Alex Murphy Professor Izrailevsky PHIL-1120 Ethics and Moral Problems April 21, 2014 Useless Machine A Rube

Goldberg machine is a creative machine designed to be too complicated. Weve seen them in cartoons. They are the machines that start with a marble rolling down a track and then hitting a row of dominoes. Then, the dominoes hit a propeller before setting off a toaster at the end. Each object moves the only direction it can. And each chain reaction is a direct result of the objects defined movement. Determinism is a view of free will that equates us with the pieces of the Rube Goldberg Machine. It is the belief that everything that happens must happen just the way it does because cause and effect governs all matter. We take for granted that we have the ability, as humans, to make choices day-to-day. Hard determinists argue we do not, though. So, are we tied to our future in the same way as our permanent past, or are we free to mold what lies ahead?

People are easy to predict. Marketers understand this concept well. In fact, Andrew Pole, a statistician at Target, can identify expectant mothers just from sale history. According to the New York Times, marketers know our ethnicity, financial situation and political leanings just from our purchases. Marketers know what we want to buy even before we do. And, not only do they know what we are going to buy, they know how we will vote and how long it takes us to travel to the grocery store and back. If we are so predictable, are we the freethinkers we claim to be? One might argue the average population is not the best place to find people exercising free will. Instead, we must look to the innovators who inspire us. The men and women whose ideas change the way we live are the genuine freethinkers. Mark Zuckerberg, Socrates, and Joan of Arc are the people who make us think, Most of us fall prey to the doldrums of day-to-day life. But, these heroes remind me I can make proactive change in the world around me! If free will is only an illusion, how can we explain these strong-willed exceptions? However, even our beloved innovators might be nothing but products of environment and genetics. Was Socrates anything more

than the right personality in the right place and the right time? After all, the only thing separating coal from diamonds is pressure and time. Perhaps these unique figures of history are no more than statistical outliers. They are natural objects bound by physical law. And most coal stays coal. Its only the lucky coal that becomes a unique and precious new substancea diamond. Was Socrates just exposed to enough pressure and time to experience refinement? If we are to subscribe to this deterministic view, there arises a problem. How can morality exist in world where we do not make choices? How can we be accountable for our decisions, if our only choice is to fail? Its easy to say a man who cheats on his wife is immoral. But, if we say the man comes from a long line of cheaters with genes predisposing to an impulsive sexuality, then it seems less wrong. If he is only a victim of pattern, then how can we call him immoral? American philosopher Peter van Inwagen said, If we dont have free will to have done other than X we cannot make the moral judgment that you shouldnt have done X. It seems then, a deterministic view encourages the removal of all shame. If we natural law forces us to do immoral acts, then why do we understand ideas like right and wrong?

In fact, if we dont have free will, then it is strange we are aware of the concept of free will. The cogs of a machine dont need to be conscious of their function or their slavery to the system to operate. Why would we need to be aware of our one-track purpose if we are just following physical law? Thomas Aquinas used a similar argument to prove the existence of God. Aquinas claimed humans understand varying perfections of varying degrees existing in the universe. These degrees assume the existence of a fundamental standard of perfection. So, perfection must have a peak. This peak must be God. So, if we understand perfection with no experience of it, then it must exist. In the same way, if we are conscious enough to understand free will, then it must exist. Perhaps, there is another way to look at it. When we go to the cinema, the filmmaker forces us to see his interpretation of a story. As much as some of us feel the urge to yell advice to characters on the screen, we have no hand in directing the movie as it plays out. Despite this permanency of the film, we are free to form independent opinion. One man could see The Godfather and find deep significance in its fatalistic idealism. Another man might find the story to be brutal and overbearing. This is our freedom. Perhaps, our will works this way.

Kant described us as free, noumenally, but slaves, phenomenally. In other words, free in our minds, but slaves to our sensory experiences. If radicalized, we could take this concept to mean something else. Maybe, natural law determines our futures, but our opinions and thinking are free. It could be we are moviegoers and our task is to find significance and meaning in the film shown to us. It is worth saying the free will problem is more of an interesting problem than an important problem. If our freedom is an illusion, there is nothing we can do about it. Whatever happened before this knowledge and whatever comes next are inevitable. And, if free will does exist, then we also continue. We recognize this freedom problem is nothing but a fascinating thought experiment. And this is where my heart lies with the problem. There is interesting evidence of strong patterns in the human experience that are almost never broken. But, I dont think this is proof of determinism. Rather, I think humans are creatures of habit, as Aristotle would agree. We are predictable because any change we make is slow, and noticeable only from a great distance. Determinism is a captivating Rube Goldberg Machine. It is intriguing and fun to meditate on, but in the end, not useful.

Works Cited Duhigg, Charles. How Companies Learn Your Secrets. The New York Times. The New York Times, 18 Feb. 2012. Web. 20 Apr. 2014. Peter Van Inwagen. Peter Van Inwagen. Information Philosopher, n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.