Is there any aesthetic difference between an original artwork and a perfect forgery?

In this essay, I will be arguing that there is an aesthetic difference between an original artwork and a perfect forgery but the difference cannot be associated with a single factor such as originality or level of achievement. I will proceed by critically analysing responses to the problem of forgery as outlined by Kulka, Lessing and Dutton1. I will conclude that the nature of the aesthetic difference is most satisfactorily explained by Irvin's argument that forgeries betray a corruption of the 'aesthetic understanding' established by original artworks Irvin, !""#$. %he problem of forgery is most apparent when we consider cases where an existing artwork has been perfectly copied 'referential forgeries' &Levinson, !"''($ or where a new artwork is convincingly misattributed to an artist other than the creator 'inventive forgeries' &Levinson, !"''($2. ) fre*uently used example is van +eegeren's Christ and the Disciples at Emmaus, an inventive forgery imitating ,ermeer's style, lauded by )braham -redius one of the world's foremost experts on ,ermeer at the time$ to be '[t]he highest art... the masterpiece of Vermeer' -redius, './#$. It is clear that we would value an original ,ermeer differently to a van +eegeren forgeries0 the issue is whether the difference is a difference in aesthetic value or something else entirely. If the distinction is indeed aesthetic, what is the nature of that aesthetic difference1 Aesthetic value versus artistic value? %he issue is seemingly resolved by positing a distinction between 2aesthetic value3 and 2artistic value3 or 2art4historical value3$. Kulka argues that when we 5udge an artwork's aesthetic value, we are assessing it exclusively by its perceivable *ualities 6 shapes, colours, audible sounds etc. 7hen we 5udge an artwork's artistic value, we are assessing it by contextual considerations, such as sociocultural and historical significance and the intention of the artist Kulka, '.8!$. )ccording to this view, there is no purely aesthetic difference between an original artwork and an identical perfect forgery. It is an attractive solution because the problem of the aesthetic status of forgeries seems to dissolve. 9or example, The Disciples' aesthetic value as a forgery would remain the same and the critics would still be 5ustified in praising the painting for its technical mastery. %here is however, a difference in artistic value 6 an original ,ermeer would surpass any referential or imitative ,ermeer forgery, however skilful, because the forgery would lack among other factors$ the ingenuity, originality and historical of original ,ermeer paintings. :onse*uently, Kulka's system makes the differences in value between original artworks and forgeries explicit and potentially *uantifiable, without needing to resort to comparing them under the same umbrella term of 2aesthetic value3.

Due to the purposes of this essay, I will choose to omit an analysis of Sagoffs account and treat original artworks and forgeries as fundamentally comparable.
2

In both these cases, it is assumed for an artwork to be a forgery, there has to be an intentional attempt made to deceive and pass the work off as an original.

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;owever, this distinction between aesthetic and artistic value can be re5ected for a number of reasons. 7hile an artwork's perceivable *ualities and its socio4historical context can be separated in principle, in practical terms it is a near impossible exercise to undertake within the scope of art criticism. %his is best illustrated by recent developments in modern and contemporary art e.g. the emergence and popularity of conceptual art. It seems nonsensical to 5udge artworks separately based on their perceivable *ualities when the very idea of the artwork may eschew the importance of these *ualities. <imilarly, Dutton argues that our aesthetic appreciation and the language we use to express it$ is inextricably connected with 'the experience of making'. 7e can still aesthetically en5oy a natural ob5ect, but any esteem conferred upon the experience e.g. 2admiring3 an ob5ect$ would be misplaced Dutton, '.8/$. %here are also plenty of artworks that do not necessarily have an 2aesthetic3 dimension 6 for example, it is not easy to distinguish the 2perceivable *ualities3 of literature such as novels or poems, yet it would certainly be contentious to deny a work such as Paradise Lost has aesthetic value. 7hile categorical distinctions like Kulka's may superficially seem helpful, the reality is that they cause unnecessary confusion. Lessing on forgery Lessing's assessment of the aesthetic status of forgeries suffers from similar problems0 he argues that 'aestheticall it !ould seem to make no difference !hatever !hether The Disciples is a Vermeer or a van "eegeren' 6 if one considers a work to be aesthetically superior on account of its genuineness, it is 'rather a piece of sno##er ' Lessing, '.=>$. Despite this categorical confusion, Lessing goes on to present a strong argument for the difference between an original artwork and a forger'. ;e argues that if the aesthetic difference does not lie in the empirical *ualities of the artworks, the difference must concern the originality of an artwork. <pecifically, it is the 'artistic novelt and achievement... of the totalit of artistic productions of one man or even one school' that sets original artworks aesthetically apart from perfect forgeries. ) perfect forgery 'represents the perfection of techni$ue !ith the a#sence of all originalit ' Lessing, '.=>$. 9undamental practices within art criticism seem to support this view. %he classification of artworks into different periods or genres in its very nature re*uires the comparison of artworks in terms of their development over time0 this development is easily characterised by the emergence of novel techni*ues and ideas. 9or example, the Impressionist movement is widely considered to be a ma5or development in art history. Impressionist artists, in part reacting to the rising popularity of photography, differentiated their artworks from both photographs and previous art by emphasising a sub5ective view of the sub5ects. It is convincing therefore to assert that the originality of the collective Impressionist techni*ues and ideas is what confers aesthetic value to the totality of the artistic productions of that school. %herein lies the aesthetic difference between an original artwork and a perfect forgery? the forgery is merely a physical reproduction par excellence of brush strokes and paint lacking in originality and conse*uently, it lacks aesthetic value. ;owever, Lessing's account seems to place too high an emphasis on originality. %he reproduction and incorporation of certain techni*ues and ideas is a 'time%honoured tradition' within all arts Irvin, !""#$. 9urthermore, it can also be argued that re4appropriating techni*ues and ideas is unavoidable in the creation of new art. %he pervasive nature of artistic ideas means that it is inevitable that every artwork will be somehow influenced by artworks
'

(or the purposes of this essay, the term )aesthetic* will henceforth refer to both perceivable +ualities and socio,historical conte-t.

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that preceded it. Irvin even suggests that in all artworks there is 'some degree of st listic reliance on past !orks in unavoida#le' Irvin, !""#$. 9or example, ,ermeer himself was undoubtedly influenced in some form or another by the works of his contemporaries. <imilarly, the Impressionist painters would have drawn from the techni*ues and ideas of preceding artists, as well as other Impressionists. %herefore, using originality as a benchmark for aesthetic value is implausible because of the difficulty involved in identifying whether ideas are truly original or not. Lessing is correct in identifying that there is an aesthetic difference between an artwork and a perfect forgery, but incorrect in associating the difference with the concept of originality. Dutton's reply Instead of focusing on forgeries lacking originality, Dutton argues that forgeries are aesthetically inferior because they misrepresent artistic achievement. Dutton claims that all arts are simultaneously creative and performative and every creation of an artwork involves a 2performance3 6 'a human activit !hich stands in some sense complete in itself'. :reating art involves solving problems and overcoming obstacles or challenges uni*ue to each individual artwork or artifact Dutton, '.8/$. ,iewers of art must therefore have a notion of the artistic intention of an artwork in order to 5udge whether the performance is fulfils it successfully or fails. If we do not understand the achievement, we are unable to make a reasoned and relevant aesthetic 5udgement. ) perfect forgery would be aesthetically different from an original artwork, not only because its origin has been misattributed, but more importantly because the achievement of the performance has been misrepresented. In this way, perfect forgeries arouse 'an overl positive assessment of its o!n value' because viewers are unable to accurately 5udge the achievement behind the artwork Irvin, !""#$. @n the other hand, it is also then possible and according to Dutton, rational$ to re4evaluate a forgery with the knowledge that it is a 2different3 kind of performance e.g. one could admire the forger's attention to detail. Dutton's account is more acceptable than Lessing's, not only because he makes a substantial case against the primacy of originality, but also because the appreciation of achievement which may include originality$ is an important factor to our aesthetic 5udgement of artworks. )s such, the account clearly explains the nature of our aesthetic appreciation for a great artwork as well as the reason for experiencing a forgery differently. <imilarly, it allows for the possibility that we may even come to admire the technical expertise of perfect forgeries 6 looking back on the van +eegeren case, one may be inclined to praise the dedication and skill of the forger because the understanding of the intention and subse*uent 5udgement of success or failure$ has been re4evaluated. Aonetheless, it is possible that Dutton places too much authority in the notion of artistic achievement. 7e have allowed that an artist's ability to overcome obstacles contributes to our aesthetic appreciation of a work, but it does not necessarily follow that the effort put it makes the work better. Irvin uses the example of a visually impaired artist who paints a fantastic artwork, albeit with tiny stylistic discrepancies 6 she concludes that the artist in this case would be less blame4worthy for the errors, but this should not lead us to interpret the work in a completely different way Irvin, !""#$. In addition, Dutton provides no explanation as to how we 5udge the achievement of works we are completely unfamiliar with. In order for an aesthetic 5udgement, we need to first assess the achievement of the piece0 to do that, we need to discern whether the piece was successful in carrying out its intention. ;owever, if the artwork is so removed from our experience we have no conception as to its intention or idea, we cannot be expected to arrive at a 5ustifiable aesthetic 5udgement. %he problem is worsened

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if we consider a perfect forgery of such an artwork 6 without the ability to assess the aesthetic value of the original artwork, how would we be able to discern any aesthetic difference between the original and the forgery1 ) reply could be that there would never be an artwork, let alone a forgery, so removed from our experience that we had no frame of reference for it 6 even if there existed such an artwork, the sensible route of en*uiry would be to learn more about the work from individuals more experienced than us. )dmittedly, these criticisms are relatively insignificant compared to the account as a whole. Bet even if we allow that aesthetic 5udgements are based primarily on assessing the artist's achievement, Dutton's account fails to acknowledge a larger and more important problem with the concept of forgeries in general. -oth Dutton and Lessing treat the issue of forgeries in an individualistic way, such that the discovery of the misrepresentation or misattribution of a forged artwork only has an effect on the way we perceive the forged artwork itself. If a forged artwork is more correctly represented e.g. as a painting of :hrist's Disciples at Cmmaus in the style of ,ermeer$, then the problem disappears. Irvin's theory disagrees and claims that the aesthetic difference cannot be easily identified with a single factor because forgeries cause harm in a wider way 6 they corrupt aesthetic understanding. Irvin and Aesthetic Understanding Irvin !""#$ defines 2aesthetic understanding3 as the capacity to? recognise aesthetically relevant *ualities in an artwork compare the aesthetic *ualities of multiple artworks 5udge the aesthetic merit of artworks situate the comparisons and 5udgements '!ithin a context of aesthetic considerations'

)s such, aesthetic understanding relies on both perceptual and cognitive capabilities. 7hen we encounter an original artwork, we do not automatically 2detect3 its aesthetic value 6 we make an aesthetic 5udgement based on our aesthetic understanding and pre4existing structures of knowledge and belief about artworks in general the 2context of aesthetic considerations3 mentioned above$. %herefore, it is essential for us to develop our aesthetic understanding. Irvin describes the process of development as a 2bootstrapping process3, whereby we place provisional 'aesthetic trust' defeasibly in artworks and art experts critics or the artist themselves$ and find our trust affirmed or undermined. 7e then gradually build up a network of both perceptual and conceptual knowledge about art. )s a result, our conception of art is formed from a complex web of relations between individual artworks such that a new development in our aesthetic understanding will affect our experience of every previous and future$ artwork. Irvin argues that the difference with forgeries is that they corrupt our existing aesthetic understanding, such that our ability to 2bootstrap3 is undermined and our aesthetic trust is misdirected. %he conse*uence is that we create artificial associations between the forgery and existing artworks we have experienced and gained knowledge about 6 for this reason, inventive forgeries are most misleading Irvin, !""#$. %herefore, the overall aesthetic difference between an original artwork and a perfect forgery is that an original artwork can add to our aesthetic understanding whereas a forgery, no matter how perfect, can only ever cause harm to the collective aesthetic understanding. Irvin's claims are appealing because they explain the more pervasive problem with forgeries as whole and links it into a system of aesthetic 5udgement and contextualisation 6 the aesthetic difference between an original artwork and a forgery is no longer a particular issue between particular artworks, but appropriately becomes an issue for our experience of art in

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general. ) particular strength of her account does not associate the aesthetic value of an artwork with a single factor, but instead posits a 5udgement based upon a myriad of connections and a mindful process of aesthetic knowledge development widely applicable across all art forms. 9or example, an advantage that her account has over Lessing's is that it manages to avoid the criticisms against originality outlined above0 the account works well with our notion of art criticism, particularly in areas where artistic cross4comparisons are necessary to fully appreciate an artwork e.g. symbolism4heavy artworks, musical motifs, literary themes. %he account also accurately acknowledges that a careful consideration of forgeries may reveal more about our existing relationships with artworks and hone our artistic sense. @ne might counter that Irvin relies too much on an abstract notion of relations and strays into theorising about our psychological notions of art without the providing the necessary evidence. -ut similarly, until her account is scientifically or otherwise$ disproved, it stands as a generally satisfactory account of our aesthetic conception of artworks and forgeries.

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ibliography
-redius, ). './#. ') Aew ,ermeer? :hrist and the Disciples at Cmmaus'. In The &urlington "aga'ine, ,ol. #'. Dutton, D. '.8/. ')rtistic :rimes'. In The (orger)s *rt+ (orger and the Philosoph of *rt, D. Dutton, ed. -erkeley? Dniversity of :alifornia Eress Irvin, <. !""#. '9orgery and the :orruption of )esthetic Dnderstanding'. In Canadian ,ournal of Philosoph , ,ol. /#, Ao. !. Kulka, %. '.8!. '%he )rtistic and )esthetic ,alue of )rt'. In Leonardo- ,ol. '>, Ao. !. :ambridge? +I% Eress. Lessing, ). '.=>. '7hat is 7rong with a 9orgery1'. In The ,ournal of *esthetics and *rt Criticism, ,ol. !/, Ao. F. 7iley4-lackwell. Levinson, G. !"''. "usic- *rt- *nd "etaph sics. @xford? @xford Dniversity Eress. Le7itt, <. '.=#. 'Earagraphs on :onceptual )rt'. In *rtforum. <agoff, +. '.#=. '%he )esthetic <tatus of 9orgeries'. In The ,ournal of *esthetics and *rt Criticism, ,ol. />, Ao. !. 7iley.

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