Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
As the war in Afghanistan ends, we can begin to reduce the size of our Army
No longer sizing for prolonged stability operations
modern
- Smaller budget mandates a smaller force that we can keep ready and
We value the operational contributions of all components in the Army Our response to crises has been and will be a Total Force response
We looked at our needs with the Total Force in mind
We also looked to protect the National Guard from cuts as much as possible
They do cost less when we don't use them They provide support to state governors daily
From a state perspective, the force is going downwe have no choice - Insulating the National Guard from cuts means less active force
Less active force also impacts state jobs and homeland response
Overview
OSD
Immediate mobilization of Reserve Component (RC) elements needed to augment Active Component (AC)
Based on dennands and assumptions, we estimated the following size force meets strategic needs with some risk:
_ 440-450K AC (13-15% cut relative to today's force)
335K National Guard (5% cut)
- AC grew to ~ 570K during the war; National Guard to '"360K At sequester, can support only 420K AC, 315K National Guard
Risks: shorter dwell times for units if:
Major combat operations are more demanding - Follow-on stability operations exceed planning estimates
Larger cut to AC than to RC
Reduction to 335K means, on average, every state would lose about 300
Guardsmen
Loss of 300 is about 5% cut; loss of 700 is about 10% cut, on average
Available pool will be much larger than what states have today
Both from Army National Guard and nearly 100,000 Air Nationai Guard Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) provide a regionai Nationai
Guard force for governors to draw upon
in these cases, SECDEF brings a Total Force response under Title 10 authorities
National Guard likely still provides preponderance of forces, under Title 32 authorities
Duai-status commander authorities make for more efficient application of Totai Force
response
National Guard and the rest of the Totai Force wlulmSeet state needs
Flood
Gustavand id
nes
Ike 1
[
Flood
Inauguration
Support
Sandy
Spring Flood
Ice Storm
lood^J
Hurricane
4.000
2.000
<s^Drv.rr*.f^f^f^f^'^OOooooooOOooco
00 a>
OOqOOOOOOOOOOoOOQ
00
Ot
Other
Aviation Restructure
OSD
Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) becomes new trainerrequires increase of 100 LUHs in AC force Savings go, in part, toward Apache and Blackhawk upgrades/recap
Elimination of Kiowa fleet results in roughly 40% decrease in Army's attack/reconnaissance battalions (37 to 22)
Makes these units a low density/high demand capability
Army Helicopters
OSD
Keeping 4 types
Losing 3 types
Apaches
Bell Rangers
L.
Blackhawks
Klowa Warriors
Kiowa Scouts
Chinooks
10
Operational tempo
Training time
- Training complexity
Mission alignment
11
Operational Tempo
OSD
- AC units experienced 1:1.5 ratio of time deployed (Boots on the Ground or BOG) to not deployed (Dwell)below desired ratio of 1:2
- RC Apache units also deployed almost every company one or two times, with slight majority deploying only once
12
Active Component
1-501 4-501
1-501 ATK
14 ATK 1-227 ATK 1-227 ATK
4-4^
14 ATK
1-227 ATK
4-4 ATK
MAT*
1-4 ATK
227 ATK 4-227 ATX
</
4-*
1-227
SSS^TK
4 K <>I <
4-227 aS^
B-flMI4t01AO
c cu
I
2-159
2-eCAV
rm
;.2-159ATIC
40) CAB
Aalvatktn
_o
>
2-6 CAV tt
6-6 CAV
asia
6-6 CAV
OSS 1-101 ATK 3-lOlATK 101 ATK
2il-101 AT
Q. 0) -a
1-101 ATK
3-lOlATK
nsnmi
l^nund te t-2S A1K
2-101 ATK
axas 1-3 ATK NovOO
1-1 ATK
1MM44A
2-101 ATK
1-3 ATK
<
1-229
FB
U l-lATKjJ
1-10 A1K
mi*
iiii-tw 1-229ATK r
U U 4-3 HAS
CTTT
4-3 HAS
ccsn
4-3 CAV
llnMtt4le-2An
C O)
E _o
>. Q. CU T3
35-0 3610
1-135 1-149
1-130
^-149/H3S{-) !
iuaitmd
1-130ATX 1-2UATK m-lSlATK
0 B/1-149
1-211
4210 l-lSl
Army Reserve
2910 2810 8-229 1-158
U
C
Legend
0^
Off OND
KFOR
Re-riaiied
0 0 0
Co She Elamcnt
AH-640 ncldlnc
13
In early 2007, SECDEF Gates instituted BOGiDwell policy of 1:5 for RC units
"...to distribute more fairly, and more effectively, the burdens of way among our active and reserve components, while providing a more predictable schedule of mobilizations and deployments for troops, their families, and civilian employees." RC Apache units recapitalized early with newer models adhered to this rotation policy
Deploying National Guard units fill out end strength by cross leveling personnel from other statesusually by calling for volunteers
A strength of RC
However, for Apaches, this means cross-leveling personnel from other National Guard Apache units, which erodes the readiness of those other units, making them less
available
National Guard units had to upgrade their equipment to most modern and
survivable model before deploying to both wars
14
Training Complexity
OSD
RC Apache units train 39 days plus extra training days to maintain individual
flight proficiency
- Will, in post-war, occasionally rise to company level proficiency - Limited training opportunities with both ground units and other aviation
battalions
Low supply/high demand and mission complexity argue for Apaches to be irj^
Mission Differences
OSD
One way this collective-training readiness difference between AC and RC Apache units manifested itself was in the way units
were used in the wars
National Guard
0% 11%
49%
51% 16
Training Time
OSD
Time to ready NG aviation units for deployment differed depending on degree of collective training required
Table below shows the range of pre- and post-mobilization
Medevac
Apache
80-110
120-140
150-180
Blackhawk |
17
Mission Alignment
OSD
18
Summary
OSD
19