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The Epistemological Lifeboat

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The Epistemological Lifeboat

EpistemologyandPhilosophyofScienceforInformation Scientists
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Habermas'theoryofcommunicativeactionbyGerald
Benoit

Introduction To do justice to contemporary German social critic Jrgen HabermasmagisterialTheoryofCommunicativeActionrequires several booklength treatments. To understand how his broad critique of modern society, interactivity, science, and power mightopenoureyestonewviewsofinformationworkrequires, perhaps, loosening ones bounds to strict empiricism and being open to reading far and wide outside the traditional library, information science, and computer science literatures. The resultwillprovidethereaderwithalucidandviableworldview and grow a rich tree of ideas that apply to everything in information systems, interface design, information seeking behavior, and the sociology of knowledge. This review, naturally, cannot be all things to all readers and will not do justice to the subtly and fecundity of Habermas ideas, but it may provide a useful account of the development of the theory and suggest to the reader opportunities for applying it in informationwork. The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) is one part of Habermas long examination of positivist science, society, technology,andstrategicorinstrumentalactionsthatlimitones ability to perform successfully through linguistic means in the public sphere. By separating communication into several elements and focusing on the motivation behind speech, Habermas is able to articulate an entire speech act theory, sociallysensitive means of verification, and demonstrates with a variety of examples the use of power to control the knowledgebased emancipatory interests of individuals in modern, democratic societies thus the main theme of the TCA isthetheoreticalreconstructionofthecompetenciesthatpeople useineverycommunicationtoservetheseinterests. Habermastheoryonepistemologydifferentiatesthreecognitive areas in which human interest generates knowledge. These areas determine categories relevant to what we interpret as knowledge, that is, they are knowledge constitutive they determine the mode of discovering knowledge and whether knowledge claims can be warranted. These areas define cognitive interests or learning domains, and are grounded in
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different aspects of social existence work, interaction and power (MacIsaac, 2004). For Habermas, work is acting and using language instrumentally, typically based in the empiricalanalyticsciencespracticalinterestsarehumansocial interaction, or communicative action, governed by consensual norms, reciprocal expectations, and propositions that are valid only in their intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding of intentions, which are reflected in the historicalhermeneutic disciplines and, finally, emancipatory knowledge, that is, selfknowledge or reflection, involving recognizing ones own andothersmotivationsandappropriatereactiontoactions.The types of knowledge are generated and interpreted through speechacts. Communicationstheory Habermas begins the construction of his framework by dividing communication into social and nonsocial. The nonsocial operates on instrumental action and might be considered the linguisticfaceofreification.Theother,social,isalsobifurcated into strategic action, oriented to success by objectifying objects in the social world and seeking to manipulate them to supportonesowninterestsandcommunicativeaction,which aims at mutual understanding, by meaningful, intersubjective relationships. This is termed universal pragmatics because such competences transcendspecificculturesandsocietalboundaries.Thereisthe capacity for social actors to produce and to sustain stable, useful, ordered and meaningful social life. Integrating and critiquing many important thinkers, primary among them Kant, Marx, Popper, Husserl, Adorno, Mead, and Peirce, Habermas seekstoworkuptheconstitutivecapacitiesofthesocialagent by calling attention to the takenforgranted practical attributes of competent social agents in producing and sustaining society. Other authors have pursued the same but arerejectedbyHabermasbecausetheirviewsaremonological, overlooking the effects of human interaction, leading to subjectlessrulesystems. Playingagameisanexampleofsucharulesystem.Playersof agamerecognizeandrespondtotherulesofagame,knowing when a move is appropriate and when it is not, so Habermas incorporates Chomskys structuralism and Wittgensteins explanation of language games in how humans recognize appropriate language use. Wittgenstein states that there is a basiccompetencyabidingbytherulesbut,interestingly,one doesnotneedtoknowtherulesindetail.Peopleplayinggames knowhowratherthanknowthat.Innovelsituations,people respond successfully without needing to articulate the rules and that the rules differ in the cognitive role of language, e.g., to communicate facts about nonlinguistic world (e.g., its raining). Using language to describe the state of affairs in the world, e.g., it is raining if and only if it is [actually] raining leads some to think Habermas calls for a correspondence theory of truth. He is more concerned about the appropriateness and entailments of using such sentences in particular settings. Thus languagerulesforthereligiouscontextarenotthesameasfor sciencenorpoetrythesameasforjournalism,andsoon.What is entailed in making a true or even meaningful sentence is distinctive to that particular language game. In a simplistic example, to utter a sentence is one thing to utter that same
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sentence in response to a different language game and be successful means the speaker and hearer need to know the rules of that language and need to be able to relate to each other in concrete situations. It requires knowledge of when certain forms of questions and answers are appropriate. Moreover, it requires a kind of questioning to create mutually the context for a certain form of questioning and so establish the conditions in which the participants can reply meaningfully (Habermas,2001). Unlike other forms of communications or linguistic analysis where utterances are parsed into logical units, assigned truth values, and from that one determines the [logical] truth of the whole, as the logical atomists and positivists did and certain analytic philosophers of language do still, Habermas situates utterances in social theory: people act when they speak to othersincontextsparticipatesrecognize.Thespeechactbehind the surface of the utterance includes commitments or some aspect of the relationship between the interlocutors, e.g, questioning, promising, ordering, requesting, etc. For example, to say Ill meet you at the bar at 6 p.m. is partially informative[thespeakerintendstobeatthebarat6]butalso a normative commitment on the speakers part to the hearer [I promise Ill meet you at the bar at 6]. If the speaker does not appear at the restaurant at the agreed upon time, then the other person is owed (because of the relationship between them, the normative right) some kind of explanation or apology. Some of this type of behavior is already institutionalized. A religious figure (priest, rabbi, shaman, etc.) who pronounces two people as married brings those two people (and the congregation) into the shared religious community and also changesthesocialidentityofthenewlymarriedfolk.Thereare, then, various social, moral, religious, behavioral and social entailments in public speech acts. The theory is not aimed solely at the individual who is affected, but Habermas universal pragmatics is just that: a reconstruction of the conditions of successful interchange of all language users why not,then,wholesocieties,too? Habermas furthers his idea by considering what types of relationships that exist and recognizes the need to examine the role of cognitive language use. He uses the example of playing chess against a computer or against a human. There is no difference if the humanity of the human player is overlooked. Theinherenettelosofcommunicationismutualunderstanding between subjects here the mutual anticipation of each others intentions. [This is found also in communications theory where speakers will anticipate and so complete sentences for the other.] Keeping to the chess game, Habermas claims that a goodgamecanbestrategicbothsidesplayingtowinandbe enjoyable just by following the rules. Although the process can beginanddrawtoasuccessfulclosewithcheckmate,theremay be no literal communication between speaker/hearer. For instance, when discourse partners begin to misunderstand the others intentions during the game, then communication will breakdown,orwhenoneorbothsidesdisregardtherules.But communication may continue as language about the language: the players can stop the game to ask for clarification, or even to discuss whether they would agree on suspending play long enoughtoaskquestions. Ifthegameanalogydistortsrelationsbetweencommunicationit
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distortsalsotherelationshipbetweenthespeakerandlanguage because communicating partners are intersubjective speakers. Communicators can assess the legitimacy of the social connection as part of the very process of using them, but only so far as they acknowledge each other as competent subjects. Consider the case of a police officer trying to make a difficult arrest. The person being arrested might challenge the officer You cant arrest me... Im in my own house! As the countless television shows about police activity evidence, the officer will not engage in communication about the legitimacy of his actions: the normative right, his role, has already been established,albeittacitly,byboththeuniformedofficerandthe person being arrested. The relationship between officer and arrestee is established first by the officers role but not usually maintained communicatively: the officer acts strategically to achieve his end, choosing not to respond to some questions. That same officer, out of uniform, offduty, may not enter someones house and make an arrest. The potential arrestees demands for explanations are on a far stronger normative ground. RespondingpartiallytoJohnL.Austins(1962)andJohnSearles (1969, 1998) theory of speech acts (that people do things with words, to effect change or to describe something about the world), and from Kant (that language has a transcendental role in that language is not the reality but the possibility of our experience of reality (Habermas, 2001, p. 58)), and from other thinkers (that our language acts are interactions, perhaps our interaction or labor in the lifeworld), Habermas explains the cognitive role of language in providing both propositional content and illocutionary force. Habermas adopts part of Austins theory and reshapes it by incorporating the effect intersubjective action exerts over speech. Discourse partners aware of the norms of behavior between them can expect to pursue questions with the other person without necessarily rupturing their relationship and, importantly, by receiving an answer, a warrant, for the speakers claim to cashin the claim.Onecansay,forexample,Imthirsty,getmeaglassof wateramongfriendsintheappropriatediscoursesituation,say visiting ones home, and the hearer will respond by providing a glassofwater.Thesameutterancetoagraduatestudentduring alectureraisesdifferentbehaviors:areyousureyouwantme togetyouaglassofwater?Theresapitcherandglassrightin front of you. Or Im your research assistant, not your waiter Either way, discourse partners can remove the locus of attention from the surface or semantic level to the use of the utterance between them, that is the pragmatic level, by decenteringthediscourse. In an idealized way, if all participants can challenge the claims (both the truth or falsity of an utterances content, or the appropriateness of the utterance and the context of their interaction), then to commit a speech act means the other person is entitled, given the relationship between them, to challengeit.Thustodosomethingwithwordsmeansthehearer can challenge about the facts in the utterance. To assert a fact in an utterance means the emphasis is upon the relationship established between the speaker/hearer (S/H), rather than the factitself. Challenges (whats your right to do X?) risk a potential breakdown in the conversation but conversations can continue using language to talk about the conversation itself. One does not need an artificial language (such as logic systems or
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metalanguage) to discuss the language. (Compare this to philosophy of language theories that require an utterance to be labeled p, for proposition, and conversation about p are describedsymbolicallythroughametalanguageasthatp.) On a grander scale, such that of a society, a main point of speech acts is that they are considered successful if they have theforcetogenerateaninterpersonalrelationshipbetweentwo or more subjects, freely entered by all partners. Excluding for the moment institutionalized or already ritualized situations, such as baptisms, the speech act generates the context within which a speakers agreements, promises, etc., can make sense andbebindingonallinvolved. The second main point is that speech acts focus on understandingandacceptingothersintentionsinspeech. From these theories, Habermas wants to establish a rational foundation, the reasons for accepting or rejecting claims and to establish communicative action as an alternative both to instrumentalanddialecticalreasoning.Thishedoesintheform ofvalidityclaims. ValidityClaims Inprinciple,onecanchallengeanutterance,thatisdemandthat the speaker demonstrate that what is claimed, implicitly or explicitly, is valid or acceptable. But to demand this, the speaker must be free to challenge, based on normative right: what rationales might be valid or acceptable? Habermas demonstratesthatentailedinanutteranceisafourpartvalidity claim.Theseclaims(1)bindthespeakertotheutteranceitself, (2) to his own intentions in making the utterance, (3) to the socialworldoftherelationshipbetweenparticipants,and,(4)to theexternalnaturalworld.Thefourclaimsarelabeled 1. truth [cognitive content the relationship of the utterance to the objective world], 2. normative right (or rightness) [the relationshipofthespeakertosocial,cultural,andmoralworld], 3. intelligibility [the linguistic coherence of the utterance the basic sense of an utterance that follows the rules of semantics and syntax], 4. truthfulness, or sincerity [the intention of the speaker in making the utterance the relationship of utterance andspeaker]. RedemptionorCashinginoftheclaim Redemption of the truth claims may be at a rather superficial level: the speaker could choose an empiricist response, say showingsomeoneacopyofabookwiththeauthorsnameonit in response to the question Did John really write that book? More significantly is how a validity claim may disrupt ones knowledgeorthelanguagegame.Newevidence,beitevidence that is contrary to an earlier promise or facts or some other entailment that do not hold together, or expectations that are unfulfilled, returns Habermas to his original interest with C. S. Peirces pragmatism. For Peirce, scientific inquiry incorporates the takenforgranted expectations and the disruptive nature of new data and how ultimately the totality of [scientific] knowledge and expectations of it use are adopted and adjusted by the community of scientists. When there is disruption, it is likely that discourse, or some form of argumentation, is required to establish the relevance of the contested truth claim (Habermas, 2001, p. 88). As suggested earlier, it is not solely
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the truth of something corresponding with reality, but the process through which truth comes to be ascribed to a proposition. From this Habermas argues to a broader social and discursive perspective: a proposition is true if and only if everyone else who could enter into this discourse with me would accept it as true (Habermas, 2001, p. 89). It is important to note, though, that Habermas is not arguing for a simple, relativistic view of truth. Furthermore, Habermas takes this idea from scientific inquiry (the community of scientists) to the larger community, toseethiskindofargumentationasanemancipatoryaccountof truth (Habermas, 1976a). Propositions are held provisionally trueargumentationrespondstothedisruptiveevidence.Truth, then,isredeemedthroughdiscourse. Validityclaimcontributions Each of the validity claims contributes some facet to understanding. Truth and normative right have already been expressedasbearingheavilyuponeachother. The purpose of discourse is to move from the appearance of realitytoanunderstandingoftruth,ifallcompetentparticipants could join in free discussion. The participants are themselves somewhat bound to the background of takenforgranted assumptions(lifeworld)andthediscourse,whichmayalsocall into doubt the competence of earlier disputants, which reintroducessomehumanityintotruth.Secondly,forcompetent participants to join in freely means imbalances of power between speakers need also to be addressed. A community of disputants theoretically would address this because all could raisequestions,explain,justify,etc.,providedallmovetowards freeconsensusandmutualunderstanding. Society is not the free exchange of ideas nor are all contexts equal:enternormativerightagain.Ifthereisanormativeright to initiate a certain social relationship, then one is associated withsocialnorms.Forexampleapersonorderinganothergiven some context, such as higher rank, social role, or something basedinotheracknowledgednorms,suchasrespectforelders. The point is the legitimacy of the norm and the norms binding power are present with and controlled by the participants. Legitimacy must, then, differ from a strict empiricist or positivist view, that logic based systems existing outside their domain of use, the way mathematical and logical truths are believed by some to be immune from human bias, as an external, selflegitimating metalanguage might. Norms do not express a morally binding obligation (e.g., ought to do something), but instead reflect an is (that a rule is part of a reifiedsocialreality)(Habermas,1976b). The two remaining claims, intelligibility and truthfulness, are straight forward. Intelligibility is the intelligibility of the actual heard or seen utterance. If a hearer cannot comprehend an utterance, say the syntax is askew or one does not understand aterm,thespeakercanrephraseorprovideanexplanation. Truthfulness, or sincere intentionality, is redeemed by examining the consistency between the utterance and the act overtime.Thevalidityclaimisbasedonobservation:promising to meet at the bar at 6 p.m. and appearing fulfills part of the claim. Having an inconsistent record of fulfilling promises, of course,impactsthis.
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Actual communication is not always directed towards mutual understanding and people do not often reflect on the norms between speaker and hearer there recede at times into the takenforgranted lifeworld. One does not see the sincerity and intentionsofallspeechandsuchspeechmightbesystematically manipulated. What standard is available to help critique and so recognize strategic action? How does one know when there is manipulationorsomehowonesacceptanceofspeechactsisnot fully free? Writes Habermas, there will always be disruptions but a person, or group, can act strategically by treating the others as objects to be manipulated, rather than subjects with whom one communicates: there is privileged access to weapons,wealthorstanding,inordertowrestagreementfrom anotherparty(Habermas,1982)bypreventing,forestalling,or otherwisemanipulatingrationalargumentandaccesstovalidity claimsbehindutterances. In sum, the ability to reflect on ones own assumptions and to treat utterances as hypothetical moves discourse from mere communication between speaker(s) and hearer(s) to the motivations, truths, needs, expectations, and so on, to the mutual relationship between them and how they create the context in which a utterance might be judged true (in their lifeworld) and so warrants the groups acceptance as part of members participation in the public sphere, because the speaker is accountable. Since the way in which this discourse enfolds is critical, Habermas must address the freedom of the participants, their competencies, and how such speech in the publicspheremightbedistorted. Systematicallydistortedcommunication It seems one of the most difficult ideas for some to accept is that people in the sciences, or those who create technological solutions to human problems based in science, do not necessarily act objectively and that pure reason necessarily yields unbiased, objective, and humanlyuseful consequences. There are certainly situations where people resort, perhaps unwittingly,oftenknowingly,tolonghelddeceptions.Thereare also situations where the symbol system of speech chosen by the speaker and deemed intelligible are unintelligible to the hearer. Resorting to hermeneutic discourse in such situations is useless because the language has become a private language: unintelligibility distorts the communication and the source of that distortion may be intentional as an attempt to avoid conflict. Habermas sees this akin to systems theory, almost as different systems coming together but there are power imbalances in the lifeworlds of these systems, some excluding others from communication, some deliberately shielding their warrants from inspection. In the end, all such efforts destroy consensus and significantly are replaced by stereotypic, unreflexive, rigid relations. The influence is greater than the sum of the parts because this affects the individuals human development and by extension the others in the lifeworld and whole societies, because even the coherency of social norms areaffected.Itisnotmerelytheprocessofrationallegitimation but the very demand for legitimacy that is challenged. In light of this, Habermas articulates an idealized model, the ideal speech situation, which is a development of Meads work. He sees the need, too, to explicate the process of legitimation and ethicalentailmentsoflegitimacy.[Herethereaderisdirectedto Legitimation Crisis, but in brief, without falling into moral relativism, discourse ethics accept the tentative validity of
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cultural values and helps to expose false consensus, applied by some to the repression and marginalization of interests of certaingroups.] Fromtheorytopractice:lifeworldandsystem Having articulated a theoretical model, Habermas realizes his model in The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA). In this twovolume work, he explains three themes: concept of communicative rationality, society as consisting of two levels (system and lifeworld), and a theory of modernity. As already seen, TCA is both linguistic and intersubjective. Habermas explains in a complex of ideas what happens when the notions of intersubjective relationships, language, and universal pragmatics coalesce at the societal level, the social world in which humans work, manipulate each others, or strive formutualunderstanding.Whatcompetenciesareneededinthe modern world and how are they formed and used? What happens when the same linguistic and actions occur in similar, but slightly discordant, situations: the contexts shift enough (topicdependent contextual knowledge shifts (Habermas, 1999, p. 241) to challenge nave presumptions of social norms, of interpretation, and lead to significantly different outcomes. The takenforgranted assumptions of shared belief and social links become unstable and those affected must attend to the affected part of their lifeworld. What do the affected participants share and on what can they agree? As actions change,sodifferentelementsofthelifeworldbecomerelevant. What is at issue here is the way in which the immediate activity or situation is defined by those participating in it. A situation is a segment of lifeworld contexts of relevance (Habermas, 1987, p. 122) what beliefs and competencies from the lifeworlds involved are relevant now? The framework of interpretationcanshift. The beliefs and competencies of the participants are presented, discussed, and validated in and through language. This means the lifeworld is not the physical reality but the linguistically mediated one. A situation, an utterance, an experience, etc., is meaningless initially at least between people until there is a shared understanding of the event. It is the mutual attempt to draw others into ones takenforgranted background of the lifeworld that establishes meaning and, in some situations, appropriatenessforfutureaction.Thecollectionofabilitiesthat one has at repairing and maintaining social relations in language, moving towards mutual understanding, is ones communicativecompetence. These same agents can participate obliquely in situations in which they are not actual subjects: one can see other events andnarrateeventstoothersorexplicateonesownpastevents by drawing on the shared cultural and social norms and knowledge. The lifeworld, then, has three parts: culture, society, and personality (Habermas, 1987, p. 138). Habermas (1988)defineseach: Culture: the store of knowledge from which those engaged in communicative action draw interpretations susceptible of consensusastheycometoanunderstandingaboutsomethingin theworld, Society: the legitimate order from which those engaged in communicativeactiongatherrelationshipswithoneanother,
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Personality: the acquired competences that render a subject capable of speech and action and hence able to participate in processes of mutual understanding in a given context and to maintainhisownidentityintheshiftingcontextsofinteraction. This does not suggest Habermas is denigrating science, knowledge, or truth into something relativist: his view of truth incontextultimatelyisboundinempiricalwaystotheobjective world, although he echos Husserls complaint about positivist assumptions that the natural sciences can and do represent the objective (physical) world as it is. Habermas denies that scientific knowledge are necessarily bound to cultural artifacts. Understanding and action in the world (knowledge) in the framework of TCA are liable to create disruptive situations, which act as a check, and result from agents interacting with eachotherswithinasharedculturaltradition.Interpretationsof eventsarestillboundtorationality,sharedbodiesofknowledge and social practices. Nor are these bound to a single culture. Habermas abstracts this to the symbolic level, so while individualsareshapedbytheirsocietiesandviceversa,itisnot a particular member of society or a specific society. There is a system of symbolic reproduction that moves between the resources of the lifeworld and the competencies of social agents. There is not a preexisting role but a dynamism in whichtheindividualsidentity,values,andbeliefsareinrelation to the normative structures of a society and the fully socialized individualhastheinterpretiveskillstoparticipateinanddiscuss the objective world. Society does not dictate the shaping of the individual. Resources, competencies, and normative behaviors are played out in a culture for the transmission of rational knowledge and are the source of legitimation for social institutions. CritiqueoftheTCA Critique of Habermas theory of communicative action is often merged into critique of his overall program, criticizers favoring one part or the other. There is no particular dominant theme and, indeed, a review of the literature suggests, among other things, strong biases on the part of the critic and little sustainable,warrantedcomplaint. The theory has been applied in many fields. Those issues are discussed below. In general complaints about the TCA range over Habermas opinion, real or imagined, about empiricism to the issue of universality. Given his interest in, and original writing on the critique of positivist science, some reviewers focus on his attitudes of technology. To illustrate, Feenberg (1996) offers what is typical of the rather curious cant. He writes Design critique holds that social interests or cultural valuesinfluencetherealizationoftechnicalprinciples.Forsome critics, it is Christian or masculinist values that have given us theimpressionthatwecanconquernature,abeliefthatshows up in ecologically unsound technical design for others it is capitalist values that have turned technology into instrument of dominationoflaborandexploitationofnature.... Other authors complain Habermas view is too limited, too restricted to that dismissive phrase dead white men. Stanley and Pateman (1991) lament that Habermas hopeful, universal considerations do not indulge sufficiently issues of gender or race.TheyaskisHabermastheorizingbuiltonaconceptionof the world in which, surreptitiously, essentialist characteristics (e.g., middle class white males) dominate? It is a fact that
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the entire project of modernity and associated discourses of rationality and progress have historically sided with men over women (Stanley and Pateman, 1991). Their argument, however,offersnorealevidencetheyhaveestablishedintheir mindsthefactofmodernityandproceedtodismissthosewho disagree. Furthermore, they complain that Habermas efforts at universality are gender blind and therefore malestreams [sic] analysis. On the other hand, feminist philosopher Selya Benhabib (1986) accepts the theory as an appropriate basis for normativecritiqueforsociety. Gilroycomplains(1992)thatHabermasworkistooEurocentric. McCarthy, a translator of Habermas work and sometime critic, counters: Postmodernist critiques of moral universalism too often simply ignore the fact that it is precisely notions of fairness,impartiality,respectfortheintegrityanddignityofthe individual, and the like that undergrid respectful tolerance of difference by placing limits on egocentrism. Typically, such notions are simply taken for granted in antiuniversalist invocationsofothernessanddifferencewhichare,itevidently goes without saying, to be respected, not obliterated (1978, p. xii). In the same way, some authors claim Habermas is focused too much on the bourgeoisie. Given his early social and intellectual environment, critique of Marxian conditions for knowledge in a Kantian framework and the influence that an affluent proletariatexertsonhistoricalMarxism,hemayskewthatway but an open mind sees that given Habermas interest in the universal pragmatic perspective that unless one adopts a paternalistic, postmodern point of view, this is not a crippling concern. For example, Byberg (2003) analyzes Norwegian society of the 17th century as a public sphere as the result of the Bishop of Kristiansands establishment of 40 reading societies among peasants and the consequences of literacy amongthosegroups. Nikolas Luhann (1982) is a longstanding critic of Habermas efforts, believing that the German social theorists work is too big, has too many grounds and arguments, and that communication does not necessarily lead anywhere (quoted in Brand, 1990). Luhmann complains that Habermas does not sufficientlydistinguishbetweentwocontextsofanalysis:formal universalpragmaticsorempiricalresearch.Someauthors,e.g., Doorne,thinkHabermasconflatesthemandclaimsHabermasis hostile to empirical research and deductive logic. However, Szczelkun, McCarthy, Benoit and others see Habermas as using both tools, when appropriate. Indeed Szczelkun downplays Habermas transcendalist gilding and proclaims the TCA itself a product of empirical investigation. McCarthy emphasizes Habermas point that competing normative claims are geared to what everyone could rationally will to be a norm binding on everyone alike through reasoning argument among those subjecttothenorminquestion(p.viii).Benoitmodelshuman computer and humanhuman interaction on the TCA and then uses Habermas validity claims as a quantifiable measure of linguisticperformanceindifferentnormativeright. Habermasnolongerusestheidealspeechsituationtoreferto a situation of perfect symmetry among partners and that perhaps affects presuppositions about rational discourse that one makes when engaging in argumentation. As Habermas writes, discourse participants can suspend discourse about an acknowledgedsharedgoaltoconsiderthestructureandrulesof
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their linguistic engagement in order to clarify the normative right between them. Habermas never states specifically that discoursepartersareequalinallparticularsandhetakespains to describe the takenforgranted aspects of roles in the social sphere. But the most interesting point is that Habermas avoids contextualism in favor of the necessity of communicative or intersubjectivist approaches, thinking of instrumental vs. communicative rationality, and the need to avoid drifting into private language to cashin the validity claims. Heath (2003) criticizes Habermas attempt to introduce a universalization principle governing moral discourse, as well as his criteria for distinguishingbetweenmoralandethicalproblems[byapplying gametheoretic models] to specify the burden of proof that the TCA and discourse must assume. It is not convincing, though, in Heaths writing that there is any kind of proof, verification techniques,andthelikethatcanaddressmoralproblems,since theytendtobetranscendentaland,likeallsuchargumentation, separatefromempiricaldebate. The most difficult part of Habermas as a philosopher remains the issues of intersubjectivity, role of rationality, and truth. Powells (2002) argument about the role of experience in the vindication of cognitive claims of truth is not sufficient to overcome Habermas marrying of his work to Peirce and other pragmatists.Thepragmatistaccountoftruthhasyettobefully explained in ways that will settle the minor concerns of correspondence, coherence, and deflationists complaints. One must acknowledge, however, that the pragmatist account of truth is difficult to internalize without slipping into relativism, but one suspects that Bertram Russells frequently cited, half citationofWilliamJamessexpressionofthepragmatistaccount oftruthisaconfoundingfactor(Putnam,1995). Again, Powells complaint about the concept of intersubjecvity and rationalism in linguistic communication does not deride Habermas theory. Habermasian rational communication can limit the affected aspects of belief (passion, desire, religious feeling)providedtherearewillingdiscoursepartners. Finally, a legitimate difficulty is how to connect rational communicative behaviors to nonrational issues and to non linguisticformsofcommunication. Testing the Theory of Communicative Action is, naturally, the bestwaytoexposeweaknesses. ApplicationsoftheTCA The TCA has been applied to society in general, to organized workandtointerpersonalcommunicativebehaviors.Ithasbeen tested empirically in a variety of disciplines management, information retrieval, etc. as a model for humanhuman and humanmachine information exchanges and as a framework for building actual computerized systems. For brevitys sake, this section will proceed from the broadest uses of the TCA to specificprojects. Habermas work has been considered also as a complement or counter to modernist and postmodernist hypotheses. For instance,Foursconsidersthetheoryasmanyauthorsdoaspart of modernism and postmodernisms concern for reflexivity, since TCA is bound to formal pragmatics, communicative
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rationality, reactivition of the criticaltheoretic program (see alsoHonneths(2004)),and,importantlycritiqueoflegitimation. Gimmer is an example of researchers who use the theory to bridge to longstanding complex philosophical concerns, cognitivism,moralvs.ethicalissues,anduniversalization. If we consider universalization of technology then mass communication comes to the fore. Skollerhorn (1998), Leydesorff (2001), among others, consider the TCA and its effect on people. They examine how people are watched, data and information transmitted, the use of entertainment, and ultimately,howallthesecometogetherasmobilization:turning information into action in the public sphere. Skollerhorn, for example, applies the theory to understand the consequences of public environmental policy Alvesson and Willmott (1992) to critical management, and Van Every & Taylor (1998) to modelingtheorganizationasacommunicativeactivity. Abrieflistofotherapplicationsshouldsuggesttothereaderthe flexibility both of the theory and of interpretation of the TCA. Wilson (1991) applies the theory to the concept of the commons and the use of both hermeneutichistorical and empiricalanalytic methods and how the theory can be used to understand the systemic forces on the commons, the reproductionofconservationnorms,andthemanagementofthe community in which these events occur. McDonald (2005) takes the same idea of government policy and TCA and applies ittosport. InHabermasearlywork,hestatesheismotivatedtoadegree by systems theory. It follows that this interest would resonate in systems design, management, information systems design, and the humaninformation systems that consume information resources. Ng (2002) examines the applicability of university pragmatics in IR interaction Benoit (1998 2002) also examines, adopts, and tests the theory for IR. The model has been applied in computerized information systems: the Coordinator (Winograd & Flores), Sampo (Auramki, Lehtinen, & Lyytinen, (1988), Milan conversational model (De Michelis & Grasso (1994)), information systems design (Janson and Woo (1995) Benoit (2002) Lyytinen & Ngwenyama (1992)),doingandspeakingintheoffice(Flores&Ludlow). For information retrieval and humancomputer interaction researchers, the TCA is potentially a powerful model, but to date has not been fully capitalized. One reason, perhaps, is the lack of interest in education in theory in LIS (Fisher, et al., 2005 Warner, Miksa, Blaire, Bonnici, & Miksa, 2005), the lack of interest in philosophical issues, or the dismissal of that topic entirely. While recently some Library & Information Science authors, such as Budd (2004), tackle the everdifficult trinity of language, semantics, and philosophy in the form of relevance, others, such as Dobson (2002), Wiegan (2003), and Andersen (2001) put their own fine points on the issue. Anderson asks information criticism: where is it? Dobson asks why one should even bother with philosophy. The reason is the compelling insights social theory, philosophy, and systems design have at their intersection, something Arnold (2003), Benoit(2002,2006),andothersconfirm. It should go without saying that considering phenomena of interestfromdifferentperspectivesisverylikelytoexpandour knowledge of that phenomenon. The difficult lay in reading and publishingacrossthediscipline.Perhaps,withoutthebonafides
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a second doctorate provides or evident mastery of jargon of other domains, as well as a commitment to working difficult philosophical intellectual content to comprehension, the TCA, and most theories, will remain outside the reach unless (a) the legitimacy of the model is demonstrated in approachable, familiarforms(empiricism)and(b)anappreciationofthevalue oftheoryingeneralisencouraged. Conclusions The TCA is only part of a long developing, expansive, indeed magisterial, view of society, ways of shaping understanding of society and of each others through our communicative actions. Unlike the skepticism of his colleague Adorno, and (for some) the excessive transcendentalism of Kant, critiquing both excessive rationalism and idealism, gathering from pragmatists and Popper, Habermas has created a viable model of how the world works, treading a middle way between extremes of any doctrineandintheendcreatingahopefulpathforhumanity. But the work is not done. Critique of established agents, working instrumentally and strategically for their own goals, so successfully that what appears natural is really the product of instrumental social agencies, is extremely difficult perhaps impossible without a renting of the veil shielding educational, technical,commercial,andgovernmentalwork. For those interested in information, the TCA is especially useful. It serves as a framework and criterion for critique of information systems (humanhuman, humanmachine, human machinehuman). The validity claims of Habermas conception of speech acts can be useful in information providing agencies in understanding the relevancy of the claims, both of the humanandcomputerizedinformationresourceprovidingagent. In other words, TCA serves to critique information work practices. Finally, the TCA, derived from social theories, the ordinary language philosophy, work and politics offers library & information science a store of concepts and descriptive language to expand LIS efforts and establish bridges to other disciplines,profitingall.

Literature Austin,J.L.(1962).Howtodothingswithwords:theWilliam JameslecturesdeliveredatHarvardUniversityin1955.J.O. Urmson(Ed.).Oxford:Clarendon. Benhabib,S.(1986).Critique,norm,andutopia:astudyofthe foundationsofcriticaltheory.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity Press. Benoit,G.(2002).Criticaltheoryasafoundationforpragmatic informationsystemsdesign.InformationResearch,6(2), http://informationr.net/ir/62/paper98.html Byberg,L.(2003).Readingsocietiesforpeasantsearly democraticinstitutions?Norsktidsskriftforbibliotekforskning, 11.http://www.hum.uit.no/dok/ntbf/sd4

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Gilroy,P.(1992).BlackAtlantic.London:Hutchinson. Habermas,J.(1995).Moralconsciousnessandcommunicative action.ChristianLenhardtandShierryWeberNicholsen (Trans.).IntroductionbyThomasMcCarthy.Cambridge:MIT Press. Habermas,J.(2001).Liberatingpowerofsymbols:philosophical essays.PeterDews(Trans.).Cambridge:PolityPress. Habermas,J.(2001).Onthepragmaticsofsocialinteraction: preliminarystudiesintheTheoryofCommunicativeAction. BarbaraFultner(Trans.).Cambridge:PolityPress. Heath,J.(2003).Communicativeactionandrationalchoice. Cambridge:MITPress. Powell,J.L.(2002).UnderstandingHabermas:modern solutions,postmodernproblems.Sincrona. http://sincronia.cucsh.udg.mx/modr.htm Stanley,L.,&Pateman,C.(1991).Feministinterpretationsand politicaltheory.Cambridge:PolityPress. Szczelkun,S.(nd).AestheticjudgmentcritiqueoftheTheoryof CommunicativeAction.http://www.stefan szczelkun.org.uk/phd503.htm HabermasWritings(partiallist) Habermas,J.(1971).Knowledgeandhumaninterests.Boston: Beacon. Habermas,J.(1976a).Legitimationcrisis.T.McCarthy(Trans.). Boston:Beacon. Habermas,J.(1976b).Somedistinctionsinuniversal pragmatics.TheoryandSociety,1(3),15567. Habermas,J.(1982).Areplytomycritics.InJ.B.Thompson& D.Held(Eds.),Habermas:criticaldebates.London:Macmillan. Habermas,J.(1984).TheoryofCommunicativeAction.Vol.1: Reasonandtherationalizationofsociety.Boston:Beacon. Habermas,J.(1987).TheoryofCommunicativeaction.Vol.2: Lifeworldandsystem:acritiqueoffunctionalistreason.Boston: Beacon. Habermas,J.(1987).Thephilosophicaldiscourseofmodernity: twelvelectures.F.Lawrence(Trans.).Cambridge:MITPress. Habermas,J.(1988).Philosophicaldiscourseofmodernity: twelvelectures.F.G.Lawrence(Trans.).Cambridge:MITPress. Habermas,J.(1996).Betweenfactsandnorms.Contributionsto adiscoursetheoryoflawanddemocracy.W.Rehg(Trans.). Cambridge:MITPress. Habermas,J.(1998).Onthepragmaticsofcommunication.M. Cooke(Ed.).Cambridge:MITPress. Habermas,J.(2001).TheChristianGaussLecturers,inOnthe pragmaticsofsocialinteraction:preliminarystudiesinthe
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TheoryofCommunicativeAction. Habermas,J.(2001).VorstudienundErgnzungenzurTheorie deskommunikativenHandelns.[Onthepragmaticsofsocial interaction:preliminarystudiesinthetheoryofcommunicative action.]BarbaraFultner,Trans.Cambridge,MA:MIT. HelpfulReadingsandwebsites The Association for Information Systems website hosts a number of references on critical social theory. http://www.qual.auckland.ac.nz/critical.htm Theories used in IS Research: Critical social theory website: http://www.istheory.yorku.ca/criticalsocialtheory.htm Apel, K.O. (1998). Openly strategic uses of language: a transcendentalpragmatic perspective (A second attempt to think with Habermas against Habermas). In P. Dews (Ed.), Habermas:acriticalreader,pp.27290.Oxford:Blackwell. Cooke,M.(1994).Languageandreason:astudyofHabermass pragmatics.Cambridge,MA:MITPress. Davidson, D. (2001). Essays on actions and events. 2nd ed. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Davidson,D.(2001).Inquiriesintotruthandinterpretation.2nd ed.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Davidson, D. (2001). Subjective, intersubjective, objective. Oxford:ClarendonPress. Davidson, D. (2004). Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford UniversityPress. Davidson, D. (2005). Truth and prediction. Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress. Davidson,D.(2005).Truth,language,andhistory:philosophical essays.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of knowledge. London: Tavistock. Geuss, R. (1981). The idea of a critical theory: Jrgen Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress. Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of society: Outline of the theoryofstructure.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress. Held, D. (1980). Introduction to critical theory: Horkheimer to Habermas.London:Hutchinson. Ljungberg, J., & Holm, P. (1997). Speech acts on trial. In M. Kyng & L. Mathiassen (Eds.), Computer and Design in Context. Cambridge:MITPress. MacIsaac, D. (1996). The critical theory of Jrgen Habermas. http://physicsed.buffalostate.edu/danowner/habcritthy.html McCarthy, T. (1978). The critical theory of Jrgen Habermas. London:Hutchinson.
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McCarthy, T. The Critical Theory of Jrgen Habermas, MIT Press,Cambridge,MA,1982. Outhwait, W. (1994). Habermas: a critical introduction. Cambridge:Polity. Putnam, H. (1995). Pragmatism: a state of the question. Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. Putnam, H. (2002). The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy andotheressays.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. Quine, W. V. (1990). Pursuit of truth. Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress. Rawls,J.(1972).Atheoryofjustice.Oxford:ClarendonPress. Rehg,W.(1994).Insightandsolidarity:astudyinthediscourse ethics of Jrgen Habermas. Berkeley: University of California Press. Searle,J.R.(1969).Speechacts:anessayinthephilosophyof language.London:CambridgeUniv.Press. Searle, J. R. (1998). Mind, language and society: philosophy in therealworld.NewYork:BasicBooks. Thompson, J. B. (1981). Critical hermeneutics: a study in the thought of Paul Ricur and Jrgen Habermas. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Thompson, J. B., & Held, D. (Eds.), (1982). Habermas: Critical Debates.London:Macmillan. White, S. K. (1987). The recent work of Jrgen Habermas: reason, justice and modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress. White, S. K. (ed.). (1995). Cambridge companion to Habermas. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Inadditiontotheabovecitations CritiqueofTechnology Feenberg, A. (1991). Critical Theory of Technology. New York: OxfordUniversityPress. Winograd, T., F. Flores, (1986). Understanding Computers and Cognition:ANewFoundationforDesign.Norwood:Ablex. Education Willson, R. (2000). Comparing inclass and computermediated discussion using a communicative action framework. Journal of PlanningEducationandResearch,19(4),409418. Abras, A., MaloneyKrichmar, D., & Preece, J. (2003). Evaluating an online academic community: purpose is the key. HCI International. Crete, Greece. HumanComputer Interaction, TheoriesandPractice(Part1),vol.2,829833. HCI
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Communication. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 17(3),273288. Skollerhorn, E. (1998, Sept. 1). Habermas and nature: the Theory of Communicative Action for studying environmental policy. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 41(5),555573. Needforcriticism Andersen, J. (2005, Summer). Information criticism: where is it?Progressivelibrarian,25. Dobson, P. J. (2002). Critical realism and information systems research: why bother with philosophy? Information Research 7(2)[Availableathttp://InformationR.net/ir/72/paper124.html] Weigan, W. A. (2003, June). What American studies can teach theLibraryandInformationStudiescommunityaboutthelibrary and the life of the user. American Studies Association Newsletter. Organizationsassystems Van Every, E. J. & Taylor, J. R. (1998). Modeling the organization as a system of communication activity. ManagementCommunicationQuarterly,12(1),128147. Sports McDonald, I. (2005). Theorising partnerships: governance, communicativeactionandsportspolicy.Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress.

SeeAlso Criticaltheory

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