CHAPTER7

CaliforniaPolicyOptions2014
UCLALuskinSchoolofPublicAffairs

InformalParkingonSidewalks: TheBrokenWindowsEffect

DonaldShoup

DonaldShoupisaprofessorofUrbanPlanningattheUCLALuskinSchoolofPublicAffairs. HehasservedasdirectoroftheInstituteofTransportationStudies andchairoftheUrbanPlanningDepartmentatUCLA.

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Citiesregulateeveryaspectofparking,usingeverythingfromtimelimitsforonstreetparkingtozoning requirementsforoffstreetparking.Citiesalsoemploylegionsofparkingenforcementofficerstoensure thatdriversobeytheseregulations,andticketsforparkingviolationsareamajorrevenuesource.Los Angeles,forexample,earned$134millionfromparkingticketsin2011(CityofLosAngeles2012:307).If somuchparkingisformal,regulated,andpoliced,whatthenisinformalparking?Whatdowelearn aboutthepracticeofinformalparkingandaboutbetterformalparkingpolicyfromtheneighborhood aroundUCLA?

InformalParking Informalparkingmarketsoperateoutsidetheregulatedsystem,andtheyfillmarketnicheshardto serveinanyformalway.TheyoftenappearneartheLosAngelesColiseum,forexample,where residentschargenonresidentstoparkintheirdrivewaysongamedays.Driversmayhavetowalkafew blockstothestadium.Butafterthegametheycanleavefromaresidentialdrivewaymuchfasterthan theycanleavefromalargestadiumlotthattakesalongtimetoclearwheneveryonetriestoexitatthe sametime.Theresidentsparktheirowncarsonthestreetandrentspaceontheirdrivewaystoticket holders,someofwhomareregularcustomers.DriversmaythinkthatpayingforparkingisunAmerican, butresidentswhoreceivetherevenueknowthatpayingforwhatyouuseisatraditionalAmerican value. Nonetheless,informalparkingcancreateproblems.Whereonstreetparkingisunderpricedand overcrowded,manydriversfeeltheyhavenoalternativetoillegalparking.Forexample,theLosAngeles TimesdescribesthechaoticinformalparkinginMexicoCity:Carsdominatenearlyeverysquareinchof MexicoCityspublicspace.Vehicleownersdoubleandtripleparkonthestreets,tosaynothingof curbs,sidewalks,gardens,alleys,boulevardsandbikepaths(Dickerson2004:26). Thisanythinggoesinformalparkingismorecommonindevelopingcountries,butdriversalsoparkon sidewalksinsomeCaliforniacities,althoughitisclearlyillegal: Nopersonshallstop,park,orleavestandinganyvehiclewhetherattendedor unattended...onanyportionofasidewalk,orwiththebodyofthevehicleextending overanyportionofasidewalk(CaliforniaVehicleCode22500).

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Despitethislegalprohibition,LosAngeleshasadoptedapolicyofrelaxedenforcementofthelaw againstparkingonsidewalks.1Theinformalcustomofparkingonthesidewalkhasevolvedinsome neighborhoodsinresponsetoashortageoffreeparkingspacesonthestreetsandthecitysfailureto enforcethelaw.

InformalparkingonthesidewalksinNorthWestwoodVillage Ibegantostudyinformalparkingonsidewalksin2005whenteachingacourseonUrbanTransportation EconomicsatUCLA.ManyofthestudentslivedinNorthWestwoodVillage,aneighborhoodnextto campus.Theymentionedthatdriversoftenparkontheapronsofdriveways(thepavedareabetween thesidewalkandthestreet),withpartofthecarextendingoverthesidewalk(Figure1).Parking enforcementofficersignoredthisviolationbecausetheNorthVillageisastudentareaanditscity councilmemberhadrequestedrelaxedenforcement.

Figure1.CarsparkedonthesidewalkinNorthWestwoodVillage

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Mostcarsaretoolongtoparkentirelyontheapron,andmanydriversparkwiththefrontofthecar extendingoverthesidewalk.Somealsoparkonthedrivewaywiththebackofthecarextendingover thesidewalk(andnopartofthecarontheapron).Nomatterhowfarthecarsextendoverthesidewalk fromeithertheapronorthedriveway,driverscallitapronparking.

TheBrokenWindowsEffect Unfettered parking over the sidewalk is a good example of what George Kelling and James Wilson referredtoasthebrokenwindowstheoryofurbandisorder: Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. . . . one unrepaired brokenwindowisasignalthatnoonecares,andsobreaking morewindows costsnothing(KellingandWilson,1982). Ifwesubstitutecarsparkedonsidewalksforbrokenwindows,NorthWestwoodVillageillustratesthis theory:Whereenforcementofficersdonotticketthefirstcarsparkedonthesidewalk,moredriverswill parkonthesidewalk.Eventually,driverswillparkonsidewalksthroughouttheneighborhood.Because thecityhasrelaxedparkingenforcement,aninformalparkingmarkethastakenoverthesidewalks.

InformalProtocols NorthVillageresidentshavedevelopedseveralinformalprotocolsfordealingwithapronparking.For example,ifcarsareparkedontheapron,howdoresidentswhoparkinthegarageofanapartment buildinggetout?Tosolvethisproblem,someapronparkersexchangecarkeysandcanmoveapron parkedcarsblockingthedriveway.Theyalsotexteachotheraboutanyplanstousetheircars,sothat ownerscanmoveapronparkedcarsthatareblockingsomeonewhowantstoleave. Ondayswhenparkingisprohibitedononesideofthestreetfortheweeklystreetcleaning,everycar illegallyparkedonthesideofthestreetbeingcleanedusuallygetsaticket.Carsillegallyparkedoverthe sidewalkontheothersideofthestreet,however,rarelyreceiveaticket.Theparkingenforcement officersselectivelyticketstreetcleaningviolationsandignoreparkingonthesidewalks.Ifanapron parkedcarextendsintothestreetonthesidebeingcleaned,however,italwaysreceivesastreet cleaningticket.InNorthWestwoodVillage,parkedcarsaremoreimportantthanpedestrians.

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TheMagnitudeoftheProblem MystudentsbegantostudytheinformalparkingproblemsintheNorthVillage.Theycountedparking spacesandparkedcars,analyzedcensusdata,interviewedresidentsandpropertyowners,and documentedthesituationwithmanyphotographs.Table1summarizestheirfindingsaboutapron parkingintheNorthVillage.2 Table1

Thestudentscounted205carsparkedonthedrivewayaprons.The2000Censusshowedthat11,021 residentsliveintheNorthVillageandtheyown5,879cars.Thissuggeststhatonly3.5percentofthe residentscarsareparkedontheaprons(2055,879),andonly1.9percentofresidentsparktheircars onanapron(20511,021).Althoughonlyatinyminorityofresidentsparkontheaprons,theircars extendoverthesidewalksoneveryblock. PopulationTurnover

Apopulationshifttowardresidentswhodonotownacarcanhappenquickly.The2000Censusfound thatalmosthalftheresidentsintheNorthVillagehadnotlivedthereoneyearbefore.Apopulation turnoverof50percentperyearisunderstandablebecausestudentapartmentsnaturallyhaveahigh turnoverrate.AndlivingintheNorthVillagewithoutacarismanageablebecauseitisashortwalkto campus.Anyonewhoownsacarneedsaparkingspace,butnoteveryoneneedsaparkingspace

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becausenoteveryoneownsacar.Ifonly205residentswithoutcarsreplaceresidentswhoparkonthe aprons,thereductioninparkingdemandwillbeenoughtoclearthesidewalksofparkedcars. Sincetherearenotenoughapronparkingspotsforalltenantswhowantone,landlordseithercharge tenantsforparkingontheaprons(usuallyabout$50amonth)orgivethempermissiontoapronpark whentheyleaseanapartment(andpresumablychargehigherrentfortheprivilege).Iflandlordscould nolongerrentapronparkingspacestotenants,carownerswouldfindapartmentswithoutoffstreet parkinglessdesirable. SomeonewhoownsacarandcannotfindanapartmentintheNorthVillagewithoffstreetparking shouldnotexpecttoparkonthesidewalk.Anyonewhocannotgetalongwithoutacarmightfindthat anotherpartoftownwithmoreoffstreetparkingwouldbeabetterplacetolive,andastudentwho doesnotownacarcanthenrenttheNorthVillageapartmentwithoutoffstreetparking.Asaresult, moreapartmentswouldbecomeavailableatlowerrentstostudentswithoutcars.Clearingcarsoffthe sidewalkswouldalsomaketheNorthVillagemorewalkable.

Politicalsupportforapronparking MichaelDukakis,formerGovernorofMassachusettsandDemocraticcandidateforPresidentin1988, livesintheNorthVillagewhenheteachesintheLuskinSchoolofPublicAffairsatUCLAduringthe winter.Hewalkstocampus,andwasappalledtoseethechaosoneveryblockashethreadedhisway betweencarsonthesidewalks.Hecontactedcityofficialstoseekremediesbut,muchtohisdismay,was ignored.Nevertheless,duetohiscelebrity,Dukakisbecamenotoriousforprotestingapronparkingin theNorthVillage. Politicaluproarfollowed,atleastintheblogosphere.ResidentswhoapronparkedintheNorthVillage vilifiedDukakis(andoccasionallyme)inblogposts,manyscatologicalbutafewamusing.Apronparked carsarelikesquatters,andendinginformalbutillegalsquattingisdifficultonceithasbecome established.AsOliverWendellHolmessaid,Athingwhichyouenjoyedandusedasyourownforalong time,whetherpropertyoranopinion,takesrootinyourbeingandcannotbetornawaywithoutyour resentingtheactandtryingtodefendyourself,howeveryoucamebyit(Holmes1897).Whenitcomes toparking,informaldoesnotmeaneasilychanged.

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Manypeoplehaveastakeinapronparkinganddonotwantittoend.Landlordswhonowrentapron parkingprivilegestotheirtenantswouldloserevenuetowhichtheyhavenolegitimateclaim.Residents havealsocometodependonapronparking,eveniftheyrealizetheyareblockingthesidewalks. TheAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct Informalparkingonthesidewalksmayseemsolelyalocalissue,butin2003,theU.S.SupremeCourt ruledthattheAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(ADA)appliedtosidewalks.ThedecisioninBardenv. Sacramentorequirescitiestomakepublicsidewalksaccessibletothedisabled.Becauseofthisruling, citiesmustremovebarriersthatblockaccessforpeoplewithdisabilities.3Thisdecisionhascreateda seriousliabilityforLosAngelesbecausethecityhasinformallyalloweddriverstoparktheircarsonthe sidewalksinNorthWestwoodVillage,althoughitviolatesbothCaliforniaandLosAngeleslaw. TwoADAlawsuitsagainstthecityhavespurredreform.Bothlawsuitsdealwithbrokensidewalksand carsparkedonthesidewalks.TheleadplaintiffinonewasaUCLAstudentwhousesawheelchairand hadtomakealongdetouronthewaytocampusbecausecarsparkedonthesidewalksprevented takingtheshortestroutethroughtheNorthVillage(Pesce2007).Thelawsuitalleges: Duetohismobilitydisability,NamedPlaintiffVictorPinedausesamotorized wheelchair.PlaintiffPinedaisagraduatestudentatUCLAandlivesinresidentialNorth WestwoodVillage...PlaintiffPinedahasconsistentlyexperiencedapronparkingona numberofsidewalks...Thenarrowspacesbetweenthevehiclesonthesidewalk preventPlaintiffPinedafromtravelingalongthesidewalk.Asaresult,PlaintiffPineda oftenmusttravelonthestreettoreachhisdestination,literallyriskinghislife.4

Afteryearsofneglect,lawsuitshaveforcedthecitytoreconsidertheinformalpolicyofrelaxed enforcementforapronparkingviolations,andtodecideexactlywhatshouldbelegalandwhatshould not.5 Regularizingapronparking BecauseoftheADAlawsuits,citystaffproposedallowingapronparkingthatdoesnotextendoverthe sidewalkortoofarintothestreet.Figure2illustratestheproposal.6Carsparkedontheapronscould extendontothestreetasfarasthewidthoftheparkinglane,andcarscouldalsoparallelparkonthe streetinfrontoftheaproniftheyhaveapermit.Parkingwithpartofthecarextendingoverthe sidewalkorintothestreetbeyondtheparkinglanewouldremainillegal.

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Figure2.ProposalforlegalapronparkinginLosAngeles. TheeasiestreformisillustratedbyVehicle7inthefigureparallelparkinginfrontofonesown

driveway.Somecitiesalreadysellpermitsthatallowresidentstoparallelparkonthestreetinfrontof theirowndriveway.Parallelparkingonthestreetinfrontofadrivewaydoesnotaccommodateasmany carsasperpendicularapronparkingdoes,buttheparkedcarsdonotextendoverthesidewalkorinto thestreetbeyondtheparkinglane.Residentscanusetheseblockyourowndrivewaypermitsto provideguaranteedparkingforguests,homehelp,andservicevehicles.7 ParallelparkinginfrontofadrivewayisillegalinLosAngeles,butenforcementofficersdonot

issuecitationsinfrontofsinglefamilyhousesunlesssomeonecomplainsanotherexampleofrelaxed enforcement.Parallelparkinginfrontofanapartmentbuildingsdrivewayposesdifficulties,however, becauseitcanblockalltheresidentscarsparkedoffstreet.Nevertheless,itmayworkifresidents cooperatebysharingkeystotheparallelparkedcarsthatblockthedriveway. Formalrulesforapronparkingcancuretheproblemofinformalparkingonthesidewalksonlyif

thecityenforcestheserulesconsistently,butLosAngelesproposedapronparkingruleswouldbehard toenforce.Thecitymustfirstestablishcriteriaforcitingcarsthatextendtoofaroverthesidewalk(from theapronorthedriveway)ortoofarintothestreet.Howfaristoofar?Ifapronparkingismadelegal forvehicles5and6inFigure2,parkingenforcementofficerscannotseefromtheirpatrolcarswhether

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anyofvehicles2,3,4,5,and6illegallyextendoverthesidewalk.Inthisscenario,theyhavetogetoutof theircarstoexamineeachvehicle.

Easingthepathtoformality GiventhethreatofADAlawsuitsoverinaccessiblesidewalks,allcitiesthatinformallyallowillegal parkingonsidewalkswillneedtofindwaystomitigatethewithdrawalpainscausedbyenforcingthe law.Fortunately,LosAngeleshasalreadyestablishedoneprogramthatpromisestoeasethepathto formality:dedicatingcurbparkingspacesforsharedcars.8 Carsharingsgreatestbenefitistodividethefixedcostsofautomobileownership(includingparking) amongagroupofpotentialusers.Becauseallresidentshaveaccesstothesharedcars,the neighborhoodbecomesmoreattractivetoeveryonewhodoesnotownacar.SharedcarsintheNorth Villagecouldservetheapproximately5,000residentswhodonotownacar,attractevenmore residentswhodonotownacar,andtherebyreducethedemandforcurbparking.Inpublicmeetings, however,someresidentswhoparkonthestreetvehementlyopposedcarsharingbecauseofthelossof curbparking. ReducingParkingDemand Despitethisopposition,thecitycontractedwithZipcar,acarsharingcompany,toplaceitscarsonthe streets.ThecityhasdedicatedsevenonstreetspacesintheNorthVillagetoZipcar,andthecompany hasobtainedfourmoreoffstreetspaces.Thesurveyofonstreetparkingfound857legalcurbspacesin theNorthVillage(seeTable1).Whilethesharedcarsremovesevencurbspacesfromtheparkingsupply (0.8%ofthetotalcurbspaces),theyprobablyreduceparkingdemandbymanymorespacesbyreducing thedemandforprivatecars.Severalstudieshaveestimatedthateachsharedcarreplacesbetween9 and13privatecars(Osgood,2010;MartinandShaheen,2011),sothe11sharedcarsintheNorth Villagemayhavereducedthedemandforparkingbybetween99and143spaces.Thesharedcarscan thusreduce,ratherthanincrease,thecompetitionforcurbparking. Similaroppositiontocarsharingarosein2010whenHoboken,NewJersey,reservedcurbspacesat cornersthroughoutthecityfor42sharedcars,sothat90percentofthepopulationliveswithinafive minutewalkofasharedcar.ThecityestimatedthateachCornerCarwouldreplace17privatecars, butsomeresidentsstronglyopposedthelossofcurbparking:

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Atthebeginningoftheprogram,42ofthecitysroughly9,000onstreetspaceswere sacrificedtoacitycarsharingprogram,knownasCornerCars,leadingmanyresidents todecrythearrivalofnewvehiclesontheirblocks,whereclaimstocurbsidespacehave longbeenregardedassacrosanct....AsofJuly2012,nearlyaquarteroftheprograms roughly3,000memberssaidtheyhadgivenuptheircarsordecidedagainstbuyingone becauseofthecarshare.Since2009,thenumberofpeoplewithresidentialparking permitshasdecreasedbyabout1,000,to16,000totalparkingpermits(Flegenhimer 2012). WecanusetheHobokendatatoestimatehowdedicating42curbspacestosharedcarsreducedthe demandforparking.Ifaquarterofthe3,000carsharemembersshedonecar,eachsharedcarreplaces 18privatecars(75042).Andifcarsharingexplainsthe1,000fewerresidentialparkingpermits,each sharedcarreducesthedemandforcurbparkingby24spaces.Allocatingafewcurbspacesexclusivelyto sharedcarscanthusimproveparkingevenforresidentswhoparktheircarsonthestreet. Likepeertopeerparkingreservations,carsharingisanotherexampleofcollaborativeconsumption basedonsharingratherthanowningresources.Becausesharingacaralsomeanssharingaparking space,itcangreatlyreducethedemandforparking.Theinternetiskeytotheeaseoffindingand reservingthesharedcars,sothegrowingubiquityofsmartphoneshelpstoexplainthegrowing popularityofcarsharing.Thewebbasedformalmarketforcarsharingmaythuseventuallyhelpto resolvetheproblemscausedbyinformalparkingonsidewalks.

Aformalparkingmarketforcurbparking ThelossofapronparkingintheNorthVillagewillincreasethealreadyhighdemandforcurbparking. ManystudentssaytheparkingshortagealreadymakeslifeintheNorthVillagemiserable.Residents whorelyoncurbparkingsaytheyhavetoplantheirlivesaroundfindingaparkingspot,andtheyoften cruisefor20minutestofindacurbspace.Visitorsalsofinditfrustratingtohuntforacurbspacewhen visitingtheNorthVillage. To address these problems, Los Angeles can allow the residents of any block in North Westwood Village to adopt an Overnight Parking Permit District that prohibits overnight parking on the street except by permitholders. Enforcement officers need to make only one visit during a night to cite all cars parked without permits. Los Angeles charges residents $15 per year (less than half a cent per day) for each permitinanOvernightParkingPermitDistrict.Residentscanalsobuyguestpermitsfor$1pernight.

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RationingorMarketPricing Given the high residential demand for onstreet parking in North Westwood Village, the demand for overnight permits priced at $15 a year will greatly exceed the supply of onstreet parking spaces. The city can keep the permit price low and limit the number of permits in some way, such as by a lottery. Alternatively, the city can charge a fair market price for the permits, so the number of permits demandedwillequalthesupplyofonstreetparkingspaces. SupposeLosAngeleschargesthesamepriceforaNorthVillageparkingpermitthatUCLAcharges studentsforaparkingpermitinthenearbycampusresidencehalls$89amonth.Ifthecitycharges$89 amonth(about$3aday)for857overnightpermits(equaltothenumberofonstreetparkingspacesin theNorthVillage),thenewrevenuewillamounttoabout$76,000amonth(857x$89),or$915,000a year.Ifthedemandforpermitspricedat$89amonthismoreorlessthanthe857curbparkingspaces, thecitycannudgethepriceupordown.Therightpricefortheovernightpermitsisthelowestpricethat willpreventashortageofcurbparking.

DirectingParkingRevenuetoLocalNeeds Chargingforcurbparkingwillneverbepoliticallypopular,butresidentswillbeabletofindacurbspace moreeasily.Toincreasetheacceptabilityofthismarketbasedsolution,thecitycouldspendallthenew parkingrevenuetoimprovepublicservicesintheNorthVillage.Thecitycouldusetherevenuetorepair brokensidewalks,plantstreettrees,andfillpotholesallofwhichtheNorthVillageneeds.Thesepublic improvementswouldgreatlyincreasethelivabilityoftheNorthVillage,andcouldsatisfythecitys impendingobligationtomakethesidewalksaccessibleforthedisabled. TherevenuefromparkingpermitscouldquicklypaytorepairallthesidewalksintheNorthVillage. Becauseitusuallycostslessthan$20persquarefoottoreplacesidewalksinLosAngeles,theparking revenueof$915,000peryearwouldpaytoreplaceatleast46,000squarefeetofsidewalkperyear. BecausethesidewalksintheNorthVillagearefivefeetwide,therevenuewouldpaytorepairatleast 9,000linearfeet,or1.7miles,ofsidewalkperyear.TheNorthVillagehasaboutfivemilesofsidewalks, soaboutthreeyearsofparkingrevenuewouldprobablybeenoughtocompletelyrenewallthe sidewalks.Replacingonlythedamagedpartsofthesidewalkswouldofcoursecostmuchlessandwould becompletedmuchfaster. Somemayobjectthatchargingforcurbparkingandgivingticketstocarsparkedonthesidewalkswould

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place an unfair burden on many lowincome students who live inthe North Village. But if drivers can no longerparkonthesidewalksandhavetopayforparkingonthestreet,fewerpeoplewithcarswillwant to rent apartments without parking. Rents may decline, but people without cars will then rent the apartments.Thatdoesnotseemunfairtostudentswhoaretoopoortoownacar.

CrimeReduction Inadditiontofixingsidewalks,thecitycouldalsousethenewparkingrevenuetoincreasepolicepatrols intheNorthVillage.In2012,this17blockneighborhoodexperiencedthreerapes,15robberies,20 aggravatedassaults,58burglaries,and89larcenythefts(seeFigures3and4).9Iamnotsayingthatthe citysfailuretoenforcethelawagainstapronparkingcausesanyofthiscrime.Iamsayingthatusingthe revenuefromchargingmarketpricesforcurbparkingcanreducesomeofthiscrime.Whichpolicywill makeNorthWestwoodVillageabetterplacetolive:freeparking,brokensidewalks,andhighcrime,or paidparking,goodsidewalks,andasaferneighborhood?

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Figure3.ViolentCrimesinNorthWestwoodVillagein2012 Evendriverswhoparkonthestreetcanbebetteroffwithpaidparking,foratleastthreereasons.First, overnightparkingpermitswillguaranteethemonstreetparkingspacesinconvenientlocations.Second, theircarswillbesafer.Inadditiontothecrimeslistedabove,fourcarswerestolenandsixwerebroken intointheNorthVillagein2012.Third,thedriverswillbesaferwhilewalkingfromtheirstreetparking

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Figure4.PropertyCrimesinNorthWestwoodVillagein2012

spacestotheirresidences.Ifthechoiceisbetweenfreeparkingandhighcrime,orpaidparkingand morepoliceprotection,eventhesmallminorityofNorthVillageresidentswhoparkonthestreetmay preferpaidparking.

DaytimeParking Overnight parking permits will not solve all the curb parking problems in the North Village. Commuters to UCLA, for example, may try to park free in the North Village during the day. In this case, the city can

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add a daytime permit district on blocks that request it. If the residents agree, the city can also allow nonresidents to pay for parking on blocks that have daytime vacancies, and the revenue will pay for evenbetterpublicservices. Dedicatingparkingrevenuetotheneighborhoodthatgeneratesithasbuiltpoliticalsupportforpaid parkinginothercities(KolozsvariandShoup2003;Shoup2011).The857motoristswhoparkonthe streetsovernightwillpayafairmarketpricefortheirpermits,buttheywillalsofinditmucheasierto findacurbspace.Alltherestofthe11,000peoplewholiveintheNorthVillagewillpaynothing,butwill liveinabetterneighborhood.

Thesoundofchange AsolutiontotheproblemscreatedbyapronparkinginNorthVillagewillhavelongtermeconomicand environmentalbenefitsbutalsoshorttermpoliticalcosts.AsNiccolMachiavelliwroteinThePrincein 1532,Thereisnothingmoredifficulttoplanormoreuncertainofsuccessormoredangeroustocarry outthananattempttointroducenewinstitutions,becausetheintroducerhasashisenemiesallthose whoprofitfromtheoldinstitutions,andhasaslukewarmdefendersallthosewhowillprofitfromthe newinstitutions.OrasWoodrowWilsonsaidalmost400yearslater,Ifyouwanttomakeenemies,try tochangesomething. Mostpeoplewantsustainablecities,greatpublictransportation,lesstraffic,andmorewalkable neighborhoods.Buttheyalsowantfreeparking,whichconflictswithalltheseothergoals.Fortunately, fewpeoplewillhavetogiveupacarifthecityenforcesthelawagainstparkingonthesidewalksinthe NorthVillage.Instead,afewcarownerswilldecidethattheNorthVillageisnotthebestplacetohunt foranapartment,andpeoplewhocannotaffordacarwilltaketheirplace.Duringthetransition,the whiningwillbethesoundofchange.

Conclusion:Turningtheproblemintoanopportunity Informalparkingmarketsoftenrespondtothefailureofcitiestocreateformalmarketsforonstreet parking.Evenonsomeofthemostvaluableland,citiesofferfreecurbparkingonafirstcomefirst servedbasis.Indenseneighborhoods,suchasthosesurroundingUCLA,howcouldinformalmarketsfor thisfreeparkingnotemerge?

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Ifcurbparkingisfree,entrepreneurswillfindwaystocreateinformalmarketsthatservedriverswho arewillingtopayforconvenience.Theseinformalmarketsrespondtotheproblemscausedalmost entirelybyfreecurbparking.Theshortageoffreecurbparkingisnotmerelyaproblem,however.Itis alsoanopportunitytocreateaformalmarketwithfairpricesthatallocatelandforparkingefficiently: parkingreformislandreform.Afair,formalmarketforonstreetparkingwillreducetrafficcongestion, airpollution,andgreenhousegasemissions,andwillgenerateamplepublicrevenue. FairmarketpricescouldendtheHundredYearsWaroverfreecurbparkinginWestwoodandsimilar urbanareas.Thenewparkingrevenuecouldprovideapeacedividendtorebuildneglectedpublic infrastructure.Livable,walkablecitiesareworthfarmorethanfreeparkingonthestreetsand sidewalks.

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References CityofLosAngeles.2012.BudgetfortheFiscalYear201213.Accessedfrom http://cao.lacity.org/budget1213/201213Proposed_Budget.pdf.AccessedOctober18,2012. Dickerson,Marla.2004.MexicosEconomyIsVrooming.LosAngelesTimes,December26.Accessed fromhttp://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/26/business/fimexcars26. Flegenheimer,Matt.2012.DataShowaCitysCarSharingMayBeWorking,butDoubtsPersist.New YorkTimes,September2.Accessedfromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/nyregion/carsharing gambleinhobokenhasmixedreactions.html. Gonzalez,David.2008.DontBoxMeIn,DoubleParker.NewYorkTimes.September10. Accessedfromhttp://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/10/themoraltheologyofdoubleparking/. Holmes,OliverWendellJr.1897.ThePathoftheLaw10HarvardLawReview457. Kelling,GeorgeandJamesQ.Wilson,BrokenWindows,TheAtlantic,March1982. Accessedfromwww.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenwindows/304465/. Kolozsvari,Douglas,andDonaldShoup.2003.TurningSmallChangeintoBigChanges.Access23:27. Martin,Elliott,andSusanShaheen.2011.TheImpactofCarsharingonHouseholdVehicleOwnership. Access38:2227. Olsson,Marie,andGeraldMiller.1979.TheImpactonCommutersofaResidentialParkingPermit Program.Washington,D.C.:TheUrbanInstitute. ONeill,Natalie.2012.DoormenAccusedofHoggingParkingSpotsinSlopeParkingRing. TheBrooklynPaper.February16.Accessedfrom http://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/35/7/dtg_parkingring_2012_02_17_bk.html. Osgood,Andrea.2010.OnStreetParkingSpacesforSharedCars.Access36:813. Pesce,Anthony.2007.Apronparkingrestrictsdisabledstudents.TheDailyBruin,July30.Accessed fromhttp://dailybruin.com/2007/07/29/anthony/. Shoup,Donald.2010.PuttingCitiesBackonTheirFeet.JournalofUrbanPlanningandDevelopment 36(3):225233. Shoup,Donald.2011.TheHighCostofFreeParking.Chicago:PlannersPress.

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Endnotes 1. SanFranciscoalsohasaninformalpolicyofnotcitingcarsparkedonthesidewalkifthecars leavesomeroomforpedestrianaccess: http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/ParkingOnSidewalksInSanFrancisco.pdf. 2. Thestudentsresearchisavailableonlineat: www.its.ucla.edu/shoup/NorthWestwoodVillageDatav3.pdf. 3. Shoup(2010)explainsADArequirementsforsidewalkaccessibility.

4. Pages811inthelawsuit,Pinedavs.CityofLosAngeles: www.its.ucla.edu/shoup/PinedaVsCityOfLosAngeles.pdf.Thesecondlawsuitthatinvolvesapronparking onsidewalksisWillitsvs.CityofLosAngeles: http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/WillitsVsLosAngeles.pdf. 5. WhenIfirstlearnedthattheADArequiresaccessiblesidewalks,IwrotetotheLosAngelesCity AttorneytoexplaintheinformalparkingproblemsinNorthWestwoodVillage,andaskedhimifthecity wouldbegintoenforcethelawagainstparkingonsidewalks.Perhapsnaively,Iexpectedananswer. WhenIreceivednoanswer,IwrotetoLosAngelesCitycouncilmembers,theMayor,andtheDeputy MayorforTransportation(whowasaformerstudent),butneverreceivedasinglereplytoanyofmy30 lettersandemailmessages.Thiscorrespondenceisavailableonlineat: www.its.ucla.edu/shoup/ParkingOnSidewalksInNorthWestwoodVillage.pdf.. 6. MemofromtheLosAngelesDepartmentofTransportationtotheCityCouncil,Apron Parking/ParkinginFrontofDriveways,November7,2011: http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/ApronParkingReform.pdf. 7. HermosaBeach,forexample,issuespermitsfordriverstoblocktheirowndriveways: http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/HermosaBeachDrivewayParkingPermit.pdf. 8. SeeOsgood(2010)foranexplanationofhowcitiesallocateonstreetparkingtosharedcars.

9. I am grateful to Jonathan Kwan in the University of California Police Department for providing thesecrimestatistics.

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