A M A NEY J A M A L !

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53

MOSQUES, COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

AND GENDER DIFFERENCES AMONG
ARAB AMERICAN MUSLIMS
AMANEY JAMAL

!"

T heories on gender and political engagement and participation have found

that women in general are less politically engaged than men (Verba,
Burns, and Schlozman 1997; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Scholars
have attributed higher levels of male participation to the availability of po-
litical resources as educational levels, income and employment opportunities
(Dalton 1988; Scholzman, Burns, and Verba 1984; Rosenstone and Hansen
1993). Few studies have examined the ways in which women of ethnic mi-
norities or, specifically, immigrant women are affected by this gender dynamic
(Lien 1998). Immigrant women face a host of obstacles that pose serious dif-
ficulties for mainstream political participation in the United States. Learn-
ing about politics in a new environment is a process of cognitive reach and
behavioral competence, which involves confronting and hurdling numerous
barriers: acquiring language, interacting with and in American culture, and
reconciling both homeland and American identities in their daily lives. Some
immigrants find themselves in networks or communities where they are able
to reproduce many aspects of their lives in the homeland. Others find them-
selves in environments completely detached from co-ethnics. Needing to ad-
just to a new form of life, immigrants face challenges compounded by the
reception with which immigrants are greeted in their new homes. Fear of oth-
ers with different backgrounds, wariness of those who speak a different lan-
guage, and unease about the impact immigrants have on the availability of
jobs all mediate the way immigrants understand themselves as members of

J O UR N A L O F MI D D LE E A ST W O M E N ’ S STU D IES
Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 2005). © 2005
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J O URN A L O F MID DLE E A ST W O MEN ’S STUDIES

a political society. For immigrants, then, the cognitive and behavioral path-
ways to ideal citizenship involve specific challenges that those who benefit
from birth in the US do not face and that may present themselves differently
to men and women.
In this plethora of literature on gender and political participation, we
know little about the factors that either promote or stifle female immigrant
patterns of political participation and engagement. More specifically, very
little is known about the factors that encourage or depress patterns of Mus-
lim Arab immigrant political participation in the US. When are Muslim Arab
women more likely to exercise their political voices? And which factors me-
diate their decisions to actively engage the political process around them?
In this paper, I argue that the differences in political engagement among
Arab Muslim men and women are not solely constructed by factors specific
to gender per se; rather, they are mediated by specific patterns of civic en-
gagement and involvement in the US. More specifically, because the Arab
Muslim women in my sample of Arab immigrants from the Detroit metro
area are more likely than men to be involved in mosques and ethnic organi-
zations, their levels of group consciousness are higher than their male coun-
terparts’. Women see their location in the US as one linked to broader
communal Arab and Muslim interests, while men tend to situate themselves
vis-à-vis their personal economic success. Further, because these Arab Mus-
lim women see their interests linked to larger communal priorities, they are
more willing than their male counterparts to exercise their political voices
when they perceive the community is targeted.

RELI G I O US I N STITUTI O N S A N D
P O LITI C A L P A RTI C IPATI O N

The academic community has long been interested in the role played
by religious institutions in fostering American civic and political engagement
(Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Jones-Correa and
Leal 2001; Wuthnow 1999; Peterson 1992; Greenberg 2000; Smidt 1999). Dat-
ing back to the early 1800s, Tocqueville was fascinated by the direct relation-
ship between church participation and the increased voluntaristic virtues of
American citizens. Through church participation, he believed, citizens forge
meaningful ties that prevail across pre-existing social cleavages and enhance
the potential for meaningful civic involvement. More recent scholarship has
focused on the extent to which religious sites bolster the civic skills deemed
 A M A NEY J A M A L !"
55

necessary for democratic forms of participation. Democratic theory, both as

practice and discourse, necessitates the involvement of an engaged citizenry
(Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). An engaged and concerned person ap-
proaches the ideal citizen.
Religious institutions are communities, groups of people who meet
regularly, who share beliefs and values that are articulated when they meet,
and who create a common interpretive context for their separate experiences.
Thus, in addition to forging ties between individuals and building their so-
cial skills, religious institutions also create a communal identity. This iden-
tity can have an important political significance even if the institution itself
does not sponsor political activities. It can create solidarity that allows indi-
viduals to take others’ concerns as their own. It can influence ideas about the
public good. It can transform events of private significance into causes with
public consequences.
Burns, Schlozman, and Verba find that among the general American
population, religious institutions foster political activity for men and women.
They find, however, that religious participation bolsters political activity for
men more than women. Gender and race consciousness do not necessarily
increase political activity but channel participation among women, African
Americans, and Latinos on issues related to civil rights and minority issues.
Building on this analysis, patterns of groups consciousness among Arab
American Muslim women suggest that ethnic-specific institutions help pro-
mote group consciousness in ways that enhance political engagement.

M USLI M W O M E N A N D M O S Q UE P A RTI C IPATI O N

In 2003, Amina Wadud applauded the gains Muslim women were

achieving at the grassroots levels in the US. “An exciting area of development
in Muslim women’s identity formation is the growth of Muslim women’s
grassroots organizations and networks.” For Muslim Americans both male
and female, mosques have become sites in which external contextual influ-
ences and issues like discrimination and stereotyping dominate religious ser-
mons and programmatic initiatives. The mosque, as a place of membership,
signals more than an instrumental attachment to a community—there is an
intrinsic spiritual dynamic which in of itself produces a sense of community
(Jamal in press; Abraham 2000; Bagby, Perl, and Froehle 2001; Bagby 2004).
Estimated at between six and seven million, the Muslim American popu-
lation is one of the fastest-growing religious minorities in the country. To-
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J O URN A L O F MID DLE E A ST W O MEN ’S STUDIES

day, American mosques number close to 1,200—a 62% increase since the
1980s. Within a four-year period, New York city itself witnessed a two-fold
increase in the number of mosques (Dodds 2002).1 More than 20% of US
mosques have Islamic schools associated with them, and mosque attendance
has increased 75% in the past five years, with approximately 1,625 Muslims
linked to each mosque (Bagby, Perl, and Froehle 2001). The Muslim Ameri-
can community is composed of both first-generation immigrants—prima-
rily from the Middle East and South East Asia—as well as second-, third-, and
fourth-generation Americans.2 US mosques gather Muslims from all sects and
generations, creating spaces for community and worship. Approximately 90%
of contemporary US mosques assemble congregations with mixed ethnic
backgrounds, including African Americans, Arab Americans, and Asians.
These mosques foster a sense of pan-ethnic Muslim identity. Although there
remains friction between various ethnic groups in specific mosque locales,
American mosques cultivate a new brand of communal Islam.
Although female mosque attendance is lower than female church atten-
dance, the mosque nevertheless serves as an important site for women’s civic
participation. Muslim women of all backgrounds gather at mosques for reli-
gious classes (h· alaqas), Friday prayers, charitable work, Islamic schools for
their children, and a variety of other activities. While participation in mosques
in many parts of the Arab world is relegated to the domain of Muslim men,
in the US, women play a more pronounced role in the mosque (Leonard
1993; Hermansen 1991). In fact, a comparison of survey data from the Middle
East and Detroit, Michigan reveals that women are much more involved in
mosques in the Detroit metro area than their counterparts in the Arab world.
Whereas 10% of all women in Jordan and 20% of all women in Morocco re-
port attending a mosque at least once a week, 37% of Arab Muslim women
in the Detroit metro area report this level of activity.3
In the first part of this paper, I argue that the development of political
engagement for immigrants is mediated by structures such as religious in-
stitutions and ethnic advocacy groups, which help to develop the communal
identities that give immigrants a voice and the ability to act. In the second
part of this paper, through a comparison of Muslim Arab male and female
responses, I highlight the ways in which ethnic institutions bolster levels of
political engagement for women. Because the women in my sample are more
likely to be in ethnic advocacy groups and involved in religious institutions,
they are also more politically engaged than the men in the sample.
 A M A NEY J A M A L !"
57

I examine one important aspect of political engagement in this paper:

the process by which immigrants learn to voice their concerns and speak up
when mistreated. This process is important for both women and men. This
paper examines the relationship between this dimension of political en-
gagement—the right to complain about a civic abuse—and Muslim Arab-
American mosque participation. Most studies on religious institutions and
American civic life focus on the role of churches, especially African Ameri-
can churches; however, very few studies have examined the role of mosques.
Unlike churches, mosques face external contextual influences that structure
political engagement differently. Primarily, Muslim Americans associated with
mosque communities consistently state that they feel unjustly portrayed and
targeted by American popular media and cinema.

SETTI N G A N D M ETH O D S

This chapter is based on in-depth, qualitative interviews conducted with

53 Arab immigrants, half male and half female, from the Detroit metropoli-
tan area, home to the highest concentration of Arab Americans and the most
visible Arab community in the United States.4 All participants immigrated to
the United States as teenagers or adults and have been in the US for at least
five years and at most fifty. They occupy a variety of economic circumstances
(from women on welfare to storekeepers to small businessmen to wealthy sub-
urban families) and live in a variety of neighborhoods (from majority-Arab
streets in Dearborn to upscale suburbs). Of the participants, 25% are Chris-
tian (either Orthodox or Catholic) and the other 75% are Muslim (either
Sunni, Shifia, or Druze). They claim seven nationalities of origin (Palestin-
ian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, Jordanian, Algerian, and Egyptian) and ten send-
ing areas, including all of the above as well as Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and
Canada. Sixty-seven percent are citizens; all but two of the rest have perma-
nent residence.
Respondents were recruited through a variety of means: personal net-
works in mosques and churches, a radio advertisement, and referrals from
various acquaintances. Further, staff and clients were approached in the wait-
ing room of a social service agency catering primarily to Arab Americans, and
the researchers introduced themselves to customers in restaurants and Arab-
owned stores. The resulting sample is not statistically representative of the
Arab community in the Detroit metro Area; however, a deliberate attempt was
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J O URN A L O F MID DLE E A ST W O MEN ’S STUDIES

made to maximize the diversity of respondents, with the intention of learn-

ing about the immigrant experience both within and outside of ethnic en-
claves and ethnic-primary social circles.
To understand whether mosque participation structures political en-
gagement differently for men and women, I excluded all Christian respon-
dents from this sample and grouped Muslims (n=38) into two groups: those
who attended the mosque on a frequent basis (n=18) and those who did not
(n=20). I found that the Muslim Arabs in the sample who did not attend a
mosque accepted stereotyping as the price of becoming American, turning
their anger on their ethnic community rather than on those who disparaged
it. By contrast, Muslim Arabs who were members of and participated in a
mosque took a different approach, challenging stereotypes and harassment
as both unjust and un-American. For them, their communal identity as Mus-
lims and Arabs completed, and did not compete with, their identification as
Americans. For women, however, the “mosqued/unmosqued”5 differentiation
mattered less than for the men in the sample. I will discuss this finding be-
low and attribute it to the unmosqued women’s involvement in ethnic ad-
vocacy groups, which paralleled the mosque’s effects in creating a sense of
community.
The data through which I approach immigrant forms of political en-
gagement—defined narrowly in this paper as their willingness to use state
institutions for the exercise of political voice and in order to change the be-
havior of state institutions—rests primarily on one set of hypothetical ques-
tions. To understand whether they felt empowered to complain about
government misconduct, I asked them what advice they would give an Arab
friend who was harassed by police while being issued a speeding ticket.6 I
grouped their responses to concerns about police harassment into two cat-
egories. Some said, without hesitation, that they would encourage their friend
to file a complaint against the police officer. A second group, however, felt
that the speeder probably deserved the ticket and were dubious about his right
to complain. 7
Of the 38 Muslims interviewed, I found that those likely to use their
voices in response to the specter of police harassment were also more likely
to be mosqued (see Table 1). They felt comfortable with the voice they had
attained and familiar with the available pathways to participation. They were
also confident that they had rights warranting protection. Those who did not
see the officer’s actions as discriminatory, by contrast, did not necessarily lack
a sense of knowledge or a desire to act. But they feared that complaining
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Table 1: Mosqued and Non-Mosqued Immigrant

Responses to Police Harassment
Mosqued Non-Mosqued
Police Harassment: Complain 60% 44%
n=9/15 n=8/18
Police Harassment: Speeder Deserved It 40% 56%
n=6/15 n=11/18

would exacerbate stereotypes rather than dispel them. Thus, they had a stra-
tegic belief in the benefits of non-engagement. This sentiment is captured well
in Nancy Rosenblum’s words:
[W]e are reluctant to object because we don’t want to cause a scene. Why?
. . . because we lack faith that others share our indignation. We imagine
that in admonishing a bank teller who treats a customer unfairly we will
be met with indifference or hostility from those who have been kept wait-
ing in line. We do not expect encouragement and agreement. And this la-
tent mistrust is self-perpetuating. (1999: 81)

What accounts for this variation between mosqued and non-mosqued re-
spondents? And how do these responses vary when we subdivide the sample
along gender lines?

M O S Q UE M E D I ATI O N O F P O LITI C A L E N G A G E M E N T

Muslim Americans on their “path to Americanization” express deep con-

cern about the growing stereotypes associated with “being Muslim.” Stereo-
types in both the mainstream media and the Hollywood industry paint the
community as closely linked to terrorism, somewhat barbaric, and with in-
humane world views characterized by little regard for human life. Most Mus-
lims say that neither Hollywood (77%) nor the media (68%) fairly portray
Muslims and Islam.8 In 1997, Yvonne Haddad, a leading scholar on Muslim
Americans, discussed the results of a poll taken in the 1980s:
[W]e asked people whether they believed America discriminated against
Muslims. Of a sample of 365 people, 100 percent said yes. Then, when we
asked whether any had personally experienced discrimination, none had.
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So it is in the air. The press contributes to the paranoia, and we cannot

ignore it . . . [T]hey [Muslims] get up in the morning and read press re-
ports about terrorists and they panic. There is this fear that at any mo-
ment, you’ll have a mob marching, trying to bomb a mosque. It has
happened.

In the days, weeks, and months following September 11, attacks on

people of Muslim background increased. Muslim Americans have become
accustomed to hearing frequent reports of attacks on Muslims and mosques,
even in some cases witnessing the endless FBI interviews of community
members. Hate crimes—crimes committed for no other reason than “guilt
by reason of ethnicity”—have become a reality to which Muslim Ameri-
cans are gradually adjusting (Haddad 2002). Since Islam is still a greatly mis-
understood religion in the US, Islamic images generated by the American
media and entertainment machines continue to dominate conventional struc-
tures of cultural knowledge. This conventional wisdom has colored even po-
litical debate in highly ambivalent terms. US politicians seem to acknowledge
that Muslim Americans are a growing source of political power in the US,
and some extend their efforts to acquire Muslim votes. Congressman Bonior,
for instance, a democratic representative from Michigan, reported that “[i]t
was once the kiss of death to be involved with that [Muslim] community.
Now a large number of people seek their support” (Afridi 2001). Yet, other
politicians have been less willing to accept the political support of the Mus-
lim community. During the hotly contested New York senate elections, Rick
Lazzio accused Hillary Clinton of accepting “blood money” when a member
of the Muslim Public Affairs Council donated $50,000 toward her campaign.
Leaving Muslim leaders exasperated and speechless, she returned the money
to the generous donor.
Although the US offers Muslim Americans unique forms of political
expression and religious observance, the political climate surrounding this
community remains overshadowed by the propagation of stereotypes and
misperceptions. Community mobilization resources have been increasingly
employed to alter the public view of the American public toward American
Muslims. In addition to serving as sites for political incorporation and mo-
bilization, mosques are increasingly becoming sites where Muslims attempt
to bridge the gaps between Americans and Muslim Americans that stereo-
types have created. Open houses and interfaith dialogues have been initiated
at various mosques across the countries as Muslims try to reach out to mem-
bers of other religious denominations. When faced with local or national is-
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61

sues that concern the Muslim community, like the American Muslim com-
munity call to support the Eid Stamp, mosque members initiate phone drives
and petitions. Today, the American Muslim mosque is not only a house of wor-
ship or merely a community center; in many ways, it has also become a locus
of advocacy work to address misconceptions and anti-Muslim discrimination.
Mosque participants are therefore situated in a unique and multi-func-
tional locale that serves their inspirational, communal, social, and educational
needs; this locale similarly links them to sympathizers in other religious de-
nominations, puts them in contact with local governing institutions, and
keeps them informed about new and important political developments. The
mosque also serves another key role in that it creates a space for Muslims to
speak about their experiences with discrimination and stereotypes. Mosque
participants develop ties to mosque colleagues who similarly perceive that
Muslims, as a communal unit, suffer from an outside world that unfairly
judges them. In many ways, they function as ethnic advocacy groups. Mosques
in the US serve as collectivizing forums that highlight Muslim common
struggles in mainstream American society. These “common fate” attitudes and
attachments unite Muslim Americans in mosque communities, whereby the
injustice that occurs to one Muslim becomes an injustice that has befallen the
entire Muslim community (Bobo and Gillian 1990; Miller et al. 1981).9
In addition to common-fate perceptions among the mosqued Muslim
community, visible signs of religious difference potentially exacerbate the
sense that this community is under a social microscope. Most Muslim women
who attend the mosque are identifiable by and differentiated from the gen-
eral public due to the Islamic head scarf they wear—the h· ij āb. Muslim
mosqued women in the sample often talked about needing to prove they
knew how to speak English, that they were not stupid, and that they could
comprehend certain conversations. These feelings associated with being dif-
ferent—almost singled out by appearance—are more likely to be addressed
at mosque locations. Husbands too hear their wives’ stories and often feel
sympathetic to their experiences.
Muslim males, less identifiable as “other” to the public, may also feel that
they can be singled out for reasons similarly related to their religious iden-
tity. Mosqued Muslims are more likely to feel the effects of discrimination
in the workplace; for instance, they may need to perform the five daily prayers
in their employment settings. Observing specific Islamic guidelines—such as
not drinking alcohol—may impact work-related functions, and defending
other Muslims when inaccurate and hostile conversations occur in the work-
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place can further prejudice co-workers. These patterns of Muslim religious ob-
servance may generate feelings that view the non-Muslim community as intol-
erant or that perpetuate discriminatory conceptions of difference. In many ways,
the Muslim head scarf and Islamic rituals is yet another layer that adds to per-
ceptions of discrimination among the mosqued Muslim American community.
Mosque participants, as a concentrated group of observant Muslims, feel
the pangs of stereotypes more sharply than non-mosqued Muslims because
their basic religious identities visibly differentiate them from mainstream so-
ciety. Mosques further forge common-fate tendencies among Muslims. By
examining the context of mosque participation in the US, this paper seeks
to conceptualize the relationship between religious involvement and levels of
political engagement among Muslim mosque attendees. It seeks to show that
membership in a mosque does translate into a greater awareness that stereo-
types are harmful and the willingness to act upon that knowledge. That
mosque populations are more cognizant about the effects of stereotypes and
discrimination offers us a unique opportunity to study the impact of exter-
nal contextual influences—in this case, perceived patterns of stereotypes—
on levels of political engagement among Muslim Americans.
An initial hypothesis for the findings in Table 1 might be that Muslims
who frequent the mosque are more politically efficacious or knowledgeable
about their rights. Mosqued individuals were more likely than non-mosqued
individuals to complain about police harassment, whereas non-mosqued
Muslims were more likely to blame the speeder for speeding. Non-mosqued
individuals might appear less willing to link discrimination to harassment.
They may be misinformed about their rights, or they may be operating from
a source of fear that does not want to confront the police about question-
able acts. On both counts, however, this is not true.
First, I find that mosque participants more readily believe that the po-
lice officer deliberately abused his powers by being biased. Compared to non-
mosqued Muslims, mosque participants in the sample were more likely to
believe that stereotypes of the community were indeed harmful (44% to
15%). Further, among the sample of Muslim Arab Americans, not a single
non-mosqued individual reported that he or she had personally experienced
discrimination. Of the mosqued sample, however, 40% did report an uneasy
experience in which they felt their religion (including symbols of that reli-
gion, like the hijab) or ethnicity was the primary source of the mistreatment.
These constituents are more likely to witness discriminatory practices fueled
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63

by unjust stereotypes, and they are more likely to address the problem seek-
ing to raise non-Muslim awareness through education. This Muslim woman
spoke about the types of discrimination that exist in the US, clearly point-
ing out that she felt women who wear the hijab would probably have a hard
time looking for a job:
There is a kind of discrimination . . . hidden discrimination. . . .

[How is it hidden?] Like, if you want to apply to job as a Muslim woman

adhering to your religion, it won’t be as easy to find job as [if] you looked
like every other person. So if you are different, it’s not that simple.

This same woman also reported her willingness to complain about police ha-
rassment:
But I took him [the police officer] to court and I encourage people to do
the same because you shouldn’t let people to get away with such behav-
ior. This is a wrong thing to let go. You have to let people see that that
hurts. Because some people are ignorant of other people’s feelings. They
think it’s OK to step all over you, maybe you don’t have feelings, maybe
you are not like them. When you let them hear your voice, they know
more about you.

This woman feels that she was unduly harassed because of her hijab. Her will-
ingness to go to court ensures that she was not mistreated because of her re-
ligious identification. She believes that through proper education, prejudice
and bias can be addressed. Other Muslim mosqued women in the sample told
of uneasy experiences with the police. They explained that the police were
rude and unnecessarily ticketed them. Said this woman:
And he stopped me. And he asked me [if I knew] why he stopped me?
And I said such and such. And he said, did you know that this is not right
to do it? I said, yeah, but she [another driver] was very slow and I did not
want to keep the traffic behind me. He was very very rude and mean . . .
Sometimes the policeman, you know, they give you an attitude.

She and her husband see the officer’s terse demeanor as one dictated by his
prejudicial lens. Her husband adds:
I have to speak up for my rights. Even if I lose, I have to fight for my
rights, to make me comfortable . . . If she is not wearing that thing [hijab]
they would have probably let her go.
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One male mosqued individual, who also feels that the community is
subjected to unfair stereotypes, readily encouraged the speeder to complain;
he urged the speeder to “write a letter to the chief of police, to the mayor of
the city, or to the city council. Absolutely,” he continued, “don’t take this.”
Similarly, this male mosqued Muslim added:
Go to the court, take him to the court. That exactly happened to one of
the guys, who the police stopped him, and he said, you were speeding—
no. He actually had an accident, and that accident was not his fault, so
the police told him, “You sound like you are a stranger. Why did you come
here, to this country?” I said, “What did you say to him?” He said, “Noth-
ing.” I said, “If I were you, I would just take his badge number and take
his name and take him to the court. Because it’s not his—because this
country, basically, is based on foreigners. And even if that was not the case,
as far as you are legal in this country, as far as you doing your job, as far
as you are—it’s not his concern!” So I would just take him to court.

These findings illustrate that Muslim Arab Americans who share simi-
lar experiences—in this case, the collective mosque experience and the reli-
gious symbols associated with it—are more likely to understand phenomena
like police harassment as being informed by prejudicial motives; they are less
likely to dismiss it altogether, as the non-mosqued members of the sample
do. This highlights the different ways that these two distinct groups of Mus-
lim Arab Americans think about and engage the political institutions sur-
rounding them. Mosqued individuals are more likely to see the police’s action
as based on prejudice; they seek out appropriate channels in an effort to al-
ter pre-existing misconceptions about the community and make sure police
officers are held accountable for their discriminatory practices. Non-mosqued
individuals, however, refuse to see such police action as prejudicial. In an at-
tempt to exonerate state representatives of wrongdoing, these individuals in
fact attribute blame on the speeder, without much qualification.
Non-mosqued males placed blame on the community, pointing out that
in Dearborn, Michigan there are a lot of Arabs who drive recklessly. He says:
Well, there is something here. The new generation, let’s say, teenagers, 18,
20, 21, the younger people in Dearborn here . . . drive crazy, the Arabs, I
mean, really, really, I never heard somebody been treated by the police bad.

Another non-mosqued individual distinguished between “ticketing” and “ha-

rassment”; he notes that American police “do not harass. They just give you
a little paper with your ticket, and that’s it. They don’t do these things [ha-
rass] here.”
 A M A NEY J A M A L !"
65

Both responses illustrate that these non-mosqued individuals are not

unwilling to see the actions of the police as wrong; rather, they refuse to cite
discrimination as a motive for the officer’s behavior. And when possible, they
turn their lenses to the community to look for patterns of behavior to blame.
Absent the collectivizing experience of the mosque, these individuals don’t
identify with the similar common-fate perceptions about discrimination and
stereotyping that their mosque counterparts share. (Tate 1994; Stokes 2003;
Miller et al. 1991; Calhoun-Brown 1996).

C O M M O N -F ATE V ERSES I N D I V I D U A L I N TERESTS

In addition to mosque participation, other factors influence individual

assessments of the degree of discriminatory practices and the appropriate re-
sponses to such actions. All of the Muslim Arab immigrants in the sample
spoke of the opportunities available to them in the US. The vast majority con-
trasted these newly found opportunities with the lack thereof in the Middle
East. When I asked respondents to speak about discrimination in the US, I
found that interviewees consistently acknowledged that there was discrimi-
nation and a plethora of negative stereotypes about the community; the im-
pact of this prejudicial environment on their personal achievements, however,
had been minimal. Hence, those individuals not involved in mosques that es-
pouse common-fate tendencies were more likely not to attribute police ac-
tions to prejudice. Individuals in mosques (or similar ethnic advocacy groups)
were more likely to see discriminatory acts as such and state that they were
willing to complain. As mosque participants—as religious members of a com-
munity who are potentially singled out—their assessments of discrimination
included not only themselves and their personal levels of attainment but also
the larger Muslim community. Those who were not involved in the mosque
were less willing to blame the police officer, less willing to complain, and more
willing to place blame on the driver.
In the category of individuals who stated that the speeder deserved the
harassment, I find two subcategories. All of these individuals praised the US
for being kind to them and for allowing them to meet their potential in terms
of economic rewards and benefits. This group is composed of professionals,
store owners, and businessmen. Having done well in the US, they are careful
to guard their successes. They fall into two categories. One group of individu-
als does not acknowledge that discrimination truly exists in the US; they hold
that their economic advancement has not been blocked by discriminatory
barriers. The US is linked to their good fortune and prosperity; to acknowl-
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edge discrimination and to realize that members of the American law enforce-
ment system might have to do something with it is to upset this link between
“America” and “personal prosperity.” Introducing discrimination into the dis-
course of the American Dream might undermine that dream altogether and
leave them suffering economic repercussions. One non-mosqued Muslim in-
dividual clearly articulated this relationship:
I mean, United States, it’s a great country, and God bless America. I have
no doubt about it. For feeding the kids, the poor, and treat them free and
give the elderly the right to live with little, I mean, they provide them with
money and medicare, and that’s a blessing. Nobody could deny that un-
less they are stupid, or mean, or doesn’t understand what they say. You
know what I mean?

This non-mosqued male wanted to emphasize the point that the US is

an inherently good place to be. It is kind to its citizens; it provides opportu-
nity for all ages and sectors. Those who see the US as a place that discrimi-
nates and offers opportunities to some and not others, in his opinion, are
wrong. This pattern of responses was shared by similar non-mosqued indi-
viduals who felt indebted to the US for its kindness and wealth of opportu-
nity. Often comparing their experiences to their home countries, they are less
likely to hold negative attitudes about the US. In response to the survey ques-
tion about police harassment, this non-mosqued male cites “disbelief ”:
First of all, I would not believe him. I think the police here are very re-
spectful. Because it happened to me a few times, the police stopped me
and they were of utmost respect and kindness.

Later in the interview, he explains how indebted he is to the American sys-

tem for offering him opportunities that he was unable to attain in his home
country. “[I]n Syria,” he argues, “I should [have been] able to ask my own
president” for assistance. Of course, structuring this analysis is the notion that
civil servants in Syria do not equally represent citizen interests.
Unlike this group, other non-mosqued Muslim Arabs do recognize that
stereotypes exist; however, they are very cautious in about complaining about
the police or the US more generally. Their fear stems from two primary
sources. On the one hand, they fear that the community may suffer economic
repercussions if they are seen to be ungrateful or overly critical of the sys-
tem that has given them new lives. On the other hand, they also worry that
labeling police harassment as discriminatory may feed into pre-existing,
harmful stereotypes about the community. Because Muslims and Arabs ac-
 A M A NEY J A M A L !"
67

knowledge that they are unfairly characterized in public discourse, there is

fear among this group that members of the Arab community will try to get
away with breaking the law and resort to crying discrimination when they
are held accountable. This, they argue, will feed into and exacerbate pre-
existing negative stereotypes about the community. Examine the statement
by this non-mosqued male who says that the Arab driver deserved the ha-
rassment:
And I also ask that the Arab community to fight anybody within the com-
munity who does harm to the community. He who does something that
is not legal should be punished by the community before the US punishes
him. Because when one person does something wrong it reflects on all
Arabs. Unfortunately, the media here will say “Arabs,” when it is not all
Arabs who did wrong. They don’t say one person did something wrong
because s/he is wrong. They describe us as all the Arabs did wrong. Where
only 5% probably do something wrong and 95% do things right.

In a similar vein, another mosqued male who felt the speeder deserved it ar-
gues that police harassment should not be seen as a larger pattern in society:

You know you don’t blame the American society for that. You have a
drunk come in sometimes and calls you names just because they are
fighting Saddam Hussein or whatever. You don’t have nothing to do with
that and they don’t have nothing to do with that, but sometimes on an
individual basis, sometimes they don’t like you, the way you are. Who-
ever you are! But I wouldn’t look at that as an obstacle to success or any-
thing, you know. If the people [Arabs] make that an obstacle in their way,
then they have the problem, not the others.

The respondent above was one of five males among mosque participants
who said that the speeder deserves the harassment or that the incident was
not motivated by prejudice on part of the police. Although he acknowledges
that stereotypes might be an impeding force to Arab and Muslim advance-
ment, he notes that he has also enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle in the US.
These non-mosqued individuals who speak of negative stereotypes against the
community while praising the level of opportunity available must reconcile
two competing world views in their responses. On the one hand, they want
to help out the community but want to make sure that only “real” cases of
discrimination are brought forth; and that those members of the community
who are claiming discrimination are indeed quite justified. And on the other
hand, they also want to ensure that the US continues to offer opportunities
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J O URN A L O F MID DLE E A ST W O MEN ’S STUDIES

for upward mobility. This individual, who is willing to place blame on the
speeder, similarly invokes knowledgability about the law enforcement system
as a criteria for lodging complaints:
You just have to know about the system, and you could have a lot of ad-
vantages here . . . For many things, the newcomers, you have to tell them,
if you’re going to speed, this is what’s going to happen, and what’s going
to happen is you get a ticket. Again, this is a lesson they have to have.
Don’t abuse the system. Here, they give you some more freedom, just don’t
take it and go beyond it.

This non-mosqued Muslim points out an interesting distinction between

himself and the “others” who may be willing to cite discrimination as the
source of the policeman’s treatment. The “others,” here, are the newcomers—
newcomers who may jeopardize the gains and accomplishments of the pre-
vious generations of Muslim immigrants. Although the above respondents
provide different reasons for not blaming the policeman or seeing his actions
as harassment, the rationale behind each of their answers is similar. They wish
to guarantee and maintain the level of opportunities they have in American
society and feel compelled to demonstrate the law-abiding standards under-
lying their citizenship and their dedication to “America.”
The non-mosqued individuals who spoke of the economic rewards (in
the sample, these individuals were predominately male) in America and ex-
pressed their concerns about stereotypes are unlike the group of mosqued
individuals who immediately stated that they would complain about the ques-
tionable police behavior. Those who were willing to complain viewed their
actions as an invocation of civic rights; they had had the right to protect
themselves. Those who placed blame on the speeder were more likely to be
in a category that attempted to balance two sets of concerns: their individual
economic mobility in American society and common-fate perceptions linked
to the effects of stereotypes. These Muslim immigrants must reconcile two
world views—one based on a sense of opportunity and fortune in the United
States and one based on an acknowledgment that Muslims and Arabs are un-
fair targets of distorted images—in order to determine both the impact of
discriminatory practices and their own willingness to engage the political in-
stitutions about them.
In this frame of mind, these individuals are more likely to think in terms
of their civic duties towards the system—how best to serve the system that
has offered them opportunities and guarantee that the system is not unfairly
 A M A NEY J A M A L !"
69

Table 2: Responses to Police Harassment Divided by Gender

Female Male
Mosqued Non-Mosqued Mosqued Non-Mosqued
Police Harassment:
Complain 83% 78% 44% 11%
N=5/6 N=7/9 N=4/9 N=1/9
Police Harassment:
Speeder Deserved It 27% 22% 56% 89%
N=1/6 N=2/9 N=5/9 N=8/9

subjected to attacks by other co-ethnics on the grounds of discriminatory

practices by state officials. These concerns, as embodied in particular re-
sponses to the question about police harassment, reflect a negotiated mental
settlement characterized by an evaluation of benefits both personal and com-
munal. They believe that their willingness not to link the policeman’s behavior
to discrimination, as well as their unwillingness to engage the state on these
grounds, is in fact in the interests of not only the larger Muslim community,
but also their own economic stability.

TH E I M PA C T O F G E N D ER

Dividing the sample by gender highlights these points more clearly (see
Table 2). In this sample, women are more likely to see the acts of the police
as motivated by prejudice; therefore, they are more likely to complain. The
non-mosqued Arab women share many experiences with their mosqued
counterparts. All of the non-mosqued women who reported they would com-
plain are also involved in Arab American ethnic advocacy groups, which per-
form similar functions as the mosque in creating a communal identity aware
of prejudicial stereotypes. The women in the sample who downplay the po-
lice officer’s actions share features with non-mosqued males. They are more
likely not to be attached to major ethnic advocacy groups.
When I subdivide the data along gender lines, the most striking finding
is the impact exerted by gender on evaluations of the speeder. Men were more
likely to say the speeder deserved it than women (64% to 25%). On the one
hand, the category of non-mosqued Muslim Arab men contained the largest
70 #!"##
J O URN A L O F MID DLE E A ST W O MEN ’S STUDIES

percentage of individuals who would exonerate the policeman. On the other,

mosqued men were more likely to complain about police harassment. In these
interviews, they—like the mosqued women—were also more likely to speak
about personal incidents of discrimination and more likely to exhibit the
common-fate overtones of unfair treatment associated with mosque partici-
pation. Mosqued men, as well as women, are therefore less likely to dismiss
the behavior of the policeman than non-mosqued men.
The non-mosqued males in the sample offer a rich story about the pro-
cesses involved in assessing discrimination and engaging local authority as a
remedy. These non-mosqued individuals are in fact very engaged with the
American political system. Fifty percent are politically active, reporting that
they have voted, petitioned, and/or participated in public demonstrations.
They are successful professionals, students, and business owners interacting
significantly with mainstream America. Their disapprobation of the speeder
instead of the police is predicated on a lack of common-fate experiences that
directly link stereotypes to individual and personal experiences of discrimi-
nation. Examining the police-speeder exchange with a lens turned inward,
they do not see stereotypes against Arabs and Muslims as hindering their per-
sonal efforts to succeed. Because they reported that they do not have personal
experience with discrimination, they are also not able to tie stereotypes to
barriers that inhibit community advancement. They have been able to move
through society relatively unscathed by the effects of discrimination, and they
also are concerned that accusations of discrimination may sound false, im-
mature, or unjustifiable, doing nothing more than offending the country that
has been kind to them. Accusations of discrimination may even create “real”
discrimination or impair the progress that they have been able to make in
this society.
The differences in the sample may appear to be highlighted solely by
gender, but in fact what is being revealed is the economic substrata that struc-
tures the Arab Muslim relationship between common-fate perceptions (or
lack thereof) and plausible discriminatory patterns (Table 3). This economic
division directly influences the content and form of political engagement es-
poused by this group of Muslim Arabs. Non-mosqued males in the sample,
most of whom are professionally employed or owners of their own businesses,
are less likely to be involved in Arab advocacy groups—groups that may gen-
erate common-fate perceptions about the impact of negative stereotyping.
Only three of the nine non-mosqued males are involved in an Arab advo-
cacy group. Mosqued males similarly employed are almost equally divided in
 A M A NEY J A M A L !"
71

Table 3: Responses of Non-Mosqued Muslims by

Involvement in Arab or Muslim Advocacy Groups
Female Male
Belongs to ethnic Does not belong Belongs to ethnic Does not belong
advocacy group to ethnic advocacy group to ethnic
advocacy group advocacy group
Police Harassment:
Complain 86% 50% 33% 0%
N=6/7 N=1/2 N=1/3 N=0/6
Police Harassment:
Speeder Deserved It 14% 50% 67% 100%
N=1/7 N=1/2 N=2/3 N=6/6

how they respond to the police. Those who say the speeder deserves it balance
their appreciation for economic opportunities in the US with perceptions
about the impact of discrimination. They fear that increased confrontation
with the state might make matters worse for Arab Americans. However,
mosqued males who say they would complain see discrimination as a poten-
tially destructive force. They, like the female mosqued individuals in the
sample or the unmosqued but politically active women, feel obligated to ex-
press their concerns to the appropriate authorities.
In this sample, female non-mosqued members share many similar fea-
tures with their female mosqued counterparts. Seven of the nine non-
mosqued women are members of Arab ethnic advocacy groups, which help
to address the feelings about stereotyping, discrimination, and common-fate
perceptions that are analogous to those of mosqued women. As students or
employees of Arab-owned businesses, they are less likely to be professionally
employed in mainstream companies. The non-mosqued women who say the
speeder deserves it, on the other hand, are not involved in advocacy work and
do value the levels of opportunity in the US. Therefore, they do not exhibit
the common-fate tendencies that other organized members of the sample do.
The one member in this category who both says that the speeder is to blame
and participates in an Arab advocacy group demonstrates a similar rationale
to mosqued males who blame the speeder; she fears that the community
might bring upon itself increased levels of stereotyping:
72 #!"##
J O URN A L O F MID DLE E A ST W O MEN ’S STUDIES

And he has to acknowledge that he was speeding. Because what I don’t

like also is people crying discrimination when they are at fault! But it’s
happening! . . . We are 100% American citizens from an Arab background.
And we have to fight discrimination against Arabs, stereotyping of Arabs,
showing the Arab as an ugly, frightening terrorist. This is what we need
to fight, because every human being deserves respect.

Although she acknowledges that discrimination and stereotypes exist, she—

a successful real estate agent—is also concerned about the possible ramifi-
cations of rashly crying discrimination or confronting state institutions with
these types of concerns.

PER C EPTI O N S A B O UT G O V ER N M E N T

Interestingly, both mosqued and non-mosqued individuals view the

state as impartial, although both groups have different structural differences
and experiences that influence their opinions of state officials. Those who
perceived wrongdoing on the part of the police officer consistently stated that
they would resort to government institutions to make their cases heard. Not
one respondent doubted the state’s ability to uphold the law fairly and equally.
The police officer’s discriminatory practices are interpreted as the actions, not
of a biased or prejudicial political institution, but rather of a misinformed
individual. Although some believed that their complaint would reap few re-
sults—because it was their word against that of the police officer’s—they still
chose to have their day in court. Their faith in the legal process to allow them
a voice is deeply respected. In other words, they can tell their story—narrate
their plight in front of others—so that others will become more educated.
They also forge stronger bonds with others in the community through the
very act of storytelling. Due to their faith in the legal system, they adamantly
state that they would complain about officers who abuse their power. Good
citizens, that is, protect their civic rights and channel critique through puta-
tively benign state institutions in order to alter misperceptions leading to
unjustified targeting. As long as state institutions respond to their concerns,
they feel protected.
In a similar vein, those non-mosqued respondents who say that the
speeder deserves it also have an apparently untarnished image of benevolent
government that serves the interests of its citizens. So convinced are they by
the impartial practices of political institutions that they cannot even ascribe
wrongdoing to a government representative. Applauding the opportunities
 A M A NEY J A M A L !"
73

available to them in the US and experiencing neither personal discrimina-

tion nor the common-fate sentiments associated with religious institutions,
these non-mosqued Muslims defend the state unequivocally. The political
environment that has allowed them to move freely and prosper is inherently
a good government. In many ways, these individuals see themselves as ser-
vants of the state, simultaneously protecting their own individual interests and
those of the government. By curtailing “accusations” against the state, accu-
sations that may potentially stain its distinguished reputation, these individu-
als uphold their world view of civic duties and citizenship vis-à-vis the state.
By contrast, those individuals who are unwilling to blame the police be-
cause they fear increased levels of negative stereotypes against the commu-
nity are more likely to be mosqued members (or members of advocacy
groups), but they are so convinced that they have been misrepresented that
they want to carefully diagnose cases of discrimination before they label them
as such. Carefully navigating the system, they balance economic interests with
the levels of harmful, public stereotypes. This group of individuals may be-
lieve that the government will listen to their complaints, but they fear aug-
mented levels of stereotyping against the community. Recognizing that some
complaints might be beneficial to the community while others may not, their
levels of engagement are directly structured by a careful selection of the cases
worth taking to the government. These individual negotiations, exhausting
as they may be, clearly illustrate the ambiguity and caution built into Mus-
lim Arab relationships to state institutions. That this group of highly cogni-
zant, involved individuals chooses to protect its community by not
approaching government demonstrates that the external contextual influ-
ences—in this case, the impact of stereotypes—hinders the willingness of in-
dividuals to engage their governing institutions.

C O N C LUSI O N

This data provides us with an intriguing account of the influence of ste-

reotypes and discrimination on political engagement. Individuals will only
respond to actions when they believe the benefits of complaining outweigh
the plausible repercussions. For women involved in mosques and ethnic as-
sociations, complaining for the sake of the community’s welfare supersedes
other concerns. Due to their participation in religious and other civic orga-
nizations, mosqued individuals foster ties premised on common-fate world
views and thus more readily process and respond to harassing acts as a means
74 #!"##
J O URN A L O F MID DLE E A ST W O MEN ’S STUDIES

of protecting both their civil rights and their community at large. Arab
American Muslim women in this sample are more likely to be involved in
Arab ethnic advocacy groups, and as such these women exhibit similar ten-
dencies as their mosqued counterparts. They are more likely to identify acts
of the police as discriminatory and take action.
Ethnic institutions play multifaceted roles in the daily lives of Arab Mus-
lim women. Not only does participation in ethnic-specific institutions, such
as mosques, allow women the opportunity to practice their faith, preserve key
elements of their identities, and situate themselves in larger communal dis-
courses, but it also increases their levels of political efficacy and willingness
to exercise voice over silence. For Arab Muslim women, therefore, ethnic in-
stitutions serve as vehicles of cultural and identity preservation while simul-
taneously increasing levels of female political capital in ways that bode well
for mainstream political participation. Arab and Muslim women, it has been
argued, place the interests of their communities above and beyond their own
personal interests. This paper, however, demonstrates that female promotion
of communal interests need not come at the expense of individual welfare.
Through participation in ethnic community associations, these Arab Muslim
females have adopted discourses of individual rights and responsibilities while
simultaneously assuming their roles as communal guardians.

N O TES
I would like to thank Sondra Hale, Frances Hasso, Ann Lin, Ellen Lust-Okar,
John Mollenkoph, Andrew Shryock, and Sherifa Zuhur and the reviewers of the Jour-
nal of Middle East Women’s Studies for very useful and constructive comments.
1. In 1980, the five boroughs contained only eight or nine mosques, a number
that expanded, according to Marc Ferris, to about thirty-seven in 1991. By 1994, there
were over seventy mosques; the number of mosques in New York city had doubled
in three years.
2. The African American community makes up 30% of the Muslim American
population in the US.
3. Findings based on the 4th Wave World Values Survey and the Detroit Arab
American Study.
4. Interviews were conducted by Amaney Jamal and Ann Chih Lin through the
support of the Institute for Research on Women and Gender and the Rackham Gradu-
ate School (1997–2002) at the University of Michigan. In order to protect our
interviewees’ privacy, all names are pseudonyms, and some identifying details have
been changed. Jamal and Lin conducted all of the interviews, using Arabic or English
as the respondent preferred. Interviews were conducted privately, in person, at loca-
tions the respondents chose. Interviews lasted between one and two hours and fol-
lowed a structured, open-ended questionnaire.
 A M A NEY J A M A L !"
75

5. Please note that this is a classification I use for the purposes of this paper.
6. Question: Police harassment: “Imagine that an Arab friend told you that he
had been stopped by the police for speeding, and he was speeding. But when they were
giving him the ticket, they harassed him, they were rude and insulting. Your friend is
really upset and he asks you for advice. What would you advise him to do?”
7. Five additional respondents said that they would not respond to harassment
at all, because it was best to stay away from the police. We don’t analyze this category
of responses in this paper, because we believe that perceptions of the police as a body
that should not be engaged are highly influenced by homeland experiences in com-
parison to experiences in the United States. However, we do not believe that this omis-
sion from the study biases the results of our findings. Of the five respondents that
we do not discuss here, three are mosqued individuals and two are non-mosqued. Be-
cause their distribution is almost equal between both categories we are confident that
our classification (mosqued and non-mosqued) is not what explains these responses.
8. MAPS poll, 2001.
9. Studies on African American patterns of political behavior focus on the con-
cept of common fate as a determining factor in shaping black attitudes in the US

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