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Galen's Anatomy of the Soul Author(s): R. J. Hankinson Source: Phronesis, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1991), pp.

197-233 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182386 . Accessed: 25/09/2013 11:20
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Galen's Anatomy of the Soul


This paperpresentsthe firsthalfof a two-partinvestigation into the nature and coherence of Galen's philosophicalpsychology.In it, I shall consider Galen's account of the structureof the soul, his vigorous defence of a Platonictripartitional psychologyin contrastto the unifyingaccountof the of the Stoics, paying particular attentionto his attempteddemonstrations distinctnessand variouslocations of the soul's parts, and to the epistemological and methodologicalprincipleshe bringsto bearin this effort. Part of the purpose of this will be to demonstratein some detail how Galen's twin professions of philosopher and physiologistcombine to inform his particulartreatmentof these issues. In the second part,' I shall turnto the moralaspectsof Galen'sphilosophicalpsychology,and in particular to his accountof the passions,and the questionof whetherthey can be tamed, or whether rather they require root-and-branch eradication;and I shall attempt to show how Galen's physicalism is to be made compatiblewith his belief that, at least in their generalcondition,our passions,and the extent to which we are the slaves of them, are up to us. Fromall of this, I hope, there will emerge a picture of Galen engaged in what Fodor has called 'speculative psychology',2 that is the attempt to steer a middle course between a purely empiricaland hence potentiallyimpoverishedapproach to the science of psychologyon the one hand, and an overlyaprioristic and rationalisticpsychology of the mind carriedthroughwith no regard for empiricaladequacyon the other. And, I hold, Galen engaged in it in a sophisticatedmanner- for, properlycarriedout, such a project need be neitherbad science nor inadequatephilosophy,butindeedthe only fruitful and intelligentway of going about either.3
To appear as 'Actions and passions:emotion, affection and moralself-managementin Galen's philosophical psychology', forthcoming in Passion & Perception (the proceedings of the Fifth Symposion Hellenisticum), edd. J. Brunschwigand M.C. Nussbaum. 2 See J. Fodor, The Language of Thought(CambridgeMass: 1975), p. vii. 3 This is a strong, some may think lunatic, claim, which I cannot defend here. Of course,

Phronesis 1991. Vol. XXXV1/2 (Accepted February 1991)


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1. A CautiousSyncretism Galen is at least to some extent a Platonist,'althoughscholarshave sometimesallowedthatfactto obscurethe degreeto whichGalenwas, in the best he madeuse of the possiblesensesof the words,an eclecticanda syncretist;' wide variety of materials available to him in the tradition to weave a compoundcloth of greatstrengthfroma varietyof strands.6 It is important to stress against its detractorsthat such an eclecticismis not necessarily - on the contrary simplya type of sophisticated plagiarism its resultscanbe, and in Galen's case to my mind are, powerfullyoriginal. One of the areas in which he both evinces and acknowledgesmost generouslyhis debt to Platois in his psychology.Like Platoof the Republic he is committedto tripartition as a necessaryconditionfor explainingthe in his assignment of phenomenaof psychicconflict;he followsthe Timaeus the three partsof the soul, rational,spirited,and appetitive,to the brain, the heart, and the liver respectively; and he takes over Plato'sterminology for the faculties.7 Indeed, Galen wrote a massiveworkOn the Doctrinesof
as Fodor himself points out, the best form for such a defence consists simply in applying the model, working it through, and showing that the results are fruitful. See P.H. De Lacy, 'Galen's Platonism', AJP 1972. See my article 'Galen's philosophicaleclecticism', forthcomingin Aufstiegund Niedergang der Romischen Welt,1I, 36 4; I couch the last remarkcarefullybecause there seems to be a divergenceof opinion as to whichof 'syncretism'and 'eclectism'is the commendatory and which the pejorative term. Dillon and Long, in their recent collection The Question of "Eclecticism"(California, 1988), tend to reserve the latter for reasoned, principledselection of the best elements from a variety of traditions,leaving the former for uncritical rag-baggery; my own intuitions regarding usage tend the other way, although nothing really hangs on that - as Galen himself would have said, provided we know what we mean the rest is futile quibbling over words. Perhaps we should have 'eclecticism'cover the cullingof diverse materialsfrom differentsources, while reserving 'syncretism' for the project of attempting to show that, surface differences notwithstanding, the various strands of the tradition in fact turn out to say the same thing. Whatever the truth of the linguistic matter, Galen was certainly not merely an omnivorous intellectual magpie creating a pot-luck supper out of the offerings of his predecessors. 6 In his philosophy of science, as well as in his general metaphysics,Galen owes more to Aristotle than Plato: see my op.cit, n. 5 above. see Plato, Rep. 434-441; and see also Galen's 7 logistikon, thumoeides, epithume'tikon: On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP = CMG V 412, De Lacy 1978-84) V 307, 338, 363-5, 382, 516-18, etc. PHP was also edited for the Teubner series by 1. Muller (Leipzig, 1874); Muller'stext is a huge advanceon Kuhn, but is no substitutefor the magnificent CMG edition of P.H. De Lacy (3 vols, including English translation, commentaryand indices): Berlin, 1978-84;'De Lacy, 1984'refers to the thirdvolume of commentaryand indices.


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and Plato the main purposeof whichwas to demonstratethe Hippocrates harmonyof the views of its two principalsubjects,and to show, interalia, of the comthe empiricalinadequacyand methodologicaldisreputability peting Stoic account. But Galen's Platonisingis neither slavish nor unthinking;and in his of the psychicfaculties, he deliberatelyavails himself of characterization Aristotelian and even some Stoic elements in addition to his Platonic inheritance(althoughhe is to take issue with Aristotle'sassignmentof the reasoningfacultyto the heart,as well as withmuchin the Stoictreatment): for instance, he considers(at least in some contexts) nutrition,reproduction, and the threptikedunamis to be psychic in category.8Galen, in commonwithmost Greekthoughton the subject,consideredthereto be no radicaldistinctionof type between the physicaland the mental (or more properly,the psychic).The bodycontainsorgans(organa), properlyconstiwhichseverally physicalstructures tuted, goal-directed,anhomoeomerous have functions (chreiai) that are contributory(and hence teleologically posterior)to the overallfunctioningof the organismas a whole; and these activities,or energeiai,which functionsare expressedin the characteristic of one or more these organsperform.A diseaseconsistsin the impairment of these activities;hence therapyinvolves the removalof the impediment

PHP V 521; cf. 533, 658; although characteristically he doesn't want to make an issue out of this: cf. MM X 635: 'it makes no difference whether you call it desiderative, natural, or nutritive, nor whether you call it a soul or a power' (see also P.H. De Lacy, 'The third part of the soul', in P. Manuliand M. Vegetti (eds.) Le Opere Psicologiche di Galeno (Naples, 1988), pp. 43-63, esp. pp. 52-5). On the general issue of Galen's divisions of the soul, see De Lacy, 1988, who rightly stresses the flexibility of Galen's thought behind the dogmaticfacade, and notes that in De Semine (Sem.) Galen alters his account of the partition of the soul to allow the gonads a share as the fourth part of it (Sem. IV 570, 572f., 622; cf. Ars MedicaI 319, and De MethodoMedendiad Glauconem XI 97); and see also De NaturalibusFacultatibus(Nat.Fac.) 11 1-2, where Galen sides with the Stoics against the Peripateticsin assigningthe vegetative functions not to soul but to nature (cf. 6-7, 10, 12, 15, 17-18, etc.; however, at ib. 28-9, his languagesuggests a general indifference to such terminological distinctions). Jaap Mansfeld, in an unpublishedmanuscriptentitled 'The idea of the will in Chrysippus,Posidoniusand Galen' detects a further move too in Galen's De Moribus (a work lost in Greek but which survivesin an Arabic epitome, translatedinto English by J.N. Matlock, in S.M. Stern et al. (edd.) IslamicPhilosophyand the ClassicalTradition(Oxford, 1972) ), away from the concept of a soul divided into partsand towardsa more Aristoteliannotion of a varietyof psychic functions; however, I do not find the passages he quotes convincing as evidence that Galen ever abandoned tripartition;nor do I share Mansfeld's view that such an abandonmentwas more or less forced upon him by the fact that his 'physiology on the one hand and his moral philosophy and philosophy of mind are not co-ordinate'.


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and the strengtheningof the naturalfunctionalcapacityof the organ or organs in question.9Many such functions and activitiesare assigned by Galen to the soul (as I shall standardlybut with all the usual caveats continue to renderpsuche), indeed to the rationalor hegemonicsoul;'0 Galen lists those of the imagination,memory, recollection, knowledge, thought, consideration,voluntarymotionand sensation."Otherfaculties, such as anger and states of passion in general, are to be assignedto the thumoeides;`2 while the thirdpartof the soul is that in chargeof
nutritionin the animal, the most importantfeature of which in us and all blooded animals is the production of blood. To this power also belongs the enjoyment of pleasures; and when it is moved by enjoyment more than is fitting, it produces incontinence (akrasia) and licentiousness (akolasia). (PHP V 601; trans. here and passim after De Lacy; cf. Symp.Diff. VII 55; MM X 636; note the Aristotelian terminology for weakness of the will.)

9 Galen works this out in detail in the first two books of MM (see n. 5 above); but cf. particularlyMM X 78-81. On the issue of the natureof psychologicalafflictions,and the extent to which they are to be described as diseases, see PHP V 432-54; and see p. 203 below. '? Galen uses both logistikon and hUgemonikoninterchangeably;he repeatedly emphasizes the fact that terminologyitself is unimportant,providedthat you providea clear indication of the referents of the terms in your usage; hence this indifference as to whether to adopt Platonicor Stoic terminologyis not simplycarelessnesson Galen's part - it is part of his theory of scientific language; see my art.cit., n. 5 above. "phantasia, mnemme, anamnesis,episteme,noesis, dianoesis, PHP V 600; see also On the Differencesof Symptoms (Symp.Diff.) VII 55f; and see MM X 636: The thirdpart, the logicalsoul, is located in the brain,and it controlsthe activitiesin accordancewith choice as well as perceptions, makinguse of the nervesas conduits, and sending perception and movement to the whole animal by way of them. and compare the remarks in On Habituations(Eth.: this does not appear in the Kuhn edition; it is edited by Muller in SM 2 9-31): As the hegemonic soul has capabilities(dunameis)directedtowardsall the technai, it is necessary that there is one (sc. dunamis)with whichwe understandconsequence and conflict, and another with which we remember; and we are cleverer in respect of the first mentioned, but more retentive in respect of the second. (Eth. 4,
= SM 2 25)

The distinction between intellectual sharpness and retentive ability is an ancient commonplace: see in particularthe Hippocratictext On Regimen 1 35. 12 PHP V 601; cf. Symp.Diff. VII 55-6; and see MM X 635-6: a second partof the soul belongs to us not in virtueof our growingor being alive, but because we are animals, it is located in the heartand is the sourceof the innate heat; the arteries are the conduits for this source, which has many names: it is called the living power (dunamisz6tike), the spiritedpower (dunamisthumoeides),the living soul, and the spirited soul.


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So Galendrawson a diverserangeof previoustheoriesin orderto construct to stressthatthe theorythatresultsis no his own account;butit is important andill-assorted mere haphazard porridgeof badly-digested scrapsfromthe tableof his predecessors.He is not afraidto take issuewiththemon matters of substantial importance,andto take issuewiththemin his own characteristically,indeed uniquely,polemicalstyle. For instance, he will not say, as Plato does, that any part of the soul is on the matterhe demonstrably immortal.Indeed, in his pronouncements exhibitsan admirable to commithimselfwith anydegree caution,unwilling of certaintyon matterswhichhe viewsas beingby theirverynatureresistant to secure demonstration."3 Thus at PHP V 791-2, Galen writes:
Plato said that the cause who made us, the demiurge who fashioned the universe, commanded his children to make the human race by taking . .. the substance (ousia) of the immortalsoul from him and addingit to what was generated. But we must realise that there is no formal similaritybetween provingand positing the fact
that we were made in accordance with the providence of some god . . ., and

knowing the substanceof the maker or even of our own soul ... [T]he statements of the most divine Plato about the substanceof our soul . .. and still more all that he says about our whole body, extend only to plausibilityand reasonableness (achri tou pithanou kai eikotos).

That last remarkis important(indeed Galen, perhaps excessively charitably, takes Plato himselfto be committedto it by his remarksabout the eikos muthos[Tim.29c-d]).Thereis a classof thingsaboutwhichwe can at best speculate, and most particularlythese are the preserve of the philosophers:
In philosophyit is not surprising that most disagreementshave not been resolved, as the matters it deals with cannot be clearlyjudged by experiment (peira);thus some say that the universe is uncreated, others that is created, some say that there is nothing outside it, others that there is something, and of the latter, some say that what surroundsit is a void that has no substancein it, others that it is surroundedby incalculablymany other universes. Such a dispute (diaph6nia)cannot be settled by evident perception (aisthesisenarges) (PHP V 766)14

The case is not the same as it is in medicine, where theoretical pronounce-

ments can, and indeed should, be made answerableto the tribunal of

On these issues in general, see Frede, 1981. On these questions, cf. De PeccatorumDignotione (Pecc.Dig., = SM 1 45-81 Marquardt [1884], = CMG V 411, De Boer [1937];) V 67, 98-9; On the Affected Parts (Loc.Aff.) VIII 158-9; Pecc.Dig., on the diagnosis and cure of the soul's errors, is the companion volume to Aff. Dig., and is also translatedby Harkins, 1964. '" This view has a long and respectable pedigree in Greek medicine - indeed it is traceable (in a stronger form) to the early Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine



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andits mortality So Galen holdsthatthe questionsof the soul'ssubstance andnot certainty (PHP V 791-3); are ones that at best admitof plausibility, and that in any case they are extraneousto the concernsof the medical
practitioner (PHP V 794-5).16 In On the Formation of Foetuses

he mentions referring to PHP (although (Foet.Form.)IV 700-2,apparently anotherlost work, On the Formsof theSoul;cf. PHP V 803, and the notes of De Lacy, 1984, p. 708), he writesin an even more aporeticvein:
in default of finding any scientificallydemonstratedopinion, I owned myself at a loss with regardto the soul's substance, being unable to advanceeven as far as the plausible . . . I made no attemptto assertanythingregardingthe soul's substancein any of my work. For I was unable to find out by means of linear demonstrations'7 whether it was completely incorporeal, or if some part of it was corporeal, or whether it was completely eternal, or if it was corruptible.

Similar avowals of ignorance are to be found in De Usu Partium(UP) IV 472, 501. It appearsthat the real III 452, and De Utilitate Respirationis natureof the soul is not merelynot susceptibleof precise,scientificdemona little stration(I shall treat of Galen's notion of scientificdemonstration later on); we cannot even arriveat a plausible,if fallible,view aboutit.'8 Elsewhere, however, he allows himself to draw at least conditional conclusions regardingthe soul's nature. In Thatthe Powers of the Soul of the Body (QAM)'9IV 774-5, he writes Depend upon the Temperament that 'if the rationalpart is a form of the soul, then it is mortal:for it is a temperamentof the brain'(cf. QAM IV 781-3), even thougha page or so
(VM) chs. 1 and 2. For Galen's own views on the relations between logos, reason, and peira, experience, cf. MM X 33ff.; In Hippocratis de Victu Acutorum Commentaria (HVA, = CMG V 91, Helmreich [1914]) XV 446ff. XI 731; and ac Facultatibus Temperamentis 16 See also De SimpliciumMedicamentorum In HippocratisEpidemicaXVIIB 247; on this issue, see L.G. Ballester, 'Soul and body, disease of the soul and disease of the body', in Manuliand Vegetti (eds.) 1988,pp. 124-8; but Ballester seems to me to overstressthe differencesbetween Galen's pronouncements on the matter in different texts - they seem to me at least, taken together, to constitute a coherent and interesting epistemological position. '' 'linear demonstrations' are geometrical arguments: cf. Lib.Prop. XIX 40-1; PHP V 656. 18 See also in this context the fragmentaryOn the Substanceof the Natural Faculties (Subst.Nat.Fac.) IV 761-4; Subst.Nat.Fac. reproduces in part Galen's On His Own Opinions (Sent.), which survives only in Latin, and is being edited for CMG by Vivian Nutton. SequunturIV 767-822:it appearsin SM 19 Quod Animi Mores Corporis Temperamenta 2 32-79, Muller (1891); there is an Italian translationof and interpretativeessay upon QAM (as well as Aff. Dig. and Pecc.Dig.) in M. Menghiand M. Vegetti, Le Passionie gli Erroridel' Anima (Venice, 1984).


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earlierhe has said that in spite of Plato'sconvictionof the soul's immortality, he himselfhas no firmviews aboutit one way or the other (772-3:note howeverthathe does thinkthatit is betterto considerthe rationalsoul to be both mortalandcorporeal,on the groundsthatthe alternative wouldentail the unappetisingconclusionthat somethingdivine and incorporealwould be the slave of the body: 782, 787). Galen's caution on the issue is both remarkable and admirable.However, he implicitlyrelies on the principles that nothinghappenswithouta cause,20 and that all causingis bodily,2'to reject the possibility that the soul could be (at least in its entirety) immaterial:
all of this creates a strong presumptionwith regardto the whole of the soul that it is not incorporeal;for how could the soul be driveninto an unnaturalstate as a result of its association with a body, unless it were some qualityof a body, or some form, or some affection, or some power of a body? (QAM IV 788)

And Galen admits that even after much reflection he is unable to form any clear conception of what incorporeal souls could really be, and how they might be differentiated (776-7). Whatever one thinks of those robustly anti-Cartesian intuitions, howev-

er, Galen once againreaffirms the pointthat, for the doctorandphysiologist at any rate, such enquiries are as superfluous as they are inconclusive

(QAM IV 788). He cannotsay anythingwith certaintyaboutthe natureor essence of the soul:22but qua doctorhe does not need to (cf. in this context
Subst.Nat.Fac. IV 759, 763-4).23What is obvious, on his view, is that some

conditions which are clearly mental in nature (at least as regards their effects or manifestphenomenology),such as delirium,depression,drunk24 and insanity, are enness, consequent upon physical alterationsin the body, and consequentlysusceptibleof physicalcures:
so even those who postulate a special substancefor the soul will have to agree that it is subordinate (douleuein) to the temperaments of the body (QAM IV 779; cf. 777-9, 788), ' This principle is stated frequently throughout his works: see particularly in our contexts PHP V 389-90; 544, where it is described as 'one of the things known to everybody'; cf. MM X 36, 50, where it is cited as a basic axiom. 21 For this Stoic commonplace: SVF 1 89, 2 336, 340, 341, etc.; cf. Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos(M) 9 232ff; Galen himself subscribes to it explicitly at PHP V 567; and the rejection of action at a distance forms the backdrop to what I call his 'general causal axiom': see below, p. 222. 2 See also On the Formationof the Foetus (Foet.Form.) IV 699. 3 See Ballester, 1988, pp. 124, 126. 24 He expends a great deal of time expounding Plato's views on the subject; QAM IV 808-12.


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althoughit shouldbe stressedthatGalennowhereexplainsthe natureof the dependence.25Indeed, this is something that Plato agrees with (QAM The sumand 'the divine Hippocrates'.28 IV 789-91),26 as does Aristotle,27 phonia of the great authorities,so dear to Galen'sheart and the principal (as indeed it is of PHP), is not threatened. probandumof QAM29 Yet, for all that he is concernedto point out the basicagreementof the great men of the past, Galen is not blindto their genuinedifferences.His syncretismis neither utterly uncriticalnor wholly desperate. Indeed, the purposeof invokingthe 'divineHippocrates'is to reinforcethe claimthat not merelythe lower partsbut the rationalsoul too is dependentupon the constitutionof the body (QAM IV 804-5),whichis somethingthatPlato, at least in the Phaedo (90-95), is at painsto deny (althoughhe appearsnot to see n. 26 above; and cf. Rep. 10, 610aff.), as well as to do this in Timaeus: in the properregulationof emphasizethat not only are local disturbances influences,but its basic characterthe soul attributableto environmental istics (ethe) are as well.A0
See Ballester, 1988, pp. 131-3. 2 Galen quotes Timaeus86c-e in this regard, perhaps a little tendentiously (so thinks D.S. Hutchinson:see his 'Doctrines of the mean in fourthcenturymedicine, rhetoricand ethics', in R.J. Hankinson [ed.J Method, Medicine, and Metaphysics[Edmonton 1988: Apeiron Supp. Vol. XXI], on the grounds that Plato means only to emphasize that the cases of the mind and the body areparallel(Tim. 87c-89dis at least neutralin this regard); but Plato expressly says at ib. 86b: 'suchis the mannerin whichbodily diseases arise;the disordersof the soul, which depend upon the body, originate as follows'; and so Galen's readingof him seems justified (for Galen's Platonicinheritancein regardto the question of responsibility,see my art. cit., n. 1). Galen quotes furtherfrom Tim. 24c and 80b (as well as from Laws 5 747d), in order to show that the 'Platonists'are unfaithfulto their master in regard to the question of whether the environment is responsible for our characters. On Galen as a reader of Plato and Aristotle in QAM, see G.E.R. Lloyd, 'Scholarship, authority and argument in Galen's Quod animi mores', in Manuli and Vegetti, 1988, pp. 11-42. 7 Galen proves this at length in QAM IV 791-8, with extended quotations from de PartibusAnimalium 2 2-4, and the HistoriaAnimalium 1 8-10. Places;and from 2 QAM IV 798-803, by way of extended quotationsfromAirs, Waters, the Epidemics, ib. 803-4. 9 Lloyd, 1988, has rightlyemphasized, however, the indeterminacyof the exact nature of Galen's probandum in QAM: pp.33-9. 3 But once again Lloyd's remarks(see n. 26 above) are importanthere: '[f]or some of his weaker claims that MB [i.e. the mixtures of the body] are signs of CS [i.e. the capacitiesof the soul], that MB may influenceCS, he can quote supportingtexts and give some evidence, though both texts and evidence are already interpretedin a distinctive Galenic manner. At the same time the generalisationsabout CS following MB and MB even constrainingCS allow the impressionto be createdthat causallinksbetween the two might be established with some systematicityand in some detail.' (1988, pp. 38-9).


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The soul, for Galen, is a locus of capacities:

Everyone knows that we possess souls: for we plainly see the things that are activated through the body, walking, running, wrestling, the many varieties of perception; and we know on the basisof an axiom that commends itself naturallyto all of us that there is some cause for these activities - for we know that nothing comes to be without a cause. But because of our ignorance as to exactly what the cause of these things might be, we assign it a name on the basis of its capacity to do what it does, a capacity productive of each of the things that comes to be.3 (Subst.Nat.Fac. IV 760)

It may turn out to be impossible to establish, on the basis of secure demonstrations,what the physical, causal bases for these capacities are (Galen once more runs throughthe gamutof competingviews about the nature of the soul and its powers); and in those cases it is better not to deludeyourselfthatyou havesecureknowledgeof somethingfor whichyou Fac. IV 761), although it don't possess a firm demonstration(Subst.Nat. may even so be possible to arriveat a more or less plausibleaccount. But that there are causes, and separate causes for separate powers, can be
inferred a priori.32

Cf. in this context NatF.ac. II 9-10: all capacities (dunameis) fall within the class of relative concepts; and they are primarilythe cause of activities (energeiai),but also incidentallythe cause of their (sc. the activities') effects; but if the cause is relational, since it is of what comes to be from it and not of anythingelse, then it is clear that the capacitytoo is relational. And so long as we are ignorant of the nature of the productivecause, we call it a capacity. Thus we say that there exists . . . in each of the parts a special capacity correspondingto the activityof the part. So if we are to investigatemethodicallythe quantity and quality of the capacities, we need to begin from their effects. 32 QAM IV 769-72 spells this out; see in particular770-1: whenever we say 'the rational soul which is located in the brain is able to perceive throughthe mediumof the sense-organs,while it is able rememberin and of itself as a result of seeing consequence and conflict in things, of performing analyses and syntheses', we are pointing to nothing other than if we were to say compendiously that 'the rational soul has many capacities (dunameis):perception, memory, intellect and each of the others' (cf. MM X 13-14, quoting Plato's Phdr. 270c-d, on the individuation of dunameis; Eth. 4 [SM 2 25, quoted above, n. 19] and Rep. 5, 477d). Galen goes on to make the interesting claim that each section of the soul has its own desires (epithumiai): the rational part for truth, understanding, memory, knowledge etc., and the spirited for liberty, victory, reputationand honour; we call the lowest part 'desiderative'simply on account of the greater variety and range of its desires, in much the same way as 'the poet' means Homer, and 'the poetess' Sappho, 'callingthe principal representativesof the genus by the name of the genus itself' (ib. 771). The basic source for this (although not for the remarksabout namingand genera) is Plato once more: Rep. 9, 580d-e.


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In this vein, Galen rejectsthe straightforward assimilation of the soul's substanceto the pneuma (PHP V 605, 609; SMT XI 731; see Ballester, 1988, pp. 135-7),althoughhe agreesthat the pneumais the organonof the soul, the meansby whichit communicates its power:we shallreturnto this later on. Galen clearlyowes somethinghere to Aristotle, who first raised the question(in extremelygeneralterms)at the beginning of deAnima(1 1, 402bl-403a2) of whetherone shouldfirstexaminethe effects (erga)of the soul, or whetherratherone shouldstartby investigating its parts. Epistemologically and scientifically,then, Galen steers a middlecourse between excessive and unfounded dogmatismon the one hand, and a completescepticismon the other. He is preparedto speakof matterseven when knowledgeof them is not necessaryfor physicalor moralhealth(the two are consideredin Subst. Nat.Fac. to be if not indissoluble,then at the very least closely related), as long as they
bring adornmentto it as a result of knowingthem precisely(providedthat they are indeed securely known), and bring both medicine and ethical philosophy to completion. (PHP V 762; cf. 794)

Such things are both useful, and accessible to anyone prepared to take trouble to practise in it. And Galen proceeds to give a demonstration of his epistemological stance:
that every body in our partof the universe [i.e. the sublunarypart]comes to be as a result of the mixtureof elements I hold to be securely known . . . but whether as a result of complete intermixtureof the elemental bodies themselves, or whether of their qualities only, I do not think it necessaryto know, nor do I pronounceon the matter (although I think it more plausible that the mixture are mixturesof qualities). But as for the soul, whether it is immortaland directsanimalsin conjunction with bodily substances, and whether there is any substance of the soul as such, I assert that these things cannot be securely known. (PHP V 762-3)

Furthermore, ignorance of 'ensoulment' and 'metempsychosis' is of no consequence to medical practice. We can see how various sorts of physical treatment affect the soul; but it is impossible to know whether the soul can be separated from the body (PHP V 763-4).3 Thus a moderately clear picture of Galen's theoretical attitude to pronouncements about the soul (and indeed on all other controversial matters) emerges; and it is one which is consistent with what he says elsewhere about science and epistemological justification (notably in de Methodo Medendi (MM) X 31-40). Broadly, we can know things either because

See also in this regardSent. 3, 7; cf. Ballester, 1988, 126-6, 135.


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(I) they commend themselves indubitablyto the senses,'

or because
(II) they do so to the intellect,35

or because they are suitablyderivedfromthese two types of basicpremiss. It is important,Galen thinks, to keep these two methods of coming to know separate, and not to confound them - but they are both equally serviceable.Now, this epistemologicaldualismis designedpartlyto fit into Galen'ssyncreticprojectof derivingthe best featuresfromboth the Rationalist and the Empiricistschoolsof medicine;but there is nothingdisreputably ad hoc or indiscriminateabout the procedure. For Galen, certain thatwe knowledgerestson evidencein at leastone of its senses- everything know will either be, or be derived from, a phainomenon (or a set of phainomena)that comes to us enargos.But crucially,phainomenaare not merelyperceptual- even axiomatictruthsof geometrycount as phainomena in this sense (MMX 36). It is vain to pretendthat anythingarrivedat by any other route can meet the strictrequirements for knowledge.Put in this light, Galen's position has both structural clarityand methodologicalcautiousness to commend it - indeed, it sounds almost proto-Humean;and Galen mightwell agree with Hume about the appropriate questionsto ask of any text of 'school metaphysics':
3' An example of this class in what follows is the claim that 'vocal sound comes out of the

windpipe' (256: see p. 215 below); at 766-7, Galen contrasts the case of medicine with that of speculative cosmology, in which 'matters cannot be clearly adjudicated by empirical test (peira)' and where 'such a dispute cannot be decided by clear senseperception'. Galen evidently means also to include in this class the proposition 'the ears touch the brain' (240), and no doubt more controversiallythat 'irrationalanimals feel desire and anger' (211). 3 Examples of this class include Plato's 'Principleof Non-Contradiction'(Rep. 4 436b): 797. Other examples given elsewhere include mathematicaltruths ('equals subtracted from equals leave equals'), as well as metaphysicalclaims ('nothing comes to be from nothing') and logical and semantic principles ('it is necessary that everything be either affirmedor denied'): see MM X 36-7, and my notes ad loc. in my Galen on the Therapeutic Method, Books I and 2 (Oxford, 1991). At 240-1, in a passageto be considered below, Galen rejects an opponents' premiss('all thingsthat are active have their source nearby') on the grounds that it 'is neither evident to the senses nor to the mind, so as to be primary and credible in itself (ex heautoupiston)'. At 358, he apparentlyallows a thirdcategory of epistemologically respectable premiss: 'he [i.e. the genuine scientist] should inquire which premisses . . . should be taken from simple sense-perception, which from experience (empeiria), either of life or the arts, and which from truths which are clearly apparent to the intellect'; but note that the category of truthsderived from experience is not an immediate one.


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Does it contain any abstractreasoningconcerningquantityor number?No. Does it contain any experimentalreasoning concerning matter of fact or existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistryand illusion;'

None the less, the seeker after an authenticallyHumean, scientifically - for his actualpracticefails (as actual scepticalGalen will be disappointed he sets himself;since will) to meet the severetheoreticalstandards practices he claimsthat
while I am not so foolish as to make rash assertions about these things [i.e. the substantial nature and possible immortalityof the soul], still I do claim to have proofs that the forms of the soul are more than one, that they are located in three different places, that one of them (the reasoningpart) is divine, while the other two are concerned with affections, such that we are angrywith one of them, and desire those pleasures that come through the body with the other (which we share with plants)- and furtherthat one of these partsis situatedin the brain, one in the heart, and one in the liver. These facts can be demonstratedscientifically. (PHP V 793)

in a moment;but beforewe turnto We shalllook at those 'demonstrations' them, and to a detailed analysisof the types of argumentwhich Galen moral of Chrysippean bringsto bear in his discussionof the shortcomings psychologyand their respectivestrengths,let us concludethis section with afterthe passagequoted some Galenic remarksin summary.Immediately above, Galen continues:
I made my case for this in the firstsix books of this treatise;but I said nothing about the substance of the three forms of the soul, nor about their immortality. . . the knowledge that the forms of the soul are situated in three places, of what their powers are and how many they have, is useful for medicalscience and for that part of philosophy called moral and political . . . but the further inquirywhether the spirited and appetitive parts happen to be immortal .. . is of no use either to medicine or to moral and political philosophy;and many philosophersand doctors have passed over it, reasonablyenough; it belongs to the theoreticalratherthan the practicalbranch of philosophy. (PHP V 793-4)

And for Galen psychology is, properly regarded, a part of practical philosophy.37

Sect. XII, PartIII (p. 165, SelbyHume, EnquiryConcerningHuman Understanding, Bigge). Galen, no less than Hume is concerned with the uncovering of sophistry (see below, pp. 209ff.). For his views on sophisms in general, and the general structureof sophistry, see On Linguistic Sophisms (Soph.) XIV 582-98, edited by R.B. Edlow: Galen on Language and Ambiguity (Leiden, 1977); and cf. Pecc.Dig. V 62ff. " Again relevant is the discussion of Ballester, 1988, pp. 124ff.


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2. Scienceand Sophistry:the Role of Argument At the beginningof the second book of PHP, Galen writes:
I began with the doctrine that is of most importance ... namely their [i.e. Plato's and Hippocrates'] teaching about the powers that govern us, their numbers, the nature of each, and the place that each occupies in the body. And . . . I took greatest care to avoid making assertions contrary to what is plainly apparent ... Perhaps . . . it is better to distinguishthe different argumentspeople use when they argue badly about absolutely anything. With references to their premisses .. some are patently false, while others are inappropriate to the matter in hand. Patently false are those such as . . . when one says that none of the irrational animals feels desire or anger, as the Stoics do, or that the nerves have their origin in the heart. Inappropriatepremisses were dealt with it length in my On Demonstration. (PHP V 211-13)

The Stoics in general (and Chrysippus in particular) are Galen's targetfor muchof PHP; but Galenis not, as is sometimessupposed,uniformly hostile to orthodox Stoicism, even to orthodox Stoic psychology: at QAM IV 783-4, for example,he is friendlyto theirelementalaccountof the soul's composition, and Chrysippusis describedin this connection apparently
without irony for once as 'wise (sunetos)'. However Galen is implacably

hostile to the orthodoxStoic line on the position and numberof the soul's parts, hymning Posidonius for having returned at least partiallyto the Platonicway of truthon the issue: PHP V 390.38
38 Cf. also QAM IV 819-20, where Galen praises Posidonius for going against the

orthodox Stoic line on the uncorruptednature of children(see furthermy art. cit., n. 1). Posidonius of Apamea (fl. 1st Century B.C.) was an 'Aristotelizing'Stoic accordingto Strabo, II 3 8. Strabo, speaking as an orthodox Stoic, actuallysays: 'there is a great deal of aetiologizing and Aristotelizing in him, to which our school objects on the groundsof the non-evidence of the causes'; this has been taken to imply that 'Aristotelizing'means 'aetiologizing', i.e. supplying recondite causal explanations - and hence that the orthodox Stoics were opposed to such explanatorymanoeuvres:but those implicationsare justified neither by the text, nor by what we know of orthodox Stoicism and of Posidonius; see J. Barnes, 'Ancient skepticism and causation', in M.F. Burnyeat (ed.) The Skeptical Tradition(California, 1983). The fragmentsof Posidonius are collected in L. Edelstein and 1.G. Kidd, Posidonius: The Fragments, (Cambridge, 1972: hereafter 'EK'); the references above feature respectively as T 83 (PHP), F 35 (QAM), T 85 (Strabo), EK. For an instance of Galen's partialitytowardsPosidoniusin other contexts, see his Introductionto Logic (Inst.Log., ed. K. Kalbfleisch,Leipzig, 1896) 18 8. Here, as elsewhere, Galen's enrollment of Posidonius into the camp of the Platonic eclectic may not be entirely justifiable: see in the context of the psychology, I.G. Kidd, 'The Stoic intermediates and the end for man', and 'Posidonius on emotions', both in A.A. Long (ed.) Problems in Stoicism (London, 1971), pp. 150-72,200-15;and cf. M.C. Nussbaum, 'The Stoics on the extirpation of the passions', Apeiron XX 2, 1987, pp. 129-77 (p. 145-6).


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locationof the soul can Galen thinksthat the tnpartitionanddifferential (PHP V 793);the Stoicsby contrastheldout scientifically be demonstrated for both the functionaland positionalunityof the soul (actually,this claim requires care: the Stoics after all distinguishedseven distinct types of psychicpneuma: SVF 2 826, 836, 879; but they held that there was no distinctionbetween the rationaland the emotionalpartsof the soul). But the crucialfeatureof Galen's attackis his sustaineddeploymentof formal techniquesof logic and analysisin his attemptto show thatthe Stoicsfail to offer scientificdemonstrationsof their position. It is not, of course, that they deployare, in - they do. But the arguments they don'toffer arguments formulated:they rely for their apparent Galen's view, unperspicuously in theirpremisses,andon andequivocations validityon hiddenambiguities to scientific premissesthat fail to meet the standardof rigourappropriate reasoning.Galen'sstrategyis to bringthis out by dissectingthe arguments formulated,and subjectingthe and showinghow they shouldbe rigorously to severe criticalscrutiny.This alleged justificationsof their assumptions contentionof strategyis employedin the serviceof a further,fundamental Galen's:it is only by so doing, by clearlyexhibitingthe logicalstructureof argument,that one may hope to purge science of plausiblebut fallacious his works,Galenstressesthe imporreasoning.Time and againthroughout
tance of training in logic39 to anyone who wants to engage in scientific

reasoning:if one is not preparedto do this, or lacks the prequisiteinnate intelligenceto do it, theyshouldconfinethemselvesto simpleEmpiricism.' Let us then examinethe developmentof Galen'sattack. First of all, he seeks to dissect and criticizethe types of considerations they themselvesemploy in supportof their position. Their premisses,he (ouk oikeia), or 'patentlyfalse' (antikrus says, can either be inappropriate pseude:212, quoted above;cf. 286). I deal with the latterclassfirst. It will be rememberedthat Galen invokestwo distinctcriteriafor the acceptance of propositionsas being true (labelled (I) and (II) above), althoughboth involve the notion of clear appearance,enargeia.The Stoics' view, that 'none of the irrational animals feels desire or anger' (212-13, quoted

3 See particularlyPecc.Dig. V 61-93, esp. 72-5; cf. PHP V 222, 732-3, 783; MM X 18, 39; On Hippocrates' 'Epidemics' (Hipp.Epid.) XVIIB 61-2; Soph. XIV 582-98; On AntecedentCauses (CP) I 35, VIII 106, XI 142, XIII 170-2(CP exists only in a mediaeval Latin translation;it was edited for CMG [Supp. II] by Bardong [Berlin 19371;1 have prepareda new edition, translationand commentary,Galenon AntecedentCauses,to be published by Cambridge[forthcoming, 1992J:see my notes ad.locc.). ' See MM X 28-39.


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clasheswithwhatis plainlyapparent,andhence cannotbe true. It above),4" is supposed to be a datum of observation, a type (I) proposition, that animalshave desires and emotions:just take a look at the familydog. But such observationsare incompatiblewith the Stoic account- for they hold soul are one and the same (more precisely, that the rationaland irrational soul), and hence if animalslack reason they hold that there is no irrational they must lack emotion and desire;thus are the Stoics led to contradictan But in whatsense it is 'patentlyfalse'thatthe evidentdatumof experience.42 nerves have their origin in the heart? Surely that is not supposed to be somethingthat we can simplyobserve. No indeed: but on Galen's view it is, or at the very least ought to be, directlyinferrablefrom propositionsthat meet one of the two criteriafor certainty, that fall into either class (I) or class (II); and hence will itself become patent. It is important that for Galen truths can become selfevident- in a methodologically significant passage(De DignoscendisPulsibus VIII 786-802), Galen describeshow he trainedhis own facultyof touch so that he became able to detect the faint trace of the arterialsystole; but cruciallyonce he had done this, it was to him enargosphainomenon.And hence it is possible for a truth to be self-evident in this way even if few it as such. Muchof the restof (indeed, in the limitingcase, none) appreciate PHP is devoted to showinghow these truthsmay become self-evident. But before we turn to an examinationof how that is to be done, let us considerthe other classof inadequatepropositions,those thatare 'inapproandthe premissesof whichthey are priate'.In Galen'sview both arguments compoundedfall underfourgeneralheadings.In the firstplace, theycan be 'scientific'(epistemonikon),i.e. such as to be


Cf. 211, and 309: 'Chrysippus .. . holds that none of the irrationalanimals has the spiritedor desiderative or rationalpart;as I said also in the firstbook [now lost], virtually every Stoic deprives them of all these parts'(= SVFII 906). See also 338, 370-1, 32, 431, 459-60, 476, 484, 500. 42 Of course the extent to which it is an evident datum of experience may be disputed, and certainly would have been by the Stoics themselves - they are perfectly willing to allow perceptual and discriminatory faculties to animals, as well as according them impulse (horne) and impression(phantasia):see SVFII 714, 83, III 169. What they deny the aloga z6a is assent to the content of an impression,which they take to be characteristic of the rational soul; thus there need be no problem for them in accounting for how irrationalanimalsbehave as if they had emotions and desires (and perhapseven as if they could reason: this may have been the original point of Chrysippus'sdialectical dog: Sextus, PH 1 69, cf. M 8 271). This is a case where Galen's own argument outruns its evidential base.


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found in the very essence (ousia) of the matterunder consideration. . . we should firststate the essence and definitionof the thing underinvestigation,and then use it as a standard (kan6n) and a target (skopos).43(PHP V 219, cf. 220)

Anythingelse is
superfluous and irrelevant; and this is how a premiss that is (a) scientific differs from one that is either (b) rhetorical,or (c) used for training(gumnastikon), or (d) sophistical. (PHP V 220; cf. 221-4)"

By 'stating the essence and definition', Galen means that we should attend

to what he elsewhere refers to (borrowinga Stoic term) as the 'common conception'(koineennoia)of the matterin question,45andspellout exactly whatthat conceptionamountsto. This is essentiallya matterof conceptual analysis:
the governing part of the soul as even they Isc. the Stoics] allow is the source of sensation and drive (horme). Therefore the demonstration that the heart is the location of the governing part must not start from any other premisses than that (1) it initiates every voluntarymotion in the other partsof the animal'sbody,

(2) every sensation is referred to it. (PHP V 219-20)

One begins with what everyone (more or less) would agree to be the whatis in other words essentialfeaturesof the conceptunderinvestigation, out to be (1) and(2); turn these trueof the concept.In ourcase, analytically this is why Galen holds that, in proper scientific demonstrations,it is frequentlynecessaryto replace names with definitions(MM X 50), real in definitionsthat explicateandmakepatentthe naturesof theirdefinienda
" For Galen's use of the termskopos, see e.g. the firstsentence of On Sectsfor Beginners (SI, = SM 3 1-19 Helmreich [1893]) I 64: 'the target (skopos) of medical science is health, its end (telos) is the achievementof it'. Although Galen does not alwaysrigorously distinguishskopos from telos (cf. Stobaeus, Ecl. 2, = SVF 3 2-3), where he does so his distinctioncorresponds to this characterization.Cf. MM X 217-23 for an accountof the different skopoi in medicine. 4 The classes (a)-(d) form, in Galen's view, a descending sequence of increasing disreputability, although the proper order of the sequence is (a), (c), (b), (d) (in the recapitulationof PHP V 221, and at ib. 222 where they are treated in reverse order, the proper sequence is established); premisses that are 'dialectical'or 'gymnastic'are to be preferredto those which are merely rhetorical:ib. 221. The typology is clearly Peripatetic in inspiration (see in particular Top. 1 1, 100a18-101a8; and cf. Rhet. 1 1-2, esp. 1356a33ff.): Galen views the Analytics as being concerned with (a), the Rhetoric (obviously enough) with (b), the Topicswith (c), and the SophisticiElenchiwith (d): see ib. 222. Aristotle himself calls type (b) 'contentious' (eristikoi: Top. 1 1, 100b24), and type (d) 'paralogisms'(ib. 101a7). Cf. Albinus, Epit. 3 2; 6 4. 45 See MMX 43ff.


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But That muchis (at least in Galen'sview) uncontroversial. causalterms.46 he proceeds:

what can this be shown from?Fromwhat else apartfrom anatomy?For if it supplies the power of sensation and movement to all the parts of the body, then it is necessary that there be some vessel growingout of it to performthis service. (PHP V 220)

So detailed examinationby dissectionis essentialto the investigation. Galen's argumenthere rests on some not perhapsaltogetherinnocent assumptions;for instance, that the transmissionof any power must be a physicalprocessmediatedby some organ(essentiallythat all causingis, on analysis, causing by contact: I shall analyze this assumptionfurtherlater on). But what matters is Galen's insistence that the premisses of the argumentshouldbelong to class(a): thatthey shouldbe properlyscientific. As a consequence, argumentbased on anecdote and authorityshould be eschewed as falling underrhetoric,dialectic,or even sophistry:
all the premisses that are taken from men's opinions, whether those of non-experts, class. (PHP V 227) poets, or philosophers . . . belong to the third [i.e. rhetorical]47

methodof trying One of the principalobjectionsGalen has to Chrysippus' to demonstratethat the heart is the seat of the rationalfaculty is that he in supportof his position. relies on quotationfromthe poets anddramatists tell just as often againstthe ChrysipGalenpointsout thatsuch'authorities'
4 On these issues, see my opp.cit., nn. 1 and 3 above; in the context of inquiryinto the soul, see once again Aristotle, deAn. 1 1, 402bl2-403a2, esp. 21ff: 'andcontrariwisethe attributescontribute greatly to an understandingof the essence (to ti einai): for when we are able to give an accountof the appearanceof either all or most of the attributes,we will be in a position to talk in the best possible way about the essence (ousia). For the essence
(to ti estin) is the starting-point of all demonstration, so that those definitions which don't

allow us to know the attributes, or at the very least make a reasonable estimation of them, are all clearly enunciated for dialectical purposes and are without content.' Malcolm Schofield has asked whether '(i) a premissof the type evident to sense perception is the same as (ii) a scientific premiss'(since Galen apparentlyurges us to make use only of (ii) in demonstrations, and then spends some time dealingwith (i); and he further wondered whether Galen was simply confusing (a) Stoic and (b) Aristotelian styles of demonstration, where (a) is an inference from the phenomena to the best explanation ('there is sweating - so there are invisible pores in the skin'), (b) a deduction from axiomatic first principles to a conclusion. I think Galen can be acquitted of this confusion, although admittedly his language is unhelpful. Basically, Galen will admit both (a) and (b) into his science - (a) as a means of arrivingat the first principles, (b) as a systematizationof the science that results from them (see particularlyMM X 37-50, and my notes ad loc. in my op.cit. n. 35). '4 See n. 40 above.


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pean view as they do in favourof it (he gleefully seizes on the Homeric as supportfor accountof Tityus'spunishmentin Tartarus[Od. 11 576-811 his belief that the liver is locus of the desires:PHP V 583-5- at any rate if are not only demonstrais to fit the crime).Such'witnesses' the punishment tivelyuseless(althoughGalenallowsthatthey maybe broughtin to backup a claim alreadydemonstrated[PHP V 585], or to drawattentionto some ;8 of anger:PHP V 302-10,338) obviousfact, e.g.about the phenomenology reguthe gall of Galen has which prolixity famous the engender they also to complain.In fact larly(and apparentlyunselfconsciously)
with regardto the types of premiss, Zeno and Chrysippustaughtus no method and gave us no training,and consequentlythey are all jumbledtogether ... Often they will begin with a rhetoricalargument,follow it with a gymnasticand dialecticalone, follow that with something scientific, and finish with a sophistry;for they have no idea that scientific premisses refer back to the essence of the matter under investigation, having it as their target (skopos: cf. 219, above, p. 210, n. 39); everything else is irrelevant. (PHP V 221)

The fundamentalcharge levelled by Galen againsthis Stoic opponentsis that they pay insufficientattentionto the differingdemandsplaced upon contextsand purposes;and that they argumentby differentargumentative foul thingsup as a resultof sloppinessboth in theirdeductionsand in their deployment of logico-scientificvocabulary.In consequence, Chrysippus whichhave no probativeforce. For instance,he argues adducesarguments that its centralpositionin the body impliesthat the heartis the controlling organ (PHP V 228-9); Galen replies that first of all centralitydoesn't necessarilyentailcontrol(thatis, it does not followsimplyfromconceptual analysisof the notions 'centrality'and 'control'- at the very least, further premissesare required);and secondlythat the heartis not in the middlein
any case: the navel is.49
48 Galen's use of authority is a subject in its own right, and is independently of great interest: see Lloyd, 1988. A particularlyvivid case is that of the opening pages of MM (X 1-20: see my remarksad loc. in my op.cit. (1), n. 5, forthcoming), in which Galen imagines Thessalus arguing his claims to medical supremacy in front of a tribunal comprisingthe great doctors and philosophersof the past; Galen claims that not one of them could be found to agree with his position. But this is not simply an appeal to authorityas such- ratherGalen's position here as elsewhere is that agreementamong the great men of the past is a consequence of the truth of their views, and hence a weak indication of it: but is no substitute for actual scientific investigation. Cf. Nat.Fac. II 140-1, 178-80. 4 These 'arguments'are treated by Galen as being on a par with the claim that 'because the brain, like the Great King, dwells in the head as in an acropolis, for that reason the ruling part of the soul is in the brain', and others of that ilk: PHP V 230-1.


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of the claimof the heartto be the seat of But Chrysippus's championship the hegemonic soul does not rest solely on such sandy foundations. He offers an argument that at least purports, on the typology established above, to be scientific in nature, although it too, on Galen's analysis, rests on a faulty 'axiom' about the relationsbetween location and causal in the Stoic influence(PHP V 240: see furtherbelow). The mainargument arsenal for the primacyof the heart is given in three distinctversionsby Galen (PHP V 241-3), those ascribedto Zeno of Citium, to Diogenes of Babylon, and to Chrysippus himself. Here is Zeno's argument:
passes through (choreidia) the windpipe. (ii) If it were passing [A] (i) voice (phonW) from the brain, it would not pass through the windpipe. (iii) Voice passes from (apo) the same region as discourse (logos). (iv) Discourse passes from the mind (dianoia). Therefore (v) the mind is not in the brain. (PHP V 241)

That argument, however, is enthymematic;after a lengthy discussion (some of which we shall returnto below), Galen concludesthat
Zeno's argumentlacks some of the premissesrequiredfor a complete formulation. This will be more evident if we rephrase them for greater clarity, so that the argument would be as follows: [B] (vi) voice is sent out through (ekpempetaidia) the windpipe. (vii) If it were sent out of (ek) the brain it would not be sent out through the windpipe. But (viii) voice is sent out of the same region as discourse. (ix) Discourse is sent out of the mind. Therefore (x)[= (v)] the mind is not in the brain. (PHP V 256)

The difference between [A] and [B] rests on the substitutionof the more causally loaded 'is sent out' in [B] for the neutral 'passes'in [A]; and in Galen's replacementof Zeno's preposition'apo' with 'ek'.52 Galen's dissectionof [A]'s failureturnson the idea thatit confusesthe notionof causal originwith thatof simpleimmediate place of origin,and thatthis confusion
5 I translate 'phong' here and throughout as 'voice' rather than 'speech' (as DeLacy rendersit), as it is the standardGreek for any animalnoise (even fish have it, accordingto Aristotle: De An. II 8,), and as the Stoics clearly use the term thus: 'voice and speech (lexis) differ, because even noise is voice, while speech is always articulate'(DL 7 57); none the less, speech is sometimes clearly indicated. S1 dianoia is usually rendered 'thought', and sometimes De Lacy will translate it thus (e.g. PHP V 243, in a citation from Chrysippus,where the context virtuallydemands it); but in general De Lacy's rendering of 'mind' seems to fit the sense better - what is referredto in general in these passagesis not the operation, but what operates: cf. 257-8, where Galen writes 'it is clearly possible to substitute the word "sovereign part (kurieuon)" for dianoia'. 52 This substitution is not entirely gratuitous: both Diogenes and Chrysippususe 'ek' ratherthan 'apo' in their formulationsof the argumentPHP V 241-3; and Galen at least claims that it is less prone to an ambiguousinterpretation.But see n. 56.


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in the preposition'apo'. But this is not all there is fosteredby an ambiguity is to the analysis.Galen continues:
Now the first premiss [(vi)] is of the type evident to sense-perception, so that it requires no proof; for everything evident to the senses is credible in itself (pistaex heautin). But the second premiss [(vii)] belongs neither to the class of things evident to the senses nor to that of those evident to the intellect, since it is not one of the primaryaxioms. 3 The argumentshould have had the followingform, if it was to startfrom primaryand demonstrativepremisses: [Ci] (vi) voice is sent out through the windpipe. (xi) All that is sent through something is sent out of the parts continuous with it. (xii) The brain is not continuous with the windpipe. Therefore (xiii) voice is not sent out of the brain. (PHP V 256-7)

(vi) and (xii) fall into class (I), as self-evident truths of observation. By contrast (xi) is a truth of type (II) (or is at least supposed to be), and hence (I suppose) knowable a priori. Together, (vi), (xi), and (xii) entail (xiii).

However, the argumentstill requiresthe proof of a furtherlemma 'using the conclusion[sc. of the previousargument:(xiii)] as a premiss':
[Cii] (xiv) From the region from which voice is sent out, meaningfulvoice is sent out; (xv) meaningfulvoice is discourse, (xvi) [= (ix)]. Discourse is sent out of the mind; (xvii) discourseis not sent out of the brain;hence (xviii) [= (v), (x)] the mind is not in the brain. (PHP V 257; there are, Galen notes, other ways of formulating the argument:257-8).4

So where does this leave us? We need to go back a few stages into Galen's refutation in order to find out. But first of all we should note the effect of the reformulation on the argument: [A] was enthymematic, lacking the necessary axiom to articulate the inference. [C], by contrast, is fully spelled out; and the difference is made by premiss (xi) (or (C2) in the formal version of

the Appendix), which purportsto be a universallytrue relationalaxiom;

Presumablythe 'primaryaxioms' are the same as the 'logical axioms' (logikai archai) Method ad loc.); see also Thrasybulus of MM X 37 (see my Galen on the Therapeutic V 846-7; at Inst.Log. 17, Galen remarksthat virtuallyevery sound argumentderives its soundness from an axiom, which he defines as 'ex hautoupistos logos' - on the force of this see my 'Galen on the logic of relations', forthcomingin L. Schrenk(ed.) Aristotlein Later Antiquity. Galen's objection to premiss (vii), the reconstructed premiss (ii) of Zeno's original argument, is that it is unsupportedby the requisite general considerations, which is why the argumentrequiresthe additionof the 'axiom' (xi) - but of course the 'axiom' fails to meet the appropriateepistemologicalcriteria.For similarmoves (in a quite different argumentativecontext), see Inst.Log. 16, where Galen objects to both Stoic and Peripateticformulationsof the argumentthat if Socratesis Lamprocles'father, then the latter is his son, on the grounds that neither invokes the requisite axiom of father-son relations at a sufficientlygeneral level. I discussthis case and its meta-logical implicationsin my art.cit. above. 4 For a formalisationof these arguments,see Appendix.


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and it is that relationwhichis supposedto support(ii) (or (A2) ).55 But (xi) is ambiguous- and it is on the detectionof that ambiguity that Galen bases his refutation.The damageis done by the apparently innocentpreposition
'out of (apo).

Galen himself does not adopt the strategyof attacking(xi) in its full generality;ratherhe fastens on (ii), Zeno's unsupportedderivativeof it, reformulating it as
(2a) if voice were sent out from (apo) the brain, it would not be sent out throughthe windpipe. (PHP V 244-5) (= [B] vii)

in orderto 'replacethe word"passes"with a moreperspicuous term'. (2a), Galen claims, is not merely unscientific;
this premiss not only falls outside the first class [i.e. that of the scientific and demonstrative premisses: see above] . . . but even outside the second and third . . .; it belongs to the fourth class, the sophistical premisses, since it hides behind a verbal form that has been given a fraudulentand sophistical ambiguityin the hope of thus avoiding refutation. For the statement . .. 1(2a)] is unsound because it contains the preposition 'from' (apo); in all such propositions, the prepositions 'by' (hupo) and 'out of (ek) are umambiguous;. ... For voice sent out through the windpipe is also sent out of something and by something; out of something, namely the vessel which contains it, and by something, namely the power which causes the container to move. (PHP V 244-5)

Thus (2a) might be glossed either as

(2ai) if voice were sent out by the brain, it would not be sent throughthe windpipe

or as
(2aii) if voice were sent out of the brain, it would not be sent throughthe windpipe. (PHP V 245-6) " (C9) of the formal version is also an importantaxiom, but I supply on it Galen's behalf in order to get rid of the identity-sign:note that the sense of 'in' which 'I' stands for needs to be relatively strictly and tightly interpreted, otherwise the axiom turns out to be obviously false. 5 One might be disposed to doubt Galen's claim here about 'ek', at least construed as a claim about ordinary Greek - for 'ek' seems to have exactly the same indeterminacyas Iapo', perhapsmore so. Aristotle wrote a chapterof his philosophicallexicon (Met. 5 22) on its vagaries, and much of his metaphysicsof generation and change can be seen as an attempt to purge Greek philosophy of the logical and metaphysicalshambles it had got itself into as a result of too little appreciationof the logically Protean nature of 'ek' (it is entailed by the logic of generation that everything that comes to be does so from its opposite; but it cannot be the case that opposites cause opposites; hence generation is impossible - that is, I think, Parmenides' argument: and it falls foul of the same confusion). But for all that, Galen is surely substantially right about the danger of confusion here; see n. 52 above.


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(it's not thatsense of 'outof thatis (2ai) is false; (2aii) is true butirrelevant one of equivalentformulations, at issue here). In general,(xi) is susceptible of them analogousto (2ai) andfalse, whilethe other, analogousto (2aii), is true but logicallyimpotent. Consequentlythe argumentfails. Galen reinforces the truth of this by asking the reader to consider analoguesto (2ai) involvingurineandexcrement.If reasonwere located,as the Stoicshave it, in the heart,andif it werethe casethatforA to controlB, B would have to be sent out of A, then the excretoryfacultiescould not be underrationalcontrol(since the heartis not adjacentto either the urethra or the rectum).But such an argumentsimplyinvolvesthe same confusion: By payinginsufficientattention we are not, a priori at least, incontinent."7 to the properuse of languagethe Stoicsseek to drawabsurdcausalconcluthe limitsof agencyon the basisof a perfectlytruebutquite sions regarding irrelevant propositionabouttransferandadjacency.Indeed, 'the answerto our originalquestionremainsopen- nothingin the evidence[sc. of howthe body is controlled]inclinesus to either view (PHP V 249)'. andthe Transmission theLocationof Functions, Investigation, 3. Empirical of CausalPower So much for destructiveargument,Galen has, effectively, shown that the Stoics have failed to make out a case for their contentionthat
(1) the heart is the locus of choice and control (LC);

the excretory argumentssuggest furtherthat they have to supporttheir claim that it is impossiblethat
(2) LC lies in the brain.

It remains,however,for Galen to disprove(1) andto supporthis own view (2). He has establishedthatpositionallocationhasnothingdirectlyto do with whetheror not an organcancontrolthe functionsof some other;you cannot simplyinfer what moves what by seeing what is next to what. But then, as
'I need not provide a proof that this statement is not true: I need only ask that they comment on the following piece of reasoning: Urine passes throughthe genitals; if it were sent out by the heart it would not go out throughthe genitals;but it is in fact sent out throughour choice; choice therefore is not in the heart. Once can construct an argumentabout excrement in the same way.' (PHP V 246). On suchparabolai, see M. Schofield, 'The syllogismsof Zeno of Citium', Phronesisxxviii 1, pp. 34ff.


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Galen notes, Chrysippus has a rejoinderto the advocatesof (2) - if they are right, and it is possiblefor voice to be carriedfromthe windpipe,but at the initiationof the head,58 then equallyit mustbe possibleon theiraccountfor part as a (1) to be true. Galen representsthis concessionon Chrysippus' blunder, an admission that his own argumentwas not demonstratively mistakeon Galen'spart. probative:59 this mayor maynot be a philosophical is justifiedad hominem, However, even if Galen's criticismof Chrysippus he still needs, since he himselfrejects(xi), to be able to bluntthe objection, even if it turns out (as I think ultimatelyit does not) that Chrysippusis logicallybarredfrom framingit. What he needs, then, is to show just what is requiredin the way of connections between one part of the body and anotherfor control to be exercised. Suchconnectionwill be physical;' hence we mustdiscoverwhat is as a matterof fact the righttype of physicalconnection.The appropriate route to such a discoveryis via anatomy;and anatomicalexperimentation connectors. favoursthe nerves as being the appropriate The special organ of voice is the larynx,and the nerves that control its musclesoriginatein the brain;by ligatingthese nerves,you can deprivethe animalof vocal power(PHP V 235).61Galenreinforcesthisby pointingout
S8 apo

tes kephalhspoias tinos katarche's gignomenes (255): Galen purports to quote Chrysippus'sown words here.
59PHP V 255-6; cf. 261:

He conceded that it is possible that voice be sent out of the chest and through the windpipe, while the head suppliesthe originof movement (archetes kineseos) to the parts in that region; the argumentmust therefore not be considered demonstrative as most Stoics supposed. It could be objected that Galen's criticismis logically misguided: one may entertain a position per impossibile for the purposes of making an ad hominem point, without committing yourself in any real sense to its possibility(or alternativelyone may concede that it is logically possible, yet deny that it is causallypossible; and one may even allow its causal possibility, while simply denying its causal actuality). One might attempt to defend Galen here; the Stoics rely implicitly,he thinks, on an assertionof the impossibility of there being causal arrangementsof the kind that Galen wants to defend - on the a priori truth of the axiom (xi) (interpreted on the lines of (2ai): p. 217 above); but if it were true a priori, then such counterfactualswould be even conceptually impossible. That does not settle the matter- and more can be said in defence of the coherence of the Chrysippeanposition even if (xi) is construedas an a priori axiom with immediatecausal consequences. 60 Here Galen simplyadopts the virtuallyuniversalGreek view that causingis a matterof transmissionby bodily contact (see n. 21 above): I examine this 'General CausalAxiom' (GCA) further below. 61 Galen's famous experiments on the recurrent laryngeal nerve are described in AA II 576-8: much of AA is devoted to variousexperimentsinvolvingligation and severingof nerves.


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that if the heart were responsiblefor muscularmovements,such ligations would not affect the voice, and furtherthat as a matterof fact you can damage an animal'sheart without immediatelyimpairingits voice (PHP V 237).62Thusexperimentshowsus thatit is the nervesthatcarrythe causal powerresponsiblefor voice; andas a matterof type (I) evidentobservation we can see that the nerves in questionhave nothingto do with the heart. of a generalprincipleof causalmediation(GCA: Hence, by an application see furtherbelow, p. 222), the heartcan have nothing(at least directly)to and so (1) is false. The argumentalso provides do with voice-production; supportfor (2); but that supportneeds to be toughenedinto proof. In order to do this, Galen needs to tease out the resultsof his ligation experiments,and to reinforcethem with causal axioms. We have already advertedto a generalaxiomof causalmediation(GCA); that will show, in withthe anatomical evidence,thatthe nervesare experimental conjunction and for vocal power, and of consciouscontrol;63 the media of transference furtherthatwhateveris as a matterof fact the LCwill be locatedat one end medium.But it won'tas yet tell us whichend or the otherof the transferring (cf. PHP V 563-40);hence we cannot yet determinewhere the LC is. In orderto do that, Galen thinks,he mustdeterminethe origin(arche)of the in question;andit is to thatissuethathe turnshis attentionnext. structures Galen wraps up his attack on the Stoic argumentwith the following ringingparagraph:
I would perhaps say more about the fallacy of the argumentif Chrysippushad not also recognised its absurdity . . . where he said that it is possible for discourseto be sent out from the parts in the chest while the head providesthe origin of movement (arche tMs kinese6s), just as it is possible that the nerves all have their growthout of the head but receive the origin of their power from the heart. Chrysippuswas correct in saying this . . .; but what he said about argumentsfrom position, and about those among them that rest for the most part on the evidence of poets, or of the majorityof mankind,or etymology, or anythingof that kindwas not correct. He would have done better to stick to the sort of premiss supplied by the scientific method, and to examine them and judge them by means of perception (PHP V 261-2; cf. 766, quoted above, p. 201)

The important thinghere is thatGalenallowsthat, for all thathasbeen said and demonstratedso far, it is possiblethat
Indeed you can remove it completelyand the animalwill continue to protestvocally, at least for a while: 238-9. comprehensivesequence of experimentson the nervous sys'3 Galen's extraordinarily tem and the spinal column are detailed in AA II 651-706; and see also the later books, preserved only in Arabic (M. Simon, Sieben Bucher, Anatomie des Galen (Leipzig, 1906), pp. 13-31, 92-114, 261-73).


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(3) the nerves might be the vehicles for the motor functions; (4) the nerves have their origin in the brain;

and that
(5) the heart may in turn supply the brainwith the power of perception and choice (dunamis aisthetikete kai proairetike:PHP V 262).

(3), (4) and (5) are not incompatible - hence, even if (3) and (4) have been demonstrated it remainsto show that (5) is false, in orderto favour(2) over (1). In the succeedingsentences, Galen spells out how one is to go about doing that:
one must determine by dissection . . . the numberand natureof the structuresthat connect the heart with the brain, and next one must cut or crush or ligate each of them at the neck, and then observe what the effects are on the animal. The heart and brain are connected by three kinds of vessels . . ; veins, arteries, and nerves. (PHP V 263)

Then you mustproceedcarefullyto isolate each vessel in turnand see what effect ligaturehas on each of them. This is difficultto do accurately,as the vessels are very close together,andhence it is easy to trapmorethanone of them at once (this fact, Galen thinks, is responsiblefor muchfaulty theorising about these matters:264; see p. 225 below). When you ligate the nerves, the animalloses its vocal power(althoughthe involuntary activities remain unaffected, as do some of the voluntaryones): but no such effect happenswhen the arteriesare ligated;
hence one may readilyinfer that the heart needs no help from the brainto move the pulse, and the brainneeds none from the heart for the animalto have sensation and the power of voluntary action. (PHP V 264)4

Whatof those who thinkthat ligationof the arteries produces'aphasiaand stupefaction'? Well, Galen says, they makea mistakeaboutthe phainomena (ligationof the arteriesdoesn'tcausevoicelessness),65 but they are right about the conclusionsthey shoulddrawwere theiraccountof the phenomena correct:
'6 Galen wavers in quite what he assertsis lost when the nerves are ligated- sometimes it

appears only to be the voice, at other times it is the power of voluntarymovement and sensation as well; and this vacillation blurs the outline of his argument. But it is not radicallydamagingto it; and he was well awareof the distinctionbetween the sensory and the motor nerve (see the passages of AA cited in nn. 56, 57 above; and in particular Simon (1906), pp. 262-9, in which Galen describesin detail a sequence of neural ligatures to produce a variety of different results:in no case, however, is it ligatureof the arteries that produces the sensory and motor effects). '5 For this reason Galen thinks that the carotid arteriesare wronglynamed: PHP V 195.


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for if the animal really became stupefied (karodes)' . ., it would necessarily follow that the heart sent out the primaryorigin of sensation and movement to the brain, while the latter distributedit throughthe whole body via the nerves . .. For as it was demonstratedearlier [Book One, V 187-210]that the heartis the source of the arteries and the brain of the nerves, the conclusion would follow if their statement were true, that the heart supplies the brain with psychic power via the arteries (PHP V 265-6).

All of these argumentsmake use of the followinggeneralcausalaxiom:

GCA: If A transmitssome causal power P to B, then either (a) A is adjacentto B, or (b) if A is remote from B, then there is some vessel V such that V links A and B and P is transmittedthrough V.

can now be construedas a failure The Stoic errorin the windpipeargument assumptionthat to see that (b) is a legitimateoption, and a corresponding GCA amountedto its firstdisjunct(a). But GCA on its own won't deliver Galen's conclusion; he requires anothercausal axiom, presupposedas commongroundbetween him and his opponents in the argumenthere, namely an axiom of causal priority (ACP). This could be formulatedin a varietyof ways, but intuitively(and it states that semi-formally)
ACP: Some organ 0 is only causallyprimaryin regardto some power P if it is not the case that there is some further organ O' which is prior to 0 and responsible for P.

ACP as it stands is both unclear and formallydeficient. The notion of I needs givingformalflesh, as does the conceptof priority.6" responsibility minefield,and trustoptimistishall not venturefurtherinto that particular cally that the general lines of the claim being made by ACP are clear andobscure.But it mustbe the enough, even if its detailsare controverted case that 'necessary' and 'responsible'are to be construed in a sense - for, in that weak strongerthan that of simplybeing causalprerequisites voluntary sense, the heartwill satisfyACP (animalscan'tfeel or undertake movements unless they are alive; and the heart is necessaryfor life).!8 Indeed, failureexplicitlyto treatof these issuesseems to me to be perhaps the most seriousflaw in Galen'scausalanalysis.He is of coursewrongthat buthe couldallowthatthey the carotidarteriesdo not affectconsciousness;

Galen glosses karodes thus: to anaisthetonte kai akineton (266). hoper autois onoma bouletaisOmainein 67 Again informallyA is prior to B just in case A is necessary for B: but the difficulty merely resurfacesin a new guise - 'necessary'in what sense? I For a discussionof the difficultiesinvolved in determiningthe precise sense of 'causal' and 'responsible' in related contexts, see my art.cit., n. 1 above.


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did, and still preserveboth (1) andACP, if he allowsthat 0 can be primary for P even thoughsome O' is (in some sense) responsiblefor the continued functioningof 0; O' of coursecannotbe responsiblefor P (by ACP) - butit does not seem that such a state of affairscould not obtain. However, Galen appearscommittedto rejectingthis possibility.69 But howeverthat may be, we still need some wayof supporting (or at the very least of understanding) Galen's claim to have demonstrated that the heart is the origin of the arteriesand the brainof the nerves, as he claims alreadyto have done. For surely all he has shown so far (at best) by his experimentsis that there is causal communication via the nerves and the arteries- how can he claimto have shownits direction(cf. PHP V 563-4)? Let us turnto a passagein Book Six of PHP, afterthe lengthyrefutationof the Stoic accountof the passionswhichhasoccupiedmostof the intervening section of the treatise.70 In Book Six, after establishing(at least to his satisfaction)the truth of Plato's doctrine that the rationalpower is located in the brain, while the spiritedpart residesin the heart,7" he turnsto the case of the liver, and the appetitivepart:
this proof will not be from such clear evidence . ., nor are its premissestaken from the very nature of the thing under investigation, (cf. 219, 227: and see above) but from properties peculiar to it (ek ton tou6i subebekot6n idiai).72 For when the nerves were stopped with ligatures or were cut, we could see that the parts continuous with the brain retained their original powers, but those beyond the ligature immediately lost both sensation and motion. And similarlywith the arteries: we saw the naturalpulse still remainedin the arteriescontinuous with the heart but disappeared completely in those that were separatedoff by ligature." Again it See PHP V 532-4, a passage discussed below. lhis treatment forms the subject-matterof my art.cit., n. 1. At 333-4, Galen recapitulateshis argumentconcerning the brain and the heart: one must begin from [their] attributes and properties . . . as they pertain to the essence of the matter . . . [t]he main ones were that the brain is the source of . . . nerves which transmitsensation and voluntarymotion . . . as the heart is the source
of the arteries . . . and when the . . . brain is pressed or wounded the whole animal


becomes stupefied, but neither the arterial motion nor that in the heart is destroyed . . . We also showed that neither supplies these powers to the other . . . but

each of them is as it were the fountain of its own power. n The phrase is Aristotelian: see De An. I 1, 402a5; for some examples of 'properties', see n. 71. 73 On Galen's experiments with arterial ligature, and the (false) conclusions he drew thereby concerning the transmissionof the power of the pulse, see WhetherBlood is NaturallyContainedin theArteries(Art.Sang.) IV 702-36;Art.Sang. is edited with useful notes and introductoryessays by D.J. Furleyand J.S. Wilkie in Galenon Respirationand the Arteries, (Princeton, 1984); see also M.P. Amacher, 'Galen's experiment on the


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was clearly evident that the disturbancesof the soul that occur in anger and fear cause the heart to depart from its naturalaction. We also mentioned in how many ways the whole body is harmedby pressureon the brainor damageto its ventricles, and that this too clearly indicatesthat it is the sourceof motion and sensation. But in the case of the liver we are unable to make any such demonstration, whether by exposing it and applyingpressure,or by ligatingthe veins. For it is not the source of obvious motion as the heart is of pulsation and the brainof sensation and volition; nor is it the cause of rapidinjury,as the others are, but it takes time for the weakness of the liver to harm the animal's nutritionand colouring. (PHP V 519-21)

There are two importantfeatures of this passage - one is the eminently plausibleidea thatit is easierto see thatsome intervention hashadan effect if the effect in questionfollows immediatelyor rapidlyupon the intervention.74 The secondis that, given thatcausalinfluenceis directional,flowing one way only, if you interveneat some point in the vessel whichtransfers the influence such as to interruptit, then all points downstreamof the interruption will be affected,whilethose upstream of it will not be affected. - Galen himselfmakesconsidThat aqueousmetaphoris not accidental erableuse of it, and it is arguablethatthe metaphorcoloursandconditions his accountof the fluxionof bloodin the body:75 at PHP V 572, he describes the veins as ochetoi, conduits;76and in his defence of the role of the liveras the source (arche)of the veins at 545-7, he writes:
if you wished to describe the distributionof water broughtinto a city, you would not pass over its first entrance and find some other point from which to begin the account; there is every necessity first to speak of that place in the city where the water first arrivesfrom outside and from that beginningto proceed to describe the rest. Therefore you should not look for one starting-point(arche') of the nature of the thing, and another for instruction(didaskalia)about it. (PHP V 546)

Galen is makingthe ad hominempoint that even those who deny that the liver is the archeof the veins none the less begin theiraccountof the veins from the liver, which suggestsits primacy. Nevertheless,the water analogyis not, as we shall see, entirelya happy thatGalenemploysis thatof one; andindeedthe mostprominent metaphor off the branchesof a tree the veins split fromtheirbasictrunk(555-7;cf.
arterialpulse, and the experiment repeated', Sudhoffs Archivfur Geschichteder Medizin, 48 (1964). 7 Cf. in a different context In Hippocratisde Natura Hominum (HNH) XV 161-2 (ad ch. 13). the Erasistratians,and Aristotle', Bulletin 7 Cf. in this regardI.M. Lonie, 'Erasistratus, of the History of Medicine 38, (1964), pp. 426-43. 76 Cf. Tim. 77c-e, where Plato employs the same languageand a similarmetaphor(cf. ib. 78c-79a).


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530);thisimageis developedmostfullyat 522-7,whereit is interwoven with that of the water-supply;one short quotation from this passage should suffice to give its flavour:
it is evident to anyone who is versed in the ways of naturethat largerthings are the sources (archai) of smaller, just as the springis greater than the channels (ochetai) into which it is divided. And yet some have attained the peak of unreason by supposingthat what follows the archeis greaterthan the arche.7 They are misled by rivers, which are very small at their sources, but increaseas they advance . . . Some riversgrow larger . . . when tributariesflow into them, while some decrease in size as channels branchoff. No riverthat comes froma single springis smallerat its head than it is thereafter, but if it is collected from many springsit is reasonable that the whole should become larger than any one of them. (PHP V 525-6)

will serve as suitableanaloguesandno So only certaintypesof watercourse doubt Galen is thinkingof irrigationsystems, or other sorts of artificial water-supply. But what entitleshim to do this, in his view, is the absurdity of supposingthat in animalsthe sources of the nutritivepower could be various and at the extremities,flowing together to some confluence:the point is made partlyby appealingto analogy, partlyby appealto reason:
[you will be] compelled to admit that the source of the . .. arteries, nerves, and veins is in every partof the body, so that the heel perhaps,or the fingeris the source of the largest artery . . . So perhapsthe person who introducesthis argumentis not ashamed to say that the branchesof trees or the ends of roots are the archaiof the plant . . . simply to say that the ends of the veins are archaiis absurd . . . every part will be a source. If they reply that some of the ends are archai and others not they will be putting forwardan undemonstratedassumption. (PHP V 526-7)

The model, in fact, is clearly that of irrigationsystems- the blood, like waterin irrigation ditches,flowsout froma centralsource, andis dispersed to and absorbedby the extremities.78 However, the assumptionthat it is logicallyentailedby the conceptof a source,an arche', thatsucha thingmust be unitaryand undivided(hence the remarks aboutthe impossibility of the root-endsbeing archaifor the tree) is clearlya very strongone, and on the face of it unjustifiably so. It is worth remarking in this context that Galen does hold that the root-ends are analogous to mouths (527: see n. 96 below), hence he cannot simplyhold that it is impossiblefor a varietyof
7 This sort of claim bears comparisonwith Descartes' famous idea that there is always at least as much 'reality' in the cause as in the effect': MeditationsIII; although Galen's employment of an analogous principle here is I think less philosophicallysuspect than Descartes'. 78 For the pervasivenessof this model, and its possible effect of suppressing the emergence of the hypothesis of the circulation of the blood, see Lonie, 1964 and see Timaeus 77c-e, 78c-79a.


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separate parts to contribute to the same overall function. Rather, I think the crucial notion is that of control: if control over some function is to be

exercised, then it must be done centrally- causalpower ramifiesout from

the original source.79 That is a powerful intuition, and I shall not pursue the

matterfurther.I am not convincedthatit is in all casesjustified,however.' Galen'saccountis also guidedby analogywiththe case of the heart- for in the case of that organ, he thinks you can just see directlythat it is the source of arterialactivity,since
the heart alone of all the parts in the animalis seen to preserve its naturalactivity8' for a very long time even after removal. (PHP V 531; cf. 185-7, 238-9; 561-3)

But of courseit is impossibledirectlyto see this in the case of the liver- and hence its role in connectionwith the veins mustbe inferredby analogy,an analogythat involvesappealsto the similarity of the branching of structure the veins to that of the arteries, and to variousstructures to be found in plants.Galen'streatmentis muchmorecomplexanddetailedthanI can do justice to here; but I shall brieflyconsiderone subsidiary set of arguments involvinganalogybefore turningto the actualaccountof the functioning of the soul. At PHP V 532ff., Galen considersa possibleobjectionto the claimthat the liver is responsiblefor the nutritivepowersuppliedby the veins. Could not the liversimplysupplythe material,whilethe heartinjectedthe power? This is rejected partly on conceptual grounds;if an organ supplies the matter, then it must be the source of the nutritivepower:for
it is reasonable that what provides the whole body with mattersuitablefor nourishment is the source of the power of nutritionand growth. (PHP V 533)

But that is not the whole story- if the heartpossessesthe nutritivepower, then either the liver is superfluous(but nature,for Galen even more than or the liverfunctions'like a servant', for Aristotle, does nothingin vain),82
of 7 Indeed, ramificationof this sort is sometimes taken to be the definingcharacteristic causal direction: see e.g. K. Popper, 'The arrowof time', Natureclxxvii (1956), 538; see also J.L. Mackie, The Cementof the Universe(Oxford, 1974), ch. 7. ' Recent work on the nature of the immune system, and the proper way to describe it, provides an example in point: see in this regard the paper by E. Levy 'Networks', in Matthen and Linsky, 1988 (n. 82). 81 i.e. that of causing pulsation in the arteries: it is not quite clear what he has in mind here; nor does it seem, on any interpretation,actually to be true. I See my articles (1) 'Galen explains the elephant', in Matthen and Linsky (eds.) Philosophy and Biology (CanadianJournalof PhilosophySupp. Vol. 14, 1988), pp. 13557, and (2) 'Galen and the best of all possible worlds', in Classical Quarterlyxxxix 1 (1989), pp. 206-277.


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Galen rejectsthison the basisof an as Alexanderof Aphrodisiasbelieved.83

(A): every organ that prepares material for another keeps it untouched for that organ; (PHP V 534)

and (A) is taken to entail (in conjunctionwith a furtherunstatedaxiom, which is nevertheless Galenic, that Nature will arrangethings economchannelin the case of such that there will be only one distributing ically)'" organs, leadingdirectlyto the organit supplies(Galen instancesthe route fromthe lungsto the heart,fromthe stomachto the liver, andfromthe rete mirabileto the brain); but the routes of distributionfrom the liver are multiple, and hence do not matchthat model.85 But a crucial question remains to be addressed:Galen has admitted (PHP V 519) thatin the case of the role of the liverhis 'proof'has not been 'from such clear evidence' as in the case of the heart and the brain;is he therebycommittedto thinkingthat he has not genuinelyoffered a demonstration,at least not one whichmeetsthe strictandrigorousmethodological laid down at the beginningof Book Two (PHP V 219-24;see requirements premissesthatare at best above, pp. 211-14)?Is he, willy-nilly,introducing dialectical(or even worse) into the heart of what ought to be a scientific inquiry?The answerto that questiondepends, I think,on the natureof the analogiesthat Galen uses, andthe role thatthey are supposedto play in his demonstrations.He admits that he cannot offer an absolutely certain, watertightdemonstration'from the nature [i.e. the essence] of the thing under investigation';but that does not commit him necessarilyto mere dialecticor rhetoric.The dialecticalpartof his exposition,the confutation of his opponentson the basisof theirpremisses,is alreadyover - and he is certainlynot' aimingat mere conviction,or worse still intellectualfraud.

DeAn.3, pp. 95-7 Bruns (Suppl. Arist. 11.1).

84 For a discussionof the axiom (or axioms) involved here, their Galenic provenance and

justification, see my artt.cit., n. 82 above (esp. (1), pp. 151-5). Briefly, the two principles I ascribe to Galen are what I call the Principleof Creative Economy (roughly that Nature is not prodigal, and that the skill of the demiurgemanifests itself in the economy with which he makes use of the materials available to him), and the No Redundancy Assumption, namely the view that Naturewill not put more work into its creationsthan is demanded by the exigencies of structureand function. 8' It is not clear what precisely is the status of (A), whether it is supposed to be an empirical generalization, or an a priori truthof some kind: presumablyif it is the latter, then it will have to be underpinnedby considerationsof the sort outlined in n. 84. 1 At least ostensibly - others, holding a lower opinion of Galen's intellectual honesty might none the less suspect him of fraudulence here. But it is surely more interesting philosophically, as well as more charitable, to succumbto such suspicions only as a last resort.


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Of coursehe mightstill be guiltyof it - Galenfrequently remarks thatthere are two reasonswhypeople become'entrapped' by sophisms.87 Theycanbe so either as a resultof ignorance,inexperience,and lack of trainingin the logical methods, or as a resultof a deliberatedesire to cheat and mislead. Perhaps,then, Galen is the sad, unwittingvictimof the very methodological failingshe discernsin others? I thinkhe can, methodologically at least, be acquittedof this charge.To rely on the 'propertiespeculiar'to something(see above, p. 223) is not to resort to ad hominemargument,or mere rhetoric.Rather, in this case at least, the propertiespeculiarto the liverare its structural features(thatit is the originandsourceof the veins, giventhe constraints on whatcancountas a sourcewhichhave alreadybeen discussed);one cannotdirectlyassessits functionalrole, for reasonsthat PHP V 519-21(above, pp. 223-4)spelled out. Now, for Galen the link between structureand function,while close andperspicuous,is not a matterof immediateevidence,noris it in generala simplelogicalrelation;it mayhaveto be inferredon the basisof a varietyof Those considerations complexconsiderations.88 are, in this case, precisely those of n. 83 above. Galen is wrong about most of this: but he goes wrongnot becauseof a simplefailureto follow his own strictures on method.Ratherthe rootof his errorlies in a too sanguine(but I have arguedelsewherewell motivated) acceptanceof a particularly powerfullyinterpretedteleology on the metaphysicalside, and an over optimisticepistemological belief that the empiricalsciencescan be reducedto indubitable Aristotelianaxioms.The upshot of this is that the analogies he employs are not meant in themselvesto constitutethe whole of the argument;that is, he does not feebly conclude fromthatfactthatthe liverlooks like the heart(in some respect)thatit acts like it too. Rather, the analogousstructureis a guide to the rightanswer, because it serves to remind the investigatorof a basic teleologicaltruth aboutthe arrangement of the world. Of course, that in itself will not do all the work that Galen needs to do here - nothing will. But it is relativelyeasy to see how the rest of the argumentfor the primacyof the liverin relationto the veins, andof its key role in the distribution of nutrientsvia the blood, mightbe plausiblyfilled

Cf. Pecc.Dig. V 72-5 for Galen's clearest accountof his notion of a sophism; see also Nat.Fac. II 44ff., 51-3. N See my artt.cit., n. 82 above for details. 9 artt.cit., n. 82. 9 For a discussionof the latterfeaturesof Galen's philosophyof science, see my 'Galen's account of scientific knowledge', in J.A. Lopez Ferez (ed.).


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in, on the basis of the (admittedlyquestionable) causal axioms earlier discerned. 4. Desire and the Liver Let us, then, allow that Galen has indeed establishedthat the liver is the source of the veins and of the elaborationof the blood. But why imagine that that has got anythingto do with the desires?Is he not committingan the source of the ignoratioelenchion a grandscale by simplyassimilating is Galen'smodelon the nutritive veins andthe appetitivesoul?Hippocrates front,9 Plato on the philosophical(Tim. 70d-e); and Galen assertsthat
it makes no difference whether the liver is called the source of the veins, or of the appetitive soul, but it is more appropriatefor a physicianto present his teaching in terms of bodily organs, a philosopherin terms of powers of the soul; in either case; the one follows from a proof of the other. (PHP V 577)

Galen then quotes from the Timaeus(70d-71b),on the constructionand locationof the appetitivesoul; it is that partwhichis 'desirousof food and drink, and all that it requires because of the nature of the body'; i.e., matters connected with nutrition.The argumentappearsto be that, because the liver is the elaboratorof productsnecessaryfor the nutritionof for the rawmaterialsthat go the body, it mustalso be the locusof attraction to make up those products,andhence mustbe the sourceof the desiresthat go along with that attraction.Galen, it must be remembered,is operating with a broadconcept of 'soul' and the psychic;and he takes it from Plato that even plants have a certain form of perception and hence of desire (contra the general thesis of Aristotle in de Anima 3 10-11, and of the facultyof whatever Stoics:PHP V 521), namelya desirefor and attractive repulsionfor whateveris is suitablefor theirnutrition,anda corresponding alien to their systems.92 But why imaginethe locus of desire for some set of substancesneed be

He quotes many times from de Alimentoon the subject of the rhizosis [literally,where the rootgrowth of a plant becomes the trunk] of the veins: de Alim. 31 = CMG I 1, 82.13ff.; see PHP V 199-200, 531-2, 543, 577, 578. 'I Subst.Nat.Fac. IV 764-5; cf. PHP V 518, 521ff; and see Nat.Fac. II 159-60:'thus it is confirmed by all the phenomena . . . that there must obtain in almost every part of an animala certain inclination(ephesis) and, as it were, a desire (orexis) for their particular quality, and an aversion, or as it were a hatred, for the alien quality.' Nat.Fac. consists in large part of an attack on the physiology of Erasistratuswho denied the existence of 'naturalpowers' in the bodily of organsof attraction,repulsion, excretion and so on, and who sought to explain the body's mechanics solely in terms of such purely physical principles as horror vacui.


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the same as the organwhichmakesuse of them?Whycould not one organ desireon behalfof another?Well, perhapsto havea need for something(at least in a suitablystrongsense), and to take steps to get it, just is to desire that thing, other things being equal; Galen would be sympatheticto ElizabethAnscombe'sremarkthat 'the primitivesign of wantingis tryingto Section36). The liverclearlytriesto get things- hence get' (Intention [19571 it wants them. But even if we admitsuch an extensionalnotion of wantsand desires, it will not, surely, suffice to ensure that 'it makes no differencewhetherthe liver is called the source of the veins or the appetitivesoul', at least if by 'appetitive soul' we mean a locus of conscious (or at least potentially conscious)desiresfor suchthingsas food, drinkandsex. It seemsas though goingon here:mylivertriesto thereis simplya grossfallacyof equivocation get food; I try to get food; hence I (qua desire for nutrition)am my liver. I think there are broadlytwo lines of defence open to Galen here. The construed,for Plato, firstrelies on his Platonicinheritance.Thirstproperly a good drink, but for or of drink, kind a particular for desire is not the simplyto drink(Rep. 437bff.);andthe samegoes for the otherdesires.The or cognitivecontentif you - the degreeof propositional level of articulation like - is low, perhapsabsentaltogether.If thissortof nisusdoes carryalong with it some sort of propositionalarticulation,then that is secondaryand a consequence(perhapseven an epiphenomenon),andcertainsubsidiary, of John ly not a causeor component,of the desireitself:it is, in the language Searle, simply 'the froth on the wave'. When Galen remarksin his short that one can never treatise Thatthe Best Doctor Be also a Philosopher93 if one is developthe habitsof hardworknecessaryto scientificachievement that he I 59), employs (Opt.Med. or the genitals' 'a slave to the belly elemental metaphorof slaveryin a morethanusuallyliteralsense.' At this level, it makes more sense to ascribethe sourceof the cravingto the part sense) the sustenance,which which 'desires' (in a broad, non-intentional towardsit, and elaboratesthem into something attractsthe raw-materials
else.95 Here again, Galen makes use of an analogy (it is not clear how

innocently):the rhizosisof plantsis like the liver- for the liversendsshoots downwardsto the stomach to draw up nourishment,and upwards(the

Opt.Med. I 53-63, - MS 2 1-8, Maller (1891). 9 For Galen's use of the metaphorin moral contexts, see my art.cit., n. 1, forthcoming. s These various processes of elaboration, in the heart, the stomach, the liver, and the seminal vesicles, are central to Galen's metabolic system: see PHP V 565-74.


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veins) to distributethe elaboratedproduct.' (but is also, at The second defence appealsto teleologicalconsiderations least in inspiration,Platonist).Supposeit reallyis the case that one organ (the brain, let us say) desiressomethingon behalfof another.What could be the point of such a duplicationof functions?A properlyeconomical creatorsimplywouldnot toleratesucha wasteof resources.' Of coursethat is not say that there is no role for the brainto play in regardto desire: its function precisely is to weigh the raw data coming from the desiderative partand to determinewhetherdesiresshouldor shouldnot be acted upon; form- and in orderto do thisthe desiresclearlymustbe givenpropositional thatperhapsis sufficientto explainthe need for consciousdesires,at least in rationalanimals.98 5. Conclusions Let us briefly,then, take stock of whatGalen thinkshe has demonstrated. alongPlatoniclines;but he Firstly,he thinkshe hasestablishedtripartition, has done morethanthat- in demonstrating (at least to his own satisfaction) the general agreementof Plato and Hippocrateson these issues, he has shown how the physiologicalaccountof the functioningof the partsof the andof the structures thatjoin them body, of theirmutualinterdependence, accountof the separationof parts together,complementsthe philosophical of the soul. And he has elaborated and applied a method of scientific betweencertainty, investigationand argumentthat purportsto distinguish mere plausibility,and outrightsophistry,and to assign authorityits due weight. It must be admitted,I think, even by the most fervent admirerof Galen's work, that his applicationof the method falls short of the high idealshe sets himself.But it is the fact thathe sees the idealsso clearly,that he recognizesso acutelythe need to marryconceptualrigourwith skill and dedication in empirical investigation,that is impressive. However, just wherethatleaves his attackon Chrysippean moralpsychology,andhow the philosophicalandscientificresultsobtainedcanbe integratedwitha plausible accountof the phenomenologyof affection, and the theory of human
' PHP V 522-7, esp. 527: 'the ends of the roots can be called sources of the tree's nutriment,just like the veins that descend into the stomachand the arteriesinto the lungs [i.e. for the heart]'; and 556ff. See pp. 225-6 above. 7 For a detailed account of Galen's creatonism, see my artt.cit., n. 82 above. I I examine in more detail Galen's pictureof the role and functionof the intellect in the properly managed rational life in my art.cit., n. 1.


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responsibility, is a question I leave for another occasion.99 University of Texas at Austin

Appendix: A Formalisationof the Stoic Arguments It is perhaps worth setting out these argumentsin a formal manner, using the techniques of modem symbolic logic. [A] translatesas follows: [A] 1 2 2 2 1,2 6 6 1,2,6 9 10 9,10 1,2,6,9,10 1,2,6,9

(1) Tvw (2) (x)(Sxb -TxW) (3) (x)(Txw - Sxb) (4)Tvw--Svb (5) - Svb (6) (x)(Svx * Sdx) (7) Svb ++Sdb (8)-Sdb (9) Sdm (10)m = b (11) Sdb (12) Sdb &-Sdb (13) - m = b

A A 2:contr. 3:UE 1,4: MPP A 6: UE 5,7: MPP A A 9,10: = subst 8,11 &1 10,12: RAA

(i) (ii)




(v = voice; w = windpipe; b = brain;d = discourse;m = mind; Txy = x passes throughy; Sxy = x passes from y) [C] makes use of two furtherabbreviations:'Cxy' = x is continuouswithy; 'Ixy' = x is in y (the latter allows us to drop the use of the identity-signfrom the argument): [Ci] 1 2

1,2 1,2 6 1,2,6

A (1) Tvw (2) (x)(y)(Txy -. (z)(Sxz -+ Czy) ) A 2: UE (two steps) (3) Tvw-- (z)(Svz-- Czw) (4) (z)(Svz -- Czw) 1,3: MPP (5) Svb - Cbw 4: UE (6)- Cbw A (7) - Svb 5,6: MT-

(vi) (xi)

(xii) (xiii)

9 The other occasion being my art.cit., n. 1 above; I should like to thank Malcolm Schofield for his extensive and acute editorial remarks.


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But, given that discourse = df* meaningfulvoice (xv), and given that whatever goes for voice goes afortiori for meaningfulvoice (whichentails (xiv) ), then we can substitute 'd' for 'v' throughout [Ci], and hence obtain (7*) - Sdb Now we can formalize [Cii] as follows: [Cii] 8 9 9 9 8,9 1,2,6,8,9 (xvii)

(8) Sdm A (xvi) (9) (x)(y)(Ixy -- (z)(Szx -- Szy)) A (10) Imb (z)(Szm-+ Szb) 9: UE (two steps) 10: UE (11)Imb -(Sdm --Sdb) 8,11: MPP (12) Imb Sdb (13)-Imb (xviii) 7*, 12: MTT


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