Noble Rhetoric, the Order of the Soul, and the Socratic Thesis

127

what Socrates has in mind by speaking of it. Is Socrates calling for its creation? If Socrates has returned to the question of rhetoric for the sake of Gorgias as much as for the sake of Callicles (see again 500a7 b5, 501c7d2), is Socrates pointing to a better use that could be made of Gorgias powers? And might Socrates even have wanted to send a certain message to Gorgias by weaving his return to the theme of rhetoric together with his reminder of Callicles attack on philosophy? These questions are difcult to answer at this point, since we have not learned much about the character of noble rhetoric or why it might be needed. But we can say that we have seen the rst steps in a restoration or rehabilitation of rhetoric and we may wonder whether this does not bring us closer to Socrates unacknowledged but true purpose in the remainder of the dialogue.

NOBLE RHETORIC, THE ORDER OF THE SOUL, AND THE SOCRATIC THESIS (502d10508c3)

In laying out the criticism of rhetoric that led to the suggestion that rhetoric is double, with a shameful form and a noble form (see again 503a5b1), Socrates based his argument and thus this distinction on the difference between aiming at pleasure and struggling to make the souls of the citizens as good as possible. He complicated matters, however, by adding the further objection that ordinary rhetoricians act for the sake of their own private interest, giving little thought to the common good (502e67). In other words, Socrates criticism highlighted not only the lowness of what ordinary rhetoricians provide but also the selshness of their motives. This is important because it is the latter point more than the former that provokes a protest from Callicles that leads to the next stage of the conversation. Callicles is bothered less by the thought that ordinary rhetoricians provide mere pleasure than by the suggestion that they are simply out for themselves (consider 503a24). He does not think that is true in all cases. He insists that it is not true of the great Athenian statesmen Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles (503c13).

128

Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric

In Callicles protest here we can see something about Callicles character and convictions that was visible but perhaps not fully clear earlier. Callicles deepest admiration is reserved for men who, in his view, performed great acts of public service for Athens. Great Athenians such as Pericles hold a higher place in his esteem than foreign tyrants of the likes of Xerxes (consider again 483c7484c3). And insofar as the political gures he admires were rhetoricians, he speaks up on their behalf against Socrates criticism, insisting that they should be regarded as noble rhetoricians, unlike those of the current generation (503b4c3).4 Callicles protest here sounds almost as if it could come from a patriotic young American looking back with reverence to the time of Washington, Jefferson, and Adams. It is true that, in defending especially Pericles but also Themistocles and Cimon, he is defending the architects of Athenian imperialism, who built Athens into a great power at the expense of the freedom of other Greek cities. But Callicles can tell himself that, in building and asserting Athenian strength, these leaders were acting in accordance with the justice of nature that dictates that the strong ought to dominate the weak. In fact, not only is

4. It is important to know the most famous accomplishments of the men whom Callicles praises. Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles were all celebrated leaders of Athens whose careers collectively spanned the period of Athens rise to great power. Miltiades, the earliest of the great four, led the Athenians in their famous victory against the invading forces of the Persian king Darius at Marathon in 490 B.C. Themistocles helped, roughly ten years later, to defeat the second Persian invasion, led by Xerxes. Themistocles defeated the Persian navy in a crucial battle at Salamis, and he contributed to the rise of the Athenian empire by building up the Athenian navy. Cimon carried Themistocles work further by dealing a nal defeat to the Persian navy and by leading Athens during much of the period in which it transformed itself from one of the leading cities in the Greek alliance against Persia into an imperial power in its own right. Pericles, of course, is the most famous of all Athenian leaders of this period. He led the Athenians at the peak of their strength and helped lead them into the Peloponnesian War. For more extensive discussions of the careers of these four men, see, in addition to the accounts of Herodotus and Thucydides, Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 23, and Dodds, Gorgias, 3256, 3569.

Noble Rhetoric, the Order of the Soul, and the Socratic Thesis

129

Callicles patriotism compatible with his earlier argument about justice, but his admiration of the architects of Athenian imperialism even suggests that a patriotic concern to vindicate Athens may have played a role in leading him to defend a view of justice according to which Athenian imperialism would be an example of natural justice, not a violation of right.5 Callicles protest against Socrates present suggestion is guided, to repeat, more by the belief that his heroes served Athens than by a conviction that their service consisted in improving the souls of the Athenians. It is only by combining these standards such that their difference becomes blurred that Socrates is able to provoke Callicles into defending his heroes as noble rhetoricians. But Callicles response then allows Socrates to turn to the question of the true task of noble rhetoric and to sketch out what its aim should be (consider 504c4e1). Socrates procedure here may serve several purposes at once. Most obviously, Socrates intends to establish a standard by which Callicles heroes can be criticized (see 503d56). In addition, and as an extension of the same effort, Socrates will press Callicles himself to turn his attention away from the simple fact that his heroes served Athens and to focus instead on the character of their service. Callicles position, as it appears here, has the mixed or ambiguous character of patriotism, which puts service to the city above all else without being too morally strict about the end that the city itself serves.6 In pressing Callicles, Socrates will challenge the adequacy of this position a position that in a way afrms the primacy of virtue (as service of the individual to the common good) but in another way fails to (as the end to which the city should be devoted). Since any defender of such a view, precisely as a
5. In support of this suggestion, consider Callicles opening remark at 481b10 c4, where Callicles speaks in defense of the present order of things, and expresses his concern that Socrates extreme arguments about justice would turn everything upside down. 6. It is worth comparing, in this connection, a famous passage from the foremost of Callicles heroes. See 2.4143 of Pericles Funeral Oration in Thucydides.

130

Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric

devotee of virtue and the city, would nd it hard to concede that the city should be devoted to low ends, Socrates is justied in pressing Callicles toward greater rigor and consistency. Finally, Socrates procedure will also allow him to begin to sketch something of the character of noble rhetoric and its aims. Socrates begins his description of the noble rhetorician the good man, who speaks with a view to the best by comparing him to the other craftsmen, who do not perform their tasks at random but instead look away to something, namely, to whatever their work (ergon) happens to be and to the form (eidos) into which they are trying to mold whatever they are working on (503e15). (The important Platonic term form eidos makes its appearance here as an image or pattern that would seem to exist in the minds eye of a craftsman and then later in the result of his work.) Socrates gives the examples of painters, house builders, and shipwrights, all of whom are typical craftsmen in the sense that they put the materials of their work into a certain order until they have formed an arranged and ordered whole (503e5504a2). The same is true, according to Socrates, even of gymnastic trainers and doctors, who work on the body (504a35). As for the character and goodness of the nal order aimed at by each of the craftsmen, that would seem to be established by the use to which the craftsmans work is to be put. For instance, the order of a ship is dictated and vindicated, so to speak, by the needs of sailing, just as the order of a house is dictated and vindicated by the needs of daily life. It is hard to deny that an ordered ship, an ordered house, or even an ordered body is preferable to a disordered one (504a8b3). So far so good. But what about the soul? Is it true in that case, too, that arrangement and order render it useful, whereas disorder has the opposite effect? Socrates puts this question to Callicles, and Callicles assumes, in the wake of the preceding examples, that it is also necessary to agree to this (see 504b36). And perhaps it does make sense to assume that an ordered soul, even if its order is more complicated than that of a ship or a house, is more useful than a disordered one. But a more questionable step comes next. For after reminding

Noble Rhetoric, the Order of the Soul, and the Socratic Thesis

131

Callicles that there is a name or a couple of names for that which comes about in the body through arrangement and order namely, health and strength Socrates asks about that which comes to be in the soul from arrangement and order (504c13). Callicles unwillingness to respond Why dont you say it yourself, Socrates? (504c4) enables Socrates to declare that the names of the arrangement and order of the soul are the lawful and the law. From these, he claims, souls become lawful and orderly; and lawfulness and orderliness in the soul are justice and moderation (504d13). Callicles response at this point Let it be (504d4) indicates that he senses a problem with Socrates argument. But what problem does Callicles sense? What is questionable here? To begin with the structure of the argument, Socrates does not work in the case of the soul, as he did in the preceding analogies of the products of the craftsmen, from the notions of work or use. His statement about the soul seems closer in this respect to the analogy of the body (consider 504b4c3). Yet it is much less disputable to claim that the end or product of the proper arrangement and order of the body is health and strength, and therefore that the order itself should be called the healthy (see 504c78), than it is to claim that the arrangement and order of the soul ought to be called the lawful and law, and then to conclude that from these arise lawfulness and orderliness, which in turn ought to be called justice and moderation (compare 504b7 c8 with 504d13). What is the basis for calling the arrangement and order of the soul the lawful and law? And how do we know that the lawful and the law produce states of lawfulness and orderliness that truly deserve the names of the virtues justice and moderation? Perhaps we do in some sense know this, insofar as the law is commonly held to be the source of lawfulness and orderliness, and such lawfulness and orderliness are commonly taken to be justice and moderation. Looked at in this way, however, Socrates argument does little more than appeal to a common opinion without providing a genuine defense of that opinion. Or, to be more precise, Socrates argument gives the impression of demonstrating that the lawful and law have a

132

Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric

rationality that is as straightforward as that found in the works of the craftsmen, and a goodness that is as unquestionable as that of bodily health and strength. But this impression of demonstrating that there is a perfect harmony between law, virtue, and rationality serves to cover over the problem that the argument really rests on a mere assertion an assertion, moreover, that avoids the difcult questions that would be involved in a truly serious effort to discover the arrangement and order of the soul. After a series of initial steps that give the appearance of perfect soundness and clarity, Socrates reaches his conclusion by a nimble and well disguised leap.7 That Socrates does not offer a sound argument here should make us wonder whether we are not seeing a rhetorical presentation of the task of rhetoric. According to Socrates account, the rhetorician that is, the artistic and good one will look when he speaks and acts to the inculcation of justice, moderation, and the rest of virtue in the souls of his fellow citizens, and to the removal of injustice, intemperance, and the rest of vice (504d5e4). This will benet the citizens, since, just as it is of no benet according to the just speech to give a sick and corrupted body all sorts of food and drink, so must a thoughtless, intemperate, unjust, and impious soul be kept away from the objects of its desires and directed toward those things from which it will be made better (504e5505b7). Such restriction involves a certain kind of punishment, namely, the punishment of keeping the sick soul away from the objects of its desires. But to be punished, Socrates insists, is better for the soul than to remain immoderate. And Socrates urges Callicles, who objects to this suggestion, to endure the benet he himself is receiving by submitting to the punishment he is getting (504b9c4).

7. The aw in Socrates argument is missed by some commentators. See, e.g., Jaeger, Paideia, 2:145; Friedlander, Plato, 2:26869. For other commentators who raise objections to Socrates argument, see Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:37575; Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 2734; Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 1424; Newell, Ruling Passion, 31, 7.

Noble Rhetoric, the Order of the Soul, and the Socratic Thesis

133

As this last remark to Callicles indicates, Socrates is not only describing a kind of punishment in this section but also practicing it on Callicles. This ts with the suggestion that he is not only describing a certain sort of rhetoric but also practicing it. But rhetoric of what sort? As it appears here, the rhetoric that Socrates is at once describing and practicing combines exhortation and a kind of chastisement that can plausibly be called punishment, although this punishment involves no physical violence and would seem to work together with the inspiring effects of exhortation. It may be worth noticing, in this connection, that Socrates compares what he is doing in this section to the telling of myths (see 505c10d3). Is Socrates exhorting Callicles to a view that somehow has the character of a myth? This question cannot yet be answered, since, as Socrates puts it, the argument still does not have a head (505d23).8 Let it sufce for now to say that Socrates is presenting what appears to be a doctrine of virtue, a doctrine to the truth of which he does not quite attest (consider 506a15), but one that he is willing to spell out at least in part because Gorgias steps in to express his wish to hear Socrates go through the remaining things (see 506a8b3). The exchange in which Gorgias urges Socrates to continue even as Callicles withdraws from the discussion leads to the strange spectacle of Socrates speaking for an extended section in a mode that combines dialectical questioning and extended monologue. That is, Socrates accepts Callicles temporary withdrawal and proceeds on his own, but he continues to speak as if he were engaged in a back and forth exchange, taking on the roles of both questioner and respondent (see 506b4ff.). Socrates argument thus becomes, in its very form or method, a blend of Socratic dialectics and a kind of rhetoric. And this form may give us a clue to the character of the content of Socrates extended monologue. In keeping with this, Socrates also suggests that
8. On this odd expression and Socrates use of the word muthos in this passage, see Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, 60.

134

Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric

his monologue is replacing a more strictly dialectical attempt to give to Callicles the speech of Amphion in response to the speech of Zethus (506b4c1).9 This indication that Socrates is no longer arguing in the strictest dialectical manner, even as he preserves something of the form of dialectics, suggests that whatever we may see in Socrates monologue, it will not be the truest or deepest response to Callicles attack on his way of life. Instead, Socrates is completing what he calls the speech (ton logon) or the just speech (ton dikaion logon), a speech or an account that he has already given us reason to suspect may have something of the character of a myth. With an exhortation of his audience to listen, Socrates returns to take up the speech from the beginning (506c5). The beginning, apparently, is the distinction between the pleasant and the good, and Callicles agreement as to the superiority of the good (506c69). But after repeating these steps, Socrates now says more than he did earlier about the character of the good. Just as the pleasant is that through which, by its presence, we are pleased, so the good is that through which, by its presence, we are good (506c9d2). But we are good when some virtue is present (506d24). With these steps, Socrates turns the acknowledgment of the superiority of the good into a case for virtue, or, in other words, he brings out the implication that virtue should be our highest concern. Next, he describes virtue in such a way that arrangement and order, the principles he has been emphasizing, are its distinguishing marks and even its sources (see 506d5e2). Once again, Socrates does not speak in the case of virtue, as he did earlier when speaking of the products of the craftsmen, of any use or end from which the arrangement and order in question take their bearings.10 Instead, he speaks simply of an order that, when present, makes a given being good; and he claims that, when this being is the soul, the orderly soul is better than the disorderly one (506e26).

9. This phrase refers, of course, to Callicles earlier allusion to Euripides Antiope. See footnote 10 in Chapter 3. 10. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 85.

Noble Rhetoric, the Order of the Soul, and the Socratic Thesis

135

As Socrates spells out his account of virtue, we begin to see the signicance of his emphasis on order: moderation comes to sight as the highest virtue. Socrates argues that since the orderly soul is moderate, the moderate soul is good, and the soul that experiences the opposite to the moderate is bad (506e6507a7). The soul that experiences the opposite to the moderate, according to Socrates, is the foolish and te kai akolastos at 507a67). By menintemperate soul (see he aphron tioning two opposites of moderation foolishness in addition to intemperance Socrates suggests that at least one meaning of moderation here is a kind of sensibleness or even a kind of wisdom.11 This, in turn, can help us to grasp the most remarkable feature of Socrates present account of virtue: at least at the beginning of this account, he presents all of the other virtues as derivative from moderation (507a5c7).12 For this to make sense, it would seem that moderation must incorporate a kind of wisdom that is able to discern the tting things, since it is out of his concern to do the tting things that the moderate man as Socrates here describes him can be relied on to do the just things toward human beings, to act piously toward the gods, and to be courageous (see 507b15). The virtuous man, because he does the deeds of justice, piety, and courage, can be said to be just, pious, and courageous; but the spirit of his actions would seem to be that of a sensible concern not to make foolish mistakes (consider 507b5c5). By presenting virtue in this way, Socrates makes it easy to defend virtue as conducive to the happiness of the moderate man and he even adds that he himself is convinced that moderation is the path to happiness (see 507b8d1). But one could wonder how closely the virtue

11. On the two opposites of moderation, see Dodds, Gorgias, 336. As Dodds points out, the more common opposition is sophr on-akolastos (moderate intemperate). But for the opposition sophron-aphron (moderate-foolish) and the broader meaning of moderation implied by that opposition, see Protagoras 332a4335b5; Laws 710a38; Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.16, 1.3.9. 12. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 61: Moderation becomes the single virtue into which even justice is absorbed. See also 85, 90.

136

Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric

that Socrates is describing and defending here resembles the kind of virtue that most people admire and would like to see defended. What, for instance, is its relationship to the lawfulness that Socrates spoke of just moments ago? Would such virtue merit the name the lawful? Or is it closer to the kind of virtue that Socrates speaks of, for example, in Book Four of the Republic, where he denes justice as the proper order of the soul? That denition of justice, like Socrates current description of moderation, makes virtue appear to be something that would clearly be good for an individual to possess, but it departs quite far from any ordinary notion of virtue.13 If Socrates description transforms virtue into something that most people would nd hard to recognize, he does not continue very far down this path before turning back toward a view that does not give such pride of place to moderation. Socrates retreat begins when he returns to the theme of punishment punishment not just of oneself but also of ones own and when he speaks of the city (see 507d46). Once the primary object of concern ceases to be ones own soul, as it seemed to be while Socrates was praising moderation, justice returns to reclaim at least equal status with moderation. In the second half of Socrates account of virtue, justice is no longer presented as a subordinate and derivative virtue (compare 507d4508b2 with 507a5d3). It also is striking that the reemergence of justice from subordinate to at least equal status with moderation brings with it a transformation in the character of Socrates case for the goodness of virtue. On the one hand, the straightforward case for the goodness of virtue that was presented in the section that elevated moderation casts its glow, so to speak, over Socrates whole account of virtue, especially since Socrates does not call attention to the important shift in the account. But, on the

13. See, in particular, Republic 443b7444a2. On the difference between Socratic temperance and Socratic justice, on the one hand, and commonly recognized temperance and commonly recognized justice, on the other, see Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 1256. Compare Santas, Socrates, 295 301.

Noble Rhetoric, the Order of the Soul, and the Socratic Thesis

137

other hand, Socrates now moves away from the view that the sensible actions of the moderate man produce benets that ow directly from the actions themselves by suggesting, instead, that moderation and justice are good because they enable the virtuous to unite in friendship and community with other human beings and with the gods (see 507d6e6). Socrates speech culminates in a vision of the cosmos of heaven, earth, gods, and men bound together by the ties of community, friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justice (507e6508a2). This is why, he tells Callicles, they call this whole a cosmos, not disordered or intemperate.14 Socrates tells Callicles that he fails to see the cosmic power of geometrical equality: You seem to me not to apply your mind to these things, and, wise though you are about them, you do not realize that geometrical equality has great power among gods and human beings, but you think that one must practice taking more, since you neglect geometry (508a38).15 Now, Socrates seems to be serious here in urging Callicles to embrace the view that he sets forth. He certainly addresses him directly by name (see 507c1, e6, 508b4). And if we recall our earlier suggestion that Callicles is troubled by doubts about whether the virtuous receive
14. The Greek word kosmos (translated above as cosmos) is the same word that I have been translating as order. To call this whole a kosmos is to claim that it is orderly. As for who they are who call this whole a kosmos, that may refer either to people in general or to the wise mentioned by Socrates at 507e6. 15. Geometrical equality refers to what is more often called proportional equality, the equality of ratios in a geometrical progression. This is the kind of equality that provides the standard for Aristotles famous account of distributive justice (see Nicomachean Ethics 1131a10b22). Socrates suggestion here that such equality somehow has force throughout the universe may have Pythagorean origins (see Dodds, Gorgias, 3389; see also Olympiodorus, Commentary on Platos Gorgias, Lecture 35). Whether or not it has such origins, the vision Socrates here holds out of an ordered whole, supportive of virtue, has drawn the attention of many commentators, some of whom place considerable weight on this passage. See, e.g., Friedlander, Plato, 2:269; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1467; Voegelin, Plato, 3637; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 96, 119; Newell, Ruling Passion, 32, 38.

138

Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric

the happiness they deserve, Socrates speech here in praise of virtue can be seen as an effort to help Callicles by assuaging his doubts. We see Socrates here in the role of an exhorter, punisher, and helper. Or, to use an earlier analogy that will reappear before the conversation is nished, Socrates seems to be acting like a doctor giving Callicles soul the medicine that it needs. But does that mean that we should accept what Socrates says in his account of virtue also as an expression of his own deepest views? A number of difculties stand in the way of drawing that conclusion. First, Socrates has not given a completely sound defense of virtue. In fact, his speech, by moving from an (unconventional) understanding of virtue as a kind of wise moderation to a (more conventional) understanding of it as justice and moderation, even raises a troubling question about the unity of virtue and the harmony between wisdom and justice. To be sure, the surface of Socrates speech afrms the unity of virtue and the harmony of its parts. But that surface is not supported by an adequate argument.16 Perhaps as an acknowledgment of this, immediately after delivering his speech, Socrates presents its results in a way that quietly undercuts the conviction with which he seemed to be speaking: Either this argument [logos], then, must be refuted by us by showing that it is not by the possession of justice and moderation that the happy are happy, and by the possession of vice that the miserable are miserable or else, if this argument is true, we must consider what follows (508a8b3). Why does Socrates hold out, even if only as one of two alternatives, the possibility of a refutation of his argument? Since Socrates goes on at once to connect his defense of virtue with the Socratic thesis about justice that he has been defending since the beginning of his discussion with Polus, it may seem mistaken to raise doubts about his conviction (see 508b3e6). But after referring back to the Socratic thesis, Socrates then goes on to speak directly

16. Compare the similar objection of Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 1256, 12930. Irwins critical analysis should be contrasted with Friedlander, Plato, 2:269; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:146; Voegelin, Plato, 36.

Noble Rhetoric, the Order of the Soul, and the Socratic Thesis

139

about that thesis, and what he says forces us to confront an even more far-reaching question about the true character of his views. For Socrates says unobtrusively but clearly that even his defense of the Socratic thesis should be understood, not as a defense of a view that he knows to be true, but only as a defense of a view that no one he encounters can deny without becoming ridiculous. Speaking of that thesis, he says to Callicles:
These things that came to sight for us up there in the earlier speeches, are, as I say, held down and bound if I may put it in a rather rude way by iron and adamantine arguments [logois], as it would seem at any rate. And if you or someone younger than you does not loosen them, it will be impossible for anyone saying something different from what Im now saying to speak nobly. For to me at least, the speech [logos] is always the same that I do not know how these things stand, but of those I meet up with, as now, no one who says something different is able to avoid being ridiculous. (508e6509a7)

In this statement, Socrates suggests that in defending the Socratic thesis he is giving voice to a view that has greater power in peoples souls than many realize. But he stops short of afrming that he himself is convinced of the truth of this view, and he even suggests that the iron and adamantine arguments holding this view in place, as it would seem at any rate, might be loosened by Callicles or by someone younger than him (see also 506a15, 508a8b3). We should be reminded in this connection of another important statement that we considered earlier in which Socrates made a similar suggestion. For Socrates virtually began his exchange with Callicles by telling him that he will never attain consistency that he will go through life in disagreement with himself unless he refutes the Socratic thesis (see again 482a4b6). The most surprising aspect of that statement, especially since it came immediately after Socrates defense of the Socratic thesis in the Polus section, is one that I did not call attention to earlier: Wouldnt one have expected Socrates to say that Callicles must accept the Socratic thesis as the only way to achieve genuine consistency?

140

Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric

Does Socrates mean to indicate that he thinks this view is refutable? To be sure, his statements suggest that a refutation of this view would be far more difcult than people like Callicles think. In fact, it would be so difcult that Socrates is able to claim never to have encountered anyone who was able to avoid becoming ridiculous when arguing against the Socratic thesis. But does the great difculty of refuting this view amount to an impossibility? Would it be possible for someone of sufcient strength to achieve consistency by loosening the iron and adamantine bonds?17

SOCRATES SITUATION, THE QUESTION OF ASSIMILATION, AND THE ISSUE OF SELF-PROTECTION (508c4513d1)

Whatever indications Socrates gives that he may have doubts about the position he is defending, they do not prevent him from urging
17. On this last question, consider Socrates statement about himself at 482b7 c3 in light of his preceding remark about Callicles. On the general question of this paragraph, while Socrates statements that he does not know whether the Socratic thesis is true are sometimes noted by other commentators, these statements are usually not taken very seriously. See, for instance, Jaegers claim, after noting what looks like the logical indecision of [Socrates] conversations, that nonetheless there glows the relentless moral conviction of his life, sure of its ultimate aim, and therefore possessing that hotly sought for knowledge which renders any faltering of will impossible (Paideia, 2:150; see also 1467). Or consider Kahns claim: There is no doubt that Socrates regards the doctrine of the paradoxes as established by the refutations of Polus and Callicles (Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 110, the emphasis is Kahns; see also 11113, 11819; in his quotation on page 111 of Socrates crucial statement at 508e6509a7, Kahn omits Socrates claim that he does not know whether his thesis is true). Similar to Kahns insistence that there is no doubt that Socrates thinks his thesis has been established is McKims insistence that Socrates of course believes in the position he defends, a position whose truth, according to McKim, is beyond argument (see Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 47, 48; see also 3946). Consider also Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 45, 21432; Brickhouse and Smith, Platos Socrates, 3041, 1278. Somewhat closer to my own analysis is Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 97.