandbeliefs:Individual differencesandtheirantecedents.ChildDevelopment,62,13521366. Dunn,J.,&Cutting,A.(inpress).Understandingothers,andfriendshipinteractionsinyoungchildren.SocialDevelopment. Eliot,G.(1979).Themillonthefloss.Harmondsworth,England:PenguinBooks. Goodnow,J.J.(1990).Thesocializationofcognition:What'sinvolved?InJ.W.Stigler,R.A.Shweder,&G.Herdt(Eds.),Culturalpsychology(pp.259286). Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Harris,P.L.(1991).Theworkoftheimagination.InA.Whiten(Ed.),Naturaltheoriesofmind(pp.283304).Oxford,England:BlackwellPublications. Hudson,J.A.,Gebelt,J.,Haviland,J.,&Bentivegna,C.(1992).Emotionandnarrativestructureinyoungchildren'spersonalaccounts.JournalofNarrativeand LifeHistory,2,129150. Hughes,C.,&Dunn,J.(1997).''Pretendyoudidn'tknow":Preschoolers'talkaboutmentalstatesinpretendplay.CognitiveDevelopment,12,381403. Hughes,C.,&Dunn,J.(1998).Understandingmindandemotion:Longitudinalassociationswithmentalstatetalkbetweenyoungfriends.Developmental Psychology,34(5),10261037.

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Hughes,C.,Dunn,J.,&White,A.(1998).Trickortreat?:Unevenunderstandingofmindandemotionandexecutivefunctionamong"hardtomanage"preschoolers. JournalofChildPsychologyandPsychiatry,39(7),981994. KarmiloffSmith,A.(1992).Beyondmodularity:Adevelopmentalperspectiveoncognitivescience.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Leslie,A.M.(1987).Pretenseandrepresentation:theoriginsof'theoryofmind'.PsychologicalReview,94,412426. Lewis,C.,Freeman,N.H.,Kyriakidou,C.,MaridakiKassotaki,K.,&Berridge,D.M.(1996).Socialinfluencesonfalsebeliefaccess:Specificsiblinginfluencesor generalapprenticeship?ChildDevelopment,67,29302947. Mannle,S.,&Tomasello,M.(1987).Fathers,siblingsandthebridgehypothesis.InK.E.Nelson&A.vanKleeck(Eds.),Children'slanguage(Vol.6,pp.23 41).Hillsdale,NI:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Meins,E.,Fernyhough,C.,Russell,J.,&ClarkeCarter,D.(1998).Securityofattachmentasapredictorofsymbolicandmentalisingabilities:Alongitudinalstudy. SocialDevelopment,7,124. Moore,C.(1996).Evolutionandthemodularityofmindreading.CognitiveDevelopment,11,605621. Newton,P.E.(1994).Preschoolprevarication:Aninvestigationofthecognitiveprerequisitesfordeception.Unpublisheddoctoraldissertation,Universityof Portsmouth,Portsmouth,England. Perner,J.,Ruffman,T.,&Leekam,S.R.(1994).Theoryofmindiscontagious:Youcatchitfromyoursibs.ChildDevelopment,65,12281238. Reddy,V.(1991).Playingwithothers'expectations:Teasingandmuckingaboutinthefirstyear.InA.Whiten(Ed.),Naturaltheoriesofmind(pp.143158). Oxford,England:Blackwell. Sodian,B.(1991).Thedevelopmentofdeceptioninchildren.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,9,173188. Strichartz,A.F.,&Burton,R.V.(1990).Liesandthetruth:Astudyofthedevelopmentoftheconcept.ChildDevelopment,61,211220. Youngblade,L.M.,&Dunn,J.(1995).Individualdifferencesinyoungchildren'spretendplaywithmotherandsibling:Linkstorelationshipsandunderstandingof otherpeople'sfeelings.ChildDevelopment,66,14721429.

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Chapter13 InfluencesonMaternalAttributionofInfantIntentionality
J.StevenReznick UniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill Iamintriguedbythesortsofinfantbehaviorsthatwelabelasintentional.Afolkpsychologicaldefinitionofintentionalityclaimsthatintentionalbehaviorsaredone deliberately,onpurpose,orwithawareness.Confusionemergesbecausephilosophersoftenusethetermintentionalityinamoregeneralsense.Inthescholastic tradition,broughttopsychologyinthe19thcenturybyFranzBrentano(1874/1973)andtomodernearsbyJohnSearle(1983)andDanielDennett(1987), intentionalityisatermusedtodescribementalstatesthataredirectedat,orareabout,objectsandstatesofaffairsintheworld.Abeliefisanexampleof intentionalitybecauseitisahypothesisaboutsomething(e.g.,abeliefthatitwillsnow)afearisanexampleofintentionalitytotheextentthatthefearisofsomething orthatsomethingwilloccur(e.g.,afearofsnakes).So,thebehaviorsthatwenormallythinkofasintentionalinthefolkpsychologicalsenseofbeingdeliberate(e.g., pullingastringtoretrieveatoy)arealsointentionalinthephilosophicalsenseinthattheyimplyanactionundertakenwithagoalinmind.Moreimportant,the philosophicaldefinitionofintentionalityincludesamuchlargersetofmentalstatesthatarerelevant.Thatis,aninfantwhohashopes,fears,orthoughtscouldbe consideredintentional. ResearchonEnglishspeakingadultsconductedbyMalleandKnobe(1997)indicatesthatspeakersgenerallyusethetermintentiontodescribethementalstateofa personwho"intendstodosomething"(i.e.,hasaspecificsetofbeliefsanddesiresaboutagoalstate),andthatintentionalismoreoftenusedtodescribeanaction thatisperformedbyanagentwhohas

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notonlyintention,butalsotheskillneededtoperformanappropriategoalorientedaction.Thespecificationofskillisimportant:Imighthaveanintentiontothrowa dartintothebull'seye(i.e.,abeliefthatitisagoodthingtodoandadesiretomakeithappen),butifIdonothavetherequisiteskill,myaccuratetossisnotlikelyto beconsideredintentional. Thereisconsiderableinterestamongphilosophersinthebroadquestionsofwhatitmeanstosaythatabehaviorisintentional(e.g.,Anscombe,1957)andofwhether humansaretheonlyorganismsthatcanbehaveintentionally(e.g.,Griffin,1992Radner&Radner,1989),butlittleinterestinthedevelopmentalquestionofwhenand howintentionalityemergesinhumaninfants.Twopathsdivergeatthispointinmypresentation,anditisimportanttorecognizetheirdifferences.Therealistpathleads tothequestionofwhetherornotinfantscanbehaveintentionally.Thereisarichhistoryofdebateindevelopmentalpsychologyconcerningtheinfantbehaviorsthat suggestintentionalityinthefolkpsychologicalsense.Candidatesincludecoordinatedreachingandgrasping(Bruner,1973Lockman,Ashmead,&Bushnell,1984 Thelenetal.,1993),meansendsbehaviors(Mosier&Rogoff,1994Willatts,1984),andcommunicationviagesturesorwords(Bates,Benigni,Bretherton, Camaioni,&Volterra,1979Bruner,1975Dore,Franklin,Miller,&Ramer,1976Harding&Golinkoff,1979).Intentionalitycanalsobeinferredonthebasisof interactivebehaviorswithasocialpartner(Bakeman&Adamson,1984Trevarthen,1979)actsofsharedreferenceorjointattentioninwhichinfantsfollowan adult'sdirectionofgazeorpointing(Butterworth&Cochran,1980Moore&Dunham,1995Murphy&Messer,1977Scaife&Bruner,1975)orinactsofsocial referencinginwhichinfantsaltertheirgoaldirectedactivityinresponsetoemotionalsignalsfromanadult(Campos&Stenberg,1981Emde,1984Feinman,1982 Walden&Ogan,1988).Theseinteractivebehaviorscouldevensuggestsomerudimentaryskillatascribingintentionalstatestoothers,theusualtopicintheoryof mindresearchconductedwithpreschoolchildren. Giventhisrangeofbehaviorsthatcouldbelabeledintentional,thereislittleagreementregardingtheexactbirthdateofintentionality.However,acrossvarious theoreticalapproaches,thereisabroadconsensusthatintentionalactionblossomsduringthesecond6monthsoflife,alongwithtransitionsincognition,manipulative ability,mobility,andthecapacitytoexperienceandshareemotions.IconfesstobeingarealistaboutintentionalityIamcomfortablewiththeclaimthatsomesystems haveinternalpropertiesthatallowthemtobeintentional.Inthepresentcontext,thattranslatesintoabeliefthatresearchonhumaninfantswillleadtopersuasiveclaims aboutapsychologicalstatethatcouldbecalled"havingintentionality"andthatbecomesanincreasinglysalientaspectoftheinfantlate

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inthefirstyear.Ontheotherhand,asDennett(1987)hasnoted,therearemanynonhumansystemsthatappeartohaveintentionality:Itcanbesaidthatsunflowers turninordertofacethesun,thermostatsseekaparticulartemperature,orcarshatetostartoncoldmornings,witheachstatementimplyingsomedegreeof intentionality.Dennett(1987)suggestedthatwedescribethesesystemsasintentionalbecausethisdesignationhelpsusexplain,understand,andpredictthem.This notionofanintentionalstanceisrelevantinthepresentcontextbecauseevenifinfantscannotlayasubstantiveclaimtointentionalityonthebasisofinternalproperties, parentsandotherpeoplecertainlyregardinfantsasintentional:Thatis,theytakeanintentionalstancetowardchildren. Thus,thesecondpath,andtheoneonwhichwetravelhere,istheascription/attributionpath,inwhichwefocusonthewillingnessofadultstoascribeorattribute intentionalitytoinfants.Fromafolkpsychologicalperspective,thisprobablymeansthatadultsassumethatinfantshaveintentions(i.e.,beliefsanddesires)andthe skillsnecessarytoperformactionspursuanttothesebeliefsanddesires.Inthischapter,Iusethephrase"parentperceptionofinfantintentionality"(PPII)toreferto theparent'sbeliefthataninfantcandothingsonpurposeordeliberately.Itisimportanttonotethatmyuseofthetermperceptiondoesnotnecessarilyentaila commitmenttoarealiststanceinwhichparentsperceivetheintentionalitythatisinherentintheinfant'sbehavior.Mostadultsarewillingtoascribeorattributesome degreeofintentionalitytovariousinfantbehaviors.Theresultofthisascription/attributionissomedegreeofperceptionofinfantintentionality. MyinterestinPPIIisnotjustidlecuriosity:Thewillingnessofparentstoascribeintentionalitycouldhavesignificanteffectsoninfantdevelopment.Psychologistsoften contrasttherelativeinfluenceofnatureandnurture,butitwouldbeludicroustodenytheimportanceoftheparent'sroleintheinfant'spsychologicaldevelopment. Kaye(1982)describestheparentalroleasaseriesofpsychologicalframes.OfmostrelevancehereisKaye's"instrumentalframe"inwhichtheadultcarriesoutwhat appearstobetheinfant'sintentions.Kayesuggeststhatthiscontextofintentionalinterpretationfacilitatesthedevelopmentoftheinfant'sskills(e.g.,meansends activities),aviewalsosharedbyBruner(1983).Tomasello(1992,1996)extendsthisreasoningtosuggestthatwheninfantsaretreatedasintentional,theycometo understandthatothersareintentionalagents,whichinturnfacilitatestheiracquisitionoflanguage(seealsoDunn,chap.12,thisvolume). Ipresentsomeofourrecentfindings,whichareorganizedintothreethemesthatillustrateongoingprogressinunderstandingPPIIandthatmotivateourresearch.

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MeasuringParentPerceptionofInfantIntentionality IfirstdescribesomeofthewaysinwhichwemeasurePPII.Inourresearchtodate,wehaveusedthreemaintechniquesthatcanbeconsidereddirectinthesense thatanexplicitnarrativecontextisprovidedthatevokestheparent'sresponse.Thesetechniquescanbecomparedwithotherapproaches,notdescribedhere,in whichPPIIisinferredonthebasisoftheparent'sbehaviorinalessobviouscontext. InfantIntentionalityTape TheInfantIntentionalityTape(IIT)isavideobasedinstrumentthatcouldbeconsideredeitheraquestionnaireoraprojectivetest.SuzanneZeedyk(1994),inher dissertation,filmedinfantsinnormaldaytodaysituationsandthenselectedbrieffilmclipsinwhichinfantswerebehavingmoreorlessintentionallyinthesenseof performingthesortsofbehaviorsthatparentstendtoconsiderintentional(e.g.,persistingineffortstoobtainagoal,participatingininteractivegames).Themostrecent versionofthetape(Zeedyk&Reznick,1996)has28segmentsof5to12montholdinfantsofvariousethnicity.Somefilmclipshaveinfantsaloneandothersshow aparentaswellsomeinfantsareplayingwithtoysandothersareunencumbered.Participantsviewthefilmclipsandrateeachofthemonan8pointscalethat indicateshowconfidenttheyarethattheinfant'sbehaviorinthefilmclipisdeliberateoronpurpose.Clipsinwhichtheinfantisnotbehavingintentionallyarerated between1and4,andclipsinwhichtheinfantisbehavingintentionallyareratedbetween5and8,withgradationstoreflecttheparent'sconfidencethatthebehavior wasorwasnotdeliberateoronpurpose.WeassumethattheaverageratingacrosstheIITclipsreflectstheparticipant'sgeneraltendencytoinferinfantintentionality. InfantIntentionalityQuestionnaire OursecondmeasureofPPIIisevenmoredirect.TheInfantIntentionalityQuestionnaire(IIQ,Version4.2Reznick&Feldman,1998),contains32specificquestions aboutintentionality(e.g.,Doesyourinfantchooseappropriatewaystoreachhisorhergoals?Doesyourinfantrecognizewhenyouaredisappointed?Canyourinfant feelsadness?),withthetargetalways"yourinfant."Thebroadthemesofthesequestionsconcerntheinfant'sawarenessofneeds,desires,andgoals,andtheinfant's abilitytocausetheenvironmenttorespond.Inthemostrecentversion,wehaveaddedseveralquestionsthatprobeforaspectsofintentionalitythatarenegative.One

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suchquestionis"Doesyourbabydothingsonpurposetomakeyouangry?"Giventhecontentofthequestions,itseemsreasonabletoexpectthattheIIQtapsthe parent'sassessmentofhisorherowninfant'sintentionality(incontrasttothegeneralviewaboutinfantintentionalitytappedbytheIIT). PredictingInfantIntentionalBehavior OurthirdmeasureofPPIIisinsomesensethemostdirect.Aspartofourongoinglongitudinalstudy,weneededacontextinwhichwecouldobservetheextentto whichindividual9montholdinfantsdisplaythesortsofbehaviorsthatparentsregardasintentional.Aconsiderableamountofpilottestingledtoasetofgamesand tasksinwhichindividualdifferencesinintentionalitymightberevealed.Forexample,inonetasktheinfantseesanattractivetoythatisontheothersideofsome horizontalbars.Aninfantwhoignoresthetoywouldberegardedaslessintentional.Aninfantwhoretrievesthetoywouldberegardedasmoreintentional.Inanother episode,theexperimenterattemptstoengagetheinfantinagameofpeekaboo.Alessintentionalinfantwouldnotparticipate.Amoreintentionalinfantwouldnot onlyparticipatebutalsoactivelyinitiatesubsequentroundsofpeekaboo. Whenthebatteryofintentionalitytaskswasreadytouseandcodingprocedureshadbeenestablished,wewroteaquestionnairethatdescribeseachepisodeandasks theparenttopredicthowhisorherinfantwillrespond.Themultiplechoiceanswersavailableforeachquestioncorrespondtoourcodingschemeforintentional behaviors.Forexample,"Yourbabyiswearingalongbib.Theexperimenterraisesthebibinfrontofherownface,lowersit,andsays,'Peekaboo.'The experimenterthenraisesthebibagain.Yourbabywill:1.Notbeinterestedatall.2.Pullthebibdowntoencouragethegame.3.Pullthebibdownandthencontinue thegamehimself/herselfbypullingthebibup."Inourongoingstudy,motherscompletethe20itemquestionnairePredictingInfantIntentionalBehavior(PIIBVersion 1.2Reznick,1998)beforetheirinfantparticipatesinthebatteryoftasks.Incomparisontotheotherinstruments,thePIIBisfocusedonaspecificinfant'sbehavior buttheinferenceofintentionalityisbasedonourinterpretationofspecificbehaviors:ThePIIBdescribesbehaviorandnevermentionsthetermintentional. ThePresentData Thedatathatwillbepresentedinthischapterarefromasampleof130mothers.Previousresearchsuggestssomeminordifferencesbetweenperceptionofinfant intentionalityformothersandfathers,butdatafrom

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fatherswasnotavailableforthepresentanalysis.FortysevenmotherswererecruitedinourlaboratoryatYalethroughlettersmailedtoinfantswithbirthcertificates onfileintheNewHavenHallofRecords.ThisrecruitmentmethodprovidesamiddleclassanduppermiddleclasssamplethatisalmostentirelyEuropeanAmerican, suburban,andwelleducated.Thesemothershadinfantswithinthe6to12monthagerange.Anadditional83motherswererecruitedwhiletheyattendedwellbaby pediatricvisitsattheHillHealthCenterinNewHaven.TheHillHealthCenterservesadisadvantagedurbanneighborhoodandhasaclientelethatidentifythemselves asprimarilyAfricanAmericanorHispanic.TheHillHealthsampleincludes41AfricanAmericanmothers,34Hispanicmothers(primarilyofPuertoRicanorigin),and 8EuropeanAmericanmothers.Thesemothersweretestedwhentheirinfantswerebetween9and10monthsofage.1ThemothersrecruitedatHillHealthCenter reflectarangeofeducationalattainmentbutarealmostallrelativelypoor:92%ofthemqualifyforWICfunds,67%receivefoodstamps,and62%areonAidto FamilieswithDependentChildren,theeligibilityofwhichprogramsarebasedonincome.AlloftheHillHealthsampleandmostoftheYalesampleareparticipatingin anongoinglongitudinalstudyofPPII.AdditionalmothersweretestedbyNicoleEldridge(1997)forherundergraduateSeniorProjectatYale. InfluencesonParentalPerceptionofInfantIntentionality DoParentsAttributeIntentionalityBecauseofthePresenceofCertainInfantBehaviorsandCharacteristics? InfantBehaviors SuzanneZeedyk(Zeedyk,1992,1994)usedvariousinterviewsandquestionnairestodeterminethecriteriathatparentsclaimwouldleadthemtoinferthataninfantis actingdeliberatelyoronpurpose.Mostofthecriteriainvolveactions.Forexample,parentssaythattheyconsiderinfantstobeintentionalwhentheinfantanticipates theoutcomeofanaction,selectsactionsappropriatetoagoal,persistsinactionstoattainagoal,andstopsactionwhenagoalisattained.Othercriteriaimplysome sortofemotionalorsocialpresence.Forexample,parentsclaimthattheynoticewheninfantsmaintaineyecontactormodulatetheiremotionalintensity. Itisimportanttodeterminewhetherornotparentsdoindeedbringthesecriteriatobearwhenmakingajudgmentaboutaninfant'sinten
1

ThetermsAfricanAmerican,Hispanic,andEuropeanAmericanarenotsatisfyingforvariousreasonsbutareusedherebecausetheydesignateagroupofinterestand/or becausetheyareusedbythemothersthemselvesinresponsetoaquestionabouttheirethnicity.

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tionality.Atonelevel,wearequestioningthevalidityoftheIIT.Thatis,areparentratingsofthevideoclipsdetermined(oratleast,influenced)bytheinfant's behavior?Atamoregenerativelevel,wearesomewhereontheroadbetweenintentionalityasaprojectionandintentionalityasconstitutive:Ifwecanidentifythe behaviorsthatimplyintentionality,wemayhavesomeguidanceinoursearchfortheunderlyingmechanismsthatallowinfantstobehaveintentionally.Thedatasuggest asimpleanswerbutinthecontextofamorecomplexanswer.Thesimpleanswerisyes,manyparentsdobringthesamespecificcriteriatobearwhenjudgingan infant'sintentionality. Table13.1liststhe28IITclipsandsummarizesparentalresponsetoeachclipforthe130mothers.TheclipsinTable13.1areorderedaccordingtotheaverage intentionalityscoreassignedtotheclipbythemothers.Averagescoresrangedbetween6.79and2.55onthe8pointintentionalityscore.Thedistributionofscores suggeststhatparentstendedtohonorthedistinctionbetweenintentionalclips(ratingsof58)andnotintentionalclips(ratingsof14):Therewasanotablegap betweenclip12(M=5.23)andclip19(M=4.29).Onthebasisofthisdiscontinuity,wedividedtheclipsintothosethatwereconsideredonaveragetobe intentionalandthosethatwereconsideredonaveragetobenotintentional.Weusedtwostatisticalapproachestoconfirmthisdichotomy.First,wecalculatedthe percentageofmotherswhorespondedwithascoreof5orhighertoeachclip.AsindicatedinTable13.1,70%ormoreofthemothersrespondedwith5orhigheron theclipsdesignatedasintentionalandnomorethat52%ofmothersgaveascoreof5orhigheronthenotintentionalclips.Second,wecomputedananalysisof variance(ANOVA)inwhicheachmother'sratingofeachclipwastheunitofanalysis.Thisanalysisindicatedamaineffectofclip,F(27,3449)=39.40,p<.01.A StudentNeumanKeulsposthoctestindicatedseveralclustersofclips,buttheprimarylocusoftheeffectwasadifferencebetweentheclipsthatwehavedesignated asintentionalandnotintentional. InspectionofthescriptsfortheitemswithhighintenionalityratingsconfirmsthecriteriareportedbyZeedyk(1994).Highintentionalityscoreswereassignedtoclipsin whichtheinfantperformssomegoalorientedaction(e.g.,manipulatesa"busybox,"shakesarattle,insertsacubeinaslot,slidesashovelacrossatable).High intentionalityscoreswerealsoassignedwhentheinfantparticipatesinasocialgame(e.g.,puttingafootinthemouthasmothersaysno,handgames,touchingfather's face).Fromthisinformalcategorizationofclips,itwouldappearthatathirdcueforintentionalityisperceptualvigilance.Forexample,mostmothersassignedhigh intentionalityscorestoaclipinwhichaninfantiscrawlingandthenstopstolookatsomething,oraclipinwhichtheinfantissimplyscanningtheroom.Thisimplies someparentalsensitivitytothebroader

Page250 TABLE13.1 AverageIntentionalityRating,Description,DistributionofRatings,andScriptforEachClip Rating 6.79 6.60 6.51 6.43 6.38 6.31 6.23 6.12 5.98 5.75 5.40 5.26 5.24 5.23 4.29 4.28 4.23 4.21 4.20 4.19 4.01 3.74 3.67 3.44 3.34 3.18 3.10 2.55 Clip Sex Skin Light Light Light Light Light Dark Light Light Dark Light Light Light Light Light Light Dark Dark Light Light Light Dark Dark Light Dark Dark Light Light Light Age 11 12 11 8 9 10 7 11 10 9 7 11 11 6 8 6 10 8 10 11 10 10 7 6 8 8 11 5

5
93% 91% 92% 86% 92% 82% 86% 87% 86% 81% 76% 76% 70% 80% 47% 52% 48% 46% 52% 49% 36% 43% 30% 29% 33% 30% 29% 16%

1,27,8 7%75% 9%71% 8%64% 9%65% 11%64% 10%63% 10%60% 13%55% 13%52% 12%44% 19%45% 18%36% 16%37% 24%41% 33%26% 26%22% 28%20% 26%20% 34%22% 32%21% 28%16% 37%12% 36%15% 43%13% 47%9% 49%12% 54%2% 63%6%

Script Manipulatesvariouspartsof"busybox" Putsfootinmouthasmothersaysno,smiles Respondsreciprocallytomother'shandgames Imitatesmother'sspinof"busybox"wheel Shakesrattleupanddown Insertscubeintocorrectslot,motherclaps Crawls,stopstolookatsomething Bangshandsonhighchairtrayrepeatedly Slidesshovelonhighchair,watchesattentively Bumpsheadagainstbackofhighchairrepeatedly Chewsonboxvacantly,scanstheroomintently Manipulatestrain Restlessinhighchair,stretches,babbles Touchesfather'sface,smiles Flapsarmsexcitedly,stickinhandhitsxylophone Touchestoy,grabsit,putsitinmouth Pullsdoll,makeseyecontactwithmother Patsfloor,points(?),flapsarms Picksupball,dropsorthrowsit Motherspeaks,childdropsorthrowstoy Motherclaps,infantscratcheshead Respondstomother'ssmile,liftsarms Stares,smiles,fallsonside Stretcheslegs,rubsfeettogether Rollsball,pushesitoffhighchairtray Motherclapschild'shands,childnotattentive Mothermoveschild'shands,childnotattentive Watchesfathertouchtoy,coughs,squirms

24 Boy 6 Girl 22 ? 28 Girl 5 Girl 10 ? 17 Girl 3 Boy 4

23 Girl 11 Girl 14 Boy 16 Boy 12 Boy 19 Girl 15 Girl 21 Girl 9 Girl 7 Boy 1 Boy 27 ? 13 Girl 26 ? 8 Girl 25 ? 18 Boy 2 ? 20 Boy

Page251

definitionofintentionalityinwhichoneinfersthattheinfanthassomethinginmind.Finally,intentionalitywasawardedwhentheinfantrepeatedacontrolledaction.For example,manymothersassignedintentionalitytoaclipinwhichaboybangshishandsonthehighchairtrayseveraltimesoroneinwhichagirlbumpsherhead againstthebackofthehighchairrepeatedly.Thisimpliesparentalsensitivitytotheinfant'sabilitytocontrolhisorherongoingactivity. InfantAge Theintentionalityscorewascorrelatedwiththeageoftheinfantintheclip,r(26)=.39,p<.05.Thisfindingisdifficulttointerpretbecausewehadattemptedto counterbalanceagewithintentionalitywhenweselectedtheclips,butcounterbalancingwasdifficultbecauseagelimitstherangeofintentionalbehaviorsthataninfant emitsandtheprobabilitythatanintentionaleventwouldoccurduringourfilming.Fromthisperspective,itisnotablethatsomeyounginfants(i.e.,6or7montholds) wereratedashighlyintentionalinsomeclips.Also,oneoftheoldestinfantsparticipatedinoneoftheleastintentionalclips. InfantSexandSkinColor Similardifficultyininterpretationoccurswhenwelookatthesexorskincoloroftheinfantintheclip.Infantfacialfeaturesandclothingcanbeusedtocategorizemost infantsintheclipsasboysorgirlsbutsomeareambiguous.Weconfirmedtheseclassificationsusingseveralindependentjudges.Also,someinfantsareobvious membersofaparticularethnicgroupbutmanyareambiguous,particularlywhenaparentisnotpresent.Forthepresentanalysis,wecategorizedtheinfantsbasedon skincolorperse,whichisamorecompellingvariablethanethnicity.TheEuropeanAmericanandHispanicinfantsintheIITwereallcategorizedashavinglightskin andmostoftheAfricanAmericaninfantshaddarkskin.Theseclassificationswereconfirmedusingindependentjudges. Wehadattemptedtocounterbalancelevelofintentionalbehavioracrosssexandskincolor,butwewereapparentlyunsuccessful.Ofthe11clipsratedasthemost intentional,6wereclipsofgirls,3wereambiguous,and2wereclipsofboys.Onewaytoquantifythiseffectistocalculateseparatescoresforeachtypeofclip(i.e., IITratingsacrossclipsofgirls,boys,orambiguousinfants).AnANOVAonthesescoresconfirmedamaineffectofclip,F(2,242)=12.09,p<.01,withaverage scoresof5.08(SD=1.52),4.75(SD=1.41),and4.71(SD=1.28),respectively:Girlswereratedasmoreintentionalthanboysorambiguousinfants.The counterbalancingacrossracewasnotsuccessfuleither:Despiteourbesteffortstohavecomparabledistributionsofskincolorwithineachlevelofintentionality,the clipsthatthemothersratedashighlyintentionalcontainedadisproportionaterepresentationoflightskinnedinfants.AsindicatedinTable13.1,12ofthe14high intentional

Page252

clipscontainedalightskinnedinfant.AnANOVAonmeanscorescalculatedacrossclipscontaininginfantswithlightordarkskinindicatedasignificantdifference,F (1,121)=75.98,p<.01,withaveragescoresof5.07(SD=1.38)and4.42(SD=1.41),respectively. Onecauseofthedisproportionaterepresentationofgirlsandlightskinnedinfantsinthehighlyintentionalclipscouldbeanunbalancedselectionofclips(i.e.,theclips thatwechosewithgirlsorwithlightskinnedinfantsaremorelikelytocontainintentionalbehaviors).Asecondcausecouldbethatmothershaveabiastoattribute moreintentionalitytogirlsandtolightskinnedinfants.Therearesomereasonstoexpectmaternalbias.First,regardingheightenedexpectationsofintentionalityingirls, FeldmanandReznick(1996)reportedthesameeffectinapreviousversionoftheIITusinganentirelydifferentsetofclips.Moreover,variousstudiesindicatethat parentsoftenhavepredictableexpectationsaboutsexdifferencesininfants.Forexample,Rubin,Provenzano,andLuria(1974)andReid(1994)foundgender stereotypesintheparentsofnewborns(e.g.,thatsonswillbestrongandthatdaughterswillbefragile).Also,Grant(1994)foundsexspecificdifferencesinhow parentsinteractwiththeirinfants(viz.,theystimulate,initiate,andgoadboysandareresponsiveandinteractivewithgirls).Thepresentresultspointtoapossible connectionbetweenPPIIandthesexoftheinfantthatisbeingrated.FurtherresearchisneededtoelucidatethisrelationanddeterminewhetherPPIIcausesparents toresponddifferentlytoboyandgirlinfantsorisitselftheresultofsomemorefundamentalprocessthataffectsbothPPIIandgenderstereotypes. Thereisalsoreasontoexpectdifferentattributionsofintentionalityasafunctionofskincolor.WilliamsandMorland(1976)notethatidiomaticspeechrevealsample usageofthewordblacktosignifynegativeevaluation(e.g.,ablackmark,toblacklist,toblackball,blackmail,blacksheep)andwhitetosignifypositiveevaluation (e.g.,whitehope,whiteknight,awhitelie).KennethGergen(1967)reportednumerousexamplesofwhiteaspositiveandblackasnegativeinthereligiouspractice andsymbolisminnonWesterngroupsandsimilardistinctionsemergeinJudeoChristianimagery,literature,andmassmedia(seeWilliams&Morland,1976,foran extendeddiscussionofthistopic).ThisbiasisalsoconsistentwiththedominantconceptualframeworkinpsychologyinwhichWhite,middleclassprototypesare acceptedasthestandardfornormaldevelopment,andanythingelseisregardedasinferior(GarcaColletal.,1996).And,whileitisnotinconceivablethatourefforts tocounterbalanceraceandintentionalitymighthavefailed,itishardtoacceptthatwewouldhavefailedsodefinitively.Indeed,inspectionoftheclipswithdark skinnedinfantssuggeststhatsomeoftheseclipsreceivedloweraverageratingsthandidclipsshowingcomparablebehaviorsinlightskinnedinfants.Thesedataraise thepossibilitythatsomeadultsarebiasedtowardattributing

Page253

moreintentionalitytoinfantswhoaregirlsandinfantswhoarelightskinned.Definitiveproofofthiseffectwouldrequirecreativemethodologyinwhichthelevelof intentionalbehaviorcouldbematchedexplicitlyacrossclipsthatvaryinsexorskincolor. DoParentsAgreeonTheirAttributionsofIntentionality? Althoughtherewasconsensusontheintentionalityratingsformanyclips,thisstatementmustbequalifiedbythreeobservations.First,theconsensuswasnotably strongerforclipsthatseemintentionalthanforclipsthatseemnotintentional.Table13.1liststhepercentageofmotherswhoassignedascoreof7or8(i.e.,the highestratingsofintentionality)orascoreof1or2(i.e.,thelowestratingsofintentionality).Nineofthe14intentionalclipsrecruited50%ormoreratingsof7or8.In contrast,only2ofthe14notintentionalclipsevokedascoreof1or2frommorethan50%ofthemothers.Thus,insomeabsolutesense,manymotherstendedto perceivesomeinfantbehaviorsasintentional,butmotherswerelesswillingtoagreeontheinfantbehaviorsthatwerenotintentional.Inanearlierstudy(Feldman& Reznick,1996),wereportedthissametendencytoagreeonintentionalityandnotagreeonthelackofintentionalityonthebasisofIIQdata.Thisasymmetrycould reflectadisjunctivedecisionruleinwhichaclusterofpositivecuesprovidecompellingevidenceforintentionalitywhereasisolatedcuesarenotwidelyviewedas diagnostic. AsecondqualificationthatappliestogeneralstatementsaboutconsensusisthatthemoreprominentaspectoftheIITisitstendencytoevokevariabilityinPPII.The distributionofanswerswashighlyskewedforsomeclips,buteveryclipevokedeveryresponseatleastonce.Someclipswererelativelybalanced,evokinganalmost rectangulardistribution,andsomeevokedstrongdisagreement.Forexample,inClip19,agirlholdsastickinherhandandflapsherarmsexcitedly.Theflapping movementcausesthesticktohitaxylophone,whichmakesaloudsound,andthissoundseemstoencouragethegirltoflapherarmswithincreasinggusto.Thirty threepercentofmothersratedthisclipat1or2,interpretingthegirl'sactionsasaccidental.Twentysixpercentofmothersratedthisclipat7or8,apparently assumingthatthegirlwasperformingtheactiononpurpose.And,evenwhentherewasconsiderableconsensusthataclipwasintentionalornotintentional,some mothersratedtheclipintheoppositedirection.Forexample,Table13.1indicatesthat7%ofmothersusedaverylowscore(i.e.,1or2)todescribetheclipthat evokedthehighestaverageintentionalityscore,and6%ofmothersusedaveryhighintentionalityscore(i.e.,7or8)todescribetheclipthatevokedthelowest averageintentionalityscore.GiventhatweintendedthattheIITbeameasureofindividualdifference,variabilityisexpectedandsuggeststhat

Page254

manyclipsprovidedparticipantswithanopportunitytoprojectintentionalityratherthanjustdetectit,aswouldbeexpectedifintentionalityisascribedbytheviewer. Ontheotherhand,thelackofconsensusregardingthemostextremeclipsraisesthepossibilitythatsomemotherswererespondingrandomlyeitherduetolackof motivationorbecausetheyfailedtounderstandthetask.Toexplorethispossibility,wedefinedmothersasanomalousiftheyrespondedwitha1or2onanyofthe fouritemsratedasmosthighlyintentionalorwitha7or8onanyofthefouritemsratedasleastintentional.Only3of130motherswereanomalousfromboth perspectives,whichsuggestsalowrateofhaphazardresponse.Wecomparedeachgroupofanomalousmothers(i.e.,themotherswhorespondedanomalouslyon highintentionalitemsandthemotherswhorespondedanomalouslyonlowintentionalitems)withthenotanomalousmothersontheiroverallIITscoreandontheir scoresfortheitemsratedashighlyintentionalornothighlyintentional.Motherswhowereanomalouslylowononeormoreofthe4mostintentionalitemsgave significantlylowerratingsthanothermothersontheiroverallIITscore,theirscoreforthe14highlyintentionalIITitemsandtheirscoreforthe14leastintentionalIIT items,andtheconversewastrueformotherswhowereanomalouslyhighononeormoreofthe4leastintentionalitems.Thissuggeststhatmostmotherstendedtobe consistentintheirratingofinfantsaseitherlikelyorunlikelytobehaveintentionally. Third,despitevariousdifferencesinPPIIacrossspecificclips,thedatasupporttheclaimthatanIITscorecombinedacrossclipsismeaningful.Cronbach'scoefficient alpha(Cronbach,1951)was.93,suggestingstrongconsistencyacrossclips.Aprincipalcomponentanalysisindicatedasinglecomponent(eigenvalue=10.85)that accountedfor39%ofthevariance.Thisconsistencyisimportant.Itindicatesthatalthoughmothersaresensitivetothecriteriathatdifferentiateamongtheclips,the tendencytobestrictorlenientintheascriptionofintentionalityisaconsistentgeneralbiasthatinfluencesparentperceptionacrossclips.Asubsetofthemotherswho completedtheIITalsocompletedtheIIQ.Version4.2oftheIIQcontainsquestionsaboutinfantintentionalbehaviorsbutportraysintentionalbehaviorsaseither positiveornegative.Instancesofnegativeintentionalitycanbedescribedverballybutaredifficulttocapturevisually,sotheIITwouldseemtobeprimarilyabout positiveintentionality.DespitethepresenceofthesetwotypesofitemswithintheIIQ,theCronbachcoefficientalphaforthe32IIQitemswas.88.Whenitemswere separatedintopositiveandnegative,thealphaforthe24positiveitemswas.88andforthe8negativeitemswas.80.AprincipalcomponentsanalysisoftheIIQitems confirmedtheuniquecharacterofthenegativeitems.Fivecomponentscanbeidentifiedthataccountfor50%ofthe

Page255

varianceintheIIQ.Component2loadedexclusivelyonthe8negativeintentionalityquestionsandincludednootherquestions.Theothercomponentscaptured variousaspectsofpositiveintentionality. DoAspectsoftheParentInfluencePerceptionofInfantIntentionality? Welookedatfactorsinthemotherthatcouldbeexpectedtoinfluenceherperceptionofinfantintentionality.ThisanalysisisbasedontheIITandalsoontheIIQ. Education Ourpreviousresearch(Feldman&Reznick,1996)indicatedanegativecorrelationbetweenPPIIandeducationbecauseseveralveryhighlyeducatedmothers (doctorsandlawyers)werehesitanttoattributeintentionalitytoinfants.Weassumedthatthesemotherssoughtmorecompellingevidencetosupportaclaimof intentionalbehaviorandthusattributedrelativelylittleintentionality.Thepresentsample,whichhadanotablylargerrangeofeducationalattainmentwithfewextremely highscores,indicatedasignificantpositivecorrelationbetweenIITandmaternaleducation,r(100)=.23,p<.05.Also,motherswithmoreeducationattributedless negativeintentionalityintheIIQ,r(90)=.30,p<.01.Thisrelationseemsmorereasonablethanourpreviousfinding:Acrossanormalrangeofeducation,mothers whohavehadmoreintellectualtrainingaremoresensitivetothepossibilityofintentionalityinaninfant'sbehaviorandareunwillingtobelievethatinfantscandothings onpurposetobemeanorspiteful.Thiseffectalsoemergedinameasurethatreflectstheeffectofeducation.PeabodyPictureVocabularyTest(Dunn&Dunn,1959) scores,whichwereavailableforalimitedsubsetofmothers,werepositivelycorrelatedwithIITscores,r(64)=.31,p<.01,andnegativelycorrelatedwithnegative intentionalityintheIIQ,r(63)=.36,p<.01.Thissuggeststhatmotherswhoaremoreeducatedand/orliterate(inEnglish)aremoreinclinedtoseeinfantsas intentional(ortodetectsubtlesignalsofintentionality)andarelesslikelytoviewthisintentionalityasnegative(i.e.,theyattributedlessnegativeintentionalitytoinfants). Finally,asreportedinpreviouswork,IITscoreswerepositivelycorrelatedwiththemother'sage,r(100)=.23,p<.05.Negativeintentionalityscoreswere negativelycorrelatedwiththemother'sage,r(87)=.24,p<.05. Ethnicity Themother'sethnicityalsoaffectshertendencytoperceiveintentionality.AlmostallmothersinthepresentsampleidentifiedthemselvesaseitherCaucasian(whichwe havetermedEuropeanAmerican),AfricanAmerican,orHispanic.OursamplingstrategytendstoyieldaEuropeanAmericangroupthatismorehighlyeducatedthan theAfrican

Page256

AmericanorHispanicmothers,butthereisconsiderablerangewithineachgroup.Toforminterpretablecategories,wedividedmothersintothosewhoreported12 yearsofeducationorless(whichincludeshavingaGraduateEquivalencyDegree)versusthosewhohadattendedsomecollegeorprofessionaltraining.2AnEducation LevelEthnicGroupANOVAonIITscoresindicatedasignificantmaineffectforethnicity,F(2,121)=6.83,p<IT>.01.AsindicatedinTable13.2,European AmericanmothersandAfricanAmericanmotherswerecomparable,andbothgroupshadhigherIITscoresthanHispanicmothers.Theaveragescorefor moreeducatedmotherswassomewhathigherthanthescoreforlesseducatedmothers,buttheeffectwasnotsignificant.Moreimportant,educationdid notinteractwithethnicity. AnalternativeviewofthiseffectistouseindividualclipsasthelevelofanalysisratherthantheIITscoreaveragedacrossclips.Thisapproachallowsustodetermineif theinfluenceofmaternalcharacteristicsisspecifictocertaintypesofclips.Educationdidnotinteractwithscoresacrossindividualclipsbutethnicitydidinteractwith clipscores,F(54,3449)=1.92,p<.01.Toexplorethisinteraction,weusedseparateANOVAstotestforethnicityeffectsineachclip.Thepatternofeffectswas remarkablyconsistent:Elevenofthe14highintentionalclipshadasignificantethnicityeffect(p<.01)duetoHispanicmotherswithlowerscoresthanEuropean AmericanorAfricanAmericanmothers.Therewerenoeffectsofthemother'sethnicityamongthelessintentionalclips.ThisanalysisindicatesthatthelowIITscores forHispanicmothersreflectsanunwillingnesstoascribeintentiontoactsrecognizedasintentionalbymothersintheothergroupsratherthanageneralfilterthatlowers intentionalityinallcircumstances. Foranalternativeviewofthiseffect,wecomputedseparatescoresforthe14highintentionalclipsandthe14lowintentionalclipsandanalyzedthesetwoscoresina repeatedmeasuresANOVA.TheEthnicityxIntentionalityinteractionwasstatisticallysignificant,F(2,121)=9.03,p<IT>.01andcanbedecomposedintoa significantethnicityeffectforthemeanscoreacrossthehighlyintentionalclips,F(2,121)=11.22,p<IT>.01,andnoeffectofethnicityacrosstheless intentionalclips.Consistentwiththefindingspresentedthusfar,Hispanicmothershadthelowestscores. Thematernalethnicityeffectacrossindividualclipsdescribedpreviouslycouldreflectethnicdifferencesinattributionsabouthighlyintentionalinfants,butgiventhatgirls andlightskinnedinfantsweremorelikelytobeviewedasintentional,theeffectcouldbemorecomplicated.Wecom
2

Itisdifficulttoequateeducationalattainmentindifferentethnicgroups.Wearecurrentlygatheringadditionaldatatorefinetheseclassifications.Thepresentanalysesshouldbe regardedaspreliminary.

Page257 TABLE13.2 PPIIScoresforEachEthnicGroup

IIT

M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N

AfricanAmerican 5.17 1.34 41 3.35 .61 34 2.01 .87 34 1.94 .14 32

EuropeanAmerican 5.25 .89 52 3.31 .49 30 1.28 .31 30 1.86 .12 29

>

Hispanic 3.99 1.58 34 2.70 .79 28 1.92 .78 28 1.85 .16 23

IIQpositive

>

IIQnegative

>

<

PIIB

>

putedtwoadditionalANOVAs,onewithseparatescoresforgirlsandboysandonewithseparatescoresforlightskinnedanddarkskinnedinfants.TheseANOVAs revealedthemaineffectsofethnicityasjustdescribed,andthemaineffectsofinfantsexandinfantskincolor,buttherewasnointeractionwithethnicity:European Americanmothers,AfricanAmericanmothers,andHispanicmothersratedtheclipsofgirlsasmoreintentionalthantheclipsofboysandtheclipsoflightskinned infantsasmoreintentionalthantheclipsofdarkskinnedinfants. TheethnicityeffectrevealedintheIITwasconsistentwitheffectsfortheIIQ,butthisanalysismustberegardedastentativeatpresentbecauseofrelativelysmall groupsizesforthehighlyeducatedHispanicmothers(N=7)andthelesseducatedEuropeanAmericanmothers(N=9).Becauseofthesmallsamplesizeforthese twogroups,wedidnotuseeducationlevelasatermintheanalysisofIIQ.Thiscausessomedegreeofconfoundingbetweenethnicgroupandeducation,with EuropeanAmericanmothersbeingmoreeducatedandHispanicmothersbeinglesseducated. ArepeatedmeasuresANOVAontheIIQscoresindicatedamaineffectofethnicgroup,F(2,89)=4.77,p<IT>.01,andquestiontype(i.e.,positivevs. negative),F(1,89)=353.13,p<.01,butthesetwoeffectsinteracted,F(2,89)=22.89,p<.01.TheethnicityeffectforthepositiveIIQquestions,F(2,89)= 9.49,p<IT>.01,emergedbecauseAfricanAmericanmothersandEuropeanAmericanmothershadhigherpositiveIIQscoresthanHispanicmothers(as indicatedbyaStudentNewmanKeulstestseeTable13.2).Theethnicityeffectfornegativequestionswasalsosignificant,F(2,89)=9.96,p<.01,but thepatternofmeanswasdifferent.AfricanAmericanandHispanicmothersratedinfantsasmorenegativelyintentionalthandidEuropeanAmericanmothers.

Page258

Finally,welookedatscoresonthePIIBinwhichmothersattemptedtopredicthowtheirowninfantwouldperforminsituationsthatevokeintentionality.Therewasa maineffectofethnicity,F(2,81)=3.76,p<.05.AsindicatedinTable13.2,AfricanAmericanmothersratedtheirinfantsasmoreintentionalthandideither EuropeanAmericanmothersorHispanicmothers. Theeffectsofethnicityshouldbeinterpretedfromacrossculturalperspectivebutwithconsiderablecaution.Asnotedalready,ourrecruitmentprocedurescauseda confoundingofethnicityandeducationsuchthattheHispanicmothersinoursampletendtobelesseducatedthaneithertheAfricanAmericanmothersorthe EuropeanAmericanmothers.Second,alloftheHispanicmotherscouldcommunicateinEnglishbutformanyitwastheirsecondlanguage.Thus,theymayhavehad lessunderstandingofthequestionsusedineachofthemeasurementprocedures.Finally,ourassessmentswereconductedinalaboratoryeitheratYaleorattheHill HealthCenter.Thiscontextwasunnaturalforallmothers,butmayhaveevokeddifferentlevelsofanxiety,compliance,sociallydesirableresponding,andcandorfrom thedifferentgroupsofwomen. Thesecaveatsnotwithstanding,Hispanicmothersconsideredtheirinfantstobelessintentionalthandidothermothersacrossthetwoprimarymeasuresofpositive intentionality.OneinterpretationofthiseffectisthattheHispanicmothersarelessknowledgeableregardinginfantdevelopment.Forexample,PachterandDworkin (1997)reportedthatPuertoRicanmotherstendtoexpectchildrentoattainmilestonessuchasfeedingfromaspoon,smilingataface,orrecognizingtheirmotherata lateragethandomothersforotherethnicgroups.However,thefactthatmilestonesaremisstatedsystematically(i.e.,theyarepredictedtoberelativelylate)rather thanrandomlysuggestsabroaderinterpretation.Hispaniccultureplacesconsiderableemphasisongroupaffiliationandfeelingsofidentification,loyalty,andsolidarity amongfamilymembers(Harrison,Wilson,Pine,Chan,&Buriel,1990).Thus,manyHispanicmothersmayderivepotency,pleasure,andprestigefromtheirnurturing behavior,andtheinfant'sdependencyenhancesthemother'ssenseofselfbyprovidingherwithabetteropportunitytofulfillherroleasanurturer.Inthepresent context,Hispanicmothersmighttendtounderstatetheinfant'sabilitytodothingsdeliberately,particularlyincomparisontoothermotherswhoseetheirmissionasto encouragetheinfant'sautonomyorfostertheinfant'sintellectualdevelopment.Thishypothesisisspeculativebutisconsistentwithotherfindings.Forexample,Field andWidmayer(1981)examinedmotherinfantinteractionsduringfeedingandfacetofaceplayandfoundthatPuertoRicanmothersusedmore''babytalk"(i.e., exaggeratedintonationsandbriefphraseswithverylittleintentionalcontent),displayedmorecontingentresponsivity,andplayedmoresocialgames.

Page259

AfricanAmericanmothersratedtheirinfantsasmoreintentionalonthemeasuresofnegativeintentionalityandinthecontextofpredictingspecificbehaviors.Manyof thecautionsdescribedpreviouslyarealsorelevanthere,butthiseffectsuggeststhattheAfricanAmericanmothersinoursamplearemorewillingtoviewinfantsas capableofbeingannoyingordifficultonpurpose.ThismayberelatedtothefindingthatmanyAfricanAmericanmothersareconcernedwiththepossibilityof "spoiling"aninfantbyprovidingtoomuchattention(Field&Widmayer,1981Solomon,Martin,&Cottington,1993).Moreover,becausemanyoftheAfrican AmericanandHispanicmothersinthepresentsamplewereyoung,previousfindingsaboutadolescentmothersmayalsoberelevant.Forexample,Carter,Osofsky, andHann(1991)notedthatadolescentmothersoftenhaveunrealisticexpectationsabouttheirinfants(e.g.,encouragingveryyounginfantstoholdtheirownbottles andfeedthemselves,beinginsensitivetothechild'sgrowingneedforautonomy,exercisingexcessivecontroloverthechild'slocomotionandexploration).And, KarrakerandEvans(1996)foundthatmanyadolescentmothershavepoorknowledgeofinfantmilestonesandarenotaccurateinpredictingtheirinfant'sbehavior. Fromthepresentperspective,thewillingnesstoseeinfantsasbehavingnegativelyonpurposecouldberelatedtoamorepunitivestyleofchildrearinginwhichinfants mustbepunishedforwillfultransgressionsinordertoavoid"spoiling"themandtokeepthemundercontrol.Forexample,Dix,Ruble,andZambarano(1989)found thatmothersof4to12montholdinfantsoftenbasetheirdisciplinedecisionsoninferencesabouttheinfant'scompetenceandresponsibilityfornegativeacts.Ifthis decisionisbasedonafaultyinference(e.g.,thataninfantisoverlyintentional),thendisciplinecouldbeentirelyinappropriate. MentalHealth Finally,ourpreviousresearchindicatedatendencyforwomenwithmoresymptomsofdepressionoranxietytoreportlessinfantintentionality,buttheeffectshave beensmallandscatteredacrossvariousmeasures.Thepresentdataareconsistentwithpreviousfindings:BeckDepressionInventoryscoreswerenegatively correlatedwithIITscores,r(105)=.25,p<.01,andpositivelycorrelatedwithnegativeintentionalityscoresintheIIQ,r(92)=.24,p<.05.BeckAnxiety InventoryscoreswerenotrelatedtoIITscoresbutwerecorrelatedwithnegativeintentionalityscoresintheIIQ,r(92)=.22,p<.05.Itseemslikelythata depressedoranxiousmothermightbeinsensitivetoherinfant'semergingintentionalityeitherbecauseofalackofinterestintheinfant'sdevelopmentorbecausean intentionalinfantismoredemandingthananinfantwhoispassiveordocile.Or,theeffectcouldbereversed:Depressedoranxiousmothersmightprovidelittle stimulationorcontingentresponseandthusunderminetheirchild'sintentionality.Carefulclinicalworkisneededtounravelthisphenomenon.

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GeneralandSpecificPerceptionofInfantIntentionality Thesecondbroadquestionaddressedhereiswhetherparentsseparatetheirperceptionoftheirowninfant'sintentionalityfromamoregeneralbeliefaboutthe intentionalityofinfants.Ourdatasuggestthatmanyparentsofyounginfantsdonotmakethisdistinction.Inastudyof40motherinfantdyadstestedat4and8 months,thecorrelationbetweentheIITandtheIIQwasahefty.54and.57(Feldman&Reznick,1996).InthemostrecentversionoftheIIQ,weattemptedto focustheparentonhisorherowninfantbyremovingquestionsthatwerewordedtoogenerally.Still,forthepresentsample,theIITandtheIIQwerepositively correlated,r(81)=.26,p<.05.ThepositiverelationwasparticularlystrongfortheIIQquestionsthattappositiveaspectsofintentionality,r(81)=.35,p <IT>.01. ManymothersalsocompletedthePIIB,whichisaradicallyspecificviewoftheirinfant'sintentionalityinthesensethatrespondentsareaskedtopredicthowtheir infantwillrespondinaparticularsituation.Asnotedearlier,wechosethesituationsandresponsealternativesbasedonourowninterpretationofhowanintentional infantwouldactinspecificsituations(e.g.,arelativelyintentional9montholdwouldattempttorollaballbacktoanexperimenterorwouldtryrepeatedlytoretrieve atoythroughaslotthatwasabittoosmall).ScoresonthePIIBdidnotcorrelatewiththeIITscores,butdidcorrelatepositivelywiththeIIQ,r(80)=.34,p <IT>.01.ThispatternofcorrelationsisconsistentwiththeviewthatourcurrentinstrumentsaretappingPPIIatdifferentbutrelatedlevels:TheIIT capturesthemother'sgeneralview,thePIIBcapturesthemother'sspecificexpectationsaboutherowninfant,andtheIIQhasaspectsofboth.Itis interestingtonotethatthePIIBscorecorrelatedpositivelywithbothaspectsoftheIIQ:r(80)=.31,p<.01withthepositiveIIQitems,andr(80)=.21,p <.05withthenegativeIIQitems.ThissuggeststhatthePIIBmaybepickingupbothpositiveandnegativeaspectsofintentionality.Whenthesamplesizeinthe presentresearchislarger,theseclaimscanbeinvestigatedusingstructuralequationmodeling. Thenotablefindinghereandinpreviousworkisthatdespitesomedegreeofdifferentiation,PPIIinageneralsense(i.e.,ratingsofanonymousbabies)andPPIIina specificsense(i.e.,questionsabouttheparent'sownchild)haveahighdegreeofoverlap.Thisoverlapbetweengeneralandspecificviewsvaultsusintoanintriguing zoneofspeculation.Oneinterpretationoftheoverlapisthatsomeparentsarelesslikelythanotherstoattendtoaspectsoftheirinfant'sbehaviorthatcouldsupportan ascriptionofintentionality(i.e.,theydonotnoticetheirinfant'stendencytomanifestbehaviorsthatsuggestintentionality)sotheydrawontheirgeneralopinionabout infantcapabilitieswhenansweringspecificquestionsabouttheir

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infant.Asecondinterpretationisthateachparentusessomewhatdifferentcriteriafordecidingifaninfant'sbehaviorisintentional,andtheyusethesesamecriteriafor boththeirownandother'schildren.Finally,itcouldbethatparentsaregivinganaccuratereportoftheirinfant'slevelofintentionality,buttheparent'sgeneralbeliefs aboutinfantintentionalityhaveledthemtotreattheirinfantinawaythatinfluencestheinfant'sdevelopmentofintentionality(e.g.,theparenthasbeenparticularly responsiveorhasprovidedappropriatelychallengingplaymaterials),thuscausinganalignmentoftheinfant'sintentionalbehaviorsandtheparent'sgeneralviewsabout infantintentionality. ParentPerceptionofIntentionalityAsMeasurementorIntervention? ThethirdandfinalquestionaddressedhereiswhethertheassessmentofPPIIshouldberegardedasameasurementoranintervention.Whenweaskparentstorate infantintentionalityusingtheIIT,wemustfirstprovideanexplanationoftheconstruct.Inanearlystudy(Feldman&Reznick,1996),wenoticedthatmanyparents wereintriguedbyourpresentationoftheideathatinfantsmaydifferintheirabilitytodothingsdeliberately.Moreover,inafollowupstudyinwhichweassessedPPII afterprovidingalesscomprehensiveexplanation,theeffectsweredisappointing,suggestingthatwehadnotmeasuredtheconstructaswell.WiththeIIQ,the questionsthemselvespaintavividpictureofwhatitwouldmeantoclaimthataninfantisintentional.Anintriguingquestionlooms:Doourmeasurementtechniques assesstheperceptionofintentionalityordotheycreatetheperceptionofintentionality(i.e.,teachparentshowtorecognizeorascribeintentionalbehaviors)? Toanswerthisquestion,Schwartz(1997)administeredanearlyversionoftheIIQtoonelongitudinalsampleofmotherswhentheirinfantswere8,10,and12 months,asecondlongitudinalgroupwhentheirinfantswere10and12months,andacomparisongrouptestedonlyat12months.TheresultsindicatedthatIIQ scoresincreasedwithageforthe81012monthlongitudinalcomparison,F(2,68)=81.91,p<.01,andforthe1012monthlongitudinalcomparison,F(1,19)= 31.07,p<.01,butnotforthecrosssectionalcomparison.Inotherwords,motherswhocompletedtheIIQforthefirsttimewhentheirinfantwas8,10,or12 monthsoldreportedthesamelevelofintentionality.At10and12months,IIQscoreswereaffectedbythenumberofpreviousassessments.Indeed,thethreecohorts weresignificantlydifferentat12months,F(2,74)=4.67,p<.05,withIIQscoresproportionaltothenumberofpreviousassessments.So,fromalongitudinal perspective,thenumberofpreviousadministrationsofthe

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IIQisabetterpredictorofIIQscorethanistheageoftheinfant,againsuggestingthatthisisamatterofwillingnesstoascribeintentionalityratherthantheperception ofsomethingthatisreallythere. TheseresultscanbecontrastedwithadifferentparentreportmeasurethatwasadministeredtothesamemothersatthesametimeastheIIQ:TheMacArthur CommunicativeDevelopmentInventory(Fensonetal.,1993)wasusedtomeasuretheinfant'sabilityinwordproduction,wordcomprehension,andgesturalnaming. Forthelanguageassessment,scoresincreasedovertimeforthe81012monthlongitudinalcomparison,F(2,68)=87.26,p<.01,andforthe1012month longitudinalcomparison,F(1,17)=24.20,p<.01.But,incontrasttotheIIQscores,thelanguagescoresweresignificantlydifferentinacrosssectionalanalysis,F (2,67)=38.25,p<.01.Also,languagescoresforthe2groupsofmothersassessedwhentheirinfantwas10monthsandthe3groupsofmothersassessedwhen theirinfantwas12monthsdidnotdifferasafunctionofthenumberofpreviousassessments. Thisresultindicatesthatprovidingaparentwithanopportunityandperhapsaninducementtoascribeintentionalityinaparticularcircumstancemayaffecttheparent's subsequentperception.Fromamethodologicalperspective,themeasurementofPPIIisreactive,raisingtheparent'sconsciousnessaboutthepossibilitythatinfants couldberegardedasintentional.Thus,wemustbecautiousinoureffortstomeasurePPII,particularlyinalongitudinalcontext,andsearchformethodsthatwould assessPPIIindirectly(e.g.,byanalyzingthelanguagethatparentsuseinaseeminglyirrelevantcontextsuchasnarratingavideotape). Fromaninterventionistperspective,therearecertainlycircumstancesinwhichitwouldbeadvantageoustoalterPPII.Asnotedearlier,Kaye(1982),Bruner(1973, 1975),andTomasello(1992,1996)arguedpersuasivelythatbytreatingtheinfantasintentional,parentsfacilitatevariousaspectsoftheinfant'scognitive development.TherearealsoreportsthatsuggestthatPPIIcanbeproblematic,particularlyattheextremes.Parentswhoabusechildrenhavemoreunrealistic expectationsaboutchilddevelopment(Azar,Robinson,Hekimian,&Twentyman,1984Twentyman&Plotkin,1982),attributemalevolentintentiontochildren (Bauer&Twentyman,1985),aremorelikelytousepowerassertiveandnegativelyorientedstrategiesforcontrollingtheirchild(Oldershaw,Walters,&Hall,1986), andarelesslikelytorespondcontingentlytotheinfantandtodemonstrateenjoymentofandresponsivenesstotheinfant'sgoaldirectedbehavior(Crittenden& Bonvillian,1984LyonsRuth,Connell,Zoll,&Stahl,1987).Also,clinicianswhoworkwithparentswhoabuseorneglectachildreportthatfromtheparent's perspective,therationalefortheirbehaviorisoftenstatedintermsofintentionality:Someparentsmayholdaninappropriatelyoverstatedviewofinfantintentionalityin whichtheinfantmustbepun

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ishedforintentionalmisdemeanors,taughtwhoisboss,orbroughtintolinewithsomeethicalprecepts(e.g.,Helfer,McKinney,&Kempe,1976Pollock&Steele, 1972).Ontheotherextreme,someparentsmayholdaninappropriatelyunderstatedviewofinfantintentionalityinwhichitiseasytoignoretheinfant'sinteractional bidsorneedforstimulationandmasteryexperiences.Fromthisperspective,thefactthatparentsattributemoreintentionalitywhenthesesortsofbehaviorsaremade salientoffersausefulclueastohowaneffectiveinterventionmightbestructured. Conclusion Thepresentdataconfirmpreviousclaimsthatparentsusegoalorientedactionandparticipationinsocialgamesascluesthatsuggestinfantintentionality.Wealso foundthatperceptualvigilanceandcontrolledactionareviewedasevidencesuggestingintentionality.Furtherresearchisneededtoidentifythespecificpsychological mechanismsthatemergeduringthefirstyearandallowinfantstoperformthesesortsofbehaviors. Itisnotsurprisingthatintentionalityismorelikelytobeascribedtoolderinfants,buttheapparenteffectsofsexandskincolorareintriguing.Wecouldpropose variousmechanismsthatmightexplaintheseeffectseitherasaccuratedescriptionsofinherentdifferencesininfants,projectionsofstereotypicattitudesheldbyparents, orasartifactsofthepresentmeasurementstrategy.However,weprefertoadoptthemoreprudentstrategyofacknowledgingtheneedforreplicationand experimentalmanipulationasthenecessarynextsteps. FromtheperspectiveofPPIIasanexplanatorygloss,thepresentanalysesconfirmandextendpreviouseffortstoidentifyfactorsthatinfluencetheparent'swillingness orabilitytoascribeintentionalitytoinfants.Ageandeducationplayarole,suggestingthatinfantintentionalityissomethingwelearntoappreciate.Indeed,even providingasecondorthirdopportunitytoanswerquestionsaboutintentionalityappearstohavesomeinfluenceonthispractice.Thepresentsampleincludesmothers only,butitseemslikelythatfatherswouldshowthesamepatternofeffects. Theeffectsofculture,asrevealedintheanalysisofethnicity,willnodoubtbecomemorecomplicatedwhenwehavealargeenoughsamplesizetoisolatethe influencesofeducationandage.However,thepresentresultspointtoatendencyforHispanicmotherstoviewinfantsaslessintentionalandforAfricanAmerican motherstobemorelikelytoascribenegativeintentions.Itwillbeinterestingtoseeifthesedifferencesarerelatedtodifferencesintheinfant'sbehaviorandto subsequentpsychologicaldevelopment.Thesameistrueforeffectsrelatedtosymptomsofdepressionandanxiety.

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Finally,wenotethatparentsmaybeabletoseparatetheintentionalityoftheirowninfantfromtheirviewofinfantsingeneral,butthereisagooddegreeofoverlap. Thisrelationisimportantbecauseitreflectsthebidirectionalnatureofthepresentphenomenon.Parentsarelikelytomakeattributionsabouttheintentionalityoftheir infant'sbehavior.Theseattributionsarebasedonboththeinfant'songoingbehaviorcapacitiesandtheparent'scriteriafortheattributionorascriptionofintentionality. Moreover,theparent'sresponsetotheinfant'sbehaviorisinfluencedbytheparent'sperceptionoftheintentionalityofthatbehavior,andtheparent'sresponsemay encourageordiscouragetheinfant'semergingintentionality.Thus,returningtothethemeofthisvolume,thereismuchtobegainedfromembracingtheclaimthat intentionsdevelopinasocialworld.Whetherornotinfantsarecapableofintentionalbehavior,therecanbenodoubtthatparentstendtoregardinfantsasintentional, anditseemslikelythattheytempertheirbehavioraccordingly.Whenwefocusonintentionalityasaparentperception,wediscoverusefulcluesaboutthespecific infantbehaviorsthataretakenasindicatingintentionalityandthewaysthatparentalascriptionofintentionalityislikelytoencourageorthwarttheinfant'sdevelopment. Acknowledgments IamgratefultotheW.T.GrantFoundationfortheirsupportofthisresearch.HelpfuleditorialcommentswereprovidedbyDavidOlson,CynthiaGarciaColl,and RobinHarwood. ThepresentresearchgrewoutofalivelydiscussiongroupatYaleintheearly1990scalledIntentionaliTea.SuzanneZeedykconductedherdissertationonthetopic andpublishedanexcellentsurveyofdevelopmentalaccountsofintentionality(Zeedyk,1996).Morerecently,myresearchinvolvedcollaborationswithRuthFeldman, BenaBrandweinSchwartz,NicoleEldridge,StephanieAubry,ChristineFingado,andNicoleStraightduringtheirtimeatYaleUniversity.Eachoftheseindividuals hascontributedtothepresentresearch. References Anscombe,G.E.M.(1957).Intention.London:Blackwell. Azar,S.T.,Robinson,D.R.,Hekimian,E.,&Twentyman,C.T.(1984).Unrealisticexpectationsandproblemsolvingabilityinmaltreatingandcomparisonmothers. JournalofConsultingandClinicalPsychology,52,687691. Bakeman,R.,&Adamson,L.(1984).Coordinatingattentiontopeopleandobjectsinmotherinfantandpeerinfantinteractions.ChildDevelopment,55,1278 1289.

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Bates,E.,Benigni,L.,Bretherton,I.,Camaioni,L.,&Volterra,V.(1979).Theemergenceofsymbols.NewYork:AcademicPress. Bauer,W.D.,&Twentyman,C.T.(1985).Abusing,neglectful,andcomparisonmothers'responsestochildrelatedandnonchildrelatedstressors.Journalof ConsultingandClinicalPsychology,53,335343. Brentano,F.C.(1973).Psychologyfromanempiricalstandpoint.(A.C.Rancurello,D.B.Terrell&L.L.McAlister,Trans.).NewYork:HumanitiesPress. (Originalworkpublishedin1874) Bruner,J.S.(1973).Organizationofearlyskilledaction.ChildDevelopment,44,111. Bruner,J.S.(1975).Theontogenesisofspeechacts.JournalofChildLanguage,2,119. Bruner,J.S.(1983).Child'stalk:Learningtouselanguage.NewYork:Norton. Butterworth,G.,&Cochran,E.(1980).Towardsamechanismofjointvisualattentioninhumaninfancy.InternationalJournalofBehavioralDevelopment,3, 253272. Campos,J.J.,&Stenberg,C.R.(1981).Perception,appraisalandemotions:Theonsetofsocialreferencing.InM.E.Lamb&L.R.Sherrod(Eds.),Infantsocial cognition(pp.333373).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Carter,S.L.,Osofsky,J.D.,&Hann,D.M.(1991).Speakingforthebaby:Atherapeuticinterventionwithadolescentmothersandtheirinfants.InfantMental HealthJournal,12,291301. Crittenden,P.M.,&Bonvillian,J.D.(1984).Therelationshipbetweenmaternalriskstatusandmaternalsensitivity.AmericanJournalofOrthopsychiatry,54, 250262. Cronbach,L.J.(1951).Coefficientalphaandtheinternalstructureoftests.Psychometrika,16,297234. Dennett,D.(1987).Theintentionalstance.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Dix,T.,Ruble,D.N.,&Zambarano,R.J.(1989).Mothers'implicittheoriesofdiscipline:Childeffects,parenteffects,andtheattributionprocess.Child Development,60,13731391. Dore,J.,Franklin,M.B.,Miller,R.T.,&Ramer,A.L.H.(1976).Transitionalphenomenainearlylanguageacquisition.JournalofChildLanguage,3,1328. Dunn,L.M.,&Dunn,L.M.(1959).PeabodyPictureVocabularyTest.(AvailablefromAmericanGuidanceService,P.O.Box99,CirclePines,MN550141796) Eldridge,N.E.(1997).Parentalattributionsofinfantintentionality.Unpublishedmanuscript,YaleUniversity. Emde,R.N.(1984).Theaffectiveself:Continuitiesandtransformationsfrominfancy.inJ.D.Call(Ed.),Frontiersofinfantpsychiatry.NewYork:Basic. Feinman,S.(1982).Socialreferencingininfancy.MerrillPalmerQuarterly,28,445470. Feldman,R.,&Reznick,J.S.(1996).Maternalperceptionofinfantintentionalityat4and8months.InfantBehaviorandDevelopment,19,483496. Fenson,L.,Dale,P.,Reznick,J.S.,Thal,D.,Bates,E.,Hartung,J.P.,Pethick,S.,&Reilly,J.S.(1993).TheMacArthurCommunicativeDevelopment Inventories:UsersguideandtechnicalmanualSanDiego,CA:SingularPress. Field,T.M.,&Widmayer,S.M.(1981).MotherinfantinteractionsamonglowerSESblack,Cuban,PuertoRican,andSouthAmericanimmigrants.InT.M.Field, A.M.Sostek,P.Vietze,&P.H.Leiderman(Eds.),Cultureandearlyinteractions(pp.4160).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. GarciaColl,C.,Lamberty,G.,Jenkins,R.,McAdoo,H.P.,Crnic,K.,Wasik,B.H.,&VzquezGarcia,H.(1996).Anintegrativemodelforthestudyof developmentalcompetenciesinminoritychildren.ChildDevelopment,67,18911914. Gergen,K.J.(1967).Thesignificanceofskincolorinhumanrelations.Daedalus,96,390407. Grant,V.J.(1994).Sexofinfantdifferencesinmotherinfantinteraction:Areinterpretationofpastfindings.DevelopmentalReview,14,126. Griffin,D.R.(1992).Animalminds.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.

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Harding,C.G.,&Golinkoff,R.M.(1979).Theoriginsofintentionalvocalizationsinprelinguisticinfants.ChildDevelopment,50,3340. Harrison,A.O.,Wilson,M.N.,Pine,C.J.,Chan,S.Q.,&Buriel,R.(1990).Familyecologiesofethnicminoritychildren.ChildDevelopment,61,347362. Helfer,R.E.,McKinney,J.P.,&Kempe,R.(1976).Arrestingorfreezingthedevelopmentalprocess.InR.E.Helfer&C.H.Kempe(Eds.),Childabuseand neglect(pp.5573).Cambridge,MA:Ballinger. Karraker,K.H.,&Evans,S.L.(1996).Adolescentmothers'knowledgeofchilddevelopmentandexpectationsfortheirowninfants.JournalofYouth& Adolesence,25,651666. Kaye,K.(1982).Thementalandsociallifeofbabies.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress. Lockman,J.J.,Ashmead,D.H.,&Bushnell,E.W.(1984).Thedevelopmentofanticipatoryhandorientationduringinfancy.JournalofExperimentalChild Psychology,37,176186. LyonsRuth,K.,Connell,D.,Zoll,D.,&Stahl,J.(1987).Infantsatsocialrisk:Relationsamonginfantmaltreatment,maternalbehavior,andinfantattachment behavior.DevelopmentalPsychology,23,223232. Malle,B.F.,&Knobe,J.(1997).Thefolkconceptofintentionality.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,33,101121. Moore,C.,&Dunham,P.(1995).Jointattention:Itsoriginsandroleindevelopment.Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Mosier,C.E.,&Rogoff,B.(1994).Infants'instrumentaluseoftheirmotherstoachievetheirgoals.ChildDevelopment,65,7079. Murphy,D.J.,&Messer,D.J.(1977).Mothers,infantsandpointing:Astudyofagesture.InR.H.Schaffer(Ed.),Studiesinmotherinfantinteraction(pp.323 354).NewYork:AcademicPress. Oldershaw,L.,Walters,G.C.,&Hall,D.K.(1986).Controlstrategiesandnoncomplianceinabusivemotherchilddyads:Anobservationalstudy.Child Development,57,722732. Pachter,L.M.,&Dworkin,D.H.(1997).Maternalexpectationsaboutnormalchilddevelopmentin4culturalgroups.ArchivesofPediatricandAdolescent Medicine,151,11441150. Pollock,C.,&Steele,B.(1972).Atherapeuticapproachtotheparents.InC.H.Kempe&R.E.Helfer(Eds.),Helpingthebatteredchildandhisfamily(pp.3 21).Philadelphia:Lippincott. Radner,D.,&Radner,M.(1989).Animalconsciousness.Buffalo,NY:PrometheusBooks. Reid,G.M.(1994).Maternalsexstereotypingofnewborns.PsychologicalReports,73,14431450. Reznick,J.S.(1998).PredictingInfantIntentionalBehavior,Version1.2.(AvailablefromJ.StevenReznick,CB#3270,UniversityofNorthCarolina,Chapel Hill,NC275143270) Reznick,J.S.,&Feldman,R.(1998).InfantIntentionalityQuestionnaire,Version4.2.(AvailablefromJ.StevenReznick,CB#3270,UniversityofNorth Carolina,ChapelHill,NC275143270) Rubin,J.,Provenzano,R.,&Luria,Z.(1974).Theeyeofthebeholder:Parents'viewsonsexofnewborns.AmericanJournalofOrthopsychiatry,44,512519. Scaife,M.,&Bruner,J.(1975).Thecapacityforjointvisualattentionintheinfant.Nature,253,265266. Schwartz,B.B.(1997).Memoryforlocations:Developmentalfunctionandindividualdifferences.Unpublisheddoctoraldissertation,YaleUniversity. Searle,J.R.(1983).Intentionality.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Solomon,R.,Martin,K.,&Cottington,E.(1993).Spoilinganinfant:Furthersupportfortheconstruct.TopicsinEarlyChildhoodSpecialEducation,13,175 183. Thelen,E.,Corbetta,D.,Kamm,K,Spencer,J.P.,Schneider,K.,&Zernicke,R.F.(1993).Thetransitiontoreaching:Mappingintentionandintrinsicdynamics. ChildDevelopment,64,10581098. Tomasello,M.(1992).Thesocialbasesoflanguageacquisition.SocialDevelopment,1,6887.

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Tomasello,M.(1996).Theculturalrootsoflanguage.InB.M.Velichkovsky&D.M.Rumbaugh(Eds.),Communicatingmeaning:Theevolutionand developmentoflanguage(pp.275307).Mahwah,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Trevarthen,C.(1979).Communicationandcooperationinearlyinfancy:Adescriptionofprimaryintersubjectivity.InM.Bullowa(Ed.),Beforespeech.:The beginningsofinterpersonalcommunication(pp.321347).Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Twentyman,C.T.,&Plotkin,R.C.(1982).Unrealisticexpectationsofparentswhomaltreattheirchildren:Aneducationaldeficitthatpertainstochilddevelopment. JournalofClinicalPsychology,38,497503. Walden,T.A.,&Ogan,T.A.(1988).Thedevelopmentofsocialreferencing.ChildDevelopment,59,12301240. Willatts,P.(1984).Stagesinthedevelopmentofintentionalsearchbyyounginfants.DevelomentalPsychology,20,389396. Williams,J.E.,&Morland,J.K.(1976).Race,color,andtheyoungchildChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress. Zeedyk,M.S.(1992).Parentalperceptionsofinfantintentionality.Unpublishedmanuscript,YaleUniversity. Zeedyk,M.S.(1994).Maternalinterpretationsofinfantintentionality.Unpublisheddoctoraldissertation,YaleUniversity. Zeedyk,M.S.(1996).Developmentalaccountsofintentionality:Towardintegration.DevelopmentalReview,16,416461. Zeedyk,M.S.,&Reznick,J.S.(1996).InfantIntentionalityTape,Version2.1[Film].(AvailablefromJ.StevenReznick,CB#3270,UniversityofNorth Carolina,ChapelHill,NC275143270)

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Chapter14 IntentionandEmotioninChildPsychopathology: BuildingCooperativePlans

JennyJenkins RachelGreenbaum UniversityofToronto Cognitivetheoriesofintentioncontributetoourunderstandingofhowonepersoncanrepresentthebeliefs,intentions,andgoalsofanotherperson.Typicallythe interestincognitivescienceistoexaminethestructuraldevelopmentofthisrepresentationalsystem.Thischapterswitchesthefocusawayfromthestructureofthese representationstothereasonswhytheydevelopandtheirsemanticcontent.Wearguethatcognitivestructuresforrepresentingourownandothers'intentionsand goalsdevelopedtoenablecomplexcooperationacrossmultipleagents.Suchacognitivesystemallowsfortheconstructionandexecutionofjointplans(Oatley, 1992).Muchofcognitivesciencehasbeenconcernedwithunderstandingtheindividualmind.Andyettounderstandthemajorachievementsofculture,science,and soon,weneedtounderstandhowmultipleagentscanworktogetheronajointgoal,andhownewgoalsemergethatarenottheproductofanyoneindividual,but representtheemergentpropertiesofindividuals'mindsininteraction(Hutchins,1995). Weusethetermintentiontomeantherepresentationofagoal.Theindividualwantssomethingandformsaplantoexecutethegoal.Suchaplanmayinvolvea sequenceofactions.Astheexecutionoftheplanisunderway,itwillalsoinvolveadjustmentstotheplan,repairs,modificationsoftheoriginalgoal.Thepsychologyof planningandactionismademorecomplexandmoreexciting,however,becauseitoccursinasocialcontext.Intentionsarenottypicallyjustintentionsofanindividual inisolation.Theyoftenconcernwhatwewantfromothers,whatwethinktheywantfromus,whatwebelieveaboutourselvesandthem.

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Inthischapterwelookatindividualdifferencesinchildren'sabilitiestoaccuratelyrepresenttheirownandothers'intentions.Somechildrenshowmajorinaccuraciesin howtheythinkabouttheintentionsofothers.Theyalsobuildupanintentionalstructuretowardothersthatmakesitdifficultforthemtoexecuteacooperativeplan. Wereviewdatafromthefieldofdevelopmentalpsychopathologylinkingenvironmentaladversitiestothedevelopmentofcognitivestructuresinwhichchildrenshow biasesintheirownintentionstowardothersandtheirunderstandingofothers'intentionstowardthemselves.Thesesubjectsarenotthetypicalsubjectsforthe psychologyofintention.However,wearguethatbyexaminingtheintentionalstructureofchildrenwhoshowaproblematicdevelopmentaltrajectory,wegainan understandingoftheprimaryfunctionofourabilitytorepresenttheintentionsofselfandother:thecreationofnewpiecesofknowledge(orobjectsintheworld)that canonlybecreatedbythecooperationofindividuals. TheGoalCorrectedPartnership Howdoesafatherwhohasjustprepareddinnermanagetogethistwochildren,whoarehappilyengagedinperformingaplay,tothetablewhenhewantsthem there?Howaretwochildren,whodonotreallylikeoneanotherbutareaskedtoworkonaprojecttogetheratschool,abletocomeupwithajointplanandgetthe projectdone?Althoughsucheventsposechallengestohumans,wedomanagethesecooperativeendeavors.Weplanwithoneanother.Wethinkaboutwhatother peoplewantandinterleaveourowngoalsaccordingly.Webuildcooperativestructuresthatallowforpeopletolivetogetheramicablyandproductively. This''jointness"ofplanningandactionrequiressomethingspecial.Wehavetobeabletorepresentwhattheotherpersonwantsandwhytheywantit.Wehavetobe abletothinkaboutourowngoals.Givingconsiderationtoourownindividualgoalsandthegoalsoftheother,wehavetoagreeonajointgoal.Sometimeswealso needtomakeanexplicitplanforhowthegoalwillbeachieved.Parentsandtheiryoungchildrencometobeabletoconstructthesejointplansintheserviceoftheir goals.Bowlby(1971)calledthisthegoalcorrectedpartnership. Bowlbyisnotusuallymentionedincognitivediscussionsofintention.Weargue,however,thathistheoryofthegoalcorrectedpartnershipisveryusefulfor understandingthedevelopmentofintention.Suchpartnershipsarebasedonschemas,thatistosaycognitive/emotionalstructures,inwhichthegoalsorintentionsof boththeselfandtheotherarerepresented.Suchschemasallowpeopletoconstructbothasharedsemantics,andrepresentationsofinternalstatesoftheother.This theoryimplies

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thatintentionalitythementalqualitiesof"aboutness,"thatistosay,ofsemanticsandofbeingabletorepresentaspectsoftheworldarisesnotjustbecausethe mindsomehowhastheabilitytorepresentthingsoutsideitself,butbecausesuchrepresentationsfigureinthesharingofintentionsandplans,inthefirstinstancewith caregivers. Duringinfancyweseethebeginningsofgoalcorrectedpartnerships.Parentsmatchtheirbabies'vocalizationsandactionswiththeirownvocalizationsandactions, sensitivelytimingthemtocreateafinelytuneddancewiththeirbaby.Thebabygetsafeelingforwhatitisliketoactcooperatively,toexecuteanactionandtohave someoneelsetakeitupandrespondtoit.Onthebasisofsuchsynchrony,cooperativeactionfeelsfamiliarandrewarding(Stern,1985). Languagebringswithitamuchmorecomplextoolforengagingincooperativeaction.Withlanguage,childrenacquireboththemeansforrepresentingandreferringto objectsintheoutsideworld,andfornegotiatingaroundtheinternalstatesofotherpeople.A2yearoldcanfindoutaboutsomeoneelse'sfeelingsandthoughts,and talkabouthisorherownfeelingsandthoughts(Dunn,1988).Aplacebetweenpeopleisconstructedinwhichthemeaningsandrepresentationsbothofthetangible andthemoreintangibleaspectsoftheworldcanbenegotiated. Considerhowachildasyoungas2yearscannegotiateaboutconflictinggoalsinsuchawayastoclarifyhisorherownandothers'internalstatesandrepair awkwardmoments.Oneofus(Jenkins)wasbabysittinga2yearoldoneeveningwhilestayinginhishome.Hewenttosleepandwokebeforehisparentshad returned.HestartedcryingandIwenttohim.WhenherealizedthatIwasnotoneofhisparents,hestartedkickingandcryingandshouting,"Goaway,Goaway.I don'twantyou.Iwantmydaddy."Thenextmorninghespontaneouslystartedtotalkabouttheincident:
Ewan:Icried. Jenny:Yes,youwereunhappy,weren'tyou? Ewan:Iwantmydaddy.Younotmydaddy. Jenny:No,andyoudidn'twantmethere,didyou? Ewan:NoIsad.Icried. Jenny:Yeah.That'sokay.Iknowyoumissedyourdaddy.

ThenhegavemeatrainthathehadbeenplayingwithsothatIwouldplaytrainswithhim.Hewasdoingarepaironourconflict.Hewasexplaininghimselfand makingsurethatIwasnotmadathim.Sucharethebuildingblocksofbeingabletooperatecooperatively.Onepersonwantssomethingdifferentfromanother.They pushforwhatthatis.Andthen

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theywonderabouttheotherperson.HaveIgonetoofar?Canwestillplantogether,worktogethereffectively?Withinternalstatelanguage,itispossibletofindout.I canaskyoutoletmeknowhowtheexecutionofmygoalshasaffectedyou. Children'sskillsinrepresentingtheinternalstatesofothersbecomeincreasinglyadvancedinthepreschoolyears.Byaboutage4,childrencanpredictactiononthe basisofsomeone'sbeliefevenwhenitconflictswiththeirown(Astington,Harris,&Olson,1988).Youbelieveonething,andIbelieveanother.Iknowthatyouwill actonthebasisofyourbelief.Althoughchildrenhaveabasicunderstandingofthenatureofbeliefatthisage,itisstillacoupleofyearsbeforetheyanalyzecomplex socialsituationsintermsoftheintentionsandbeliefsofallactors(Case,1991).Bytheearlytomiddleschoolyears,childrenhavethecognitiveskillstothinkabout theirowngoalsinrelationships,tothinkabouthowotherpeople'sgoalsrelatetotheirown,andtocarryoutnegotiationandrepairaroundtheseinternalstates. Bowlby(1971)usedthetermgoalcorrectedpartnershiptorefertotheparentchildrelationshipinthetoddlerperiod.Wethinkthatthisuseofthetermistoonarrow. Throughoutlifeweareengagedinthedifficultiesoffindingoutwhatotherpeoplewantorneed,negotiatinginrelationshipssothatweunderstandsomeoneelse'sgoals andcanfindawayofattuningourselvestothese.Indeedthistypeofsocialproblemsolvingaccountsforthemajorityofconversationthatwehaveashumans.As Dunbar(1996)showed,menandwomenspendmostoftheirtimeduringconversationstalkingaboutwhatgoesonbetweenpeople,tryingtofigureoutgoalsand intentions.WhatdidJackiemeanwhenshespokesharplytoPeter?Whyhasthedirectorbeensopreoccupied?Thesearethetopicsthatformthebasesof conversation. Thereareseveralkeycomponentsnecessarytoformagoalcorrectedpartnership.Oneelementisagoalorientationtowardstheotherinwhichthewilltocooperate withsomeoneelseisparamount.Affiliationandcooperationarevaluedoverothergoalssuchasdominanceorretribution. Beingabletodevelopanaccuratemodeloftheotherisalsoakeycomponentofbeingabletoformagoalcorrectedpartnership.Thementalstatesthatareascribed totheotherhavetobeaccurate.IfIthinkthatyourintentionasyouwalktowardmeistohurtme,wheninfactitistohelpme,mymodelofyourintentionstowardme isalongwayfromwhatyouactuallyintend. Athirdcomponent,andonethatisuniquelyavailabletousashumans,isthecapacitytonegotiate,alter,andrepairthesemodelsofselfandotherthroughlanguage. EvenifImisinterpretyourintentions,Icantalktoyouaboutmymodelandcorrectinaccuracies.Inordertodothis,Ineedalanguageforinternalstates.Ineedtobe abletofindwordsforwhatIam

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thinkingandfeelingandalsototalkaboutwhatyouarethinkingandfeeling(Salovey&Mayer,1990). GoalsandEmotions Thegoalorientationtowardtheotherandtheself'sperceptionoftheother'sgoalscanbeunderstoodascognitive/emotionalrepresentationsoftheselfandother (Baldwin,1992Stern,1994).Ourproposalisthatthereisalimitednumberofgoalbasedcognitive/emotionalrepresentationsoftheselfandotherthatcorrespondto thebasicemotions.Theemotionsystemdevelopedasasystemthatmonitorsthestatusofourgoalsduringourtransactionswiththeenvironment(Oatley&Johnson Laird,1987).Emotionsfunctiontofacilitatethistransaction,signalingtotheselfandotherthenatureoftheindividual'sgoals.Happinessisanemotionofplans proceedingwell.Itsignalscooperationandaffiliationtowardtheother(Lazarus,1991).Angerisanemotionthatsignalsanadversarialstance.Goalshavebeen thwarted,butothershavedonethisintentionallytoblocktheself.Angersignalsafightagainstthisblocking,withanattempttodominateorforcetheothertoalleviate thegoalblock(Averill,1982Lazarus,1991). Emotionsareresponsestoimmediateenvironmentalstimuli,buttheycruciallydependonthegoalorientationthatwebringtothesituation(Lazarus,1991).When someonepullsoutinfrontofmeinacarandblocksmyexit,Icanappraisethisasatemporaryinconveniencewithoutconsequencestomyprimarygoals.OrIcan appraisethisasaninsultneedingimmediateretribution.Inthefirstcase,Ifeelnoemotioninresponsetotheevent.Inthesecondcase,Ibecomeenragedandwantto retaliateagainsttheotherdriver.Therearelongtermgoalstructuresthatwecarrywithusintoencounters,determiningwhetherwepayattentiontosomething,how weinterpretit,whatwefeel,ouractionsinresponsetoit,andhowweremembertheencounterlater.Theemotionalqualitiesofsuchencountersaredeterminedby howweperceivethegoalsofothersandwhatourgoalsaretowardotherpeople. Formostchildrenandadults,goalbasedrepresentationsoftheselfandother,andthecognitivetoolsfornegotiatinginternalstates,workwellenoughsothatjoint planningandcooperationisfrequentlypossible.Forasmallnumberofchildren,however,suchcooperativeendeavorsaredifficulttoachieve.Childrenwith externalizingdisordershavelongtermdifficultiesintheirrelationships(Caspi,Elder,&Bem,1987Huesmann,Eron,Lefkowitz,&Walder,1984).Onewayof thinkingabouttheirdisturbanceisthatthecapacitytoenterintoacooperativerelationshiphasbecomeimpaired.Insteadofviewingothersascooperativeandhelpful, theyviewtheseothersasillintentioned.Insteadoffeelingthattheywant

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toconstructjointplans,suchchildrenfeelthattheywanttogetthebetterofotherpeople,paythembackforinsultsagainstthem.Insteadofbelievingthatgoalscanbe negotiated,theytrytoforcetheothertofacilitatetheirowngoals.Ourfirstaiminthischapteristoexaminewhatthisbiasingoalstructurelookslikeforchildrenwho showexternalizingbehaviors. ExternalizingPsychopathology Childrenwhoscorehighonexternalizingpsychopathologyarechildrenwhoareangryanddefiantmuchofthetime.Theyengageinactivitiessuchaslying,stealing, bullying,andbeingoppositionalandaggressive.Theyshowageneraldisregardfortherightsofothers.Recentlyresearchershavebeeninterestedintherelation betweenemotionsandpsychopathology.WeagreewithLazarus(1991),MalatestaandWilson(1988),Tomkins(1979)andothersinthinkingthatin psychopathologyoneemotionbecomespredominantintheemotionalexperienceoftheindividual.Inonestudyoftherelationbetweenemotionsand psychopathology,wefoundthatexternalizingchildrenshowhighlevelsofanger,andlowlevelsofsadnessandhappiness(Jenkins,1999b).Weinterpretthispattern ofemotionalorganizationasindicativeofanunderlyinggoalstructure.Thesechildrenvaluetheadversarialstance:dominanceinrelationship,showingwhoisincontrol, retaliatingagainstperceivedslights.Theirlowlevelsofhappinesssuggeststhataffiliationandcooperationarelessimportanttothem. Therearelongtermcontinuitiesinlevelsofangryaffect.Caspiandcolleagues(Caspietal.,1987)followedupangrychildrenintotheiradultlife.Notonlywerethey angryadults,theyhadcreatedenvironmentsforthemselvesthatweremorenegativeandlikelytoelicitanger.Wethinkthattheselongtermcontinuitiesinaffective behaviorrepresentstablegoalstructures.Whatisimportanttoachildwithregardtotheirrelationshipsremainsimportanttothemastheydevelopintoadults.Ifin childhoodtheyhaveappraisedotherpeople'sintentionstowardthemashostile,inadulthoodsuchanappraisalstructurewillalsobemorelikely.Ifinchildhooditwas importantforthemtoretaliateagainstslightstomakeitclearthattheyweredominant,inadulthoodthisisalsolikelytobeanimportantgoalinfluencingtheir interactionswithothers. Manypeoplehavetalkedaboutmodelsorschemasoftheotherthataffectcontinuitiesinbehavior(seeBaldwin,1992,forreview).Theuniqueaspectofthework presentedhereisthatthesemodelsaresituatedwithintheframeworkofacognitivetheoryofemotion(Lazarus,1991Oatley&JohnsonLaird,1987),inwhichitis postulatedthatthereisafinitenumberofbasicemotionsthatrepresentcoregoalorientationsforhumans.Forananalysisofexternalizingbehavior,weareprincipally concernedwiththebalancebetweenangerandhappinessandthusthegoaldimensions

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of(a)cooperation,affiliationasindicatedbyhappiness,and(b)power,control,dominanceasindicatedbyanger. Inthischapterwepresentdatafromalongitudinalstudyofchildren'sgoals,emotions,andpsychopathology.Wetestthehypothesisthatthegoalsoftheselfinrelation totheotherarebiased.Ourhypothesisisthatitismoreimportanttobedominantorpowerfulintherelationshipthantobeaffiliative.Wethinkofthesechildrenas beingchildrenwhobecomeangrymuchmorereadilythanotherchildrenbecausetheyhaveabiasintheirgoalbasedcognitive/emotionalrepresentationsoftheself andother.Herewepresentevidenceonlyonthegoalsoftheselftowardotherpeople.Wedonotpresentevidenceonchildren'sbiasesinhowtheyperceivethe intentionsofothers,asthereisalreadyasubstantialliteratureinthisarea.Childrenwithexternalizingdisordershavebeenfoundtohaveahostileattributionbias.They aremuchmorelikelytointerpretneutraleventsasifsomeonehasbeenintentionallyhostiletowardsthem(Dodge&Coie,1987).Becauseexternalizingchildrenthink thattheotherisouttowoundthem,theyhavetofightbackandretaliate. Wealsopredictedthatchildrenwithexternalizingpsychopathologywerelessskilledatthelanguageofmind.Internalstatelanguagedeficitshavebeenfoundtobe morecommoninchildrenwhohaveexperiencedaversiveandstressfulenvironments.Inastudyinwhichabusedchildrenwerecomparedwithnonabusedchildren matchedonsocioeconomicstatus,BeeghlyandCicchetti(1994)foundthatabusedchildrenshowedsignificantlylessuseofinternalstatelanguagethanthenonabused group.Similarly,JenkinsandGreenbaum(1996)foundthatchildrenwholivedinhomeswithhighlevelsofparentalconflictusedlessinternalstatelanguage.Wealso foundthatchildrenwithpsychopathologyusedfeweremotionwordsthanchildrenwithoutpsychopathology. Inthisstudywewantedtofollowuptheseassociations.Wehypothesizedthatchildrenwithhigherlevelsofexternalizingbehaviorwoulduselessinternalstate languageoverall,suchthatsharedgoalswouldbehardertoachieveandthatrepairsbetweenpeople,onceproblemsemerged,wouldbehardertoexecute.Finally, wethoughtthat,ascomparedwithnormalchildren,childrenwithexternalizingpsychopathologywouldtalkrelativelymoreabouttheirowninternalstatesthanabout thoseofothers.Ifwearecorrectinourpriorhypotheses,itisaverychallengingtaskforsuchchildrentoextendthemselvesbeyondtheperspectiveoftheself. MethodsandSample ThesedatawerecollectedfromchildrenwhowereattendingtwoclassesinaschoolservingamiddleclasspopulationinToronto.Theyrepresentapreliminary analysisofalongitudinaldataset.Childrenwere8to9years

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oldattime1,and9to10yearsoldattime2.Bytime2,threechildrenhadlefttheschoolandwerenotincludedinthefollowupsample. Stage1 Inordertodeterminehowchildrentalkaboutothers'intentions,wevideotapedgroupsoffourboys,orfourgirls,planningaplaytogether.Childrenwerethen interviewedindividuallytotalkabouttheirowngoalsduringtheplayandthegoalsofotherchildren.Thirtychildrentookpartinthisstageofthestudy.Atthree differentpointsduringthetape,whenachildshowedapositiveemotion,anegativeemotion,andaneutralexpression,childrenwereaskedwhatwas[child'sname] thinkingabouttheotherkidsatthatpoint?Whatwas[child'sname]wantingtheotherkidstodoatthatpoint?Fromchildren'sanswerstothesequestionswedrewup alistofgoals:beingdominantandincontroloftheinteractions,hurtingothers,wantingtolistentowhatothersaresaying,beingclosetoothers. Stage2 Wethenaskedchildrentorateallotherchildrenintheclassaswellasthemselvesonthegoalsthatweregenerated.Twoteachersperclass(oneteacherandone traineeteacher)alsoratedthechildrenintheirclassonthesegoals.Twoclassestookpartwhichresultedinratingsfor43children. GoalRatings Dominance Childrenwereaskedtorategoalstatementsona5pointscale.Dominanceitemswere"Howimportantisitto[child'sname]togetotherpeopletotakeupher/his ideas?"and"Howimportantisitto[child'sname]tomakeothersfeelsad?"Theseitemswerestronglycorrelatedwithinteacherreportandconsequentlythesewere combinedtoformadominancescale.Astheywerealsocorrelatedforpeerreporttheywerecombinedtoformapeerreportofdominancescale.Theseitemswere not,however,correlatedinchildren'sselfreport.Therewasalmostnovarianceforchildren'sresponsesto"Howimportantisittomakeothersfeelsad,"andthiswas droppedfromfurtheranalysis.Consequentlyforselfreporttheonlyitemtomakeupthedominancemeasurewas''Howimportantisittogetotherpeopletotakeup yourideas?" Eachchildwasratedbyapproximately20children.Wecalculatedthemeanscoreforeachchildoneachgoalscale,andthesescoresbecamethepeers'ratingsof children'sgoals.Thechild'sclassteacheralsorated

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eachchildonthegoalstatements.Thechildratedhimorherselfonthesamescaleandthisisreferredtoasthechild'sratingoftheirowngoals. Affiliation Theonlyaffiliationitemusedattime1was"Howimportantisitto[child'sname]tofindoutthingsfromotherpeople,ortolearnthingsfromotherpeoplebylistening?" Thiswasabehaviorthatmanychildrentalkedaboutduringtheinterviewstodescribecooperativebehavior.Itrepresentedachild'scuriosityaboutanother,thedesire toknowwhattheythought.Weaddedanotheraffiliationquestionhalfwaythroughthetime1interviews.Twentychildrenwereaskedtorate"Howimportantisitfor [child'sname]togettoknowothersreallywellandgetclosetothem?"Becausewedidnothavescoresforeverychildonthisitem,wedidnotuseittoforma compositescale.Wedid,however,findthatthesetwoitemswerestronglyrelatedtooneanother(peerreport:r(20)=.68,p<.001selfreport:r(20)=.74,p <.001). RatingsofExternalizingPsychopathology Teacherscompletedratingsofchildren'semotionsandbehaviorintheclassroomusingtheTeacherReportForm(Achenbach,1991b).Thisinstrumentyieldsan externalizingfactorthatinvolvesitemsaboutthechildstealing,lying,cheating,beingdisruptiveatschool,beingaggressive,crueltoanimals,andsoon.Tscoresranged from39to63.Fourchildreninthissamplewereintheborderlineclinicalrangeofexternalizingproblems.Adifferentteachercompletedpsychopathologyratingsfrom theonewhocompletedgoalratingsinordertoensurethatanysignificantassociationsbetweengoalsandpsychopathologywerenottheresultofwithininformant report. RatingsofAngerFrequency Teachers,peersandchildrenthemselveswereaskedtoratehowfrequentlythechildbecameangryona5pointscale,withhigherratingsindicatingahigherfrequency ofangerexpression. Stage3 UseofLanguageinTalkingAboutIntentions Theindividualinterviewswithchildrenwhentalkingabouttheirownandothers'goalsweretranscribedandcoded.Thirtychildrenwereinvolvedinthispartofthe study.Wecodedthreedifferentcategoriesofinternalstatetalk:cognitionterms(know,think,remember),desireterms(want,need)andemotionterms(happy,sad, crazy).Wealsocountedthetotalnumberofwordsusedbythechild.Onetailedsignificancetestsarequotedthroughouttheresultssection.

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Results StabilityofRelationalGoalsOvera1YearPeriod Dominancegoalswerefoundtobehighlystableovera1yearperiod,ascanbeseenbythecorrelationsbetweentime1andtime2goalspresentedinTable14.1. Correlationswerehigherforteachersandpeerreports.Itshouldbenotedthatchildrenchangedteachersbetweentime1andtime2sothatthecorrelationsgivenfor teacherdatarepresentdifferentteachers'reports1yearapart.Correlationsforchildren'saffiliationgoalswerelesshigh,butstillsignificantforthechildren'sselfreport. Thelevelsofstabilityparticularlyforthedominancegoalsandforchildren'sangerfrequencyaremuchhigherthanthestabilityobtainedforexternalizing psychopathology.Externalizingbehaviorisconsideredtobehighlystableoveryears,leadingOlweus(1979)toarguethatitisasstableasIQ.Itisimpressivethat frequencyofangeranddominancegoalsshowacomparableor,inthecaseofpeerandteacherratings,ahigherlevelofstabilitythanthoseseeninthisstudyfor externalizingbehavior.Itmaybethatrelationalgoalsandanaffectiveorganizationinwhichangerpredominatesarestablewithinthepersonandthatbehaviors indicativeofexternalizingpsychopathologyaremorevariabledependingonenvironmentalconstraintsanddemands.Thefindingthataffiliationgoalsarelessstablemay eitherreflectthatsuchgoalsarehardertomeasureorthatthesegoalsdoindeedchangeovertime. AgreementAcrossDifferentInformants InTable14.2,agreementacrossinformantsonrelationalgoalsisshown.Itispossibletoseefromthisthatpeersandteachersagreeremarkablywellonchildren's relationalgoalsfordominance.Theagreementacrossinformantsonaffiliationgoalswassignificantfor4outof6correlations,
TABLE14.1 CorrelationsExaminingtheStabilityofRelationalGoals, AngerFrequencyandTeacher'sRatingsofExternalizing PsychopathologyOvera1YearInterval

Dominance Affiliation Angerfrequency Externalizingpsychopathology ap<.10.*p <.05.**p <.01.***p<.001.

Peer .79*** .21a .75***

Teacher .67** .25a .36* .35*

Child .34* .37** .30*

Page279 TABLE14.2 AgreementAcrossInformantsonChildren's DominanceandAffiliationGoals

Peer Teacher (Time1) .61*** .30*

Peer Child (Time1) .22a .37*

Teacher Child (Time1) .55*** .30*

Peer Teacher (Time2) .72*** .37*

Peer Child (Time2) .49** .48**

Teacher Child (Time2) .45** .28*

Dominance Affiliation
a

p <.10.*p<.05.**p<.01.***p <.001.

butitwasgenerallyweakerthantheagreementseenfordominancegoals.Againtheselevelsofcrossinformantagreementarecomparabletothosereportedforthe betterestablishedconstructofexternalizingbehavior(Achenbach,1991a).Theextentofthisagreementacrossinformantssupportsthevalidityofthesemeasuresfor assessingchildren'srelationalgoals.Eventhoughpeerandteachergoalratingsdependoninferencesaboutinternalstatesratherthanondirectlyobservedbehavior, agreementacrossinformantsisimpressive.Itisalsoimportantthatratingsmadebytheselfshowagreementwithhowothersinterpretgoalstates. RelationBetweenDominanceandAffiliationGoalsandChildren'sExternalizingProblems Correlationsbetweenchildren'srelationalgoals(asratedbypeers,teachers,andchildrenthemselves)andexternalizingsymptomsarepresentedinTable14.3.Itis possibletoseethatacrossallaccountshighdominancegoalsandlowaffiliationgoalsareassociatedwithhighlevelsofexternalizingpsychopathologyattime1.Itis alsopossibletoseethattime1dominancegoalsareassociatedwithtime2teacherratingsofchildren'sexternalizing

TABLE14.3 CorrelationsExaminingtheRelationBetweenRelationalGoals atTime1andExternalizingPsychopathologyatTime2

Time2 Externalizingpsychopathology Peer DominanceGoals Teacher Self

Time1 AffiliationGoals Peer Teacher Self

.67***

.44**

.10

.40** .15 .54*** .34* .35* .20

Angerexpressionteacherrating *p<.05.**p<.01.***p <.001.

.62***

.64***

.10

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psychopathology.Furtheraffiliationgoalsasratedbypeersattime1areassociatedwithtime2externalizing,althoughchildren'sownratingsandteacherratingsof time1affiliationgoalsarenotassociatedwithchildren'sexternalizing.Thuschildrenwhoshowhigherlevelsofdominanceandlowerlevelsofaffiliationattime1show higherlevelsofexternalizingbehavior1yearlater. Amorestringenttestofthehypothesisthatrelationalgoalsunderlieexternalizingpsychopathologywouldbetoexaminewhethergoalsattime1predictachangein externalizingbehaviorfromtime1totime2.Arechildrenwhoareratedasmoredominantandlessaffiliativeattime1likelytodevelopmoredifficultieswith externalizingbehaviorovertime? Inordertoanswerthisquestion,wecarriedoutthreehierarchicalregressionanalyses(foreachinformant'sreportofgoals).Children'sexternalizingbehaviorattime2 wasourcriterionvariable.Byenteringtime1externalizingscoresintotheregressionequationfirst,anysubsequentpredictorsoftime2externalizingwereexplaining varianceinthechangeinexternalizingscoresbetweentimes1and2.Affiliationgoalswereenteredsecondintotheequation,followedonthenextstepbydominance goals.Inthiswaywewereabletodeterminewhetherdominancegoalscontributeduniquelytothepredictionofexternalizingbehavior,aftervarianceattributableto affiliationgoalshadbeentakenintoaccount.ResultsoftheseanalysescanbefoundinTable14.4.Thefirstlineshowstheresultsofthefirststepforthethree regressions:regressingtime2externalizingontime1externalizing.Asstep1wasthesameforallanalyses,thisisnotrepeatedinTable14.4foreachseparate regression. Itispossibletoseethatforpeeraccountsofgoals,affiliationgoalspredicted17%anddominancegoalspredictedafurther16%ofthevarianceinthechangein externalizingfromtime1totime2.Usingteacherratings,affiliationgoalswerenotfoundtopredictexternalizingbehaviorbutdominancegoalspredicted11%ofthe varianceinthechangeinexternalizingfromtime1totime2.Usingselfratings,affiliationgoalswerenotfoundtopredictexternalizingbehaviorbutdominancegoals predicted8%ofthevarianceinthechangeinexternalizingfromtime1totime2. Wealsotestedtheoppositecausalmodelinwhichexternalizingpsychopathologypredictedchangesingoalratingsbetweentime1andtime2.Thisisatestofthe hypothesisthatthepresenceofpsychopathologyaffectsachangeinaperson'srelationalgoals.Wefoundnoevidencetosupportthisdirectionofeffect.Externalizing wasneverasignificantornearsignificantpredictoroftime2goalsaftertakingaccountoftime1goalsandusingdominanceoraffiliationascriterionvariables. Resultsofthisseriesofanalysesdosuggestthatchildrenwithexternalizingpsychopathologyshowabiasintheirrelationalgoals.Highexternalizershaverelational goalsinwhichbeingdominantininteractionishighly

Page281 TABLE14.4 SummaryofHierarchicalRegressionAnalysesExaminingtheRoleofAffiliationandDominance GoalsinPredictingExternalizingBehavioratTime2afterAccountingforTime1ExternalizingBehavior

Step1 Step2 Step3 Step2 Step3 Step2 Step3

a

ExternalizingbehaviorTime1 Affiliationgoalspeerreport Dominancegoalspeerreport Affiliationgoalsteacherreport Dominancegoalsteacherreport Affiliationgoalsselfreport Dominancegoalsselfreport

B .34 9.73 12.19 .17 4.5 .51 3.80

SEB .15 3.24 3.75 1.26 1.95 1.16 1.99

b
.35 .51 .57 .02 .41 .07 .31

ChangeinR2 .12 .17 .16 .00 .11 .00 .08

* ** **

p<.10.*p <.05.**p<.01.

Page282

valuedandbeingaffiliativeandcooperativeislessimportant.Theyvaluepushingtheirideasforwardandmakingotherchildrenfeelsmall.Itislessimportantforthem topayattentiontoothersandlistentotheirideasasameansofbuildingacooperativepartnership.Furthermore,itisnotonlydominancegoalsthatpredict developmentofmoreexternalizingbehaviorsovertime.Lowaffiliationgoalsalsocontributetothedevelopmentofexternalizingproblems. Returningtotheconceptofthegoalcorrectedpartnership,oneofthereasonswhyitmaybedifficulttoconstructthiskindofpartnershipisthatchildrendevelopa biasedstancetowardtheotherinwhichgoalsofdominanceovershadowgoalsofcooperation.Theintentionsoftheotherarealsoappraisednegatively.This underlyinggoalstructureinfluencesallimmediateencounterswiththeenvironment.Thisistheunderlyinggoalstructureassociatedwithhigherlevelsofangerand aggression. LanguageofMind Weexaminedcorrelationsbetweenchildren'sinternalstatetalkandteacherratedexternalizingpsychopathology.Higherlevelsofexternalizingpsychopathologywere almostsignificantlyrelatedtoloweruseofemotionterms,r(30)=.30,p<.06,andsignificantlyrelatedtoloweruseofdesireterms,r(30)=.45,p<.01. Externalizingpsychopathologywasnotassociatedwithloweruseofcognitionterms.Afterwecontrolledforwordcount,childrenwhousedfewerdesireterms showedsignificantlyhigherlevelsofexternalizingbehavior.Thatistosay,childrenwithexternalizingpsychopathologydiscussedtheirownandotherpeople'sgoalsless frequentlythanotherchildren. Finally,wewereinterestedinwhetherchildrenwithpsychopathologytalkedlessaboutwhatwasinothers'mindsthanaboutwhatwasintheirown.Ifchildrenare generallylessskilledatcooperativeendeavorswemightexpectthemtobelessabletoenterintothemindoftheother.Weassessedthisbypartitioningthemental statetalkintothatwhichwasabouttheselfandthatwhichwasabouttheother.Thenwecalculatedtheproportions:mentalstatetalkabouttheother/totalamountof mentalstatetalk.Wefoundanassociationbetweenexternalizingpsychopathologyandtalkofotherminds.Thehighertheexternalizingbehaviorthelessthetalkabout otherminds,r(29)=.40,p<.05. Herewefindanotheraspectoffunctioningthatmaynegativelyaffectthedevelopmentofthegoalcorrectedpartnership.Childrenwithexternalizingpsychopathology arelessskilledinusingmentalstatetalk,particularlymentalstatetalkthatisaboutgoals(desireterms).Theyalsospendlesstimetalkingaboutothers'goalsthanabout theirown.Wedonotknowwhetherthesepatternsofmentalstatediscourseareprimarilymotivationalorwhethertheyrepresentdeficitsinlanguageuse.Itiscertainly thecasethat

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childrenwithexternalizingbehavioralproblemsaremorelikelythannondisorderedchildrentoshowcognitiveimpairmentsindevelopment(seeMoffit,1993),which mayhaveanimpactonthewayinwhichmentalstatetalkdevelops.Itmayalsobethatcognitivevulnerabilitiesareexacerbatedbycontextualrisks(suchaspoor familyrelationships)thatmakeitlesslikelythatthesechildrenwillreachouttoothers,andfeelmotivatedtodevelopthetoolsthatwillallowthemtodevelopthegoal correctedpartnership. Insummary,wefoundthatchildren'srelationalgoalswerestableovertimeandthathighdominanceandlowaffiliationgoalspredictedexternalizingpsychopathology. Wealsofoundthatchildrenwithexternalizingpsychopathologyshowedlowerlevelsofmentalstatetalk,particularlyintheuseofdesireterms. HowDoDifficultiesintheDevelopmentoftheGoalCorrectedPartnershipDevelop? Whatleadssomechildrentovaluedominance,devalueaffiliation,anduselessmentalstatetalk,particularlyaboutthegoalsofothers?Inthisstudy,wedidnot examinetherelationbetweengoalorientations,ormentalstatetalkandenvironmentalrisks.Wecan,however,speculateontheoriginsofsuchdifficultiesbydrawing onresearchrelatedtoenvironmentalfactorsthatincreasethelikelihoodthatchildrenwilldevelopexternalizingpsychopathology. Patternsofaggressiveinteractioninchildrenstartupwhenchildrenareveryyoung.Pattersonandcolleagues(Patterson,Dishion,&Reid,1993)havefoundthat coerciveinteractionsbetweenparentsandchildrenbecomeestablishedinthepreschoolyearsandpredictincreasesinaggressivebehaviorovertime.These interactionsinvolveescalatingactsofaggressionbetweenparentsandtheirchildreninwhichparentsarecoercingchildrentogetchildrentomeetparentalgoalsand childrenarecoercingparentstogettheirowngoalsmet.Outofsuchapatternofinteractionitisnothardtoimaginethatchildrendevelopagoalstructureinwhich theythinkitunlikelythattheirowngoalswillbemetthroughcooperation.Theycometovaluedominancemorethanaffiliation.Theyalsoperceiveothers'intentions towardstheselfashostile. Anothercontextualfactorthatweknowtobeamajorriskfactorinthedevelopmentofexternalizingdisorderischildren'sexposuretoangerbasedconflictbetween theirparents.Childrenexposedtohighlevelsoftheirparentsshoutingatoneanotherandbecomingviolentaremorelikelytoshowangerduringpeerinteractionand higherlevelsofexternalizingbehaviormoregenerally(Jenkins,1999aJenkins&Smith,1991).Angerbasedmaritalconflictischaracterizedbyparentsblamingone another,powerstrugglesinwhichonetriestoconvincetheotheroftheirposition,winloseoutcomesinwhichonepersonisseenasmoredominantthanthe

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other,blockingofanother'sgoalsbybeingovertlyandcovertlyresistant(Brody,Arias,&Fincham,1996Christensen&Heavey,1990Cummings&Davies,1994 Gottman,1993Margolin,John,&O'Brien,1989).Watchingparentsinteractfrequentlyinthiswaymayincreasethechancesthatchildrenthinkthatrelationshipsare fundamentallyadversarial. Neuropsychologicaldeficitsarealsolikelytoplayapartinthedevelopmentofthesegoalbasedpatterns(Moffitt,1993).ChildrenwithlowerIQsorthosewith specificcognitiveimpairmentsaremorelikelytodevelopexternalizingdisordersthanthosewhodonotshowtheseearlypatternsofvulnerability.Itisalsointeresting tonote,however,thatevenchildrenwhoshowearlydevelopmentaldifficultiescanshowcognitivegainsandnobehavioralproblemsiftheyliveinsupportiveand stimulatingenvironments(Werner&Smith,1982).Thoseinmorestressfulenvironments(e.g.,morenegativeparentchildrelationships,divorce,poverty)showan exacerbationoftheircognitivedifficultiesovertime.Forchildrenwhoaremorevulnerableintheircognitivedevelopment,andwholiveincoerciveenvironments,the taskinvolvedinaccuratelyrepresentingtheirownandotherpeople'sgoalsandlearningthelanguageofinternalstatemayproveparticularlychallenging.Thesame analysisoftemperamentispossible.Childrencomeintotheworldshowingindividualdifferencesinhowstronglytheyreacttogoalblocksandhowlongtheycan toleratefrustrationofgoals(Emdeetal.,1992Goldsmith,1993).Someenvironmentswillexacerbatesuchtendenciestoangerwhereasotherenvironmentsmaybe conducivetothemodificationofsuchgoalorientations. Wewanttoquotefromarecentnovelabouta10yearoldboywrittenbyRoddyDoyle(1993).1Interactionsbetweenthischildandhisfather,betweenthetwo parentsandbetweenthechildandhissiblingillustrateboththeexistenceoftheserelationalgoalstructuresandthekindsofinteractionsthatmaycontributetotheir developmentwithinafamily.PaddyClarkeHaHaHatakesplaceinIreland.Thenoveliswritteninthefirstpersonfromthepointofviewoftheboy,Paddy.Over thecourseofthenoveltheparents'marriageisbreakingdown.Alotofangerbasedmaritalconflictisportrayedfromthechild'spointofview.Paddydescribesa coercivepatternofinteractionbetweenhisparentsthatischaracteristicoftheirrelationship:adynamicinwhichthefatherrefusestorespondtothemother.Thefather controlstheinteractionthroughhissilenceandderivessatisfactionfromhiswife'spowerlessness.Inthisfirstexcerpt,Paddy,thechild,isnarrating.Heistalkingabout howhisfather(alsocalledPaddy)isrefusingtospeaktohismother.Thenhereportsdialoguebetweenhismotherandhisfatherwithhismotherstartingthe discussion.Paddyandhisbrotherobservetheinteraction.
1

WewouldliketothankSeckerandWarburgandRoddyDoyleforpermissiontoquotefromPaddyClarkeHaHaHa.

Page285 Hewaitedbeforeheanswered,alwayshedid,pretendedhehadn'theardanything.Shewasalwaystheonethattriedtogetthemtotalk.He'danswerjustwhenIthoughtshe'd havetoaskagain,tochangehervoice,makeitsoundangry.Itwasagonywaitingforhim.Paddy? What? Didyouhearme? Hearwhat? Youheardme. Heardwhat? Shestopped.Wewerelisteningshesawus.Hethoughthe'dwonIthoughthedid.(p.222)

Thisembitteredstrugglebetweenhusbandandwife,structuredarounddominanceandsubmission,isonesourceforPaddy'slearningaboutgoalswithinintimate relationships.ThisinteractionalpatternisseenagaininPaddy'sinteractionwithhisfather.Inthisrelationshiphealsofeelsthathisfatherispowerfulanddominant, puttinghiminthepositionofbeingpowerlessandsubmissive.InthisexcerptPaddyhasrunhometotellhisfatheraboutamedalthathewonatschool.Heisexcited andwantingpraisefromhisfather.Beforehisfatherwillgivehimthishemakeshimwait,asameansofdemonstratinghispower.Theinteractionbetweenfatherand sonisnothostileornasty,butthedynamicsaroundpowerandsubmissivenessaretheorganizersoftheinteraction.

Iwonamedal.Icamesecondinthehundredyardsexceptitwasn'tnearlyahundredyardsitwasn'tevenfifty.ItwasaSaturday,theschoolsports,thefirstonetheschoolhad everhad... IwalkedhomeIdidn'twanttorun.Iwenttomydafirst. Getoutnotnow. Hedidn'tlookup.Hewasreadingthepaper.HealwaystalkedaboutBackbencheronSaturdays,tellingmymawhatBackbencher'dsaid,sohemighthavebeenreading Backbencher.Heclickedthepaper,straighteneditup.Hewasn'tangryoranything. Ifeltthick.Ishouldhavegonetomymafirstitwouldhavebeeneasierthen,whathadhappened.Iwenttothedoorthebonesinmylegswererubbery.Hewasinthedrawing room.Peaceandquiet,thatwaswhathegotinthere,theonlyplaceinthehouse.Ididn'tmindwaiting,notreally,buthehadn'tevenlookedup.Iwasgoingtoshutthedoor quietly. Helooked. Patrick? Sorry. Nocomein. Thepaperfellforwardandfoldedoverheletit. Iletgoofthehandle.Itneededoiling.Icamebackin.Iwasscaredand

Page286 pleased,bitsofeach.IwantedtogotothetoiletIthoughtIdid,thatkindoffeeling.Iaskedhimsomething. AreyoureadingBackbencher? Hesmiled. Whathaveyougotthere? Amedal. Showusyoushouldhavetoldme.Youwon. Second. Nearlyfirst. Yeah. Goodman. IthoughtIwon. Nexttime.Second'sgoodthough.Putitthere. Heheldouthishand. Iwishedhe'ddoneitthefirsttime.Itwasn'tfairthewayhemadeyounearlycrybeforehechangedanddidwhatyouwantedhimto.Itdidn'talwayshappenthatwaybutit happenedenoughforhimtohavepartsoftheroomstohimself,forthehousetobedifferentattheweekends.IcouldneverruntohimIhadtocheckfirst.Iblamedthepaper.(p. 205)

Thepiecebeginswiththeboy'sexcitementabouttellinghisfathersomegoodnewsandthissinkingfeelingashisfatherisnotresponsivetohim.Hisfatherletshim knowthattherelationshipisonhistermsandoncetheyoungPaddyhasunderstoodthis,hisdadisabletorespondtohim.Hisfather'sgoalwithinthatmomentof interactionwithhissonisthesameasthatinthemomentofinteractionwithhiswife:toshowwhoisboss.Dominanceistheprimarygoal,andcooperationisrelegated toasecondarygoal,ifitispresentatall.Alsointerestingtonoteisthattheauthordepictsthe10yearoldchildasabletounderstandthesegoalsexplicitlyandtotalk aboutthem,anobservationthatfoundsupportfromourempiricalwork. ThefinalexcerptdescribesanencounterbetweenPaddyandhisbrother.Hereagainthethemeisdominanceandsubmission.ThereisaffectionbetweenPaddyand hisbrother,Francis,butPaddy'sconcernforhisbrothereasilyflipsoverintoPaddyneedingtoshowwhoisbossandforceFrancistohiswill.Inthisexcerpt,in contrasttotheotherexcerpts,thewinlosedynamicisexpressedphysically.Paddyistryingtogethisbrothertoeatacookie.

Francis.D'youwantthis? Itwasabiscuit,onlyabiscuit.IwanteditaswellbutIwantedhimtotakeit.Iwasgivingittohim.Hewouldn'tevenlookatit. Igrabbedhim.

Page287 Openyourmouth! Hislipsvanishedashecloseddownhismouth.Hegotreadytobepulledaround,stiffanddead. Openyourmouth! Ihelditinfrontofhiseyes. See. Heshutthem,crammedshut.IgotthebiscuitandIgothisheadandIpushedthebiscuitathismouth,andIpusheduntilitfellapartandIcouldn'tholdit.(p.239,Reprintedwith permission)

HecontinuestobattlewithFrancis,resortingtoholdinghisnosesothatFranciswillhavetoopenhismouth.FranciscontinuestorefuseandPaddybecomesmore frustrated.
Iwon'thityouagain,okay,ever. Ididn'texpectanansweroranything.Iwaitedabit.ThenIkickedhim.AndIthumpedhim.Twice.ThenIfeltmybackgofreezing:someonewaslooking.(p.242)

WhatweseehereisPaddy'scompulsiontohavehisbrothersubmittohiswill.Althoughhehasaffectionforhimandmuchoftheirinteractionisaffiliativeand cooperative,itcaneasilytip,ashere,intoPaddybeingdominantandhisbrotherhavingtosubmittohiswill. Weseesimilargoaldynamicsinthreerelationships.Itislikelythatasynergyisoperatinghere.Paddyobservesaninteractionpatternbetweenhisparentsthathealso experiencesdirectlyinhisrelationshipwithhisfather.Heplaysoutthesamepatterninhisrelationshipwithhisbrother.Asheobservesandexperienceshimselfin relationships,heisbuildingupacognitivestructureforwhatrelationshipsareabout.CostanzoandDix(1983)describeasocialperceptionprocessinwhichchildren constructmeaningbywatchingandexperiencinginteraction:''Interpretationsofpersonsandeventsareacquiredthroughpriorcontentspecificsocialexperienceand appliedasrulesorvaluesbelievedtogovernthetypesofconductbeingobserved"(p.64).Astheserepetitionsinagoalorientationoccuracrossdifferent relationships,perhapstheygainstrengthandbecomemorecompellingandpervasive,resultinginarelationalschemainwhichthechildthinksthatthemaindynamic governingintimaterelationshipsisapowerdynamic.Rutter(1979)demonstratedthatwhenseveralenvironmentalriskfactorsoccurtogether(suchastheparents beinghighlyconflictualwithoneanotherandaparentbeingcoerciveandhostiletowardsachild),theriskofexternalizingdisorderisgreaterthanjustaddingthetwo riskstogether.

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Althoughwehavespentthischaptertalkingabouthowcontinuitiesinpeople'sgoalsinrelationshipsexistandexplainchangesinbehaviorovertime,weknowthat evenchildrenshowingextremeexternalizingproblemsdevelopalternativepatternsofintentionandaction(Graham&Rutter,1973Robins,1978).Onefactorthatis probablycentraltoexplainingdiscontinuitiesindevelopmentistheformationofnewsupportiverelationships.QuintonandRutter(Quinton&Rutter,1988)have shownthatwomenwhohadseverelydeprivedearlychildhoodsandwereconsequentlyatmuchgreaterriskformentalhealthproblemsandparentingdifficultiesin theiradultlifewereabletoavoidsuchoutcomesbyfindingasupportivepartner.Similarly,childreninhighstresscircumstancesarelesslikelytoshowdisturbanceif theyhaveagoodrelationshipwithasiblingoragrandparent(Jenkins&Smith,1990).Whatisitthatasupportivepartnerprovides?AlthoughpersonXmayhave continuitiesinherowngoalstowardothersandherperceptionofY'sgoalstowardsher,Ybringshisowngoalstructuretotherelationship.Hisowngoalsin relationshipmaybehighlycooperativesothatherattemptstoengagehiminconflictarenonproductive.Hemaybringaparticularlybenigninterpretationtoher attemptstohavepowerintherelationship,suchthathedoesnotperceiveheractionsashostile.Assheassimilateshistreatmentofhertoherexistingschemas,her owngoalsmaytakeonadifferentbalance.Changeinpsychotherapymayinvolveasimilarmechanism.Asthepsychotherapistfailstofitinwiththegoalstructure,the structureshiftsalittlebit,allowingfornewinterpretationsandthedevelopmentofnewgoalstructures.Mostpsychotherapiesinvolvetalkaboutrelationshipsandgoals inrelationships.Perhapsthroughsuchtalknewmetacognitivestructuresemergethatfacilitatesuccessfulcooperationinthegoalcorrectedpartnership.Asupportive siblingforanexternalizingchildoraspouseforanadultmayallowanewbeliefstructuretoemergeinwhichcooperationandjointplanningbecomesufficiently rewardingtosubstituteforpreviousgoals. Conclusions Somechildrendonotdevelopanintentionalstancetowardothersthatfacilitatescooperativeactionandjointplanning.Theirowngoalstowardothersandtheir perceptionsofothers'goalstowardthemselvesarebiased.Theyshowanadversarialgoalstructurethatleadstofrequentexperiencesofangerandaggression.The useofinternalstatelanguagetonegotiatedifficultiesinthegoalcorrectedpartnershipisalsolimitedandmakesitmoredifficultforchildrentomakeandsustainjoint plansthatsatisfythegoalsofbothagentsinacooperativeinteraction.Suchdifficultiesdevelopthroughexposuretoadverseenvironmentalcircumstancessuchas hostile

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parentchildrelationshipsandmaritalconflict.Althoughthiscognitivestructurefortheinterpretationofactionmayhavebeenaccuratewhenseekingtounderstand eventsintheirfamilies,suchinterpretationsmaybequiteinaccurateinmoregeneralcontexts. Wehavealsosuggestedthatthroughanexaminationofchildrenwhoshowintentionalstructuresthatarelessoptimal,wegainsomeinsightintothefunctionofthis representationalsystemmoregenerally.Childrenwithexternalizingdisordersareoppositional.Theyareactingagainstotherpeople.Theirrepresentationsoftheself andotherdiscouragecooperativeaction.Optimaldevelopmentconsistsofhavingarepresentationalsystemthatfacilitatesandenablescooperativeactionand planning.Suchcognitivestructuresforrepresentingourownandothers'intentionsandgoalshavedevelopedtoenablecomplexcooperationacrossmultipleagents. Theseenableustoconceiveof,andexecute,plansfortheachievementofgoalsthatwouldnothavebeenavailabletoindividualsactingontheirown. References Achenbach,T.M.(1991a).Integrativeguideforthe1991CBCL/418,YSR,andTRFprofiles.Burlington,VT:DepartmentofPsychiatry,UniversityofVermont. Achenbach,T.M.(1991b).ManualfortheTeacher'sReportForm.Burlington,VT.:DepartmentofPsychiatry,UniversityofVermont. Astington,J.W.,Harris,P.L.,&Olson,D.R.(1988).Developingtheoriesofmind.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Averill,J.R.(1982).Angerandaggression.Anessayonemotion.NewYork:Springer. Baldwin,M.(1992).Relationalschemasandtheprocessingofsocialinformation.PsychologicalBulletin,112,461484. Beeghly,M.,&Cicchetti,D.(1994).Childmaltreatment,attachmentandtheselfsystem:Emergenceofaninternalstatelexiconintoddlersathighsocialrisk. DevelopmentandPsychopathology,6(1),530. Bowlby,.(1971).Attachmentandloss,Volume1.Attachment.London:HogarthPress(Rep.byPenguin,1978). Brody,G.H.,Arias,I.,&Fincham,F.D.(1996).Linkingmaritalandchildattributionstofamilyprocessesandparentchildrelationships.JournalofFamily Psychology,10,408421. Case,R.(1991).Themind'sstaircase.Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Caspi,A.,Elder,G.H.,&Bem,D.J.(1987).Movingagainsttheworld:Lifecoursepatternsofexplosivechildren.DevelopmentalPsychology,23,308313. Christensen,A.,&Heavey,C.L.(1990).Genderandsocialstructureinthedemand/withdrawpatternofmaritalconflict.JournalofPersonalityandSocial Psychology,59,7381. Costanzo,P.R.,&Dix,T.H.(1983).Beyondtheinformationprocessed:Socializationinthedevelopmentofattributionalprocesses.InG.T.Higgins,D.N.Ruble, &W.W.Hartup(Eds.),Socialcognitionandsocialdevelopment:Asociculturalperspective(pp.6381).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Cummings,E.M.,&Davies,P.T.(1994).Childrenandmaritalconflict:Theimpactoffamilydisputeandresolution.NewYork:GuilfordPress.

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Dodge,K.A.,&Coie,J.D.(1987).Socialinformationprocessingfactorsinreactiveandproactiveaggressioninchildren'speergroups.JournalofPersonality andSocialPsychology,53,11461158. Doyle,R.(1993).PaddyClarkeHaHaHa.London:SeckerandWarburg. Dunbar,R.(1996).Grooming,gossipandevolutionoflanguage.London:FaberandFaber. Dunn,J.(1988).ThebeginningsofsocialunderstandingCambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Emde,R.N.,Plomin,R.,Robinson,J.,Corley,R.,DeFries,J.,Fulker,D.W.,Reznick,J.S.,Campos,J.,Kagan,J.,&ZahnWaxler,C.(1992).Temperament, emotionandcognitionatfourteenmonths:theMacArthurLongitudinalTwinStudy.ChildDevelopment,63,14371455. Goldsmith,H.H.(1993).Temperament:Variabilityindevelopingemotionsystems.InM.Lewis&J.M.Haviland(Eds.),Handbookofemotions(pp.353364). NewYork:Guilford. Gottman,J.M.(1993).Therolesofconflictengagment,escalation,andavoidanceinmaritalinteraction:Alongitudinalviewoffivetypesofcouples.Journalof ConsultingandClinicalPsychology,61,615. Graham,P.J.,&Rutter,M.(1973).Psychiatricdisorderintheyoungadolescent:Afollowupstudy.ProceedingsoftheRoyalSocietyofMedicine,66,1226 1229. Huesmann,L.R.,Eron,L.D.,Lefkowitz,M.,&Walder,L.O.(1984).Stabilityofaggressionovertimeandgenerations.DevelopmentalPsychology,20,1120 1134. Hutchins,E.(1995).Cognitioninthewild.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Jenkins,J.M.(1999a).Interparentalconflictandchildren'semotions:thedevelopmentofanangerorganization.Manuscriptsubmittedforpublication. Jenkins,J.M.(1999b).Psychopathologyandshorttermemotion:thebalanceofaffects.Manuscriptsubmittedforpublication. Jenkins,J.M.,&Greenbaum,R.(1996).Metacognitionaboutemotionandchildpsychopathology.InN.Frijda(Ed.),ProceedingsoftheIXthConferenceon theInternationalSocietyforResearchonEmotion.Toronto,Canada:InternationalSocietyforResearchonEmotion. Jenkins,J.M.,&Smith,M.A.(1990).Factorsprotectingchildrenlivingindisharmonioushomes:Maternalreports.JournaloftheAmericanAcademyofChild andAdolescentPsychiatry,29,6069. Jenkins,J.M.,&Smith,M.A.(1991).Maritaldisharmonyandchildren'sbehaviourproblems:Aspectsofapoormarriagewhichaffectchildrenadversely.Journal of(ChildPsychologyandPsychiatry,32,793810. Lazarus,R.S.(1991).Emotionandadaptation.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. Malatesta,C.Z.,&Wilson,A.(1988).Emotion/cognitioninteractioninpersonalitydevelopment:Adiscreteemotions,functionalistanalysis.BritishJournalof SocialPsychology,27,91112. Margolin,G.,John,R.S.,&O'Brien,M.(1989).Homeobservationsofmarriedcouplesreenactingnaturalisticconflicts.BehavioralAssessment,11,101118. Moffitt,T.E.(1993).Adolescentlimitedandlifecoursepersistentantisocialbehavior:Adevelopmentaltaxonomy.PsychologicalReview,100,674701. Oatley,K.(1992).Bestlaidschemes:PsychologyoftheEmotions.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Oatley,K.,&JohnsonLaird,P.N.(1987).Towardsacognitivetheoryofemotions.CognitionandEmotion,1,2950. Olweus,D.(1979).Stabilityofaggressivereactionpatternsinmales:Areview.PsychologicalBulletin,86,852875. Patterson,G.R.,Dishion,T.,&Reid,J.(1993).Antisocialboys.Eugene,OR:Castalia. Quinton,D.,&Rutter,M.(1988).Parentingbreakdown:Themakingandbreakingofintergenerationallinks.Aldershot,UK:Avebury.

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Robins,L.N.(1978).Sturdychildhoodpredictorsofadultantisocialbehavior:Replicationsfromlongitudinalstudies.PsychologicalMedicine,8,611622. Rutter,M.(1979).Protectivefactorsinchildren'sresponsestostressanddisadvantage.InM.W.Kent&J.E.Rolf(Eds.),Primarypreventionin psychopathology,Vol.3:Socialcompetenceinchildren(pp.4974).Hanover,NH:UniversityPressofNewEngland. Salovey,P.,&Mayer,J.M.(1990).Emotionalintelligence.Imagination,CognitionandPersonality,9,185211. Stern,D.(1985).Theinterpersonalworldoftheinfant.NewYork:BasicBooks. Stern,D.(1994).Onewaytobuildaclinicallyrelevantbaby.InfantMentalHealthJournal,15,925. Tomkins,S.S.(1979).Scripttheory:Differentialmagnificationofaffects.InH.E.Howe&R.A.Dienstbier(Eds.),NebraskaSymposiumonMotivation,1978 (pp.201236).Lincoln:UniversityofNebraskaPress. Werner,E.E.,&Smith,R.S.(1982).Vulnerablebutinvincible:alongitudinalstudyofresilientchildrenandyouth.NewYork:McGrawHill.

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PARTIV INTENTIONALITYANDLANGUAGE

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Chapter15 TheLanguageofIntention: ThreeWaysofDoingIt

JanetWildeAstington UniversityofToronto
Thenoticesays,"Donotfeedthepenguins."I,however,feedthempeanuts.Nowpeanutshappentobe,andtheseprove,fataltothesebirds.DidIfeedthempeanutsintentionally? Beyondadoubt:Iamnocasualpeanutshedder.Butdeliberately?Well,thatseemsperhapstoraisethequestion,"HadIreadthenotice?"Whydoesit?Or''onpurpose?"That seemstoinsinuatethatIknewwhatfatalresultswouldensue.Again,why? Austin(1966/1979,p.275,emphasisadded)

Allthreetermshighlightedaboveintentionally,deliberately,onpurposearewaysofcharacterizinghumanactionasintentional.Intentional,thatis,inthenarrow senseofbeingperformeddeliberatelyoronpurpose,ratherthaninBrentano's(1874/1960)senseofbeingdirectedatsomestateofaffairsintheworld,although intentionsareintentionalinthisbroadersensetoo:WhenIsaythatIintendtodosuchandsuch,Irepresentsomefutureactionintheworld.InthischapterIfocuson intentionalityinitsnarrowersense,involvingtheideaofactionperformedonpurpose.Theconceptofintentionhasbeenmuchdiscussedinphilosophyandpsychology andhereIwilldonomorethanconsiderthelanguageofintention,thatis,thewaysinwhichweusewords(suchasthoseemphasizedintheAustinquote)toanticipate anddescribeourownandothers'actions.Inparticular,Iamconcernedwithhowchildren'sacquisitionofsuchtermsmaymediatetheirdevelopingunderstandingof intention.By"mediate"Imeanthatthechild'sconceptwillbedeterminedbythecategoriesand

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therelationsamongthecategorieslexicalizedinthechild'snaturallanguage(Nelson,1996).Iwouldnotarguethatchildrenhavenounderstandingofintentionuntilthey cantalkaboutit.Ido,however,believethattheabilitytotalkaboutitsignificantlyinfluencesandincreasestheirunderstanding. OrdinaryLanguagePhilosophy Thisbeliefisencouragedbymidcenturyordinarylanguagephilosophy,whosepractitionersclaimedthatlanguageitselfcreatescategoriesanddistinctionsthatdonot, indeedcannot,existforuswithoutlanguage.Theirmethodaimstogivedescriptiveanalysesofconceptsasrevealedinordinarylanguage,thatis,ineveryday, nontechnicaldiscourse.J.L.Austinwasoneofthemostimportantmembersofthisgroupandthefirstpartofmytitleischosentoacknowledgeoneofhislittleknown papers,"ThreeWaysofSpillingInk"(Austin,1966/1979),fromwhichtheopeningquotationistaken.ThemanuscriptwasincompleteatthetimeofAustin'sdeath andwasassembledbyLyndForgusonfromAustin'slecturenotes. Therearetwopartstotheordinarylanguagephilosopher'smethod(whichisnotempiricalalthoughAustinsometimessaiditwas).First,onethinksofexamplesof whatwouldbesaidorwhatcouldbesaidinacertaininstanceandhowitwouldbeinterpreted.Second,oneexaminesthegrammar,etymology,anddictionary definitionsoftermsthatmightbeusedintheseinstances.Wecanseethemethodinactionin"ThreeWaysofSpillingInk"inwhichAustininvestigatedtheconceptof intention:
Inconsideringresponsibility,fewthingsareconsideredmoreimportantthantoestablishwhetheramanintendedtodoA,orwhetherhedidAintentionally.Butthereareatleast twootherfamiliarwordsimportantinthisrespect.Letusdistinguishbetweenactingintentionallyandactingdeliberatelyoronpurpose,asfarasthiscanbedonebyattending towhatlanguagecanteachus. Aschoolteachermayaskachildwhohasspilledtheinkinclass[thisisEnglandinthe1950s,whereinkwellswereanimportantpartofclassroomequipment]:"Didyoudothat intentionally?"or"Didyoudothatdeliberately?"or"Didyoudothatonpurpose(orpurposely)?"Itappearsatfirstsighttomatterlittlewhichquestionisasked.Theyappearto meanthesameoratleasttocomedowntothesameinthiscase.Butdotheyreally?Thereareinfacttechniquesavailablefordistinguishingbetweentheseexpressions... Wemayconsider,forinstance,forastart:(i)imaginedoractualcases...(Austin,1966/1979,pp.273274)

Thisisthefirstpartofthemethod,whichAustinconsideredperfectlysatisfactory.Ryle(1963)defendedthemethodsusedinordinarylanguage

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philosophybyaskingwhyweneedtocountnosesifwe'vegotoneourselvesthatis,one'sownintuitionsprovideperfectlysatisfactorydata(atleast,ifoneisa philosopher).AsForguson(1985)said,
Thenonempiricalnatureof[ordinarylanguagephilosophers']descriptiveanalyseswasnotthoughtbythemtoconstituteanobstacletounderstandingourconcepts,because universityprofessorsarecompetentspeakersofEnglishorsomeothernaturallanguage,theyareordinarypeopleoutsidethephilosopher'scloset,andhencecanbeexpectedto bringtheirordinaryunderstandingwiththemintotheclosetwhentheyaregoingabouttheiranalyticalwork.Moreover,professionalphilosophersarereflective,sensitiveto nuanceandtofinedistinctionsofusage.Whatbetterinformantscouldtherebe?

Psychologistsmightthinkdifferently,ofcourse.Bethatasitmay,in"ThreeWaysofSpillingInk"wecanseethemethodinaction,withreferencetointention.Austin providedanumberofimaginedexamples,includingthepenguinfeedingonegivenatthebeginningofthechapter.Hethenwentontoapplythesecondpartofthe method,whichconsidersthegrammar,etymology,andsoonofthewordsusedintheexamples. Austinpointedoutthatwemightsay,"Iamdeliberating,"usingthecontinuousorprogressiveaspect,butintendisnotusedwithprogressiveaspect,ratheronesays,"I intend..."Theadjectivesarealsodifferentlyformed:deliberate,purposeful,intentionaleachtakesadifferentsuffix.Austinlikened"deliberate"to"considerate,'' sayingthatthereisasuggestionthatsomeoperationhasbeenperformed,suchastheprocessofdeliberation(aboutanaction,forexample),orconsideration(of someone'sfeelings,forexample).Ontheotherhand,"purposeful,"Austinsuggested,byanalogyto"thoughtful"and"careful,"indicatesthatsomethingmayormay notbepresent(purpose,thought,care)thatis,thereisreferencetothingswemayormaynotbedoinginperforminganaction.Third,hesaid,"intentional"qualifiesan actionmoredirectly,moreintimately. Austincontinuedinsimilarfashionforafewmorepages.Onemayormaynotbepersuadedbyhisarguments.Whatconclusionmightwereach?Howshallwe distinguishintentional,deliberate,andonpurpose,and,moreimportant,whatlightwillthatthrowontheconceptofintention?First,intentional:Austinsaidthat"As wegothroughlifedoing,aswesuppose,onethingafteranother,Iingeneralalwayshaveanidea...ofwhatI'mupto..."(Austin,1966/1979,p.283).Termswith theintentionrootareconnectedwiththisnotion,thatis,awarenessofcurrentactions.Ontheotherhand,whenwecharacterizeanactionasdeliberateweimplythat therehasbeendeliberation,thatthepersonhasstoppedtothink,"ShallIorshan'tI?"beforedecidingtoact.Thus,termswiththedeliberaterootimplythinkingprior toaction.Andlast,whensomethingisdoneforapurposethepurposeissomethingtobeachievedoreffectedasaresultof

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whatisdone.NotethatAustinswitchedinthesefinalpagesandsaidforapurpose,not,asbefore,onpurposetheremaywellbeadifference.Thepaperthentailed offwithnorealconclusion,whichwasnotAustin'susualstylebuthenevercompletedthisparticularmanuscript.Ihavequoteditatsomelengthinordertoillustrate ordinarylanguagephilosophyinactionandtostartthinkingaboutthelanguageofintention. InhispaperAustinreferredtotheworkofAnscombe,whosebookhasbeenveryinfluentialinsubsequentworkonintention(Anscombe,1957).Itwasshewhofirst distinguishedbetweenexpressinganintentionforthefutureandcurrentlyactingintentionally,animportantdistinctionthathasbeentakenupbyothers.Forexample, Searle(1983)distinguishedbetweenpriorintentionandintentioninaction:"Allintentionalactionshaveintentionsinactionbutnotallintentionalactionshaveprior intentions.Icandosomethingintentionallywithouthavingformedapriorintentiontodoit,andIcanhaveapriorintentiontodosomethingandyetnotactonthat intention"(p.85). ForSearleanactioniscomprisedofintentionandmovementtheintentioninactioncausesthebodilymovement.Withouttheintentioninactionitisjustamovement andnotanaction.Actionscanbecausedbypriorintentions,whichiswhereonethinksandthenacts(seeFig.15.1,#1).However,actionsneednotbecausedby priorintentionsonecanjustact,asinanunplannedintentionalaction(Fig.15.1,#2).Alternatively,priorintentionsneednotactuallybringaboutactions.Thatis,one mayplansomeactionandthennotcarryitoutthisisanunfulfilledpriorintention(Fig.15.1,#3).Suchunfulfilledintentions,incidentally,aretheonesreferredtointhe saying,"Thepathtohellispavedwithgoodintentions"thatis,onethoughtofthegooddeedbutdidnotperformit. Bratman(1987)madeasimilardistinctionbetweenintentioninactionandpriorintention(althoughhedoesnotusetheseterms)whenhesaid:"Wedothings intentionallyandweintendtodothings.Ourcommonsensepsychologyusesthenotionofintentiontocharacterizebothouractionsandourmentalstates"(p.111).I illustratethesedistinctionswithoneexample(seeFig.15.2).Considerthreelittlegirls,one(A)isinthekitchen,lookingforsomethingtotakeoutsidetofeedthebirds, another(B)isoutside,throwingcrumbsdownforthebirdstoeat,andathird(C)iswalkingalongeatingacookie,withcrumbsdroppingbehindher,whichthebirds arepeckingup.AandBillustratethedistinctionbetweenintentionandaction,whileBandCillustratethedistinctionbetweenintentionalandaccidentalacts.One couldsaythatbothAandBintendtofeedthebirds,butCdoesnot.InSearle'sterms,AhasapriorintentionandBhasintentioninaction(whichmayhavebeen causedbypriorintention).InBratman'sterms,intentioncharacterizesA'smindandB'saction(andmaybealsoB'smind).

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Fig.15.1. Illustrationofrelationbetweenpriorintentionandcomponents ofintentionalaction(fromSearle,1983).

Letusreturn,foramoment,toAustin'sthreewaysofspillingink,intentionally,deliberately,oronpurpose,andattempttoprovidetheconclusionhedidnotreach. "Deliberately,"suggestingforethoughtinvolved,impliespriorintention.Austinwasuncharacteristicallyvagueabout"onpurpose,"seemingtomean"withpurpose"and sometimesusing''purposely"or"purposefully."Thesuggestionisthattheactionistakenforsomereasonthatis,priorintentionisimplied."Intentionally,"ontheother hand,doesnotcarrytheimplicationofpriorintention,althoughtheactionsocharacterizedmayresultfromapriorintention.Thus,onemightconcludethatallthree termscharacterizeintentionalaction,butonlydeliberatelyandonpurposeimplypriorintentionintentionallydoesnotnecessarilydoso,althoughitmayincontext. TheLanguageofIntention InthissectionIconsiderwhatisinvolvedinthelanguageofintentionmorebroadly.The"threewaysofdoingit"thatmytitlereferstoarenot

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Fig.15.2. Illustrationofthedistinctionbetweenintention,action,andaccident.

Austin'sthreewaysofspillingink,whichgiveaveryspecificfocusononeaspectofthelanguageofintention.Mytitle"ThreeWaysofDoingIt"alsoreferstoAustin's earlierwork,HowToDoThingsWithWords.Thisbook,firstpublishedin1962,isbasedonlecturesgiveninthe1950s(Austin,1962/1975).ItisherethatAustin spelledouthisideasaboutspeechacts(Feldman,chap.16,thisvolume).Speechactsarethingswedowithwords,suchasmakingpromises,askingquestions,and givingorders,aswellastheobviousone,makingstatements.Austinarguedthatwedonotuselanguagejusttomakestatementsthatcanbejudgedtrueorfalse.We alsouselanguageinspeechactswheretruthisnotanissuerather,theissue

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iswhetherthespeechactisperformedcompletely,correctly(thatis,appropriately),andsincerely.Suchisthelanguageofintention. Concerningintention,whatisitthatwewantto"dowithwords"?Whatdowewanttoachieve?Thereareatleasttwothings:expressourintentions,anddescribeand characterizeourownactionsandthoseofotherpeople.Letmeelaborateonthis:Weexpresspriorintentions,whetherornotwecarrythemout,andweaskother peopleabouttheirintentionsthatis,wegetthemtoexpresstheirpriorintentionswhetherornottheycarrythemout.Furthermore,incaseswherethepriorintentionis notcarriedout,wemaytalkaboutourownandothers'unfulfilledintentions.Wealsotalkaboutourownandothers'actions,whethersomethingwasdone intentionallyoraccidentally.Ourexcusesmaydependonourclaimthatanactionwasnotintended.Ourmoraljudgmentsinvolvejudgmentsofintentionality(Piaget, 1932/1977)forexample,praiseorblameforotherpeople'sactionstypicallymakestheassumptionthatwhattheydidwasintentional.Thus,the"languageof intention"hastocoverallofthis. Iproposethatthereare"threeways"weusetoachievetheseends: 1.IntentionisimpliedImeaninthiscasethatitisimpliedbyalinguisticexpression,notbysomeaction. 2.Intentionismadeexplicitthisisthelexicalizationofintentionwhenintentiontermsareused. 3.Intentionisavowedthatis,we"giveourword"andacommitmentismade. Ielaborateeachofthesewaysinturn. IntentionImplied Wemayusethesimplefuturetoexpressintention,asin"Iwilldox"or"Ishalldox,"althoughthefuturetensedoesnotnecessarilymarkintention.Certainlyitmay expressintention,asin"I'lldoitforyou,"butitmaynot,asin,"Help,I'lldropit!"Thelackofintentionishereimpliedbytheverbdrop(andhelp).Liketheuseof futuretense,theauxiliaryverb''begoingto"mayormaynotexpressintention."I'mgoingtovisitmyuncle"suggestsanintentiontodoso,whereas"Help,I'mgoingto fall!"impliesthelackofintentionbyuseoftheverbfall(andhelp).Modalsmayalsoexpressintention,asin,"Iwouldliketodoit,"butthismaybejustanexpression ofawish. MillerandJohnsonLaird(1976)arguedthatalthoughthereisalexicalfieldofintentionterms(seemysecond"wayofdoingit"),intentioncannotbeisolatedina simplelexicalfield.Itisexpressedallovertheplaceindifferentsemanticfields,forexample,asacomponentofthemeaningof

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someagentiveverbsthatis,verbsthatdescribeactionsforwhichitmakessensetoask,"Wastheactionintentional?"Someagentiveverbsincorporate intentionalitydirectlyintotheirmeaning.Compare: "Bdied" "AkilledB" "AmurderedB" dieisnonagentive killisagentive murderisagentive(+intention)

Thereare,however,many"neutral"agentiveverbs(e.g.,break,move)thatallowobserverstoreportwhattheyseewithoutcommittingthemselvesastowhetherthe actionisintentionalornot.Adverbscanimplyintention,whentheyareusedwiththeseneutralverbs:forexample,"hemovedskillfully,"whereskillfullymarksa mannerofintentionaldoing.Evenprepositions(e.g.,by,with)canbeusedtoexpressintention(Halliday,1970).Compare: Thewindowwasbrokenbyaball. Thewindowwasbrokenwithaball. Thewindowwasbrokenwithahammer. Here"byaball"suggeststhatthewindowwasbrokenaccidentally,but"withaball"suggestsitwasnotanaccident,butrathersuggeststherewasanagentand perhapsanintention(compare"withahammer").Evenifyouarenotconvincedbythisexample(andsomepeoplearenot),mypointisthatintentionisdeeply embeddedinourlanguage.Thisisbeforeweevergettospecificlexicalitemsexpressingintention,whichIconsidernow. IntentionExplicitTheLexicalizationofIntention Someverbsexpressintentionexplicitly:forexample,intendto...,planto...,meanto...,tryto....Inthepresenttense,thefirstthreeofthesemarkaprior intention,"Iintend/plan/meantodoit."Incontrast,trymarksintentionalaction,notpriorintention:"I'mtryingtodoit."Trycanbeusedinfuturetensetomarkprior intention:"Iwilltrytodoit"(noticethisisweakerthan"Iintendtodoit").Inthepasttense,theseverbsmayindicatethatanactionwasperformedintentionallythatis, therewasanintentioninaction,whichmayhavebeenwithorwithoutpriorintention.''Imeanttodoit"markssuchintentionalaction.However,theverbsmayalso indicateanunfulfilled,failedintention:"Imeanttodoit,butIforgot,"or"Itriedtodoit,butIcouldn't."Onlycontextallowsustodisambiguate"Imeanttodoit"as implyingintentionalactionorunfulfilledintention.Lastly,theseverbsinpasttensearefrequentlynegatedtomarkalackofintention,asin,"Ididn'tmeantodoit."

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Adverbsformedfromtheseverbs,andotheradverbialphrases,canmarkintentionalaction:intentionally,onpurpose.Adverbsandadverbialphrasescanalsomark unintentionalaction:accidentally,byaccident.Someadverbialtermsmaybeusedtoindicatethattherewaspriorintention.SuchareAustin'sterms:deliberately,for example. Expressionsofpriorintentioncanvaryinstrength.Compare"Ihopetodoit,"or"I'lltrytodoit,"with"Iintendtodoit,''or"Ifullyintendtodoit."Onewouldjudge theactionmorelikelytobeperformedifoneofthesecondtwoexpressionswereusedthanoneofthefirsttwo.Butcansomeonetrustthatmyactionwillbe performedifIsay,"Iintendtodoit"?CanInotgofartherthanthis?Yes:Thisisthethirdofthe"threeways." IntentionAvowedCommitmentMade Onemightsaythatthisis"goingalltheway"thatis,we"giveourword"andacommitmentismade.Saying"Iintendtodoit"doesn'tcommitmetodoingit,butsaying "Ipromisetodoit"doessocommitme.AsAustin(1946/1979)wrote:"Promisingisnotsomethingsuperior,inthesamescaleashopingandintending,eventomerely fullyintending:forthereisnothinginthatscalesuperiortofullyintending"(p.99).Thereisaqualitativedifferencebetween"Iintendtodoit"and"Ipromisetodoit."In promisingtoperformanaction,oneundertakesanobligationtodoso.Austincontinued:"WhenIsay'Ipromise',anewplungeistaken:Ihavenotmerelyannounced myintention,but,byusingthisformula(performingthisritual)Ihaveboundmyselftoothersandstakedmyreputationinanewway."Thereareothertermsthat obligateoneinthesamewayaspromise:forexample,"Iguaranteeit"or"Igiveyoumyword." Onecansay,"IintendtodoitbutIdon'tpromiseto,"butitisoddtosay,"IpromisetodoitbutIdon'tintendto."Onecan,ofcourse,promisetodoitandnotintend tothisisaninsincereorfalsepromise.However,onecannotsensiblysayitthisisaninstanceofMoore'sparadoxwherespeechactandmentalstateareinexplicit conflict,asin,"It'srainingbutIdon'tbelieveit'sraining"(C.E.Moore,Englishphilosopher,18731958). Children'sAcquisitionandUseoftheLanguageofIntention Thus,therearethreewaysinwhichintentionisexpressedinlanguage:implicitly,explicitly,andavowedly.Animportantquestion,towhichInowturn,iswhendo childrenacquireandunderstandtheseexpressions?Answeringthisquestionwillprovideinformationonchildren'sdeveloping

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conceptofintention.Theappropriateuseofalinguistictermmaynotbeanecessaryconditionforunderstandingthecorrespondingconcept,butitisasufficientone (Geach,1957)."Appropriate"istheimportantqualifierhere.Childrenmayusewordswithoutfullyunderstandingthemandonlycarefulexperimentalworkwillshow thepreciseboundariesofthechild'sconcept.Theabstractionandcomplexityofthenotionofintentionguaranteethattheconceptwillbedevelopedoversome considerabletimeprovidingclearexamplesofcasesof"usebeforemeaning"(Nelson,1996,p.145).Thatis,childrenmaynotpossessfulladultcontrolofsome intentiontermsuntilyearsaftertheyfirstproducethesametermsinfamiliarcontexts. UsingandUnderstandingImplicitExpressionsofIntention Almostassoonaschildrenstarttotalk,theyexpresstheirintentionsinthefirstwayIdescribed,whereintentionisimplicitinalinguisticexpression.Thatis,theyuse termslikewillandgonnatorefertotheirownandothers'futureactions.InWells'(1979)studyofchildreninBristol,England,50%ofthesamplehadusedwillby 30monthsofageandgonnaby33months.However,asOlsonandKamawar(chap.9,thisvolume)pointout,itmaybewewhointerpretsuchutterancesas expressionsofintention.Childrenmayhavelittleconceptofintentionatthispoint.Althoughwillandgonnacanrefertofutureaction,thesametermscanreferto futureevents.Childrenofthisageusethetermsinbothways,butmayhavenoabilitytodistinguishbetweenfutureactionsthatcanbeintendedandfutureevents beyondtheircontrol.SometimeagoR.Brown(1973)saidthatwhenAdam,Eve,andSarahstartedtousegonna(andalsowannaandhafta)atabout2yearsof age,theterms"wereusedtonameactionsjustabouttooccur,akindofimmediatefuturewhichwasoftenalsoastatementofthechild'swishorintention"(p.318). Recently,Montgomery(1998)analyzedSarah'sandAdam'stranscripts,nowavailableintheCHILDESdatabase(MacWhinney&Snow,1990),lookingspecifically attheuseofintentionterms(gonna,will,mean,try,andonpurpose).Thefirstusedtermsarewillandgonna,toexpressthefuturefulfillmentofsomeactorsome event.Forexample,Sarahat3years0monthssaid,"Igonnagetmorewater,"andat3years2monthssaid,"Itgonnaslip."Actionsmaybeintended,whereasevents mayhavesomephysicalcause.Montgomerysuggestedthatthechildren'searlyuseofwillandgonnaistoexpressthefuturewithnodistinctionmadebetween intentionandcause:
Insteadofsayingthatchildrenareimputingintentionswhentheybeginusingauxiliaries,itwouldbemoreaccurate...tosaythattheyareusingauxiliariestostatethatanaction orendisexpectedinthefuture.The

Page305 distinctionbetweenfutureofpresentcauseandfutureofpresentintentioncouldbeviewedasadevelopmentalacquisitionfollowingfromthissubsumingrule.(Montgomery, 1998,p.6)

GeeandSavasir(1985),whomadeanintensivestudyofwillandgonnainthespeechoftwoyoung3yearoldsplayingtogether,agreedthatbothtermsareusedfor futurereference.Theyargued,however,thatthetwotermsarenotfreelyinterchangeable.Willismostfrequentlyusedwithfirstpersonsingularinwhattheycall "undertakings,"thatis,tosustaincooperativeactivityinimmediateongoingaction(e.g.,"I'llgetsomedollsoutofmybox"[p.149]).Gonnaisusedinplanningand mayrefertoactionsbeyondtheimmediatecontextortothemoredistantfuture(e.g.,''WellI'mgonnaskatewhenI'mabigsister"[p.155]).However,eventhough thetwotermsarenotinterchangeable,theyarenotdistinguishableonthebasisofwhetherreferenceismadetofulfilmentofcauseorofintention. Montgomery'sargumentthat3yearoldsdonotdistinguishbetweenintentionandcauseparallelsanargumentImadethatchildrenofthisagedonotdistinguish betweenintentionanddesire(Astington,1993,chap.6).AsBrown(1973)said,Adam,Eve,andSarahappearedtousegonnaandwannainterchangeably,torefer toanimmediatefuturethatexpressedthechild'sintentionorwish.Thatis,intentionmaybeexpressedusingwanna,atermincommonusefrom24monthsorearlier. BartschandWellman(1995)agreedthat"announcingadesiretoact...isoftenannouncinganintentiontoact"(p.68),andintheiranalysesfoundthattheuseof wannawas"oftenintimatelylinkedtointentionorgoaldirectedaction,"asforexample: Abe(29): Father: Abe: Daddy!Fillmysquirtgun. Why?... BecauseIwanttoplaywithit.(Bartsch&Wellman,1995,p. 70)

Insum,atthisearlystage(2to3yearsofage)childrenusewillandgonnatoexpresspredictionsandintentions,andusegonnaandwannatoexpressintentionsand desires.Thus,onecouldarguethatatthisstagethereisaconflationofprediction,intention,anddesire.Furthermore,andmostimportantinmyview,itmaybethe acquisitionoflexicaltermsallowingonetodistinguishprediction,intention,anddesirethathelpsthechildtomakethesedistinctions.Ofcourse,olderchildrenand adultsusewillandgonnatoexpresspredictionsandintentions,andgonnaandwannatoexpressintentionsanddesires,buttheycanclarifywhattheymeanifitis calledintoquestion.Forexample,"I'mgonnadoit"couldbedisambiguatedthus:"I'mgonnadoitI'lltrynotto,butIprobablywill"=

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prediction"I'mgonnadoitIreallyintendtodoit"=intention"I'mgonnadoitatleast,I'dliketo"=desire.Itistheacquisitionoftermssuchastryandintendthat facilitatesthedisambiguation. Iamnotproposingthatthedirectionofcausalityisalwaysfromalinguistictoaconceptualdistinction.However,inthecaseofconceptsofabstractphenomenalike prediction,intention,anddesire,Ibelievethatlanguageplaysacrucialrole.Youngchildrenmustexperiencedesireandintention,oratleast,theymusthavethe experienceofwantingsomething,andthenoftryingtodosomethingtosatisfytheirdesire.Harris(1991)claimedthatevenataveryearlyagechildrenareawareof theseexperiencesthroughintrospection.Suchawarenessiscrucialtohisargumentthatyoungchildrendonotneedtothinkofmentalstates,likedesireandintention, ashypotheticalpostulateswithinatheoryofmind.Inhisview,youngchildrenareintuitivelyawareoftheirownexperience,forexample,ofwantingorintending something.ThisisalsowhatOlsonandKamawar(chap.9,thisvolume)referto,insayingthatyoungchildrenhave"feelings."ForOlsonandKamawar,feelings becomementalstateswhenthesamestateisrecognizedinothers.Inmyview,thelinguisticlabelplaysavitalrolehere(Astington,1996). Theyoungchildwantssomethingbutdoesnotgetit,ortriestodosomethingbutfails.Thechildhastheexperience,andtheparentorcaretakertalksaboutit,perhaps tocomfortthechild,incidentallyusingdesireandintentionterms.Forexample,"Youwantcandybutwedon'thaveany"or"Youtriedtoreachitbutyou'renotbig enoughyet"andsoon.Mostimportant,adultstalkabouttheirownandotherpeople'smentalstatestoo,usingthesameterms,notalwaysdirectlytothechildbutin conversationthatthechildoverhears.Forexample,Dunn(1988,pp.9091)describedascenewherea21montholdhasaccidentallykickedandhurthersisterand themotherintervenes:
Mothertochild: Childtosister: Mothertosister: SaysorrytoClare? Sorry(kissesandstrokesher). Itwasamistake.Shedidn'tmeanto,darling.Itwasan accident.

Thuschildrencanmapthefeelingstheyhaveontoothers'experiences.Theycometoseethemselvesaspossessingdesiresandintentions,andcometoseethatothers dotoo.Between2and3yearsofagethereisamarkedincreaseinchildren'stalkaboutdesires,andnotably,thisiswhenchildrenstarttotalkaboutothers'desires, eventhoughthereisnoincreaseinmothers'talkaboutdesiresoverthesametimeperiod(J.R.Brown&Dunn,1991).Alsoatthisagechildrenexplaintheirown experiencesinpsychologicalterms,andaskforreasonsforothers'actionsandreactions(Dunn&Brown,1993Hood&Bloom,1979).

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UsingandUnderstandingExplicitExpressionsofIntention Aschildrenstarttoexplainandexcuseactionsinthepreschoolyears,theyusetermssuchasmean,try,oronpurpose(Bretherton,1991Dunn,1991)thatI discussedpreviously:intentionmadeexplicitbylexicalization.Dunnsaidthatexcusesandblamingbasedonintentwerenotcommoninhertranscripts,butshegave someexamples,evenfromchildrenundertheageof3years(Dunn,1991,pp.101102):

1.Child(26months)climbingonhismother: Mother:You'rehurtingme! Child:Sorry.Sorry.Idon'tmeanto. 2.Child(33months)refusingtogetdownoffsettee: Mother:Getoff! Child:Look.I'mnot...[standsuponsetteeagain].Mummy.I'mnot...I'mnotstandingonthere.I'mtryingtogetapaintoff[rubsTV].I'mgoingtotryandgetapaintoff. AllI'mtryingtodois...there. 3.Child(33months)crying,sayingherbrotherhasbittenher: Mother:Hebityouonthehead? Child:Yes. Mothertobrother:Philip,isthattrue? Brother:No. Childtomother:Yes!Onpurpose!

AlthoughDunnsaidthatsuchexpressionsarenotcommon,thefrequencywithwhichthetermsareusedislessimportantthanthefactthattheyareusedatall.Bartsch andWellman(1995)showedthatfrequencyofmetacognitivetermusebypreschoolersisrelatedtolinguisticcompetence(measuredbyMLU),independentofage, butthefirstuseofatermisrelatedtoage,independentofMLU.Itmaybeuseratherthanfrequencythatisimportantasamarkerofconceptualdevelopment. Thechild'sconceptofintentionisgraduallydeveloped,asisthechild'sstockofintentionterms.Youngchildrenmayappeartounderstandintentionwhenonetermis used,andnotwhenanotherintentiontermisused.InBratman's(1987)terms,"commonsensepsychologyusesthenotionofintentiontocharacterizebothouractions andourmentalstates"(p.111),anditseemslikelythatchildrenunderstandintentionascharacterizingactionbeforetheyunderstandthatintentioncancharacterize mind.Thetermtry,whichmarksactionasintentional,isunderstoodandusedearlyon.InonestudywithMelanieMann(unpublisheddata),wefoundthat

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3yearoldscouldjudgewhichoftwocharacterswastrying,althoughinasimilartasktheycouldnotjudgewhichoftwocharactersmeanttodosomething. Wedescribedbriefscenarios,illustratedbypictures,involvingtheSesameStreetcharactersBertandErnie.Thescenarioscameinpairs,onefeaturingBertandthe otherfeaturingErnie.Inthe"trying"stories,bothcharactershadthesamedesire,oneactedbutfailedtosatisfyit,andtheotherdidnotactbutneverthelessgotwhat waswanted.Forexample:"Bertisattheapplefarm.Hewantsanappleoffthetree.Hecan'treachit.Heclimbsonabox.Hestillcan'treachit."Thesetofpictures illustratingthisstorywasleftinviewandthesecondstorywastold:"Ernieisattheapplefarmtoo.Hewantsanappleoffthetree.It'stoohighup.Hedoesn'tknow whattodo.Thentheapplefallsoffthetree,ontothegroundbesideErnie."Withbothsetsofpicturesinview,thechildwasaskedthetestquestion:''Here'sBert,and here'sErnie.Whichguywastryingtogetanappleoffthetree?"Inthefinalframes,ErnieisshownwithhisappleandBertisemptyhandednonethelesseven3year oldsknewthatBertwastheguywhowastryingtogetanapple.Tryingisassociatedwithacting. Thetermmean,however,maybemoredifficult.Insometasks,3yearoldsdoappeartounderstandmean.Ifacharacterhasagoal,acts,andachievesit,3year oldscanjudgethathemeanttodoit,whereasifheachievesadifferent,unwantedgoaltheyjudgethathedidn'tmeantodoit(Shultz,1980).Iarguedthatchildren's performanceintaskslikethesemaybebasedonmatchinggoalsandoutcomes,andjudgingmatchesasintendedandmismatchesasnotintended(Astington,1991). Whenthatstrategyisnotavailable,3yearoldshavemoredifficultyjudgingwhichcharacter"meanttodoit"forexample,inasituationwherebothcharactersdothe "same"thing,onewithintention,andtheotherasasideeffectofdoingsomethingelse.ThisislikethesituationillustratedinFig.15.2:InbothpicturesBandC,the birdseatthecrumbs,butonecaninferthatonlythecharacterinBmeantthebirdstoeatthecrumbs(atleast,onecouldinferitgivenmorecontext). Wecontextualizedsituationslikethisforthe"meantto"storiesintheBertandErnietask.Inthesesituations,theresultwasthesameinbothcasesbutonlyone characterintendedtobringitabout.Thematchingstrategycouldnotbeusedbecausethecharacters'intentionshadtobeinferredfromthepicturesandthestory.For example:"Erniehassomebread.Hetakesitoutside.Hethrowscrumbsdown.Thebirdspeckthemup."Thesetofpicturesillustratingthisstorywasleftinviewand thesecondstorywastold:"Bert'sgotsomebreadtoo.Hewalksalongeatingit.Somecrumbsfallbehindhim.Thebirdspeckthemup."Withbothsetsofpicturesin view,thechildwasaskedthetestquestion:"Here'sErnie,andhere'sBert.Whichguymeantthebirdstoeatthecrumbs?"

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Fig.15.3. Meanscoresatthreeagelevelsonintentionandcontroltasks.

Wetestedeightythree3to5yearoldsonfourpairsofstories:twowiththetrytestquestion,andtwowithmeant.Thechildrenalsoreceivedtwocontrolstory pairs,askingthemtojudgewhichguywashappy,inacasewherethejudgmentcouldbemadebymatchinggoalandoutcome.Theorderofstorypairsandof scenarioswithinthestorypairswasappropriatelybalancedacrossthechildren.Figure15.3shows3,4,and5yearoldchildren'sperformanceontwo"try"stories andtwo"meant"storiesandtwocontrolstories.Therewasasignificantdifferencebetweenagegroupsonlyfor"meant,''F(2,80)=10.9,p<.001. Althoughtryappearseasierthanmeanhere,onecouldarguethatthetasksarenotcomparableinanumberofwaysthatis,thestoriesdifferinmorethanjustwhich verbisused.Lee(1995)gave3to5yearoldsataskwithstoriessimilartothe"try"onesinthisstudyandcounterbalanced"wastryingto"and"meantto"inthetest questions.Shefound,forthesamestorycontent,thatthequestionwithtrywaseasierthanthequestionwithmean. Itislikelythatchildren'sproductionandcomprehensionofexpressionsofintentioncontinuetodevelopthroughtheearlyschoolyears.Inanearlierstudy(Astington, 1986),Ifoundthatitwasnotuntilafter7yearsofagethatchildrenwerereliablycorrectonataskrequiringcomprehensionofintendsto,meansto,plansto,to characterizepriorintention,andintendedto,meantto,onpurpose,todistinguishaccidentalandintentionalaction.Inthisstudy,priorintentionwasmarkedineight differentways:intendsto,meansto,plansto,andalso,will,isgoingto,wantsto,wouldliketo,andthinkshe'llChildrenwerejudgedtobeabletodistinguish priorin

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tentionfromactioniftheywerecorrectonsixoftheeightitems(theprobabilityofcorrectlychoosing6/8=.132).Interestingly,comprehensionoftheverbintend mostclearlydistinguishedbetweenthosewhocouldrecognizepriorintentionandthosewhocouldnot.Allthechildrenintheformergroupunderstoodthe"intendsto" item,eventhoughitwasnotrequiredforinclusioninthatgroup,becausetheyneededonlytobecorrectonanysixitems. UsingandUnderstandingAvowalsofIntention Explicitavowalsofintentionareseldomincludedininventoriesofchildren'sspeechacts,andinstancesofpromisingarerarelyrecorded(Snow,Pan,ImbemsBailey, &Herman,1996).Nonetheless,thetermpromisecertainlyisusedinconversationbetweenparentsandchildren.Forexample,theotherdayIsawafatherrunning afterhissmallchild,callingout,"Comeback....Youpromisednottogobeyondthebigtree."Undoubtedly,parentsdosay"Promiseme..."toholdthechildto someparticularcourseofaction,andchildrensay''Butyoupromised..."toremindtheparentofsomecommitmentmadeearlier.Iamsurethatevenyoungchildren knowthatthetermpromiseisusedtoemphasizetheseriousnessandimportanceofanutterance.Beyondthat,however,theirunderstandingisnotthesameasthatof adults,andalongtimeisneededtoacquirethematureconcept.Thisisoneoftheclearestcasesof"usebeforemeaning"(Nelson,1996). Inearlierstudies(Astington,1988b,1988c,1990)Ishowedthatitisnotuntiladolescencethatchildrenunderstandthatpromisingisonlyaspeechactthatis,the utteranceitselfisthepromise,evenifthepromisedactionisnotperformed.Inonestudy(Astington,1988b)5to13yearoldsheardsixstorieseachcontaininga targetutteranceofpromising,orpredicting,orasserting.Halfthechildrenwerenotinformedoftheoutcometheotherhalfheardstoriesinwhichapromisewaskept, apromisewasbroken,apredictionwasfulfilled,apredictionwasunfulfilled,anassertionwastrue,andanassertionwasfalse.Foreachstory,thechildren'staskwas todecidewhetherthespeakerofthetargetutterancehadmadeapromise,andtojustifytheirresponse.Themostobviouschangewithagewasthattheolderchildren clearlyrejectedcasesofpredictingasexamplesofpromising,whetherthepredictionwasfulfilled,unfulfilled,ortheoutcomewasunknown,andtheyjustifiedtheir responsesbyacknowledgingthatthespeakercouldnotactuallypromisetobringabouttheoutcome.Asone11yearoldsaid,"Well,heisn'ttheonewhocontrolsthe rain,sohecouldn'tpromise'cositcouldrainintheafternoon."Childrenunder10yearsofageignoredsuchfactsandfocusedonoutcomesinmakingtheirjudgment.

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Evenchildrenwhowerenotinformedoftheoutcomeimaginedanoutcomeandbasedtheirjudgmentonthat.Thus,themajorityof5to9yearoldssaidthata speakerhadpromisedifthepromisewaskeptorthepredictionfulfilled,andjudgedthatthespeakerhadnotpromisedifthepromisewasbrokenortheprediction unfulfilled.Theydid,however,showsomeawarenessofthedistinctionbetweenpromisingandpredicting.Childrenwhohadbeeninformedoftheoutcomewere askedafollowupquestiontoseewhethertheythoughtthespeakerwasresponsibleforbringingabouttheoutcome.Responsestothesequestionsshowedthatsome 7yearoldsandmost9yearoldsdiddistinguishbetweenpromisesandpredictionsintermsofthespeaker'sresponsibilityfortheoutcome,eventhoughtheydidnot makeanydistinctionbetweentheminjudgingwhetherthespeakerhadpromisedornot. Remarkably,even11andsome13yearoldsmisjudgedactualpromises,andsaidthatthespeakerhadnotpromisedincaseswherethepromisewasbroken.The olderchildreninthegroupwhowerenottoldoftheoutcomesometimesthoughttheydidnothavesufficientinformationtomakeajudgment.Whenasked"Didhe promise?"attheendofastoryinwhichabrotherpromisestotakehissistertotheswimmingpoolnextweek,a13yearoldreplied,"It'shardtotellunlessyouknow whattheguy'sthinking."Anda12yearoldsaidthatshethoughtthespeakerhadpromised,butthencontinued:''Ifhewasapersonwhousuallykeptpromiseslike that,thenIthinkitwouldbeapromise,butifhedidn'tkeeppromises,thenI'dprobablysayno,probablynot."Itisimportanttonotethatadults,giventhesame storiesandquestions,didnotfocusonoutcomes,andjudgedthatthespeakerhadpromisedinallcasesofpromising,evenwhenthepromisewasbrokenorno outcomewasgiven. Itseemsthatuntiltheadolescentyears,'childrenregardthepromiseastheutteranceplustheact.Alternatively,perhapstheyregardonlysincerepromisesascasesof promising,andtheylookfortheacttoassesstheintention:Ifthepromisedactiondoesnotoccur,orislikelynottooccur,theyjudgethepromiseasinsincereandthus notreallyapromise.However,astheadultsagreed,promisesarepromises,whethertheyarekept,broken,ortheoutcomeisunknown.Evenaninsincerepromiseis apromiseonlythespeakerknowsthatitisinsincere.Themostimportantfeatureofchildren'sconceptofpromising,distinguishingitfromthatofadults,isthattheydo notthinkofpromisingsimplyassomethingdonewithwordsforthemitisnotpromisingwithoutthepromisedperformance.Asoneparticularlyarticulate5yearold said,whenjustifyingherresponsethatthespeakerhadnotpromisedinastorywherethepromisewaslaterbroken,"Iknowwhatpromiseis,youtellthemyou'lldoit andyoudoit,that'sapromise....Youhavetodoitifit'sapromiseandifyoudon'tdoitit'snotapromise,it'sasortofjokebutit'snotaverynicejoke."

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Thisincompleteunderstandingwouldnotaffectchildren'sabilitytomakepromises,althoughitdoessuggestthattheymightexcusetheirownevenperhapsothers' lackofperformanceofapromisedactbysayingthattheydidn'tpromise.Childrenfromatleast5yearsofage(theyoungestagetested)canmakepromisesinan elicitedproductiontask,although5yearoldsareunlikelytousetheexplicitperformativeverbpromise(Astington,1988a). WhyDoesLanguageMatter? Insomecircumstances,wecananddoexpressandinterpretintentionnonlinguistically.Oneneedonlyshopinacountrywhereonedoesnotspeakthelanguage,or watchasilentmovie,orevenamoviewiththesoundturnedoff,forthistobecomeobvious.Weinferintentionsfromwhatpeopledoaswellasfromwhattheysay. Donaldson(1978)emphasizedtheimportanceofthisinearlychildhood"thechilddoesnotinterpretwordsinisolationheinterpretssituations"(p.88)butthis importancenodoubtcontinues.Suchconsiderationsleadtomyfinalquestion:Whydoeslanguagematterislanguagenecessary?Thatis,whatdoesitaddtothe behavioralexpressionandpreverbalunderstandingofintention?Aretheresomethingswecannotdowithoutlanguage(beyondmakingpicayunedistinctionsbetween purposelyanddeliberately)? Iwouldarguethatthethirdofthe"threeways"Ihavedescribedisimpossiblewithoutlanguage:thatis,intentionavowed,commitmentmade.Onecannotmakea promisewithoutlanguage.Inordertomakeacommitmenttoafutureactionthatanothercanrelyon,languageisnecessary:"Igiveyoumyword."Perhapsonemight argue,forexample,thatanexchangeofringsinamarriageceremonyiswordlessandaccomplishesthesameend.However,thisexchangeaccompaniestheverbal vows,andtheringsthemselvesaresymbolic,aslanguageis. Searle(1983)arguedthatintentionisselfreferential.Thatistosay,thesatisfactionconditionsofintentionrefertotheintention.Thepropositionalcontentofan intentionisnot[xhappens],noreven[Idox ],but[Idox inordertofulfillmyintention].Promisingissimilarlyselfreferentialthatis,Ihaveanobligationtoperform thepromisedactbecauseIsaidthatIwould.Suchselfreferencereferencetowhatissaidisimpossiblewithoutlanguage.Itisnotnecessarytousetheexplicit performativeverb,promise,inordertomakeapromise,butitisnecessarytouselanguage.IagreewithSearle(1969)that"Imayonlysay'I'lldoitforyou',butthat utterancewillcountasandwillbetakenasapromiseinanycontextwhereitisobviousthatinsayingitIamaccepting(orundertaking,etc.)anobligation"(p.63, emphasismine).IfitisnotobviousthatIamundertakinganobligation,I

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canmakeitsobyusingtheperformativeverbpromise.Thisisoftenthewaythetermisused,tomakecleartheextentofone'scommitment,forexample:"Iwilldoit." "Doyoupromise?""Sure." Austin(1962/1975)suggestedthatexplicitperformativesarelikelytocomelaterinthehistoryofalanguagethatis,"Iwill"wouldappearearlierthan"IpromisethatI will."Thisoccursindevelopmenttoochildrenuse"Iwill"tomakeacommitmentatayoungeragethantheyuse"Ipromise"(Astington,1988a).Austinsuggestedthat itiscomplexsocialinteractionthatrequiresexplicitness.Indeed,Rosaldo(1982)suggestedthatthereasonpromisingisnotfoundinlanguagessuchasIlongotmaybe becausemakingacommitmentthatanothercanrelyonisnotneededwhenone'sactionsaredeterminedbyone'spositioninthesocialhierarchy. Austinwentontoarguethatexplicitperformativesactuallycreatenewdistinctions:

Sophisticationanddevelopmentofsocialformsandprocedureswillnecessitateclarification.Butnotethatthisclarificationisasmuchacreativeactasadiscoveryordescription! Itisasmuchamatterofmakingcleardistinctionsasmakingalreadyexistentdistinctionsclear.(Austin,1962/1975,p.72)

Thatistosay,whenIusethetermpromise,asin"IpromiseIwill,"ImakeitclearthatthisisnotjustapredictionitismysincereintentionthatIamnowobligatedto carryout.Thedistinctionbetweenpredictingandpromisingisnotsomethingthatexistsandthatwedescriberather,itisonlypossibletomakethisdistinctionwhen we"dothingswithwords." Finallyandmoregenerally,Iwouldarguethateventhoughintentioncansometimesbeexpressedandinterpretednonlinguistically,afullydevelopedconceptof intentionisimpossiblewithoutlanguage.Ineverydayconversations,childrenhearlinguistictermsthatcharacterizeactionsasintended,premeditated,accidental,andso on.Theystarttoproducethesetermsinfamiliarcontexts,althoughtheymaynothaveafullunderstandingofthesametermsinexperimentaltestsoftheir comprehension.However,overtime,meaningwilldevelopfromuse,asNelson(1996)showedindetailforavarietyofsemanticfields.Thechild'sconceptof intentionisnotallornone.Itwilldevelopgraduallyandwillreflectandbereflectedinthelanguageofintention. Acknowledgments IthankPhilipD.Zelazoforhishelpfulcommentsonthischapter,andtheNaturalSciencesandEngineeringResearchCouncilofCanadaforitssupport.

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References Anscombe,G.E.M.(1957).Intention.Oxford,England:BasilBlackwell. Astington,J.W.(1986).Children'scomprehensionofexpressionsofintention.BritishJournalofDevelopmentalPsychology,4,4349. Astington,J.W.(1988a).Children'sproductionofcommissivespeechacts.JournalofChildLanguage,15,411423. Astington,J.W.(1988b).Children'sunderstandingofthespeechactofpromising.JournalofChildLanguage,15,157153. Astington,J.W.(1988c).Promises:Wordsordeeds?FirstLanguage,8,259270. Astington,J.W.(1990).Metapragmatics:Children'sconceptionofpromising.InG.ContiRamsden&C.Snow(Eds.),Children'sLanguage(pp.223244). Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Astington,J.W.(1991).Intentioninthechild'stheoryofmind.InD.Frye&C.Moore(Eds.),Children'stheoriesofmind(pp.157172).Hillsdale,NJ:Lawrence ErlbaumAssociates. Astington,J.W.(1993).Thechild'sdiscoveryofthemind.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Astington,J.W.(1996).Whatistheoreticalaboutthechild'stheoryofmind?AVygotskianviewofitsdevelopment.InP.Carruthers&P.K.Smith(Eds.),Theories oftheoriesofmind(pp.184199).Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Austin,J.L.(1946).Otherminds.ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,20.(ReprintedinPhilosophicalpapers,3rded.,pp.76116,J.O.Urmson&G.J. Warnock,Eds.,1979,Oxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress[pagerefs.aretothised.]) Austin,J.L.(1966).Threewaysofspillingink(L.W.Forguson,Ed.),PhilosophicalReview,75.(ReprintedinPhilosophicalpapers,3rded.,pp.272287,J.O. Urmson&G.J.Warnock,Eds.,1979,Oxford,England:OxfordUniversityPress[pagerefs.aretothised.]) Austin,J.L.(1975).Howtodothingswithwords(2nded.).Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.(Originalworkpublished1962) Bartsch,K.,&Wellman,H.M.(1995).ChildrentalkaboutthemindNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. Bratman,M.E.(1987).Intention,plans,andpracticalreason.Cambridge,MA:CambridgeUniversityPress. Brentano,F.(1960).Thedistinctionbetweenmentalandphysicalphenomena.InR.M.Chisholm(Ed.),Realismandthebackgroundofphenomenology(pp.39 61).NewYork:FreePress.(OriginalworkpublishedinGermanin1874) Bretherton,I.(1991).Intentionalcommunicationandthedevelopmentofanunderstandingofmind.InD.Frye&C.Moore(Eds.),Children'stheoriesofmind(pp. 4975).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Brown,J.R.,&Dunn,J.(1991).'Youcancry,mum':Thesocialanddevelopmentalimplicationsoftalkaboutinternalstates.BritishJournalofDevelopmental Psychology,9,237256. Brown,R.(1973).Afirstlanguage:Theearlystages.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Donaldson,M.(1978).Children'sminds.Glasgow:Fontana. Dunn,J.(1988).Thebeginningsofsocialunderstanding.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Dunn,J.(1991).Youngchildren'sunderstandingofotherpeople:Evidencefromobservationswithinthefamily.InD.Frye&C.Moore(Eds.),Children'stheoriesof mind(pp.97114).Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Dunn,J.,&Brown,J.R.(1993).Earlyconversationsaboutcausality:Content,pragmaticsanddevelopmentalchange.BritishJournalofDevelopmental Psychology,11,107123.

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Forguson,L.W.(1985).UnpublishedcommentaryonAstington,J.W.,1985,Children'sunderstandingofpromising.Unpublisheddoctoraldissertation, UniversityofToronto(OISE). Geach(1957).Mentalacts.London:Routledge&KeganPaul. Gee,J.,&Savasir,I.(1985).Ontheuseofwillandgonna:Towardadescriptionofactivitytypesforchildlanguage.DiscourseProcesses,8,143175. Halliday,M.A.K.(1970).Languagestructureandlanguagefunction.InJ.Lyons(Ed.),Newhorizonsinlinguistics(pp.140165).Harmondsworth,England: Penguin. Harris,P.L.(1991).Theworkoftheimagination.InA.Whiten(Ed.),Naturaltheoriesofmind:Evolution,developmentandsimulationofeveryday mindreading(pp.283304).Oxford,England:BasilBlackwell. Hood,L.,&Bloom,L.(1979).What,whenandhowaboutwhy:Alongitudinalstudyofearlyexpressionsofcausality.MonographsoftheSocietyforResearchin ChildDevelopment,44(6,SerialNo.181). Lee,E.(1995).Youngchildren'srepresentationalunderstandingofintention.Unpublisheddoctoraldissertation,UniversityofToronto(OISE). MacWhinney,B.,&Snow,C.(1990).TheChildLanguageDataExchangeSystem:Anupdate.JournalofChildLanguage,17,457472. Miller,G.A.,&JohnsonLaird,P.N.(1976).Languageandperception.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Montgomery,D.E.(1998,June).AWittgensteinianperspectiveonchildren'sacquisitionofmentalterms:Thecaseofintentions.Paperpresentedatthe AnnualMeetingoftheJeanPiagetSociety,Chicago,IL. Nelson,K.(1996).Languageincognitivedevelopment.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Piaget,J.(1977).Themoraljudgementofthechild.Harmondsworth,England:Penguin.(OriginalworkpublishedinFrenchin1932) Rosaldo,M.Z.(1982).Thethingswedowithwords:Ilongotspeechactsandspeechacttheoryinphilosophy.LanguageinSociety,11,203237. Ryle,G.(1963).Ordinarylanguage.InC.E.Caton(Ed.),Philosophyandordinarylanguage(pp.108127).Chicago:UniversityofIllinoisPress. Searle,J.R.(1969).Speechacts:Anessayinthephilosophyoflanguage.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Searle,J.R.(1983).Intentionality:Anessayinthephilosophyofmind.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Shultz,T.R.(1980).Developmentoftheconceptofintention.InW.A.Collins(Eds.),Minnesotasymposiumonchildpsychology(Vol.13,pp.131164). Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Snow,C.E.,Pan,B.A.,ImbemsBailey,A.,&Herman,J.(1996).Learningtosaywhatonemeans:Alongitudinalstudyofchildren'sspeechactuse.Social Development,5,5884. Wells,G.(1979).LearningandusingtheauxiliaryverbinEnglish.InV.Lee(Ed.),Languagedevelopment(pp.250270).London:CroomHelm.

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Chapter16 IntentionalityandInterpretation
CarolFleisherFeldman NewYorkUniversity Intentionalityisonefaceofatwopartcomplementaryprocess.Theotherfaceisinterpretation.Intheconstructionofeveryintentionalactorutterance,cultural patternsofinterpretationthatwillbenecessaryforcommunicationarealsoengaged.Everyspeakerisalsoattimesalistener.Althoughintentionalityisexpressedfor others,itisalsopersonal.Oneofthetwobasicconstituentsofintentionalityisapsychologicalmodethatpackagespersonalmeaningforpublicconsumption.The interpretiveexerciseisachallenge,requiringonetounderstandtheinnerlifeofanotherfrompublicexpression.Theformthatthisunderstandingtakes,atthefirststep, isassigninganintentiontoanactionorutterance.Lookingatintentionalitythisway,wecanseethattheremustbemanykindsofintentionalitybecausetherearesurely manykindsofpersonalmeaning,andmanykindsofinterpretations.Nevertheless,themanykindshaveanimportantstructuralcommonality,andtheyevensharea greatdealwithsimpleintentions. Intentionsarebeggingformorefocusedattention.Theyseemtobethecriterialfeaturethatdistinguisheshuman,oratleastanimate,actionfrommotioninthephysical world.Butwhatareintentions?Actsofmeaningordesiresandbeliefs?Orsimplydesires?Oraretheydispositionstoact?Andwhatistheirrelationshipto intentionality,amoreabstract,underlyingmentalattitudetowardtheworld'sobjects.Areintentionsnecessaryforintentionality? Thesameiseventruerofintentionality.Itseemsanessentialfeatureofhumans,anabilitytoorganizetheworld'sobjectsunderapointofview

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thatnophysical,orperhapsevenanimal,systemshares.Indeed,itseemssoessentialtohumansthatithasbeenidentifiedbysomeevolutionistsasthekeyelementof thegreatevolutionaryleaptohumankind.Butthesamepuzzleariseshere.Whatisintentionality?Isitastanceormentalattitudetowardamentalobject,towarda physicalobject,orwhat?Andwhatisrequiredtohaveamentalattitude,orwhatdoesintentionalityinvolvethatsimpleintentionslackabelief,orconsciousness,or what?Aresimpleintentionsthemerewanting(todo),whileintentionalitycanonlybeachievedwhenreasonis(perhapsalso)involved? Isthedifferencebetweensimpleintentionsandintentionalityamerematterofscopeintentiondistinguishes(human)physicalmotion,whereasintentionalityiswhat canmarkahumanbeingashumanevenatrest? Idonotresolvetheelusiveconnectionbetweenthesetwosystemsbydistinguishingbetweenthemmoresharply.Rathertheapproachhereistoputthembothintoa singlepotofintention/intentionality,andthentrytoanalyzethat.Foronethingisplain:Intentionandintentionalityhaveagooddealincommonbothdistinguishthe humanfromthephysicalworldinsomeway.Ratherthandisentanglethem,inthischapter,Iconsiderthecommonuniverseofintentionsandintentionality.Mymain pointistheunsurprisingonethattheintention/intentionaluniversecontainsavastnumberofinterestinglydifferentkindsofevents.Alltheseeventshaveafurther singularproperty:Correspondingtoeverykindofintention/intentionality,thereisakindofinterpretationthatisessentialtoit,asIexplain. Everykindofintention/intentionalityreflectstwosystems,oneintellectualandtheothersocial.Inreallife,expressedintention,whetherthesimpleintentionsofaction, orthemoreheadyintentionalityofintentionalactionorevenintentionalutterance,carriesbothpersonalmeaningandsocialmeaning.Thegeniusofthe "intention/intentionalityinterpretation"systemisthatitallowsboththepersonalandthesocialtobefullyrepresentedinasinglesignal.Themanneroftheexpression ofthepersonal,withinthissystem,becomescanonicalenoughtobecommunicableandpartofthecoinoffriendshipandconnectionwithothers,andyet,somehow, managesnottolosecontactwiththepersonalidiosyncraciesthatcomposeourideasaboutself.Thismiracle,throughwhichpersonalintentionisgivensocially accessibleexpression,iswhatmakeshumanlifeingroupsasweknowitpossible,withthesocialmeetingofminds. Thecommunicabilityofintentionsisafunctionofacomplementaryprocessofinterpretationthatistwinnedtoeveryintention.Interpretationisessentialtointentionsfor aspecialreason:Inmostcasesneithertheintentionofactionnortheintentionalityofwhatmightbeaction,inaction,orutteranceareexplicitlyexpressedinthem,nor therefore,directlyobservable.Theyhavetobearrivedatbythe"observer"viaaninferential

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processthatisunderthecontrolofatheorytheobserverhasinmind(whichis,ofcourse,atheoryaboutwhattheobservedotherhasinmind,andthereforeisitself intentional,aswellasbeingmetamental).Thetheorytheobserverhasinmindmustbeaninterpretivetheorythatrelatesthemyriadintentionsandintentionality commonineverydaylifetotheirpatternsofexpressioninvariouscontexts.And,asitispartofcommonculturalcoin,itisatheoryalsoknowntotheobserved person.Theycollaborate.Theactor/interpreteractsinafashionconsistentwiththeaction/interpretationpatternknownalsobytheobserver.Thetwoactionand interpretationarethuscoordinatedineveryindividualactionandinterpretation,andthisishowactorandinterpreterareabletocompetentlyperformtheirseparate rolesatanyparticularmoment. Indeed,Anscombe(1958)definesintentionalactionsintermsoftheprocessesofcomprehensiontheygiveriseto.Forher,"intentionalactionsareactionstowhicha certainsenseofthequestion'why?'hasapplication"(p.11).ForAnscombe,toseektounderstandtheintentionsofothersistoassumethattheiractionshave meaning,andmakeanefforttodiscoverit.Tosucceedinthiseffortaftermeaningistointerprettheotherperson'sactionscorrectlynamely,toidentifytheright intention(s)behindthem. Analysesoftheconceptofintentionandintentionalityhaveappearedinthetheoreticalworkofnearlyallthemajorpsychologistsworkingonthetopicoftheoryof mind,andseveralphilosophershavegiventhematterseriousattention,perhapsmostnotablyJohnSearleinhisbook,Intentionality.Searle(1983)beganwith Brentano,whofirstformulatedtheideaofintentionalityintheformweknowitintoday.Brentano(quotedinEdwards,1967)wrote:
Everymentalphenomenon...includessomethingasanobjectwithinitself,althoughnotalwaysinthesameway.Inpresentationsomethingispresented,injudgmentsomething isaffirmedordenied...indesiresomethingisdesired,etc.This...isexclusivelycharacteristicofmentalphenomena.Nophysicalphenomenonmanifestsanythingsimilar.(p. 201)

SometimeafterBrentano'sfirstformulationin1874,theconceptofintentionalityceasedforaperiodtobeimportanttoapsychologytheninthegripofbehaviorism. Butithascomebackwithforceinthelastdecade,propelledbythenewliteratureontheoryofmind.Therearecurrentlyseveraldifferentversionsofintentionand intentionalitywithinthisliterature,andnocanonicalversion.ButIbelievethatthisstateofaffairsisnotperniciouspartlybecausethemanyviewsofintention(andof intentionality)arenotmutuallyexclusive,althoughtheymaycollideondetails.Tomeitseemsthattheylargelyshareafamilyresemblance. Letmelistideasaboutsimpleintentionsfirst:

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1.Allactionsexpressorcontainintentions. 2.Intentionsaredispositionstoact. 3.Intentionsaredesiresinaction,butneednotinvolveabelief. 4.Intentionsarestatesofdesireplusbeliefbecausethebeliefthatthedesirecouldberealizedinacertainwayintheoccurringconditionsisnecessarytoconvetta simpledesireintoadispositiontoact. 5.Intentionscantaketheformofanintentioninaction,or,moregrandly,anaprioriintention,inwhichcasetheymaybeconscious,too. 6.Intentionsaremeaningsinthespecialsensethattheyarethemeaningofanaction,oritsinterpretation. 7.Intentionsmaybeexpressedinspeech. NextIdiscussintentionality.Somenotionsofintentionalityare: 1.Theytaketheformofan"aboutness."By"aboutness"weusuallymeanthatsomementalstateisdirectedatsomethingelse,usuallyanobjectinthemind.Butit mightalso,orevenalternatively,bethat 2.Thementalstateisdirectedtoarealthinginthenaiverealworld,aversionpreferredbymanyofthenewbreedofphilosophersinterestedin"cognitivescience." 3.Athirdnotion,closelyrelatedtothefirsttwo,saysthatwhateveritisabout,everyintentionaleventmustcontainapsychologicalcomponentthatisaboutsomething, andaboutitinaspecialwaythatissomethinglikeahierarchicalinclusion,orperhapsbetter,afunctionoveranargument. 4.Afourthnotionrequiresahighlevelofsophisticationinthepsychologicalcomponent,particularlythatitmustincludeagooddealofrealworldknowledgeabout peopleespecially. 5.Afifthsaysthattrueintentionalitycannotbeexpressedwithoutlanguage,perhapsnotwithoutcomplexutterancescontaining(atleast)apropositionalattitudeanda proposition. Forbothsimpleintentionsandforintentionality,thenatureofthebeastisnotclear,ornotunique.Inbothcases,therearesomeseriousdiscrepanciesamongthe claimsenumeratedhere.IndeedIhavetriedtopointtosomeofthemwithinthelistabove.Andthereare,nodoubt,difficultiesthatcouldfollowfromthis.ButagainI donotfocusonthediscrepanciesanddifferences.Rather,myplanistobeinclusive,consideringthattheremaybeusefulrichesinthebrew.Thereisagoodpossibility thatdependingonhowonecomesatit,andwhatphenomenaonehas

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inmind,onemaytendtoemphasizesometheoreticalaspectsratherthanothers,whichmayleadoneinturntogenerateoneversionoftheintention/intentionalityrather thananother.Forexample,thereissurelyaplaceforintentionsinactionandintentionsinutterance,formeaninginintentionalityaswellasintention,andperhapseven forintentionalitytowardphysicalobjectsaswellasmental,althoughforpsychologyitwouldseemthatthementalobjectisthemorebasicofthetwo.(Butwould,for example,shoutingatabrokentelevisionworkasanexampleofanintentionalitytowardthingsthatbypassedthemoreusualmentalobject?)Inanycase,thereisa gooddealofdiversityamongobservedformsofintentions/intentionality,andsomemayberelatedtotheseseemingdiscrepancies.Betterforthemomenttobe inclusive,foriftheintention/intentionalitysystemissomehowessentialtohumanness,therecouldbeasmanywaysofintendingastherearewaysofbeinghumaninthe world. Moreover,therearesomeimportantareasofagreement.HereistheundisputedcoreasIseeit:Withrespecttointentionality,allviewsagreethatitiscomposedofa specialtwopartunitthatcontainsbothaperson'sattitudesandapieceoftheworldtowardwhichtheseattitudesaredirectedorthattheyare"about."Thisspecial unitbothlooksintothemindandouttotheworld,andlinksthemtogetherviasuchsimpleintentionsasdirectednessofthementalstatetosomethingelse.Thus,simple intentionsarebasictointentionality.Furthermore,thisspecialhybridunitcomposedofalinkageofworldandmindcanbeunexpressedorexpressed,andif expressed,expressedbothinactionandinspeechandothersymbolicsystems,whereitsexpressionismoreelaboratedandsoitsworkingsareperhapseasiertosee. Schematically,wecanrepresentthisbasicpatternasageneralcaseinwhicheachelementisnamedwiththemostneutraltermIcouldfindforit(seeFig.16.1).A genericnotioncalled"intentionalevents"isdecomposedintogenericparts.Intentionaleventsalwaysincludeapersonwhohasapsychologicalmoderangingover contents,apsychologicalmode,andthecontentsofit.Thepsychologicalmodeisarelationofthepersontothecontents.Boththepsychologicalmodeandthe contentscanvaryin

Fig.16.1. Genericintentionalityandthreeintentionalsystems.

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interestingways,anditisfromtheircombinatorialthattherangeofintentionaleventsisgenerated. BelowthegeneralcaseinFig.16.1arelistedthreemorespecificformsofintentionality:theintentioninthehead,theintentioninaction,andtheintentiongiven symbolicexpressionusingspeechorother,sayvisual,symbolicsystems.Theessentialrequirementoftheexpressivesystemisthatitbesharedbyaninterpretive community,aninsightIowetoDavidOlson(1994).Ireturntothesespecificintentionalsystemsinamoment. Next,thechartproceedstodecomposethegenericnotionofintentional''event"intoitsthreemainsubtypes:states(internalevents),acts(eventsexpressed behaviorally),andspeech(eventsexpressedinwords).Thesethreearemeanttocapturethepossibilitiesfortheformofexpressionofintentionalityineverydaylife, theirformofpackagingforthesocialotherwhowillprovidethecomplementaryinterpretation.Thepackagingrangesfromnoovertindicationofintentionality(states), toanovertindication(inaction)thattheremustbeanintentionalstate,tofinallythedefiniteindicationofintentionalityinutterance.Theyrangethereforeinhow definitelytheyindicatetheexistenceofanintentionalstatenearby. Thematterofwhatspecificintentionalstatethatis,andhowexplicitlyitisexpressed,isasomewhatseparatematter,forevenwhenintentionalityisexpressedin utterance,thereisarangeofexplicitness,andthefurtherprojectofdeterminingwhatspecificintentionalityisinvolvedcanbeamajorone.Nevertheless,ingeneral thereisaroughrelationbetweenovertnessofmarkingofIntentionalityandexplicitnessoftheintentionalmode.Ingeneral,actionsaremoreexplicitthanmerestates, andspeechmoreexplicitthanacts.Withlanguagecomesthepossibilityofaprecisespecificationofthementalmodes(whichhasfurtherconsequenceswereturnto lateritmayinviteagreaterprecisioninthoughtaswell,andmayalsohaveconsequencesforopeninguptherangeofpossiblecontents).Thus,bychance,the schemecorrespondsroughlytolevelofexplicitnessaswellasofovertness.Butthatisanaccidentresultingfromtheloosecorrelationbetweenovertnessofmarking andexplicitness.Thelevelsaremeanttobelevelsofovertnessofmarking. Letusreturnnowtothegenericpattern,andconsideritscomponents:psychologicalmode,andcontents.Thesetwocomponentscanbeusedtogenerateagood manydifferentkindsofintentionality,evenifwedonottakelevelintoaccount.Turningtocontentsforamoment,wecantrytogetsomenotionoftherangeof possiblekindsofcontents.Somecommonkindsarequotidiancontents,orpropositionsabouteverydaylifeprofessionalcontentsspecializedtoeachwork communitytranscendentalcontentsofthekindfoundinreligionsfantasticcontents,asinstoriesaboutouterspaceandfinallymetacontents,whichcontainan intentionaleventascontents.Perhapseachkindofcontentcontributesitsdistinctivecharactertoa

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distinctkindofintentionalitycorrespondingtoit(as,perhaps,doeseachpsychologicalmode). Overthevariouskindsofcontentsrangedifferentkindsofpsychologicalmodesforperceivingthem:wishes,hopes,doubts,denials,affirmations,andbeliefs,among them.Thepresenceofsomepsychologicalmodeisnormallypartofintentionality.Nevertheless,sometimesnorealmentalstatecanbefoundinthepositionreserved forone,asinthecaseofanullintention.Oneimportantcaseofnullintentionsoccurswhenanagentwantstodenyresponsibilityforanactiontheyperformed"I feltlikeIdidnotapply,butratherthatIwasrecruited."Thecaseofthenullpsychologicalmode,whichIsupposeservesasaplaceholderthatmakesthewhole expressioncomeoffasintentionalinasense,isneverthelessveryodd.Whatmakesitodd,Ithink,isthatintentionalityisnormallyasmuchpartofalargerprojectof selfconstructionasitispartofanactofcommunication.Withanullmode,theheartgoesoutoftheselfmakingproject,evenifthecommunicationalgoalisstill satisfied. Inprinciple,anypsychologicalmodecanbepairedwithanykindofcontent,butcertainrelationsbetweenmodesandcontentwillseemmorenaturalthanothers.This isboundtovaryacrossculturesandpersons,andperhapseventimesandsocialcontext,buttheremaybesomepatterntoitallthesame.Attheveryleast,certain pairingsmayachievecanonicalitywithinasocialgroup,andothersmaycometobeseenasbizarre.Thecanonicalcouldelicitapprovalandsolidifyhumanconnections withinthegroup,or,andthiscouldoccurevenwithinthegroup,itcouldcometobeseenasbanal.Andsuchcanonicalpairingscouldserveasmarkersofoutsider statuswhenthepersoniswithpeopleoutsidehisgroup,ifthecanonicalpairingsofhisowngroupareapartofgeneralculturalknowledge. Somesettingsrequirecanonicalpairings,andinnovationscouldbeseenasirreverentorrejecting.Othersettingsmayinviteinnovation,andseethemascreativeor brilliant.Partofourstandardculturalknowledgeisknowingwhatkindofsituationoneisinonerequiringconformityornot.Ifitdoes,weshouldeitherknowwhat thesitution'scanonicalpairingsare(sothatifweviolatethemcanwedosoknowingly)orkeepquiet.Andifitdoesnot,wehadbestavoidtoomuchcanonicalityat theriskofseemingbanal,oreveninauthentic. Somepersonsmaytendtothecanonicalortheanticanonical,orevenuncanonical,andmanypeoplemaytendtowardasinglepairingofmodeandcontentinsome fewareas.Thiscanbeveryrigidornarrowindeed,whenapersoncanonlythinkofcertaincontentsunderasinglementalstate,oracertainmentalstatealways activatesthesamecontents."Ifitfillsmewithawe,itmustbefromVenice."Althoughsuchgeneraltendenciesofaperson,alongwithanyspecificpairingsofmode andcontentdistinctivetothem,maybemoreorlesssuccessfulfromacommunicational

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pointofview,theyareveryimportantindiciaoftheself.Theseselectionsofgeneralstyleandspecificquirkareimportanttoolsintheworkofselfmakingandself presentation. Inotedabovethatthemodesmaybemerelystates,ortheymaybeexpressedeitherbyacts,orbyutterance.Onemayhaveapsychologicalattitudethatisamere stateofbeing,onethatisnotexpressedinactionorspeechatthatmoment,oreven,perhaps,atanytimeatall.Iassumethatsuchmentalattitudesunderlieor accompanymostexpressionsofmentalattitude,whetherinactionorspeech,andthattheyarebasic.Andyetbothformsofexpression,actionandspeech,probably contributesomethingtotheindividuationanddefinitionofsuchstates,somethingthatdevelopstheunexpressedstateintoamorespecificmode.Bothactionand languagearesystemswithpatternsoftheirown.Oncedecisionsaremadeabouthowsuchastateistobeexpressedinsuchapattern,acertainspecificityis introducedthatmayactuallyaddsomethingtothelatentmeaning.Thislineofreasoningleadstotheconclusionthatalthoughtheunexpressedstatemaybethemost basicformofthepsychologicalconstituentofintentionality,theirfullexpressioninspeechmaybethemostfullyrealizedformofthepsychologicalmodes.Accordingly, inconsideringthepsychologicalmodes,itmaymakesensetojumptwolevelstotheexpressionofpsychologicalmodeinutterance,andseewhatthevarietyof utterancetypesmaycontributetothemanykindnessofintentionality. Ishouldalsonotethatnotallcontentsseemtobepossibleatalllevelseither.Forexample,quotidiancontentsseemparticularlysuitableforaction,whereas metacontentseemsparticularlyunsuitableforit.Butnotallnonquotidiancontentsrequirelanguage,andsomemaybeverytiedtoaction.Forexample,transcendental contentsmaybeparticularlytiedtotheactionofwordlessprayerormeditation,andmeditationmayinvolvemetacontentsaswell,evenifmetacontentsseemgenerally moresuitedtospeechthanaction.Andprofessionalcontentsmightbeblueprints,orevenimagesofblueprintsinthemind.Thereisnomatchofabstractnessof contenttolevel,buttherearedefinitesignsthatcontentsandlevelmustbesuitablypaired.Incontrast,themodesseemtohavetheirfullestrealizationinspeech. Asnotedearlier,psychologicalmodesmaybenamedbyanintentionalutteranceortheymaymerelybehintedat.Forexample,wecandoubtbysayingso,orby utteringadeclarativesentenceinacertaincontextandtoneofvoice.Wecansayweregretthesmallsizeoftheportionorwecanspeakofitsonlyhavingbeena smallportion.Elsewhere(Feldman,1974),IdescribedacontinuumofexplicitnessinintentionalexpressionsinEnglishthatbeginswithsimpleemphaticstress,and movesontosuchsyntacticdevicesasclefting,thatforegroundsapropositionalelement,e.g.,"ItwasJohnwhomarriedMary,"or"ItwasMarywhoJohnmarried," ascleftedversionsof"JohnmarriedMary."Inthesecases,althoughweknow

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thespeakerwasmakingapointofthecleftedelement,westilldon'tknowwhatshehadinmindtosayaboutit.Fromthere,withincreasingexplicitness,wegotothe intentionaladverbialseven,only,just,andstill.Thenwegotothemodalverbsbeforewereachlexicalizedreportsofmentalstatesuchasthepropositionalattitudes. Implicitexpressionsofpsychologicalmodetellthehearerthatthereisanintentionaroundsomewhere,buttheydonotsaywhatitis.Themoreimplicittheform,the moreitinvites,evenrequires,interpretationtocompleteit.Thus,thepainterMarcelDuchamp,tryingtogetawayfromwhathecalled"retinal"artthatappealstothe eyebutleavesnothingforthemindtodo(Dorment,1997),titledhismasterwork(TheLargeGlass),"TheBrideStrippedBarebyHerBachelors,Even[myitalics]." Implicitintentionsareprobablythenormalformofintentionalexpression.For,infact,fullylexicalizedexpressionsofintentiondonotleaveroomforwhatItaketobe theinterpretivequerybasictotheintentionaldomainnamely,"Whydidhedo(orsay)that?"wheretheanswerisanintentionalstatesuchasawish,hope,orbelief. Althoughofcoursewecangoon,onceabasicintentionisinhand,toask"why"aboutthattooe.g.''Whydoeshehopethat?"this"why"seemstomeless fundamental.Indeed,itsanswermaybeofadifferentkind,notapsychologicalmodebut,forexample,conditionsofchildhoodasinpsychoanalyticexplanation,oran appealtorealworldconstraints.Moreover,thevirtueofimplicitpsychologicalmodesarethattheyprotectthespeakeragainsttoomuchselfexposuretoalistener whomayturnouttobeunsympathetic. Themannerofsymbolizinggivesrisetoafewmoreintentionalkinds.Whenintentionalityisencodedinasymbolicsystem,intentionscanbeexpressedbyspeakers literallyontheonehand,ormetaphorically,mockingly,orironicallyontheother.Moreover,theycanbeofferedearnestlyorformulaically,givingrisetothe (nonpernicious)pseudointentionsofritualgreetings. Thebasicschemawouldkeepaninterpreterbusyenough,butinfactinterpretationsseldomarerestrictedtooneactionoronestatementpackages,fortheverygood reasonthatunderstandinganysingleintentionisoftenhelpedbyconsideringtheactionorspeechoccurringbeforeandevenafterit.Wecannotaffordnottointerpret eachindividualactionorutterancetodiscoveritsintention,butequally,wecannotavoidconsideringotherintentionalactsorutterancesarounditandhowourtarget actionorutterancemayfitintotheseriesformedbythem.Takingthisseriesintoaccountinvitesustoconstructlargerinterpretationsthatconsiderseriesofintentions, andthemeansbywhichonefollowsanothertheands,buts,ors,thens,andneverthelessesofnarrative.Theinterpretationofsuchsequencesofintentionsoften risestothelevelofnarrative,amatterIcannottakeuphere,excepttonotethatinnarrativethecomplexintentionsare

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puttogetherinapatternedway.These,then,couldleadtoaninterpretationintermsofanotherintentionalkindthatcouldbecalledpatternedintentions,oreven, narrativeintentions. Interpretationoflargerunitsreliesveryheavilyonculture.Itdoesnotbeginuntiltheinterpreterembracestheintendingagentasamemberofafamiliarcultural community.Thenitproceedstoinfertherightintentionbymakinguseofculturalknowledgeofallkinds:whatpeopleofvariouskindsarelike,howsituationsaffect them,whatitfeelsliketoberelatedtodifferentkindsofcontents,andhow,intheirculture,thesevariousconsiderationsareputtogetherintothecoherentwholesof theculture,whichiswherestandardstoriesandstorygenrescomeinascrucialinterpretiveequipment,creatingsuchpossibilitiesasfictional,realistic,and autobiographicalintentionality. Inthischapter,Ihaveexploredmanyintentionalkindsthatderivedfrommyproposedschema.Inaddition,Ihavepointedtotheabsoluteessentialnessof considerationsaboutinterpretationforanunderstandingofintention.Ihavetriedtoshowthatdistinguishingamongkindsofintentionsrequiresbringingin considerationsaboutthekindsofinterpretiveprocessesthatcompleteeachofthedistinctintentionalstates. Thebasicschemaofintentionaleventsisthattheyarecomposedofapersonandoftheperson'smentalstateaboutsomething.Therelationbetweenthepersonand thecontents,thepsychologicalmode,isthefirstconstituentthecontentsarethesecond.Thetwotogetherconstituteanintentionalevent.Ifanintentionaleventis madepublicinintentionalactsorinintentionalspeech,anobservercantrytoexplainthewhyofitbyinterpretation.Thismightinvolvedecomposingitintothesame constituentsfromwhichitwasconstitutedinthefirstplace:psychologicalmode,andcontents.Thepersonwillberecruitedintheactofinterpretationaswell,by specifyingtheculturaluniverseinwhichthepsychologicalmodeandcontentsarefound. Inotethatinterpretationisdonebyapersonwhoneednotbeaninterlocutor,butcanmerelybeanunengagedobserver,canevenbetheself,usuallyinasettingin whichthetwopersonstheintenderandtheinterpreteraresomehowconnected,whetheratabasiclevelbysharingaspace,or,morecommonly,bybeing membersofaculturalcommunity. Interpretationisseeneverywhereintentionsarefound.Thereisnothingfancyaboutit.ConsiderMenzel's(1974)chimpsfollowingeachother,evenheadingeach other,onthewaytofood.Thesearesurelyinterpretationsofacts,interpretationsthattaketheformofattributingfoodgettingintentions,interpretationsthattakeplace evenintheabsenceofaconstructedculturalframework.Whatstandsinforculturehere?Perhapsitisthesharedecologicalframeworkwhoseaffordancesforsurvival arematchedbysharedintention.

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Suchprimitiveinterpretationscanalsoariseforhumans.Forexample,whenagroupofstrangersfindthemselvestrappedinlimitedspacewithscarceresources,itis easytoseethemeachasprincipallyoccupiedwithhisorherownresourcecollectingintentions,andthegroupasawholedefinedprincipallybyaclashofcompeting individualintentionstogettheresources.Everyonesharesasinglepsychologicalmodeonlythecontentswoulddiffer,andeventhesewouldbelargelyoverlapping. Underpressure,theconditionsmaydetermineintentionalstatestosuchanextentthatindividualdifferencesintheplayofmindareoverwhelmed.Primitiveintentions likethesearecompletedbyprimitiveinterpretations.Interpretationherewouldbelimitedtodiscoveringforeachpersonpreciselywhatresourcestheyaretryingto get,ortheirpreciseintentionalobject,everyone'smodesbeingalikeanddictatedbytheconditions.Theexperienceofalossofselfandhumanityunderdesperate conditionsmustbetiedupwiththis. Moreofteninhumanaffairs,bothintentionsandtheirinterpretationsareverycomplex,drawingonvastpoolsofcommonculturalknowledge.Thementalprocesses involved,evenforquotidianintentions,canbeverydemanding,perhapsfarmoredifficultthanthosecalledforineverydayscientificthinking,forexample.Thismay haveinparttodowiththeartistryrequiredtorecruitasuitablepoolofbackgroundknowledgeformakinganinterpretation,ataskmadeessentialwhenthe psychologicalmodeisnotexpressedexplicitly,asisoftenthecase.Thelexicalizedpropositionalattitudesarethemostexplicitexpressionofagoodmany psychologicalmodesthatoften,perhapsevenusually,haveother,lessexplicitformsofexpression. Thesepropertiestheartistryofinterpretationandimplicitnesstendtomakeinterpretationahardproject,andyeteventually,asamongexperts,interpretationcan attaintheclarityoflegalreasoningandliterarycriticism.Therefore,itshouldnotbesurprisingthatittakesawhileforthedevelopingchildtolearnhowtodoit.But whatthislateonsetmaynottakesufficientlyintoaccountisthepotentialforfurthergrowthininterpretivethinking.Ifevertherewasagoodcandidateforsignificant cognitivegrowthacrossalifetime,thiswouldbeit. Acknowledgments IamgratefultotheSpencerFoundationforitssupportofthisworkthroughitsgranttoJeromeBruner,"MeaningMakinginContext."ImadeextensiveuseofJohn Searle'sanalysisofintentionalityinhisbookofthattitle,ofJeromeBruner'sworkonformscognitionthatincludeinterpretivethinking,andofDavidOlson'sinsights abouttheimportanceofaninterpretivecommunity.IfIhavecontributedanythinghere,itisbecauseIwasstandingonthebacksofgiants.

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References Anscombe,G.E.M.(1958).Intention.Oxford:BasilBlackwell. Dorment,R.(1997,April4).Strippedbareatlast:Wit,intelligence,desire,thetruelegacyofMarcelDuchamp.TimesLiterarySupplement,pp.34. Edwards,P.(Ed.).(1967).TheEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Vol.4).NewYork:Macmillan. Feldman,C.(1974).Pragmaticfeaturesofnaturallanguage.InM.LaGaly,R.Fox,&A.Bruck(Eds.),PapersfromtheTenthRegionalMeetingoftheChicago LinguisticSociety(pp.151160).Chicago:ChicagoLinguisticSociety. Menzel,E.(1974).Agroupofyoungchimpanzeesinaoneacrefield.InM.Schrier&F.Stolnitz(Eds.),Behaviorofnonhumanprimates(Vol.5).NewYork: AcademicPress. Olson,D.R.(1994).Theworldonpaper.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Searle,J.R.(1983).Intentionality.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress.

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Chapter17 TheIntentionalityofReferring
JeromeBruner NewYorkUniversity Whenonespeaksoftheintentionalityofsomesignorsymbol,oneusuallyhasinmindthemannerinwhichit"standsfor"somethingelse,asinthePeircean distinctionsamongindexes,icons,andsymbols(Peirce,19471962).Iexamine,rather,theintentioninherentinactsofindicating:howsomebodycommunicatesto anotherpersonthatthereissomethingparticularatthefocusofhisattentionthathewishestobringtotheattentionofthatotherperson,inreturnforwhichhewants someindicationthattheotherhas,asitwere,"gotthemessage."Onthisaccount,thesendermust(a)indicatethatheisseekingtodrawanother'sattentionto something,(b)indicatewhatitisthatheistryingtodrawanother'sattentionto,(c)receivesomesignwhetherhehassucceededornot,and(d)ifnot,figureoutwith orwithouttheother'shelpwhatfurtherstepsneedtobetaken. Forthehighlysocializedhumanadult,thisfourpartacttypicallybecomessoroutinizedthatwetakeitforgranted,likewalkingorusingthephone.Worsestill,wemay evenimaginethatitissimply"innate,"therebyobscuringthesupportconditionsthatbringittofruitionandsustainit,ignoringthetechnicalvirtuosityinvolvedin masteringandusingsignsandsymbolsinouractsofcommunicatingwithothers.Becausemyownconcerniswiththedevelopmentofactsofreferring,Iconcentrate onhowthisfourpartact,asI'vecalledit,developsinconcordancewithotherfeaturesofhumandevelopment. Itisonlywhenwederoutinizeactsofindicatingorreferencingbyunbalancingtheaccessibilityofinformationavailabletoparticipantsina

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referentialexchange(e.g.,Clark,1992,chap.4),orbylettingyoungchildrenmanageitontheirown,or(evenmorerevealing)bysettingupseeminglyeasyreferring tasksforhigherapes(Crawford,1937SavageRumbaughetal.,1993)thatwerealizehowcontingent,fragile,andcollaborativeactsofindicatingare.Alas,the philosopher'spristineaccountofsigns,significates,andinterpretantscontainsnofrustratedpeopletryingvainlytomaketheirindicatingintentoritsobjectclear,nor doesitdealwithoddtargetdomainsfromwhichreferencedobjectsmustbeselected.Itisfreeofmessypolysemyandpuzzlingcontextstobe"read."Suchaccounts havealtogethertoolittletosayabouthowordinarymortalsbringoffameetingofmindsunderordinaryconditions.Peirce(19471962)madeanefforttodealwiththe problembyinvokinganinterpretantasmediatingbetweenasignanditsreferent,buthisaccountofitleavestoomuchunderspecifiedforapsychologist'sneeds. Thestruggletosharewithanotherwhatonehasinmind,howoneconstructsandcommunicatesone'sinterpretant,beginsearly.Evenveryyoungchildrenaresensitive inconversationalexchangestoanadult's"What?"questions(Feldman,1996Kasermann&Foppa,1982),respondingtothemwithexpansionsoftheirutterances,as ifappreciativeoftheirinterlocutor'sdifficulties.Theyseemtobesensitivetoaproblemdomainandhavesomeearlyintuitionsabouthowtocopewithit.Sotoowith thedistinctionbetweenwhatissaidandwhatismeant:Althoughthegeneraldistinctionisearlygrasped(andearlyexploitedpragmatically!),itsparticularsnevercease posingaproblemininterpretation,evenwithrespecttowhatthespeakerisreferringto.Griceanimplicatures,subtleuseofcontext,evenordinaryellipsisturnthe referringproblemintosomethingmorecomplicatedand"psychologistic"thanstandardtextbookaccounts.Iproceedwiththeconviction,then,thatforapsychologistit isprobablybettertotreattheintentiontoreferandtheactofreferringasrathermoremysteriousthanitiscommonlytakentobe. TheBeginnings Letmebeginwiththeontogenyofthematter.Fromaverytenderage,humanbeingsseem"motivated"tobringthingsatthefocusoftheirexperiencetotheattention ofothers.Attheoutsettheyseemtodosowithoutwantingtodoanythingfurtheraboutitthantoachievesomemutualityofawareness.Thismutualityofawareness, thisprimitiveintersubjectivity,seemstoprecede(andtobeanecessaryconditionfor)morespecificreferentialacts. Earlyindicatingtakesavarietyofforms.Theyounginfantveryearlyonusesreachingandgraspingmovementstosignalanobjectofdesiretohis

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orhercaretakereventosignaldesireitself.Andwhensomedesiredobjecthasacanonicallocus(likefruitjuiceinthefridge),aninfantmayreachimportunately towardthatcanonicallocuswithappropriatevocalization.Butaroundthesametimethatordinary"demand"gesturingappears,infantsalsoshowsignsofwantingto shareattentionwithanotherjust,asitwere,foritsownsakeandwithnodiscernibleextrinsicmotive. Suchselfsustainedreferencingisstrikinglyexemplifiedinwhatpsychologistshavecometocalljointattention(Moore&Dunham,1995):Infantandcaregiverlook jointlyatacommonobject,thenlookbacktoeachothereyetoeyewithevidentenjoyment.Itmayevenbe,assomeargue(e.g.,Brazelton&Als,1979),thatsuch sharedawarenessofthingsintheworldrequiresdirecteyetoeyecontactasaprecursor.Forbothmotherandinfantseeminitiallytoderivegreatpleasurefromjust lookingdirectlyintoeachother'seyes(Stern,1985).Indeed,iftheadultofthepairfailstoreciprocateinsuchanexchange,thechildmaybecomeacutelydistressed (Stechler&Latz,1966).Andsodotheparentsofautisticchildrenwhenthelatterfailtoreciprocatetoeffortstomakeeyetoeyecontact. Butoncenormaleyetoeyecontactisestablishedintheopeningmonthsofthechild'slife,itsoonbecomeselaboratedtoincludea"thirdobject."Typically,themother introducesanobjectclosetothemutuallineofregard,makessomeconventionalattentiongettingvocalization(Fernald,1989,1991),andturnstotheobjectin question.Thechildfollowsthemother'slineofregardtotheobject,thetwolookingatitinunison,afterwhichtheyresumedirecteyetoeyecontactwithseemingly reneweddelight(David&Appell,1961).Stern's(1985)expressionforsuchboutsofsharing,attunement,seemswellchosen. Bythefourthorfifthmonth,thechildisabletotrackanadult'slineofregardwithoutpriorpriminginaneyetoeyeformat.IntheScaifeandBruner(1975)study,for example,thechildsitsfacinganexperimenterwhoexclaims(with"marking"intonation),"Ohlook!"andthereuponturnstoanobject.Farinexcessofchance,even6 montholdsturninthatdirectiontosearchforavisualtarget.Iftheyfailtofindone,moreover,theyoftenturnbacktoinspecttheadult'sgazedirectionagain (Butterworth&Jarrett,1991).Gazefollowingincreasessteadilyoverthefollowingmonths.Butnotethatitisstillacomprehensionratherthanaproductionskill:They arereliablegazefollowersbeforetheypointforthefirsttime,eventhoughtheyalreadyusedirectionalreachingtoindicateobjectsofdesire. Ataround7to9months,thechildfinallybeginspointingtobringobjectsoreventstoanother'sattention.Pointingisaveryspecialgesture,notremotelylikereaching inordertosignaladesiredobject.Itisspecifictoourspecies.Itseemsintendednotonlytobringsomethingtoanother'sattentionbutalso,asitwere,tomarkitas nonordinaryinsomeway.Icanillustratethislastmatterbyachild'sfirstobservedactofpointingthatwe

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werefortunateenoughtocatchonvideo.Richard,whosecommunicativedevelopmentmyassistantandI(Bruner,1983)hadbeenfollowingalmostweeklysincehis sixthmonth,wasnowintohiseightmonthandoffwithhisfamilyonasummerholidayinthecountry.Hisfirstfullfledgedpoint,quitean"excited"one,wastowarda smallflockofbirdsflushedupashewastoddlingaboutasmallfieldadjacenttothesummercottagewherehewasstaying.Hispointing(ifImaybepermittedsome "thickinterpretation")seemedasmuchjubilantascommunicative.Hefolloweditimmediatelywithatwicerepeatedvocalization,"Burrburr,"lookingdirectlyatthe researchassistantinattendance.Ahighspiritedandresponsiveyoungwoman,sheinturnlitup,smiled,andsuppliedthetypicalexpansionandidealization:"Yes, Richard,it'sabird,''withexaggeratedprolongationofandstressonthefinallexeme.Oneevengetstheimpression,watchingthevideo,thatRichard'sexcitementover theflushedcoveyofbirdswassharpenedbyhisownwellformedfirsttimeactofpointingtowhichmyassistantsospontaneouslyandfulsomelyresponded.The occasionseemedratherlikeanepiphanyforbothofthem. Inthemonthsfollowing,thereweresimilar(althoughlessdramatic)episodes,sometimesaccompaniedbyanamingattempt,sometimesonlybyattentiondrawing vocalizationssuchastheprotodemonstrativeda.Theyseemedalwaysaddressedtomarkworthyobjectsorevents:familiarobjectsinunfamiliarsettings,unfamiliar onesinfamiliarsettings,thingsthatwere"outoftheordinary,"thingsthatwerebeingsearchedforandthencomeupon.Richarddidnotpointathumdrumobjects. Nor,letitbenoted,didhepointatobjectshemerelydesired:Forthathecontinuedto"reachdemonstratively"ortousevocalsignalswithimplorativecontours.Inall instancesobserved(whetheronoroffvideo),Richard'spointingwasinthepresenceofsomebodyfromwhomheexpectedanappropriaterecognitionresponse. Lestitbeoverlooked,letmecommentononethreadthatrunsthroughalltheforegoingobservations.Itisnotonlythatinfantsandyoungchildren(asweliketotell ourundergraduates)are"naiverealists"whobelievethatthereisaworldouttheretowhichtheyhavedirectaccess.Noneofuseverquitegetspastthat.Rather,they believetoothattheyandtheirconspecificsexperiencethesameworld.Whentheyfindnoobjectalongtheadult'slineofregard,theyturnbacktorecheckadult's gaze,thenlookbackoutagain.Thatistosay,theyoungchildcanbeprovokedintohypothesesaboutobjectsintheworldbyothersseemingtobelookingat(or listeningto)them.Theworldofthings,then,isalsoputativelyaninterpersonalworldaswell.Althoughthisearlyintersubjectiverepresentationoftheworldhasbecome astandardtopicindevelopmentaltexts(e.g.,Astington,1993),itsimplicationsforatheoryofreferencehavenotbeensufficientlyexamined.

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GraspingIntentions Letmeturnnowtoanotherpartofthestory.Newevidenceindicatesthatduringtheirsecondyear,infants"recognize"theintentionsimpellingadultacts.Theyseemto registernotjustthe"surface"propertiesofanother'sact,buttoimputeintentionstoit.ThisisnicelydemonstratedbyMeltzoff's(1995)stunningfindingthatyoung infantsimitatenotwhatothersdo,butwhattheytakethemtobeintendingortryingtodo.Whenanadult'sacthasbeenthwartedorblockedbyobstacles,infants imitatethe"intendedact"ratherthanthethwartedactobserved.ItisakintoadultsobservingthefamedHeiderSimmel(1944)animatedfilm,unabletoresistseeing thegyratinggeometricfiguresasacting"intentionally." Thereseem,then,tobetwokindsofintentionsthattheinfant/toddlerseemsabletorecognize.Oneisepistemicrecognizingthatanotherisattendingtosomething someobject,event,state.Theotherisinstrumentalrecognizingthegoaldirectedintentionsinherentintheactsofothers.Combiningthetwois,Ibelieve,an essentialingredientofmeaningmakingamatterwithwhichweshallbemuchconcernedinwhatfollows.Thisisbecausethetwocometogetherinauniquewayin narrativestructuringwhich,asweshallseepresently,isofprimeimportanceinthedevelopmentofsharedreference. Parentsandcaregiverstypically(indeed,almostirresistibly)treatinfantsasiftheyhadbothepistemicandinstrumentalintentionalstatesgoals,beliefs,desires, feelings,"thingsinmind."Parentsalsostoutlybelievethatinfantstrytocommunicatetheirintentionstothem.Buttheyplacetheburdenofproofforinterpretingthese effortsprincipallyonthemselvesperhapsanearlyversionoftheSperberWilson(1986)presuppositionofrelevance.Parents,moreover,aresopronetosuch beliefsthattheyevenreportdelightin"discovering"thattheirinfantshave"realmindsjustlikeeverybodyelse"(Gopnik&Meltzoff,1997)asiftheyweresorelyin needofconfirmation.Tomasello(1992)hasindeedproposedthattreatinginfantsasiftheyhadanintentionendowedsubjectivelifemaybeacrucialconditionfor theirdevelopingone.AndtheworkofSavageRumbaughandherteam(1993)certainlysuggeststhatthisattitudeisanessentialingredientinthe"enculturation"of pygmychimpanzees. Wemustnotoverlookthisstrikingconcordance:thathumanbeingsarepowerfullypredisposedto"see"intentionalstatesintheactsofothers,andatthesametime,to believethatothersaresimilarlypredisposed.Thesepredispositions,uniquetoourspecies,operateinboththeinstrumentalandepistemicdomains:We"see"othersas intendingtoachieveextrinsicgoalsandasintendingtounderstandtheworld.Andweexpectthemtodothesamebyus.Ineffect,thiscreatesacommunityheld togetherbyanetworkofinteractingintentions.Suchacommunityprovidesthe

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necessaryconditionforthedevelopmentofbothcultureandlanguage,bothinthephylogeneticsenseandintheontogenyofthose"born"intothehumanspecies.Itis thisframework,asImakeclearinamoment,thatunderliesthedevelopmentofreferencefromitsearlyformsofjointattendingtoitslaterfullexpressioninlexico grammaticalspeech. Takeearlyjointattendingfirst.Bymyargument,another'sdirected"gaze"istakenbytheyoungchildasasignthat"standsfor"anobjectoutthere"intheworld." Whenanother'slineofregardisfollowedandanobjectisduly"found,"thatobjectbecomestheputativereferentofthatsign.Its"existence''isverifiednotonlyby "finding"theobjectsought,butalsobycheckingforanappropriatevocalorgesturalassentfromthepartywhoselineofregardwasbeingfollowed.Thechild's primitiveinterpretant,underthecircumstances,seemstobesomesortofnotionor"theory"ofmindintheworld1alongthelinesjustspelledout:thatothermindsare tunedtothesameworldIamtunedto,thatwhattheyaretunedtocanbeinferredfromtheirdirectionoflooking,andthatonecanconfirmwhetherthereisacommon focusboth"objectively"(by"finding"theirtargetobjectoutthere)or"consensually"(byreceivinganassentingresponsefromthepersonwhose"mind"oneistryingto "read"). Returnnowtowhatwedescribedearlierastheinfant'stwomodesofseeingtheactionsofanadultasrevealingepistemicand/orinstrumentalintentions.Ipropose thatthefirststepsonthewaytomeaningmakingconsistofbringingthetwoformsofapparentintentintoconcordancewitheachother.Attheoutset,theobjectof communicativeinteractingbetweenparentandchildseemstobeeithertoprovidethetwowith"direct"intersubjectivecontactortofillthechild'sneeds.Intime,the actofindicatingthechild'sortheadult'sdirectedtothechildbecomesincreasinglycontextualized(e.g.,withthe"marking"aspectofthechild'searlypointing,orin peekaboo[Bruner&Sherwood,1976]wherethechildis"playingwith"objectpermanence,orwhenthemotherandinfantenactsceneswithdollsorpuppetsthat requireclosespecificationofactionsandprotagonists).Indicatingalsobecomescontextualizedinaflowofobservedinstrumentalaction.Theyoungchildsometimes evencountsonanadultapplyingthe"principleofrelevance"aswhenthechildholdsouthisorherhandforsomethingwhoseidentityisdeterminedbywherethechild andadultareinamutuallyregulatedactivityasin"passinggames"(Bruner,1978).
1

Idonotmeantomakeheavyweatheroutoftheword"theory."IagreewithNelson,Henseler,andPlesa(inpress)andLillard(1998)thattheword"theory"begsthequestion aboutthekindofcognitivestructurerequiredtoaccomplishthesmallmiracleinvolvedintheactofreferring.Idonothavestrongconvictionsaboutthecontroversystirredupby the"theorytheory"positionofCarey(1985)andGopnikandWellman(1994)andIamusing"theory"inanasifsense.

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Indeed,itmaywellbethatonereasonwhynarrativeplayissoalluringtoyoungchildrenisthatitprovidesopportunitiesforthechildtoindicate(oftenveryexcitedly) theelementofviolatedexpectationintheoverallstoriedactionthetoyfarmerfallingoffthetractor,thedollmeetinganunexpectedoutcome,andsoon.Recallthat thesesetbacks(Aristotle'sold"peripeteia")arewhat,inadultpractice,justifythetellingofastorywhatgivesastoryits"sense"(HerrnsteinSmith,1978Labov& Waletsky,1967).Youcannot"refer''toahero,avillain,avictimwithoutimbeddinghimorherinthe"sensemaking"plot. Underlyingallofthis,ofcourse,istheinterestinginteraction,notedearlier,betweentheinstrumentalandepistemic,aninteractionthatliesattheheartofnarrative structuring.Forreferentsinanarrativeobjects,agents,andtherestarespecifiablebythefunctionstheyserve,andthesefunctionsarespecifiableonlyintermsof intendedactionstowardagoal(Bruner,1983,1991).Whatmakessenseandreferencesoinseparableinnarrativeisthatonecannotspecify,say,a"hero"or"villain" orevensomecrucialobjectwithoutspecifyingsomethingabouttheirinstrumental,intentionalroleinaprimitiveplot.Itisthroughthesecommunal,narrativized exchangesthatsenseandreferencecometogethertoprovidemeaninginapublic,culturallyrelevantway.Sense,asitwere,isthecognitiveframingforconsensual reference. Sohowdochildrenlearntodealwiththesecomplexities?Surelytheymustneedsomehelpfromothersalreadyadeptatit.Isuggestedsomeyearsago(Bruner, 1983)thataidcomesintheformofaLanguageAcquisitionSupportSystem(LASS)thatexistsinalinguisticcommunitytohelpchildrenfigureout,amongother things,whatisbeingsingledoutinthemessygameofreference.IchosethatacronymasacontrasttoChomsky'sLAD,hisinnateLanguageAcquisitionDevice.For evenifgrammaticalruleswereinnatebutasleep,tobewakenedbyoverheardutterances,evenpoorlyformedones,itwouldstillrequiremassivecollaborative assistancebyadultstogettheinfantstartedinthebusinessoffiguringoutwhatwasbeingmeantbywhatwasbeingsaidwhatinterpretantswereneededtoforma bridgebetweenasignanditssignificate(s). Letme,finally,giveacoupleofexamplesofLASSatworkincollaborativeactivitiesthatassurethattheexpertandnovicearepayingjointattentiontoeachother's mentalcontentsand,thereby,achievingintersubjectiveaccordtowardaworldofwouldbereferents. Wealreadyknowthatbeforethechildgetsintolexicogrammaticalspeechheisalreadyadeptatsignalingand"reading"epistemicandinstrumentalintentionsinothers, andthat,moreover,hisparentsandcaregiverscredithimorherwiththisgiftandactaccordingly.Ithinkthecrucialproblemfortheadultistoprovideoccasionsand settingsinwhichitbecomespossibleforthechildtograspbothwhatisbeingtalkedabout,

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inwhatsenseitisbeingintended,andhowitallrelatestothesettinginwhichtheexchangeisoccurring.Nowtotheexamples. Oneofthemisscaffolding,theotherformatting.Scaffolding(Bruner,1983Wood,Bruner,&Ross,1976)consistsofconstructingsimple,noiselessopportunities forachildtograspthesenseandreferenceofvarioussigns.Theadultusesgestures,facialexpressions,signs,and(furtheralong)grammaticalconstructionsthatshe knowsthechildalreadyunderstands,andthenfrugallyaddsnewsignelementsthatcaneasilybeunderstoodinthelightofthese.Thetrick,asitwere,istoreducethe numberofdegreesoffreedomthatthechildmustmanageinmakingsenseofthemessagereducingalmosttothepointofredundancy.Wedothisnotonlyforthe youngchild,butalsofornonnativespeakersandconfusedstrangers.Thesesametacticscarryoverintomatchingourgrammartothechild'sgrammaticalcompetence, whichmostofusdoexquisitelywithouteventrying,sonaturaldoesitseem(McNeill,1970).AdultsdonothavetobetaughttoplaytheirpartinLASS.Weknowfull wellnottoloadourutteranceswithheavypresuppositionalloads,tortuousellipses,burdeninganaphora. Formattingoperatesbyriggingthecontextinwhichcommunicatingoccurssoas,again,toreducetheloadontheinterpretant.Itimbedsscaffoldinginroutinized,highly recurrentsettings(or"formats")asinchildhoodmealtime,dressing,andbedtimerituals"bookreading"routines(Ninio&Bruner,1978)"greeting/farewell"and "politerequest''formatsthatprovidefamiliarsettingsformotherandchildtomakemoreeasilyknowntoeachotherwhattheyhave"ontheirminds"and,aboveall, whatistobeaccomplished.Theserecurrentsettingsestablishthesituatednessofmeaningsinparticularcontexts.Suchsituatedness,asitwere,handsthechilda comprehensiblecontextonasilverplatter,concretelyprovideshimorherwiththeinterpretantformakingmeaningofwhatisbeingreferredtoandinwhatsense.As withscaffolding,formattingreducesdegreesoffreedomtoaminimum.And,bytheway,formattingisnotrestrictedtoourinteractionswithchildren:Itistheheartof whatisvariouslyandlooselycalled"onthejobtraining,"apprenticeship,"handsonexperience."Aftersomefamiliarization,thepostalclerkquicklygraspswhatis goingoninthepostoffice,theaspiringcookwhatisbeingdoneandsaidinthekitchen. AnatNinioandIwerefirststruckbythepowerofformattinginastudyofearlyreferentialindicatingor"labeling"(Bruner,1983Ninio&Bruner,1978Ninio& Snow,1996).Jonathan'smotherwas"reading"himapicturebook,which,tobeginwith,isaratherformidableexerciseindirectingandbecomingapartnerinayoung child'sattention.Hereishowtheyproceeded.Theywerejointlyleafingtheirwaythroughafamiliarchildren'spicturebook,lookingforthingstobringtoeachother's attentionandtolookatjointly.Ifthemotherchoseanewlabelingtarget,shewouldbegin

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withacharacteristic"What'sTHAT,Jon/a/than?"stressingTHATwithadistinctive,elevatedintonation,carefullysyllabifyingherson'snameaswell.Ifherepliedwith abrief,namelikelabel,shewouldreplytohisversionwithherusual"That'sright,Jonathan,that'sa[standardlabel],"atthesametimeconfirminghisutterancewhile idealizingitintostandardEnglish.Overrepeatedoccasions,however,sheraisedtheante,asifexpectinghimtogetclosertothecorrectphonologicalform,and refusingtoaccepthisprofferedlabeluntilhedid. Soonenough,however,theybeganenteringseriouslyintothesensereferencegame.SheshowedhimapennybearingtheQueen'simage,thistimewitha"Who's THAT,Jon/a/than?""Nini,"herepliedhisnameforhisgrandmother."No,Jonathan,that'stheQUEEN."Heinsisted,andhisinterpretantprevailed.Shegavein. Oncetheyhadhitonajointlyacceptablelabel,evenifhewasoffphonologically,shewouldsignalonsubsequentreadingsthatsheknewthatheknewbyanaltered versionof"What'sthat,Jonathan?"thistimewith''that"anoctavedowninpitchandhispropernamegivenwithoutsyllabicmarking,declaringtheachievementof consensuallyconfirmedjointreference. Oncealabelwasstabilized,shebeganthenextstep,drawingattentiontothepropertiessuchajointobjectwouldhavetohavetobeabothsenseworthyand verifiablyreferential."Yes,"shewouldsaytoJonathan'scorrectlabel,"andwhat'sthedoggieDOING?"withthefinalwordcarryingtherisingintonationthistime.[The pictureddogwasconspicuouslybarking.]Or"What'sthedoggieEATING?"ifthepictureddogwerechewingonabone.Senseandreferencewerebeingserved together:Here'sadoginafamiliarsetting,andthisiswhatdogsareverifiablylikewhenwerefertothem. Jonathanandhismotherbothtookgreatpleasureinthesedaily"reading"sessions.Theyweremoreplayfulthanpedagogical,withmuchlaughter,eyetoeyecontact, andevenacertainamountof"epistemicflirting,"asintheepisodeofdecidingwhetheritwastheQueenorJonathan'sgrandmotheronthecoin. Formattingistypicalofparentsandtheiryoungchildren.Butitisalsousedwhereveracomplex,symbolicallymediatedroutineneedstobeassembledor reassembledwhetherincoachingacomplexsportorinrehabilitatingaphasia.Forinacquiringlanguageoranyotherrulegovernedskill,oneneedstograspthe waysinwhichtheelementsinvolvedare"situated"inanaccessiblecontext.Andifonehasnoreliablerepresentationofthecontexttofallbackon,ithelpsmightilyto haveitthereperceptually. Letmeconclude,then,withthesebriefremarks.Actsofindicatingprovidethemeansforextendingindividualhumanattentiontoaninterpersonal,intersubjectivelevel. Suchactswouldnotbepossiblebutforsomepreadaptedorinnatecapacitytoappreciatethatourconspecificssharea

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commonworldandthatonecan,evenattheverystart,determinewhatinthatworldisatthefocusofanother'sattentionbyfollowingtheirlineofregard.Joint attentionattheoutsetseemstobeanactivitysuigeneris,foritsownsake,andwithitsownintrinsicreward.Fromearlyonaswell,infantsperceivethebehaviorof othersasinstrumental,aimedatachievingendsinthatworld.Theyalsocansignaltheirowndemandstoothers.Caregiversaidboththeseprocessesthrough scaffoldingandformatting.Wellbeforelexicogrammaticalspeechbecomesthemaingame,thechild(andtheparent)havelearnedmanyroutesintoeachother'smind, andtherebyhavecometobereassuredthattheyarejointlyinhabitingthesameworld.Theseroutesservethechildwellingettingintothelanguagegamestofollow. References Astington,J.W.(1993).Thechild'sdiscoveryofthemindCambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Brazelton,B.,&Als,H.(1979).Fourearlystagesinthedevelopmentofmotherinfantinteraction.PsychoanalyticStudyoftheChild,34,349369. Bruner,J.(1978).Learninghowtodothingswithwords.InJ.Bruner&A.Garton(Eds.),Humangrowthanddevelopment:TheWolfsonCollegeLectures1976 (pp.6284).Oxford,England:ClarendonPress. Bruner,J.(1983).Child'stalk:learningtouselanguage.NewYork:Norton. Bruner,J.(1991).Actsofmeaning.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Bruner,J.,&Sherwood,V.(1976).Earlyrulestructure:Thecaseof'Peekaboo.'InR.Harre(Ed.),Lifesentences:Aspectsofthesocialroleoflanguage(pp. 5562).NewYork:Wiley. Butterworth,G.E.,&Jarrett,N.L.M.(1991).Whatmindshaveincommonisspace:Spatialmechanismsservingjointvisualattentionininfancy.BritishJournalof DevelopmentalPsychology,9,5572. Carey,S.(1985).ConceptualchangeinchildhoodCambridge,MA:MITPress. Clark,H.(1992).Thearenasoflanguageuse.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress. Crawford,M.(1937).Thecooperativesolvingofproblemsbyyoungchimpanzees.ComparativePsychologyMonographs,14(SerialNo.68). David,M.,&Appell,G.(1961).Astudyofnursingcareandnurseinfantinteraction.InB.M.Foss(Ed.),Determinantsofinfantbehavior(Vol.1).London: Methuen. Feldman,C.(1996).Youcan'tstepinthesamerivertwice:Repairandrepetitionindialogue.InC.Bazzanella(Ed.),Repetitionindialogue(pp.3244).Tubingen: Niemeyer.AlsoBeitragezurDialogforschung,11[specialmultilingualissue]. Fernald,A.(1989).Intonationandcommunicativeintentinmothers'speechtoinfants:Isthemelodythemessage?ChildDevelopment,60,14971510. Fernald,A.(1991).Prosodyinspeechtochildren:Prelinguisticandlinguisticfunctions.AnnalsofChildDevelopment,8,4380. Gopnik,A.,&Meltzoff,A.(1997).Words,thoughts,andtheories.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Gopnik,A.,&Wellman,H.(1994).Thetheorytheory.InL.A.Hirschberg&S.A.Gelman(Eds.),Mappingthemind:Domainspecificityincognitionand culture(pp.120134).Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress. Heider,F.,&Simmel,M.(1944).Anexperimentalstudyofapparentbehaviour.AmericanJournalofPsychology,57,243259.

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HerrnsteinSmith,G.(1978).Onthemarginsofdiscourse:Therelationofliteraturetolanguage.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress. Kasermann,M.,&Foppa,K.(1982).Somedeterminantsofselfcorrection:AninteractionalstudyofSwissGerman.InW.Deutsch(Ed.),Thechild'sconstruction oflanguage(pp.77104).NewYork:AcademicPress. Labov,W.,&Waletzky,J.(1967).Narrativeanalysis:Oralversionsofpersonalexperience.InJ.Helm(Ed.),Essaysontheverbalandvisualarts:Proceedings (ofthe1966AnnualSpringMeetingoftheAmericanEthnologicalSociety(pp.1244).Seattle:UniversityofWashingtonPress. Lillard,A.(1998).Ethnopsychologies:Culturalvariationsintheoriesofmind.PsychologicalBulletin,123,332. McNeill,D.(1970).Theacquisitionoflanguage.NewYork:Harper&Row. Meltzoff,A.N.(1995).Understandingtheintentionsofothers:Reenactmentofintendedactsby18montholdchildren.DevelopmentalPsychology,31,838850. Moore,C.,&Dunham,P.J.(Eds.).(1995).Jointattention:Itsoriginsandroleindevelopment.Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates. Nelson,K.,Henseler,S.,&Plesa,D.(inpress).Enteringacommunityofminds:"Theoryofmind"fromafeministviewpoint.InP.Miller(Ed.),Feministtheoryand developmentalpsychology. Ninio,A.,&Bruner,J.S.(1978).Theachievementandantecedentsoflabelling.JournalofChildLanguage,5,115. Ninio,A.,&Snow,C.E.(1996).Pragmaticdevelopment.Boulder,CO:Westview. Peirce,C.S.(19471962).Collectedworks(Vols.16).Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. SavageRumbaugh,E.S.,Murphy,J.,Sevcik,R.A.,Brakke,K.E.,Williams,S.L.,&Rumbaugh,D.L.(1993).Languagecomprehensioninapeandchild. MonographsoftheSocietyforResearchinChildDevelopment,58(34,SerialNo.233). Scaife,M.,&BrunerJ.S.(1975).Thecapacityforjointvisualattentionintheinfant.Nature,253,265266. Sperber,D.,&Wilson,D.(1986).Relevance:Communicationandcognition.Oxford,England:Blackwell. Stechler,G.,&Latz,E.(1966).Someobservationsonattentionandarousalinthehumaninfant.JournaloftheAmericanAcademyofChildPsychiatry,5,517 525. SternD.(1985).Theinterpersonalworldoftheinfant.NewYork:BasicBooks. Tomasello,M.(1992).Thesocialbasesoflanguageacquisition.SocialDevelopment,1,6787. Wood,D.,Bruner,J.S.,&Ross,G.(1976).Theroleoftutoringinproblemsolving.JournalofChildPsychologyandPsychiatry,17,89100.

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AUTHORINDEX
A Achenbach,T.M.,277,279,289 Adams,F.,2,11,97,114 Adamson,L.,43,46,60,64,74,244,264 Akhtar,N.,20,41 Allen,C.,169,191 Allesandri,S.M.,78,85,92,93 Als,H.,331,338 Amsel,A.,79,92 Anand,K.J.,112,114 Anderson,C.,163,166 Anscombe,G.E.M.,244,264,298,314,319,328 Appell,G.,331,338 Appleton,M.,9,11,232,240 Arias,I.,284,289 Armstrong,D.M.,97,114 Artuso,M.,156,158,165 Asendorpf,J.B.,86,92 Ashmead,D.H.,244,266 Astington,J.,4,5,6,7,8,11,11,12,17,25,31,37,38,39,102,103,113,115,116,120,123,130,131,134,151,154,158,161,163,165,166,229,230, 233,239,240,241,272,289,305,306,308,309,310,312,313,314,332,338 Austin,J.L.,295,296,297,300,303,313,314 Averill,J.R.,273,289 Azar,S.T.262,264 B Baars,B.J.,109,114 Baillargeon,R.,170,190,191 Bakeman,R.,43,46,60,64,74,244,264 Baker,C.I.,201,224 Baker,S.C.,158,165 Baldwin,D.A.,19,23,38,46,60,210,221,223 Baldwin,J.M.,1,2,4,5,11,12,95,96,98,99,101,114,154,165,229,234,240,241 Baldwin,M.,273,274,289 Banerjee,M.,29,41 Bargh,J.A.,80,92 BaronCohen,S.,65,74,119,131,182,192,200,220,220,221,223,224 Barresi,J.,44,45,46,60,61,65,74,148,151,154,160,165 Barton,M.E.,20,26,41 Bartsch,K.,20,31,39,144,150,229,237,241,305,307,314 Bates,E.,244,262,265 Baudonniere,PM.,86,92 Bauer,W.D.,262,265 Beardsall,L.,37,39,232,241 Beeghly,M.,275,289 Bekoff,M.,169,191 Bem,D.J.,273,274,289 Benigni,L.,244,265 Benson,P,199,224 Bentivegna,C.,235,241 Berg,E.A.,103,115 Berridge,D.M.,8,12,233,242 Berthenthal,B.I.,89,91,92 Bevan,R.,199,224 Bialystok,E.,113,114 Bidell,T.R.,102,115 Bierschwale,D.T.,200,213,225 Bill,B.,19,38 Br,S.,28,39,65,74,176,192

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Bjorklund,D.F.,128,131 Bloom,L.,306,315 Bonvillian,J.D.,262,265 Borton,R.W.,190,193 Boshart,J.,149,152 Bowerman,M.,113,114 Bowlby,J.,270,272,289 Brakke,K.E.,330,333,339 Bratman,M.E.,298,307,314 Brazelton,B.,331,338 Brentano,F.,1,2,12,96,114,243,265,295,314 Bretherton,I.,46,60,244,265,307,314 Brierly,K.,199,224 Brody,G.H.,284,289 Brooks,P.,109,115,122,127,130,131,147,148,151,152 BrooksGunn,J.,85,86,90,92,93,116 Brown,J.,9,12,37,39,232,233,234,235,239,241,306,314 Brown,R.,304,305,314 Bruner,J.,3,4,11,12,37,39,72,74,95,114,230,232,234,241,244,245,262,265,266,331,332,334,335,336,338,339 Burgess,A.,159,165 Buriel,R.,258,266 Burton,R.V.,236,242 Bushnell,E.W.,244,266 Butterworth,G.,47,60,91,92,200,201,224,244,265,331,338 Byrne,R.,171,183,192,194,197,220,224,225 C Call,J.,69,72,73,74,75,183,189,194,201,225 Camaioni,L.,73,75,244,265 Campos,J.J..244,265,284,290 Carey,S.,163,165,170,171,176,192,193,334,338 Carlson,S.M.,91,94,119,121,122,127,128,129,131,133,134,144,148,150,151 Carpenter,M.,47,59,60,63,64,65,66,74,75 Carruthers,P,98,112,114,182,192 Carter,A.97,108,117,120,122,125,132,145,152 Carter,S.L.,259,265 Caryl,PG.,171,192 Case,R.,272,289 Caspi,A.,273,274,289 Cech,C.G.,220,213,225 Chan,S.Q.,258,266 Chance,M.R.A.,199,224 Chandler,M.,236,241 Cheney,D.L.,170,171,171,172,174,182,183,186,189,192 Christensen,A.,284,289 Cicchetti,D.,85,93,275,289 Clark,H.,70,74,330,338 ClarkeCarter,D.,238,242 Clements,W.A.,149,151,183,192,193 Cochran,E.,47,60,200,201,224,244,265 Cohen,L.B.,49,60,61,99,115 Coie,J.D.,275,290 Connell,D.,262,266 Cooper,R.,190,194 Corbetta,D.,244,266 Corkum,V.,44,46,47,49,61,99,116,200,201,224 Corley,R.,284,290 Cosmides,L.,170,191,192 Costanzo,P.R.,287,289 Cottington,E.,259,266 Craik,F.I.M.,110,115 Crane,T.,2,12 Crawford,M.,330,338 Crittenden,P.M.,262,265 Crnic,K.,262,265 Croft,K.,199,224 Cronbach,L.J.,254,265 Csibra,G.,28,39,65,74,176,192 Cummings,E.M.,284,289 Cutting,A.,8,12,233,241 D Dale,P.,262,265 Damon,W.,19,39 Dantzer,R.,83,92 Darwin,C.,20,39,81,82,92,195,224 David,M.,331,338 Davidson,C.A.213,225 Davidson,D.,154,157,159,160,165 Davies,PT.,284,289 Dawkins,R.,171,192,193 DeFries,J.,284,290 deVilliers,J.,158,165 deVilliers,P.,158,165 deWaal,F.,197,199,220,224

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DeLoache,J.,111,115 Dempster,F.N.,128,131 Dennett,D.,77,78,80,92,157,164,165,169,192,243,245,265 Desjardins,R.N.,19,38 Dewey,J.,98,111,115 Diamond,A.,128,131,134,145,151 DiBiase,R.,85,92 Dishion,T,283,290 Dix,T.,259,265,287,289 Dodd,B.,190,192 Dodge,K.A.,275,290 Doherty,M.J.,141,151 Dolan,R.J.,158,165 Donaldson,M.,312,314 DonelanMcCall,N.,233,241 Dore,J.,262,265 Dorment,R.,325,328 Doyle,R.,284,290 Dretske,F.,170,192 Dunbar,R.,272,290 Dunham,P.,64,75,244,266,331,339 Dunn,J.,8,9,10,12,13,37,39,230,231,232,233,234,235,238,239,241,242,245,271,290,306,307,314 Dunn,L.M.,255,265 Duval,S.,80,82,92 Dworkin,D.H.,258,266 E Eddy,T.J.,91,94,183,186,193,200,201,202,208,210,213,216,225 Edwards,P.,319,328 Eilan,N.,96,115 Ekman,P.,20,39 Elder,G.H.,273,274,289 Eldridge,N.,248,265 Eliot,G.,238,241 Emde,R.N.,244,265,284,290 Emery,N.J.,201,224 Eron,L.D.,273,290 Estes,D.,237,241 Evans,S.L.,259,265 Everett,B.A.,199,224 F Feinman,S.,244,265 Feinman,S.,244,265 Feldman,C.,3,7,11,234,241,300,324,328,330,338 Feldman,R.,246,252,253,255,260,261,265,266 Fenson,L.,85,86,87,88,92,262,265 Fernald,A.,23,40,331,338 Fernyhough,C.,238,242 Field,T.M.,258,259,265 Fincham,F.D.,284,289 Fischer,K.W.,85,86,87,89,91,92,94,102,115 Flavell,E.R.,17,31,39,123,131,134,151,199,210,224 Flavell,J.H.,17,31,39,123,131,134,151,199,210,224 Fletcher,PC.,158,165 Fodor,J.,38,39,81,92,158,165,169,170,176,188,192 Foppa,K.,330,339 Forguson,L.W.,297,315 Frackowiak,R.S.J.,158,165 Franklin,M.B.,244,265 Freeman,N.H.,8,12,233,242 Frege,G.,96,115 Freud,S.,1,12,82,83,84,92,111,115 Frey,R.,158,165 Frith,C.D.,158,165 Frith,U.,158,165 Fritz,A.S.,236,241 Frye,D.,3,7,10,12,13,43,60,61,66,74,96,97,99,102,106,108,109,110,115,117,119,120,121,122,125,127,128,130,131,132,133,134,135, 136,137,138,143,145,146,147,148,151,152 Fulker,D.W.,284,290 Furrow,D.,161,166 G Gale,E.,158,165 Gallup,G.G.,Jr.,91,92,220,224 GarcaColl,C.,252,265 Gardner,H.,82,92 Geach,304,315 Gebelt,J.,235,241 Gee,J.,305,315 Gelman,R.,171,176,190,192,194 Gergely,G.,28,39,65,74,176,177,192 Gergen,K.J.,252,265 Gerstadt,G.L.,134,151

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Giambrone,S.,220,223,225 Gibson,E.,64,74 Gilbert,J.,128,131 Gluckman,A.,72,75 Goethe,J.W.,95,115 GoldmanRakic,P.S.,110,115 Goldsmith,H.H.,284,290 Golinkoff,R.M.,244,266 Gomez,J.C.,183,192 Goodall,J.,192,224 Goodnow,J.J.,236,241 Gopnik,A.,2,3,4,5,6,9,11,12,13,17,18,20,25,31,34,35,36,37,38,38,39,40,46,61,68,75,95,102,113,115,119,123,131,134,137,148,152, 154,161,162,165,182,190,192,210,224,333,334,338 Gordon,A.C.L.,7,12 Gottman,J.M.,284,290 GouinDecarie,T.,47,61 Graf,P,162,165 Graham,P.J.,288,290 Gralinski,J.H.,90,94 Grant,D.A.,103,115 Grant,V.J.,252,265 Gray,J.A.,98,115 Green,F.L.,17,31,39,123,131,134,151 Grice,H.,70,74 Griffin,D.R.,244,265 H Hadwin,J.,29,39 Hala,S.,236,241 Halford,G.,126,131 Hall,D.K.,252,266 Halliday,M.A.K.,302,315 Hann,D.M.,259,265 Happe,F.,158,165 Harding,C.G.,244,266 Hare,B.,201,225 Harnishfeger,K.K.,128,131 Harries,M.,199,221 Harris,P.,5,11,12,17,29,38,39,49,61,86,92,138,145,151,160,165,229,237,240,241,272,289,306,315 Harrison,A.O.,258,266 Harter,S.,89,93 Hartl,M.,6,13 Hartung,J.P.,262,265 Hauser,M.D.,3,4,10,170,171,172,176,178,182,191,192,193 Haviland,J.,235,241 Heavey,C.L.,284,239 Heider,F.,27,39,176,193,333,338 Hekiman,E.,262,264 Helfer,R.E.,263,266 Helwig,C.C.,110,117 Henseler,S.,334,339 Herman,J.,310,315 HernnsteinSmith,G.,335,339 Heyes,C.M.,182,183,193 Hickey,P.R.,112,114 Hietanen,J.,199,224 Hix,H.R.,121,128,129,131,114,148,151 Hogrefe,J.,134,151 Homer,B.,163,165 Homskaya,E.D.,134,151 Hong,Y.J.,134,151 Hood,B.,170,193 Hood,L.,306,315 Howard,J.A.,85,86,93 Hudson,J.A.,235,241 Huesmann,L.R.,273,290 Hughes,C.,119,128,131,133,134,143,144,149,151,232,233,239,241,242 Hughes,R.,159,165 Hume,D.,195,224 Humphrey,N.K.,220,224 Hutchins,E.,269,290 I Ilyenkov,E.V.,3,12 ImbemsBailey,A.,310,315 Irwin,J.M.,19,38 J Jacques,S.,96,97,98,100,103,104,108,109,113,115,116,117,121,129,130,131,132,146,152 James,W.,11,12,112,116 Jarrett,N.,200,201,224,331,338 Jarrold,C.,6,12,121,132,133,152 Jaynes,J.,82,93 Jeannerod,M.,144,151

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Jenkins,J.,8,10,12,37,39,113,116,158,166,233,241,274,275,283,288,290 Jenkins,R.,262,265 Jennings,S.,85,86,87,89,94 John,R.S.,284,290 JohnsonLaird,P.N.,273,274,290,301315 Jolly,A.,220,224 K Kagan,J.,19,39,99,101,102,116,284290 Kamawar,D.,10,11,157,162,166,304,306 Kamm,K.,244,266 KarmiloffSmith,A.,222,224,238,242 Karraker,K.H.,259,266 Kasermann,M.,330,339 Kavanaugh,R.D.,86,92,138,151 Kaye,K.,245,262,266 Kearsley,R.,101,117 Kempe,R.,263,266 Kirkham,N.Z.,108,116,129,130,131 Knobe,J.,243,266 Koos,O.,65,74 Kopp,C.B.,90,94 Krebs,J.R.,171,192,193 Kripke,S.,153,166 Kruger,A.C.,43,61,64,70,74,75 Kuhl,P.K.,190,193 Kyriakidou,C.,8,12,233,242 L Labov,W.,335,339 Lamberty,G.,262,265 Lang,B.,10,108,120,134,138,139,144,148,152 Largo,R.H.,85,97,93 Latz,E.,331,339 Lau,A.,110,117 Lazarus,R.S.273,274,290 Leadbeater,B.J.,9,13 LeDoux,J.E.,81,82,93 Lee,E.,309,315 Leekam,S.R.,8,13,37,40,134,152,233,242 Lefkowitz,M.,273,290 Lempers,J.D.,199,210,224 Leonard,E.L.,99,117 Leslie,A.,7,12,68,74,91,93,100,116,138,149,151,171,176,182,193,237,242 Levine,L.J.,29,40 Levinson,S.,70,75 Lewis,C.,8,12,233,242 Lewis,M.,5,8,10,78,79,80,81,82,84,85,86,90,91,92,93,101,112,116 Lillard,A.,334,339 Lockhart,R.S.,110,115 Lockman,J.J.,244,266 Lorincz,E.N.,201,224 Loveland,K.A.,85,93 Lowe,M.,86,88,93 Lumb,A.,6,12 Luria,A.R.,3,12,103,113,116,129,131,134,151 Luria,Z.,252,266 LyonsRuth,K.,262,266 M MacCallum,F.,6,12 MacWhinney,B.,304,315 Malatesta,C.Z.,274,290 Malle,B.F.,243,266 Mannie,S.,235,242 Mans,L.,85,93 Marcovitch,S.,101,116 Mareschal,D.,156,166 Margolin,G.,284,290 MaridakiKassotaki,K.,8,12,233,242 Markman,E.M.,19,38 Marler,P.,172,193 Martin,K.,259,266 Mauthner,N.119,120,125,128,132,133,143,148,152 Mayer,J.M.,273,291 Mayringer,H.,144,152 McAdoo,H.P.,262,265 McCune,L.,86,88,89,93 McEvoy,R.E.,119,131 McKinney,J.P.,263,266 McNeill,D.,336,339 Mead,G.,72,75 Meins,E.,238,242 Meldon,A.I.,95,116 Meltzoff,A.N.,2,3,4,5,9,17,18,19,20,25,26,27,28,30,33,34,36,38,39,40,46,61,68,75,86,93,95,102,116,137,182,

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190,192,193,210,224,333,338,339 Menzel,E.,196,224,326,328 Meredith,M.C.,86,92 Messer,D.J.,244,266 MichotteA.,176,193 Miller,G.A.,301,315 Miller,PH.,17,39 Miller,R.T,244,265 Millikan,R.,170,193 Mistlin,A.,199,224 Mitchell,R.W.,171,193,197,224 Moffitt,T.E.,283,284,290 Montgomery,D.E..304,305,315 Moore,C.,3,6,10,11,12,44,45,46,47,49,60,61,64,65,66,68,74,75,99,116,148,151,154,160,161,165,166,200,201,224,238,242,244,266, 331,339 Moore,M.K.,18,19,20,33,35,38,39,95,116 Morgan,R.,65,75 Morissette,P,47,61 Morland,J.K.,252,267 Moses,L.,6,12,17,23,25,31,38,39,40,46,60,121,128,129,131,144,148,151,221,223 Mosier,C.E.,244,266 Mounoud,P.,81,91,93 Mumme,D.L.,23,40 Munn,C.,171,193 Murphy,D.J.,244,266 Murphy,J.,330,333,339 Murray,L.56,61 N Ndasdy,Z.,28,39,65,74,176,192 Nagel,T.,98,116,160,166 Nagell,K.,47,59,60,63,64,66,74 Nelson,K.,296,304,310,313,315,334,339 Newell,A.,81,93 Newton,PE.,236,242 Nichols,S.,110,117 Nicolich,L.,86,88,93 Ninio,A.,336,339 Norman,D.A.,144,151 O O'Brien,M.,284,290 O'Neill,D.K.,20,40,213,225 Oakes,L.M.,49,60,61 Oatley,K.,269,273,274,290 Ogan,T.A.,244,267 Oldershaw,L.,262,266 Olson,D.,2,5,7,8,10,11,11,12,17,38,157,161,162,165,166,229,240,272,289,304,306,322,328 Olweus,D.,278,224 Oram,M.,199,201,224 Ortega,J.,199,224 Osofsky,J.D.,259,265 Ozonoff,S.,119,131 P Pacherie,E.,144,151 Pachter,L.M.,258,266 Palfai,T.,96,110,115,119,121,122,127,131,133,134,135,136,138,147,151 Pan,B.A.,310,315 Papousek,H.,78,94 Patterson,G.R.,283,290 Peirce,C.S.,329,330,339 Pennington,B.,119,128,131,132 Perilloux,H.K.,213,225 Perner,J.,4,6,7,8,10,13,17,29,37,39,40,91,94,108,116,120,124,131,132,133,134,138,139,141,142,144,145,148,149,151,152,183,192, 193,194,233,242 Perret,D.I.,201,224 Perrett,D.,199,224 Peskin,J.,157,166 Pethick,S.,262,265 Phillips,S.,126,131 Piaget,J.,4,7,13,66,69,75,80,85,91,94,95,99,101,111,116,301,315 Pine,C.J.,258,266 Pinker,S.,170,191,193 Pion,D.E.,103,104,117 Pipp,S.,85,86,87,89,94

Page347

Plesa,D.,334,339 Plomin,R.,284,290 Plotkin,R.C.,262,266 Pollock,C.,263,266 Potel,D.,121,132,133,152 Povinelli,D.J.,3,4,10,43,46,91,94,156,183,186,189,191,193,200,201,202,208,210,213,216,223,225 Premack,A.J.,171,177,181,183,193 Premack,D.,171,176,177,181,183,189,193,210,225 Pribram,K.H.,134,151 Provenzano,R.,252,266 Pure,K.,161,166 Pyers,J.,158,165 Q Quine,W.V.O.,157,166 Quinton,D.,288,290 R Rader,N.,64,74 Radner,D.,244,266 Radner,M.,244,266 Ramadas,J.,163,166 Ramer,A.L.H.,244,265 Ramsay,D.S.,5,8,10,85,86,87,88,92,93,101,112 Rapus,T,106,117,122,128,132 Ratner,H.H.,43,61,64,70,74,75 Raver,C.C.,9,13 Reaux,J.E.,202,213,225 Reddy,V.,9,11,231,232,240,242 Reid,G.M.,252,266 Reid,J.,283,290 Reilly,J.S.,262,265 Repacholi,B.M.,2,3,4,5,6,9,13,20,23,31,36,40,95,102,137,148,152 Rescorla,R.A.,79,94 Reznick,J.S.,8,10,11,97,101,102,103,104,108,117,120,122,125,132,144,146,152,230,246,247,252,253,255,260,261,262,265,266,267, 284,290 Ricard,M.,47,61 Ricks,M.,85,94 Robins,L.N.,288,291 Robinson,D.R.,262,264 Robinson,J.,284,290 Rochat,P.,65,75,91,94 Rogers,S.,119,131 Rogoff,B.,244,266 Roitblat,H.L.,80,94 Romanes,G.J.,195,197,225 Rosaldo,M.Z.,313,315 Rosen,C.S.,91,94 Ross,G.,336,339 Roth,K.,163,166 Rubin,J.,252,266 Ruble,D.N.,259,265 Ruffman,T,8,13,37,40,233,242 Rumbaugh,D.L.,330,333,339 Russell,B.,96,111,116,196,197,225 Russell,J.,6,12,43,61,119,120,121,125,127,128,132,133,143,144,148,151,152,238,242 Rutter,M.,287,288,290,291 Ryle,G.,296,315 S Sa,W.,162,166 Salovey,P.,273,291 Samuels,M.,109,115,122,127,130,131,147,148,151,152 Santos,L.,182,183,186,193,194 Sapp,F.,6,12 Sarda,M.,25,40,138,140,152 SavageRumbaugh,E.S.,330,333,339 Savasir,I.,305,315 Scaife,M.,244,266,331,339 Schneider,K.,244,266 Schwartz,B.B.,261,266 Schwebel,D.C.,91,94 Searle,J.,4,6,7,13,21,33,40,77,79,81,82,94,99,102,103,116,124,132,158,166,243,266,298,299,312,315,319,328 Sellars,W.,155,161,165,166 Semcesen,T.,108,116,129,130,131 Sevcik,R.A.,330,333,339 Seyfarth,R.M.,170,171,172,174,182,183,186,189,192 Shallice,T.,144,151 Shapiro,B.L.,163,166 Sharpe,S.,119,120,125,128,132,133,143,148,152

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Sherwood,V.,334,338 Shipstead,S.G.,199,224 Shultz,T.,25,40,138,140,152,156,166,308,315 Sigel,I.,111,116 Silk,J.,174,192 Simmel,M.,176,193,333,338 Singer,J.L.,91,94 Skinner,B.,158,166 Skinner,B.F.,111,116 Slaughter,V.,6,12,17,20,31,37,39,40 Slomkowski,C.,9,12,37,39,232,233,241 Smith,M.A.,283,288,290 Smith,P.K.,182,192 Smith,R.S.,284,291 Snow,C.,304,310,315,336,339 Sodian,B.,236,242 Solomon,R.,259,266 Sommerville,J.A.,110,117 Spelke,E.,163,165,170,176,190,192,194 Spencer,J.P,244,266 Spiker,D.,85,94 Spinazzola,J.,101,117 Sroufe,L.A.,85,93 Stahl,J.,262,266 Stanger,C.,82,84,85,86,91,93 Starkey,R,190,194 Stechler,G.,331,339 Steele,B.,263,266 Stein,N.L.,29,40 Stenberg,C.R.,244,265 Stern,D.,271,273,291,331,339 Stich,S.,158,166 Stipek,D.J.,90,94 Strichartz,A.F.,236,242 Strosberg,R.,20,41 Struhsaker,TT,172,194 Stummer,S.,10,108,120,138,139,141,142,148,152 Sugarman,S.,81,94 Sullivan,K.,149,152 Sullivan,M.W.,78,82,84,85,86,91,92,93 T TagerFlusberg,H.,149,152 Taylor,M.,17,40,91,94 Tesla,C.,9,12,37,39,232,233,241 Thal,D.,262,265 Theall,L.A.,202,213,225 Thelen,E.,244,266 Thomas,R.K.,197,225 Thomas,S.,199,224 Thompson,C.,148,151 Thompson,N.S.,197,224 Tidball,G.,19,38 Tidswell,T,119,120,125,128,132,133,143,148,152 Tomasello,M.,3,4,9,11,19,20,26,41,43,47,60,61,63,64,69,70,71,72,73,74,74,75,95,99,102,148,183,189,191,194,201,210,225,235,242, 245,262,266,267,333,339 Tomkins,S.S.,274,291 Tooby,J.,170,191,192 Trevarthen,C.,56,61,65,75,95,116,244,267 Tulving,E.,98,110,114,116 Twentyman,C.T,262,264,267 V VsquezGarca,H.,262,265 Vinden,P.,8,13 Vinter,A.,91,93 Vishton,P,170,194 Volterra,V.,244,265 vonHofsten,C.,170,194 Vygotsky,L.S.,3,13,95,111,113,116 W Walden,T.A.,244,267 Walder,L.O.,273,290 Waletzky,J.,335,339 Walters,G.C.,262,266 Warkentin,V.,86,92 Wasik,B.H.,252,265 Watson,M.W.,85,87,94 Weiss,M.,82,84,85,86,91,93 Wellman,H.M.,6,13,17,20,29,30,31,39,41,46,61,119,131,144,150,161,165,229,237,241,305,307,314,334,338 Wells,D.,25,40,138,140,152 Wells,G.,304,310 Welsh,M.,128,132 Werner,E.E.,284,291

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White,A.,239,242 Whiten,A.,171,182,183,189,192,194,197,220,224,225 Wicklund,R.A.,80,82,92 Widmayer,S.M.,258,259,265 Willatts,P.,244,267 Williams,J.E.,252,267 Williams,S.L.,330,333,339 Wilson,A.,274,290 Wilson,D.,333,339 Wilson,M.N.,258,266 Wilson,W.H.,126,131 Wimmer,H.,4,6,13,91,94,120,124,132,133,134,144,151,152,183,194 Wittgenstein,L.,24,41 Won,D.,23,40 Wood,D.,336,339 Woodruff,G.,171,183,193 Woodward,A.,49,61,68,75 Woolley,J.D.,29,30,41 Y Youngblade,L.,9,12,13,37,39,232,233,241,242 Yuill,N.,29,40 Z ZahnWaxler,C.,284,290 Zambarano,R.J.,259,265 Zeedyk,M.S.,246,248,249,264,267 Zelazo,P.R.,96,97,99,101,117 Zelazo,P.D.,1,2,7,8,9,11,13,66,75,96,97,98,99,100,101,103,104,106,108,109,110,113,115,116,117,119,120,121,122,125,127,128, 129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137,138,140,145,146,147,148,151,152 Zernicke,R.F.,244,266 Zoll,D.,262,266

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SUBJECTINDEX
A AnotBerror,145156 Abstraction(s),84,90 Abulicdissociations,106107,110 Accomodation,66 Action(s),95 andintentionality,95,96 Actioncontrol,96,97,102,121,125 Actionmonitoring,144 Activeintermodalmapping(AIM),18 Affectiveexpression,79 Animalstudies,172174,177179,83187,202209,211213,214220 vs.humanstudies,195,197,222223 mentalstatesinprimates,171 seeingasknowing,202,205,208,209,210,214 Appearancerealitydistinction,37,112,161 Appearancerealitytasks,seefalsebeliefs Ascription,153,154,155,158,161 acquisitionofability,155 vs.description,153,159 andinfantintentionality,260261,261 andintention,163,164,245 andlanguage,159 understandingof,162 Assimilation,99 Attachment,238 Attention,330,331 asamentalstate,201 Autism,331 Autonomy,258,259 B Behaviorism,behaviorists,44,189 Beliefs, ascriptionof,154,155,156,157,160 aboutbeliefs,154 children'sunderstandingof,18,19 conceptof,154,155,157,160 andsurprise,154,155 Biases,127 Brain, andconsciousness,82 andmind,237 C Childabuse,262,275 Childchildinteraction,37,233,235,276 Chimpanzees andcommunicationofintention,7273 andconceptsaboutmentalstates,201,209,213,220 highandlowlevelmodels,201,205,208,219 vs.humanbeings,209,220,222 andsocialunderstanding,73,196197,198,211 CognitiveComplexityandControltheory,96,105,109,121,122,125126,128,129,130,135143 andtheoryofmind,126,135,138 Communication, animal,7273,170175

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Complexity,109,110,111,113,135,136,140 Consciousexperience, useof,tounderstandexperienceofselfandother,84,306 whatitislike,98,160 Consciousintention,80,85,86,90,91 Consciousness, andaction,96 intentionalityand,84,98 minimal,97,99 andthepsychologist'sfallacy,112 recursive,100101,111112 reflective,104,108109 ofself,81,102,112 Cooperativeplay,233,276,277 D Deception,120121,122,125,126,127,129130,144,147,157 inanimals,171,196,197 children'sunderstandingof,157 intentionin,236 Desires asintentionalstates,3132,331 understandingof,24 Developmentalpsychopathology,273274 externalizing,274275,277,278,279,280,283,284,289 andintention,270,282,288 andinterpretationofothers'intentions,274,288 Differentiation,237238 Dimensionalchangecardsort(DCCS),105106,108,122124,126,128,129,134,135,136,138 E Eliminativism,158 Epistemologicaldevelopment,162,163 Emotionjudgments,274275 Emotions,230 andcognition,237 conversationabout,232,233,235 andgoalorientation,273 andintentionality,20,29,3031,81,282 andnarrative,234235 andsocialcontext,238 andunderstandingofmentalstates,20,22,238 roleofculturein,239240 individualdifferencesin,239 Evolution,189,191,198 ofsocialbehaviors,220,221,222 oftheoryofmind,221 Executivefunction, vs.automaticcontrol,144145,148 competenceandperformance,121 andmetarepresentation,7,120 taskstoassess,122,123,124,134,138,141 andtheoryofmind,119120,121,23,125126,127,130,133,135,139,141,143149 Expectancies,171,174,178,179,181,182,183,187,188 vs.belief,188 Expectancyviolationprocedure,176,178,183,190 F Falsebeliefs,17,37,123,126,136,156 andexecutivefunction,138139,141,142,143,149 inprimates,187 andruleuse,136137,138 testsof,133134,183,184185 FeelingsseeEmotions Folkpsychology,245 acquisitionof,17,18,29,32 inchildren,17 Formatting,336337 Functionalism,7,171 G Gazemonitoring,19,46,47,64,331,332,334 inchimpanzees,199,200,221,222 Goalcorrectedpartnership,270271,272,282,283 Goals,269,270,275,276,278279,280,282,282 H Habituationparadigms,51,52,54,57,173,176,190191

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I Imitation, Baldwinand,2,5 behavioralreenactmentprocedure,20,2526,27,30,102,333 asanindexofunderstandingofintention,18,20,25,26,3435,68,333 andpretendplay,8687 andsharingbehavioralstates,35 Inference(s), andobserverinterpretation,319 knowledgeacquiredthrough,27,30,126 Inhibition,121,122123,128,129,134,144,145,146,147,148,149 Innatemechanisms,170,197,237 Instrumentalism,164165 Intention(s),2,57,21,44,243,269 andaction,79,82,320 ascriptionof,231,318319,244245 andbelief,6,22,31,320,333 andbrain,82 incommunication,63,64,7072,73,230231,304310,329,334 inculturalunderstanding,72 andnonhumanprimates,7273 taskstoassess,276 anddesire,6,21,30,3132,33,148,305,306,320,333 developmentof,4,79,85,333 directionalityand,2124,306 expressedinlanguage,233,304,305,312,313 developingunderstandingof,309313 expressedinpretendplay,234 andinterpretation,275,287,317,318,319,322,325,326,327,330,333 levelsof,8081,83,84,91 Innarratives,234236,325326 aspropositions,2122,312,320 asrepresentations,2122, simple,24,320 understandingof,27,33,47,66,7273,272,304,307,309310 Intentionactiondistinction,4,24,28,79,145,298,300 developmentof,2425,43 Intentioninaction,34,298299 Intentionalaction,2,7,83,124,125,140,299,302,318,319,321,322,324 anddescription,124 andverbtense,302303 Intentionalagent,6366,69,71 andsimulation,6869 Intentionalevents,321,322 Intentionalobjects,97,99,101 Intentionalrelations,4447 constructivisttheoryof,48 andfirstperson/thirdpersoninformation,45,47,4849,5960,156,160 andnoveltypreferenceparadigm,4950,51,54,57 Intentionalspeech,321,322,324,325 Intentionalstance,7778,157,231,245 Intentionalstates,321,324 directionofcausalityin,7 Intentionality,12,2122,44,96,229,243244,295,317ff. contentsof,323,324,326,327 consciousnessand,82,83,84,9697 andculture,333334 emergenceof,244 andemotion,80,83,84 functionalexplanationof,8,9, andgoaldirectedbehavior,12,45,2428,64,65,67,70,80,81,82,9697,125,244,269,272,308,333 parentperceptionof,245ff. andpersonalmeaning,317,318,321 andpsychologicalmode,322323,325,326,327 andreference,329,333,334,336 andselfotherknowledge,23,32,33 andsimpleintentions,317321 structuralexplanationof,78,9 Internalstates, communicationabout,231,232,233,275,277,282,284 innarratives,234235 J Jointattention,46,6466,210,331,212,331,334,336,337 ascharacteristicofintentionalagents,65,244,334

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emergenceof,65,66 K Knowing,158,165,189190 feelingof,161 limitsof,160 L Labeling,95,100,336337 Language, andaction,95,96,113114. incommunication,335 ofinternalstates,272273 andconsciousness,111113 anddevelopment/understandingofintentionalstates,271,335 knowledgeofintentionexpressedin,300301 avowed,303,310312,313 implicit,301302,304 explicit,302303,307310,313 andselfawareness,seepersonalpronouns andtheoryofmind,158,282283 Languageacquisition,11,113,245 LanguageAcquisitionSupportSystem(LASS),335,336 andscaffolding,336 andformatting,336 LevelsofConsciousnessmodel,96,100,102103,106,108,110111,113 andexecutivefunction,112113 andlanguage,111,113 Longtermmemory,98,100,103 M Maturation,2,99,237 Mentalstates, abilitytoreporton,229 ascriptionof,72,156157,182,272 andbehavior,223 communicationand,282 computational,169 conversationsabout,233 knowledgeof,210,211 interestin,231232 intentional,21,22,169 reasoningabout,197 Metacognitiveabilities,82,91,158,307,288 Metarepresentations,153 Mindreading,231, causesfordevelopmentof,237,238 primate,183 Modularity,65,210,238 Motion, animatevs.inanimate,28,29,3435,176,177,178181,182 expectancyviolationprocedure,176,178 andinferenceaboutgoals/beliefs,177178 Mutualgaze,331,seealsoGazemonitoringJointattention N Naiverealism,332 Nativism,38,66,80 Nineto12monthchange,46,6366,99 Nonlinguisticexpression,ofintention,312,313 O Objectpermanence,190 Ordinarylanguagephilosophy,296299 andintention,296 P Parentchildinteractions,37 aggressionin,283,284287 mutualgoalsin,271 intentionalcommunicationin,230231 andinfantcharacteristics,251253,255259,263 criteriaforattributionof,248249,250,251,260261 andparentcharacteristics,255,259 taskstomeasure,246247, Perceptions,andknowledge,155 Perseverativeerrors,104,105,106,107,122,128,129 Personalpronouns,andselfrecognition,8990 Planning,122,126,273,288,305 Planfulness,8

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andlanguage,113 Prediction(ofbehavior), vs.promise,310311,313 Prefrontalcortex,7,136 Pretendplay,8489,91,233234,335 developmentof,86,138 andfalsebelief,138 intentionexpressedin,85,91,234,335 selfawarenessin,86 selfrecognitionin,8687,88,91 Priorintention,299,301 Primates,seealsoAnimalstudies,chimpanzees alarmcallsfrom,172 asintentionalagents,6970,72 selfotheridentification,6970 Proceduralsystem,98 Propositions,157 andtheoryofmind,157 Psychologicaldistance,111 R Ramptask,135,147 Recursion, andconsciousness,110,112 levelsof,97 Referentialcommunications,334,335,337 developmentof,331332, Representation, animal,189 primate,175,182,189 andreality,159 understandingof,141,145,149 Representationalredescription,222 Rules,102,214215,216,219 biasin,127 embedded/higherorder,121,125,126,129,136,141,146 inferenceversusactionproblems,126127 andtheoryofmind,126,141 formulationof,113 andlanguage,113,129 perseverationand,105,106,107,122,128,129 Representationof,107108,109 selfreferring,102,104,109 Ruleuse developmentof,121,122,124 andinhibition,146 tasks,103,105,122,123 S Saysomethingdifferenttask,141143 Scaffolding,336 Schemata,99,141142,145,146,147,271,274,287,325,326 Seeingknowingdistinction,202,205,208,209,210,214 andexperience,210 Selfawareness,8283,90 objective,82,8990 andpretendplay,85 Subjective,82,90 Selfconcept,102 Selfconsciousness,80,81,101104 andemotion,84,85 Selfknowledge,68,69 Selfotherdistinction,18 Semanticsystem,98,101 Simulationtheory,160 Socialcognitivemodules,65 Socialcontext,269 Socialconvention,158 Socialreferencing,2223,24,46,64,244 Socialroles, primate,175 Speechacts,300301 T Theoryofmind,56,1718,37,46,9092,110,113,334 theoriesof,120 andepistemologicaldevelopment,163 andexecutivefunction,119120,126,133ff. inprimates,183 socialfactorsinacquisitionof,9,37 Theorytheory,161 Triadicinteractions,43,46,56,64 W WisconsinCardSortingTask,134,136 Workingmemory,100101

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CONTRIBUTORS
JanetWildeAstington,InstituteofChildStudy,UniversityofToronto JeromeBruner,DepartmentofPsychology,NewYorkUniversity JudyDunn,Social,GeneticandDevelopmentalPsychiatryResearchCentre,InstituteofPsychiatry,London CarolFleisherFeldman,DepartmentofPsychology,NewYorkUniversity DouglasFrye,GraduateSchoolofEducation,UniversityofPennsylvania AlisonGopnik,DepartmentofPsychology,UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley RachelGreenbaum,InstituteofChildStudy,UniversityofToronto MarcD.Hauser,DepartmentsofAnthropologyandPsychology,HarvardUniversity JennyJenkins,InstituteofChildStudy,UniversityofToronto DeepthiKamawar,CentreforAppliedCognitiveScience,OntarioInstituteforStudiesinEducation,UniversityofToronto BirgitLang,UniversityofSalzburg MichaelLewis,InstitutefortheStudyofChildDevelopment,RobertWoodJohnsonMedicalSchool,NewBrunswick,NJ AndrewMeltzoff,DepartmentofPsychology,UniversityofWashington ChrisMoore,DepartmentofPsychology,DalhousieUniversity,Halifax,NovaScotia DavidR.Olson,CentreforAppliedCognitiveScience,OntarioInstituteforStudiesinEducation,UniversityofToronto JosefPerner,DepartmentofPsychology,UniversityofSalzburg DanielJ.Povinelli,LaboratoryofComparativeBehavioralBiology,UniversityofSouthwesternLouisiana

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DouglasRamsay,InstitutefortheStudyofChildDevelopment,RobertWoodJohnsonMedicalSchool,NewBrunswick,NJ BettyM.Repacholi,MacquarieUniversity,Sydney,Australia J.StevenReznick,DepartmentofPsychology,UniversityofNorthCarolina,ChapelHill SandraStummer,UniversityofSalzburg MichaelTomasello,MaxPlanckInstituteforEvolutionaryAnthropology,Leipzig,Germany PhilipDavidZelazo,DepartmentofPsychology,UniversityofToronto