TALKI NG T H I N G S OVER

J. A. P A S S M O R E

M c lb o u r n c

U n i v c r s i Iy

Pres s

TALKING THINGS OVER

By the same Author . REA D IN G AND REM EM BERING Cr. Svo, 32 pp., 6d. net Third edition, 1944 M.U.P

TALKING THINGS OVER

J. A. PASSMORE
Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Sydney W ith a Foreword by W . G. K. Duncan, Director of Tutorial Classes, University of Sydney

M E L B O U R N E U N IV E R S I T Y P R E S S
in association with OXFORD U N IV E R S IT Y P R E SS

1945

M E L B O U R N E
U N IV E R S IT Y PR E SS C a r l t o n , N.3, V i c t o r i a Publishers in association with Oxford University Press, Melbourne and London. N ew York: G. E. Stechert & Co.
[C O P Y R IG H T ]

STATE LIBRARY OF VICTORIA

2 7 S E P 7996

sour.Cz
CALL
f'n

MC?

3 H + -2 .Z

P Z6T

W holly set up and printed in. Australia by B R O W N , P R IO R , A N D E R S O N P T Y . L T D . 430 L ittle Bourlce S treet, M elbourne

Registered a t th e G .P .O ., M elbourne, for transm ission b y post as a book

CONTENTS
PAGE

F oreword P reface

..

..

..

..

..

..

7 9

......................................................................................... W h a t is D i s c u s s i o n ? C h o o s in g a T o p ic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

I. II . III. IV . V. V I. V I I. V III.

11 IS
26

T h e S t r u c t u r e o f D isc u ssio n T h e L a n g u a g e o f D isc u ssio n

41

F a c t a n d F a l l a c y ............................................ 56 S o p h istry ...........................................................69 .. ............................... 83

G r o u p L ea d ersh ip

T h e P la c e

o f

D i s c u s s i o n ..............................90 ............................................................ 95

A ppen d ix

F O R E W O R D
Th e habit of talking things o v er seems to be spreading.

A t all events, the num ber of organized discussion groups (enrolled either as listening g roups w ith th e A ustralian B roadcasting Com m ission, or as discussion g roups w ith U niversity T u to rial Class D epartm ents, or, m ore recently, w ith the D epartm ent o f P o st-W a r R econstruction) has reached unprecedented levels. T h e sam e influences are at w ork in overseas countries. In Canada, fo r instance, the N ational F a rm R adio F o ru m and the C itizens F orum now have, betw een them , a netw ork of over th ree thousand groups m eeting regularly each week. T alking things over is not alw ays as easy as it sounds, however. Q uite a num ber of discussion groups get into difficulties. T h ey find th a t they dont know how to start, o r how to guide an d control a discussion, or, indeed, w hat a discussion is. T h ey flounder about, and a fte r hours of talk feel th a t they have got now here. W h a t they seldom stop to ask them selves is w here they should get, anyway. W h a t is th e purpose of a discussion? and how can this purpose be attained w ith the least confusion or w asted effort? T o help group leaders answ er these questions M r. Passm ore w as asked to give a sh o rt course of lectures on T he E lem ents o f a Good D iscussion. W h a t he had to say proved extrem ely helpful not only to civilian groups but to A rm y E ducation officers facing the sam e problem s. N ow th a t M r. Passm ore has w ritten out his views in this book, they should have a very w ide audience and should be the m eans of saving literally thousands of m an-hours th a t w ould otherw ise be w asted in getting now here. A s th e reader will soon discover, M r. Passm ore has given him m uch m ore than th e usual points fo r discussion leaders. T h e substance of the book is really a short course

FOREW ORD

in elem entary logic an d logic w ithout te a rs at that, for there is no ja rg o n and scarcely a difficult w ord in the whole book. W h a t is m ore, th e read er is provided w ith a series of exercises on which to try him self out, and see if he can spot a red herrin g , or a fallacy, on the ru n as it w ere. T his is w hat he will have to do d uring a discussion, and this is one o f the reasons w hy discussion is such a difficult art, and requires so m uch practice. U n d e r M r. P assm ores guidance the read er can at least see w hat is expected of him , and w hat the skill is th a t he needs to acquire. In both substance and m anner of presentation this book seems to m e an excellent exam ple of the contribution which U niversity teachers can m ake in th e field of ad u lt education m ethods. I t is th e second contribution from M r. P assm ores pen. T h e first was a pam phlet entitled R eading and R em em bering, w hich has already ru n th ro u gh several im pressions an d proved a boon to thousands of individual students. T h is w ork is designed to help groups, and a careful reading o f it will, I am confident, result in an im m ediate im provem ent in th e stan d ard of th eir discussions. W . G. K . D u n c a n Director of Tutorial Classes University of Sydney

PREFACE
Th is book has been w ritten in the belief th at one of the

best w ays of finding out m ore about subjects like economics and politics, philosophy and psychology, literatu re and a rt, is to talk them over w ith those who share o u r interest in th e m .' I t is w ritten, also, from the experience th at discussion can be the m ost w earisom e and pointless of activities. T h ere are m any different reasons w hy this is so. People cannot discuss if they have no info rm atio n to add to the common pool; discussion cannot take th e place of careful reading an d careful listening. A n d some people are not tem peram entally capable of getting the best out of discus sion, w hether because they are too domineering, o r too shy, too obstinate o r too easily convinced. B u t I believe, and I hope to show, th at discussion o ften breaks dow n solely because those w ho take p a rt in it fail to realize th a t it has its own laws, its ow n stru ctu re, w hich m ust be respected. E veryone realizes th at there are law s of form al debate, because these are m ade explicit; it is not commonly realized th at discussion, too, has its laws, because these have not so fa r been m ade explicit. In thus em phasizing th e form al stru c tu re of discussion, I lay m yself open to th e charge th a t I am seeking to destroy spontaneity, w hich is the very life-blood of discussion. I fully agree th a t nothing could be m ore fatal to discussion than the unim aginative application o f iron-clad rules. B ut spontaneity m ust be tem pered by a respect fo r relevance, if discussion is to be som ething m ore than an opportunity for public speaking, if it is to be a serious attem pt to thrash out, in a co-operative spirit, th e im plications of a problem. A nd w e can only learn, and teach others, w hat is relevant an d w hat is irrelevant, if we keep clearly b efo re our m inds w hat discussion is, and how it w orks.
9

10

PREFACE

T h ere is no recipe which can be m echanically applied in order to produce successful discussion. N o rules can serve as a su b stitute fo r tolerance, fo r interest o r fo r knowledge. B ut if we reflect critically on o u r own procedures w e can, I believe, considerably im prove the p resent deplorably low standard of discussion. T h is book is m eant to provide a startin g point fo r such critical reflection; to finality, it m akes no claim. I should like to thank the officers of th e D epartm ent of T u to ria l Classes, Sydney U n iversity, fo r m any helpful criticism s; an d M iss A nne C ourt fo r generous stenographic assistance. A n d I should like also to th an k P ro fessor John A nderson, P ro fe sso r o f Philosophy in th e U niversity of Sydney, who has contributed a g re a t deal even to those p arts of this book w ith w hich he is in serious disagreem ent. F inally, I should like to th an k P ro fe sso r A . K . S tout fo r his careful scrutiny o f th e p ro o fs and m y w ife fo r her help a t this stage, as a t earlier stages, in th e com position of the book.

W H A T IS D IS C U S S IO N ?
Th e r e is no point in beginning w ith definitions if we can

feel confident th a t the term s we are going to use are already quite well understood, but, u n fo rtu n ately , we cannot safely assum e th a t everyone know s w hat discussion is. N ot long ago, fo r exam ple, I came across a rep o rt on discussion m ethods which contained this sentence: T h e difficulty of obtaining persons of diam etrically opposite views to open the discussion is o ften presen t. T h e m an who w rote th at sentence does not know w hat discussion is ; he is confusing it w ith debate. A nd I have o ften been told th a t Discussion is no use, because people still disagree a t the end of it. T h e people who tell m e th at do not know w hat discussion is, either. Som etim es it has been a different story th at was a very good discussion, because everyone was so interested. B u t th a t will n o t d o ; interest is not enough. I t is clear enough th a t discussion is a w ay of talking together, but it by no m eans follows th at w henever we are talking together, w e a re discussing. We m ay be conversing, we may be debating, w e m ay be d isp u tin g ; only quite rarely will we be discussing. I f we can distinguish discussion from each of these, w e shall be well on o u r w ay to finding out w hat it is, and in w hat its special value consists. L isten carefully to an ordin ary conversation. Y ou will soon discover th a t quite a num ber of topics a re taken up and cast aside, topics not a t all closely linked w ith one another. I f a person has som ething interesting to say, he feels a t liberty to in te rru p t w ith it a t an y stage in the conversation. Y ou will notice also th e prom inence of anecdotes an d personalities. T h e re is little consideration of general issues, and no thorough consideration of any issue w hich is b rought forw ard . In no sense of the phrase does
11

12

T A L K IN G

T H IN G SO V ER

a conversation try to get som ew here. I f it is lively and interesting, everyone is perfectly satisfied. D ebate is very different. R igid form ality characterizes i t ; set speeches w ith a predeterm ined tim e lim it and no interru p tio n s of one person by another. I t is com petitive in spirit, since people set out to w in debates, w hereas it is im possible to w in a conversation. In consequence, the debater is all the w hile try in g to score p oints off his opponents. H e is necessarily a propagandist, in the sense th at his sole object is to p u t up a convincing case, w ithout being lim ited by considerations o f sincerity and tru th . Black and w hite a re the only colours he can em ploy; he is un d er no obligation to m ake concessions to the o ther side, o r to draw attention to weaknesses and difficulties in his ow n case. T o sum up, th e debate, as a form o f talking together, is form al, com petitive an d one-sided. D isputation is a little m ore difficult to describe, ju st because it is externally very like discussion, even though in spirit quite alien to it. D isputation, like debate, is a contest, but it has none of the form ality of debate. (T h e re is m uch the same difference betw een debate an d disputation as there is betw een an organized boxing m atch an d a street braw l.) N o holds a re b arred and the atm osphere is one o f anger and contem pt, w ithout any pretence of detachm ent. A ssertion and counter-assertion is th e typical m ethod of d ispute; th e debater a t least has to give an ordered presentation of his case, but in a dispute th ere is no attem pt to state a case, o r to do anything except to overcome the adversary by the sheer w eight o f contradiction. P erhaps you will u n derstand better w hat I m ean if I say th a t m ost dom estic squabbles, m ost street-co rn er argum ents, are exam ples of disputation. B oth discussion and disputation a re inform al, both use th e m ethod o f cu t-an d -th ru st ra th e r than the m ethod of long speeches, but th e difference betw een them was noticed long ago by A ristotle w hen he drew a distinction between

WHAT

IS

D IS C U SS IO N ?

13

those w ho discuss in the spirit of com petition and those who discuss things in th e spirit of enquiry. W hile disputa tion is alw ays a battle, in discussion th ere is no victor and no vanquished. O ne person ra th e r th an another m ay be the first to p u t fo rw ard the point o f view which is finally accepted, but this is his contribution to the w ork of the group, not a personal victory. In form , discussion falls betw een debate and conversation. U nlike conversation, it has a logical fo rm ality ; it tu rn s around a single topic, and insists upon relevance. B ut unlike debate, it is not a series of set speeches. I t m ay have a leader, who guides the course of the discussion to some extent, but, unlike the chairm an of a debate, the leader is not applying arb itra ry rules. H is task is sim ply to keep the discussion going, and to keep it to the p o in t; relevance is th e only rule he needs. U nderstanding, not victory, is th e object of dis cussion ; co-operation, not com petition, its m e th o d ; relevance, not fixed rules, provides its form ality. W e have now arriv ed at a general description of the m ethod o f discussion, as contrasted w ith conversation, debate and disputation. A co-operative attem pt to study a problem in such a w ay as to gain a g reater understanding o f it, and of th e argum ents which can be b rought fo r and against p articu lar solutions o f it th a t will do as a rough definition. A n d it will be clear enough by now th a t m uch of w hat passes as discussion is not discussion at all. Discussion g roups a re o ften the occasion fo r a pleasant gossip or a stim ulating disputation ra th e r th a n a genuine discussion. I do not at all w ish to deny the value o f conversation, of debate, o r even of disputation. C onversation, w ith its lively gliding over the su rface of th in g s; debate, w ith its skilful and vigorous presentation of w hatever can be said in favour o f a p articular point of v ie w ; th e ham m er and tongs dispute o f violent adversaries each of these has its value. B ut the discussion m ethod, the co-operative investigation o f a

14

T A L K IN G

T H IN G S

OVER

problem , has som ething of its own to contribute, and it is w ith th a t m ethod, an d th a t alone, th a t I shall here concern m yself. P erh ap s there will never be a p erfect discussion; perhaps, in p a rt, any actual discussion will be conversation or disputation, but there a re certainly discussions w hich are principally efforts at understan d in g as com pared w ith discussions w hich a re principally gossip, or principally dispute, and I see no reason w hy we should rest content w ith o u r present deficiencies.

II CH OO SING A TO PIC
All discussion begins w ith a topic. T h is should usually be

form ulated as a question, because a question sets the m ind w orking, as the announcem ent of a general subject does not. A sked to discuss E ducation in th e M odern W o rld we flounder, looking fo r a m ore specific problem , whereas Should the T eaching o f L atin be A bandoned? immediately sets such a problem b efo re us. N ot every question will do. Faced by a topic which is vaguely and am biguously phrased, a group can m ake no headw ay. N o r is clarity enough. F o r th ere a re some topics which no group, how ever capable an d w ell-intentioned, can discuss; th ere a re some groups w hich are incapable of discussing any question, no m a tte r how carefully it is selected and how judiciously it is p h rased ; and m ost topics, how ever suitable they m ay be fo r some groups, a re quite unsuitable fo r others. A.
1. 2. 3.
D is c u s s a b le Q u e s tio n s

Q uestions can be divided into three main ty p es:

Questions of Fact. Is this true or not? Questions of Preference.1 Do you like so-and-so? Questions of Policy. W hat are we to dc?

E ach o f these needs separate consideration. Q uestions o f Fact T hese can again be subdivided, w ith an occasional hesi tancy, into those on which exp ert opinion is final (w hich can be settled by looking up a reference book) and those on which the opinion o f th e ordin ary m an is relevant and im portant. M any people will argue fo r h ours on points
I. There is a difficulty in term inology here, since preferences are themselves facts. B u t I th in k th e distinction I have in m ind is clear enough.

1.

15

16

T A L K IN G T H IN G S

OVER

which an encyclopaedia would settle a fte r a m inutes search. Such arg u m en t is bound to be futile and alm ost certain to be bad-tem pered, ju s t because discussion is not a way of settling, or even illum inating, this so rt o f problem of fact. N o one would sit dow n to discuss w hether tw o and two m ake fo u r, but men will dispute endlessly about the distance from Sydney to L ondon or the date of the abdication of K ing E d w ard v m . A lthough no one would deliberately select such topics as these a s the m ain subject fo r discussion, they are bound to arise as discussion proceeds. A group begins on the Cabinet System , b u t finds itself discussing the precise constitutional pow ers o f the G overnor-G eneral o r the num ber o f mem bers in Caucus. T h e re is some point in this, if the group becomes aw are of th e gaps in its know ledge, but if the discussion drags on and on it loses its original im petus and vitality. E ncountering such problem s as these, a group should be able to recognize them as undiscu ssab le; to recognize, th at is, th a t the g roup has not at its disposal th e inform ation which alone could th ro w any light upon them. (W h a t an ordinary group finds to be undiscussable m ight, of course, be a subject fo r w arm discussion a t a g ath erin g of expert constitutional law yers.) T h e g ro u p should learn to distinguish betw een discussable and undiscussable m atters of fact, b u t it should not be led to conclude th at no questions of fact a re discussable. I t is better th at people should try to discuss th e undiscussable than th a t they should refu se to discuss, as beyond their pow ers and rights, all questions of fact. T o m aintain, as some do, th at only policy lends itself to discussion, th a t it is fo r the ex p ert to supply all the facts, is to go fa r beyond w hat can p roperly by argued. F o r one thing, ex p erts disagree how a re w e then to proceed? O u r tendency is to describe as ex p erts those whose conclusions satisfy o u r hopes an d dispel our fears; those w ho disappoint us in th is respect a re cranks and

C H O O SIN G A T O P IC

17

quacks and crack-brained theorists. I f , in discussion, nothing m ore happens th an th is th a t the opinions of the e x p e rt on whom w e pin o u r faith have to stand up to the criticism s of others, th a t in itself can be distinctly illum inating. A nd, of course, it is precisely about those questions which a re m ost commonly th e subject fo r dis cussion politics and the like th at ex p e rts a re especially in disagreem ent. F urth erm o re, the m an in the street has som ething to say on these m atters, has his own contribution to make. H e may be m uch m ore aw are th an the ex p ert of the sort of life which is lived in the slums, of the kind of resistance which can be expected to housing schemes, m uch m ore conscious of the difficulty of bringing up children u n d er m odern con ditions, of w hat it feels like to be unem ployed, o r to live in a small country tow n. Q uestions like W h y is the b irth ra te decreasing?, Can th e d rift to the city be stopped? are questions of fact, yet no ex p ert can be said to have settled them , and the o rdinary m em ber of a discussion group can m ake some contribution to th e ir solution. T h e m ore inform ed the opinions which the m em bers of th e group can bring to bear on them , th e better, b u t experience and common sense are im m ensely im portant. 2. Q uestions o f P reference A simple question of preference, such as D o you like po etry ? or Do you prefer classical m usic to ja z z ? o r Do you support the p a rty system ? is not, as it stands, suitable fo r discussion. I t lends itself to th e answ er Y es o r N o and th a t is a l l ; it does not encourage the g ro u p to argue, to state a case, w hich is th e first requirem ent of a topic fo r discussion. I f the group is asked to give reasons fo r its preferences, to support them in some way, the position is ra th e r different but w e have then passed out of th e region of preferences

18

T A L K IN G T H IN G S O V ER

into the realm of facts. I f we ask a person w hy he likes poetry, fo r exam ple, w e usually w ant him to talk not about him self, but about poetry. B ut, as this question is phrased, it is still directed too m uch to individual m em bers of the group, too little to th e group as a whole. I t m ay encourage individual m em bers to exam ine th e ir ow n soul-states o r to recount th eir own life-histories, ra th e r th a n to m ake any serious study of poetry. Such questions can be used, w ith discretion, to get people talking, to break the ice. A sk a .person, W h y do you dislike totalitarian ism ? and this m ay lead him to consider m ore precisely w hat totalitarianism stands fo r than he has ever done before. B ut it will usually be necessary to fram e our questions ra th e r differently, as, fo r exam ple, W h at exactly are the disadvantages o f living in a to talitarian state?, if w e w ant people to ju s tify th e ir p references by referrin g to facts, to w ean them fro m th e a ttitu d e th a t they know w hat they like and th a t is enough. 3. Q uestions o f Policy Q uestions of policy usually take the form , W h at ought w e to d o ? F o r exam ple, O u g h t w e to re tu rn to free tra d e ? N ow , th is m ight be in terp reted as a simple question of preference, as equivalent to W ould you like to retu rn to free tra d e ? T ak en in this w ay, it would be (as w e have already arg u ed ) u ndiscussable; and discussions on policy o ften break dow n because they resolve them selves into a m ere conflict of preferences. If , how ever, w e in te rp re t O ught we to re tu rn to free tra d e ? as being equivalent to W h a t a re the disadvantages and advantages of free trad e ?, th e position is quite different. A simple Y es- N o an sw er is now out of th e question. W h a t w e have is obviously a com bination of tw o questions, a question o f fact and a question of preference. W e are being asked first of all to describe the consequences of free trad e and then to divide those consequences into tw o groups

C H O O SIN G A T O P IC

19

those we approve of (advan tag es) and those we disapprove of (disad v an tag es). T h e special function o f discussion in th e developm ent of policy is to ensure th at th ere will be a full consideration of the relevant facts. In o u r zeal fo r th e policy to w hich we incline, we are only too likely to overlook facts w hich have an im portant bearing on the proposals we advocate. I t is essential, then, in an y discussion o f policy, to disentangle the relevant issues o f fact, leaving aside fo r the m om ent the question w hat we w ould like to happen, o r w hat we would particularly oppose. O nce the facts have been determ ined, w e are in a m uch b etter position to decide upon policy. N ote, how ever, th a t the facts alone will not determ ine our policy. T h e m em bers of a g ro u p m ay be able to agree upon th e facts, but yet m ay still disagree about th e policy to be adopted. T h ey m ight agree, fo r exam ple, th a t state control o f in d u stry w ould lessen th e risk of unem ploym ent, but will also restrict individual freedom . Y et some m em bers o f th e group will support state control, others condem n it. Ini the end, w e come back to simple preferences, to a choice o f th e soul, to use G. K . C hestertons phrase, which no am ount of discussion can overcome. W e need not be surprised, th erefo re, to find th a t a fte r all th e discussion the group still disagrees about policy. B ut, fo r all that, discussion does often lead us to change o u r m ind. W e may discover th a t w e have supported a policy blindly, w ithout realizing w hat is involved in it. T h is discovery, how ever, we shall only m ake if th e discussion tu rn s aro u n d issues o f fact, if we are not content w ith the m ere opposition of preferences. O therw ise, w e shall be n o clearer about the im plications o f o u r policy a t the end th an w e w ere a t the beginning. T o sum up, questions of p reference and questions of policy are only discussable when they are reform ulated as questions o f fact. W hen they are thus reform ulated, it will have to be considered w hether these questions o f fact a re of a kind the group can profitably discuss.

20

T A L K IN G T H IN G S

OVER

B. Th e G r o u p

a n d th e

To p ic

Topics well suited to some groups a re quite unsuitable fo r others. So m uch is obvious; but it is not quite so obvious how one can determ ine ju s t w hat topics to select fo r a particu lar group. T h e re a re fo u r m ain factors, Interest, In fo rm atio n , E x te n t o f A greem ent, an d E x te n t o f D isagree m ent, which m ust certainly be tak en in to account. 1. In terest A group will n o t discuss w hat does not interest it th at also is obvious. B u t ju s t w hat does in terest a group it is not alw ays easy to discover. Som etim es a group chooses a topic out of a sense of duty (because, fo r exam ple, it feels it ought to know som ething about L ite ra tu re ) ; sometimes it fails to realize ju s t how interesting questions of which it has had no previous experience can be. I t is surprising, fo r exam ple, how interested groups of o rd in ary men and wom en can become in logic. H ence, it is necessary to experim ent, cutting losses as rap id ly as possible w hen failure is obvious. T h ere is no fool-proof w ay o f finding out w hat interests a group, even though a little previous reflection can rule out certain topics as im practicable. A topic can be im practicable, not m erely because the group is uninterested in it, but also because some m em bers o f the g roup a re too interested in it. T h is m ay completely throw out th e balance of th e group. I t m ay become quite a successful tu to rial class, w ith som e m em bers of the group acting as teachers an d th e others as ta u g h t; but it will be b etter to give u p the pretence o f being a discussion group, which will only serve to confuse its w ork. O r some tim es it will m ean th a t a topic cannot be discussed a t all. F o r exam ple, m any people a re very interested in religion, b u t a g roup unpractised in discussion will find this a m ost difficult topic to consider, ju s t because it arouses such passion. T h e discipline of discussion is not easy to acquire under such circum stances.

C H O O SIN G A T O P IC

21

2. Info rm a tio n D iscussion proceeds by th e critical exam ination of o p in io n s; and criticism , to be of any value, m ust be based on in form ation. A group cannot fru itfu lly sit down to consider w hether the p resent pow ers of th e H ig h C o u rt should be restricted, unless it know s w h at those pow ers are, and w hat effect they have upon legislation. E v ery g ro u p needs occa sionally to ask itself, H ave w e enough inform ation to discuss this question fru itfu lly ? particularly w hen the discussion appears to be m aking no headw ay. H e re again, th e inform ation needs to be distributed throug h o u t the group. T h a t is one great advantage of basing discussion on a book the m em bers of th e group have all read, o r a lecture they have all heard. I f all the inform ation is in the hands of one or tw o persons, th en the group should let them talk, an d h ear w hat they have to say, asking them questions, of course. T h en , w ith th at inform ation at its disposal, it can set about discussion. T o insist, u n d er such circum stances, on trying to keep to the o rdinary p attern of discussion group procedure is to attem pt the impossible. 3. E x te n t o f A g reem en t M any people appear to believe th a t all th a t is necessary to arouse a good discussion is to bring tog eth er people of quite opposite points o f view ; th a t if, fo r exam ple, it w ere possible to bring together in a discussion group the A rch bishop o f C anterbury and the P resid en t o f the Society of A theists and get them talking on R eligion an d E d u cation then a good discussion would be inevitable. B u t while there m ay result, u n d er these circum stances, a good debate or a lively disputation, th ere cannot be a good discussion. Inevit ably, both participants will be led off on to o ther issues. T hey will not agree about w hat religion is, n o r w hat educa tion is, n o r w hether any religions are tru e, n o r w h at m oral

22

T A L K IN G T H IN G S

OVER

education w ould be, and w ithout some agreem ent on these points discussion of Religion and E du catio n is impossible. U nless th ere is agreem ent on m ore general principles, it is im possible to discuss w hat is, com paratively, a m atter of detail. Sim ilarly, to choose a m ore likely illustration, a group set dow n to discuss Should th e G overnm ent build F la ts or H o u se s? will alm ost certainly end up in a w rangle about Socialism. I f th e group does not first agree th a t th e re ought to be a G overnm ent H o u sin g Schem e, it cannot profitably discuss th is m ore special topic. Som etim es an artificial agreem ent is sought fo r th e sake o f arg u m en t, but it is very difficult to w ork w ithin a convention o f this kind. T he m ore fundam ental disagreem ent will keep cropping up, how ever w ell-intentioned the m em bers of th e g roup m ay be. T opics, then, should n o t be chosen which presuppose a background o f agreem ent which is unlikely, in fact, to be realized. T h e m ore w illing a g ro u p is to co-operate, the less extensive its region of agreem ent will need to b e ; but w ithout some m easure o f agreem ent discussion is simply impossible. 4. E x te n t o f D isagreem ent A discussion g roup is n o t a M utual A dm iration Society. U nless various points o f view a re represented w ithin it there will be no really critical exam ination o f opinions. T o realize th a t th ere a re not m erely tw o (a superstition the debate encourages) but m any sides to a question, w e m ust come u p against a variety o f opinions. F o rtu n ately , this condition of discussion is usually satisfied. A group needs to rem em ber, how ever, th a t th ere is m uch to be said which will find no expression by its m em bers, and hence it should not flatter itself th a t if it reaches agreem ent this is a sure indication th a t it has arrived a t the tru th .

C H O O SIN G A T O P IC

23

C . Th e C o n d it io n s

o f

D is c u s s io n

I f a group cannot discuss not ju s t this question, o r th a t question, b u t any question a t all it can only be because the m em bers of it are unable or unw illing to co-operate w ith one another. (A ssum ing, th a t is, th a t they are n either deaf m utes n o r m orons.) W ith o u t co-operation, discussion is im possible; w ith it, discussion of som e topics at least is always possible. C o-operation does not exclude vigorous opposition. M em bers of a group can co-operate w ith one another, how ever m uch they disagree. W h a t is excluded is com petition, the use of a discussion group as a field of battle. Co-operation is p rim arily a w illingness to tre a t seriously the opinions of oth er people. T h a t does not im ply a willing ness to accept them as being tru e , although it does im ply a receptivity to new ideas. W h en an opinion is proposed fo r consideration, a g ro u p w hich is w orking co-operatively will tre a t it as a hypothesis, which has to be tested in the light of the inform ation th e group has at its disposal, not as a challenge w hich m ust be refuted at w hatever cost to tru th o r relevance. I t implies also a w illingness on th e p a rt of those w ho p u t fo rw ard opinions to have them treated as hypotheses, subjected to critical exam ination. T h a t type o f person who is offended th a t anyone should criticise his opinions, who feels th a t w hat he believes is so self-evident th a t only a fool o r a scoundrel could disagree w ith him , who regards a criticism of his opinions as an attack upon his personal integrity, has no place in a discussion group. T horo u g h co-operation m ay not be achieved fo r a variety of reasons. T em peram ent is im portant. A ggressiveness, sensitivity, shyness, impatience, intolerance, cocksureness all o f these tem peram ental qualities, an d m any others, can be an obstacle to co-operative discussion. J u s t how fa r they can be broken dow n will depend upon the a ttitu d e of the rest of th e group and perhaps especially on the leader. I f

24

T A L K IN G

T H IN G S O V ER

he reto rts in kind, the group has no chance of surviving; but not m any people can handle w ith equal skill the cocksure and th e shy. F ortu n ately , a group can survive a nonco-operative m em ber o r tw o, providing he is not allowed to dom inate the d iscussion; b u t som etim es th ere is no alternative but expulsion or, m ore easily m anaged, the break ing up of the g roup an d the form ation o f a new one which excludes the unm anageable m em ber. T hese problem s of tem peram ent a re not m y concern in this book nor do I feel com petent to say m uch about m any of them but they are an ever-present difficulty in the conduct of discussion. W e m ust also rem em ber th at m ost people have had little or no experience of discussion, that, to them , discussion is disputation, and th e m ethod of assertion and counter assertion th e only possible one. T h e discussion group has th erefo re to be a train in g in the a r t of discussion, as well as a study of a p articu lar topic (alth o u g h this does not im ply th a t th e group has to be lectured on th e m ethod of discussion; a g reat deal can be learn t by tria l and e rro r). P ro g ress is necessarily gradual.- T o lay dow n impossibly high standards at the beginning is to court disaster. If people can come to see th at discussion is not th e same thing as disputation, th a t in itself is an im m ense step forw ard. E xercises T h e follow ing topics fo r discussion have been used in A dult E ducation w ork, some in th e U nited States of A m erica and some in A ustralia. Look carefully a t each question and ask yourself (a) Is it a question of fact, of preference, or of policy? (b) How far can it be discussed without specialist knowledge? (c) What groups is it likely to interest? (d) Is it so phrased as to give rise to active and relevant dis cussion? If not, can you suggest a better formulation? 1. W h a t is the statu s of wom en in G erm any and R ussia? 2. W ould you ra th e r read a play o f S hakespeares o r see it p erfo rm ed ?

C H O O SIN G A T O P IC

25

3. W h at is societys d u ty to the u n fo rtu n a te ? 4. W h y do we have depressions? 5. W h a t do you consider is th e m ost im portant field fo r hum an thinking? 6. Is it tru e to say th a t the specifically E nglish genius is prim arily poetic and fantastic? 7. W h a t is the place o f wom en in in d u stry ? 8. Is propaganda a menace? 9. H as th e grow th of the pow er of the S tate m eant a decline in the freedom of the individual? 10. O u g h t m edicine.to be nationalized?

Ill T H E STR U C TU R E O F D ISCUSSIO N

N o tw o groups will ever discuss the sam e topic in precisely the same way. W h a t happens in th e discussion will vary w ith the g ro u p s in terest in the subject, its capacity fo r discussion an d the inform ation it possesses. N one the less there is a common pattern to be found in m ost good dis cussion, a p a tte rn fro m w hich it will not deviate very far. T h e re a re five stages in th e p a tte r n :1 A. Clarification of the problem. B. The making of an assertion. C. The examination of the assertion. D. Coming to a conclusion. (These stages B, C, D will be repeated for each main assertion which is put forward in the discussion.) E. The weighing of conclusions. A.
C la rific a tio n o f th e P ro b le m

T h e m em bers of th e g roup m ust know w hat they are supposed to be talking about, and m ust all be talking about the sam e thing. O fte n enough, these conditions are not fulfilled, unless th ere is a prelim inary clarification o f the problem . T ak e, fo r exam ple, th e topic Is propaganda a m enace? Som e people use th e w ord propaganda to m ean m uch the sam e thin g as persuasion; o thers th in k th a t only th a t sort o f persuasion w hich relies on deception ought to be called propaganda. U nless the g roup m akes up its m ind how it is going to use the w ord, it is im possible fo r it to discuss w hether propaganda is a menace o r not. O ne p u r pose of the clarification stage is to get rid of such ambiguities. Sim ilarly, any obscure expressions will need to be clarified.
1. T hese stages, of course, are n o t so sharply separated off from one another as they appear in th is plan. T he m ain assertions are necessarily inter-connected; w hat we say about one m ay lead us to revise w hat we have already said abo u t th e others. A nd o ther variations are inevitable. W h a t I have to say is a rough guide, n o t a rigid analysis.

26

THE

S T R U C T U R E O F D IS C U SS IO N

27

T he w ord m enace, fo r exam ple, is highly o bscure; the group will have to decide to w hat propaganda is supposed to be a menace. H o w fa r such verbal clarification is necessary will depend largely on the care w ith w hich th e topic has originally been fram ed. B u t there is another sort of clarification w hich is always necessary w hen a question of p reference o r of policy has been laid b efore the group, an d o fte n necessary in con sidering a question of fact. I t consists in disentangling some particu lar issue from th e m ore general problem presented by th e topic. T hu s a discussion m ay begin som ew hat as fo llo w s: W eve been asked to consider w hether we w ould ra th e r send our children to H ig h Schools o r to Technical Schools. W ell, I w onder if its possible to get anything out of a H ig h School education which cant be got a t all in a Technical School. W h a t do you thin k about th a t, G eorge? H e re an attem pt, a t least, is m ade to tu rn a question of p reference into a question of fact, to force m em bers of th e g ro u p to bring forw ard specific reasons fo r p re fe rrin g one to the other. O r, again, W e have to talk about w hether we think th at m edicine ought to be nationalized. W h a t do you think w ould happen if we did nationalize m edicine? W hat would be the effect upon ourselves an d upon th e docto rs? H e re a question of fact is extracted fo r consideration from a problem of policy. Indeed, tw o questions o f fact a re dis tinguished from each other, and th e speaker m ight go on to suggest th at w e should talk first of all of the effect of nationalization upon the m an in the street, and later of its effect on the doctor. H e will need to be careful, how ever, not to insist upon the separate discussion of issues which are so bound up w ith one an o th er th at they cannot possibly be discussed separately. W e can quite pro p erly try to tre a t one question a t a tim e, b u t w e m ust be su re th a t it is one question and not h alf a question. In the exam ples I have so fa r given, th e first speaker,

28

T A L K IN G T H IN G S

OVER

w ho will norm ally be the leader, does th e clarifying. Som e times, how ever, to avoid th e im pression th a t the leader is a pedantic so rt o f person w ho insists on getting between the topic an d th e group, the clarifying m ay follow the first contribution to the general discussion, th u s : L e a d e r : Well, we have to discuss whether medicine ought to be nationalized. What about it, George? G e o r g e : I think it certainly ought to be nationalized. I havent got any doubt about it at all. L e a d e r : Just why, George? What difference do you think it will make if we do nationalize? In this case the leader perm its G eorge to state his preference, b efo re asking him to give reasons in support of it. A n d th e sam e m ethod can be used_ fo r verbal clari fication : : To-night we have to consider whether propaganda is a menace. Will you start, George? G e o r g e : Of course its a menace 1 Any sort of deception is bound to be a menace? L e a d e r : Wait a minute I George evidently assumes that propa ganda always involves deception. Would you all agree? B ut w hatever m ethod is used, the topic m ust be clarified before discussion can really get u n d er way.
L eader

B . Th e M aking

o f an

As s e r t io n

O nce it is clear precisely w hat has to be discussed, then a statem ent of opinion is sought from , o r volunteered by, a m em ber of the group. T h is statem ent of opinion, like the original topic, m ay need clarification b efore it can be made the basis fo r discussion th e problem , again, being to dis entangle a precise issue fo r th e consideration of the group. H ow ever diligently the leader has sought to divert the group fro m a statem ent o f p reference to a statem ent of fact,1 m em bers of the group will w ith difficulty be prevented from regard in g an opportu n ity to speak as a chance of
1. T h is phrase m ay cause some B y *a statem ent of fact I mean a from a statem ent th a t it ought to th e case (preference). A ll geniuses although it is clearly false. confusion, b u t I ca n n o t th in k of an altern ativ e. statem en t th a t som ething is the case, as distin ct be th e case (p o licy ) or th a t we like its being are bearded, for exam ple, is a statem en t o f fact,

THE

S T R U C T U R E O F D IS C U SS IO N

29

showing th a t they know w hat they like. U nless th e ir state m ents a re clarified, discussion will go to pieces. Suppose the question is W ould you sooner see a play of Shakespeares acted o r read it? , then even if the leader has m ade an effort to tu rn it into Is th ere anything which you can get out o f a play of Shakespeares by seeing it acted w hich you cant get out o f reading it? , the discussion is quite likely to proceed as follow s:
Jam es: G eorge : John : W e ll, in m y opinion, th e res n o com p arison . I d so o n er g o to the th eatre any day th an read a book. G ive m e a b ook 1

Im with you there. I dont see how people can be bothered going to the theatre, although I cant say Im a very great reader either. W i l l i a m : I think youre quite wrong. You know what Shake speare saidThe plays the thing; if he doesnt know, who would? and so on. I f , how ever, G eorge h ad come in w ith a dem and for clarification, th u s: G e o r g e : Why exactly? What do you reckon you get from the theatre you cant get from the book? then Jam es is practically forced into some such reply a s : J ames: A plays much more real to me if I can see it acted, and the question can then be raised w h eth er this is tru e of everyone. Discussion does not even begin, properly speaking, until we a re out of th e region of preference. N o assertion has been m ade, as I am using the w ord, until a statem ent of fact has been proposed fo r the consideration of the group. A nd it m ust be clearly form ulated. L ike th e topic, it will need verbal clarification. O ne sort of clarification is p ar ticularly im portant at this stage, to deal w ith rem arks like the follow ing (th e discussion is about T h e Place of W om en in In d u stry ) :
G eorge : I th in k w om en s p lace is in th e hom e. W o m en h aven 't any real in terest in their w ork. J a m e s : Yes, they have. What women are r e a lly bored by is

housework.

30

T A L K IN G

T H IN G S

OVER

N eith er speaker m akes it clear w hat he m eans by wom en ; w hether, th a t is, he m eans all wom en o r som e women and until he does so w e do not know w hat assertion he is really trying to make. T he m aking of an assertion, then, involves m uch m ore th an m erely opening ones m outh and letting th e w ords flow o u t; no assertion has been m ade until a statem ent of fact has been clearly an d definitely p u t b efore th e group. C.
T h e E x a m in a tio n o f th e A s s e rtio n

T his, the n e x t step in discussion, is th e vital core of the whole procedure the critical exam ination of opinion. Som etim es th e g ro u p will accept im m ediately the assertion which has been put b efo re it. T hen they should proceed as rapidly as possible to a fu rth e r point (w ith o u t pausing to congratulate them selves on th e ir u n a n im ity ). M ore often, how ever, some m em ber of the g ro u p will dem and th a t it be given fu rth e r consideration. T h is consideration may take tw o fo r m s :
1. 2. A dem and for p roof. A dem and fo r v erifica tio n (c o n fir m a tio n ).

1. A dem and f o r p ro o f T his is a common re sp o n se ; an d any m em ber of the group is, of course, w ithin his rig h ts in asking fo r p ro o f. B ut he should not be surprised if he fails to obtain it. Som e people apparently believe th a t we ought not to say anything unless w e can offer p ro o f of i t; and if w e fail to offer such p roof, they take th is to m ean th at o u r opinion is not w orth con sidering. A nyone who has ever reflected on the n atu re of proof, how ever, will see th a t it is n o t m erely im probable th at anyone will be able to prove everything he says, it is actually impossible. F o r w e can prove an assertion only by bringing fo rw ard oth er assertions fro m w hich it follow s; and if w e a re not entitled to believe these o th er assertions unless we can prove them , then w e will be compelled to

THE

ST R U C T U R E O F D IS C U SS IO N

31

bring fo rw ard fu rth e r assertions as th e p ro o f, and fu rth e r assertions to prove these assertions, an d so on. W e could never m ake any assertion at all, if w e had to prove every thing w e said. T h u s while we can be asked fo r p ro o f can be asked, th at is, to show th a t the opinion w e have p u t fo rw ard follows logically from assertions the re st of th e group will accept as being tru e the fact th a t w e cannot offer a proof does nothing w hatever to show th a t w hat we have said is false. A n opponent w ho, having dem onstrated th a t w e have n o t proved w hat we said, takes th is to im ply th a t w hat we say m ust be false, is him self com m itting a m ost serious fallacy th e fallacy o f ignoring the point. T o show th at o u r assertion is false, he m ust offer a disproof of i t ; th e fact th at we cannot offer a p ro o f of it, is not enough. T h is applies, equally, if w e do offer a p ro o f, and th at proof can be shown to be invalid. A n invalid argum ent is one in w hich the conclusion does not follow from the assertions w hich are used to prove it the prem ises. In o ther w ords it comm its a fallacy. T h e fact th at our proof is invalid by no m eans shows th a t o u r conclusion is false. W e can very often see th a t som ething is th e c a s e ; b u t w hen we are asked to prove it is thd case, w e cannot do so, and fall into a fallacy in the course of m aking th e attem pt. T h u s a discussion m ight proceed as follow s: J a m e s : A man cant be a dentist unless he has a University degree.
G eorge : I d lik e p roof o f that. J a m e s : O h w e ll I w a s ta lk in g to a lad s fa th er th e o th e r d ay, and th is lad w an ted to be a d en tist, and h is fa th er w a s sa y in g he w a s g o in g to th e U n iv e r s ity n e x t y ea r . . . . G eorge : T h a ts a fine p roof a rg u in g fro m a p articu lar case.

Jam es is flustered by being asked to prove som ething w hich it had never b efore occurred to him to question and he cannot do so, on th e sp u r of th e m om ent. B u t while G eorge is entitled to point out th a t, even if this particular lad who w anted to be a dentist was going to the U niversity,

32

T A L K IN G

T H IN G S O V ER

this does not prove th a t all dentists go to the U niversity, he is not entitled to conclude th a t w hat Jam es says is false. G eorge has now to attem pt a disproof, and if he cannot succeed in disproving Jam ess opinion, then there is a dead lock until the m atter can be settled in some other way. T h is is a situation w hich constantly arises in d iscussion: people suddenly find them selves co nfronted w ith a dem and th at they should prove w hat they have alw ays taken fo r granted, and break, dow n in the attem pt. T h e skilful con troversialist the m an w ho sets out to w in a discussion will alw ays be dem anding p ro o f from his opponents, but will be chary of offering proof him self. A nd unless he is carefully w atched, he will proceed as if a criticism of his opponents p ro o fs was equivalent to a falsification of th eir conclusions. T o sum up, it is quite legitim ate to ask fo r p ro o f it is not legitim ate to conclude, w hen no pro o f or an invalid proof is offered, th a t th e assertion in question deserves no fu rth er consideration. 2. A dem and fo r verification I f th e person w ho p u ts fo rw ard an opinion cannot offer proof of it and this will often be the case then the group m ust tre a t his opinion as an hypothesis. N ow , hypotheses a re tested by exam ining their consequcnces, by considering w hat will happen if they a re tru e , and seeing w hether it does h a p p e n .' I f , to take a simple instance, th e hypothesis is th at all small boys a re aggressive, then w e will proceed by taking small boys we happen to know (notice th a t we have to know th a t Jo h n is a small boy, Jam es is a small boy, in o rd er to be able to te st th e hypothesis) and seeing w hether in these cases w e find th a t Jo h n is aggressive, Jam es is aggressive, and so on. I f , in doing this, we find a sm all boy w ho isn t aggressive, th e hypothesis has been falsified, since all small boys are aggressive is false if there is a single small boy w ho is not aggressive. O n the other

THE

ST R U C T U R E O F D IS C U SS IO N

33

hand, even if all the small boys we can think of are aggressive, we certainly have not proved th at all small boys a re aggressive it m ay be th a t there are small boys whom w e do not know an d w ho are as m ild-tem pered as lambs. B ut if we cannot think of any exceptions and have no other reason fo r believing th a t it is unlikely to be the case th at all small boys are aggressive, then we will norm ally accept the hypothesis fo r the tim e being looking out, how ever, fo r possible exceptions and not giving up the search fo r a proof, if we still feel uncertain about it. T h e exam ination of an hypothesis consists in the search for exceptions to i t ; th a t is the crucial point, and th at is w here the m ethod of science, and the m ethod of discussion, cuts across m any of o u r o rdinary tendencies of thought. W hen we p u t fo rw ard an opinion, it is because we have already some fondness fo r it it fits in w ith the general picture we have of th e w ay things happen, o r w ith the way we should like them to happen and o u r tendency is to tu rn a blind eye to exceptions and to welcome w hatever appears to be a confirm ation. In discussion, on the other hand, we m ust be prep ared to face up to exceptions; the m em bers of the group a re falling dow n on th eir job unless they bring them squarely before o u r notice. Suppose, fo r exam ple, th e opinion is p u t fo rw ard th at U n d er th e P a rty System only people of mediocre talents are prepared to enter P arliam en t, then exam ination o f this hypothesis should take the form of looking for. people who are not m ediocre but are in Parliam ent. I f we proceed in this way, we are m uch m ore likely to find ourselves in a position to come to a decision on the hypothesis either to disprove it o r to decide th a t it is tru e th a n if we proceed in the oth er way, by looking out fo r instances w hich will confirm the hypothesis. O f course, the person who sets out to find exceptions cannot expect to be p o p u lar; he will probably be labelled a destructive critic. B ut the rejection of false hypotheses is c

34

T A L K IN G T H IN G S

OVER

an essential stage in the developm ent of correct views on any m a tte r; to be able to see, fo r exam ple, th a t some small boys are not aggressive is to leave th e way open fo r the study o f the problem w hy it is th a t some small boys are aggressive and others a re not a problem w hich will be ignored while it is believed that all small boys are aggressive. T h e critic, fo r his p a rt, m ust be p rep ared to recognize th a t w hat he calls an exception m ight not really be an exception at all. H e m ight be m aking a m istake in believing th at Jam es is not aggressive (Jam es m ight not adopt an aggressive a ttitu d e tow ards oth er small children, because he is afra id to , but m ight 'take it o u t on his to y s) o r he m ight even be m istaken in thinking Jam es is a small boy ( he m ight be a girl in boys clo th in g ). A hypothesis m ight sometim es have to be accepted, in th e full recognition th at th ere appear to be exceptions to it, in d efau lt of a better. B ut even then, the m an who realizes th ere are exceptions of w hich he has not given an account will be alert to recognize a m ore satisfactory hypothesis, if one appears. D.
C o m in g to a C o n c lu s io n

W e can now see w hat is m eant by the critical exam ination of opinions. T his testing, this search fo r exceptions, will be the w ay in w hich th e g roup exam ines the contributions of its m em bers. T h ere is m uch th e g ro u p will im m ediately accept as being t r u e ; oth er suggestions can be fairly rapidly disprov ed ; o thers stand up well to testing, and m ay be accepted by the group. T h u s fa r the group can agree. B ut in m any cases th ere is bound to be deadlock. Som etim es th ere will be a clash on a question of fact which th e g roup cannot settle, an d until it can be settled it will not be clear w h eth er o r n o t th e hypothesis can be disproved. T a k e th e follow ing discussion: J a m e s : Every member o f the Labour Party must b e a trade unionist. J o h n : Surely notl Youre not going to tell m e that Evatt is is a member of a trade union.

THE
J a m es: John:

S T R U C T U R E O F D IS C U SS IO N

35

Jam es

Yes, he ished have to be, I dont believe it. But, in any case, look at J. T. Lang. He was Labour leader long enough. And what union would he belong to? : Im quite sure Lang is a unionist.

In such a case, the discussion has come up against undiscussable questions of fa c t; until they can be settled, no agreem ent can be reached. M eanwhile, the group will have to agree to disagree. Som etim es it will be only a m inor point w hich has caused th e difficulty, sometimes a point vital to the whole conduct of the argum ent. In either case, if the group can come to see th at to settle the dispute they have only to look up the facts, th a t is so m uch gained, even if nothing can be done about it fo r th e m om ent. T h ere will always be some other issue which the g ro u p can take up. O f course, this is not the only w ay in which a deadlock can be reached. People cannot be expected to abandon readily, in a single discussion, opinions to w hich they have clung fo r m any years, sometimes fo r their whole life. T hey feel th eir prestige is at stak e; and often they realize th at to abandon th e ir position on this point will involve, in the end, a m odification of th eir whole way of thinking a reflection which appalls them . W e constantly find, th erefo re, th at people hold to their original views in discussion, even when the w eight of the argum ent tells heavily against them . A nd, here again, it is no use persisting beyond a certain p o in t; the only result will be an outb u rst of tem per. O nce m ore the group m ay have to decide to agree to disagree. T h a t is why th e well-known lines in O m ar K hayyam are sometimes quoted, in condem nation of discussion: Myself when young did eagerly frequent Doctor and Saint, and heard great Argument About it and about; but evermore Came out by the same door as in I went. B u t it is a m istake to assum e th a t people come out of dis cussion by the same door as they w ent in, m erely because they are a t the end asserting their original opinion m ore

36

T A L K IN G T H IN G S

OVER

vehem ently than they asserted it in the beginning. W atch them in the n ex t m onth an d you w ill often notice a consider able change in th eir attitu d e and point of view. T oo obstinate and too p ro u d to adm it it at the tim e, they are yet im pressed in spite o f them selves by the w eight of argum ent brought against their position. F u rth e rm o re , oth er m em bers of the group can learn som ething from the obstinate defence. T hey have learnt, a t once, w hat is to be said fo r the position which has been su sta in e d ; an d also ju st how it can be overthrow n. W h a t we can expect to come out of discussion is not agreem ent, but a fuller understanding both of our own position (w hich we often do not properly understand o r appreciate until forced to defend it) and of the reasons w hich lead oth er people to reject it, w hether we are con verted by their reasoning o r not. I t m ust be adm itted, how ever, th a t the quality o f criticism is o ften so low th a t it h as no educative v alu e; and, again, th a t people forced on the defensive will often seek refuge in a policy of attack, in w hich sophistical and fallacious argum ent is the m ain w eapon, and in th a t w ay m ay conceal ra th e r than m ake clear the m ain issues. J u s t w hat stratagem s they m ost com monly employ, we shall see in chapter v ; w ithout some defence against them (an d logic is the only defence) we m ay come out of a door considerably in fe rio r to the one by which we w ent in. T h is section w as called Com ing to a conclusion, yet it has mainly been concerned w ith those cases in w hich it is impossible, in the ord in ary sense of the w ords, to come to a conclusion. A nd th e reason is sim ply th a t it is very easy to come to a conclusion w hen th e group ag rees; it is fa r less easy to see w hat has been gained w hen no agreem ent has been reached, to see th at und er these circum stances too the group m ay still come to a conclusion. A discussion which ends in disagreem ent is better than one which fails to thrash out the issues.

THE

S T R U C T U R E O F D IS C U SS IO N
W e ig h in g o f C o n c lu s io n s

37

E.

T h e

A t the end o f its discussion the g ro u p will be in this position it will have decided th a t there are some m atters on which it cannot a g re e ; on others it will be able to reach agreem ent. B ut these will all be statem ents of fact. S u p pose th e subject is Should M edicine be N ationalized?, then the group m ay have decided th at the follow ing would be the effects of nationalization: 1. Cheaper medical services. 2. Greater uniformity in the treatment of disease. 3. Easier access to specialists. 4. Less freedom to choose a doctor, 5. Less encouragement to research and advanced study (dis agreement). 6. Less competent people attracted to medicine(disagreement). 7. Less individual attention from the doctor. I t has still to weigh conclusions, to decide, on the basis of these conclusions, w hat policy to adopt. Clearly, on this showing and even if there w ere agreem ent on all th e points m entioned there may still be disagreem ent on the policy to be adopted. W h eth er, fo r exam ple, individual attention and freedom to choose a doctor are w orth the ex tra cost of unnationalized medical services th at is som ething on which we m ust expect people to disagree. B u t th at is p a rt of the value of this final weighing of conclusions. I t helps us to recognize th at before we m ake up o u r m ind on policy we should exam ine closely the character and consequences o f the action we propose to support. A t the same tim e, it helps to m ake it clear th at there are fundam ental differences of objective, w hich have to be reckoned w ith in any account of the social scene, as opposed to th e belief th a t if oth er people do not support our policies then this is only because they a re fools, who cant look facts in th e face. T h e group, in the end, m ay decide fo r o r against natio n alizatio n ; but in either case it should be m ore conscious of w hat th at choice involves. T his final w eighing of conclusions, this transition from statem ents of

38

T A L K IN G

T H IN G S

OVER

facts to a decision of policy, serves a t once as sum m ary and as m oral of the whole discussion. O f course, if th e original topic is itself a problem of fact, then there will be no question of w eighing conclusions, in this special sense of the w ord. W h a t will be needed is a different sort of weighing, a sum m ary of conclusions which have been reached in the course of th e discussion, and a decision w hether these a re sufficient to enable the group to pass judgm ent on the principal topic if not, w hat else needs to be studied, w hat other facts need to be ascertained, before a decision can be reached. A nd the quality of a group will be judged, n o t by the assurance of its final conclusion, but, m ore often, by the ex ten t of the gaps it has discovered in its know ledge. N o t th e ex ten t o f agreem ent, b u t the grow th o f understanding, is the test of th e value o f a discussion. E xcrcise E xam in e the follow ing short version of a discussion and distinguish w ithin it: 1. The stage of clarification. 2. The main assertions about which the discussion turns. 3. The method by which those assertions are treated by the group.
S
h o u l d

r iv a t e

c h o o ls

be

b o l is h e d

Well, to-night we have to consider whether private schools ought to be abolished. Whats your view about it, James? J a m es: Of course they ought to be abolished. Theres no place for them at all in Australia. G eorge: But just why? Whats wrong with them, anyhow? J a m es: They encourage snobbery. Jo h n : Thats not true o'f all private schools. I dont think children from the ordinary Catholic schools are any more snobbish than children from the state schools. W i l l i a m : Oughtnt we to make a distinction? I mean, there are two sorts of private schools. Some of them are set up only because parents wish their children to> be brought up in a particular religious faith; but thats not true of the posh schools. Parents send their children there for quite different reasons.
G eo rg e

THE
Jam es:

S T R U C T U R E O F D IS C U SS IO N

39

Im prepared to accept thatthough I object to both sorts of private schools. But when I mentioned snobbery it was what you called the posh schools I really had in mind. Theres the issue, then. Is it true that that sort of private G eorge : school encourages snobbery? W il l ia m : Id be prepared to agree with thateven though I dont think private schools ought to be abolished. But I certainly dont think youd get rid of snobbery by abolish ing private schools. You might lessen it, but thats all. I admit you wouldnt get rid of it. But it seems to me J am es : that if we can even lessen snobbery and class-conscious ness by abolishing private schools, thats reason enough for doing so. , Wait a minute. There may be other factors to be taken G eorge : into account. William admitted the charge of snobbery and still said he didnt want to see private schools abolished. Why is that, William? W i l l i a m : Well, Im thinking of the fact that private schools are the home of experiment; and educational experiment is such a valuable thing, I wouldnt care to see private schools abolished. But surely private schools often use quite out-moded J am es : educational methods I W il l ia m : Thats true. I didnt want to suggest that all private schools arc experimental, but only that many of them have carried on valuable experimental work. Id like proof of that statement. J am es : I think youll have to admit that, James. Look at the John : work of A. S. Neill in England, and, in Sydney, too, there are some experimental private schools. But I dont see why you cant get just as much experi Jam es : ment in state schools. You admit what William says, then, but think that state G eorge : schools can experiment quite as well as private schools? W il l ia m : Well, if that is his position, I think lies quite wrong. The state insists on turning out people who will do what it wants them to d o ; and that means it is committed to a policy of uniformity. Thats not so. You speak as if the state exercised a J am es : day by day supervision over the work of the schools; but in fact, in British countries at least, the teacher has a good deal of freedom. W il l ia m ; But has he? Look at New South Wales, for instance. There the teacher is tied down to a rigid syllabus. Thats not true of all state systems. In some of the Jo h n : United States of America, for example, theres a good deal of experimental work done in the state schools; many of the new educational schemes were worked out there.

40

T A L K IN G

T H IN G S

OVER

W illia m

G eorge:

: Well, I still think that theres room for the private schools. Youve admitted that, in seme state systems at least, there is little or no experimental workand the private school gives an opportunity to parents who dont want their children to pass through the deadening routine of the state schools. We havent any more time left, now. You can see where weve got to. It looks as if private schools do some thing to encourage snobbery, but equally may do some thing to encourage experiment. Youll have to make up your own mind, on the basis of these facts, whether they ought to be abolished or not. And, of course, I think we should remember that there are bound to be other aspects of the matter we havent been able to touch upon to-day.

IV T H E LANGUAGE O F DISCUSSIO N
La n g u a g e is not a p erfect instrum ent of com m unication;

w ords can be used to conceal ra th e r than to reveal thought, w hether th ro u g h carelessness, th ro u g h ignorance o r by deliberate intention. I t is obvious enough th at unless we are thoroughly acquainted w ith the m eaning of the w ords we m eet w ith in o u r everyday life, we are in no position either to follow, or to contribute to, the course of discussion. I t is n o t so obvious th a t m any of th e w ords w hich are m ost o ften on o u r lips are so vague, so em otionally coloured, o r so am biguous, th at they hinder, rath er than advance, the com m unication of o u r thoughts. T h e language of discussion should be, in these respects, on a higher plane than the language of everyday conversa tion. I t should be m ore objective, m ore directly descriptive of the facts and less coloured by o u r personal attitu d e to those fa c ts; it should be m ore precise, should m ore exactly convey ju st w hat we m ean ; it should be less am biguous, less liable to m isunderstanding and m isinterpretation. P e r fection, it w ould be absurd to expect; but it should be one of the not least valuable by-products of th e discussion m ethod th at it encourages a m ore reflective and a m ore critical attitude to language. I f a group can gradually come to see th a t high-flown language is not a satisfactory substitute fo r exact thinking, th a t is a distinct gain. F irs t of all, how ever, we m ust learn to recognize high-flown language when we see it. I t will be convenient to consider in tu rn each of the three sources of confusion we m entioned emotional colouring, vagueness, and ambiguity. 1. Language Plain and Coloured Y ou will rem em ber th at we divided statem ents into state m ents o f fact, statem ents of preference and statem ents of
41

42

T A L K IN G

T H IN G S O V ER

policy, and argued th at statem ents of policy am algam ate fact and preference. I t is possible to m ake a sim ilar, though not precisely parallel, distinction betw een w ords. W o rd s may be factual (p o in t to facts) o r expressive (express likes or dislikes) o r expressive-factual (sim ultaneously point to a fact and express an attitu d e tow ards th a t fa c t). Suppose o u r heroes, G eorge and Jam es, a re walking together in Sydney D om ain on a S unday afternoon. G eorge rem arks, W h a t about listening to th a t m an across th ere on a p la tfo rm ? an d Jan ies replies, Y es, th ere is no one listening to him a t the m om ent. T h en G eorge and Jam es are using p urely fa ctu a l language. W o rd s like listen, m an, p latfo rm , no one, re fe r to facts, w ithout suggesting any p articu lar attitu d e tow ards them and th a t is w hat is characteristic of objective, o r factual, language. G eorge an d Jam es approach th e speaker a little m ore closely and G eorge rem arks, H e looks like a confounded idiot, to w hich Jam es feels it unnecessary to reply. T he w ord confounded is purely ex pressive; it gives vent to G eorges feelings, but in no w ay tells us w hat sort of an idiot G eorge takes the speaker to be. I t looks like a descrip tive w ord, but in fact it conveys no description at all. N ow G eorge an d Jam es listen fo r a while, in silence, to the speaker. A nd G eorge is led to com m ent, I thought as m uch: a blasted red-rag g er, to w hich Jam es adds, People ought to be stopped from throw ing m ud, th e w ay hes doing. I f we had a strong governm ent, this so rt of th in g w ouldnt be allow ed. T h e w ord red -rag g er is in a different category from the w ord blasted ; blasted is m erely expressive, w hereas red -rag g er indicates to us not m erely th a t George dislikes th e speaker, b u t som ething o f w h at he has been sa y in g ; th at, a t least, he has been critical of th e established social ord er. Sim ilarly, 'th ro w in g m u d conveys th a t the speaker is engaging in hostile criticism ; and w hen we hear o f a stro n g governm ent we know th a t it m akes a consider able use of its police force. B u t none of these w ords and

T H E L A N G U A G E O F D IS C U SS IO N

43

phrases is p urely factu al; each expresses an a ttitu d e at the same tim e as it presents a fact. Suppose G eorge and Jam es had spoken som ew hat in the follow ing m a n n e r:
G eorge: J a m es:

H es a m an o f tru ly p ro g ressiv e v ie w s . Yes, th a ts really v ig o ro u s cr itic ism ; but its a sig n

th a t ou r govern m en t is n ot w h o lly rep ressive, th a t it p erm its su ch criticism .

T hen we should still have learn t th a t the speaker is dis satisfied w ith things as they a re ; tlm t he says so, w ithout caring whose feelings' he hu rts, and th at the police do not in te rfe re w ith him. T h e language is quite different, not because there has been any change in the facts b u t m erely because the speakers have a different attitude to those facts. T h e ord in ary language of political controversy is very largely expressive-factual. W e a re n o t content to point to the fa c ts; we a re anxious to indicate o u r attitu des at the same tim e. T h is is not surprising, fo r we are not accustom ed to treatin g politics and economics as subjects of inquiry, to be studied in the same sort of w ay as w e m ight study physics or botany. W e think of them , instead, as battlegrounds in which o u r preferences, o u r dem ands, struggle w ith the dem ands o f others. T h a t is, we confuse political science w ith politics its e lf ; or, perhaps better, we a re too interested in the practice of politics to have m uch concern w ith the objective study of political issues. T h a t th e study of facts m ust precede, o r at least go along w ith, th e form ulation of successful policies even th a t we find difficult to believe. O u r dem ands are so strong th a t we a re unw illing to face the realization, which a study of the facts m ight involve, th a t it is impossible for them to be satisfied. Consequently, the language o f discussion is bound to be coloured (to use th e term inology of T houless1) by o u r attitud es. T h is need not cause any serious difficulty, p ro vided only th a t we are aw are th a t language m ay am algam ate
1. I n his Straight and Crooked T hinking.

44

T A L K IN G

T H IN G S

OVER

fact and attitude. O therw ise, we m ay find ourselves accept ing an attitu d e, unthinkingly, because w e accept the fact to which it is a ttach ed ; o r becoming indignant at other people fo r refu sin g to look facts in th e face when they a re quite well aw are of the facts, b u t refuse to accept o ur attitude tow ards them . C onfronted, fo r exam ple, w ith rem arks like the fo llo w in g :
G eorge:

Surely, you dont say that the Civil Service ought to let in University graduates 1 You dont want the country to be administered by a lot of highbrow dilettanti. Yes, of course I want the country to be administered by highbrow dilettanti.

it is certainly difficult to reply, in the m anner of Jam es,

J a m es:

and George relies upon Jam es feeling this difficulty. B ut it will not be very difficult, a fte r a little practice, fo r Jam es to reply som ew hat as follow s (alth o u g h fo r a while he may only thin k o f this reply a day o r tw o la te r) :
J a m es:

If b y h ig h b r o w d iletta n ti y o u m ean w ell-ed u cated m en and w om en , th e y re ju s t th e people I do w an t to see

ad m in isterin g the cou n try.

T h a t is to say, he can tran slate the so rt of language which G eorge uses into his own language, o r else into purely neutral o r objective term s, w here these exist. N otice th e suggestion that, in some cases, th ere will not be any purely objective language in w hich to express o u r selves, so accustom ed are we all to am algam ate fact and attitude. O r even if th ere is such language, it will be intolerably circum locutory, an d lack all force and vigour. T h e choice, o ften enough, lies betw een th e use of coloured language an d silence. In any case, people are entitled to th eir attitudes. So long as w e realize th a t w hat appear to be sim ple statem ents of fact m ay be partially p referential, no harm is done. A lthough we have spoken of factual an d of expressive w ords, the real distinction is betw een an expressive and a factual use o f language. A w ord w hich is in some contexts

T H E LA N G U A G E O F D IS C U SS IO N

45

purely factual may be, in other contexts, expressive. T ake the w ord strong. In th e phrase a strong governm ent this w ord, as we saw, is expressive-factual, but in the phrase H ercules was a strong m an it is not expressive but purely factual, although vague. In the same way, the w ord good is sometimes purely expressive B eer is a good d rin k and sometimes factual Beer is good for you. T h ere are recog nizable w ays of arguing w hether or not Beer is good for yo u ; the issue can be settled by considering its effect on the digestion, its calorific content and so on. O n the other hand, there is no w ay of settling w hether Beer is a good d rin k that is literally a m atter of taste. F u rth erm o re, a w ord m ay sometimes be used to express liking which, under different circum stances, expresses dis liking. T h e phrase H e is a real C om m unist has one colour in the m outh of th e Secretary of th e C ham ber of M anufactures an d a quite different colour in the m outh of the S ecretary of the Com m unist P a rty . O nly the tone of voice can m ake the difference clear. U n d e r these circum stances, it is not surprising th at it is sometimes h ard to decide w hether a w ord is partly o r wholly expressive o r even w hether it is expressive or factual. M oral theorists have been discussing fo r over two thousand years w hether the w ord good in the phrase a good m an is purely expressive, or factual, or expressive-factual. B ut, in general, th e distinction between factual and expressive, at least, is easy enough to m a k e ; and th at is the vital distinction. T o sum up, th ere are very m any w ords w ords like dem agogue, b ureaucrat, w ow ser, reactionary, p ro gressive, propagandist which we should exam ine w ith some care when we h ear them used in discussion, in case an attem pt is m ade to use them as a substitute fo r discussion. B ut w e do not advance- discussion ourselves m erely by calling out Coloured w ord. O u r task is to distinguish from its protective coloration the factual body of the w ord, and ignore the rest. Everyone uses coloured language; th at is

46

T A L K IN G

T H IN G S

OVER

no reason fo r using it indiscrim inately n o r fo r being deceived by it. 2. Language V ague and Prccisc W e can no m ore expect to expel vague language from our discussion than we can expect to abolish coloured language. W e often m ake use o f w ords w hich have no precise m eaning no fixed m eaning, th a t is and yet w hich convey quite well w hat we w ish to say. T ake, as an exam ple, the follow ing conversation:
J am es : I b eliev e th ere w ere quite a fe w p eop le at the con cert la st n ig h t. G eorge : Y e s , co n sid erin g the p rices w ere s o h i g h ; th ey kept, a lo t o f people aw ay.

T h e phrases quite a few , so high, a lot of people, are all vague. T hey m ean som ething to Jam es and G eorge but they d ont mean anything to u s until we discover w hether they are talking about some local affair o r a celebrity concert. Q uite a few an d a lot m ight be any th in g fro m fifty to a thousand, depending on the circum stances; the high prices m ight be anything fro m th ree shillings to fifteen. O nly in a p articu lar context have these phrases any m ean ing at all and even then they havent a quite precise meaning. T hey assum e a com m on standard o f m easurem ent which is not explicitly stated, since it is assum ed th a t those w e are talking to will have the sam e stan d ard as ourselves. You will be able to th in k o f o th er w ords and phrases of the same kind. Plen ty , m any, several are of the same so rt as a few an d a lot ; d ear, expensive, cheap are like so high ; then there a re h o t an d cold, tali and sh o rt, w ide and narrow , f a t and th in , an d num erous (th e re s o n e!) others. T alking to o u r friends, w hose standards we know , none of these w ill cause any difficulty. B u t in a discussion group th ere are o ften gathered together m en and women w ith very different standards. C onsider th is discussion o f housing pro b lem s:

T H E LA N G U A G E O F D IS C U SS IO N
G eorge:

47

We can't leave building to private builders. The houses they build are too dear. J a m e s : Thats nonsense. I was a builder before the war, and it was very rarely I built an expensive house. Jo h n : Up our way, they were dear enough. J a m e s : Most of the houses which we built cost only from five hundred to twelve hundred pounds. G e o r g e : I thought you said they werent dearl In this case, it eventually becomes clear th a t there is a m arked difference in standard, th a t d ear to Jam es doesnt m ean the same as it does to Jo h n and G eorge. B ut m ean w hile the vagueness of d e a r an d expensive has given rise to a ra th e r pointless discussion. T his is a com paratively m inor difficulty. T h e real trouble occurs w ith w ords which are at once vague and expressivefactu al; w ords, th a t is, w ith an expressive em phasis and a vague factual content, a content w hich varies w ith the social setting. H e re is an exam ple: G e o r g e : I think schoolboys ought to get a reasonable technical training, but I think it oughtnt to go to extremes. J a m e s : Of course, there should be some limit; but the schools must ensure that their pupils get a decent training for a trade. They cant afford to spend much time on anything else. G e o r g e : I disagree. What the schools should teach is a sane outlook on life. Decent citizens with a proper regard for the distinction between right and wrongthats what we can expect from the schools. Look a t th e w ord reasonable. H ow m uch training w ould be reasonable? I t is impossible to tell, unless we know som ething m ore about th e standards Jam es adopts. But; th e w ord has an expressive fo rc e ; a reasonable tech nical train in g is certainly one of w hich Jam es w ould approve, w hatever else it is. T h e real problem , in fact and this has been the subject of m uch recent controversy is w hether a w ord like reasonable is p urely expressive. A nd the same problem attaches to w ords like extrem es (fu rth e r than I would lik e ? ), and decent (th e sort I w ould lik e ? ). Suppose we rew rite G eorges speech in th e language of likes an d dislikes. T h en we h av e:

48
G eorge:

T A L K IN G

T H IN G S O V ER

I disagree. What the schools should teach is the sort of outlook on life I like; the sort of citizens I like with the sort of regard I like for the distinction between what I like and what I dont likethats what we can expect from the schools.

I think you will agree th at w e learn ra th e r m ore about G eorges views from th e first speech than we do from the rew ritten speech. T h a t, no doubt, is only because w e have experience of the standards of judgm ent which are common in o u r country and in o u r time, and can assum e th at G eorge is w orking w ith these standards, but there is no reason why we should not m ake use of th a t knowledge. T o pretend th a t people are n o t saying anything m erely because they are m aking use of vague language is a useful controversial trick, but it does not really advance discussion. W e are entitled, how ever, to be suspicious of this vague and expressive language, ju s t as w e are entitled to be suspicious of coloured language generally. I t is an excellent disguise fo r th e propagandist who is anxious to w in converts w ithout com m itting him self to any particu lar line of policy. Both the lazy an d the unscrupulous thin k er find in it a refuge from the probing of criticism . N evertheless, since people who are thinking things over in the course of dis cussion are also liable to express them selves vaguely, just because they do not quite know w hat they w ant to say, to reject out of hand w hatever is vaguely form ulated is to dis miss m any a potentially valuable contribution to discussion. O f course, w e can ask fo r elucidation, fo r m ore details, but we m ust bew are of evoking this sort of discu ssion:
G eo r g e :

Youll never get decent housing at a reasonable price until the government starts building houses. to themselves, and there ought to be hot water and refrigeration in every houseand a garage as well.
You cant expect to

J a m e s : W h a t w ou ld y o u c a ll d ecen t h o u sin g ? G e o r g e : Well, everybody ought to have a room

Jo h n :
G eorge:

I think refrigeration is a luxury. have that in every house.

Its not a luxury. In the country, especially, it saves more than it costs.

T H E L A N G U A G E O F D IS C U SS IO N

49

Jo h n :

My grandparents lived happily in the country for years, and they had no refrigerationor a garage, cither.

A nd this sort of th in g can go on fo r a very long time. H ere, of course, it is not Jam es but Jo h n who is at fault. Clearly, when Jam es asks fo r details, he only w ants a general description of the sort of thing G eorge m eans by decent housing. T h is is a quite sensible question to ask, if Jam es suspects th a t George is setting an absurdly high standard of decency ; he m ight sim ilarly have asked w hat George understood by a reasonable price. B u t John is out of ord er in taking up one particu lar detail in G eorges description of decency. I t is not as if the presence or absence of a re frig e rato r w ould vitally affect the m ain issue. Jo h n has the sort of m ind, common in discussion groups, which is only happy w hen there are details to be discussed ; a group which is w orking co-operatively will need to be careful lest in try in g to avoid th e airy regions of vagueness it falls into the bog of details. I f Jam es had replied to G eorge som ew hat as follow s:
Jam es

: I dont see that you need to rely on the government to build decent houses cheaply; private enterprise can do it, if only the government steps in to prevent costs of materials from rising.

then he is assum ing that G eorge and him self have common standards o f decency and cheapness. T h is can o ften be done quite safely, and in such cases the fact th a t vague language rem ains does not m atter in the least. W hile, then, it is fairly easy to recognize vague language, it is not so easy to make up ones m ind w hen to dem and, in the course o f discussion, th at it be replaced by m ore precise language. T he only general rule is th is : th a t w e have to consider w hether the lack of precision is likely to conceal a real difference o f standards w ithin the group, and th us to in te r fere seriously w ith the conduct of the discussion. A nd, of course, a person w ho consistently uses vague language, w ho m akes a habit of inexactness, can well be taught an

so

T A L K IN G T H IN G S O V ER

occasional lesson. ( I t is p ru d en t to rem em ber, however, th at the A thenians p u t Socrates to death because he insisted on people form ulating th eir m oral and political beliefs m ore exactly!). T h ere is another so rt o f vagueness, closely com parable, which arises from th e use of incom plete w ords w ords such as essential,' necessary, dangerous, beneficial/ desirable, m enace, an d th e like. O nce m ore, th e context o ften m akes the m eaning perfectly clear. A conversation like the follow ing can be quite easily understood by those who take p a rt in it:
G eo rg e:

I think we'll have tc go to a solicitor. That seems to me essential.

W e ll, y o u k n o w , its rath er d an gerou s.

Jam es:
G e o rg e :

Still, think what a benefit it could be.

Y et it conveys nothing w hatever to th e reader. G eorge and Jam es know perfectly w ell fo r zvhat th ey ll have to go, fo r w hat its essential, to w hat it m ight be dangerous, to w h a t it could be a benefit, because they obviously have some common objective, in th e light of w hich they in terp ret the incom plete w ords. I t is by no m eans to be assum ed, how ever, th at the m em bers of a discussion g ro u p will have comm on objectives, and th e uncritical use o f incom plete language (like the uncritical use o f vague language) m ight lead them to believe they have a com m unity of in terest which does not in fact exist. T ak e a com m ent like th e follow ing:
G e o rg e:

We cant have subversive teachers in the schools. Theyre a menacewith their destructive teaching.

B efore we too lightly agree, we should ask ourselves w hat th e teachers a re subverting, to w hat they a re a m enace, and w hat they a re seeking to destroy. Y ou will notice th at these w ords are n o t m erely incom plete; they a re also highly expressive. I t is this so rt o f incom plete w ord which is m ost likely to be a hindrance to discussion. T ak e a w ord like

T H E L A N G U A G E O F D IS C U SS IO N

51

beneficial. T h is is incom plete, expressive and vague as well (w h at is a benefit? ). T h e re are m any other such w ords unfit, reactionary, progressive, h arm fu l are especially com m on in discussion groups. O nce again, to recognize that such w ords can be a source of confusion is not th e sam e thing as to dem and th eir abolition. W e could scarcely get along a t all, if we had to express ourselves in full detail every tim e we opened our m ouths. B u t once it is realized th a t w e ordinarily talk in a kind of shorthand, it will also be realized th at care in in terp retatio n is necessary, th at m any a confusion of thought lurks behind a vagueness of language. A nd we are always entitled to ask a person D angerous to w hom ? or N ecessary fo r w h a t? , although, if we are co-operating fully, we shall not do so in a spirit of m ischief, but only when the conduct of the discussion m akes it necessary. 3. Language A m b ig u o u s and U nam biguous V ery few w ords in the E nglish language have only one m eaning, a fact w hich does n o t usually cause us any diffi culty. T h e context m akes it clear which m eaning is intended, in any p articu lar case. W e cannot readily confuse the angelic w ith the alcoholic sense of sp irits, fo r example. O n the other hand, there are constant m isunderstandings about dem ocracy o r about freedom , about socialism or about education, about propaganda o r about equality. W h y do these w ords cause so m uch difficulty ? O ne th in g these w ords have in common is that their context o ften does not clearly reveal their meaning. T h u s if G eorge rem arks, Socialism is inevitable, anyhow , we do not find it possible to decide w hether he means by socialism (as some d o ) a form of social organization in which the state governs an d directs th e activities of the community, or (as others do) a social system in which the state w ithers aw ay,' since th ere is no longer any need fo r it. O r take such a discussion as the follow ing:

52
G eorge: Jam es

T A L K IN G T H IN G S O V ER

Of course Im all in favour of education, but I wont stand for propaganda. : Yes, these teachers are always asking for liberty, when what they really want is licence.

I t is still quite obscure how G eorge w ould distinguish educa tio n from p ropaganda or Jam es liberty from licence. Ju st because th e context m ay not m ake clear the speakers intention, these w ords a re particularly troublesom e in dis cussion. T h e m em bers of a g roup m ay find them selves in w hole-hearted agreem ent about th e virtues o f dem ocracy, or equally in violent disagreem ent, until they suddenly discover th at they a re using th e w ord in quite different ways. Such a confusion could not easily occur in a discussion which is preceded by th e critical exam ination of opinions: it would speedily become clear, in such a case, th a t w ords w ere being used in very different senses. In fact, these w ords a re m ost at hom e in statem ents of preference and statem ents of policy. T h ey grav itate n atu rally to slogans. So expressive a re they, th a t we a re all anxious to retain them as descriptions o f o u r ow n procedure ( if they are favourably to n ed ) o r to attach them to th e schemes o f o u r adversaries (if they a re u n favourably to n e d ). O fte n enough, liberty is w hat I w ant to d o ; licence is w hat you w ant to do. E du catio n is m y m ethod o f teach in g ; p ropaganda is your m ethod of teaching. W e a re n o t p rep ared to undertake a dispassionate study o f usage, since we a re anxious to m aintain th a t w hat w e call dem ocracy is w hat everyone ought to m ean by th a t w ord. U n fo rtu n ately , we cannot m ake any headw ay in our political discussion w ithout m aking use o f these expressive and am biguous w ords. H o w a re w e going to avoid the difficulties to w hich they give rise? O nly one procedure is possible. T h e g roup m ust decide on a usage and stick to it. T his is n o t as simple as it sounds. F o r one thing, no m em ber of the group will be prep ared to adm it th at any other usage but his own has any p ro p rie ty ; certainly he

THE

L A N G U A G E O F D ISC U SSIO N

S3

will be unw illing to su rren d er such expressive w ords to his critics. T o decide upon usage is th erefo re a severe strain on the co-operativeness of the group. N evertheless, agree m ent can be reached, if it is m ade clear th a t the group is not deciding upon a final definition, but only on a tem porary agreem ent about usage. Difficulties still rem ain. H ow ever sincerely m em bers of the group agree to accept a certain usage, they are almost certain to d rift back to th e ir habitual usage in the course of the discussion. T h is is particularly easy to do because, as K a rl B ritto n 1 has recently pointed out, the various ways of using a w o rd like dem ocracy are not sharply cut off from one another. O ne person m ay deny th at parliam entary governm ent is essential, an o th er th at the p arty system is essential, another th at equality of opportunity is essential yet all m ay agree th a t universal suffrage and free speech are essential. C onsequently a t some stages in the discussion the w ord will be used w ith im plications which are quite fam iliar to them , an d it is easy to forget that, in other respects, the g ro u p s usage is different from their own. T h e price of clarity is eternal vigilance. A w ord o r tw o m ore about definition. W e saw th at a group should recognize th a t it is not its task to define dem ocracy. In alm ost every group, th ere will be some body w ith a m ania fo r asking fo r definitions. Occasionally a group m ay attem pt definition w ith some profit to itself. A n attem pt to define propaganda, fo r exam ple, may at least lead a group to recognize how vaguely w e ordinarily use this w ord an d ju s t how h ard it is to give a satisfactory definition of it. In general, how ever, the definition-collector is a nuisance. I t m ust be m ade clear to him th at it is extrem ely difficult to form ulate satisfactory definitions and th at w e can use a term quite accurately w ithout being able to define it. T ak e a simple instance say dog. W e all know a dog
I. T he Language of C ontroversy in Philosophy (vol. x v i, no. 6 4 ).

54

T A L K IN G

T H IN G S

OVER

w hen we see one, and yet try to discover a definition of dog ! T o state a definition, w e need to find a com bination o f characteristics w hich all dogs possess and nothing else possesses, so th a t we can be su re th a t we a re confronted by a dog w henever w e find these characters p resent and can also be sure, w henever we m eet a dog, th a t he will have these characteristics. Suppose we suggest th a t a dog is a four-legged anim al. T his will n o t do, because th ere a re plenty of four-legged anim als w hich a re n o t dogs. S uppose w e say a barking anim al. T h is will n o t do either, because not every dog can bark. I t has, in fact, been a difficult task fo r zoologists and botanists to define the com m on plants an d anim als. M any term s like 'society, the s ta te / th e m in d a re n o t yet satis factorily defined. A nd it is no use relying on a dictionary definition, because a dictionary does not give p ro p er defini tions, b u t only a ro u g h indication of th e w ay in which a w ord is used. T h u s it w ould be absurd to conclude th a t a m an does not know w hat he is talking about m erely because he cannot define his term s. N o r should a g ro u p be seriously p erturbed because it cannot arriv e a t satisfacto ry definitions. A ll it needs is a ro u g h agreem ent on usage. T o sum up, w ords can be a considerable obstacle to satis factory discussion, to m utual u n derstanding. B ut so can the person be an obstacle w ho discovers th a t its all a m a tte r of w ords, anyhow w hen th e discussion is going against him (th o u g h never w hen he is triu m p h a n t). W o rd s should be regarded w ith c a re ; b u t not w ith such excessive prudence as to cause intellectual an d vocal paralysis. E xercise Pick out of the follow ing discussion th e w ords which need to be exam ined w ith care. C onsider ju s t w hat it is about each of them which is likely to lead to confusion, and

THE

L A N G U A G E O F D IS C U SS IO N

55

how fa r they w ould need to be clarified if discussion was to m ake any headw ay.
S
h o u l d

d u l t

d u c a t io n

be

n c o u r a g ed

G e o rg e :

In my opinion, the answer is No. Education can be a very dangerous thing, unless it is in the hands of the right people. All these so-called educators do is to encourage objectionable and often seditious criticism of constituted authority. Jam es: Surely, adult education can be very beneficialthough no doubt you have to be careful not to let demagogues and extremists pervert it to suit their own schemes. Keep propaganda out, and select teachers of reasonable and moderate views, and education cant do any harm and may do a lot of good. Jo h n : I cant see that education is any use. We dont want to become a nation of bookworms. Lets leave all this chatter about arty books and half-baked ideas to the highbrows. The ordinary man doesnt want to have his time wasted by a lot of pedants ramming stuff about the -ologies down his throat. What we want is a fit nation; we dont want hump-backed, hcrn-rimmed children or adults. W i l l i a m : You go too far. A moderate amount of healthy recreation is all right, but the way in which Australians indulge in competitive sport just makes it impossible for the nation to progress. G e o rg e : I still dont see why we should let a let o f intellectuals loose on ordinary men and women. This is a free country, but unless we place some limit on these Bolshieswhy, theyll just make an end to democracy and even to the common decencies. Jam es: Youre right in putting character first. But I do think there is a place for the development of our intellect, providing that the physical and moral welfare of the people is given its due consideration.

V FA CT AND FALLACY
D i s c u s s i o n , we said, is the critical exam ination of opinions. W e exam ine opinions by try in g to prove, to confirm , o r to disprove them . T h a t m eans we have to bring fo rw ard other opinions, connected together in an argum ent. T h e value of o u r critical exam ination will depend on tw o th in g s:

(a ) w hether the opinions we b rin g fo rw ard are tru e o r fa ls e ; (b ) w hether the argum ents we em ploy a re valid or fallacious. A.
F a c t

W henever, in discussion, we p u t fo rw a rd an opinion, we are try in g to p resent a fact. ( I shall assum e th at we do not tell deliberate lies.) W e do not alw ays succeed; in other w ords, some of o u r opinions are false. W h en we realize th at an opinion is false w e set about m aking fu rth e r investigations in order to discover the facts. T his investigation m ay take one of tw o form s. W e may look at the facts fo r ourselves, o r we m ay refer to someone elses opinion and, especially, the opinion of an au th o rity . O n looking at th e facts fo r ourselves (observ ation) it is unnecessary to com m ent. E x cep t, perhaps, to say this th at observation is liable to erro r. It is surprising w hat we can see w ith o u r own eyes o r h ear w ith o u r own ears, when those eyes and ears are th e servants o f p rejudice and preconceptions. So we should not feel affronted if our personal observations are taken w ith a grain of salt by the rest o f the group. I t is a salu tary experience to find out th a t w hat seem to us to be self-evident facts o thers consider the w ildest speculations. A uth o rities provide us w ith a g reat deal of inform ation
56

FA C T AND FALLACY

57

we could obtain in no other way. W ith o u t th eir aid, we should be helpless w hen it comes to stating the population of A fg h an istan , o r the b irth ra te in N .S .W . in 1913. But a n encyclopaedia of 1890 will not be a reliable source of inform ation about the population of A fg h an istan ; antiquity may bring reverence to some authorities, but it ought to dim inish th e reverence due to others. T his is only a particu lar illustration of the m ore general rule, th a t authorities are not to be accepted w ithout scrutiny. W e need to test the opinion th at a particular person is an authority, ju st as we need to test any other opinion. The follow ing questions, a t least, we should ask ourselves: (a ) I s this a m a tter on w h ich expert opinion is decisive? W e have already suggested th a t authorities on economics and politics should be treated w ith consideration b u t not, how ever elevated their status, as p utting an end to discussion by th eir pronouncem ents. T o suppose th at one m ans opinion is as good as an o th ers in these m atters is an a b su rd ity ; but to suppose th a t there are experts, whose w ord is final, is equally an absurdity. (b ) I s the authority quoted really an expert in these m a tters? A m an m ay be a brilliant physicist, an outstanding botanist, a veterinary scientist of distinction. I t by no means follows th a t he has an expert know ledge of religion, of education, o r of international affairs. H e may have such a knowledge, because m en som etim es devote a t least as much attention to th eir intellectual hobbies as to their professional pursuits. B u t w e shall certainly need independent evidence th a t this is so, th a t to his hobby the auth o rity devotes the same careful study, th e same close investigation of facts, the sam e attention to relevant literatu re as has won him the repu tatio n fo r expertness in his own science. O th er wise, the opinions of such ex p erts is w orth no more (and, of course, no less) th an your opinion or my opinion. A nd w hen, in the m anner of the advertisem ents, film stars

58

T A L K IN G T H IN G S

OVER

become experts on nu tritio n , an d m usicians on refrigeration, hum an sanity seem s perilously poised. (c ) H a s th e a u th o rity been accurately quoted,? W e often derive, from experts, views which w ould startle them , by seizing upon stray sentences which confirm o u r prejudices, and ignoring the m ain ten o r o f th eir argum ent. I f an implausible opinion is presented as th e view o f an expert, it is o ften not the expert, but the read er who is a t fault. I t is h ard to get any satisfacto ry answ er to these questions in the course of a discussion. W e are often enough con fronted by som ething like the follow ing:
A chap I was reading about the other nightsome sort of scientist he was, tooreckons we can talk to spirits by radio. J a m e s : Yes, but didnt you see that next day some other people were quoted as saying that wasnt so?,
G f.o rce:

H azy authorities give hazy opinions on hazy subjects. W e cannot expect, w hat w e can p roperly dem and from a book, a detailed reference to an au th o rity whose nam e and status is specified. A ll we can really do, in discussion, is to tre a t w hat are given as th e opinions o f authorities on their m erits, w ithout taking too seriously th eir claim to be regarded as exp ert opinion. Som etim es, of course, we will already know som ething of the au th o rity q u o ted ; th a t will largely affect th e w eight we a re prep ared to attach to his point of view.
B . F a lla cy

T h ere is no rule by which we can tell w hether an opinion is tru e o r not. O nly observation can decide th a t fo r us. O n the o th er hand, th ere a re rules by which w e can tell w hether an argum ent is valid o r fallacious.1 A valid argum ent is one in w hich the conclusion follow s from the propositions w hich are being used to prove it (these are called the prem ises o f the a rg u m e n t). A nd to say th at a
I. N otice the term inology. O pinions (o r statem ents or assertions o r propositions) m ay be true or false; argum ents (o r inferences) m ay be valid or fallacious (in v a lid ). W e should n o t ta lk of a fallacious opinion, nor of a tr u e argum ent.

FACT AND FALLACY

5 9

conclusion follows from certain premises is to say that these premises could not possibly be true without the conclusion being true also. If this is so, every argument of the same form, the same general character, will also be valid.
Take an argument like the following:
All men are bipeds and all birds are bipeds, so that it must be true that no men are birds.

Both premises and the conclusion are true but you will easily see that the argument is fallacious, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. W e could argue in precisely the same way that
All men are bipeds and all artists are bipeds, so that it must be true that no men are artists.

In this case both premises are true and yet the conclusion is false. In the first argument, in other words, we arrived at a true conclusion by accident; arguing in a precisely parallel way on another occasion, we arrive at a false conclusion. W hat is characteristic o f a valid argument, on the other hand, is that if w e argue in the same way on any other occasion, then, assuming only that our premises are true, the conclusion will be true. Consider, for example, an argument like the following:
All troglodytes are agoraphobic and anyone agoraphobic is introverted. Hence all troglodytes are introverted.

W hether or not we know what troglodytes and agora phobic and introverted mean, w e can see that this argument is valid, that the conclusion fo llo w s fr o m the premises. Or we could use symbols instead o f words: If all X are Y and all Y are Z, then all X are Z. W hatever is substituted for the three symbols X , Y and Z, the argument will still be valid. (T h is is the most important of all forms of valid reasoning, because any argument1 by which we try to prove a universal affirmative proposition a proposition affirming something about every man, or about every artist, or about every X will take this form.)
1. T h is is n o t s tric tly tru e ; b u t it is tru e of syllogistic reasoning, and th is is by far th e m ost common type of argum ent.

60

TALKING THINGS OVER

The science of logic is very largely concerned to discover just what types of valid and fallacious argument there are. W e cannot, in a few pages, make any thorough study of fallacy. But it might be worth while to reformulate some of the more common rules of argument2 in a way especially relevant to discussion.
FIRST RULE

F ro m the fa c t that tw o things, or so rts o f things, have a characteristic in com m on, it is im possible validly to draw any fu r th e r conclusions about their relation to one another.
G e o rg e: W .E.A. tutors are a lot of Fascists 1 J a m e s : H ow do you m ake th a t o u t? G e o rg e : Well, look at the way theyve been criticising Russia.

T hats just what the Fascists are always doing.

George does not make it clear whether he is talking about all W .E .A . tutors, or som e W .E .A . tutors, but in either case the fallacy is the same. H e is arguing that because W .E .A . tutors (all or som e) have it in common with Fascists that they criticise Russia, therefore they must be Fascists. This is the most common, though the most glaring, form of the fallacy to argue that because one thing resembles another in a certain respect, it must resemble it in all other respects. It is amusing to construct a parallel argument:
G e o rg e : Winston Churchill is nothing but a Communist. J a m e s : H ow do you m ake th a t o u t? G e o rg e : Well, look at the way hes been criticising Germany.

T hats just what the Communists are always doing 1

This may serve to dispel any lingering doubts you may have about the fallaciousness of the original argument. The propagandist makes great use of this fallacy in what is called the technique of labelling. The recipe is simple. First find a group of people who are already unpopular, then find some doctrine your enemies share with that group, and then proceed as if you had now identified them with the group.
2. I have tried , in w hat follows, com pletely to avoid technical expressions. T he reader should tu rn to some such book as Jevons, E lem entary Lessons in Logic, for a brief, b u t m uch more thorough, account of the principal fallacies. W h a t follows will, I hope, w het his appetite, n o t satisfy it.

FACT AND FALLACY

61

The fallacy is sometimes a little concealed because the argument is not fully stated. Thus James may say
J a m e s : Of course, theyre Fascists. Why, theyre always criticis

ing Russia I

H e leaves unstated the premise: All Fascists criticise Russia, on which his argument depends. H e hopes we shall become muddled in our own minds and confuse this premise with the very different o n e : A ll critics of Russia are Fascists. If you doubt whether they are different, look at the pair: A ll Communists criticise Germany and All critics of Germany are Communists. W e shall constantly find, in our everyday arguments, that a premise has been omitted, because it is thought to be too obvious to state. Our ordinary discussions, in fact, take a great deal for granted. W e have already seen how it is assumed that the group shares common standards and common objectives; now w e see the further assumption that they share common beliefs. And this assumption, like the others, can be a prolific source of confusion and misunder standing.
SECOND R U LE

F ro m the fa c t that tw o things, or sorts o f things, are d ifferent fr o m one another, it cannot validly be concluded that a characteristic w hich belongs to the one docs not belong to the other. If tw o things are different it does not follow that they are different in all respects any more than, if they are alike, it follow s that they are alike in all respects. Consider the following discussion:
G e o rg e : W hy do you say th a t jaz z is no good as m usic? J a m e s : Well; youll agree that ja z z is very different from

classical music and, to my mind, classical music is good.

The argument is that because jazz is not the same thing as classical music, therefore, if we admit that classical music is good, w e have to conclude that jazz is bad. And this is

62

TALKING THINGS OVER

like arguing that since Victor Trumper is not the same person as Don Bradman, to say that Victor Trumper is a good cricketer is thereby to deny that Don Bradman is a good cricketer. This is a-primitive sort of thinking, but not at all infrequent in discussion, and even more at home in disputation. Once more, the fallacy is often concealed by the omission of one o f the premises, th u s:
Jam es :

Politicians never have brilliant m inds; there hasnt been a single first-rate scientist yet who has become a politician.

T he argument depends on a premise, A ll first-rate scientists have brilliant minds, which has not been expressed. Then from the premise that first-rate scientists are not politicians and the further premise that first-rate scientists possess brilliance of mind as one o f their characteristics, it is fallaciously concluded that politicians never have brilliance o f mind as one of their characteristics.
TH IRD RULE

F ro m the fa c t that tzvo things are d ifferent fro m a third thing, nothing can be validly concluded about their relation to one another. Tw o things which are different from a third thing may themselves be identical, partly identical, or wholly different from one another. W e cannot, that is, decide how two things are related to one another, merely from the informa tion that they are both different from something else. Here is an example of this fallacy, in discussion:
J a m e s : Politicians make plenty of money. G e o rg e: Thats not true, is it? J a m e s : Of course it is. Y ou d o n 't see th em living in slum s.

The argument is that since no politicians live in slums and no wealthy people live in slums (an assumed prem ise), there fore all politicians are wealthy people. Set out in this way, the fallacy would scarcely escape detection. But in the ebb and flow of discussion, with its half-stated arguments, the fallacy is common enough. Take another instance:

FACT AND FALLACY

63

G e o rg e : Artists must be unhealthy people. You never hear of

an artist playing grade cricket, or anything like that.

The vagueness of anything like that makes this argument hard to analyse. But w e may take it that George is saying that since no artists play grade sport and no unhealthy people play grade sport, therefore all artists are unhealthy, and this is clearly a fallacious argument. The fact that neither artists nor unhealthy people are grade sportsmen shows nothing about their relation to one another.
FOURTH RULE

F ro m the fa c t that two characters are fo u n d together in one instance, it cannot be validly concluded that they w ill alw ays be fo u n d together. Thus, for example, it would be fallacious to argue that since good painters are both technically skilled and imagina tive, therefore anyone who is technically skilled must be imaginative. T his argument, you might object, would not deceive a child of six. N or would it. But here is part of a discussion which took place not long ago:
G eorge : W h y do y o u oppose com pulsory languages in the schools ? J a m e s : Well, look at the Germans. They have compulsory

languages, and see what dreadful people they arel

Set out more clearly, this argument runs, Since all (or som e) Germans are compelled to learn languages in the schools, and all (or som e) Germans are bad, therefore every one compelled to learn languages is bad. And the speaker was not a child of six !
F IF T H RULE

F ro m the fa c t that one thing fo llo w s another, it cannot validly be concluded that w hat precedes is the cause o f what follow s. This rule could be expressed a little differently, in a way which would connect it closely with the fourth rule. From

6 4

TALKING THINGS OVER

the fact that two things go together on one occasion, it does not follow that they always go together. But, when we are trying to find a cause, w e have not merely a general going together in mind, but a very special sort of going together. For one thing, the cause must precede and pass into the effect; for another thing, the cause must never occur with out the effect following, nor the effect occur without the cause preceding it. It is, in fact, exceedingly difficult to establish that one thing is the cause of another. The super stitious are constantly breaking this rule. It must be unlucky to eat pepper on Fridays, because I ate pepper last Friday and the very next day I lost my false teeth. But political discussion will reveal plenty of other instances.
"* Jam es:

If it hadnt been fo r our Conservative Governments, wed still be in the depression. G e o rg e: W hats your proof of that statement? J a m e s : Look what happened in N.S.W . It was not long after a Conservative Government came to power that the depression began to disappear.

N ow , the mere fact that the entry o f the Conservative Government was folloived by the lifting of the depression will not show that the second is an effect of the first. To prove this point, James would have to show that depressions lift when, and only when, Conservative Governments come into power, and this he is far from having done.
S IX T H RULE

F ro m the fa c t that i f one thing occurs another always follow s, it cannot be validly concluded that w henever the second occurs the first m ust have preceded it. T o put it differently, the fact that a thing is always followed by some other thing does not imply that that other thing cannot occur under different circumstances as well. T o illustrate:
G e o rg e : W hat makes you think the Cabinet must be meeting? J a m e s : Well, whenever they meet, theres an awful crowd in

Canberra, and the place is crowded out at the moment. H e r e Ja m e s h as a rg u e d th u s : I f C a b in e t m e ets, th e re is a

FACT AND FALLACY

65

crowd in Canberra, so, since there is a crowd in Canberra now, Cabinet must be meeting. And this ignores the fact that there might be other occasions as well as a Cabinet meeting on which Canberra is crowded. Once again, premises are often omitted, thus:
G eorge : H ow do you m ake o u t th a t the governm ent w ill be defeated ? J a m e s : T h e re has been a lo t of u n re st in the p a rty lately.

In this case, either James is assuming that 'when there is unrest in the party, the government is always defeated and, in this case, the argument is quite valid, but breaks down because the assumed premise is false, or else he is rightly assuming that when the government is defeated, there has always been unrest in the party and then it is fallacious to conclude that because there is unrest on this occasion, the government will be defeated (the unrest might, for example, only mean that special concessions will have to be made to some members o f the party). In analysing an argument we are often in this position, that we can say that either a false premise has been assumed or an invalid argument used, but w e cannot say which has happened. And the person who uses such an argument, as a deliberate device, hopes that those who see what can be truly assumed will not notice the invalidity o f the argument, while those who construct the valid argument will not notice the falsity o f the premise on which it depends. T hese rules by no means exhaust the list, but by now it should be clear how fallacies arise in discussion, and how they may be disguised by the fact that the arguments are not fully stated. W hen w e hear or read such fallacies, we usually feel uneasy, whether we have made any study of logic or not, but it is a difficult matter to pass beyond this general feeling of uneasiness, to learn how to analyse and demonstrate the nature of the fallacy concerned. W e are like the car-driver who can tell if his engine is not running sweetly, even though he knows nothing of mechanics.

66

TALKING THINGS OVER

Something, however, we can do. W hen an argument is used which strikes us as being fallacious, w e can ask that it be stated more clearly and more fully. Once that is done, the fallacy will usually be apparent, whether w e can give a name to it or not. The really difficult thing is to smell out a fallacy when it is carefully disguised by scented rhetoric; only increased knowledge and constant practice can develop this, like any other, art. One particular omission from these rules may appear striking. Nothing has been said about arguing from a particular case to a general rule, and yet this is the only fallacy most people seem to have heard of. Quite frequently, people are accused of committing this fallacy when they are making no pretence o f offering a proof, but are merely verifying or illustrating a universal proposition. For exam ple:
G e o rg e : A ny m an w ill tell a lie i f he is h a rd pressed. I ll co n fess I've done so m yself. J a m e s : Youre arguing from a particular case to a general

rule I

But George is really doing nothing of the sort. H e is stating what he believes to be a true universal proposition, and is at the same time offering a particularly striking illustration of its truth. If, however, George were trying to offer a proof, if he were really arguing from a particular case to a general rule, then he would be breaking our fourth rule. H e would be arguing that because he him self is both a man and a liar, therefore all men are liars. A nd it will be found that the first and second rules forbid a different kind of argument from particulars to generals, argument, that is, from the common possession (or absence) o f one characteristic, to the common possession o f all characteristics. W hat is called arguing from a particular to a general/ in fact, covers a number o f different types o f argument, which need to be distinguished from one another.

FACT AND FALLACY E xercise Exam ine the following discussion and pick out in it

67

(a ) W ords which need to be examined with care, and (b) Fallacious arguments. See if you can classify them into the types set out in chapter v. S h o u l d C ivil S e r v a n t s
G e o rg e:
b e

University G r a d u a t e s ?

I think they certainly shouldnt be. W e dont want a lot of intellectual snobs running the country by looking up text-books. Jam es : But surely you havent reflected on what ydur e saying. Youd agree that a University education is important, wouldnt you, and I know you believe that the Civil Service is important, too. It surely follows that the Civil Service ought to have a University education 1 W i l l i a m : Well, I agree with George. A University education isnt a training in administration and Civil Servants need a training in administration. So they dont need a Univer sity education at all. Jam es: W e wouldnt have all this trouble with bureaucrats if only they had a decent education. G e o rg e : W hat d ifference w ould it make? Jam es: Well, y o u dont find people complaining about engineers and doctors, and they have a University education. W i l l i a m : I dont think much of engineers. They dont get much of an education by going to the University, so whats the use of sending anyone else up there? Jam es: Engineers are a ll right. You dont find them in the criminal courts. G eorge : Theyre the cause of most cf our present troubles. Before there were so many engineers around the place, you didnt get all this discontent and laziness. Jam es: Well, I think the Government is going to insist on Civil Servants all being graduates. G e o rg e: How do you w o rk th a t o u t? Jam es: Theres been a lot of talk about it, and that must mean something. W i l l i a m : Thereve been a lot of professional windbags opening their mouths about it. But you cant take any notice of that. W hat youll have to wait and see is whether the Government increases the grant. Theyd have to do that if they were going to _send Civil Servants up to the University, so that will show you whats going to happen. G e o rg e: But I know theyre not going to do it. So the Univer sities wont get a bigger grantand I think thats highly desirable.

68
J am es :

TALKING THINGS OVER

W hat have you got against the University? I told you beforesnobbery. I've known several lads who went to the University and they were awful snobs. But intelligent people are bound to be different from other people, and so they must be snobs. : The trouble is all this silly talk about intellect. W hat really matters is character. People of character are never snobs. T hats why intellectuals are snobs, because an intellectual cant have real character. Well, I still say that if a graduate goes into the Civil Service, he does a good job; and thats why ycull never have a decent Civil Service while graduates arent let in.

G e o rg e :

J am es : W
il l ia m

J am es:

VI SO PH ISTR Y
T o many people, we said, the discussion group is a field of battle; and they are well aware that victory in battle does not always go to the stronger, but often to the more cunning. W e cannot retort to their cunning with further cunning without destroying discussion, but if we are to retort with logic, we must be able to recognize sophistry when we see it. Sophistry, the art of making the stronger case appear the weaker and the weaker case appear the stronger, was first analysed by Plato and Aristotle over two thousand years ago, but so little have the ways of the sophist altered that what Aristotle had to say is bound to form the basis of this chapter.1 The lobster has not changed its lifehabits since Aristotle first described them ; and similarly the modern sophist employs the same methods of seizing and devouring his prey as his classic ancestor. Some of these methods we have already considered. The sophist, for example, will take every possible advantage of coloured, obscure and ambiguous language; and fallacies come naturally to him. N ot, o f course, that only the deliberate sophist uses these, or any other, devices. Merely through ignorance or through an unconscious imitation of what w e have observed to be effective methods of dis putation, w e are all liable to sophistry. And there are some hypotheses we are so desperately anxious to defend, even against all evidence, that we automatically fall into confused and illogical argument whenever they are threatened. The unconscious sophist can be quite as much a menace to
!. A ristotles description of sophistry is to be found especially in his Concerning Sophistical M ethods of Refutation.. I am also considerably indebted to the accounts given of th e m aterial fallacies' in the ordinary logic-books, to Schopenhauer's A rt of Controversy and to chapter x i in H a nee and M cB urney's T he Principles and M ethods o f D iscussion. B ut for th e arrangem ent and detailed description of the various devices I m ust bear sole responsibility.

69

70

TALKING THINGS OVER

discussion as the deliberate manipulator o f fallacy; each will have to be countered, even though we shall have to deal much more tenderly with the one than with the other. A . The D e v ic eo fO b s c u r in g th e P o in t The sophist dislikes to come out into the open. The more obscurely he can express him self, the more avenues of retreat he leaves open if his position should be threatened. Thus he will resist the process of clarification, and for the group to insist upon clarification is to rob the sophist of one of his most potent weapons. W omen prefer hom e-life to working in factories. That is the sort o f statement in which the sophist delights. For it does not commit him to saying that all women prefer homelife to factories, and yet it does not bring sharply before the group the fact that this applies to some women only. If challenged, the sophist can beat an easy retreat:
G eorge : jWomen prefer home-life to working in factories. J a m e s : Im sure that doesnt apply to all women. Why----G e o rg e : Of course, I know that. I didnt say that all women

liked home-life. I only meant women generally.

N otice how George falls back on the phrase women generally/ which still suggests that universality which George is not prepared to defend. W ords like generally have come down in the world. A general rule* ought to mean a rule which applies universally, but so frequently do we use words like general and 'always when we do not really mean them, that they have come to be synonyms for often. ( I'm alw ays going to the pictures; I dont think I ll go to-night.) Y et they have still something of their original sense about them. That is w hy the sophist, who wants to pretend that he has established a universal rule even when he has no hope of defending it, finds words like generally so useful. Logical clarification, the insistence that it be made clear whether we are talking about all or som e/ is the obvious defence to this sort o f stratagem.

SOPHISTRY

7 1

The sophist will be w ell pleased if he finds that his opponents also state their case vaguely. H e can accuse them of not having made up their mind, if all other resources fail him, and, more important, it gives him the chance to use the device o f extension. T he more sweeping the state ment to which he can induce his opponents to commit themselves, the simpler it is to win easy victories over them.
J a m e s : Y ou know , I th in k th is easy divorce business o u g h t to be p u t a stop to. G e o rg e : Oh, so youd like to go back to the old days, would

you? When a wife had no relief even from a husband who was always knocking her about and running around with other women. Havent you any considera tion for women?
J a m e s : T h a ts all v ery w ell, b u t divorce tells h a rd ag ain st w om en.

T he use, by James, o f the vague phrase this easy divorce business enables George, by interpreting it in a very broad way, to indulge in a sentimental outburst, another of his characteristic weapons o f disputation. James, instead of insisting that this is not what he meant by easy divorce,' is led away into a quite different, and perhaps less defensible, position that divorce tells hard against women. If only by its vagueness, this is sure to give George further oppor tunities for scoring off him. Thus the sophist finds vagueness useful, not merely to conceal his own policies and to make them more plausible, but because it gives him greater opportunity of coping with the position o f his opponents. In either case, to insist upon clarification is fatal to his schemes.
B . Th e Lo g ic a l D e v ic e s

The sophist always finds it an admirable disguise to clothe himself in the outer garments o f his real adversary the logician. So skilfully may this be done, that the onlookers sometimes compliment the sophist on his logic, and rebuke the logician for his sophistry or logic-chopping.

72

TALKING THINGS OVER

1. Criticism as Camouflage W e have already seen some of the ways in which the sophist may parade him self as the real logician o f the group. H e may, for example, make a great show of attacking, as illogical, a particular proof, and under cover of this attack, pretend that this amounts to a disproof of the original hypothesis. Or again, he may criticise a hazy authority, or an imprecise use o f language, and by that means leave the group with a general impression that he has completely demolished the position of his adversaries.
W i l l i a m : Who do you think is going to win the elections, Jam es : G e o rg e :

James? Well, I was talking to a man in the bank the other day who reckoned that business men would vote Labour. If that is so, Labour is bound to win. A man in the bank! T hats a fine authority to rely upon! Of course, business men wont vote Labour. Labour hasnt got a ghost of a chance.

Here George, by attacking Jamess reference to 'a man in the bank which James obviously doesnt intend to be taken as any sort of final authority disguises the fact that he has himself done nothing whatever to show that what James says is false, that, in fact, he has merely thrust h im se lf forward as an authority. The most detailed and elaborate criticism of language and o f arguments can be used in the same way, as a smoke-screen by which to disguise the absence of any argument on the really crucial point. Substantially the same method is used, with even less justification, when the critical consideration of a particular case, which has been offered as confirmation or as disproof o f a hypothesis, is substituted for any consideration of the hypothesis itself. T hus:
G e o rg e : Professors dont make good civil servants; they have J a m e s : W hat about Masaryk?

no knowledge of how to handle people. He was a professor and he made a first-rate civil servant.

G eorge : B u t h e w asnt a civil servant. J a m e s : W e ll, h e w as P re sid e n t o f C zechoslovakia. G e o rg e : Surely, you wouldnt call a President a civil servant!

SOPHISTRY

73

J a m es : I suppose you cant really. G e o rg e: Of co u rse you caut. S o y o u ll have to ag ree w ith m e now th a t pro fesso rs m ake bad civil servants.

George is, of course, quite entitled to claim that the case of Masaryk is no exception to his generalization about professors and civil servants; but he is not entitled to claim that, once this has been established, James has no option but to accept his hypothesis. Furthermore, George had originally sought to prove that professors make bad civil servants by asserting that they dont know how to handle people. And even if a President isnt a civil servant, it is none the less true that a President must know how to handle people, so that the case o f Masaryk can properly be raised against the only proof which George has offered of his general con clusion. James is, therefore, in a much stronger position than George, because on George, as the original proposer of the hypothesis, lies the burden o f proof. But George, by concentrating on Jamess exception, and treating the rejection of this exception as equivalent to proof of his hypothesis, has made the weaker case appear the stronger. 2. Inconsistency as D isp ro o f The accusation of inconsistency can be used in the same way, to avoid an awkward argument. Even if a speaker has really been inconsistent, this is by no means a fatal argument against the truth o f one o f the things he has said. In a discussion, a speaker can be expected to change his mind; we might sometimes draw his attention to the fact that he has done so, to make sure he is not being merely flippant and careless, but even this is sometimes a quite unnecessary embarrassment. And to take the fact that he has changed his mind as proof that none o f the things he says is true is the height of sophistry.
G eorge : J a m es : T h e ra d io is no use as a n in stru m en t of adult educa tion, because it never gives any s o rt o f continuous instruction. I w ouldnt a g re e w ith th a t I th in k th a t a t le a st it gives continuous instru ctio n in c u rre n t affairs.

7 4
G e o rg e :

TALKING THINGS OVER

But you said the other day that many of the talks were very patchynow you talk about continuous instruction. Youre quite inconsistent. W i l l i a m : H e s got you there, James. I remember you saying that. I'm afraid youll have to give him his point.

Here it may be doubted whether James has really been inconsistent: whether it is inconsistent to say both that some radio talks are patchy and that, nevertheless, the radio does give some sort of continuous instruction in current affairs. But if he were inconsistent, while George and W illiam are entitled to draw his attention to the fact, they are not entitled to assume that this is sufficient refutation of the point he has made; James would be quite entitled to say that he was mistaken on the first occasion. But we are usually so put out when we are accused o f inconsistency that w e do not pause to consider whether the inconsistency is a real one, let alone whether w e cannot easily abandon one of these inconsistent propositions without any real harm to our main position. Once again, then, the sophist may win an easy victory. 3. Fallacy as L ogic There are two formulae which many people apparently believe to express logical principles, although each is quite illogical. The exception proves the rule, is one. That is all right in theory, but it doesn't work out in practice, is the other. Both seek to invoke logic in an attempt to defy logic. In the first case, the point about exceptions is that they do not prove but disprove a rule. In this formula, we exalt that tendency w e already noted to ignore inconvenient exceptions into a logical principle. But the fact o f the matter is that if an exception can really be proved against our hypothesis, then logically w e have no alternative but to abandon that hypothesis, at least in its original form.
J a m e s : Australians are impatient of snobbery. G e o rg e: That isnt true o f the people whose names appear in the social columns.

SOPHISTRY
J a m e s : Well,

7 5

I ll p u t the matter this way. The ordinary middle-class Australian hasnt the snobbishness of the middle-class Englishman.

H ere James admits the force of Georges exception, and brings forward a new hypothesis to meet it. If, on the other hand, he had blithely replied, Thats the exception that proves the rule, then he would simply be ignoring the basic principles of discussion. T he second formula rests on an assumed logical distinction between theory and practice, a distinction which is in fact without warrant. W hat this formula attempts to do is to evade the consequence of a hypothesis without embarking on a direct criticism of it.
J a m e s : Whenever

wages are increased, prices rise propor tionately. G e o rg e : T hats all right in theory but it doesnt work out in practice. T ry and persuade a working man hes not better off when wages go up!

N ow , if it is true that working men are better off when their wages go up, then Jamess theory is not true in theory but simply false. If, on the other hand, what James says is true, then the working men must be mistaken, and James is as right in practice as he is in theory. A theory is either true or fa lse ; and, if it is true, then it gives a correct account of practice, o f what in fact happens. If it does not, then it is simply false. It will be observed, then, that it is bad logic, not good logic, which the sophist uses as protective covering. And his bad logic can only be countered by good lo g ic : not always an easy task, as already suggested, especially when the sophist is on the right side, on the side, that is, of sentiment and prejudice. T his consideration leads us naturally to the psychological devices. C. T he Psyc h o l o g ic a l D e v ic e s The members o f a discussion group are not calculating machines but human beings, men and women, with all the

76

TALKING THINGS OVER

passions and all the weaknesses of human beings. The sophist must know how to play upon those passions and to exploit those weaknesses. H e is a sort of salesman, with opinions for sale, and he will use all the devices of the salesman to achieve his end. Flattery of the prospective purchaser, the offer of free g ifts, subtle, or not so subtle, depreciation of the merchandise of his competitors, appeals to our desire to be in the swim , will all appear, in a slightly modified form, in the tactics o f the sophist. Just how sales-resistance is to be developed, it is difficult to say. But it is interesting to observe that it is not the person with an expert knowledge o f literature, but the person who is ignorant of books, who can most readily be persuaded to buy expensively bound volumes of worthless and unreadable rubbish; it is not the trained mechanic, but the casual driver, who can most readily be enticed into the purchase o f a glittering but inefficient automobile. If we are really interested in the subject o f discussion, really con cerned to arrive at the truth, we are so much the less likely to be moved by simple flattery, by mere abuse or by appeals to popular prejudice. For the rest, it is worth while considering some of the ways in which the sophist may substitute an appeal to emotion for solid argument, although w e could never hope to exhaust this field o f enquiry. H e makes use, especially, o f what the Institute of Propaganda Analysis calls 'the transfer device. I f w e are emotionally attracted or repelled by any thing or person, that attraction or repulsion can be easily transferred to whatever can be associated, in our minds, with that thing or person. 1. T ra n sfe r by Labelling Thus, for example, suppose we are already violently opposed to Communists, or to Fascists, then the sophist will try to associate the position he is opposing with Communism or with Fascism. T h u s:

SOPHISTRY

77

J a m e s : I think all young children should go to nursery schools. G eorge : Oh, I cant have that. Why, thats what they do in

Soviet Russia!

N ow , this is really a particularly glaring example o f one of the fallacies w e discussed in the last chapter. George is arguing that because nursery schools, in some cases, occur in Russia and, in some cases, what happens in Russia is bad, therefore nursery schools in all cases are bad. Clearly enough w e might, with equal force, object to underground railways on the ground that they have them in M oscow! W hat gives force to this argument, in fact, is not its logical structure, which is hopelessly fallacious, but the transfer of emotion it arouses. The sophist hopes to induce us to feel towards nursery schools what we already feel towards Russia by associating these two things in our mind. Clearly be will have to change his argument to suit his audience. Precisely the same phrase, thats what they do in Russia, would serve as a reason for approving of nursery schools if the group members were favourably disposed towards Russia. 2. T ra n sfe r by A b u se O f course, the sophist may sometimes proceed in a more obvious way, remembering the old advice, I f you havent got a case, abuse the other side, and argue somewhat as fo llo w s:
J a m e s : I see Bertrand Russell says that science and religion are G eorge : Russell 1

incompatible. Why, thats the man who has had three wives I Catch me paying any attention to his opinion 1

This is the transfer device again, but in a cruder form. And it may work the other way, thus:
Jam es

: According to Dr. Temple, Christians ought to take part in movements for social reform. G e o rg e : N ow , theres a man its worth taking notice of. H es one of the most respected men in England. No one has ever been able to breathe a word of reproach against his private lifel

78

TALKING THINGS OVER

3. T ra n sfe r by Inconsistency This device can be particularly effective when it plays upon our natural dislike of being told what to do by people who are themselves conspicuous for doing something quite different.
J a m e s : Any doctor w ill tell you that we need regular sleep

and regular meal-times.

G e o rg e : Yes, theyll tell you that I

themselves. hours I

And look what they do Why, theres nobody with more irregular

In this case, we are substituting an attack upon what we call the inconsistency of doctors for a consideration of the value o f the advice they give us. This is not really an inconsistency at all, in the proper sense o f inconsistency. There is nothing illogical in a person practising one sort of conduct and preaching another. A person who advises others to keep their studies tidy, and yet fails to keep his own tidy, is not being inconsistent or illogical. W e can often see quite well that a certain type o f conduct is the best and yet be quite incapable o f carrying it out ourselves, whether through circumstances or through temperament. And it may be just the doctor, with his own experience of irregular hours, who is best able to advise others against them. It is only human to be irritated and suspicious o f hypocrisy when a person fails to practise what he preaches ; but if w e permit that irritation to be transferred to the advice he gives, we are falling into sophistry. 4. T ra n sfe r by A p pea l to M o tives W e are also inclined to be suspicious o f, and hostile to, the person who publicly advocates a policy from which he stands personally to profit. W e may keep that suspicion, but must learn to realize that to assign motives is not to refute argument.
J a m e s : I see th a t one of th e d ire c to rs o f the ----- C om pany

has been coming out in favour cf a high tariff policy. H e says that without such a policy the industry built

SOPHISTRY

7 9

up in Australia during the war will simply have to be abandoned. G eokge: Of course he wants tariffs. Its h is own profits th a t hes looking out for. There isnt a more blood-sucking firm in Australia.

George ignores the arguments James has brought forward and considers instead the motives which, in his opinion, inspire them. Clearly, however, even if a director of the ------- Company does stand to gain by a high tariff policy, to point this out is not a refutation of his argument; on the contrary it may rather be a confirmation of it. I f, of course, we can show that his argument is a bad one, then we can go on to point to the reasons why he none the less upholds it, but the consideration o f motives should follow, not precede, the examination of argument. Otherwise, we are at the mercy of the sophist, because since people talk only about questions they are interested in, it is always possible to assign motives with at least some plausibility and even with truth. W e do not need any elaborate training in logic to cope with these psychological devices; w e need only to keep always in mind that the crucial question is not W ho said this? or W hy did he say it? but Is this true? For the rest, our success in meeting the sophist will depend on the extent to which we are dominated by vanity, greed and pride rather than by a willingness to look at the facts of the case. If, for example, we consider Theres nothing in it for m e a sufficient objection to any policy which may be proposed, then a discussion group is not the place for us. T h e L itera ry D evice T he Greek sophists were experts in rhetoric, in the art of stating their case in the m ost pleasing possible way, and even if the modern sophist usually lags somewhat behind in this respect, he will certainly try to use literary devices to distract attention from the logical structure o f his argu ment, and to give it a force it would not otherwise possess. H e knows, for example, how to use sarcasm. 5.

80
Jam es:

TALKING THINGS OVER

Capitalism inevitably tends towards monopoly and so towards totalitarianism. G e o rg e : W hat you say is no doubt true, but it is far beyond my weak intellect. Couldnt you explain, just for my benefit, exactly what you mean, but this time in words of one syllable? No doubt you understand exactly what you mean, but I'm afraid that no one else does.

George is skilfully suggesting that James, while saying nothing at all, is disguising that fact in high-flown language. H e hopes by this means to win the support o f the rest of the group, who will like to see James taken down a peg or tw o, and also to make James angry, because an angry man is usually easy to defeat in disputation. The sophist also knows the value of anecdote.
Jam es:

I dont see why you think so well of the British. Look what they did in Ireland! G e o rg e: T hat reminds me of the story about the Irishman who was showing a Scot over his country. After a while they came to a place which was particularly barren, with no farms on it at all. W hats wrong with this land? asked the Scotsman. Too boggy, replied the Irishman gloomily. Those cursed Englishmen, you know.

A n anecdote of this kind is obviously no answer at all to James; but George hopes that the group will be pleased with him for telling an anecdote, and that this pleasure will pass over (by transfer) to his attack on James. There is just sufficient connection between the story and Jamess argument to subdue the suspicion that it is quite irrelevant. Analogy is another favourite weapon of the sophist, both because this provides an opportunity for telling stories, and because it is so hard to pick out, on the spur o f the moment, just where the analogy breaks down, just why the supposed ground o f comparison is not a ground of comparison at all. H ere is a simple instance:
Jam es:

I t seems to m e that the Prime Minister is quite wrong in his attitude towards the miners. G e o rg e : I can't understand you people. Youre always criti cising the Government. If you were on board a ship, you wouldnt be always criticising the captain. You would leave the running of the ship to him.

SOPHISTRY

81

T his sounds plausible enough until we reflect that in this analogy George is assuming exactly what James would ques tion. H e is assuming, especially, that the relation between a passenger on board a ship and the captain of that ship is comparable to that between a citizen and his government. And clearly these are not comparable, in vital respects. T he citizen is not totally ignorant of politics, as the pas senger is totally ignorant of navigation; the passenger is not called upon to vote for or against the captain, as the citizen is called upon to vote for or against the government. In fact, the democratic community can only continue in existence and develop if the citizens take an active and critical part in politics, whereas it is not true that the ship will break down unless the passengers take an active part in navigation. It is hard, as I said, to detect immediately where an analogy breaks down. W e should develop a general attitude of suspicion towards the use of analogy, a general reluctance to be convinced by it, because an analogy is at most an illustration or a comparison, never a proof, and very often is not even a real illustration; and, with practice, w e can improve our capacity for seeing just whether an analogy has any force or not. E xercise Examine the following discussion, and pick out from it the sophistical devices and fallacies it contains.
S h o u l d Un iv e r s it ie s
G e o rg e : J a m es:
b e Fr e e ?

O f course, they ought to be free; and I know thats the opinion of many of the Labour members of the Parlia ment, at least.
Y ou cant tak e any notice of them . T h ey re hoping to w in v o te s; th a ts a ll th ey re u p to. alw ays

W i l l i a m : Well, I still think they ought to be free.

I was only reading the other day about a free University in Cali fornia which contains some very brilliant professors indeed. T hat shows the advantage of free Universities. Look at the stodgy professors weve got at our Uni versities, and theyre not free.

82
J ohn :

TALKING THINGS OVER

Free Universities are an American idea. W e British think a University education ought to be paid for. People don't appreciate what they dont pay for. You remind me of the man who was prosecuted for selling ordinary water as a marvellous patent medicine. Well, he said, just like you, people dont appreciate what they dont pay fo ri Yes, I dont see that its true people have to pay for a thing to appreciate it. Look at the way Australians enjoy swimming, and thats usually free. Thats the exception that proves the rule. Anyhow, swimming isnt really free. Youve got to buy costumes, and things. And often people have to pay for trams and dressing-sheds and, perhaps, even to go into the swimming pool. H es got you there, George. You cant get away with that. So it is true people have to pay for a thing before they appreciate it. T hats like saying that people have to buy food before they can eat it. Its not much help if youre hungry and havent got a penny in your pocket. I think youve all missed the main point. Free U ni versities mean state control. T hats just what the Nazis have always stood for. You said before that free Universities were an American idea! Can't you even make tip your own mind? All you are worried about is that you dont want your children to mix with ordinary people at the University. Youre pretty particular about the company your own children keep, anyhow I Now, dont get excited, just because the argument is going against you. It may be obvious to you that you are right, but we others cant think as fast as you, you know, we need a little bit of convincing. I still say that the free Universities are not the best ones. How about the Californian Universities? I meant, of course, as a general rule. There may be exceptions, but they arent important. Look here! You cant tell me that free Universities are no good. Many of them are quite up to the standard of ordinary Universities; and they are much more open to talent, as well. Universities dont want swots. They want people with a decent background, people with the sort of home life you and I can give them. Theyre the people we need in the professions. Surely, professional people need to have some brains!

W il l ia m :

G eorge : J a m es : John :

J a m es : W il l ia m : J o iin : W
i l l ia m :

Jo h n : G eorge :

J a m es : G eorge : J a m es : W
il l ia m

J a m es :

il l ia m

V II GROUP LEAD ERSH IP

Tx ie duties of the group leader will vary greatly from group

to group. Sometimes all he will need to do is to open and close the discussion, and otherwise he can regard himself simply as an ordinary member of the group. Sometimes, on the other hand, if he is far superior in competence and experience to the rest of the group, he will need to act as the groups Conscience, to prevent it from straying from the more rigorous path of discussion into the enticing realms of gossip and disputation. Like Conscience, he can easily make himself unpopular, if he is unduly officious; like Conscience, again, he should estimate the value of his work, not by the number of times it is necessary for him to interfere, but by the fact that it is less and less necessary for him to interfere at all. A t their most onerous, his main duties a r e : 1. T o C larify the P roblem The leader cannot let discussion proceed without making sure that the group understands what it is talking about. W ith this proviso, that he may sometimes let the group start talking, and then get it to see the need for clarification, as a way out of the difficulties in which it will find itself. (C f. chapter ill, a.) Gradually other members of the group, realizing the importance of clarification, will come to demand it of themselves. 2. T o D evelop in the G roup a Feeling fo r Relevance H e will need to ask such questions as
W hat precisely does that prove? Are we still talking about the same point? Wouldnt that come up better, a little later?

83

84

TALKING THINGS OVER

H e must beware, however, lest in seeking relevance he kills spontaneity. H ow rigid the control that can be exercised will depend largely on the character of the group. If it is ready and anxious to talk, it can be kept fairly strictly to the point; if it is slow and shy of speech, then utterance of any kind is welcome. But the leader should then seize hold, in that utterance, of whatever is relevant, and by that means help the group to distinguish between what is to the point and what is not. 3. T o C heck S o p h istry H ere, again, he must take care. W e are all sophists, some times, but are not always skilful enough to deceive the other members of the group. They may not know any logic, but common sense is often enough all they need to see through our sophistry. Only if the group is obviously being misled, should the leader actively intervene. Even then it is not usually desirable for him to give a lecture on logic, although he may weave a point of logic into what he is saying. To question the sophist, to ask him to state his proof in another way, to puncture his rhetoric by re-stating his assertions in simple language, all these procedures will help to show up the fallacy and confusion in what the sophist is saying. Techniques like these may be picked up, by imitation, just as the techniques o f the sophist are picked up. Providing that the leader is careful not to give the impression that only a person o f superhuman ability and knowledge can see through the pretences o f the sophist, the group will soon follow his lead. 4. To R ecognise D eadlocks Every now and then the group will reach a point at which it can go no further without more information. It is the leaders duty to realize that this is so, to delegate to some member of the group the task of getting the information, and to suggest that the group go on to another point. It is no

GROUP LEADERSHIP

85

use saying, simply, Hadnt w e better go on to something else? It is necessary to make it clear why no further progress can be expected; and to suggest another specific point for the groups consideration. O ften enough, all that will be necessary is to raise again a point that was left for later consideration. 5. To R ecognize B oredom A group sometimes goes on talking about a point long after it has exhausted all it really has to say. It is not always easy to recognize when the time has come to sum up and to pass on to another point. But if some members o f the group begin to yawn and fidget or, more politely, to look blank, if the contributions of the group become slow and desultory, or restricted to one or two members of the group only, then the time has come to call a halt. Once again the group itself will quickly come to realize that it is for it to say when it feels that the interest of a point has been exhausted, and that this can be done without rudeness. 6. T o O vercom e S h yn ess This a temperamental problem, on which I feel no special competence. A sympathetic and tolerant personality is much more important, as in so many other cases, than any knowledge of rules. It is certainly a help, however, to try to bring in the quiet members of the group, first of all, on a relatively simple problem, or on issues concerning which the leader knows they have an opinion. It is a help, too, if the leader can develop the art of extracting what is valuable from their contributions (not always an easy m atter). Then they will feel that they have not opened their mouths in vain. 7. T o S u b d u e the O ver-talkative Once more, a temperamental problem, calling on the tact of the leader rather than on his knowledge. Over-talkative people are sometimes particularly vain, and particularly easy

86

TALKING THINGS OVER

to anger by any suggestion that their contributions are not much more valuable than those of any other member of the group. I f, however, the leader always addresses his questions to the quieter members o f the group, and leaves the more talkative to break in for themselves and if he demands a higher standard of relevance from the noisy members, he will have at least some chance o f coping with them. H e can also insist on taking one point at a time, to overcome any tendency to turn the discussion group into an opportunity for speech-making. Other members o f the group are often in a better position to cope with this sort of person than the leader is. Certainly, without their'co-operation, his task is a difficult one. 8. T o S u m Up It is the leaders task to see that the group knows what conclusions it has reached, or why it has failed to arrive at any unanimous decision. T his task he can, from an early stage, delegate to some other member of the group; perhaps to a special reporter, whose job it is to record, in a summary form, the decisions of the group, and the main arguments advanced for and against those decisions. That is all I have to say about group leadership, though by no means all that can be said. It is an art which can only be learnt by experience, and which some people will never learn. If you have an opportunity of practising the art under the eye of an experienced and candid critic take it. That is the best way o f all, though not the most comforting, if the critic is really candid. One word of warning, only,_ which has been constantly given throughout this book. Group leadership does not consist simply in applying directly to the conduct of a group the lessons which this book has to teach. The more the leader knows about discussion methods the better; but that does not mean that he should regard the group as a way of airing his new-found know ledge. U se with discretion should perhaps have been inscribed on the title-page of this book.

GROUP LEADERSHIP E xercise

87

Comment on the tactics o f the leader in the following discussion:

S L e a d e r: G e o rg e:
hould

I ndu stry

be

e c e n t r a l iz e d ?

L eader :
W

Well, to-niglit what we have to talk about is whether industry should be decentralized. I know George will have a lot to say about that. Come cn, George. Well, I think industry should be decentralized. The city has lived off the country long enough. Its time the country had its own industries, instead of sending all it produces down to the city and having to buy it back again. And just'look at the cities! Slums, and immorality everywhere. Youll avoid all that by decentralization. Youll keep the young people in the town, too. Thats highly important. And, as well ----T hat should keep us going for a bit, George. I think we all know what your opinion is by now. Well, youve all heard George. W hos coming in next?
: So f a r as I m concerned, I w ouldnt live in the country

il l ia m

a t any price. I t s to o dull fo r me. I like to sec a bit of life. T h e c o u n try cant ever be like th e city, and th e city life in te re sts me.

But its a fallacy to conclude from that, that the country wouldnt interest you. T hats called the fallacy of illicit process. Ja m es : Fallacy or not, I agree with William. The countrys dull. T hats the plain fact of the matter. And youll never get city people to live happily in the country. You cant turn country people into mechanics overnight, so where are you going to get the people to start your industries with? Another thing, I dont believe our cities are too big. They arent big enough. It will be time to complain when they get bigger than New York or London. L eader : Well, James seems to be quite as determined as George, and theyre on opposite sides. This ought to be an interesting discussion. How about you, John? Havent you anything to say? J o iin : Dont know much about it, Im afraid. L e a d e r : T hats a pity 1 W hat about you, Hector? H e c t o r : Decentralization wont solve anything. W hat we need is a change in the credit system. Unless we get that were done for. W hy should the banks be able to upset all our industrial and economic life, like they did in the depres sion, just so as they could have some more figures to write down in their books. Thats w h at I w an t to know . All this talk doesnt get down to the real problems. Unless we have a change in the credit system ----L ea d er:

88
L eader :

TALKING THINGS OVER

Yes, well, Im sure we all agree with that. But I'm afraid I have to go now. Could you take the chair, Henry? H enry : Ill be glad to carry on. I was very interested in some thing George said, a while back. H e suggested, I think, that the concentration of industry in the cities produces slums there. Mightnt you bring slums to the country towns, with the industries ? W hat do youthink about that, John? Didnt I hear you saying, the other day, that housing conditions are pretty bad in the country towns even now? John : Well, I don't want to pretend to be an expert, and I dont know that conditions in the country are as bad as they are in the city. But, taking the bread around, Ive seen some pretty bad conditions in the country. There isnt any sewerage, or things like that, in so much of the country. That doesnt help. H en ry : W hat would you say to that, George? I ts true there are some pretty bad conditions in the G eorge : country, but thats only because its hard to get a decent living in the towns. Bring out the factories, and people will soon find they can live much better in the country town than they ever could, on the same money, in the city. W ith a different credit system, people in the country H ector : towns wouldnt be poor, even without factories being taken there. W hy should people have to starve just because they havent get a few figures opposite their name in a bank-book? T hats an interesting question, Hector, but not quite to H enry : the point, I m afraid. Suppose other things stay as they are, suppose there isnt a change in the credit system, would you agree that people will find their city money goes further in the country than it did in the city? T h o m a s : I certainly would agree, whether Hector would or not. I know those conditions John talks about. Theyre pretty bad, some of them. But at least the children have air and space to play around in. They arent cooped up in city streets, scarcely ever seeing a tree or a bit of green grass. W il l ia m Still, at least the city children can see Mickey Mouse when they want tol T h o m a s : Bring city industry to the country, and youll soon find city conveniences following after it. H en r y : Can we agree, at least, that decentralization will help to cut down slums? N o one seems seriously to deny that. Perhaps we can go on then to the other point someone raised. Would people be prepared to come and live in the country? Could they settle down there after a city life? T h o m a s : I dont see why they shouldn't be able to. You can get used to anything in time.

GROUP LEADERSHIP
W
il l i a m :

89

Suppose you had to have a tooth pulled out every day. Do you suppose youd ever feel happy about it? I certainly wouldnt, however often it happened. G eorge : Youre not trying to make out that living in the country is as bad as having a tooth pulled out every day? W il l ia m : I didnt say that. I was just making a comparison. H enry : But wheres the comparison, William? W il l ia m : Well, its not much of a comparison, Ill admit, but I was saying I couldnt get used to living in the country, any more than I could to getting my teeth pulled out. G eorge : But no one likes having their teeth pulled out. It's certainly not true that nobody likes living in the country. And those who dont at first often settle down to it eventually. T h o m a s : Just why do people object to the country, anyhow? Only because there arent modern conveniences. If we had large country towns all over the place those disadvantages would go. Give a place modern conveniences and discomfort disappears. People dont like discomfort, so theyd be all right once the modern conveniences come. I m not too sure about that argument of yours, Thomas. H enry: It seems to depend on the assumption that the discomfort of the country is the only thing people dislike about it. Otherwise it doesnt seem to follow that if, onceyouget modern conveniences, people will be quite happy.Doyou feel prepared to assert, what you havent so far said, that its discomfort is the only thing that makes living in the country unpopular? I dont see how he could say that. Lots of people like J a m es : the life, the strange faces, the constant coming and going, of a city. People like that wont ever be happy in the country. I dont know about other people, but I wouldnt live Jo h n : in the city for ten quid a week. Looks as if we might have to say that some people just H enry: dont like country towns, others are quite happy there and others would be happy if only there were more amusements and conveniences. Can we decide, then, that it would be possible to get enough people to keep the factories going, if you saw that the towns you select were well provided in this respect? I think Id admit that; though you wouldnt get everyone J a m es: you wanted to go there. Well, we havent got far. But I think weve been able H en r y : to see that decentralization might help to get_ rid of slums, and that at least one objection brought against it that you wont get people to live in country towns wont be true if you look after the towns properly.

V I II TH E PLACE OF DISCUSSION
D is c u s s io n is only possible if the members of the group have information to throw into a common pool. That is a limitation upon discussion from the very start. M ost of that information has to be acquired, not by discussion, but by reading, by listening, or by looking. It is true that w e do gain new information by taking part in the discussion; we learn much from the other members of the group, and other members learn something from us, but we could never arrive, for example, at a thorough knowledge of psychology, of political theory or of economics to say nothing of mathe matics and chemistry simply by discussion. Education, in fact, needs to be an alternation o f the solitary and the social. In the solitary stages, we read, we listen to talks, w e look at plays or films, w e reflect on the life we see around us. W e may be part of an audience at the play, w e may be one o f many readers at a public library, we may be one of thousands who are listening to a radio talk, but, none the less, at these stages w e are solitary, in the sense that w e are not communicating in any way with our fellow-learners. It would be wrong to say that w e are quite passive at this stage in our education; for we must be actively reflecting on what we see and hear if we are to profit by it, but w e cannot answer back the speaker or the writer or the actor. (R ude comments on the margin scarcely count!) W hat, on the contrary, is typical o f the social stage in our learning is its give and take. W e are learner and teacher in one, critic and criticised, leader and led, if we take an active part in discussion. W e shall not hear, in a discus sion, that continuous presentation of a case which we find in a good lecture or a good talk; we shall not have facts

90

TH E PLACE OF DISCUSSION

91

marshalled skilfully for our critical inspection, we cannot pay the same close and detailed attention as we can to a book. But there are compensating advantages. For one thing, the solitary reader is very liable to misunderstand what he reads, to find there what the author never intended and even what no author ever would intend. Forced on the defensive in discussion, he realizes that some thing is wrong; he may meet with others who have inter preted the same book quite differently, or else, at least, the exposition of his favourite author is met with such criticism that it drives him back to wrestle with the book again. Or even if there is no question of misunderstanding, it is one thing to be convinced, in library or study, by a brilliant and persuasive author; another to face the criticism of a vigorous discussion group, when it gets to work on that authors point of view. If you can rebut that criticism, you will find your appreciation and understanding of the position you are defending much deepened and enlarged; if you cannot, then, however much you resent the fact at the time, in the end you will be glad that you were not won over to a false opinion or, perhaps, that you were brought to see that you needed to study much more fully the case you were defending. Finally, discussion gives an opportunity for expression. There is an old educational maxim which reads, No impression without expression. The best way of retaining knowledge is to make use o f it. That is not always easy when it is knowledge of subjects like psychology and philosophy and economics which is in question. It is easy to make use of newly acquired knowledge about gardening or about mechanical techniques; discussion provides a method of making use o f other sorts of knowledge as well. Discussion, however, should not only be preceded, but followed, by further reading. It should drive you back on a subject to make a further study o f it, not leave you with the impression that there is no more to be learnt. That is

92

TALKING THINGS OVER

why the value of a discussion depends on the vigour of the criticism which forms part o f it. T he solitary and the social stage should, as I said, alternate with one another. Neither can replace the other; neither by itself is really satisfactory. H ow can these matters be arranged? It is not possible simply to go out into the streets and say, I have been studying psychology; w ont someone discuss it with m e? Odd conversations in trams and buses and other places of public resort may have some value, but if what was said in the first chapter has any force, that value is very limited. And it is rare, in these days, to hear anything which deserves to be called discussion springing up spontaneously. That has not always been so, but a ridiculous convention has grown up that it is ill-bred to make use o f an ordinary social occasion as an opportunity for the discussion o f serious questions. A s matters stand, then, you will need to seek out and help to form discussion groups within the organization to which you belong or amongst your friends. Several choices lie before you. A number o f people may be selected to discuss, perhaps before an audience, some question in which they are known to be interested. A topic is chosen, just like a topic for debate, on the ground that it is especially controversial or because it needs no great background knowledge. This is an unsatisfactory method, for a number of reasons. There is no continuity in the subjects chosen for discussion, and the group is therefore unable to develop that feeling of working co-operatively at a common task, o f making progress in a subject, which is such a valuable aid to the practice of the discussion method. There is normally no background o f information common to the group, and therefore the discussion is especially liable to degenerate into a wrangle about undiscussable matters of fact. If the group is recon stituted for each topic, it has to shake down anew each week; if it is not, some o f the topics are bound to be of no

T H E PLACE OF DISCUSSION

93

interest to members of the group. Many of the criticisms one hears of the discussion method are really directed against the deficiencies o f this quite artificial, set topic method. If matters can be so arranged that the group listens to a series of talks, turning around a single main subject, and uses these as the basis of each discussion, many of these deficiencies disappear. This is the method used in the classes of the W orkers Educational Association, and the Listening Group scheme of the Australian Broadcasting Commission is a variant. The group retains continuity of membership for many weeks and thus learns how to work together ; it can make use o f the common fund of information provided by the speaker; it is able gradually to develop its know ledge o f a single subject. Again, a group may select a book as the starting point o f its discussions, reading a chapter a week. T his is substantially the method used in the Discussion Group scheme organized by the Tutorial Class Department of the University of Sydney; with this difference, that the books used are specially written for the use o f Discussion Groups and contain suggested topics for discussion, attached to each chapter. A s well, a tutor with special knowledge of each subject keeps constantly in touch with the group by corres pondence. One advantage o f this scheme over the lecture method is that it is very easy to misunderstand lectures (which have to be caught on the w ing) , and very hard to prove the misunderstanding, whereas it is a simple matter to re-read a chapter, if any dispute arises. The Listening Group scheme overcomes this difficulty by supplying a copy o f the script of each talk. Again, it is possible to offer a wide choice of subjects to groups in even the most remote parts of the state; which neither the Australian Broadcasting Commission nor the W orkers Educational Association (in its lecture courses) can attempt. On the whole, then, this is the scheme with most promise for the future; and those

94

TALKING THINGS OVER

readers who live in states where it is not yet available will do well to press for its adoption. Sometimes a film rather than a book may be chosen for discussion; but the Documentary Film s M ovement, which seeks to foster this sort of discussion, is only yet in its infancy in Australia. I f these facilities for discussion are to be extended, it will only be as a result of the activities of those who believe in the value of the discussion method. U sin g the phrase in its broadest sense, it will need political action. I put special emphasis on that point, as a way o f making it clear that in emphasizing the value of discussion, I do not in the least want to suggest that discussion can be substituted for political agitation, or that agitation is in any way inferior to discussion. They are different, that is all different, even though it may be in the course of our political action that we first of all embark upon discussion. It is sometimes objected to the discussion group method that it doesnt get you anywhere, in the sense that even if your group does decide, for example, that it approves of a certain type of post-war building scheme, you are no nearer getting it. O f course you arent. A discussion group is not a political party; to exert political pressure you will need to agitate, to go out looking for supporters, to join and work within organizations which have political power. Discussion is only one stage in your political life; just as, I suggested, it can be only one stage in your education. But it can be a most important stage, if it puts you in command of the relevant facts, if it helps you to see what your own position is, and with what obstacles it will need to contend. The indirect political consequences of discussion can be very great, even though,, by itself, it is politically powerless. W hether your object is to develop your cultural life, or whether it is to bring into effect political changes (these two, of course, may be closely connected with one another) in either case, discussion has its place and its value.

A P P E N D IX
H
ere

a r e a g e n c ie s y o u m ig h t g e t

in to u c h w it h , i f y o u w a n t

t o f o r m d is c u s s io n g r o u p s :

The W orkers Educational Association. The Department of Tutorial Classes, or the Extension Board, in the various Universities. The Organizer o f -Listening Groups, Australian Broad casting Commission, Sydney. The Executive Officer, Documentary Films Committee of N .S .W ., The Public Library, Sydney.

95

Brown, P rior, Anderson P ty . L td.

One S hilling and Sixpence N d