Project on

ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPER REGULATOR IN INDIA

AS PER THE REQUIREMENT OF REGULATION OF BANKING AND INSURANCE INSTITUTIONS COURSE

SUBMITTED TO - Prof. (Dr.) O. V. Nandimath SUBMITTED BY Rekha Patil-I.D No. 532 Ronak Karanpuria-I.D No. 534 LL.M -2nd Year

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA

UNIVERSITY, BANGALORE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We express our sincere gratitude to Prof. (Dr.) O.V Nandimath, National Law School of India University, Bangalore, and owe our foremost regards to him for giving us an opportunity to carry out this project work under his guidance. This work would not have been possible without his invaluable support and thought provoking comments. We would also like to thank my batch mates who directly or indirectly helped us in making this project.

Rekha Patil Ronak Karanpuria LL.M. 2ndYEAR

TABLE OF CONTENTS

S.NO.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

PARTICULARS
INTRODUCTION HOW MARKETS ARE REGULATED? SUPER REGULATOR IN INDIA? COMMITTEE REPORT REGULATOR JURISDICTION DISPUTE NEED TO HAVE SUPER REGULATOR CHALLENGES CONCEPT OF SUPER REGULATOR IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Pg. no.

9 10

CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AIM AND OBJECTIVE:

The aim of this research paper is to analyse the concept of super regulator and its establishment in India.

OBJECTIVES To study the aspects of financial market in India To study the background of regulation in India. To examine the need to have super regulator in India. To explain the objectives & challenges of super regulator. To study & analyse the concept of super regulator in other countries.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1. What are the advantages of establishing the super regulator over the sectorial regulators? 2. What are the challenges faced by the super regulator? 3. Whether there is a necessity of super regulator in India? RESEARCH METHODOLOGY The research methodology adopted is descriptive and analytical in approach. LIMITATION:

The field study would have been desirable but due to paucity of time this paper is limited only to the theoretical aspect of establishment of super regulator which have been gathered from various sources including books, articles, and journals. SOURCES OF DATA The Researcher has mainly relied on Primary and Secondary sources of data. MODE OF CITATION A uniform system of citation would be adopted throughout the project.

INTRODUCTION:
The financial sector has witnessed significant changes world-wide in recent decades, following globalisation, deregulation and technological advances. These developments, which are inter-related and mutually reinforcing, have, in turn, led to blurring of traditional distinctions which used to apply across types of firms, products and distribution channels on the one hand and the emergence of financial conglomerates on the other. This resultant poses a regulatory challenge. The need for harmonisation in regulation has generated a debate about the appropriate regulatory/supervisory structures both in policy and academic circles.

As financial institutions normally specialised in a particular business activity, the distinction between institutional and functional regulation was not considered of much significance so that regulating an entity was the same thing as regulating its core business. For instance, regulating banks meant regulating the business of banking and regulating the insurance company meant the same thing as regulating the business of insurance. In the face of blurring of activities among financial service providers and emergence of financial conglomerates (i.e., financial institutions undertaking a combination of activities), the institutional structure of supervision has become a major issue of policy debate in several countries.
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In recent years, some countries have set up super regulators for the financial sector. In the Indian context as well, it has been suggested in some quarters that there is a need for a super regulator. As the underlying rationale for creation of a super regulator is to deal with the regulatory challenges emerging from the blurring or convergence of activities performed by providers of various financial services and the resultant overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies and uneven playing field in regulation, this paper systematically examines in detail whether and to what extent such elements are present in India.

There is also no evidence of an uneven playing field amongst similar financial institutions. One significant development has been the emergence of financial conglomerates. However, their number is not very large. As such, the study argues that there is no case for a super regulator in India. Given the present institutional settings in India, the institution of a super regulator could have serious ramifications for the stability of the financial system. While there is no case for a super regulator in India, the need is felt to have in place a lead regulator.

HOW MARKET SECTORS ARE REGULATED?1

The financial system in India is regulated by independent and specialised regulators in the respective field of banking, insurance, capital market, commodities market, and pension funds. However, Government of India plays a significant role in controlling the financial

system in India and influences the roles of such regulators at least to some extent.

The five major financial regulatory bodies in india.

A) Statutory Bodies via parliamentary enactments: 1. Reserve Bank of India: Reserve Bank of India2 is the apex monetary Institution of India. It is also called as the central bank of the country. It acts as the apex monetary authority of the country. The Central Office is where the Governor sits and is where policies are
1 2

http://www.allbankingsolutions.com/Banking-Tutor/Regulatory-Bodies-in-India-RBI-SEBI-IRDA.shtml See http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx The Reserve Bank of India was established on April 1, 1935 in accordance with the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. The Central Office of the Reserve Bank was initially established in Calcutta but was permanently moved to Mumbai in 1937. The Central Office is where the Governor sits and where policies are formulated. Though originally privately owned, since nationalization in 1949, the Reserve Bank is fully owned by the Government of India.

formulated. Though originally privately owned, since nationalization in 1949, the Reserve Bank is fully owned by the Government of India. The preamble of the reserve bank of India is as follows: "...to regulate the issue of Bank Notes and keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage." Focus on:

supervision of financial institutions consolidated accounting legal issues in bank frauds divergence in assessments of non-performing assets and supervisory rating model for banks

2. Securities and Exchange Board of India: SEBI Act, 1992 : Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)3 was first established in the year 1988 as a non-statutory body for regulating the securities market. It became an autonomous body in 1992 and more powers were given through an ordinance. SEBI basic function is: "...to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate the securities market and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto" 3. Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority: The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA)4 is a national agency of the Government of India. Mission of IRDA as stated in the act is "to protect the interests of the policyholders, to regulate, promote and ensure orderly growth of the insurance industry and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."

(B) Part of the Ministries of the Government of India:

3 4

http://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/stpages/about_sebi.jsp http://www.irda.gov.in/ADMINCMS/cms/NormalData_Layout.aspx?page=PageNo1332&mid=1.9 It was formed by an Act of Indian Parliament known as IRDA Act 1999, which was amended in 2002 to incorporate some emerging requirements.

4. Forward Market Commission India (FMC): Forward Markets Commission (FMC) headquartered at Mumbai, is a regulatory authority which is overseen by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Govt. of India. It is a statutory body set up in 1953 under the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 19525. Its mission is: to provide for the regulation of certain matters relating to forward contracts, the prohibition of options in goods and for matters connected therewith. 5. PFRDA under the Finance Ministry: Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority: PFRDA6 was established by Government of India on 23rd August, 2003. to promote old age income security by establishing, developing and regulating pension funds, to protect the interests of subscribers to schemes of pension funds and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

SUPER REGULATOR IN INDIA:

The idea of a super regulator for the Indian financial system was first mooted by the Khan Working Group for Harmonising the Role and Operations of Banks and Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) (hereinafter referred to as KWG)7 set up by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which submitted its report in May 1998. However, a careful reading of the report reveals that although the KWG (1998) used the term super regulator, what it had in mind was lead regulator, which is evident from the following: In view of the increasing overlap in functions being performed by various participants in the financial system, the Group feels that a measure of coordination among regulators is
5

http://www.fmc.gov.in/index1.aspx?lid=26&langid=2&linkid=18

The Commission has been keeping the commodity futures markets well regulated. In order to protect market integrity, the Commission has prescribed the following measures 1. Limit on open position of an individual members as well as client to prevent over trading; 2. Limit on price fluctuation (daily/weekly) to prevent abrupt upswing or downswing in prices; 3. Special margin deposits to be collected on outstanding purchases or sales to curb excessive speculative activity through financial restraints; Currently 5 national exchanges, viz. Multi Commodity Exchange, Mumbai; National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange, Mumbai and National Multi Commodity Exchange, Ahmedabad, Indian Commodity Exchange Ltd., Mumbai (ICEX) and ACE Derivatives and Commodity Exchange, regulate forward trading in 113 commodities. Besides, there are 16 Commodity specific exchanges recognized for regulating trading in various commodities approved by the Commission under the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 6 http://pfrda.org.in/indexmain.asp?linkid=56 The Government has, through an executive order dated 10th October 2003, mandated PFRDA to act as a regulator for the pension sector. The mandate of PFRDA is development and regulation of pension sector in India. 7 http://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&ID=387

desirable. The Group, therefore, recommends the establishment of a super regulator (or regulator of regulators) to supervise and coordinate the activities of these multiple regulators in order to ensure uniformity in regulatory treatment (pp 7). Thus, the KWG did not recommend merging of all regulators into one. Although it used the term super regulator, the underlying idea was that of a lead regulator to coordinate the activities of various regulators. Narasimham Committee II (1998)8 did not touch upon the issue of a super regulator nor did the Discussion Paper (1999) released by the Reserve Bank in January 1999 in response to the two aforesaid high-powered committees. The Deepak Parekh Advisory Group (DPAG) on Securities Market Regulation (2001)9 referring to the diffusion of regulatory responsibilities observed that there may be a merit in formalising the High Level Group on Capital Markets (HLGCM) by giving it a legal status. It also recommended that a system needs to be devised to allow designated functionaries to share specified market information on a routine and automatic basis. Thus, DPAG also stopped short of recommending the institution of a super regulator. The issue of choosing between single and multiple regulators for financial system in the Indian context was dealt in detail for the first time by Y V Reddy, the then deputy governor and the governor of RBI, in his speech delivered in May 2001. However, Reddy also did not recommend the institution of a super regulator for the Indian financial system. Instead, he wanted to explore the feasibility of an umbrella regulatory legislation, which can create an apex regulatory authority without disturbing the existing jurisdiction. The case for a super regulator in the Indian context for the first time was made by Mor and Nitsure (2002) who argued that in India the existence of multiple regulators has segmented markets and created certain systemic distortions10. Also, unequal regulatory burdens and fragmented markets give rise to severe distortions in prices such as interest rates. They argued that streamlined oversight by a super regulator may be able to deliver an improved supervision at lower cost and may better align different supervisory functions with economic realities. While Mor and Nitsure strongly argued in favour of a super regulator on the ground that existence of multiple regulators has created certain systemic distortions, they provided no

8 9

www.bis.org/review/r010524c.pdf

http://drnarendrajadhav.info/drnjadhav_web_files/Published%20papers/Single%20versus%20Multiple%20Re gulator.pdf
10

www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap62.pdf

evidence whatsoever to prove their point. The Joint Parliamentary Committee (2002)11 in its report also touched upon the issue of a super regulator. While feeling that there is a need for better and closer coordination amongst the multiple agencies involved in the financial system, the committee observed that super regulator is not the answer to the problem.12 The issue of a super regulator in the Indian context has been examined from the two viewpoints. One, as the institution of a super regulator has been suggested mainly on the grounds of regulatory overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies, etc, an attempt has been made to ascertain whether and to what extent these elements are present in the Indian financial system. Two, what would be the ramifications if a system of unified structure or super regulator is adopted in India. Several significant developments have taken place in the Indian financial system since the second half of the 1980s. Some of the major changes relevant to the question under examination are set out below: Two DFIs (ICICI and IDBI), have converted into banks. Two banks (SBI and ICICI Bank) have diversified into a number of activities including insurance, securities, mutual fund, etc. Some banks (Canara Bank, Bank of Baroda, Bank of India, Punjab National Bank and Indian Bank) have set up subsidiaries to undertake securities/merchant banking and mutual funds related activities. Some other banks (Allahabad Bank, Rajasthan Bank and Federal Bank) have also set up subsidiaries for undertaking merchant banking business. Some banks have plans to enter into insurance business. While two banks (Jammu and Kashmir Bank and Vysya Bank) have been accorded approval to participate in the equity of joint ventures on a risk participation basis, two other banks (Punjab National Bank and Vijaya Bank) have been permitted to make a strategic investment up to certain limits in the life and non-life insurance joint venture and in a distribution and services company. Besides, some banks have also been given in principle approval to act as a corporate agent of insurance companies for distribution of insurance products on a fee basis. Are there overlaps/conflicts, gaps and uneven playing field in the financial regulatory system in India?: The question which we need to examine here is whether the above referred changes/ developments have led to overlaps and conflicts in regulation.

11 12

www.watchoutinvestors.in/JPC_REPORT.PDF

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2002-04-08/news/27346780_1_super-regulator-jalan-rbigovernor

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COMMITTEE ON ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPER REGULATOR

1. Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC)13 Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC) was set up by the Indian Government in pursuance of the announcement made in Union Budget 2010-11, to help rewriting and harmonizing the financial sector legislation, rules and regulations so as to address the contemporaneous requirements of the sector. The resolution notifying the FSLRC was issued on March 24, 2011. FSLRC had a two year term. The Commission was chaired by Supreme Court Justice (Retired) B. N. Srikrishna, and had ten members with expertise in the fields of finance, economics, law and other relevant fields. The secretariat was placed at National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP). Secretariat consisted of a Secretary at the level of Joint Secretary to the Government of India and other officials and support staff. The establishment of the FSLRC is the result of a realisation that the institutional foundation (laws and organizations) of the financial sector in India needs to be looked afresh to assess its soundness for addressing the emerging requirements in a rapidly changing world. Today, India has over 60 Acts and multiple Rules/ Regulations that govern the financial sector. Many of them have been written several decades back. For example, the RBI Act and the Insurance Act are of 1934 and 1938 vintage respectively and the Securities Contract Regulation Act, which governs securities transactions, was legislated in 1956 when derivatives and statutory regulators were unknown in the financial system. A Large number of amendments were, therefore, made in these Acts and regulations at different points of time to address various needs. But these have also resulted in their fragmentation, often adding to the ambiguity and complexity of regulations in the financial sector. Key Recommendations of the committee: The commission has proposed a sector-neutral Indian Financial Code to replace multiple and old financial sector laws, splitting the regulation between the Reserve Bank of India and a new Unified Financial Agency that will oversee the remaining financial sector. In effect, the proposed unified financial sector regulator would subsume, repeal and basically every
13

http://www.simplydecoded.com/2013/03/29/financial-sector-reforms-recomendations/

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existing law that deals with sector regulators like Sebi, IRDA, PFRDA and at least some functions of the Forward Markets Commission. These laws include principal and main legislations like the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act (Sebi Act), the Reserve Bank of India Act (RBI Act). Even as the RBI Act is separate, all other laws (essentially 20 laws) would get repealed, while there would be amendments in many other laws. In short the Securities and Exchange Board of India ( Sebi),Forward Markets Commission (FMC), Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority ( IRDA) and Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) should be merged into this new agency.

A Financial Sector Appellate Tribunal will hear appeals against all financial sector regulators and into which the existing Securities Appellate Tribunal will be subsumed and a Resolution Corporation will replace the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation of India, which assists in closure of distressed financial sector institutions. According to the report RBI will be divested of its powers over management of public debt, which is currently one of its subsidiary functions. The Debt Management Bill, likely to be considered by the Cabinet, proposes a separate debt management office to be attached to the finance ministry. The report also recommends creation of a public debt management office, a recommendation that was criticized by RBI when the draft report was issued for consultations. It also recommends empowering the existing Financial Stability and Development Council, by making it a statutory body responsible for managing risk and crises in the financial system. The report also recommends setting up of a financial data cell, which will look out for systemic risk in the financial sector, especially the ones arising out of the financial conglomerates.

REGULATORS DISPUTE OVER JURISDICTION

1. ULIP TUSSLE: SUPREME COURT TALKS OF SUPER REGULATOR14 Taking a dig at the wrangling between market regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) over Unit
14

http://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/ulip-tussle-supreme-court-talks-of-superregulator/article1-537728.aspx

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Linked Insurance Plans (ULIPs), the Supreme Court recently wondered if the industry needed a super regulator. Why not appoint a super regulator? a bench headed by Chief Justice of India-in waiting SH Kapadia remarked after Attorney General GE Vahanvati mentioned SEBIs petition seeking clubbing of cases pending in various high courts on the ULIP controversy. Explaining the controversy, Vahanvati said the insurance companies have collected Rs 90,000 crore under ULIPs and they are investing the money in mutual funds, which fall in the jurisdiction of SEBI. SEBI and IRDA have been at loggerheads over regulating ULIPs and the market regulator approached the apex court after the two regulators failed to resolve their differences. While IRDA allowed insurers to continue selling ULIPs, SEBI sought to stop them asserting that they fell in its jurisdiction. Acting on SEBIs petition, the court issued notices to the Centre, IRDA and 14 insurance companies, asking them to respond by July 8, the next date of hearing. It also issued notices to two petitioners Dhruv Kumar and Rak Thackeray who have filed PILs in Allahabad and Bombay high courts. Raj has questioned SEBIs decision while Dhruv has complained that the insurers were charging high commissions. However, the court posed certain questions to the attorney general before issuing notices to the various parties. SEBI is in Mumbai insurance companies are in Mumbai LIC is in Mumbai, the bench said suggesting that the issue could be resolved at the Bombay High Court. Stating that IRDAs head office was in Hyderabad, the attorney general said the issue of jurisdiction has to be settled by the SC and that it could be heard by the SC or any high court. The dispute started after SEBI banned 14 life insurers, including those belonging to SBI and Anil Ambani Group from raising further money through ULIPs without registration with the market regulator. The finance ministry was forced to intervene after IRDA asked insurance companies to simply ignore the SEBI order. The ministry asked them to jointly seek a legally binding order from an "appropriate" court over jurisdiction. Following the ministrys intervention, SEBI allowed insurers to raise money from existing ULIPs, but asked them not to issue fresh ULIPs after April 9, the date when it issued the order banning 14 life insurance companies from raising funds through ULIPs.
2. REGULATORS SQUABBLE OVER JURISDICTION15: Gold Traded Fund : FMC v. SEBI
15

http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/regulators-squabble-over-jurisdiction/1/8747.html

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While the much-hyped tug of war over Ulips between market regulator Sebi (Securities and Exchange Board of India) and insurance regulator Irda (Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority) has ended up at the Supreme Court, more tussles involving other regulators are coming to light. One such face-off was avoided recently after the NSE decided not to launch derivatives on gold exchange-traded funds (ETFs). The launch was postponed after the Forward Markets Commission (FMC), regulatory body for commodities trades, said that the regulation of such products was under its purview, not Sebi's. Earlier, the NSE had taken permission from Sebi to launch futures and options products with gold ETFs as the underlying asset. The commodities regulator is also fighting a court battle with the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) after the latter refused futures trading in power. The dispute started over a year ago, when CERC stayed the plans by the Multi Commodity Exchange (MCX) to introduce trading in power futures. The power regulator argued that the MCX would have to approach it, rather than the FMC, to launch the product. However, CERC is in no mood to allow the launch as it fears the speculators will distort the prices in a market that is facing short supply. FMC cited the Forward Contract (Regulation) Act of 1952, which gives it power to regulate all futures contracts. Market observers believe that more regulatory disputes may be brewing and are likely to come out in the open soon. For instance, the original Insurance Act allows for pensions under insurance, which is regulated by Irda. However, the category has its own regulator, the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority. Similarly, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) can regulate competition issues across sectors. However, various sectors are subject to specific regulatory control and sector regulators, such as Sebi, RBI, Trai (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India) and Irda, have the mandate to regulate competition in their spheres. For instance, there is high tension between the RBI and CCI over the merger of banks. While the CCI seeks to control mergers across sectors, including banking, the RBI is unwilling to share its turf with CCI. 3. SEBI v. RBI (Central Bank against changes in Securities Law)16 There is a turf war brewing between central bank Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and market regulator Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). The RBI is not in favour of changes to the securities law, which gives SEBI control over all market-traded instruments

16

http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/cnbc-tv18-comments/rbi-vs-sebi-central-bank-againstchangessecurities-law_409530.html

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including currency derivatives. The proposed amendments seek to redefine securities and redefine them as any marketable instrument and this could mean any real product which currently today is actually under the domain of the RBI for instance currency derivatives. Thats one example, there could be many more. Only fixed deposits (FDs) and insurance policies are sought to be kept out of it, every other product which is marketable instrument and is traded, should be under the purview of the SEBI. That is what is being proposed. The other point which is very significant again is that the regulator wants to redefine a stock exchange. Currently, it has to be a corporate body and the regulator has specifically mentioned the negotiated dealing system where government securities are traded because it is not a corporate body even though it is a market place, it is not considered a stock exchange. Now, the proposed amendments seek to bring the negotiated dealing system (NDS) or any place on which any trading happens or any market place that is created out of any arrangement to be treated as a stock exchange. Which means that also gets regulated by the SEBI. The third point is that the regulator also wants all clearing corporations. Now, the stock exchange clearing corporations are already regulated by the SEBI, but there is the Clearing Corporation of India which caters to debt instruments which is outside the purview of the regulator. Now, the proposed amendment also seeks to bring that within the SEBIs purview. What we understand is that the RBI opposed these proposals in the SEBI board meeting a RBI Deputy Governor is on the SEBI board when this board meeting happened on June 18, there was an objection which was raised and therefore in the minutes of the SEBI board meeting it says that while the board has approved these changes, it would like the government really to consult RBI and come to a conclusion on whether these changes need to be brought in. Round one has gone to the RBI and has succeeded in convincing the SEBI board that this should not go through right now. 4. Stock market: SEBI v. MCA v. Stock Exchange Even in case of securities market SEBI, MCA and Stock Exchange together share jurisdiction over securities market. Currently there is no mechanism for settling class action/ appeals. It is found that there is a clash of functions between SEBI and MCA.

NEED TO HAVE SUPER REGULATOR:

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All the regulators are expertise in their sector and have the exclusive jurisdiction over their sector. One regulator cannot interfere in the working of the other regulator. Since the financial market has developed in the recent past, the jurisdiction of these regulators may overlap and the regulators end up in squabbling over jurisdiction. In order to overcome this, we need to have a super regulator to supervise and interfere in all the disputes between the existing regulators. An analogy can be drawn from the present judicial system where the Supreme Court is the apex court which looks after the jurisdiction issues between different high courts of the states. The following are the points which support the need to have super regulator: 1. Fragmented supervision may raise concerns about the ability of the financial sector supervisors to form an overall risk assessment of the institution, operating domestically and often internationally, on a consolidated basis, as well as their ability to ensure that supervision is seamless and free of gaps. There are also group-wide risks that may not be adequately addressed by specialist regulators. As the lines of demarcation between products and institutions have blur, different regulators could set different regulations for the same activity for different players. Unified supervision could thus help achieve competitive neutrality. The unified approach allows for the development of regulatory arrangements that are more flexible. Whereas the effectiveness of a system of separate agencies can be impeded by turf wars or a desire to pass the buck or where respective enabling statutes leave doubts about their jurisdiction, these problems can be more easily limited and controlled in a unified organisation. Unified supervision could generate economies of scale as a larger organization permits finer specialization of labour and a more intensive utilization of inputs and unification may permit cost savings on the basis of shared infrastructure, administration, and support systems. Unification may also permit the acquisition of information technologies, which become costeffective only beyond a certain scale of operations and can avoid wasteful duplication of research and information-gathering efforts. A final argument in favour of unification is that it improves the accountability of regulation. Under a system of multiple regulatory agencies, it may be more difficult to hold regulators to account for their performance against their statutory objectives, for the costs of regulation, for their disciplinary policies, and for regulatory failures.
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CHALLENGES FOR A SUPER REGULATOR:

Hiring manpower for the unified regulation is a biggest challenge.17 The financial market is regulated by various regulators who are expert in their own field so when a single regulator is created it is practically impossible to have one regulator with all the expertise. Other challenges include: 1. Given the diversity of objectives ranging from guarding against systemic risk to protecting the individual consumer from fraud it is possible that a single regulator might not have a clear focus on the objectives and rationale of regulation and might not be able to adequately differentiate between different types of institutions. 2. A single unified regulator may also suffer from some diseconomies of scale. One source of inefficiency could arise because a unified agency is effectively a regulatory monopoly, which may give rise to the type of inefficiencies usually associated with monopolies. A particular concern about a monopoly regulator is that its functions could be more rigid and bureaucratic than these separate specialised agencies. It is argued that another source of diseconomies of scale is the tendency for unified agencies to be assigned an ever-increasing range of functions; sometimes called Christmas-tree effect. 3. Some critics argue that the synergy gains from unification will not be very large, i.e., economies of scope are likely to be much less significant than economies of scale. The cultures, focus, and skills of the various supervisors vary markedly. For example, it has been argued that the sources of risks at banks are on the asset side, while most of the risks at insurance companies are on the liability side. 4. The public could tend to assume that all creditors of institutions supervised by a given supervisor will receive equal protection generating moral hazard. Hence depositors and perhaps other creditors of all other financial institutions supervised by the same regulatory authority may expect to be treated in an equivalent manner. 5. Another serious disadvantage of a decision to create a unified supervisory agency can be the unpredictability of the change process itself. The first risk is that opening the issue for discussion will set in place a chain of events that will lead to the creation of a unified agency, whether or not it is appropriate to create. The second risk is legislation in that the creation of a unified agency will generally require new legislation, but this creates the possibility that the

17

http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/cnbc-tv18-comments/fslrc-chairman-highlights-challenges-for-superregulator_898593.html

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process will be exploited by special interests. The third risk is a possible reduction in regulating capacity through the loss of key personnel. Another risk is that the management process itself will go off track.

CONCEPT OF SUPER REGULATOR IN OTHER COUNTRIES:

In major markets around the world there has been a growing trend towards unification of responsibility for the regulation of banks, securities markets and insurance companies. Countries where unified agencies have recently assumed regulatory responsibilities for all financial institutions include the UK, Japan and Korea. In May 2002 Germany established a single financial regulator. Ireland and Switzerland are other European countries that are in the process of moving towards the single regulator model18. The increasing popularity of the single regulator model in Europe should be viewed against the background of the policy objectives of the European Union regarding the establishment of a fully integrated financial market. The convergence of national regulatory structures of member states in a way that brings them closer to each other has been identified as a necessary step for the achievement of that goal.

Scandinavian countries led the way in establishing unitary financial regulators. Norway was the first country to establish an integrated regulatory agency in 1986 followed by Denmark in 1988 and Sweden in 1991. However, as the first major international financial centre to adopt the single regulator model, the UK changes have attracted particular international attention.19 For countries that are major financial centres, an important argument in favour of the single regulator model is that it matches the nature of their markets, in that the emergence of financial supermarkets and increasing use of sophisticated techniques such as securitisation and derivatives trading have broken down the traditional sectorial distinctions. The trend towards increasing blurring of sectorial boundaries intensified during the 1990s. The timing of the UKs overhaul of its regulatory structure thus largely coincided with the period when questions about the need for changes to national regulatory arrangements in order to keep pace with the markets were becoming an issue for public policy debate in many countries.

18 19

http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/2-4Panel2Ferransingleregulator.pdf http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/lsn/abstracts/346120.html

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As well as responding to trends in the international financial markets, changes to national financial regulatory structures are usually also driven by country-specific factors. This is certainly true so far as the UK is concerned where some of the impetus for change came from local factors involving financial scandals and collapses that were attributed, in part, to failings in the old system. Around the world there is wide variety in the existing institutional arrangements and, despite the current interest in the single regulator model, its adoption in practice remains relatively rare.

THE BACKGROUND TO THE ADOPTION OF THE SINGLE REGULATOR MODEL IN THE UK:

This historical survey begins in the 1980s, which was a period of regulatory upheaval in the UK. At that time the UK had a fragmented regulatory structure, with different institutional arrangements and legal regimes in place for banking, securities and insurance business. The survey examines key events in the period up to May 1997. It was in May 1997 that a new Labour government was elected in place of the Conservative government which had been in power since 1979. In the days immediately following the election in May 1997 the new government moved with remarkable swiftness to start the process of switching to the single regulator model. This was one of its first major policy initiatives.

Banking regulation In the 1980s regulatory responsibility for the UK banking sector lay with the central bank, the Bank of England. Although the Bank of Englands informal involvement in the supervision of banks dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, it was only in 1979 that it acquired formal powers to grant or refuse authorisation to carry on a banking business in the UK. Catalysts for the changes made by the Banking Act 1979 were the secondary banking crisis of 1973-4 and the Banking Co-ordination Directive of 1977 which was the first major step towards European harmonisation in this sector. Banking failures continued to influence change throughout the following years. The collapse of Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd in 1984 exposed defects in the framework established by the 1979 Act. As a consequence, that structure was replaced in 1987 by a new legislative framework. The Banking Act 1987 confirmed the Bank of England in its role as bank regulator but strengthened its supervisory

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powers. The Act introduced a new Board of Banking Supervision to assist the Bank in its supervisory functions. Another bank failure, The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), in 1991 again put the UK banking regulatory framework under scrutiny. Although international supervisory action co-ordinated by the Bank of England had brought about BCCIs closure in 1991, the Bank was heavily criticised for not intervening sooner to stop BCCIs fraudulent operations. An official inquiry was set up, chaired by Lord Justice Bingham. The inquiry found weaknesses in the Banks techniques of supervision which were found to be too heavily reliant on informal methods based on trust and frankness to cope with sophisticated fraud. It also identified gaps in the Banks powers. In response, certain technical changes were made to the Banking Act 1987 as well as changes to the Bank of Englands supervisory practices. On the more radical question whether a reorganisation of regulatory responsibility was required - the inquiry produced a negative response. The option of transferring banking regulatory responsibility from the central bank to an independent body was specifically rejected. The inquiry found nothing in the history of BCCI to invalidate the judgment made prior to the Banking Act 1987 to continue to entrust this task to the central bank.

The spectacular collapse of Barings in 1995 prompted another official inquiry in the UK, this time by the Board of Banking Supervision. The Barings crisis had been triggered by massive unauthorised losses incurred by a single derivatives trader employed by the Singaporean arm of the Barings group. The official inquiry found that the main reasons for the collapse of Barings were management failings within Barings and lack of appropriate internal controls. But it also found some failings in the Bank of Englands performance as the lead supervisor of the Barings group. Like the previous BCCI collapse, Barings provided a graphic illustration of the difficult challenges faced by national regulators in attempting to supervise complex multinational banking groups. It also illustrated the need within a fragmented regulatory system for close contact and co-operation between banking and securities regulators in order to achieve effective supervision of financial supermarkets whose businesses straddled the fuzzy boundaries between those sectors.

At the same time as bank failures were reflecting badly on the Bank of England in its regulatory role, a growing consensus was emerging amongst politicians and economists in favour of giving the central bank monetary policy independence. Central bank independence

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is regarded as a practical consequence of new economic orthodoxy in which monetary policy is the main instrument for delivering price stability.

The connection between monetary policy independence and the location of regulatory responsibility for the banking sector is that if the two functions are combined regulatory concerns may create conflicts of interest that undermine policy independence. Following Good hart and Schoenmaker, Taylor gives the example of a central bank not wanting to adjust interest rates if to do so might trigger a number of bank failures for which it could be blamed. Separating the monetary policy and regulatory roles would remove this conflict and leave the central bank to determine t monetary policy free from extraneous influences. But the arguments for and against separation of functions are finely balanced: arguments against separation include the central banks role as lender of last resort, its oversight function in relation to the payment system, the need for consistency between monetary policy and banking supervision and synergy advantages in concentration of functions. What this debate indicates is that a central bank will inevitably have a continuing involvement in some aspects of the regulatory process because of its role in ensuring financial stability and, further, that the demarcation of its responsibilities and those of any other body that assumes a banking supervisory role is an issue that must be specifically addressed. So far as banking regulation was concerned, practical events and the evolution of the public policy economic agenda in the 1980s and early 1990s thus provided various reasons for considering change. Alongside these factors it should also be noted that UK banking law and regulation was significantly amended during this period in order to implement various new EC measures. These changes, though very significant in their own right in that they removed internal barriers to the free operation of banking activities throughout the European Union, did not have a major direct impact on the institutional framework of regulation and so they, and equivalent measures in securities and insurance law, do not require detailed examination here.28 Their immediate relevance to the present discussion is that piecemeal changes to existing legislation and the addition of extra layers of regulation, as took place in the 1980s and 1990s to implement European measures, added to the complexity of the framework and to compliance costs. A further advantage of a fundamental root and branch reform was that it would provide an opportunity for a thorough principled assessment of how best to combine domestic and European requirements in a coherent overall framework.

Securities regulation
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Paralleling banking regulation, the history of UK securities regulation in the 1980s and early 1990s is the story of a system that was undermined by financial scandals that badly affected consumer confidence. It was also a complex system that exacerbated the problems involved in ensuring effective supervision of multi-function firms. The excessively fragmented institutional infrastructure for the regulation of the securities industry meant that firms were often regulated by more than one regulatory agency with the consequence that the system was heavily dependent on the quality and effectiveness of communications and co-operation between the regulators. There was strong industry dissatisfaction with the system. The presence of multiple regulators was a source of uncertainties about boundaries and created inefficiencies. From its inception, the regulatory regime was the target of persistent criticism. It was seen to be unwieldy and bureaucratic. The extremely detailed, legalistic style of early versions of regulatory rulebooks did little to enhance the reputation of those responsible for the regime. When even the head regulator acknowledged in 1993 that many of the criticisms were justified, it became indisputable that the UKs defective system for the regulation of its securities industry was in dire need of reform.

The source of the problems was the institutional structure established under the Financial Services Act 1986. Under the Act, ultimate regulatory responsibility for the financial services industry lay with a government department but most regulatory powers were delegated to the Securities and Investments Board (SIB), a private company limited by guarantee financed by a levy on market participants. The SIB set the overall framework of regulation but did not itself act as the direct regulator of most investment firms. That function was performed by the second tier regulators, of whom the Self Regulating Organisations (SROs) were the most prominent group. SROs were funded and partly managed by investment firms. For this reason the style of regulation established by the Financial Services Act 1986 was sometimes described as self regulation within a statutory framework. Underlying the emphasis on self regulation in this description was a political compromise designed to assuage the concerns of market participants as Professor Gower, whose studies of UK securities regulation in the 1980s powerfully influenced the character of the regime, had noted the intellectuallyappealing full statutory model could not be pursued at that time because it would have been unacceptable in prevailing market conditions. The extent to which the system established under the Financial Services Act 1986 really retained a self regulatory character in practice is debatable but that it was presented in this way soon had unfortunate repercussions in that many observers latched onto the self regulatory dimension as a key reason why the regime
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failed to succeed. But, whilst growing mistrust of self regulation undoubtedly played a part in the events that unfolded over the following years, the more potent seeds of the regimes destruction lay in the complex two tier structure and in the fragmentation at the SRO level.

At the outset there were five SROs but by 1994 the number had reduced to three: the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA), the Investment Managers Regulatory Organisation (IMRO) and the Personal Investment Authority (PIA). Some of the many changes to the institutional arrangements at the second tier, SRO, level can be seen in a positive light, as being the dynamic response of a flexible and market-sensitive system to developments in the industry. But it is also the case that much of the change was driven by dissatisfaction about overlaps and possible gaps in the areas of responsibilities of the original SROs. There were persistent concerns about the effectiveness of the SROs efforts to prevent fraud and misconduct. The SROs attracted severe criticism for having failed to protect the interests of consumers in a number of high-profile financial scandals, including the Maxwell affair where IMROs failure to detect the theft of company pension fund assets by its controller, Robert Maxwell, was the target of particular complaint. Another notorious problem that damaged the reputation of the regulatory agencies in the early 1990s was that of pensions mis -selling, which involved the selling of inappropriate, pension investment products to investors. Black and Nobles describe the pensions mis -selling episode as a manifestation of a critical failing in the regulatory structure involving regulatory blindness, lack of awareness and lack of communication and co-operation between the different regulators.

In a personal assessment published after the Maxwell affair the then Chairman of the SIB, Andrew Large, identified a number of problems that were thought to afflict the regime he headed: lack of clarity about regulatory objectives; lack of confidence that self regulation was anything other than self interest; doubts about cost-effectiveness; and a feeling that fraud was going undetected. Larges acknowledgement that many of these criticisms were justified set the agenda for policy discussions and political debate in the following years. By the end of 1995 it was clearly articulated Labour Party (then in opposition) policy to remove the last remnants of self regulation and the unnecessary distinction between the SIB and the SROs. It seems likely that a Conservative government would have gone down the same route if it had remained in power. There was no indication at this stage, however, of quite how radical the incoming Labour government would be. The case for a single regulator for the whole of the financial sector was not yet figuring prominently in the discussions.
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Insurance The regulation of the insurance industry in the 1980s and 1990s was a complex affair but, except in relation to the Lloyds insurance market where there were particular problems, it attracted little attention from policymakers. The prudential regulation and authorisation of insurance companies were the responsibility of a government department under the Insurance Companies Act 1982. Long term insurance policies were treated as investments for the purposes of the Financial Services Act 1986 with the result that these aspects of insurance companies business also fell within the scope of the regulatory regime established under that Act. Insurance brokers were also subject to another form of self regulation within a statutory framework operated by a body known as the Insurance Brokers Registration Council. By the 1990s the continuance of this degree of self regulation was regarded as anomalous. The Lloyds insurance market had a special status under the Insurance Companies Act 1982 and exemption under the Financial Services Act 1986. Problems at Lloyds in the early 1990s resulting from disastrous losses put its special regulatory status under scrutiny. Some observers suggested that by not being within the scope of the Financial Services Act 1986 Lloyds lost out on access to the latest standards and methods of regulation and that, if it had been better regulated, the impact of the losses might have been less severe. An internal review published in early 1997 recommended that Lloyds should b e brought within the regulatory jurisdiction of the SIB. The proposal was soon swept up into the radical new approach to financial regulation announced by the new government in May 1997.

All Change The new Labour government was elected on 1 May 1997. On 6 May 1997 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, announced that he was giving monetary policy independence to the Bank of England. This was followed on 20 May by a further announcement from the Chancellor in which he announced the transfer of responsibility for banking regulation and supervision from the Bank of England to the SIB and also reform of the regulatory structure introduced by the Financial Services Act 1986. According to the Chancellor: SIB will become the single regulator underpinned by statute. The current system of self regulation will be replaced by a new and fully statutory system, which will put the public interest first, and increase public confidence in the system.
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The instigation of regulatory reform in itself was no surprise but that it took the form of a switch to a single regulator was unexpected and politically contentious, not least because the Go vernor of the Bank of England had not been consulted about the proposals to strip the Bank of its regulatory role. Previous statements from Labour Party spokesmen had suggested more modest incremental change concentrating, in particular, on the dismantling of the two tier structure under the Financial Services Act 1986. According to the Chancellors statement there were three key reasons for the new approach: the existing system was failing to deliver the standards of investor protection and supervision that the industry and the public had the right to expect; the two tier structure under the 1986 Act was inefficient, confusing and lacked accountability and a clear allocation of responsibilities; and the need for a regulatory structure that would reflect the nature of the markets where the old distinctions between banks, securities firms and insurance companies had become increasingly blurred. The first two reasons were predictable given the local historical record. The third reason had not previously enjoyed the same degree of prominence. Although matching the nature of the national regulator to the nature of the markets is now the familiar centrepiece of discussions about the institutional framework of regulation, in the political debates on financial regulation in the UK in the 1990s it was not an issue that had attracted particular attention. So why was the single market /single regulator argument raised to such a prominent position by the British Chancellor? The full answer to this question may well not be known until current political figures publish their retirement memoirs or until confidential political records are finally released but one plausible theory has been put forward by Mark Bolat who was the then Director-General of the Association of British Insurers. He suggests that the decision to opt for a single regulator was driven more by pragmatic considerations relating to pressures on the parliamentary timetable than by principle: The Treasury team had failed to secure in the first Queens Speech legislation to abolish the two tier system under the Financial Services and Markets Act. However, a separate decision had been taken to give the Bank of England independence in respect of conducting monetary policy and this did require legislation. It seems that an opportunist decision was taken at this stage to move towards a single regulator because the legislation to give the Bank of England independence in respect of monetary policy could be used for any other purpose relevant to the Bank of England.

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The first stage in the reform process was the renaming of the SIB as the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in October 1997. Thereafter most of the existing regulatory agencies collapsed themselves into the FSA structure on a largely informal and ad hoc basis. In effect the FSA assumed the de facto role of single regulator. The process of vesting full powers in the FSA as single regulator began in July 1998 with the publication of the Financial Services and Markets Bill in draft form.

Super regulator in European Union:

EU finance ministers agreed a new pan-European system of market regulation to tame excesses and take pre-emptive action to head off the kind of financial meltdown of the past 18 months.20 In Austria, a government department watches over the markets, a task that the Irish leave to their central bank. The French have two main regulators for their markets while the Germans have three. The British set a brand new example last year when they introduced a single all-powerful regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), to watch over all their financial markets. And in February, an influential EU group of wise men, headed by Alexandre Lamfalussy, a former chairman of the EMI, forerunner of the European Central Bank, endorsed the British model and recommended a single national regulator for each EU country. That led some to wonder whether what's good for Britain might be good for Europe too. Would the EU benefit from having a single super-regulator? The French too are talking about merging their regulators. France's main supervisory authority is the Commission des Oprations de Bourse (COB), but it shares responsibility with two other bodies: the Conseil des Marchs Financiers, a self-regulatory organisation that oversees market transactions, and the Commission Bancaire, the watchdog for the banking industry.21 The French government is a strong proponent of the so-called twin heads model of regulationhaving one regulator for prudential supervision and wholesale business (the markets for financial products between professionals), and one for the retail markets, where financial products are sold to consumers. The head of the COB, Michel Prada, says that two separate regulatory bodies are preferable to one for two main reasons. In the first place, they reduce the risk of the retail market regulator being contaminated by its wholesale

20 21

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/dec/02/eu-financial-regulation-deal http://www.economist.com/node/518194

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counterpart, and vice versa. And, secondly, they reduce the huge management burden that is imposed on a single regulator. Setting up a feeble Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) in 1997 to promote co-operation among securities regulators. FESCO's work has been inconsequential though, largely because it does not have any official status. It is further handicapped by being obliged to work by consensus, and by being unable to make recommendations that are binding. In the aftermath of the launch of the euro, Europe's leaders decided to take more robust action to tackle other financial markets. They endorsed the European Commission's Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) at their Lisbon summit in March 2000, a blueprint for integrated capital and financial-services markets across the EU.

Failure of FSA in UK
The FSA rarely took on wider implication cases. For example, thousands of consumers have complained to the Financial Ombudsman Service about payment protection insurance (PPI) and bank charges. The FSA in an internal report into the handling of the collapse in confidence of customers of the Northern Rock Plc described themselves as inadequate. The FSA ignored warning signals from Northern Rock building society and continued to allow the bank to operate without a risk mitigation programme for months before the bank's collapse. The FSA was criticised by some within the IFA community for increasing fees charged to firms and for the perceived retroactive application of current standards to historic business practices. The perceived lack of action by the FSA in many cases, and allegations of regulatory capture led to it being nicknamed the Fundamentally Supine

Authority by Private Eye magazine. The FSA was not legally able to circumvent statute yet hid behind secret legal opinion regarding its summary removal of practitioners' legal rights in respect of their ability to use a longstop defence against stale claims. FSA regulation was also often regarded as reactive rather than proactive. In 2004-05 the FSA was actively involved in crackdowns against financial advice firms who were involved in the selling of split-cap investment trusts and precipice bonds, with some success in restoring public confidence. However, despite heavily criticising split-cap investment trusts, in 2007 it suddenly abandoned its investigation. Where it was rather poorer in its remit is in actively identifying and investigating possible future issues of concern, and addressing them

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accordingly. There were also some questions raised about the competence of FSA staff. The composition of the FSA board appeared to consist mainly of representatives of the financial services industry and career civil servants. There were no representatives of consumer groups. As the FSA was created as a result of criticism of the self-regulating nature of the financial services industry, having an independent authority staffed mainly by members of the same industry could be perceived as not providing any further advantage to consumers. Although one of the prime responsibilities of the FSA was to protect consumers, the FSA was active in trying to ensure companies' anonymity when they were involved in misselling activity, preferring to side with the companies that have been found guilty rather than consumers. The FSA countered that its move away from rules-based regulation towards more principlesbased regulation, far from weakening its consumer protection goals, could in fact strengthen them: "Our Principles are rules. We can take enforcement action on the basis of them; we have already done so; and we intend increasingly to do so where it is appropriate to do so. The FSA was criticised for its supposedly weak enforcement program. For example, while FSMA prohibits insider trading, the FSA only successfully prosecuted two insider dealing cases, both involving defendants who did not contest the charges. Likewise, since 2001, the FSA only sought insider trading fines eight times against individuals and companies it regulated, despite the FSA's own studies indicating that unexplained price movements occurs prior to around 25 percent of all UK corporate merger announcements

CONCLUSION:
Establishing a super regulator in India will simply lead to an increase in the hierarchy of the financial market regulatory system which is nothing more than a burden on the state in terms of revenue since all the specific regulators have authority in their respective sectors to decide and formulate the procedure in case of matters falling under their jurisdiction. As they are the final authority to decide the matters which in case of conflict can be either decided by the Central government or the Supreme Court, creating one more institution to decide the policy matters or redressal mechanism is just an increase in procedural formalities which even after that to be decided by the Supreme Court, even the matters to be decided by the unified or super regulators are policy matters which can be scrutinized by the respective ministry.
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India does not need super regulator for financial sector markets but need better co-ordination among existing regulators. "At this particular time, it may be advisable to continue with existing system, rationalise the overlap if there are any and try to improve the co-ordination among different regulators. We still have not reached a stage in which our various financial segments have developed to full extent. The experience that is now available does not point to very clear evidence as to which is better. UK had a single regulator and it ran into problems. USA had multiple regulators and they also ran into problems.

We have not yet witnessed financial instruments of the kind witnessed by some countries. Most of the products being offered by various intermediaries are stand alone and do not combine features of bank deposits, insurance policies and investment. Banks direct participation in the equity market is also very insignificant. Also, insurance companies are not yet allowed to set up banks which would require legislative changes.

There are no significant regulatory overlaps, barring perhaps the case of cooperative banks. Regulation in India is by and large on institutional lines and institutions essentially report to a single regulator. One area of potential conflict could have been the regulation of the debt market, but the Government has already issued a notification in March 2000 delineating responsibilities between the RBI and SEBI.

Banking supervision has historically been done by the Reserve Bank and as a result, a large volume of expertise has been built up in this area within the central bank. Besides, since ours is a bank-based economy and banks are the conduit for carrying monetary policy impulses to the real economy, it is necessary to keep bank supervision within the central bank.

Considering these facts, especially the given institutional settings in India, and the disadvantages of unified structure as outlined above, it is felt that the existing arrangement of supervision by separate agencies may continue. To take care of some overlaps, duplication etc., however, there is a need to devise some formal mechanism among three major regulators to exchange information and coordinate their activities. This could be achieved in a variety of ways through micro-level and macro-level regulatory co-ordination. *********

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BIBLIOGRAPHY: I. PRIMARY SOURCES STATUTES: RBI ACT, 1934 SEBI ACT, 1994 COMMITTEE REPORTS: FSLRC REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

II.

SECONDARY SOURCES

WEB SOURCES:
http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/economy/fslrc-chairman-highlights-challenges-forsuper-regulator_898593.html http://www.simplydecoded.com/2013/03/29/financial-sector-reforms-recomendations/ http://www.finmin.nic.in/fslrc/fslrc_report_vol1.pdf http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/2-4Panel2Ferransingleregulator.pdf http://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/ulip-tussle-supreme-court-talks-of-superregulator/article1-537728.aspx http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-10-28/news/34780423_1_singleregulator-super-regulator-unified-regulator http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Srikrishna-committee http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/dec/02/eu-financial-regulation-deal http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/5778324/UK-creates-new-superregulator-to-avoid-a-future-collapse-of-the-financial-system.html http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/cnbc-tv18-comments/rbi-vs-sebi-central-bankagainst-changessecurities-law_409530.html http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/super-regulator-for-financialsector-mooted-113032200218_1.html http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-10-24/india/43361443_1_environmentclearance-regulator-appraising-projects http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-10-29/india-business/34797622_1_singleregulator-super-regulator-pfrda

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http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2005_40/35/Is_There_a_Case_for_a_Super_Regulator _in_India.pdf http://www.prsindia.org/parliamenttrack/report-summaries/financial-sector-legislativereforms-commission-2792/

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RBI (1998): Report of the Working Group for Harmonising the Role and Operations of DFIs and Banks (Khan Working Group), May, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai. Taylor, M (1995): Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation Working Paper No 20, December, London. (1996): Peak Practice: How to Reform the UKs Regulatory System, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, October, London.

Thompson, G J (1996): The Wallis Inquiry: Perspectives from the Reserve Bank, speech delivered at the Economic Society of Australia Conference, Melbourne, September.

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