Legal Ethics

LEGAL ETHICS
voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action
Posted on March 8, 2012 by Erineus
The Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent, reporting that: Normally the personal affair of a court employee who is a bachelor and has maintained an amorous relation with a woman equally unmarried has nothing to do with his public employment. The sexual liaison is between two consenting adults and the consequent pregnancy is but a natural effect of the physical intimacy. Mary Jane was not forced to live with Nicolas nor was she impelled by some devious means or machination. The fact was, she freely acceded to cohabit with him. The situation may-not-be-so-ideal but it does not give cause for administrative sanction. There appears no law which penalizes or prescribes the sexual activity of two unmarried persons. So, the accusation of Mary Jane that Nicolas initiated the abortion was calculated to bring the act within the ambit of an immoral, disgraceful and gross misconduct. Except however as to the self-serving assertion that Mary Jane was brought to a local midwife and forced to take the abortifacient, there was no other evidence to support that it was in fact so. All pointed to a harmonious relation that turned sour. In no small way Mary Jane was also responsible of what befell upon her.[3] The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.[4] To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.[5] A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[6] Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondents comment, and the findings of the Investigating Judge, we find that the acts complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct. We find it evident that the sexual relations between the complainant and the respondent were consensual. They met at the Singles for Christ, started dating and subsequently became sweethearts. The respondent frequently visited the complainant at her boarding house and also at her parents residence. The complainant voluntarily yielded to the respondent and they eventually lived together as husband and wife in a rented room near the respondents office. T hey continued their relationship even after the complainant had suffered a miscarriage. Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior.[7] The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.[8] While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their familys future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or should not marry.[9] However, we take this occasion to remind judiciary employees to be more circumspect in their adherence to their obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with respect to their official duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as private individuals. This is the best way to preserve and protect the integrity and the good name of our courts.[10] WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present administrative complaint against Nicolas B. Mabute, Stenographer 1 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Paranas,Samar, for lack of merit. No costs. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/P-11-2922.htm
Clerk of court who is dismissed from service is proper considering her failure to exercise supervision over her administrative staff resulting in commission of blatant infractions against the Rules
It is evident in her Explanation that Atty. Lometillo preferred to shift responsibility over fund shortages to her administrative staff. With exoneration in mind, she desperately tried to convince the Court that she did everything possible to come up with a competent flow of functions in her office, but to no avail. Atty. Lometillo, in fact, designated the other respondents to functions which she herself should have performed, or at least closely monitored, she was unmindful of her duty to personally attend to the collection of the fees, the safekeeping of the money thus collected, the making of the proper entries thereof in the corresponding book of accounts, and the deposit of the same in the offices concerned.[47] Her so-called office memoranda, apprising her co-employees of their tasks in handling the finances of the Court can only provide as much leverage in her favor, but surely, absolution for the fund shortages which ballooned over time, is not forthcoming.
In the recent case of OCA v. Penaranda and Mediante,[48] a Clerk of Court delegated the handling of the financial matters of the court to her trustworthy c ashier including actual possession of court collections and issuance of receipts. Like Atty. Lometillo, the Clerk of Court claimed that she signs the deposit slips every day, but whether or not all collections were actually deposited, she was unaware. The Court had this to say: While Pearanda was not the custodian of the courts collection and she, instead, delegated said function to Mediante, still, the expectation that she would perform all the duties and responsibilities of a Clerk of Court is not diminished. Indeed, the fact that Mediante was the one tasked to deposit the court collections does not absolve Pearanda from liability, since the duty to remit court collections remains with her as the clerk of court, albeit, in this case, she was supposed to monitor that the same was being carried out. x x x Both have been remiss in their duty to remit the collections within a prescribed period and are liable for keeping funds in their custody Pearanda as the one responsible for monitoring the courts financial transactions and Mediante as the one in whom such functions are reposed. Undoubtedly, Pearanda and Mediante violated the trust reposed in them as disbursement officers of the judiciary. Thus, they should be held liable for the shortages mentioned above. [Emphasis supplied] xxxx Based on the foregoing findings, Atty. Lometillo had clearly failed to live up to the standards of competence and integrity expected of an officer of the court. Mediocrity is not at all fit for a member of a complement tasked to dispense justice. Her failure to exhibit administrative leadership and ability renders Atty. Lometillo guilty of negligence, incompetence and gross inefficiency in the performance of her official duty as Clerk of Court. Thus, the penalty of dismissal from service is proper considering her failure to exercise supervision over her administrative staff resulting in commission of blatant infractions against the Rules. In view of Atty. Lometillos com pulsory retirement, however, the imposition of accessory penalties, including the forfeiture of her retirement benefits, is justified. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/P-09-2637.htm
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Grounds for administrative disciplinary action

RULE X. GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTION SECTION 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative disciplinary action prescribed under existing laws, the acts and omissions of any official or employee, whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary, hold-over, permanent or regular capacity, declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code, shall constitute grounds for administrative disciplinary action, and without prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities provided herein, such as: (a) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of his office. x x x. (b) Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by his office, unless expressly allowed by law; (c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law or regulation, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions; (d) Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending official transaction with his office, unless such recommendation or referral is mandated by (1) law, or (2) international agreements, commitment and obligation, or as part of the functions of his office; xxxx (e) Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially known to him by reason of his office and not made available to the public, to further his private interests or give undue advantage to anyone, or to prejudice the public interest; (f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value which in the course of his official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of, his office. x x x.
xxxx (g) Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code for any purpose contrary to morals or public policy or any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public; (h) Unfair discrimination in rendering public service due to party affiliation or preference; (i) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people; (j) Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt, except as otherwise provided in these Rules; (k) Failure to process documents and complete action on documents and papers within a reasonable time from preparation thereof, except as otherwise provided in these Rules; (l) Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or to act promptly and expeditiously on public personal transactions; (m) Failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and disclosure of business interests and financial connections; and (n) Failure to resign from his position in the private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises, and/or failure to divest himself of his shareholdings or interests in private business enterprise within sixty (60) days from such assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises: Provided, however, that for those who are already in the service and a conflict of interest arises, the official or employee must either resign or divest himself of said interests within the periods herein-above provided, reckoned from the date when the conflict of interest had arisen. In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman,[20] this Court had the occasion to rule that failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its implementing rules, is not a ground for disciplinary action, to wit: The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The provision commands that public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their dut ies with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. Said provision merely enunciates professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by public servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6713 adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives and rewards to officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the mandated incentives and rewards system, officials and employees who comply with the high standard set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot expect the same favorable treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to be sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code. Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them. (Emphasis supplied.) Consequently, the Court dismissed the charge of violation of Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713 in that case. We find no compelling reason to depart from our pronouncement in Domingo. Thus, we reverse the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. In so ruling, we do no less and no more than apply the law and its implementing rules issued by the CSC under the authority given to it by Congress. Needless to stress, said rules partake the nature of a statute and are binding as if written in the law itself. They have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.[21] http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/178454.htm
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Incentive and Rewards System for public officials

In addition to its directive under Section 4(B), Congress authorized [19] the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement R.A. No. 6713. Accordingly, the CSC issued the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (hereafter, Implementing Rules). Rule V of the Implementing Rules provides for an Incentive and Rewards System for public officials and
employees who have demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713, to wit: RULE V. INCENTIVES AND REWARDS SYSTEM SECTION 1. Incentives and rewards shall be granted officials and employees who have demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of the Code, namely: (a) Commitment to public interest. x x x (b) Professionalism. x x x (c) Justness and sincerity. x x x (d) Political neutrality. x x x (e) Responsiveness to the public. x x x (f) Nationalism and patriotism. x x x (g) Commitment to democracy. x x x (h) Simple living. x x x http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/178454.htm
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Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees

We quote the full text of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713: SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. (A) Every public official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties: (a) Commitment to public interest. Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues. (b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. (c) Justness and sincerity. Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs. (d) Political neutrality. Public officials and employees shall provide service to everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or preference. (e) Responsiveness to the public. Public officials and employees shall extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest, public officials and employees shall provide information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and appreciation of the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas. (f) Nationalism and patriotism. Public officials and employees shall at all times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally-produced goods, resources and technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion. (g) Commitment to democracy. Public officials and employees shall commit themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and manifest by deed the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party. (h) Simple living. Public officials and employees and their families shall lead modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form. (B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) observance of these standards including the dissemination of information programs and workshops authorizing merit increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by their office colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and experimentation on measures which provide positive motivation to public officials and employees in raising the general level of observance of these standards. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/178454.htm
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administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges
On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was dismissed, she cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.[17] http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/178454.htm
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Does the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondents complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them
On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondents complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them.[12] Section 13(1),[13] Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Under Section 16[14] of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as theOmbudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure. Section 19[15] of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we. [16] http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/178454.htm
Posted in Jurisdiction, Ombudsman, Question and Answers | Tagged Does the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondents complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them |Leave a comment
Legal researher is liable under Rule IV, Section 52 (A) 20 for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in view of her act of offering her services for facilitation of the land transfer papers at the BIR
In her motion, Hernando repleads the assertions in her memorandum and prays that a more severe penalty should be imposed on Bengson. According to her, respondent being a court employee she had no business offering her services for facilitation of the land transfer papers at the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Such actuation is conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and thus should be punished for such act pursuant to the ruling in Largo v. CA.[2] In addition, she prays that the amount of P76,000.00 that was given to respondent should be cons idered as a just debt and, therefore, she should be made to answer for the same from her salary.[3] In her Comment, Bengson counters that she merely accommodated the request for help from Hernandos own daughter. She insists that she had no interest whatsoever in the facilitation of the said land transfer papers.[4] The Court stands pat in its earlier holding that: In the present case, the OCA (Office of the Court Administrator) found, and we agree, that Bengsons complicity in the failed titling of the property eyed by Hernando was manifest. Based on the trial judges investigation and that of the OCA, Bengson offered to he lp Hernando find a surveyor for a fee, and she was the very same one who directly received the money intended for the titling of the property. To Hernandos dismay, Villacorte did not turn out to be the expert that she was made to believe. To our mind, i t was the very misrepresentation that precipitated the transaction that eventually defrauded Hernando. Complainant would not have parted with her hard-earned money were it not for Bengsons misrepresentation with respect to Villacortes capacity to facilitate the titling of the property. Respondent cannot extricate herself by claiming that she had no direct participation in the negotiations.[5] This is buttressed by the report of the investigating judge, Executive Judge Teodoro A. Bay (Judge Bay). Although Judge Bay did opine in his report that the above transaction was purely private in character and that there was no showing that respondent took advantage of her position as legal researcher of the court, he did conclude: x x x. The respondent, therefore, insofar as the complainant was concerned, was the person responsible for the package contract for which reason all communication from the Hernandos were directed to her. Moreover, respondent acknowledged to have received after repeated calls/demands from the complainant.[6] The above finding is likewise affirmed by the OCA. Through then Court Administrator and now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Jose P. Perez, it made the following observation:
In the instant case, the participation of respondent Bengson, in the failed titling of the property being eyed by the family of the complainant, cannot be denied. From the facts ascertained by the investigating judge, it was respondent who offered to help the complainant find a surveyor, in exchange for a fee. It was also established in the investigation that respondent directly received money from the complainant. To aggravate the situation, the surveyor, Maritess Villacorte, whom respondent recommended, did not turn out to be the expert complainant had expected. Complainant would not have parted with her hard-earned money, if not for the assurances she received from the respondent. The seed of the fraudulent transaction would not have been planted if respondent did not offer her services in the first place.[7] The complicity of Bengson was very apparent. During the hearing before Judge Bay, she admitted that it was she together with her husband who went to see Hernando at the latters residence sometime in September 2002 in order to explain the package for facilitation of the land transfer papers of the subject property at the BIR.[8] Certainly, no disinterested or uninvolved person would go so far as to pay a visit to someone whom she had not met before just to relay the package contract allegedly offered by her half-sister and niece, unless she herself was very much involved in it or, at the least, would benefit from the arrangement. Bengson also admitted that when she went to Hernandos re sidence for the second time, she was accompanied by her halfsister and niece purportedly to explain and reduce the package contract cost from P100,000.00 to 70,000.00. In the meeting, payment was agreed to be paid through her (Bengson).[9] Later in her testimony, Bengson admitted having received the amount of P70,000.00 from Hernando in the presence of her half-sister and niece.[10] While Bengson claimed that she immediately turned over the full amount to her half-sister and her niece at the time that they were still at Hernandos residence, the receipt covering th e amount was only issued when she allegedly chanced upon them at McDonalds in April of the following year. The Court is of the considered view that it is nothing but a desperate attempt on the part of Bengson to distance herself from the deal made with Hernando. Thus, the Court is not ready to depart from its original finding with respect to the complicity of Bengson in the wrongdoing against Hernando. What remains to be resolved now in this motion for reconsideration is whether Bengson should be held liable for Simple Misconduct or for Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service? In resolving this issue, a review of the Courts disposition in the case of Largo v. CA[11] is instructive. In that case, it was explained that an administrative offense constitutes misconduct when it has a direct relation to, and is connected with, the performance of the official duties of the one charged. x x x. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer, x x x. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office, x x x.[12] Thus, misconduct refers to a transgression of an established and definite rule of action, more specifically, some unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer charged.[13] It must be noted however that in this case, no proof was offered to show that Largos actions being complained of were related to, or performed by him in taking advantage of, his position. His actions did not have any direct relation to or connection with the performance of his official duties. Hence, it was concluded that Largo acted in his private capacity, and thus, could not be made liable for misconduct.[14] But, considering that Largos questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his public office, he was still held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The basis for his liability was found in Republic Act No. 6713 (R.A. 6713) or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The Code, particularly Section 4 (c) thereof, commands that public officials and employees shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest. Largos actuations fell short of this standard. [15] Similarly, applying the same standard to the present case, the Court agrees with the position taken by Hernando that Bengson should be liable under Rule IV, Section 52 (A) 20 for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in view of her act of offering her services for facilitation of the land transfer papers at the BIR and representing that her half-sister and niece had the power, influence and capacity to facilitate the titling of subject property. Following the standard set forth in R.A. No. 6713, Bengson should not have offered the so called package contract and asked for a considerable amount from Hernando knowing that her half-sister and niece were neither geodetic engineers nor employees of the BIR knowledgeable in the preparation of the necessary papers and documents for the titling of the subject property. Certainly, this misrepresentation on the part of Bengson begrimed both the image and integrity of her office. At this point, the Court would like to once again underscore that the conduct of every court personnel must be beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may cause to sully the image of the judiciary. They must totally avoid any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in the performance of their official duties but also in conducting themselves outside or beyond the duties and functions of their office. Every court personnel are enjoined to conduct themselves toward maintaining the prestige and integrity of the judiciary for the very image of the latter is necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official and otherwise. They must not forget that they are an integral part of that organ of the government sacredly tasked in dispensing justice. Their conduct and behavior, therefore, should not only be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility but at all times be defined by propriety and decorum, and above all else beyond any suspicion.[16] With Bengsons complicity in the scam or fraud against Hernando, she is undeniably guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service which is punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense pursuant to Section 52 A (20) of the Uniform Rules of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/P-09-2686.htm
Posted in Judicial and Legal Ethics | Tagged Legal researher is liable under Rule IV Section 52 (A) 20 for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in view of her act of offering her services for facilitation of the land transfer| 1 Comment
Can the employee be ordered by the court to return the money, thus, making the court a collecting agent?
As regards Hernandos prayer that Bengson be ordered to return the money in the amount of P76,000.00, the Court resolves to reconsider its earlier disposition. While Courts should refrain from becoming a collection agent, it cannot simply shy away from setting right those that are evidently or obviously improper acts or conducts among its personnel, and instead, order them to do what is but proper and just.[17] In this case, what is right and just under the circumstances is to order the respondent to pay her obligation to the private complainant. In the case of Villaseor v. de Leon,[18] it was written: Truly, this Court is not a collection agency for faltering debtors. Hence, in a disciplinary proceeding, we cannot adjudicate on the existence and amount of the loan if such facts are disputed by the parties. At the same time, it is not proper in
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these proceedings to issue writs of execution or order the levy of respondents properties, including her salaries to satisfy the indebtedness. For, the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to protect public service and maintain its dignity based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. Evidently, disciplinary cases involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance, as they are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. The complainant or the person who calls the attention of the court to the alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper management of justice. Consistent with the realm of an administrative case, we are dutybound to correct whatever we perceive as an improper conduct among court employees by ordering them to do what is proper in the premises. In the instant case, therefore, we direct respondent to pay her indebtedness to complainant, i.e., inclusive of principal and interest agreed upon, in accordance with their agreement, if any, or within a reasonable time from receipt of this Decision. A violation of this order could become the basis of another administrative charge for a sec ond offense of willful failure to pay just debts punishable by suspension of one (1) to thirty (30) days, among other serious charges arising from a willful violation of a lawful order of this Court. With this command, we hope that respondent will stay away from such misdeed and shun a subsequent offense of the same nature, or any other offense for that matter. The payment of respondents debt is in addition to the penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. This ruling should suffice to accomplish the purpose of disciplining an erring court employee to whom a passage in the Book of Proverbs must have a reverberating significance, A single reprimand does more for a man of intelligence than a hundred lashes for a fool. Considering that Bengson, in her comment on Hernandos motion for reconsideration offered to restitute the said amount without admitting guilt but only to buy peace; that her complicity in the so called package contract remains; that he did admit having received the amount of P70,000.00 during her testimony before the investigating judge, the Court now resolves and orders the restitution of the said amount of P76,000.00 plus legal interest starting from the year 2003. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/P-09-2686.htm
Posted in Judicial and Legal Ethics | Tagged Can the employee be ordered by the court to return the money thus making the court a collecting agent? | Leave a comment
Judges act of collecting or receiving money from a litigant constitutes grave misconduct in office http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/MTJ-08-1727.htm Judges concealment of his direct participation in elections while remaining in the judiciarys payroll and his vain attempt to mislead the Court by his claim of forgery, are patent acts of dishonesty rendering him unfit to remain in the judiciary Posted on February 28, 2012 by Erineus We find the OCAs recommendation to be well-founded. Judge Limbona committed grave offenses which rendered him unfit to continue as a member of the Judiciary. When he was appointed as a judge, he took an oath to uphold the law, yet in filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative in the May 1998 elections without giving up his judicial post, Judge Limbona violated not only the law, but the constitutional mandate that no officer or employee in the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.[19]
The NBI investigation on the authenticity of Judge Limbonas signatures on the certificate of candidacy unqualifiedly established that the judge signed the certificate of candidacy for the May 1998 elections, thus negating his claim that his signatures were forged. The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate for an elective post. For his continued performance of his judicial duties despite his candidacy for a political post, Judge Limbona is guilty of grave misconduct in office. While we cannot interfere with Judge Limbonas political aspirations, we cannot allow him to pursue his political goals while still on the bench. We cannot likewise allow him to deceive the Judiciary. We find relevant the OCAs observation on this point: x x x Judge Limbonas concealment of his direct participation in the 1998 elections while remaining in the judiciarys payroll and his vain attempt to mislead the Court by his claim of forgery, are patent acts of dishonesty rendering him unfit to remain in the judiciary. In light of the gravity of Judge Limbonas infractions, we find OCAs recommended penalty of dismissal to be appropriate. Under the Rules of Court, dishonesty and gross misconduct are punishable by dismissal.[20] We also approve the OCA recommendation that Judge Limbona be made to refund the salaries/allowances he received fromMarch 26, 1998 toNovember 30, 1998. With this ruling, we likewise resolve the charge against Judge Limbona referred to us by the Courts Second Division in itsJune 16, 2003 Resolution in A.M. No. SCC-03-08 that the respondent judge continued to perform judicial functions and to receive his salaries as judge after he had filed a certificate of candidacy in the May 1998 elections. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/SCC-98-4.htm Posted in Judicial and Legal Ethics | Tagged Judge's concealment of his direct participation in elections while remaining in the judiciarys payroll and his vain attempt to mislead the Court by his claim of forgery are patent acts of dishonest | Leave a comment
For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, she is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer
We agree with the common finding of the Ombudsman and the CA that, in the aftermath of the aborted transaction, petitioner still failed to return the amount she accepted. As aptly stated by the Ombudsman, if petitioner was persistent in returning the amount ofP50,000 until the preliminary investigation of the estafa case on September 18, 2003,[28] there would have been no need for the parties agreement that petitioner be given until February 28, 2003 to pay said amount including interest. Indeed, petitioners belated attempt to return the amount was intended to avoid possible sanctions and impelled solely by the filing of the estafacase against her. For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer. In Joson v. Macapagal, we have also ruled that the respondents therein were guilty of conduct unbecoming of government employees when they reneged on their promise to have pertinent documents notarized and submitted to the Government Service Insurance System after the complainants rights over the subject property were transferr ed to the sister of one of the respondents.[29] Recently, inAssistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., we said that unbecoming conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.[30] This Court has too often declared that any act that falls short of the exacting standards for public office shall not be countenanced.[31] The Constitution categorically declares as follows: SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[32] Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount to respondent after failing to accomplish the task she had willingly accepted. However, she waited until respondent sued her for estafa, thus reinforcing the latters suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her money. Although the element of deceit was not proven in the criminal case respondent filed against the petitioner, it is clear that by her actuations, petitioner violated basic social and ethical norms in her private dealings. Even if unrelated to her duties as a public officer, petitioners transgression could erode the publics trust in government employees, moreso because she holds a high positi on in the service. As to the penalty, we reprimanded the respondents in Joson and imposed a fine inJamsani-Rodriguez. Under the circumstances of this case, a fine of P15,000 in lieu of the three months suspension is proper. In imposing said fine, we have considered as a mitigating circumstance petitioners 37 years of public service and the fact that this is the first char ge against her.[33] Section 53[34] of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that mitigating circumstances such as length of service shall be considered. And since petitioner has earlier agreed to return the amount of P50,000 including interest, we find it proper to order her to comply with said agreement. Eventually, the parties may even find time to rekindle their friendship. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/178454.htm
Posted in Administrative Law, Civil Service Commision, Civil Service Law, Public Official/Employees | Tagged For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount she is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer | Leave a comment
Court personnel shall not be required to perform any work or duty outside the scope of their assigned job description
Posted on February 27, 2012 by Erineus
Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel expressly states that court personnel shall not be required to perform any work outside the scope of their job description, thus: Sec. 7. Court personnel shall not be required to perform any work or duty outside the scope of their assigned job description. (Emphasis supplied) In Re: Report of Senior Chief Staff Officer Antonina A. Soria on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Accounts of Clerk of Court Elena E. Jabao, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Ecija, Guimaras, the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Valencia in Guimaras was designated to act as Court Stenographer in addition to her duties as Clerk of Court to fill in for the newly appointed Court Stenographer who was not yet well-versed in stenography. The designation passed the Courts scrutiny as the duties of a Court Stenographer are subsumed under the general responsibilities of a Clerk of Court since Clerks of Court exercise control and supervision over Court Stenographers. In the instant case, both Legal Researcher and Court Interpreter are subject to the control and supervision of the Clerk of Court. Since Legal Researchers do not exercise control and supervision over Court Interpreters, the duties of a Court Interpreter cannot be deemed subsumed under the general functions of a Legal Researcher. While the executive judge may not require court personnel to perform work outside the scope of their job description, except duties that are identical with or are subsumed under their present functions, the executive judge may reassign court personnel of multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of administrative supervision when there is a vacancy or when the interest of the service requires, after consultation with the presiding judges of the branches concerned. Section 6, Chapter VII of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC Re: Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties so provides: Sec. 6. Reassignment of lower court personnel. (a) Executive Judges of the RTCs shall continue to have authority to effect the following temporary assignments within his/her area of administrative supervision: Personnel of one branch to another branch of a multiple-branch court; xxxx Reassignments shall be made only in case of vacancy in a position in a branch, or when the interest of the service so requires. In either case, the assignment shall be made only after consultation with the Presiding Judges of the branches concerned. In case of any disagreement, the matter shall be referred to the OCA for resolution. (Emphasis supplied) However, consistent with Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, the reassignment of court personnel in multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of the executive judges administrative supervision must involve (1) workwithin the scope of the court personnels job description or (2) duties that are identical with or are subsumed under the court personnels present functions. In this case, since respondents job description is that of Legal Researcher, Judge Apita may not designate her to act as Court Interpreter indefinitely or until the vacancy is filled up. The said designation will require respondent to perform work, which is outside the scope of her job description and which involves duties not identical with or subsumed under respondents current functions. To do so would violate the express language of Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. This rule is rooted in the time-honored constitutional principle that public office is a public trust. Hence, all public officers and employees, including court personnel in the judiciary, must serve the public with utmost responsibility and efficiency. Exhorting court personnel to exhibit the highest sense of dedication to their assigned duty necessarily precludes requiring them to perform any work outside the scope of their assigned job description, save for duties that are identical with or are subsumed under their present functions. Indeed, requiring a Legal Researcher to perform the work of a Court Interpreter is counter-productive and does not serve the ends of justice. Not only will respondent jeopardize her present position as Legal Researcher by constantly shifting from one job to another, her qualification as Court Interpreter will also be put in question. This arrangement does nothing but compromise court personnels professional responsibility and optimum efficiency in the performance of their respective roles in the dispensation of justice. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/P-06-2206.h
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What constitute gross ignorance of the law? Posted on February 27, 2012 by Erineus To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of respondent judge in the performance of her official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, she must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. 29 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/MTJ-08-1718.html Posted in Judicial and Legal Ethics, Question and Answers | Leave a comment A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement by court personnel. Posted on February 27, 2012 by Erineus Judge De Vera would do well to keep in mind that [a] judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.30 A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement by court personnel. Proper and efficient court management is as much her responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of her official functions.31 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/MTJ-08-1718.html Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. Posted on February 27, 2012 by Erineus Complainants should also bear in mind that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judges challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against her at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision rendered, assuming she has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make her position doubly unbearable. 32 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/MTJ-08-1718.html Posted in Judicial and Legal Ethics | Tagged Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not com Acts of a judge, pertaining to his judicial functions, are not subject to disciplinary action, unless they are tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. Posted on February 25, 2012 by Erineus
However, as to the allegation of grave misconduct in holding a hearing notwithstanding the fact that defendants counsel already rested his case, the same has no leg to stand on. It should be emphasized that the questioned ruling of respondent judge was done in the discharge of his judicial functions. Time and again, we have ruled that the acts of a judge, pertaining to his judicial functions, are not subject to disciplinary action, unless they are tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.[6] This, complainant failed to establish. If the complainant felt aggrieved, his recourse is through judicial remedies, i.e., to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. Indeed, disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against magistrates do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. An inquiry into their civil, criminal and/or administrative liability may be made only after the available remedies have been exhausted and decided with finality. In fine, only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. To hold, otherwise, would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[7] http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/RTJ-10-2241.htm Judge who used degoratory and irreverent language in relation to complainant is guilty of unbecoming a judge Posted on February 24, 2012 by Erineus Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Judge Amila should be reminded of Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.[7] CANON 4 PROPRIETY Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. xxxx SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety but even acts which have the appearance of impropriety. The Code recognizes that even acts that are not per se improper can nevertheless be perceived by the larger community as such. Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys and other persons not [vested] with public trust. [8] In this case, the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the intervenors to a meeting inside his chambers. His explanation that he called the said meeting to advice the parties that he will rescind his October 2, 2007 Order is not acceptable. Why would a judge give the parties advance notice that he is going to issue an Order, more so rescind his previous Order? Worse, why would he call on the intervenors whom he had earlier ruled as not having any legal personality in this case? This act of respondent judge would logically create an impression to complainant that the meeting of the judge with the intervenors had turned his views around towards issuing a revocation of the October 2, 2007 Order. In his Comment, respondent judge used degoratory and irreverent language in relation to complainant. The former in effect maliciously besmirched the character of complainant by calling her as only a live-in partner of Belot and presenting her as anopportunist and a mistress in an illegitimate relationship. The judge also called her aprostitute. The judges accusations that complainant was motivated by insatiable greedand would abscond with the contested property are unfair and unwarranted. His depiction of complainant is also inconsistent with the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) he issued in her favor as a victim of domestic violence. Verily, we hold that Judge Amila should be more circumspect in his language. It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.[9] Accordingly, respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is hereby found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10,[10]Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11C[11] thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning. In as much as Judge Amila was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in connection with his Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 14988 and 14989 which was docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-07-2071 where he was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, the penalty of fine of P21,000.00 is deemed appropriate in the instant case. http://bataspinoy.wordpress.com/wp-admin/post-new.php Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court under Rule 139-B, Section 13 do not involve a trial Posted on February 24, 2012 by Erineus Respondents requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17SC are unmeritorious. In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonens separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautistas Compliance, she similarly expressed the sentiment that [i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing.[141] It is this group of respondents premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process. The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs largely from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majoritys purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution. However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter. The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit: SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.) From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed. As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type hearing. We have held that: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process , the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.[142] (Emphases supplied.) In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio[143] that: Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[144] (Emphases supplied.) In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court Br. 81, Romblon On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law,[145] we further observed that: [I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability. In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur. Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record. xxxx These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.[146] (Emphases supplied.) . A final word In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/10-10-4-SC.htm Whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts. Posted on February 24, 2012 Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest . One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice , within the context, in other
words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x.[132](Emphases supplied.) For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents[133] that the Statement presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/10-10-4-SC.htm Posted in Freedom of Expression, Judicial and Legal Ethics, Supreme Court | Tagged In cases Court employee actually interferes with the execution of a valid certificate of sheriffs sale in behalf of a friend is unbecoming a Court official Posted on February 25, 2012 by Erineus Time and again, we have emphasized that court personnel must devote every moment of official time to public service. The conduct and behavior of court personnel should be characterized by a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as they mirror the image of the court. Specifically, court personnel must strictly observe official time to inspire public respect for the justice system. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that court personnel shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.[6] Indeed, we cannot ignore the fact that Aromin herself admitted that she was at Lims warehouse on November 8, 2006 to stop the execution of the certificate of sheriffs sale upon the request of her close friend, Billy Lim, the owner of the warehouse. As pointed out by the Investigating Judge, considering that November 8, 2006 was a regular working day, Aromin was supposed to be in her station in the court attending to her duties. No leave of absence was presented to justify her absence. The transaction which Aromin participated in is clearly not part of her duties as a court employee. Thus, Aromin failed to devote her time exclusively to her official duties, because she had dealt with Lims issues during office hours on the transaction complained of. But what is more disturbing is the fact that Aromin actually interfered with the execution of a valid certificate of sheriff s sale in behalf of a friend without regard to the impropriety of her acts considering that she is a court employee. Her actuations, thus, led complainants to believe that she was using her position to advance the interest of Billy Lim over the complainants despite the existence of the NLRC decisions and orders in favor of the latter. Clearly, Aromins acts fell shor t of the standards expected of a court employee. As a public servant, she should have known that she is enjoined to uphold public interest over and above personal interest at all times. Let this be again a reminder to all court employees that employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance of official duties but also in their personal and private dealings with other people so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community. The image of the court, as being a true temple of justice, is aptly mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowliest of its personnel.[7] http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/march2011/PA Clerk of Court who issues a subpoena absent any proceedings, suit, or action commenced or pending before a court is liable of Gross Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service Posted on February 15, 2012 by Erineus Respondents act of issuing the subpoena to complainant was evidently not directly or remotely connected with respondents judicial or administrative duties. It appears that she merely wanted to act as a mediator or conciliator in the dispute between complainant and the Baterinas, upon the request of the latter. Respondent as Clerk of Court is primarily tasked with making out and issuing all writs and processes issuing from the court. She should have known or ought to know what a subpoena is. A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for the taking of his deposition. [4] She should have known that a process is the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the defendant before it, or a compliance with its demands. [5] Hence, absent any proceedings, suit, or action commenced or pending before a court, a subpoena may not issue. In this case, respondent knew there was no case filed against complainant. Neither had complainant commenced any proceeding against the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was issued. Respondent, then, had absolutely neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a subpoena to the complainant.[6] Perusal of the subpoena she issued to complainant shows that the form used was the one used in criminal cases, giving complainant the impression that her failure to appear would subject her to the penalty of law, and that the subpoena was issued with the trial courts sanction. We find, therefore, that respondent was using without authority some element of state coercion against complainant who was understandably compelled to heed the contents of the subpoena resulting in her humiliation. Such naked abuse of authority by complainant could not be allowed to pass without appropriate sanction. Accordingly, this Court has no recourse but to agree with the recommendation of the OCA that respondent be disciplined and fined. WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita G. Bravo is hereby found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for which she is fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act would be treated more severely. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/apr2001/am_p_99_1307.htm Posted in Judicial and Legal Ethics | Tagged A Clerk of court who issues a subpoena absent any proceedings suit or action commenced or pending before a court is liable of Gross Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service | Leave a comment A judges duties to the Court and to the public. Posted on February 18, 2012 by Erineus Case law teaches us that a judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly of justice; he or she must, therefore, be the first to follow the law and weave an example for the others to follow.[3] Interestingly, in Julianito M. Salvador v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc.,[4] a case where Judge Limsiaco was also the respondent, we already had the occasion to impress upon him the clear import of the directives of the Court, thus: For a judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaint thoroughly and substantially is gross misconduct, and may even be considered as outright disrespect for the Court. The office of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors. After all, a resolution of the Supreme Court is not a mere request and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but has likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of the judicial system. We also cited in that case our ruling in Josephine C. Martinez v. Judge Cesar N. Zoleta[5] and emphasized that obedience to our lawful orders and directives should not be merely selective obedience, but must be full: [A] resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an administrative complaint against officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from the Court. Nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately or selectively. Respondents in administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations against them in the administrative complaints because it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. Moreover, the Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference of respondents to administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints. As demonstrated by his present acts, we find it clear that Judge Limsiaco failed to heed the above pronouncements. We observe that in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge Limsiaco did not fully obey our directives. Judge Limsiaco failed to file the required comment to our show cause resolution despite several opportunities given to him by the Court. His disobedience was aggravated by his insincere representations in his motions for extension of time that he would file the required comments. The records also show Judge Limsiacos failure to comply with our decision and orders. In A.M. No. MTJ -01-1362, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment/answer to the charge of irregularity pertaining to his approval of applications for bail in several criminal cases before him. He also failed to pay the P40,000.00 fine which we imposed by way of administrative penalty for his gross ignorance of the law and procedure and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Incidentally, in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment on the verified complaint despite several orders issued by the Court. We cannot overemphasize that compliance with the rules, directives and circulars issued by the Court is one of the foremost duties that a judge accepts upon assumption to office. This duty is verbalized in Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct: SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the Judiciary. SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the Judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence. The obligation to uphold the dignity of his office and the institution which he belongs to is also found in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 2.01 which mandates a judge to behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Under the circumstances, the conduct exhibited by Judge Limsiaco constitutes no less than clear acts of defiance against the Courts authority. His conduct also reveals his deliberate disrespect and indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by his failure to heed our warnings and directives. Judge Limsiacos actions further disclose his inability to accept our instructions. Moreover, his conduct failed to provide a good example for other court personnel, and the public as well, in placing significance to the Courts directives and the importance of complying with them. We cannot allow this type of behavior especially on a judge. Public confidence in the judiciary can only be achieved when the court personnel conduct themselves in a dignified manner befitting the public office they are holding. They should avoid conduct or any demeanor that may tarnish or diminish the authority of the Supreme Court. Under existing jurisprudence, we have held judges administratively liable for failing to comply with our directives and circulars. In Sinaon, Sr.,[6] we penalized a judge for his deliberate failure to comply with our directive requiring him to file a comment. We disciplined another judge in Noe Cangco Zarate v. Judge Isauro M. Balderian[7] for his refusal to comply with the Courts resolution requiring him to file a comment on the administrative charge against him. In Request of Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena, etc.,[8] we dismissed the judge for his repeated violation of a circular of the Supreme Court. In fact, we have already reprimanded and warned Judge Limsiaco for his failure to timely heed the Courts directives in Salvador.[9] A judges duty to his public office Given the factual circumstances in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, the considerable delay Judge Limsiaco incurred in deciding the subject ejectment case has been clearly established by the records and by his own admission. Judge Limsiaco admitted that he decided the ejectment case only onFebruary 4, 2008. In turn, the records show that Judge Limsiaco did not deny Guinanaos claim that the ejectment case was submitted for resolution as early asApril 25, 2005. Thus, it took Judge Limsiaco more than two (2) years to decide the subject ejectment case after it was declared submitted for resolution. The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct[10] which mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness. In line with jurisprudence, Judge Limsiaco is also liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to decide a case within the reglementary period.[11] The Penalty Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges with the following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one or more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.[12] In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Limsiacos work history which reflects how he performed his judicial functions as a judge. We observed that there are several administrative cases already decided against Judge Limsiaco that show his inability to properly discharge his judicial duties. In Salvador,[13] we penalized Judge Limsiaco for having been found guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision, imposing on him a P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. In Helen Gamboa-Mijares v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,[14] we found Judge Limsiaco guilty of gross misconduct and imposed on him a P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a more severe penalty would be imposed in case of the same of similar act in the future. In Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,[15] we resolved to impose a P20,000.00 fine on Judge Limsiaco for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely. The Court also resolved in the said case to re-docket, as a regular administrative case, the charge for oppression and grave abuse of authority relative to Judge Limsiacos handling of two criminal cases. In Re: Withholding of Salary of Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc. ,[16] we imposed aP5,000.00 fine, with warning, against Judge Limsiaco for his delay in the submission of the monthly report of cases and for twice ignoring the OCAs directive to explain the delay. Moreover, in the recent case of Florenda Tobias v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,[17] where Judge Limsiaco was charged with corruption, the Court found him liable for gross misconduct and imposed a fine in the amount of P25,000.00. Lastly, we also note the existence of two other administrative cases filed against Judge Limsiaco that are presently pending with the Court. The first case is Mario B. Tapinco v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., [18] where Judge Limsiaco is charged with grave misconduct, obstruction of justice, and abuse of authority in connection with his invalid issuance of an order for the provisional release of an accused. The second case entitledUnauthorized Hearings Conducted by Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, et al.,[19] is a complaint charging Judge Limsiaco of violating the Courts Administrative Circular
No. 3, dated July 14, 1978 which prohibits the conduct of hearings in another station without any authority from the Court. We find that his conduct as a repeat offender exhibits his unworthiness to don the judicial robes and merits a sanction heavier than what is provided by our rules and jurisprudence. Under the circumstances, Judge Limsiaco should be dismissed from the service. We, however, note that onMay 17, 2009, Judge Limsiaco has retired from judicial service. We also note that Judge Limsiaco has not yet applied for his retirement benefits. Thus, in lieu of the penalty of dismissal for his unethical conduct and gross inefficiency in performing his duties as a member of the bench, we declare all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, forfeited. Furthermore, he is barred from re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/MTJ-01-1362.htm Posted in Judicial and Legal Ethics | Tagged A judges duties to the Court | Leave a comment A judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for failure, after conducting a preliminary investigation, to transmit the resolution of the case together with the entire records to the Provincial Prosecutor Posted on February 15, 2012 by Erineus In the case extant, Respondent was only acting as Assisting Judge and then as Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Guihulngan, Negros Oriental when he issued the questioned Orders. This court is of the view that Respondent innocently thought that he could legally issue said Orders despite acting only as the Investigating Judge. Besides, nobody had called his attention about the errors he committed, not even the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Oriental, the Executive judge nor the regular Presiding Judge himself, the Hon. Judge Ricardo M. Garcia. Further, after he ceased to be the Acting Presiding Judge in July 2004, he lost the opportunity to rectify his errors. Hence this Court also believes that the ruling in the case of Northcastle Properties and Estate Corporation vs. Acting Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas, MeTC, Branch 45, Pasay City, A.M. No. MTJ-991206 October 22, 1999, where the respondent judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when she erred by applying the provisions of Sec. 19, Rule 70, Rules of Court instead of Sec. 21 of the same rule regarding the execution of the decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in an ejectment case. The Supreme Court said that her utter lack of familiarity with the Rules undermined the public confidence in the competence of our courts and she was penalized to pay the fine of P5,000.00 with the warning 6hat6 a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.(emphasis and underscoring supplied) As to the claim of the Respondent that he had no more personality to comment the allegations in the complaint, particularly the archiving of cases because he is no longer the Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court since July 2004, this court also believes that such does not hold water. This is so because being an officer of the court he can always be held responsible for his previous official acts. In fact, even those who have already retired from the judiciary could still be held responsible for acts done during their incumbency. xxxx And, the fact that the Orders, as argued by the Respondent, were not questioned by the government prosecutors, the parties and their counsels, and the complainant was not a party to the cases, is of no moment because the Supreme Court, with or without complaint can look into his acts in view of its power of administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof and to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal. Finally, the claim of the Respondent that the questioned Orders were already final and executory and could only be correctible by appeal is also a misplaced argument because such were merely in the nature of the interlocutory order as the cases involved were not finally disposed of by reason thereof, and thus, not subject to appeal. Respondent invoking the ruling of the case of Salcedo vs. Coquia, et al., A.M.MTJ-1328, February 11, 2004, to the mind of the court is also not meritorious. This is so because in that case, the Supreme Court, citing the case of Bello III vs. Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311, October 3, 2003, ruled that: It is plain from the complaint that the error attributable to respondent Judge pertains to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings , but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies. In the recent case of Bello v. Diaz, we reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary; an inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled. It is to be noted that herein Respondent is sued in the exercise of his executive functions. In the case of Balagapo, Jr. v. Dequilla, 238 SCRA 645, citing the case of Crespo vs. Mogul 151 SCRA 462, it was ruled that: When a municipal judge conducts preliminary investigation he performs a non-judicial function, as an exception to his usual duties. The assignment of suchexcecutive function to the Municipal Judge under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court is dictated by the necessity and practical consideration. Consequently, the findings of an investigating judge are subject to review by the Provincial Prosecutor whose findings in turn may also be reviewed by the Secretary of Justice in appropriate cases. Further, citing the case of People v. Gorospe, 53 Phils. 960 (1928) the Supreme Court ruled that it is ministerial duty for an investigating judge, after conducting a preliminary investigation, to transmit the resolution of the case together with the entire records to the Provincial Prosecutor, regardless of his belief or opinion that the crime committed falls under the jurisdiction of his court. The only remedy that was available in order that Respondent could be forced to perform his ministerial duty of transmitting the records of the cases to the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Oriental was an action for Mandamus under Sec. 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court, but such is not obtainable anymore because he has already ceased performing the function the office of an Acting Presiding judge in the Municipal Trial Court of Guihulngan, Negros Oriental long before the instant complaint was filed. x x x x[6] (citations omitted; italics, emphasis and underscoring in the original) As for the rest of the charges against respondent, Judge Bahonsua found no merit thereon. Judge Bahonsua thereupon concluded that respondent is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law in archiving the criminal cases and recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P30,000.[7] In their Memorandum[8] dated June 21, 2010, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and Deputy Court Administrator Jesus Edwin A. Villasor found the recommendation of the investigating judge well-taken. They noted, however, as follows: Respondent Judge Barillo will compulsorily retire from the service on July 30, 2010 at the age of 70. We find that, although he committed an error in issuing the questioned orders, there was, however, no malice on his part and no one has ever called his attention on such error. We believe that he deserves some compassion especially considering his long years in the service. In the words of the investigating Judge, [I]t would be equivalent to putting an abrupt end to his life if he is kicked out from the service and stripped of all the monetary benefits due him and/or he is disbarred from the law profession. Despite of [sic] what he has done, he still deserves to enjoy at best, the few remaining years of his life.[9] The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross ignorance of the law.
A judge owes it to himself and his office to know basic legal principles by heart and to harness that knowledge correctly and justly, failing which publics confidence in the courts is eroded.[10] In issuing the orders archiving the five above-cited criminal cases, respondent failed to consider that he was acting not as a trial judge but an investigating judge of an MTC whose actions were thus governed by Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure on preliminary investigations. He ought to have known that after conducting preliminary investigation on the criminal cases, it was his duty to transmit his resolution thereon to the provincial or city prosecutor for appropriate action. His failure to do so betrays an utter lack of familiarity with the Rules. The complaint against respondent is for gross ignorance of the law in which the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence; it must have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption[11] the presence of which in the present case is not clear. Be that as it may, such leeway afforded a judge does not mean that he should not evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory functions. Sanctions are still in order as such lapses in judgment cannot be countenanced. As the Court has repeatedly stressed, a judge, having applied for the position and appointed as such, is presumed to know the law. Thus, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[12] Gross ignorance of the law is penalized by Section 11 (A), Rule 140, viz: SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed. 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 1. Suspension from the office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 1. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. In meting a penalty on respondent, the Court considers the fact that he, during the pendency of the case or on July 30, 2010, compulsory retired. WHEREFORE, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Judge Hector B. Barillo is meted a FINE of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/MTJ-08-1710.htm Posted in Judicial and Legal Ethics, Preliminary Investigation | Tagged A judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for failure after conducting a preliminary investigation to transmit the resolution of the case together with the entire records to the Provincial Pros | Leave a comment Judge is liable for issuing a subpoena to prisoner sentenced to death or life imprisonment or detained upon legal process for the commission of any offense punishable by death or life imprisonment conferred in NBP without permission from the SC Posted on February 15, 2012 by Erineus In the wake of media reports that ex-Congressman Nicanor de Guzman, Jr. of Nueva Ecija, presently detained in the National Bilibid Prison on a life sentence, celebrated his birthday in his hometown in Nueva Ecija on January 16, 17 and 18, 1997, it was ascertained that in an Order dated November 27, 1996, Acting Presiding Judge Geminiano A. Eduardo of the Municipal Trial Court of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija directed the issuance of a subpoena in LRC File No. 9-96 entitled Petition for the Issuance of Second Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. NT -185476 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, Nicanor de Guzman, Jr., petit ioner, requiring the latter to appear at the said Court for hearing on January 16, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning. As soon as the MTC Judge signed the order, Clerk of Court II Juana F. Edades issued a subpoena to petitioner with a First Indorsement, dated December 5, 1996, forwarding it to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City. In a letter dated January 6, 1997 addressed to the Clerk of Court, MTC of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, which was received on January 10, 1997, Penal Superintendent Juanito S. Leopando of the Bureau of Prisons gave the information that prisoner Nicanor de Guzman is a life termer, hence permission from the Supreme Court must be secured first to enable this office to bring prisoner de Guzman before the Honorable Court in compliance with Administrative Circular No. 6 dated December 5, 1977 of the Honorable Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Administrative Circular No. 6 dated December 6, 1977 provides that: x x x pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 2 dated December 2, 1976, no prisoner sentenced to death or life imprisonment or detained upon legal process for the commission of any offense punishable by death or life imprisonment conferred in NBP is allowed to be brought outside of the said penal institution for appearance or attendance in any court except when the Supreme Court authorizes the Judge, upon proper application, to effect the transfer of the said prisoner. In addition, the said Circular directs every judge in Metro Manila and the Provinces of Rizal, Bulacan, Cavite and Laguna who requires the appearance or attendance of any of the aforestated prisoners confined in the New Bilibid Prisons in any judicial proceedings to conduct such proceeding within the premises of the said penal institution. The Court finds the above explanations unacceptable. It cannot allow such misconduct to pass without sanction. Respondents pretended ignorance of the existence of such circular because no copy was on file or that the Judge was appointed much later than the date of issuance of said circular cannot be a valid excuse. Circular No. 13 dated July 7, 1987, particularly enjoins all members of the judiciary to keep abreast of the rulings and doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court and apply them to appropriate cases x x x. In Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462 [1996], the Court has stressed that: Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties. They are likewise charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which relate to the scope of their authority. They are duty bound to observe and abide by these rules and procedures, designed as they are, primarily to ensure the orderly administration of justice. With the foregoing exhortation from the Court, respondent Judges unawareness of the circular is unexcusable. He has been in the Judiciary since 1983. With the length of service and experience in the bench, he cannot justifiably feign ignorance of the existence of Circular No. 6. In Ting v. Atal, 231 SCRA 80 [1994], we explained that: x x x. While it is true that respondent Judge failed in his duty to be updated in his knowledge of law, good faith and the lack of intent to cause prejudice or damage should be considered in his favor. In Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon. Dionisio M. Capistrano, this Court stated: To be sure, good faith and absence of malice and corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being held accountable for errors of judgment, on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. Good faith and lack of malicious intent however cannot completely free respondent Judge Elpidio B. Atal from liability. The role of justices and judges in the administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence. Respondent judge in this case failed to meet this requirement and standard. .
Moreover, Circular No. 6 also provides that it was a judges duty to examine and study carefully any application for the issuance of subpoena or summons involving detention prisoners filed with their court xxx. If, indeed, the Judge was not remiss in his duty in carefully examining the subpoena, then he would have clearly noticed that Nicanor de Guzman, Jr., a resident of San Vicente Homes, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, is the same Nicanor de Guzman, Jr., a life termer presently detained at the NBP. While Clerk of Court Edades admitted that she simply addressed the subpoena to Nicanor de Guzman, Jr. thru the Director of the NBP, Muntinlupa when she was informed that a similar subpoena in a certain criminal case was also issued by the prosecutors office at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, she was at the very least negligent in the performance of her official function as Clerk of Court. Her position as clerk of court is just as essential in any judicial system. She must realize that her administrative functions are vital and must, therefore keep abreast of circulars and rules that are important and necessary for a prompt and proper administration of justice. Likewise, we fault her for her deliberate inaction on her violation after her attention was called by the NBP Superintendent. This Court has not been wanting in its warnings that judges and all court employees should endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice. Respondents actions indeed show their lack of familiarity with the laws, rules and regulations as to undermine the public confidence in the integrity of our courts (Cuaresma v. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993]) IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds respondents guilty of gross negligence in the performance of their duty and hereby IMPOSES a fine of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos upon Judge Geminiano A. Eduardo and Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos upon Clerk of Court Juana F. Edades with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/am_97_2_12_mtc.htm Posted in Judicial and Legal Ethics, Prisoners, Subpoeana | Tagged Judge is liable for issuing a subpoena to prisoner sentenced to death or life imprisonment or detained upon legal process for the commission of any offense punishable by death or life imprisonment con | Leave a comment A judge who fails his SALN is GUILTY of violation of Section 7, R.A. No. 3019 and Section 8, R.A. No. 6713 Posted on January 25, 2012 by Erineus The Court also agrees with the OCA that respondent is guilty of violating Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713. Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019 provides: Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after assuming office and, thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or Chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of the said calendar year. In the same manner, Section 8, R.A. No. 6713 states: SEC. 8. Statements and Disclosure. Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. (A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. The two documents shall contain information on the following: (a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value; (b) personal property and acquisition cost; (c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like; (d) liabilities, and; (e) all business interests and financial connections. The documents must be filed: (a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office; (b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and (c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service. All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and financial connections in previous years, including, if possible, the year when they first assumed any office in the Government. Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required statements jointly or separately. xxx xxx xxx From the foregoing, it is imperative that every public official or government employee must make and submit a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth.[5] This serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of public officials and employees in compliance with the constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, to promote transparency in government, and to ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives,[6] with the end in view of curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.[7] In the present case, respondent clearly violated the above-quoted laws when he failed to file his SALN for the years 20042008. He gave no explanation either why he failed to file his SALN for five (5) consecutive years. While every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of justice.[8] Considering that this is the first offense of the respondent, albeit for five years, the Court shall impose a fine of only Five Thousand Pesos (5,000.00) with warning.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Uyag P. Usman, Presiding Judge, Sharia Circuit Court, Pagadian City, GUILTY of violation of Section 7, R.A. No. 3019 and Section 8, R.A. No. 6713 and orders him to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/SCC-08-12.htm

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