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Vocabulario Sociedad civil, humanidad, comunidad, derecho. Civil Society: 1. A.1798, 279. On the appetitive power. [] So supposing someone prejudicial to my best friend were said in a so-called public social gathering (properly speaking, any dinner party no matter how large, is always private gathering only civil society as such is public in its Idea) [] 2. A.1798, 305. Anthropological characterization. In civil society woman does not gives herself up to mans pleasure outside marriage, and indeed, monogamous marriage where civilization has not yet reached the degree of feminine freedom. 3. A.1798, 330. Anthropological characterization. [] Main features of the description of the human species. Character: 1.- Man was not meant to belong to a herd like cattle, but to a hive like bees. Necessity to be a member of a civil society or other. The simplest least artificial way of establishing a civil society is to have one siege in this hive (monarchy) but when there are many of such hives near one another, they soon attack one another [] So in our species, civil or foreign war, is also the incentive to pass from the crude state of nature to the civil state. 4. A.1798, 331, On the character of the Species.[] Four conceivable combinations of power with freedom and law: A) Law and freedom without power (anarchy) B)Law and Power without freedom (despotism) C) Power without freedom and law (barbarism) D) Power with freedom and law (republic). We see that only the last combination deserves to be called a true civil constitution. But by a republic we do not mean one of the three forms of a state (democracy) but an state as such. And the ancient dictum of Brocard: salus civitatis (not civium) suprema lex does not mean that the material good of the community (the happiness of citizens) should serve as the supreme constitution [] Rational good, the preservation of the state constitution once it exists is the highest law of a civil society as such; for it is only by the state constitution that civil society maintains itself. 5. I.1784, Fifth proposition, 8:22. The greatest problem for the human species to which nature compels it to seek a solution is the achievement of a civil society which administers right universally. Natures highest intend for humankind that is, the development of all of the lattes natural predispositions can be realized only in society and more precisely in a society that possesses the greatest degree of freedom. 6. KU.1790, 5:433. The formal condition that must be satisfied in order that nature can attain this end (culture) its final aim is a constitution that governs the relations of human beings among one other and un which the damage to freedom that results from the mutually conflicting exercise of freedom is opposed by a lawful force embodied in a whole, which is called civil society, for only in such a society can the greatest development of the natural predisposition occur.
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7. F.1795 8:347, footnote. One has previously doubted and not without basis, wheter there exist, beyond laws of commandment (leges praeceptivae) and laws of prohibition (leges prohibitivae), laws of permissibility (leges permissivae) based on pure reason. For all laws imply a ground of objective practical necessity, whereas permission implies a ground of the practical contingency of certain actions. A law of permission would therefore imply an obligation to carry out an action to which one cannot be obligated. And this, if the object of the law has the same meaning in both respects, would be a contradiction But here the prohibition that is presupposed in the law of permission concerns only the future manner of acquiring a right, the current state of possession can, in the transition from the state of nature into the state of civil society, continue to be preserved as an, although not lawful, nonetheless honest possesision (possesio putativa). This obtains for such a putative possession as soon as it has been recognized as such in the state of nature, even though a similar manner of acquisition in the subsequent state of civil society (after the transition) is prohibited. This authorization of continued possession would not exist if such a putative acquisition had occurred in the state of civil society. For in the state of civil society such possession would constitute an injury and have to end immediately after the discovery of its unlawfulness. 8. F.1795, 8:352. The following clarifications must be offered, so that one does not (as often happens) confuse the republican constitution with the democratic constitution. The forms a state (civitas) takes can be classified either according to the persons who hold the position of highest authority in the state or according to the manner in which the head of state govens the people (whoever th ehad of state may be). The frmer is properly called the form of sovereignty (forma imperii) and only three such forms are possible, since only one person, a group of associated persons, or everyone who makes up the civil society can posses sovereign power. 9. F.1795, 8:326. It is understandable that a people would say: There shall be no war among us, for we desire to form ourselves into a state, that is, to establish a supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority over ourselves that will our disputes in a peaceful manner. But when this state says: There shall be no war between myself and other states, even though I acknowledge no superior legislative authority that guarantees me my rights and to which I guarantee them theirs, than it is not all clear what the confidence in my own rights is based on, if not on a surrogate for the compact of civil society, namely, a free federalism, which reason must necessarily connect with the concept of international right, if the latter is to mean anything at all. 10. F.1795, 8:371. Now the practical person, for whom morality is mere theory, actually bases his miserable refutation of our well-intentioned hope on the following claim: that he can predict on the basis of human nature that no one will want to do what must be done in order to bring about the end that leads to perpetual peace, even while he concedes that it can and ought to be done. Certainly the will of all individual human being so live under a legal constitution in accordance with principles of freedom (the distributive unity of the will of all) is not sufficient to attain this end. For civil society
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to become a whole, it is also necessary that all individual human beings together want this condition (the collective unity of the general will), that they all want this solution of a difficult task. 11. MS.1797. 6:331. [] Crimes can be divided into those of the base character (indolis abiectae) and those of the violent character (indolis violentae). Judicial punishment (poena forensis), which is distinguished from natural punishment (poena naturalis) insofar as vices punish themselves and the legislator takes no account of the latter, can never be imposed merely as a means to promote another good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but must be imposed on him only because he has committed a crime.

Humanity: 1. A.1798. 277. The way of thinking that unites well-being with virtue in our social intercourse is humanity. What matters here is not the degree of well-being, since one person will require much and another little, depending on what each considers essential to his well-being. What counts is only the kind of relation between well-being and virtue, the way in which inclination to well-being should be limited by the law of virtue. 2. A.1798. 277. Sociability us also a virtue; but the social inclination often becomes a passion. If, however, social enjoyment is of entatiously enhaced by lavishness, this false sociability ceases to be virtue and is a kind of well being thats prejudicial to humanity. 3. A.1798. 282. No matter how insignificant these laws of refined humanity may seem, especially in comparison with pure moral laws, anything that promotes sociability, even if it consists only in pleasing maxims of manners, is a garment that dresses virtue to advantage, a garment to be recommended to virtue in more serious respects too. The cynics purism and the anchorites mortification of the flesh, without social well-being, are distorted figures of virtue, which do not attract us to it. Forsaken by the graces, they can make no claim to humanity. 4. R.1793. 8:259. []The third reminder, that even conceding that it is really a matter of what we call moral evil, a guilt resting on the human being, yet no guilt may be ascribed to God, for God has merely tolerated it for just causes as a deed of human beings: In no way has He condoned it, willed or promoted it this rejoinder incursed and the same consequence as the previous apology (b) (even if we take no offense at the concept of a mere tolerating on the part of a being who is the one and sole creator of the world): namely since for God it was impossible to prevent thus evil without doing violence to higher and even moral ends elsewhere, the ground of this ill (for so we must now truly call it) must inevitably be sought in the essence of things, specifically in the necessary limitations of humanity as a finite nature; hence the latter can also not be held responsible of it.

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5. MS, 1797. 240 In the doctrine of duties many can and should be represented in terms of the property of his capacity for freedom which is wholly supersensible and so to merely in terms of his humanity, his personality independent of physical attributes (homo noumenon), as distinguished from the same subject represented as affected by physical attributes, man (homo phenomenon). 6. MS, 1797. 363 [] I said that the ius talionis is by its form always the principle for the right to punish, since it alone is the principle determining this Idea a priori (not derived from experience of which measures would be most effective for eradicating crime). But what is to be done in the cases of crimes that cannot be punished by a return for them because this would be either impossible or itself a punishable crime against humanity as such, for example, rape as well as pederasty or bestiality? The punishment for rape and pederasty is castration (like that of white or black eunuch in a Seraglio), that for bestiality, permanent expulsion from civil society, since the criminal has himself unworthy of human society. The cries mentioned are called unnatural because they are perpetrated against humanity itself. 7. KU, 1790. 5:233 []However an idea of a beauty adhering to determinate ends, e.g., of a beautiful residence, a beautiful tree, beautiful gardens, etc., is also incapable of being represented, presumably because the ends are not adequately determined and fixed by their concept and consequently the purposiveness is almost as free as in the case of vague beauty. Only that which has the end of its existence in itself, the human being, who determines his ends himself through reason, or, where he must derive them from external perception can nevertheless compare them to essential and universal ends and in that case also aesthetically judge their agreement with them: this human being alone is capable of an ideal of beauty, just as the humanity in his person, as intelligence, is alone among all the objects in the world capable of the ideal of perfection. But there are two elements involved here: first, the aesthetic normal idea, which is an individual intuition (of the imagination) that represents the standard for judging it as a thing belonging to a particular species of animal; second, the idea of reason, which makes the ends of humanity insofar as they cannot be sensibly represented into the principle for the judging of its figure, through which, as their effect in appearance, the former are revealed. 8. KU, 1790. 5:257 The feeling of the inadequacy of our capacity for the attainment of an idea that is a law for us is respect.15 Now the idea of the comprehension of every appearance that may be given to us into the intuition of a whole is one enjoined on us by a law of reason, which recognizes no other determinate measure, valid for everyone and inalterable, than the absolute whole. But our imagination, even in its greatest effort with regard to the comprehension of a given object in a whole of intuition (hence for the presentation of the idea of reason) that is demanded of it, demonstrates its limits and inadequacy, but at the same time its vocation for adequately realizing that idea as a law. Thus the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation, which we show to an object in nature through a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the
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object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject), which as it were makes intuitable the superiority of the rational vocation of our cognitive faculty over the greatest faculty of sensibility. 9. I,1784.8:25 [There are three questions to consider here:] Whether one ought to expect that, by an Epicurean concourse of efficient causes, the states, as do minute particles of matter, through random collisions, will create all sorts of formations which are in turn destroyed upon further impact, until finally a formation is created, by chance, which can maintain its form (a fortunate coincidence, which is unlikely ever to occur!); or whether one ought instead to assume that nature pursues a regular course in this regard and gradually leads our species from the low level of animal nature to the highest level of humanity by its own art (an art which nature compels humankind to invent) and develops, in this seemingly disorderly arrangement, those original predispositions in a fully regular manner; or whether one ought rather to assume that nothing, at least nothing sensible, results from all of these actions and reactions of humankind at large, that it shall always be as it always has been, and that one cannot know in advance whether discord, which is such a natural feature of our species, is ultimately setting us up for a hell of ills, however civilized our condition may become, by later perhaps destroy in this civilized condition itself and all the advances of culture made thus far by means of barbaric devastation (a fate that one could not resist if one were governed by blind chance, which is indeed one and the same as the state of lawless freedom, unless we assume that such freedom is secretly guided by the wisdom of nature); these three questions all boil down roughly to the question of whether it is reasonable to assume that the order of nature is purposive in its parts, and yet purposeless as a whole. 10. G.1785. 4:408 If we add further that, unless we want to deny to the concept of morality any truth and any relation to some possible object, we cannot dispute that its law is so extensive in its import that it must hold not only for human beings but for all rational beings as such, not merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions but with absolute necessity, then it is clear that no experience could give occasion to infer even the possibility of such apodictic laws. For, by what right could we bring into unlimited respect, as a universal precept for every rational nature, what is perhaps valid only under the contingent conditions of humanity? 11. G.1785. 4:425 But we have not yet advanced so far as to prove a priori that there really is such an imperative, that there is a practical law, which commands absolutely of itself and without any incentives, and that the observance of this law is duty. For the purpose of achieving this it is of the utmost importance to take warning that we must not let ourselves think of wanting to derive the reality of this principle from the special property of human nature. For, duty is to be practical unconditional necessity of action and it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to which alone an imperative can apply at all) and only because of this be also a law for all human wills. On the other hand, what is derived from the special natural constitution of humanity - what is derived from certain feelings and propensities and even, if possible, from a special
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tendency that would be peculiar to human reason and would not have to hold necessarily for the will of every rational being - that can indeed yield a maxim for us but not a law; it can yield a subjective principle on which we might act if we have the propensity and inclination but not an objective principle on which we would be directed to act even though every propensity, inclination, and natural tendency of ours were against it - so much so that the sublimity and inner dignity of the command in a duty is all the more manifest the fewer are the subjective causes in favor of it and the more there are against it, without thereby weakening in the least the necessitation by the law or taking anything away from its validity. 12. G.1785. 4:429 But every other rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on just the same rational ground that also holds for me; thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The practical imperative will therefore be the following: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.

Community: 1. KU. 1790, 5:297. For himself alone a human being abandoned on a desert island would not adorn either his hut or himself, nor seek out or still less plant flowers in order to decorate himself; rather, only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a human being but also, in his own way, a refined human being (the beginning of civilization): for this is how we judge someone who is inclined to communicate his pleasure to others and is skilled at it, and who is not content with an object if he cannot feel his satisfaction in it in community with others. Further, each expects and requires of everyone else a regard to universal communication, as if from an original contract dictated by humanity itself. 2. KU. 1790, 5:465 Thus, in analogy with the law of the equality of effect and counter effect in the mutual attraction and repulsion of bodies, I can also conceive of the community of the members of a commonwealth in accordance with rules of justice, but I cannot transfer the specific determinations of the former (the material attraction and repulsion) to the latter and attribute them to the citizens in order to conceive of a system which is called a state. 3. R. 1793, 6:105 If, however, we regard ourselves as duty-bound to behave not just as human beings but also as citizens within a divine state on earth, and to work for the existence of such an association under the name of a church, then the question How does God will to be honored in a church (as a congregation of God)? appears unanswerable by mere reason, but to be in need of a statutory legislation only proclaimed through revelation, hence of a historical faith which we can call "ecclesiastical" in contradistinction to pure religious faith. For in pure religious faith it
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4.

5.

6.

7.

all comes down to what constitutes the matter of the veneration of God, namely the observance in moral disposition of all duties as his commands. On the other hand, a church which is the union in a moral community of many human beings of equally many dispositions, needs a public form of obligation, some ecclesiastical form that depends on experiential conditions and is intrinsically contingent and manifold, hence cannot be recognized as duty without divine statutory laws. However, we should not therefore forthwith presume that the determination of this form is a task of the divine lawgiver; there is rather reason to assume that it is God's will that we should ourselves carry out the idea of such a community. I.1784 8:360.The growing prevalence of a (narrower or wider) community among the peoples of the earth has now reached a point at which the violation of right at any one place on the earth is felt in all places. For this reason the idea of cosmopolitan right is no fantastic or exaggerated conception of right. Rather it is a necessary supplement to the unwritten code of constitutional and international right, for public human right in general, and hence for perpetual peace. Only under this condition can one flatter oneself to be continually progressing toward perpetual peace. I.1784 8:364 Occupied enough with their struggle against the animals that live there, the inhabitants coexist peacefully. What originally drove them into these regions, however, is presumably nothing other than war. But the first tool of war among the animals that humankind learned to tame and domesticate in the time that it has populated the earth, is the horse[], just as the art of cultivating certain types of grass[] was possible only with previously established states in which ownership of land was secure,after humankind had earlier made its way from the lawless freedom of hunting, fishing, and shepherding to a life sustained by agriculture, and then salt and iron had been discovered, which perhaps became the first widely sought after articles of trade among the different peoples. It was trade that first brought them into peaceful relations with one another and thereby into relationships based on mutual consent, community, and peaceful interactions even with remote peoples. MS, 1797. 6:314 Only the ability to vote qualifies one for citizenship. Yet this ability assumes the independence of the citizen among the people, who is not merely part of the commonwealth but a member thereof, which is to say, wishes of his own volition to be an acting part of the same in community with others. MS, 1797. 6:352 This rational idea of a peaceful, if not yet friendly and universal community of all peoples on earth who can come into active relations with one another is not a philanthropic (ethical) one, but rather a principle of right. Nature has placed them all together (due to the spherical shape of the place where they live, as globus terraqueus) within finite boundaries. And since the possession of land on which the earths inhabitant can live can always only be thought of as the possession of a part of a certain whole and thus a part to which everyone originally has a right, all peoples originally stand in a community of the land, but it is not a legal community of possession (communio) and thereby of use, or ownership of the same. Rather it is a community of possible physical interaction (commercium), that is, of a universal

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relation of one to all others to present oneself for possible commerce with each other. They have a right to try to enter into it, without the foreigner being justified in confronting him as an enemy for that reason. This right, to the extent that it concerns the possible unification of all peoples with the intention of establishing certain universal laws governing their possible commerce, can be called cosmopolitan right (ius cosmopoliticum).Oceans may seem to prevent peoples from entering into a community with one another, and yet due to navigation they provide the most auspicious means for their commerce. 8. A.1798, 331 []Four conceivable combinations of power with freedom and law: A) Law and freedom without power (anarchy) B)Law and Power without freedom (despotism) C) Power without freedom and law (barbarism) D) Power with freedom and law (republic). We see that only the last combination deserves to be called a true civil constitution. But by a republic we do not mean one of the three forms of a state (democracy) but an state as such. And the ancient dictum of Brocard: salus civitatis (not civium) suprema lex does not mean that the material good of the community (the happiness of citizens) should serve as the supreme constitution [] Rational good, the preservation of the state constitution once it exists is the highest law of a civil society as such; for it is only by the state constitution that civil society maintains itself.

Right, Law: 1. I.1784, Fifth proposition, 8:22. The greatest problem for the human species to which nature compels it to seek a solution is the achievement of a civil society which administers right universally. Natures highest intend for humankind that is, the development of all of the lattes natural predispositions can be realized only in society and more precisely in a society that possesses the greatest degree of freedom. 2. I.1784, Seventh proposition, 8:24. [Nature] impels humanity to take the step that reason could have it told to take without all these lamentable experiencies: to abandon the lawless state of savagery and enter into a federation of peoples. In such a federation, every state, even the smallest one, could expect its security and rights, not by virtue of its own power or as consequence of its own legal judgment, but rather solely by virtue of this great federation of peoples. 3. I.1784, Fourth proposition, 8:20. The means that nature employs in order to bring about the development of all the predispositions of humans is their antagonism in society, insofar as this antagonism ultimately becomes the cause of a law-governed organization of society. 4. G. 1785, 4:423 Let each be as happy as heaven wills or as he can make himself; I shall take nothing from him nor even envy him; only I do not care to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in need! Now, if such a way of thinking were to become a universal law the human race could admittedly very well subsist, no doubt even better than when everyone prates about sympathy and benevolence and even exerts himself to
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practice them occasionally, but on the other hand also cheats where he can, sells the right of human beings or otherwise infringes upon it. 5. G. 1785, 4:430 [] as regards necessary duty to others or duty owed them, he who has it in mind to make a false promise to others sees at once that he wants to make use of another human being merely as a means, without the other at the same time containing in himself the end. For, he whom I want to use for my purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree to my way of behaving toward him, and so himself contain the end of this action. This conflict with the principle of other human beings is seen more distinctly if examples of assaults on the freedom and property of others are brought forward. For then it is obvious that he who transgresses the rights of human beings intends to make use of the person of others merely as means, without taking into consideration that, as rational beings, they are always to be valued at the same time as ends, that is, only as beings who must also be able to contain in themselves the end of the very same action. 6. KU, 1790. 5:327 Rhetoric, insofar as by that is understood the art of persuasion, i.e., of deceiving by means of beautiful illusion (as an ars oratoria), and not merely skill in speaking (eloquence and style), is a dialectic, which borrows from the art of poetry only as much as is necessary to win minds over to the advantage of the speaker before they can judge and to rob them of their freedom; thus it cannot be recommended either for the courtroom or for the pulpit. For when it is a matter of civil laws concerning the rights of individual persons, or of the lasting instruction and determination of minds to correct knowledge and conscientious observation of their duty, then it is beneath the dignity of such an important business to allow even a trace of exuberance of wit and imagination to be glimpsed, let alone of the art of persuasion and taking someone in for the advantage of someone else.