The Arab Risings, Israel and Hamas There was one striking thing missing from the events

of the Middle East over the last month [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110303-iran-seesopportunity-persian- ulf!: the absence of Israel. Israel was certainly mentioned and condemned but it was not an issue around which any of the demonstrations were focused. Israel was a side issue for the demonstrators, with the main focus being on replacing unpopular rulers. This is odd. Since e en before the creation of the State of Israel, !ionism has been a dri ing force among the Arab public, perhaps more than it has been with Arab go ernments. "umerous Arab go ernments ha e been willing to maintain co ert relations with Israel with e#tensi e cooperation on intelligence and related matters. $hile a few ha e been willing to de elop open diplomatic relations with Israel, many more ha e maintained informal relations. The reason has been that they ha e been unwilling to incur the displeasure of the Arab masses through open cooperation. That makes it all the more strange that the Arab opposition, from %ibya to &ahrain ha e not made o ert and co ert cooperation with Israel a central issue, if for no other reason than to mobili'e the Arab masses. %et me emphasi'e that Israel was fre(uently an issue but not the central one. If we go far back to the rise of )amal Abdul "asser and his re olution for pan*Arabism and socialism, his issues against +ing ,arouk was tightly bound with anti*!ionism. Similarly, radical Islamists ha e always made Israel a central issue, yet it wasn-t there in this round of unrest. This was particularly surprising with regimes like E ypt"s that had formal relations with #sraeli [http://www.stratfor.com/wee$ly/2011020%e ypt-israel-and-strate ic-reconsideration!. A second thing was missing from the unrest. There was no rising, no intifada, in Israel. )i en the general unrest sweeping the region, it would ha e seemed logical that the .alestinian public would ha e been pressing both the .alestine "ational Authority and Hamas to take steps to at organi'e massi e demonstrations against Israel. They didn-t happen. It is not clear why Israel was not the rallying point this time. /ne e#planation perhaps is that the demonstrations in the Islamic world were focused on unpopular leaders and regimes and that the (uestion of local go ernance was at its heart. That-s possible but particularly as they were faltering, in oking Israel would ha e seen logical to legitimi'e their cause. Another e#planation might ha e rested in the reason that most of these risings failed, at least to this point, to achie e fundamental change: they were not mass mo ements in ol ing all classes of society, &ut were to a reat e'tent the youn and the &etter educated [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110203-&rea$down-e yptianopposition- roups!. This class was more sophisticated about the world and understood the need for American and 0uropean support in the long run. They

also understood that including Israel in their mi# of grie ances was likely to reduce $estern pressure on the rising-s targets. $e know of se eral leaders of 0gyptian rising, for e#ample, who were close to Hamas, yet chose deliberately to downplay their relations. They clearly were intensely anti*Israeli but didn-t want to make this a crucial issue. In the case of 0gypt they didn-t want to alienate the military nor the $est. They were sophisticated enough to take the matter step by step. This clearly didn-t displease the ."A, who had no appetite for underwriting another Intifada that would ha e led to massi e Israeli responses and disruption of the $est &ank-s economy. ,or Hamas in )a'a, howe er, it was a different case. Hamas was trapped by the #sraeli-E yptian &loc$ade [http://www.stratfor.com/ raphic(of(the(day/20100)01(fallout(over( a*a! . Their ability to access weapons, as well as basic supplies need to build a minimally functioning economy was limited by this blockade, which also limited Hamas- ability to build a strong mo ement in the $est &ank that would challenge ,atah-s leadership of the ."A there. Hamas has been isolated and trapped in )a'a. The uprising in 0gypt represented a tremendous opportunity for Hamas as it promised to create a new reality )a'a. If the demonstrators had succeeded not only in o erthrowing Hosni 1ubarak, but also in forcing true regime change, or at least forcing the military to change its policy toward Hamas, it could ha e opened the door for Hamas to dramatically increase its power and its room for maneu er. Hamas knew that it had supporters among the demonstrators and that the demonstrators wanted a re ersal of 0gyptian policy on Israel and )a'a. They were content to wait, particularly as the ."A was not prepared to launch an Intifada in the $est &ank, and one confined to )a'a would ha e little effect. So they waited. The e ents of the past few months ha e shown that while the military wanted Mu&ara$ out [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110211-mu&ara$- onee ypts-system-stays!, it was not prepared to break with Israel or shift its )a'a policy. 1ost important, the e ents thus far ha e shown that the demonstrators were in no position to force the military to do anything they didn-t want to do. &eyond forcing 1ubarak out and perhaps ha ing him put on trial, the basic policies of his regime remained in place. ,or Hamas, a shift in 0gyptian policy was the opening that would allow them to become militarily and politically more effecti e. It didn-t happen. / er the last few weeks it became apparent to many obser ers, including the Hamas leadership, that what they hoped for in 0gypt was either not going to happen any time soon or perhaps not at all. At the same time it was ob ious that the mo ement in the Arab world had not yet died out. If Hamas could combine the historical animosity toward Israel in the Arab world with the current unrest, it might be able to effect changes in policy not only in 0gypt but also in the rest of the Arab world, a region that had become increasingly indifferent to the

.alestinian cause, beyond rhetoric. )a'a has become a symbol in the Arab world of .alestinian resistance and Israeli oppression. The last war in )a'a, +ead ,ast [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/200-0113(israel( a*a(idf(advances(clos er( a*a(city!, has become a symbol used not only among Arab-s but also in 0urope to generate anti*Israeli sentiment Interestingly, )oldstone, authority of a study of the war that was se erely critical of Israel, retracted many of his charges last week. /ne of the ma2or achie ements of Hamas was to ha e shaped public opinion in 0urope o er %ead 3ast ia the )oldstone Report. Its retraction was a defeat for Hamas, as much of its positioning in 0urope rested on it. In the face of the decision by Arab demonstrators not to emphasi'e Israel, in the face of the apparent failure of the 0gyptian rising to achie e definiti e policy changes, and in the face of the re ersal of )oldstone of many of his charges, Hamas clearly felt that it was not only facing a lost opportunity, but was likely to face a retreat in $estern public opinion4this being a secondary consideration. Another Israel assault on )a'a might generate forces that benefit Hamas. In %ead 3ast, the 0gyptian go ernment easily deflected calls to stop its blockade of )a'a and break relations with Israel. In 5677, it might not be as easy for them to resist if there were another war. 1oreo er, with the uprising losing steam, a war in )a'a might re*energi'e it, using what would be claimed as unilateral brutality by Israel to bring far larger crowds into the street and forcing a weakened regime to make the kinds of concessions that would matter to Hamas. 0gypt is the key for Hamas. %inked to an anti*Israeli, pro*Hamas regime, the )a'a strip returns to its old status as a bayonet pointed at Tel A i . 3ertainly it would be a base for operations and a significant alternati e to ,atah. &ut a war would benefit Hamas more broadly. ,or e#ample, Turkey-s iew of )a'a has changed significantly since the .lotilla incident in which #sraeli commandos $illed nine /ur$s on a ship headed for 0a*a [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100131(israel(conse2uences(flotilla(r aid!. Turkey-s relationship with Israel could be further weakened, and with 0gypt and Turkey both becoming hostile to Israel, Hamas- position would impro e. If Hamas could cause He'bollah to 2oin the war from the "orth4something possible gi en Iran-s desire not to be flanked by Sunni 8ihadist mo ement, then Israel would be placed in a challenging military position perhaps with the 9nited States, afraid of a complete breakdown of its regional alliance system, forcing Israel to accept an unfa orable settlement. Hamas had the same means for starting a war as it had in the past, or He'bollah had in 566:. It could fire rockets at Israel. ,or the most part these rockets, unguided missiles, would do no harm. &ut some would strike Israeli targets, and under any circumstances, the constant firing would dri e home the limits of Israeli intelligence to an uneasy Israeli public4they didn-t know where the missiles were

stored and they couldn-t take them out. Add to this the atrocity in which an Israeli family was murdered, including an infant, and a rocket that landed 56 miles south of Tel A i , and Hamas was clearly creating a circumstance under which the Israelis would ha e no choice but to attack )a'a, setting in motion the process that Hamas hoped for. After the first series of attacks two nations inter ened. Turkey, fairly publicly inter ened persuading Hamas to halt its attacks. Turkey understood the fragility of the Arab world and was not interesting in the uprising recei ing an additional boost from a war in )a'a. The Saudis also inter ened. The Saudis pro ided the main funding for Hamas, and were themsel es trying to stabili'e the situation from ;emen to &ahrain on its southern and eastern border. It did not want anything adding fuel to the fire. Hamas subsided. Then this wee$end3 4amas resumed its attac$ [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/2011050--implications-israeli-palestinianflare!. $e don-t know its reasoning, but we can infer it. $hate er Turkey, Saudi Arabia or anyone else wanted, this was their historic opportunity. If 0gypt returns to the status (uo, Hamas returns to its trap. $hate er their friend or allies might say, missing this historic opportunity would be foolish. A war would hurt, but a defeat could be turned into a political ictory. It is not clear what Israel-s limit is. 3learly they are trying to a oid an all*out assault on )a'a, limiting it to limited air strikes. The e#isting of Iron <ome, a new system to stop rockets pro ides some psychological comfort but it is only partially deployed and its effecti eness is still unknown. In addition, the )oldstone re ersal gi es the Israelis a sense of indication that gi es them more room for maneu er. The rockets can be endured only so long before an attack. Hamas appears to ha e plenty of rockets and it will use them until Israel attacks, and then that attack will be used to try to launch a broader Arab mo ement focused both on Israel and regimes that openly or co ertly collaborate with them. Hamas hopes abo e all to bring down the 0gyptian regime with a newly energi'ed mo ement. Israel abo e all does not want this to happen. It will resist as long as it can. &ut gi en the political situation in Israel, this is limited. And that is what Hamas is counting on. ,or the 9nited States and 0urope, the merger of Islamists and democrats is an e#plosi e combination. Separated they do little. Together they could genuinely destabili'e the region and undermine the 9.S. war on the 8ihadists more than it has already been weekend. The 9.S. and 0urope wants Israel to restrain itself but cannot restrain Hamas. Another war, therefore, is not out of the (uestion and the decision in the long run rests with Hamas.