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A Survey of the Afghan People

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A Survey of the Afghan People


www.asiafoundation.org
AFGHANISTAN IN 2009
A Survey of the Afghan People
Afghanistan in 2009
A Survey of the Afghan People

Project Design and Direction


The Asia Foundation

Report Authors
Ruth Rennie
Sudhindra Sharma
Pawan Sen

Fieldwork
Afghan Centre for Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), Kabul

Report Design and Printing


The Asia Foundation
AINA, Kabul

© 2009, The Asia Foundation

About The Asia Foundation


The Asia Foundation is a non-profit, non-governmental organization committed to the de-
velopment of a peaceful, prosperous, just and open Asia-Pacific region. The Foundation sup-
ports programs in Asia that help improve governance, law, and civil society; women’s empow-
erment; economic reform and development; and international relations. Drawing on more
than 50 years of experience in Asia, the Foundation collaborates with private and public part-
ners to support leadership and institutional development, exchanges, and policy research.

With offices throughout Asia, an office in Washington, D.C., and its headquarters in San Fran-
cisco, the Foundation addresses these issues on both a country and regional level. In 2008,
the Foundation provided more than $87 million in program support and distributed over one
million books and educational materials valued at $41 million throughout Asia.

The Asia Foundation is not an endowed organization, and depends solely on monetary
contributions from donors to accomplish its work.

For more information, visit www.asiafoundation.org

This survey was made possible by support provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (Award
No. 306-A-00-09-00514-00). The opinions expressed herein do not reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for
International Development.
Afghanistan in 2009

Contents
Preface..................................................................................................................................1

1. Executive Summary..........................................................................................................3
Key findings...................................................................................................................3
Summary....................................................................................................................7

2. The National Mood..........................................................................................................15


Direction of the country.................................................................................................15
Reasons for optimism...................................................................................................16
Reasons for pessimism.................................................................................................18
Afghanistan’s biggest problems: National level..................................................................20
Afghanistan’s biggest problems: Local level......................................................................21
Confidence in specific institutions and organizations...........................................................23

3. Security..........................................................................................................................27
Security situation...........................................................................................................27
Personal and family safety and security.............................................................................29
Attitude towards reporting crime......................................................................................32
Causes of crime...........................................................................................................35
Safety to participate in various activities............................................................................37
Perceptions of the Afghan National Police.........................................................................39
Perceptions of the Afghan National Army..........................................................................40
Expectations regarding security.......................................................................................42

4. Economy and Development.............................................................................................43


Economy of Afghan households: Past and present.............................................................43
Economic situation of Afghan households.........................................................................46
Availability of basic amenities...........................................................................................47
Future expectations for infrastructure and services.............................................................49
Important development issue..........................................................................................50
Electricity supply...........................................................................................................51
Main source of energy for lighting, cooking and heating......................................................53
Development programs and public awareness of foreign aid................................................54

5. Government....................................................................................................................59
Performance of national government................................................................................59
Performance of provincial government.............................................................................66
Performance of municipal and local authorities...................................................................67
Corruption...................................................................................................................69
Contact with local government to solve local problems......................................................72
Role of elected representative bodies..............................................................................75
Contacts with Members of Parliament (MPs)......................................................................77
Contacts with Provincial Council representatives.................................................................78
Role of Community Development Councils........................................................................80
Afghanistan in 2009

6. Judicial System...............................................................................................................85
The formal and informal justice system in Afghanistan..........................................................85
Perceptions of state courts............................................................................................85
Perceptions of local shura and jirga.................................................................................89
Dispute resolution.........................................................................................................92

7. Democratic Values.........................................................................................................99
Perceptions of democracy..............................................................................................99
Attitudes toward democratic principles, processes and political activities..............................102
Personal efficacy: Influence of individuals on government.................................................105
Attitudes towards elections...........................................................................................107
Electoral participation..................................................................................................110
Freedom of expression................................................................................................117
Democratic spirit of government...................................................................................119
Involvement of religious leaders.....................................................................................121

8. Women and Society........................................................................................................123


The biggest problems faced by women..........................................................................123
Gender equality..........................................................................................................125
Women’s political participation......................................................................................127
Political leadership.......................................................................................................130
Awareness of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs...................................................................134

9. Information Sources and Media Use...............................................................................137


Access to communications technology...........................................................................137
Radio listenership.......................................................................................................138
Television viewership...................................................................................................140
Sources of information on national and local events.........................................................142

10. Appendix 1: Target Demographics................................................................................147

11. Appendix 2: Methodology............................................................................................151

12. Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire.............................................................................167

13. Appendix 4: Afghanistan Provincial and Regional map.................................................225


Afghanistan in 2009 1

Preface

2009 has been a formative year for the people of Afghanistan. In the 12 months since
The Asia Foundation conducted its last survey of Afghan public opinion in 2008, the
domestic and international landscape has shifted considerably, heralding renewed emphasis
on this nation determined to find its path forward in the post-Taliban era. Defined by
presidential and provincial council elections and an uptick in insurgent activity, these
shifts have delivered both noted accomplishment and tragedy in 2009. Despite modest
improvements in basic infrastructure, public services, education, and health, civilian
and military casualties have reached unsettling levels. Add natural disasters, inclement
weather conditions, and a renewed anti-insurgency campaign in Pakistan to the dynamic
and conditions are considerably difficult for the average Afghan. These challenging
surroundings notwithstanding, The Asia Foundation successfully conducted its fifth
nationwide assessment of Afghan public opinion. This report, outlining findings and
methodology, is the material result of that effort.

Aiming to provide policy makers and influential


actors in government, civil society, the international
community, and the broader Afghan citizenry with
useful, actionable information, the 2009 Survey of
the Afghan People is a comprehensive assessment
of national perception in several key policy areas
including security, economy, governance, democratic
values, and women and society. Expanding from its
limited scope in 2004 and building upon previous
surveys conducted in 2006, 2007, and 2008, the
2009 survey continues to track core appraisal areas
while revising its nuances and methodology to On The Cover: Field researcher walking between survey
meet contemporary constraints and demands. The points in the mountains of Badakhshan province.
survey’s value can be found in its reliable consistency
to measure public perception systematically in each passing year, making it an important
public policy tool and “snapshot” barometer of public opinion in Afghanistan.

The 2009 survey, like previous surveys, employed a standard questionnaire designed to
solicit actionable responses from typical Afghans which would prove useful to policy
makers, social researchers, and donor organizations and their interventions. In addition to
core tracking questions included in the questionnaire since the survey’s initial inception in
2004, the Foundation consulted with select experts, stakeholders, and donors for review
and suggestions for new assessment elements in 2009. This is reflected in the survey by a
greater emphasis placed in the areas of sub-national governance, economy and development,
women and society, and democratic values at the request of stakeholders. The conduct of
presidential elections in 2009 also played a palpable and influential role throughout.
2 Afghanistan in 2009

Operationally, 648 field surveyors throughout all 34 provinces of Afghanistan interviewed


6,406 adult Afghans between June 17 and July 6, 2009 to construct the 2009 report data
sets. Sample points were randomly distributed proportional to geographical and residential
characteristics with “Kish” grids to select the individual respondents. Instability, the presence
of active fighting, logistical constraints, and natural impediments such as flooding in some
provinces caused a number of sampling points to be tactically adjusted or replaced to keep
interviewers out of harms way and able to conduct their collection of data. Full details
on the methodology of the survey are available in Appendix 2 of this report. The survey
questionnaire, with percentage of responses by question, can be found in Appendix 3.

Not only providing a peek into Afghan perceptions at a specific point in time or tool
to measure shifts in public opinion, the survey represents the most visible product of
a comprehensive approach by The Asia Foundation to build Afghan research capacity.
Although the survey was commissioned, developed, and managed by The Asia Foundation’s
Afghanistan Office, several Afghan organizations benefited from the symbiotic partnerships
forged by the program. Fieldwork was conducted by the Kabul-based Afghan Center for
Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) which has received support from The
Asia Foundation since 2006. An internship program to build capacity for students and
serve the broader Afghan research community was continued from 2008 in partnership
with the National Centre for Policy Research (NCPR) at Kabul University. In addition to
specialized trainings, selected students completed projects and received practical hands-
on work experience through placements with various research organizations. The Asia
Foundation also offered specialized training on statistical tools for personnel from the
Afghan Government’s Central Statistic Organization (CSO). Further internships and
trainings are planned for later this year.

In terms of program implementation, the initial analysis and write-up of the 2009 survey
report was provided by Mr. Sudhindra Sharma and Mr. Pawan Sen from Inter-Disciplinary
Analysts (IDA), a partner of The Asia Foundation located in Kathmandu, Nepal. Ms.
Ruth Rennie, consultant to the Foundation, completed the analysis and constructed the
final version of the survey report. In Afghanistan, Mr. Sunil Pillai, Mr. Fazel Rabi Wardak,
and Mr. Michael Haines managed the overall day-to-day activities of the survey project.

Finally, the generous support and confidence of The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) and its team of professionals made this important research and
capacity building tool possible.

The Asia Foundation


Kabul, Afghanistan
October 2009
Afghanistan in 2009 3

1 Executive Summary

1.1 Key Findings

• In 2009, 42 percent of respondents say that the country is moving in the right di-
rection. This figure is higher than in 2008 (38%). Similarly, 29 percent feel that the
country is moving in the wrong direction compared to 32 percent in 2008, signaling
a check on the trend of declining optimism that had been evident since 2006.

• The main reason for optimism continues to be good security which has been men-
tioned by an increasing proportion of respondents each year, from 31 percent in
2006 to 44 percent in 2009. More respondents in 2009 also mention reconstruction
and rebuilding (36%) and opening of schools for girls (21%) as reasons for optimism
than in previous years.

• Insecurity also remains the most important reason for pessimism, cited by 42 percent
of respondents. However, the proportion of respondents that highlight insecurity in
2009 has fallen since 2008 when half of respondents (50%) emphasized this factor.

• Insecurity (including attacks, violence and terrorism) is identified as the biggest prob-
lem in Afghanistan by over a third of respondents (36%), particularly in the South
East (48%), West (44%) and South West (41%). However, concern about other is-
sues such as unemployment (35%), poor economy (20%), corruption (17%), poverty
(11%) and education (11%) has increased in 2009 compared to 2008.

• A slightly higher proportion of respondents give a positive assessment of the se-


curity situation in their local area in 2009 (64%) than in 2008 (62%). Although im-
provements were reported in almost all regions of the country, it is to be considered
that there were greater restrictions on the movement of survey researchers due to
security concerns and other reasons in 2009 compared to previous years (refer to
Appendix 2: Methodology for details).

• Just over half of respondents (51%) say they fear for their personal safety in their
local area. However, much higher proportions of respondents report at least some-
times having fears for their safety in the South East (65%), South West (62%) and
West (62%), than in other parts of the country. There has also been a significant rise
in the incidence of crime and violence experienced by respondents in these regions
since 2008.
4 Afghanistan in 2009

• Seventeen percent of respondents report that they or someone in their family have
been victims of violence or crime in the past year. Nearly one in ten victims of
violence report that this was due to the actions of militias and insurgents (9%) or
foreign forces (9%). The incidence of victimization from military type actions has
been rising steadily since 2007. Violence resulting from militant/insurgent actions is
mentioned most often in the Central/Hazarajat (24%), East (17%), Central/Kabul
(11%), South East (9%) and South West (8%). Whereas violence due to the actions
of foreign forces is most commonly reported in the South West (22%), South East
(11%) and East (10%).

• The proportion of respondents who express fear to vote in a national election rose
significantly between 2008 and 2009 (from 45% to 51%). This is now true for the
majority of respondents in the South West (79%), South East (68%), West (61%)
and East (56%) of the country.

• In 2009, Afghans give a more positive assessment of their economic situation than
in previous years, although this prosperity is not evenly shared. Considerably more
urban respondents (63%) than rural residents (52%) say they are more prosperous
today than they were under the Taliban.

• Unemployment continues to feature amongst the most important problems at both


national (35%) and local (26%) levels. Other major problems at the local level con-
cern basic infrastructure and services such as electricity (26%), roads (24%), water
(22%) and lack of health care/clinics/hospitals (20%), as in previous years.

• In terms of local amenities and services, respondents continue to report the greatest
satisfaction with the availability of education for children (67%), water for drinking
(63%) and irrigation (53%) and clinics and hospitals (49%).

• Around two-thirds of respondents (65%) say that the supply of electricity in their
local areas is bad and a third of respondents (33%) report having no access to any
kind of electricity. This is significantly lower than in previous years.

• Assessments of the performance of the national government have risen slightly from
67 percent in 2008 to 71 percent in 2009. The most commonly mentioned achieve-
ments of the current government are reconstruction (32%), establishing peace and
security (27%) and a better education system (26%). The most commonly mentioned
government failings are insecurity (31%), administrative corruption (29%), lack of
job opportunities (20%), weak economy (15%) and weak government (13%).

• The majority of respondents (71%) support the government’s attempts to address


the security situation through negotiation and reconciliation with armed anti-gov-
Afghanistan in 2009 5

ernment elements. The high level of support for this approach is likely to be influ-
enced by the fact that a majority of respondents (56%) say they have some level of
sympathy with the motivations of armed opposition groups.

• Confidence in representative bodies and their responsiveness to addressing issues of


local concern remains relatively high. Sixty-eight percent of respondents say parlia-
ment is addressing the major problems of people in Afghanistan and 58 percent
say that their MP is addressing the major problems of their constituency in the
Parliament. Satisfaction with the performance of MPs in this regards shows a small
improvement in 2009 compared to 2008.

• At the local level respondents give the most positive assessment of the performance
of Provincial Councils (75%), followed by district authorities (69%) and munici-
palities (58%). However, in 2009 satisfaction with the performance of municipal
authorities has increased while satisfaction with Provincial Councils and district au-
thorities has remained stable.

• In 2009, a significantly higher proportion of respondents than in previous years


mention freedom (50%) and peace (41%) as the greatest personal benefits they ex-
pect from democracy. This year respondents give greater importance to core demo-
cratic values such as rights and law (24%), women’s right (21%), government of the
people (19%) and Islamic democracy (23%). However, they show less confidence in
the likelihood of democracy delivering more tangible benefits such as less corrup-
tion (17%) or prosperity (15%).

• The proportion of respondents who say that democracy is the best form of gov-
ernment available continues to fall, from 84 percent in 2006 to 78 percent in 2009.
However, since 2008 there has been no change in the level of satisfaction with the
way democracy is working in Afghanistan (68%).

• Agreement with the principle of equal rights continues to fall over time, from 90
percent in 2006 and 2007 to 84 percent in 2008 and to 80 percent in 2009. The same
is true of support for the principle of peaceful political opposition which has fallen
from 84 percent in 2006 to 77 percent in 2009. There is also a decline in the accep-
tance of differences in political allegiances between individuals, from 54 percent in
2006 to 40 percent in 2009. However, support for allowing opposition parties to hold
local meetings rose significantly from 44 percent in 2008 to 54 percent in 2009.

• 2009 sees a certain renewed confidence in the electoral process. Seventy percent
of respondents say they believe that voting can lead to improvement, reversing the
trend of the last two years. This is accompanied by a steady rise in the proportion
6 Afghanistan in 2009

of respondents who say they can have some degree of influence over government
decisions from 36 percent in 2006 to 42 percent in 2009.

• 2009 also sees a significant rise in public confidence in a number of election-related in-
stitutions including the Independent Election Commission (from 58% in 2008 to 67%
in 2009) and political parties (47%, which is the highest recorded figure since 2006).

• The survey was conducted in June 2009 with the Presidential and Provincial Council elec-
tions scheduled for August. Two months before the elections 82 percent of respondents
were aware of the elections and 77 percent had registered to vote. Voter registration
was significantly higher amongst men (85%) than women (69%). Around three quarters
(73%) of those who had not registered said they did not know where to do this.

• Seventy-three percent of registered voters said they were likely to vote including
48 percent who said this was very likely. However, significant proportions in the
South West (35%), South East (29%), Central/Kabul (27%) and West (25%) said
they were unlikely to vote. The proportion of respondents who report having no
interest in participating in the elections rose sharply in 2009, and has more than
doubled since 2004 (from 12% to 16% in 2005, 18% in 2008 and 26% in 2009).
Security concerns were also prevalent (18%), particularly in the South East (25%)
and South West (30%).

• Sixty-four percent of respondents said that the upcoming elections would be free
and fair. Those who thought otherwise identified a range of potential problems
including cheating in the vote count (39%) and buying of votes (33%). Only a small
proportion mentioned intimidation against voters or party activists (8%). Doubts
about the elections being free and fair were highest in the South West (37%), South
East (29%), Central/Kabul (25%) and West (23%) regions.

• Views on freedom of expression continue to be divided. Forty percent of respon-


dents say that most people feel free to express their opinions but an almost equal pro-
portion (39%) say they do not. The proportion of respondents who say it is unaccept-
able to talk negatively about the government continues to fall, from 69% in 2007 to
61 percent in 2009. The proportion who mention poor local security conditions as a
barrier to freedom of expression is also lower in 2009 (29%) than in any previous year
(40% in 2006, 36% in 2007, 38% in 2008), although there is a small increase in those
who explicitly mention a threat from the Taliban (21%) compared to 2008 (18%).

• Support for consultation with religious leaders in government decision-making and


to resolve local problems continues to rise, with the highest levels of support in the
East (82%), and South West (72%) of the country.
Afghanistan in 2009 7

• As in previous years, education and illiteracy (49%) remain the major problems
facing women in Afghanistan. However, over the same period there has been a
consistent rise in the proportion of respondents who identify the lack of employ-
ment opportunities for women as a significant issue, from two percent in 2006 to 19
percent in 2007, 24 percent in 2008 and 28 percent in 2009.

• Stated support for gender equality remains high, including equal educational
opportunities (87%) and women’s right to vote (83%). The proportion who say that
women should be allowed to work outside the home has decreased marginally each
year from 71 percent in 2006 to its lowest level in 2009 (67%).

• Results in 2009 also show a significant decline in support for female representation
in governance bodies at all levels compared to previous years.

• Radio remains the most accessible media for Afghan household, particularly in rural
areas. However there has been a steady decline in radio ownership and radio listen-
ership since 2007. The proportion of respondents who get their information from
Television continues to rise but is still largely confined to urban areas.

• 2009 saw a dramatic rise in mobile telephone ownership compared to previous years.
This has meant that for the first time the majority of respondents (52%) now have
access to this technology.

1.2 Summary

In 2009, more respondents say that the country is moving in the right direction and
fewer say it is going in the wrong direction than in 2008, signaling a check on the
trend of declining optimism that had been evident since 2006.

Security continues to remain a key concern for Afghans and a critical factor by
which they judge the progress and direction of their country’s development. The
survey data in 2009 suggests that there have been some improvements in this area
and that respondents have a more positive view of the security situation than has
been the case in the past two years1. Good security is mentioned by an increasing
proportion of respondents each year as the main reason for optimism. Insecurity
remains the most important reason for pessimism; however, fewer respondents
cited this reason in 2009 than in 2008. A slightly higher proportion of respondents
1
It should be considered that in 2009 survey researchers faced much greater restrictions on their move-
ments due to security concerns than in previous years. For the 2009 survey, more than 100 randomly
selected sampling points across the country were inaccessible due to security reasons (see Appendix 2:
Methodology).
8 Afghanistan in 2009

also give a positive assessment of the security situation in their local area than in
2008 in almost all regions.

Nonetheless, insecurity still emerges as the biggest problem in Afghanistan, with


particular impact in the South East, South West and West of the country. Much
higher proportions of respondents in these regions report at least sometimes having
fears for their safety and the proportion of respondents who say they often fear for
their safety has been rising steadily over the last four years. There has also been a
significant rise in the incidence of crime and violence experienced by respondents in
these regions since 2008.

Although experienced by a small minority of respondents (9%), the incidence of


victimization from the actions of militias and insurgents or foreign forces has been
rising steadily since 2007, indicating that the ongoing hostilities continue to have a
perceptible impact on the lives of the Afghan people. This kind of conflict-related
violence is a particular concern again in the South West, South East, East and also
in the Central/Hazarajat and Central/Kabul regions where high levels of violence
related to militias and insurgents are reported.

The majority of respondents support the government’s attempts to address the se-
curity situation through negotiation and reconciliation with armed anti-government
elements. The high level of support for this approach is likely to be influenced by
the fact that a small majority of respondents say they have some level of sympathy
with the motivations of armed opposition groups. There is little variation between
ethnic groups, but there are significant regional differences. Around two thirds of
respondents have some level of sympathy with such groups in the South East and
East, but this is true for less than half of respondents in the Central/Kabul and
Central/Hazarajat regions.

Yet a sense of optimism remains. The majority of respondents expect the security
situation in their local area to improve in the next year, although, in regions where
insecurity is a major problem, respondents are much less optimistic about future
improvements.

Levels of insecurity continue to have an impact on respondent’s willingness to par-


ticipate in a range of public activities. Between 2008 and 2009 the proportion of
respondents who say they would be afraid to vote in a national election rose signifi-
cantly. This was the case for the majority of respondents in the South West, South
East, East and West of the country reflecting the significant impact of insecurity on
democratic participation in this election year.
Afghanistan in 2009 9

Afghans continue to express high levels of confidence in state security services. Per-
ceptions of the operational capacity of both the Afghan National Police (ANP) and
the Afghan National Army (ANA) have been improving since 2007. However, this
does not necessarily translate into greater satisfaction with their performance. Fewer
respondents in 2009 say the ANP helps to improve security or is honest and fair than
in previous years, although assessments of the ANA’s performance remain stable.

In 2009, Afghans also give a more positive assessment of their economic situation
than in previous years, although this prosperity is not evenly shared. Considerably
more urban than rural residents report that they are more prosperous now than
under the Taliban regime. Only a minority of respondents say this is the case in the
South East and South West.

Again in 2009, in terms of local services and amenities, respondents report the high-
est levels of satisfaction with the availability of education for children, especially
girls. This is also the area in which they report having seen the greatest improve-
ments in the last year. Satisfaction with the availability of water for drinking and
irrigation and clinics and hospitals also remains relatively high.

Survey responses in 2009 suggest there have been some improvements in electricity
supply in the last year. Although a third of respondents report that they have no ac-
cess to any kind of electricity, this figure is significantly lower than in previous years.
While there has been no substantial increase in coverage of the state electricity sup-
ply since 2006, there has been a rise in the use of public or shared generators. A small
proportion of respondents also use solar power generation (4%) particularly in rural
areas which appears to provide a cost effective solution to rural energy provision,
particularly if the quantity of electricity supplied can be increased.

Unemployment continues to be a major issue of concern at both the national and


local levels. Respondents are least satisfied with the availability of jobs in their local
area and report having seen the least improvement in the last year in employment
opportunities.

Despite the progress identified in a number of areas, overall assessments of the


availability of basic amenities and services have not improved substantially over
time. In fact, levels of satisfaction have been falling since 2007 regarding the avail-
ability of core services such as health and education, suggesting that expectations
for improvement continue to remain ahead of the implementation of improvements
themselves.
10 Afghanistan in 2009

As in previous years, the majority of respondents say that they are aware of develop-
ment projects in their local area relating to education and reconstruction of roads
and bridges. Significant proportions of respondents also mention projects related
to drinking water supply and health care. The Afghan Government is viewed as the
primary agency responsible for most development initiatives although foreign do-
nors are seen to play a key role in programs in the education sector, reconstruction
in industry and electricity supply. The United States is identified as the major donor
in all regions followed by Germany, Japan and India. However, a number of other
donors are mentioned by a significant proportion of respondents in regions where
they are particularly active.

In 2009, assessments of the performance of the national government have risen


slightly since 2008. As in previous years, the government’s performance is judged
most positively with regard to the provision of education, the healthcare system
and security, but least positively in terms of creating jobs, reviving/developing the
economy and fighting corruption. This year respondent’s were asked for the first
time to identify the greatest achievements and failings of the current government.
The results closely mirror assessments of the overall direction and progress of the
country suggesting that perceptions of government performance are largely indis-
tinguishable from perceptions of the state of the country as a whole. The most
commonly mentioned achievements of the current government include reconstruc-
tion, establishing peace and security and a better education system, whereas the most
commonly mentioned failings include insecurity, administrative corruption, lack of
job opportunities, weak economy and weak government. Weak government appears
most strongly correlated with poor security, but also, with assessments of govern-
ment performance in the provision of basic public services.

The majority of respondents continue to say that corruption is a major problem in


all facets of life and at all levels of government. The proportion of respondents that
identify corruption as a major problem in their provincial government has fallen
since 2006. There has also been a consistent fall in the proportion who report an an-
nual increase in corruption at this level. However, those who identify corruption as
a major problem in their daily life and in their neighborhood has been rising steadily
over the same period.

Overall confidence in representative bodies and their responsiveness to addressing


issues of local concerns remains relatively high. The majority of respondents say
that both the Parliament and their own MPs are addressing the issues of concern,
and satisfaction with the performance of MPs in this regards show a small improve-
ment in 2009 compared to 2008.
Afghanistan in 2009 11

At the local level, respondents give the most positive assessment of the performance
of Provincial Councils followed by district authorities and municipalities. Provincial
Councils continue to enjoy a higher level of public confidence than national level
representative institutions. However, confidence in Provincial Councils has been fall-
ing consistently since 2007. In 2009, satisfaction with the performance of municipal
authorities increased while satisfaction with Provincial Councils and District authori-
ties has remained stable.

In 2009, awareness of Community Development Councils (CDC) as representative


bodies at the village level has continued to rise. In addition, more than three quarters
of respondents are satisfied with the performance of their local CDC and these bod-
ies continue to enjoy the highest levels of public confidence of any formal local gov-
ernance body. However, in 2009 respondents make a much clearer distinction about
the representative role of CDCs at different levels of government than they have in
the past. CDCs are judged significantly more capable to represent local interests at
the provincial level than at the national level.

Local shura or jirga also remain important informal governance structures at the
local level. Respondents continue to prefer shura and jirga to state courts for de-
livering justice and resolving disputes, particularly in rural areas. Both mechanisms
are judged most positively in terms of accessibility although State courts are clearly
more accessible to respondents in urban areas and those with higher levels of edu-
cation. Since 2007, the proportion of respondents who have taken cases to shura
and jirga has risen whereas those taking cases to state courts has fallen. However,
satisfaction with shura/jirga continues to drop. In 2009, the difference in levels of
satisfaction between the outcomes of cases taken to formal and informal dispute
resolution mechanisms is much smaller than in previous years. Similarly, although
public confidence in shura and jirga is higher than for all formal local governance
bodies this has also been falling steadily since 2007.

In 2009, a significantly higher proportion of respondents mention freedom and


peace as the greatest personal benefits they expect from democracy than in previous
years. Indeed, in 2009 people appear to give greater importance to core democratic
values such as rights and law, women’s rights, government of the people and Islamic
democracy, reversing the trend of the last few years. However, they show less confi-
dence in the likelihood of democracy delivering more tangible benefits such as less
corruption or prosperity.

However, since 2006, there has been a steady fall in the proportion of respondents
who say they are satisfied with the way democracy is working in Afghanistan. This
12 Afghanistan in 2009

has been accompanied by a drop in the proportion of respondents who agree that
democracy is the best form of government available. This disenchantment with de-
mocracy seems to be related to the perceived inability of the democratic system to
fulfill the expectations of Afghan citizens in delivering the desired benefits.

In 2009, stated support for core democratic values such as equal rights before the
law and equality of representation from all major regions and ethnic groups remains
high. However, agreement with the principle of equal rights continues to fall over
time. Support for the principle of peaceful opposition is also high, although this too
has been falling steadily. Similarly, acceptance of differences in political allegiances
between individuals reached its lowest level to date in 2009. On the other hand,
support for allowing opposition parties, including unpopular parties, to hold local
meetings rose significantly. This may be due to the elections scheduled for 2009
which gave greater salience to the activities of political parties.

As an election year, 2009 saw a certain renewed confidence in the electoral process.
More respondents say they believe that voting can lead to improvement, reversing
the declining trend of the last two years. This is accompanied by a steady rise in
the proportion of respondents who say they can have some degree of influence
over government decisions, although the proportion who say they can have a lot of
influence was much higher in 2008. Confidence in personal efficacy rises with level
of education and remains higher amongst urban residents although there is no sig-
nificant difference between men and women in their perceptions of their ability to
influence government decisions.

The survey was conducted in June 2009 with the Presidential and Provincial Coun-
cil elections scheduled for August. Two months before the elections more than
four-fifths of respondents were aware of the elections and over three quarters had reg-
istered to vote. Voter registration was significantly higher amongst men than women.
Around three-quarters of those who had not registered said they did not know where
to do this, suggesting that a lack of information about electoral procedures may still
constitute a significant reason why Afghans may have failed to register to vote.

Around three-quarters of registered voters said they intended to vote, although there
were some significant differences between regions and population groups. More men
than women said they were likely to vote. While more than four-fifths of registered
voters intended to vote in the Central/Hazarajat, East, North East and North West,
between a third and a quarter said they were unlikely to vote in the South West,
South East, West and Central/Kabul regions. Security concerns were prevalent in
the South East and South West. Social restrictions that limit the electoral participa-
Afghanistan in 2009 13

tion of women were significant in the Central/Kabul and North East regions. The
proportion of respondents who report having no interest in participating in the elec-
tions rose sharply in 2009, and has more than doubled since 2004. Voting intention
is strongly correlated with the sense of personal efficacy, suggesting that people are
more likely to use their voting rights if they believe that voting can lead to improve-
ment. Voting intention is also strongly correlated with confidence in the integrity of
the electoral process.

The majority of respondents said that the upcoming elections would be free and
fair. Those who thought otherwise identified a range of potential problems in-
cluding cheating in the vote count and buying of votes. Only a small proportion
mentioned intimidation against voters or party activists. Doubts about the elections
being free and fair were highest in the South West, South East, West and Central/
Kabul regions. However, despite some doubts about the electoral process, 2009 saw
a significant rise in public confidence in a number of election-related institutions in-
cluding the Independent Election Commission and political parties, which achieved
the highest level of public confidence since 2006.

Views on freedom of expression continue to be divided. Physical security condi-


tions, as well as the legal guarantee of freedoms, again emerge as the key elements
in ensuring freedom of expression for citizens. The proportion of respondents who
say it is unacceptable to talk negatively about the government continues to fall, dem-
onstrating that the major obstacles to freedom of expression in Afghanistan do not
come from the government but from other factors in the environment and society.

Support for consultation with religious leaders in government decision-making and


to resolve local problems continues to rise, with highest levels of support in the East
(82%) and South West (72%) of the country

As in previous years, education and illiteracy (49%) remain the major problems fac-
ing women in Afghanistan. However, over the same period there has been a con-
sistent rise in the proportion of respondents who identify the lack of employment
opportunities for women as a significant issue.

Stated support for gender equality, such as equal educational opportunities and wom-
en’s right to vote, remains high. However, the proportion of respondents who say
that women should be allowed to work outside the home has decreased marginally
each year to its lowest level in 2009. Despite the high level of support for women’s
electoral participation only a small majority think that women should decide for
themselves how to vote. In the South West and South East significant proportions of
respondents say it is acceptable for men to vote in the place of women. As in previ-
14 Afghanistan in 2009

ous years, support for the principles of gender equality is higher amongst women,
younger age groups and urban residents. Support also rises with level of education.

Results in 2009 show a significant decline in support for female representation in


governance institutions at all levels compared to previous years. Respondents record
the least opposition to being represented by a woman in their District Development
Assembly (DDA). Women continue to have a much stronger belief in equality of
representation than men.

Radio remains the most accessible media for Afghan households particularly in rural
areas. However, there has been a steady decline in radio ownership and radio listen-
ership since 2007. Television ownership continues to rise although it remains much
more common in urban areas. In addition, 2009 saw a significant rise in mobile
telephone ownership compared to previous years, meaning that for the first time the
majority of respondents now have access to this technology.

However, the use of informal networks as a source of news and information re-
mains high. Nearly half of respondent use meetings in the community or sermons
in mosques for this purpose. Recourse to informal networks such as friends, family
and neighbors as the principle source of information also remains high, particularly
in rural areas and for women and respondents with lower levels of education. How-
ever, the proportion of respondents who say they prefer to receive information on
local events from personal acquaintances has been falling steadily in recent years. On
the other hand, 2009 records the highest proportion of respondents who say they
prefer to get information from influential people such as village chiefs, community
leaders or mullahs, demonstrating that traditional channels of information dissemi-
nation continue to remain important in Afghanistan.
The National Mood 15

2 The National Mood

2.1 Direction of the country

For the fourth year running the survey sought to gauge how the men and women
of Afghanistan assess their country’s overall situation. Respondents were first asked
whether they think the country is moving in the right direction or the wrong direc-
tion. The most common view, held by 42 percent of respondents, is that the country
is moving in the right direction. However, a sizeable proportion (29%) say it is mov-
ing in the wrong direction. About one in five respondents (21%) has mixed views on
the overall direction of the country.

Interestingly, households with lower incomes are more likely to say that the country
is moving in the right direction than those with high incomes. Over half (51%) of
households in the lowest income category say this compared to 38 percent in the
highest earning bracket. Similarly, around a third (34%) of those in the high income
categories say that the country is moving in the wrong direction compared with a
quarter (25%) in the lowest group.

There are also significant differences in opinion between regions. The majority of
people living in the East (58%), North East (54%) and North West (55%) are opti-
mistic about the overall direction of the country. In contrast, a significant proportion
of the population in the South West (42%), South East (40%) and Central/Kabul
(35%) regions feel that the country is moving in the wrong direction.

The proportion of respondents saying that the country is moving in the right direc-
tion in 2009 (42%) is higher than the figure recorded in 2008 (38%), signaling a check
on the trend of declining optimism that had been evident since 2006. Similarly, in
2009 only 29 percent feel that the country is moving in the wrong direction com-
pared to 32 percent who felt so in 2008. This figure is still higher than in 2007 (24%)
and 2006 (21%). The proportion of those with mixed views continues to fall (from
29% in 2006 to 21% in 2009).
16 Afghanistan in 2009

Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do
you think they are going in the wrong direction? (Q-9) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006,
2007, 2008 AND 2009
50%
44% 42% 42%
38%
40%
32%
29% 29% 25%
30%
21% 24% 23% 21%
20%

10%

0%
Right direction Wrong direction Some in right, some in
wrong direction

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 2.1
2.2 Reasons for optimism

Respondents who say that things are moving in the right direction (42% of all re-
spondents) were then asked to give the two most important reasons why they think
this is so. The most commonly mentioned reasons include good security (44%), re-
construction/rebuilding (36%) and opening of schools for girls (21%). Around one
in ten respondents mention good government (12%) and democracy and elections
(10%) as factors for optimism. Improvements in security are more often mentioned
by respondents in urban (49%) than rural (42%) areas. Households in the lowest
income bracket most often mention improvements in security (51%), but least often
mention reconstruction and rebuilding (29%). The opening of schools for girls is
emphasized more by women (23%) than men (19%).

Why do you say that things are moving in the right direction? (Q-10a&b combined, Base 2712)
50%
44%
40% 36%

30%
21%
20%
12%
10% 9%
10%

0%
Good security Reconstruction / Schools for girls Good government Democracy / Peace/end of the
rebuilding have opened elections war

Fig 2.2
The National Mood 17

Across the country good security is the most frequently cited reason why the country
is moving in the right direction in the North East (63%), North West (60%), Cen-
tral/Hazarajat (53%) and East (39%) regions2.

Reconstruction/rebuilding is given as the main reason in the Central/Kabul (45%),


South East (41%) and South West (35%). In the West respondents give equal impor-
tance to security (31%) and reconstruction (30%).

Table 2.1: Reasons given by those saying things are moving in the right direction (Q-10a&b com-
bined, Base 2712) BY REGION

Central/ South North North South Central/


Base: Those say- East West
ing right direction Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Reconstruction / 45 41 27 40 34 30 35 16
rebuilding
Good security 41 16 39 63 60 31 18 53
Schools for girls 17 28 24 19 13 24 31 22
have opened
Good government 12 17 12 9 15 14 11 8
Peace / end of the 10 8 4 8 15 8 7 16
war
Economic revival 9 9 2 5 6 3 10 5
Democracy / 9 17 12 5 5 21 13 14
elections
Freedom / free 6 6 3 5 5 7 7 8
speech

Between 2006 and 2009, good security has almost consistently been identified as the
most important reason why respondents say that the country is heading in the right
direction. Only in 2007 did most respondents identify reconstruction as the primary
reason for optimism. In addition, the proportion of people mentioning good secu-
rity has been rising, steadily from 31 percent in 2006 to 44 percent in 2009. The pro-
portion mentioning reconstruction/rebuilding and the opening of school for girls
has also generally been rising although the impact of rebuilding and reconstruction
was most strongly marked between 2006 and 2007. The proportion of respondents
mentioning economic revival or democracy and elections has been relatively stable
over this period. On the other hand, factors such as the end of the war which were
salient in 2006 when they were mentioned by 29 percent of respondents are much
less relevant in 2009 (9%).
2
It should be considered that in 2009 survey researchers faced much greater restrictions on their move-
ments due to security concerns than in previous years. For the 2009 survey, more than 100 randomly
selected sampling points across the country were inaccessible due to security reasons (see Appendix 2:
Methodology).
18 Afghanistan in 2009

Why do you say that things are moving in the right direction? (Q-10a&b combined) COMPARI-
SON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

50%
44%
39% 39% 36%
40%
34% 32%
31% 29%
30%
21%
21% 19%19% 21%
20%
16% 16%
10%
9% 10% 9% 9%
10% 7% 7% 6%
5%

0%
Good security Reconstruction/ Schools for girls Democracy/ Peace/ end of Economic
rebuilding have opened elections the war revival

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 2.3
2.3 Reasons for pessimism

Respondents who say that things are moving in the wrong direction (i.e. 29% of all
respondents) were also asked to give the two main reasons for their view. Insecurity
is cited by 42 percent of respondents, making it by far the most important reason
for pessimism. One-fourth (25%) of respondents identify bad government as the
reason for pessimism, followed by corruption (17%) and unemployment (15%).

Why do you say that things are moving in the wrong direction? (Q-11a&b combined, Base 1885)

50%
42%
40%

30%
25%
17%
20%
15%
11% 10%
10% 7% 7%

0%
Insecurity Bad govt Corruption Un- Bad economy Administrative Too many Presence of
employment corruption foreigners Taliban

Fig 2.4
There is also some variation between regions in the reasons cited for believing that the
country is moving in the wrong direction. Insecurity remains the most common reason
given in almost all regions with more than 40 percent of respondents mentioning this
in the South West (49%), East (47%), Central Kabul (44%), South East (42%) and
The National Mood 19

West (42%). Suicide attacks are particularly singled out by almost one in five respon-
dents in the East (19%) and one in ten in the North West (9%), which is much higher
than in other parts of the country. Bad government is the most commonly cited rea-
son in the Central Hazarajat (31%) and ranks in second place in all the other regions.
The absence of reconstruction is mentioned by nearly twice as many respondents in
the North East (13%) and Central Hazarajat (10%) as in other parts of the country.

Table 2.2: Reasons given by those saying things are moving in the wrong direction (Q-11a&b
combined, Base 1885) BY REGION

Base: Those Central/ South East North North West South Central/
saying wrong Kabul East (%) East West (%) West Hazarajat
direction (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Insecurity 44 42 47 36 28 42 49 25
Bad government 27 29 16 25 19 24 24 31
There is unemploy-
23 7 12 16 22 8 13 5
ment
Corruption 15 21 10 16 19 16 17 18
Bad economy 14 10 6 12 14 13 5 13
Administrative cor- 10 6 9 16 17 7 10 10
ruption
No reconstruction 5 4 5 13 5 7 5 10
has happened
Suicide Attacks 5 4 19 4 9 5 5 3

2009 is the third consecutive year that insecurity has emerged as the major reason
respondents say the country is moving in the wrong direction. This indicates that se-
curity continues to remain a key concern for Afghans and a critical factor by which
they judge the progress and direction of their country’s development. However, the
proportion of respondents highlighting insecurity in 2009 (42%) has fallen since
2008 when half of respondents (50%) emphasized this factor. On the other hand,
the proportion of respondents mentioning bad government (25%) has more than
doubled since 2008 (12%) and remains higher than in 2006 (22%) when it rated
amongst the top concerns.
20 Afghanistan in 2009

Why do you say that things are moving in the wrong direction? (Q-11a&b combined) COM-
PARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

60%
50%
48%
50%
42%
40%
25% 27%
30%
22% 19% 21% 15% 15% 17% 22%
15% 17%
20% 15%
12% 13% 11%
6% 12% 8%
10% 7% 6%

0%
Insecurity Bad Corruption Un- Bad economy No
government employment reconstruction

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 2.5

2.4 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: National level

The survey attempted to measure public opinion regarding the biggest problems
facing Afghanistan as a whole. Insecurity (including attacks, violence and terrorism)
is identified as the biggest problem in Afghanistan by over a third of respondents
(36%), particularly in the South East (48%), West (44%), East (31%), and South
West (41%) regions. Unemployment is mentioned by 35 percent of respondents and
is identified as the biggest problem in the Central/Kabul (41%), North East (42%)
and North West (47%) regions. Other major problems identified include the poor
economy (20%), corruption (17%), poverty (11%) and lack of education, schools
and literacy (11%).

In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Q-12a&b combined,
Base 6406)

40%
36%
35%

30%

20%
20%
17%
11% 11% 8%
10%

0%
Insecurity Un- Poor Corruption Poverty Education Presence of
employment Economy Taliban

Fig. 2.6
The National Mood 21

Since 2006, insecurity and unemployment have consistently been identified as the
most important problems, followed by the poor economy and corruption. The pro-
portion of respondents identifying insecurity as the biggest problem in Afghanistan
in 2009 is the same as in 2008 (36%). However, the figures for those mentioning
other major issues have all risen, including unemployment (from 31% in 2008 to
35% in 2009), poor economy (from 17% to 20%), corruption (from 14% to 17%),
poverty (from 8% to 11%) and education (from 9% to 11%). In contrast however,
the proportion of respondents mentioning the presence of the Taliban continues to
fall (from 18% in 2006 to 13% in 2007 and 2008 to just 8% in 2009).

In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Q-12a&b combined)
COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

50% 46%

40% 36%
36% 35%
31%
32%
27%
30% 27%
24%
19% 20%
19%
20% 17% 16% 17%
14%
11% 13%
10% 9% 11% 8%
11%
10%
5%

0%
Insecurity Un- Poor Corruption Education Poverty
employment Economy

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 2.7
2.5 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: Local level

The most important problems identified by respondents at the local level are quite dif-
ferent from those mentioned at the national level. The survey asked respondents about
the biggest problem in their local area and invited them to mention two. As in previous
years, across the country as a whole it is development issues, rather than security or
governance issues, that dominate priorities at the local level. The problems most often
mentioned by respondents are unemployment (26%) and electricity (26%), followed by
lack of roads (24%), water (22%) and lack of health care/clinics/hospitals (20%).

Unemployment is identified as a significant problem at both national and local


levels. More than a third (35%) of respondents identify unemployment among the
top two problems at the national level and around a quarter (26%) say the same at
the local level.
22 Afghanistan in 2009

What is the biggest problem in your local area? (Q-13a&b combined, Base 6406)

30%
26% 26% 24%
22% 20%
20%
15%
13%

10%

0%
Un- Electricity Roads Water Health care Education Insecurity
employment

Fig. 2.8

Lack of electricity is most frequently identified as the main local problem in the
East (36%), North East (35%) and North West (33%) regions, while over a quarter
of respondents in every region, except the North West, mention unemployment as
the local biggest problem. Insecurity, attacks and violence are much more frequently
mentioned in the South East (28%), South West (25%) and West (20%) than in other
parts of the country (between 5% and 9%). Lack of roads is mentioned by around
a third of respondents in the Central/Kabul (32%), North East (32%) and North
West (29%) regions, while water is identified as the main problem in the North West
(41%) and Central/Hazarajat (29%).

Table 2.3: What is the biggest problem in your local area? (Q-13a&b combined, Base 6406)
BY REGION

Central/ South North North South Central/


East West
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Roads 32 14 14 32 29 23 11 19
Health care/clin-
26 14 21 23 22 15 13 22
ics/ hospitals
Unemployment 25 28 26 28 18 29 28 25
Electricity 24 14 36 35 33 25 17 17
Water 21 10 18 25 41 19 8 29
Education / schools
13 21 16 11 16 18 17 16
/ literacy
Insecurity / attacks
8 28 9 6 6 20 25 5
/ violence
The National Mood 23

Twice as many respondents in rural areas (17%) mention education as one of the
biggest local problems as compared to those in urban areas (8%). The same is true
for insecurity, attacks and violence which are mentioned by 15 percent of respon-
dents in villages compared to 8 percent of those in urban areas. Electricity is also
slightly more often mentioned by rural (27%) than urban (23%) respondents. On the
other hand, roads are more often cited by respondents in urban areas (30%) than in
villages (22%), and the same is true for health care (25% of urban compared to 19%
of rural respondents).
Despite occasional fluctuations, the identification of major local problems has re-
mained relatively stable since 2006. However, the priority of roads appears to be
rising (24% in 2009 compared to 18% in 2008, 19% in 2007 and 14% in 2006), and
the same is true for healthcare, although to a more limited extent (from 15% in 2006
and 2008 to 20% in 2009).

What is the biggest problem in your local area? (Q-13a&b combined) COMPARISON BE-
TWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

40%
34%
30% 28%
30% 27% 26% 26%
25% 26% 24% 22%
21% 22%
20% 21%
19%18% 18% 17%
20% 15%
15% 15%
14% 14% 14%

10%

0%
Electricity Un- Roads Water Healthcare Education
employment

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 2.9

2.6 Confidence in specific institutions and organizations

Confidence in public institutions and organizations represents an important indica-


tor of public trust in government and other social institutions. Respondents were
asked about the confidence they have in a range of public institutions and organiza-
tions. A list was read out and respondents were asked to state how much confidence
24 Afghanistan in 2009

they have in each body to perform its job. Responses indicate that the highest levels
of public confidence are still enjoyed by the Afghan National Army (ANA) (91%)
and the Afghan National Police (ANP) (84%). Since 2006 these two institutions
have consistently enjoyed the highest levels of public confidence. Confidence in the
ANA, in particular, has even risen slightly over this period.

Representative bodies enjoy the confidence of around two thirds of respondents


including community shura and jirga (68%), Community Development Councils
(CDC) (63%) and Provincial Councils (62%). While confidence in CDCs has re-
mained stable since 2007, confidence in Provincial Councils has fallen (from 69% in
2007 to 65% in 2008 and 62% in 2009). The same trend is evident regarding confi-
dence in community shura and jirga which has fallen from 71 percent in 2007 to 69
percent in 2008 and 68 percent in 2009.

Confidence in the media is also high. Seventy percent of respondents say they have
confidence in electronic media such as radio and television. However, here too con-
fidence levels have been falling since 2006 when the figure was 84 percent. Sixty-two
percent say they have confidence in newspapers and print media. Considerable pub-
lic confidence is also expressed in non-governmental organizations, both interna-
tional (66%) and national (62%) as has been the case since 2007.

Respondents show greater ambivalence towards government institutions. Only 57


percent express confidence in the public administration. This falls to 46 percent for
the government justice system and 46 percent for municipalities. A little more than
half of respondents (53%) say they have confidence in government ministers. How-
ever, two-thirds (67%) of respondents say they have confidence in the Independent
Election Commission. This is a significant increase since 2008 (57%) which may be
due to the higher public profile of the Commission in the run up to the 2009 presi-
dential and provincial elections.

Although public confidence in political parties remains low (47%), the figure re-
corded in 2009 is the highest since 2006. This may also be related to the increased
activity of political parties in an election year. Public confidence is again lowest for
local militias, with just over one-third of respondents (37%) expressing confidence
in them. However, this figure has been steadily rising since 2006 (from 31% to 33%
in 2007 and 36% in 2008).
The National Mood 25

Table 2.4: Percentage of people who have a great deal or a fair amount of confidence in specific
institutions and organizations (Q-51a-p) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008
AND 2009

Confidence (%)
Institution/Organization
(Great deal + Fair amount)
2006 2007 2008 2009
Afghan National Army 87 88 89 91
Afghan National Police 86 83 82 84
Electronic media such as radio, TV 84 74 76 70
Independent Election commission - - 57 67
Community Shura/ Jirga - 71 69 67
International NGOs - 65 64 66
Community Development Councils - 64 65 64
Provincial Councils - 69 65 62
Newspapers, print media 77 62 63 62
National NGOs - 59 62 61
Public administration - 61 55 57
Government Ministers - 58 51 53
Political parties 44 39 43 47
The Government Justice system 38 48 46 46
The Municipality - 48 42 46
Local militias 31 33 36 37
Security 27

3 Security

3.1 Security Situation

Although respondents identify insecurity as the biggest problem facing the country
(see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: National level), in most places it is not
identified as the biggest problem at the local level (see Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan’s
biggest problems: Local level). When asked about the security situation in the village/
neighborhood where they live, a majority of respondents (64%) say that it is quite
good or very good in their area3.

Bearing this caveat in mind, the situation still appears to vary significantly between
regions. The majority of respondents have a positive perception of the security situ-
ation in their local area in the North West (86%), Central/Kabul (78%), Central/
Hazarajat (77%), North East (76%) and East (70%). On the other hand, more than
half of respondents say that security in their local area is quite bad or very bad in the
West (55%), South East (62%), and South West (65%) regions.

Would you rate the security situation as very good, quite good, quite bad, very bad in your area?
(Q-16e, Base 6406) BY REGION
60%
51%
50% 47% 44%
43% 44% 43%
42%
40% 35% 35% 36% 36%
29%
27% 29% 29% 26%
26% 28%
30%
20% 17%
20% 13% 14%
11% 12%
9% 9% 10% 6% 8% 4% 8%
10%
3%
0%
Central South East North North West South Central
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat

Very good Quite good Quite bad Very bad

Fig.3.1
Trends show that since 2006 the large majority of respondents in the North West,
North East, Central/Kabul and Central/Hazarajat regions continue to say their lo-
cal security situation is good, whereas in the South East the majority continue to say
3
It should be considered that in 2009 survey researchers faced much greater restrictions on their move-
ments due to security concerns than in previous years. For the 2009 survey, more than 100 randomly
selected sampling points across the country were inaccessible due to security reasons (see Appendix 2:
Methodology).
28 Afghanistan in 2009

that it is bad. However, while there has been an overall improvement in the security
situation since 2006 in the East and North West, the situation has deteriorated sig-
nificantly in the South West and West.

Table 3.1: Would you rate the security situation as very good, quite good, quite bad, very bad in
your area? (Q-16e – combined responses of Very Good and Quite Good), REGIONAL COM-
PARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2006 2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%) (%)
Central/Kabul 80 80 74 78
South East 42 38 35 38
East 54 64 67 70
North East 74 88 80 76
North West 78 89 82 86
West 57 40 44 44
South West 47 35 26 32
Central/Hazarajat 75 74 80 77

Respondents from rural and urban areas have significantly different perceptions of
local security. A higher proportion of urban residents (79%) say the security situation
in their local area is either quite good or very good compared to their rural counter-
parts (60%). On the other hand, more than a third of respondents in rural areas (39%)
say security in their local area is quite bad or very bad compared to only one-fifth of
urban residents (20%). This is consistent with the finding that nearly twice as many
rural residents identify insecurity as one of the biggest local problems compared to
those in urban areas (see Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: Local level).

Would you rate the security situation as very good, quite good, quite bad, very bad in your area?
(Q-16e, Base 6406) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT

50% 44%
45% 38%
39% 35%
40%
35%
30%
25% 22% 22% 24%
25% 15%
20%
13% 14%
15%
6%
10%
5%
0%
All Villages Urban

Very good Quite good Quite bad Very bad

Fig. 3.2
Security 29

3.2 Personal and family safety and security

The survey sought to gauge the perception of safety and security for individuals and
their families. About a third of respondents (32%) report that they never fear for
their personal safety or for that of their families. However, another third (35%) say
that they sometimes fear for their safety and 16 percent say they often do.

The proportion of respondents who say they often fear for their safety has been ris-
ing steadily over the last four years (from 9% in 2006 to 11% in 2007, 15% in 2008
and 16% in 2009).

How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days?
(Q-18) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

50%
38% 35% 38% 36%
40%
31% 33% 32%
30%
30%
22%
15% 16% 20% 16%
20%
11% 15%
10% 9%

0%
Often Sometimes Rarely Never

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 3.3

The proportion of respondents who report never having any fear is highest in the
Central/Kabul, North East, North West and Central/Hazarajat regions. These find-
ings show how the people living in regions where the local security situation is good
are generally less fearful for their own personal safety, or for that of their families.
Conversely, the degree of fear is more pronounced in the regions where insecurity is
identified as an important local problem such as the South East (65%), West (62%)
and South West (62%), where around two-thirds of respondents say they sometimes
or often fear for their safety (see Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: Local level).
30 Afghanistan in 2009

How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days?
(Q-18, Base 6406) BY REGION

70%
58%
60%
50% 47%
45%
43%
39% 41% 41%
40% 36%
32% 32% 30%
29% 29%
30% 26% 25%
24% 21% 19% 21% 21%
18%
20% 14% 13%
10% 12% 12% 13%
10% 8% 11% 8% 5%
10%
0%
Central South East North North West South Central
Kabul East East West West Hazarjat

Often Sometimes Rarely Never

Fig 3.4
The survey also attempted to examine people’s actual experience of violence and
crime by asking whether they, or anyone in their family, have been a victim of vio-
lence or some criminal act in their home or community in the past year. Compared
to the relatively high proportion of people who report that they sometimes or often
fear for their safety (51%), the proportion of those who have actually experienced
violence or crime in the past year is relatively low, although it is still significant.
Nearly one in six respondents (17%) report that they or someone in their family have
been victims of violence or crime in the past year.

The experience of violence or crime is almost twice as high in rural (19%) as in


urban (10%) areas. This is consistent with the greater concern about insecurity re-
ported by rural respondents (see Fig.3.2). Income also seems to have some bearing
on victimization from violence or crime. The proportion of respondents who report
having been victims of violence or crime rises consistently with monthly household
income, from 12 percent of those earning less than 2000Afs a month to 20 percent
amongst those earning more than 10,000Afs.

There is also variation between regions. The highest incidence of crime or violence
is reported by respondents in the South East (26%), followed by the West (25%),
South West (25%) and East (22%). In addition, the experience of violence or crime
has increased significantly in most of these regions since 2008, (In the South East
from 21% to 26%, in the East from 19% to 22%, and in the West from 17% to 25%).
This is again consistent with the higher perceptions of insecurity and the identifica-
tion of insecurity as a major local problem in these regions (see Fig.3.1). There has
also been an increase in victimization in the Central/Hazarajat region since 2008
(from 4% to 10%), although the level still remains relatively low.
Security 31

Table 3.2: Have you or has anyone in your family been a victim of violence or of some criminal
act in your home or community in the past year? (Q-19) BY REGION, COMPARISON BE-
TWEEN 2008 AND 2009

2008 2009
(%) (%)
Central/Kabul 13 12
South East 21 26
East 19 22
North East 15 12
North West 11 6
West 17 25
South West 22 25
Central /Hazarajat 4 10

When respondents who report having been a victim of violence or crime in the past
year (17% of all respondents) were asked about the kinds of violence and crime they
had experienced, the most commonly mentioned include physical attack or beating
(30%), racketeering/extortion (15%) and property-related crime such as burglary/
looting (15%) and theft of livestock (10%). Nearly one in ten victims of violence
report that these were due to military style actions with equal proportions identifying
the actions of militias and insurgents (9%) and those of foreign forces (9%). The
incidence of victimization from military type actions has been rising steadily both
for militia/insurgent activity (from 3% in 2007 to 8% in 2008 and 9% in 2009) and
the actions of foreign forces (from 5% in 2007 to 6% in 2008 and 9% in 2009), indi-
cating that the ongoing hostilities continue to have a perceptible impact on the lives
of the Afghan people. Indeed, violence resulting from militant/insurgent actions is
mentioned by a relatively high number of people in the Central/Kabul (11%), and
East (17%) and in the Central/Hazarajat (24%) where it is one of the types of vio-
lence most often mentioned by respondents. Violence resulting from the actions of
foreign forces is mentioned by one in five victims (22%) in the South West region,
and by one in ten in the South East (11%) and the East (10%). Analysis of responses
in individual provinces gives an even starker picture. At least one in four victims
report having experienced militia or insurgent related violence in Kapisa (27%), Pak-
tika (26%), Daikundi (26%) and Kunar (25%) provinces. One in five victims (20%)
in Kunar also report having experienced violence from the actions of foreign forces.
This is also true of more than a third of victims of violence in Uruzgan (38%) and
half the victims (50%) in Zabul province.
32 Afghanistan in 2009

What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?
(Q-20, Base 1070) (Percentage based on multiple responses)

35%
30%
30%
25%
20%
15% 15%
15%
10% 9% 9%
10%
5%
0%
Physical Racketeering/ Burglary/ Livestock Militants/ Foreign
attack or extortion looting stolen Insurgent forces
beating actions actions

Fig 3.5

Just under a third (31%) of crime victims in rural areas report having been victims of
physical attack or beating compared to around one in five respondents in urban areas
(21%). On the other hand, burglary/looting and pick-pocketing are more prevalent
in urban areas.

What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?
(Q-20, Base 1070) (Percentage based on multiple responses) BY SETTLEMENT

35%
31%
30%

25%
21% 20%
20%
15% 15% 14%
15%
12%
10%
7%
5%

0%
Physical attack or Burglary/looting Racketeering / Pick-pocketing
beating extortion

Rural Urban
Fig 3.6

3.3 Attitude towards reporting crime

Those respondents who have been a victim or violence or crime (17% of all respon-
dents) were then asked whether they reported the crime to any authority. Just under
two-thirds (61%) say they reported the crime, while another third say they did not.
Reporting levels have not changed since 2007. Rural dwellers are more likely to re-
Security 33

port crime to an authority (62%) than their urban counterparts (56%). The survey also
found that respondents with higher educational levels are more likely to report crime
than those who never went to school (58% of crime victims who never went to school
reported the crime compared to 71% of those with secondary or higher education).

Reporting of crime is highest in the North East (70%), followed by the Central/
Hazarajat (67%), East (64%) and West (63%). Reporting of crime is lowest in the
South West (54%).

Respondents who say they reported violence or crime (10% of all respondents) were
also asked to which agency or institution they reported the crime. Multiple responses
were possible. The majority of respondents say they reported the crime to govern-
ment authorities such as the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) (41%) or the district
governor/woleswal (23%). Around one in five (18%) reported the incident to the
Afghan National Army (ANA). A significant proportion say they reported the crime
to informal or traditional institutions such as tribal leaders or maliks (18%), shura/
elders (12%) or mullahs (6%).

There is a significant distinction in the choice of authority to which crime is reported


between rural and urban areas. Respondents in urban areas are more likely to report
a crime to formal institutions such as the ANP (64%) than those in rural areas (38%).
On the other hand, rural respondents are more likely to report a crime to traditional
institutions such as shura/elders (14%) than those in urban areas (4%). The district
governor’s office is also a popular place for rural residents to report crimes.

To what agency or institution did you report the crime? (Q-22, Base 658) ALL AND BY
SETTLEMENT

70%
64%
60%
50%
41%
40% 38%

30%
18% 18% 18% 18% 18%
20%
12%14% 15%
10% 6% 6% 6%
4%
0%
Afghan National Afghan National Shura/ Elders Tribal leader / Mullahs
Army Police Malik

All Rural Urban

Fig. 3.7
34 Afghanistan in 2009

Respondents, who have been victims of crime or violence, but who did not report
this to any authority (i.e., 6% of all respondents), were asked to give the reasons for
not reporting the crime. Again, multiple responses were possible. Around a quarter
(23%) say they did not report because it makes no difference. A similar proportion
(22%) say they were afraid of retaliation. Women are particularly deterred from re-
porting crime by danger or fear of retaliation (24% compared to 20% of men). This
is also a more significant factor for respondents in urban areas (32%) as compared
to those in rural areas (20%). Danger or fear of retaliation is particularly pronounced
in the North East (34%), West (28%), Central/Hazarajat (28%) and Central/Kabul
(24%) regions.

One in five (20%) say the incident was not serious enough to warrant reporting. A
significant proportion (14%) mention lack of trust in government officials as the
reason for not reporting crime. However, this is much more commonly cited as a
reason in rural (15%) than urban (5%) areas. Around one in ten (11%) respondents
say they did not report the crime because they didn’t know where to report it. This
figure was slightly higher in urban (13%) than rural (11%) areas. Those saying they
did not know where to report crime was particularly high in the North West (19%),
Central/Kabul (17%), East (13%) and North East (13%) regions.

Why didn’t you report the crime? (Q-23, Base 355) ALL AND BY SETTLEMENT

40%
32%
30%
23% 23% 22% 21%
20% 21% 20%
20% 17%
12%10% 13% 11% 11%
13% 14% 15%
10% 5%

0%
It makes no Danger or Lack of It wasn't Didn't know Lack of trust
difference fear of evidence serious where to in
retaliation report it government
officials

All Rural Urban

Fig 3.8

All respondents, regardless of whether they have had personal experience of crime
or not, were asked the hypothetical question: “If you were a witness to a crime, to
whom would you report it?” Again, multiple responses were possible. Almost half
of respondents (48%) say they would report a crime to ANP. Other government
Security 35

institutions such as the ANA (16%) and district governor/woleswal (15%) are also
identified frequently. However, as with the actual reporting of crime, a significant
number of people say that they would report to informal or traditional institutions
such as tribal leaders or maliks (23%), shura or elders (13%) and mullahs (10%).
Again, informal institutions are more often mentioned in rural than in urban areas.
This finding closely mirrors those of previous years

Responses to the hypothetical question about reporting of crime largely correspond


to the actual reporting of crime. However, there is a tendency to overestimate the
importance of the ANP as the authority to which crime is reported. About half of
respondents (48%) say they would report a crime they witnessed to the ANP, but
only 41 percent of victims actually reported the crime to the ANP. The same holds
true in the case of tribal leaders or maliks (23% say they would report to them but
18% actually did so) and mullah sahibs (10% say they would report to them, 6%
actually did). On the other hand, 15 percent say that they would report a crime they
witnessed to a district governor or woleswal, but in fact, 23 percent of victims actu-
ally reported the crime to a District Governor.

Table 3.3: Proportions of those who have reported the crime to various agencies or institutions
(actual) (Q-22, Base 658) and who they would report to if they were a witness to a crime (hypo-
thetical) (Q-24, Base 6406)

Who they have reported to Who they would report to


(Actual) (%) (Hypothetical) (%)
Afghan National Police 41 48
District Governor/Woleswal 23 15
Tribal leaders/Maliks 18 23
Afghan National Army 18 16
Shura/Elders 12 13
Mullahs 6 10

3.4 Causes of crime

The survey also attempted to identify what people think are the biggest cause of
crime in Afghanistan. Respondents were requested to mention up to two causes.
The most common cause of crime respondents mention is unemployment (37%).
Sizeable numbers of respondents also identify corruption (22%), poverty (22%),
insecurity (21%), illiteracy (16%) and weak government (12%) as amongst the big-
gest cause of crime.
36 Afghanistan in 2009

In addition to these main causes, a number of other issues were highlighted in spe-
cific regions where they have a particular impact. These include drugs (10%), partic-
ularly mentioned in the North East (15%) and West (13%), and the presence of the
Taliban (8%), which is most often mentioned in the East (15%), South West (12%)
and Central/Hazarajat (12%). Interference from Pakistan (3%) is particularly men-
tioned in the South West (7%), whereas the presence of international forces (2%) is
most often mentioned in the East (7%) and the South West (5%).

Table 3.4: What is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan? (Q-26a&b, Base 6406) BY
REGION (Percentages based on multiple responses)

Central/ South North North South Central/


ALL East West
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(%) (%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

Unemployment 37 44 28 34 43 43 28 32 28
Corruption 22 23 19 17 28 23 20 19 14
Poverty 22 25 23 22 19 26 23 11 15
Insecurity 21 23 20 23 19 17 21 25 14
Illiteracy 16 14 22 22 16 15 13 17 11
Lack of govt.
attention /weak 12 14 19 6 9 9 15 9 17
government
Drugs 10 8 8 8 15 8 13 9 6
Taliban 8 4 7 15 7 5 8 12 12
Lack of law
6 8 6 1 7 5 10 5 7
implementation
Discriminations 5 4 6 7 7 4 3 6 7
Terrorism 4 3 3 6 4 4 3 8 6
Existence of
irresponsible 4 3 6 3 5 2 6 6 1
armed groups
Pakistan’s
3 2 3 4 3 1 3 7 2
interference
Having a weak/
2 2 1 0 1 1 4 3 4
low-paid police
Presence of
international 2 2 2 7 1 1 2 5 1
forces
Lack of recon-
1 1 4 4 1 2 1 4 1
struction
Don’t know 6 4 6 4 2 11 6 4 19
Security 37

3.5 Safety to participate in various activities

The survey also examined perceptions of security by ascertaining whether people


feel safe to participate in a range of public activities. A series of activities was read-
out to respondents and they were asked to say whether they would participate in
these activities with some degree of fear or without fear. The majority of respondents
(57%) say they would have no fear participating in resolving problems at the commu-
nity level. However, this is not the case with other forms of public activity. Just over
half (51%) of respondents said they would be afraid to vote in a national election,
including 16 percent who say they would have a lot of fear doing this. In contrast, a
significant majority say they would have some degree of fear engaging in public po-
litical actions such as participating in a peaceful demonstration (61%) or running for
public office (58%). More than two-thirds of respondents (69%) also say they would
be afraid when traveling from one part of the country to another. Half (50%) of
respondents say that they would have some fear encountering officers of the Afghan
National Police (ANP). These figures closely match those recorded in 2008.

Table 3.5: Public’s level of fear to participate in various activities (Q-30a-f, Base 6406)

No fear Some fear A lot of fear


(%) (%) (%)
a) Participating in resolving problems in your
57 33 7
community
b) Voting in a national election 47 35 16
c) Participating in a peaceful demonstration 32 39 22
d) Running for a public office 31 37 21
e) Encountering ANP officers 46 36 14
f) Traveling from one part of Afghanistan to
28 42 27
another part of the country

There are important variations between regions. The highest levels of fear to partici-
pate in any kind of public activity are recorded in the South West region, followed by
the West, South East and East which are also the regions where respondents most
frequently say they fear for their safety and that of their families (see Fig.3.4) and
where insecurity is identified as one of the biggest problems at the local level (see
Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: Local level). More than half of respondents
say they would have some fear participating in resolving problems in their local com-
munities in the South West (62%) and West (54%) regions. The majority say the same
about voting in a national election in the South West (79%), South East (68%), West
(61%) and East (56%). This clearly reflects the impact of insecurity on democratic
participation in these regions.
38 Afghanistan in 2009

Table 3.6: Public’s level of fear (combination of some fear and a lot of fear) to participate in vari-
ous activities (Q-30a-f, Base 6406) BY REGION

Central/ South North North South Central/


East West
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Participating in resolving
32 44 44 34 22 54 62 30
problems in your community
b) Voting in a national election 40 68 56 46 31 61 79 30
c) Participating in a peaceful
53 61 68 56 54 73 75 53
demonstration
d) Running for public office 51 65 58 54 46 70 79 41
e) Encountering ANP officers 45 50 41 49 41 57 73 35
f) Traveling from one part of
Afghanistan to another part of 67 71 62 65 56 87 78 59
the country

More women report fear participating in public activities than men. Just under half
(46%) of women say they would have some fear participating in resolving problems
in the community, compared to around a third (34%) of men. Women also express
more fear voting in a national election (55% compared to 48% of men) and par-
ticipating in a peaceful demonstration (64% compared to 58% of men). However,
there is no significant difference in the proportions of men and women who say they
would have fear running for public office or traveling around the country.

Since 2006, the proportion of respondents who say they would have some fear par-
ticipating in resolving problems in their community has risen. The same is true for
voting in a national election or running for public office.

Table 3.7: Public’s level of fear (combination of some fear and a lot of fear) to participate in
various activities (Q-30a-f, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008
AND 2009

2006 2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) When participating in resolving problems
32 38 39 40
in your community
b) Voting in a national election 41 44 45 51
c) Participating in a peaceful demonstration 61 61 61 61
d) To run for a public office 50 56 55 58
e) When encountering ANP officers - 49 49 50
f) When traveling from one part of
- - 61 69
Afghanistan to another part of the country
Security 39

The proportion of respondents who express fear to vote rose significantly between
2008 and 2009 (from 45% to 51%). The rise is evident in all regions, but particularly
noticeable in the West (from 47% to 61%) and North East (from 39% to 46%).

Table 3.8: Public’s level of fear (combination of some fear and a lot of fear) to vote in a national elec-
tion (Q-30b, Base 6406) REGIONAL COMPARISON BETWEEN 2008 AND 2009

2008 2009
(%) (%)
Central /Kabul 34 40
South East 65 68
East 51 56
North East 39 46
North West 26 31
West 47 61
South West 74 79
Central/Hazarajat 30 30

3.6 Perceptions of the Afghan National Police

The most important institution in Afghanistan with responsibility for ensuring secu-
rity and fighting crime and violence is the Afghan National Police (ANP). The survey
sought to examine public perceptions of the effectiveness of the ANP in combating
crime and improving security. It also sought to assess the levels of trust respondents
have in the police in terms of honesty and fairness, professionalism and the capac-
ity to act without the assistance of foreign troops. A series of statements about the
ANP was read out to respondents and they were asked to state whether they agree or
disagree. The responses to these statements are summarized in the table below.

Table 3.9: Public agreement and disagreement with statements about the ANP (Q-53 a-e,
Base 6406)

Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly


agree somewhat somewhat disagree
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people. 47 36 11 5
b) ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained. 22 36 27 12
c) ANP needs the support of foreign troops and
32 38 20 8
cannot operate by itself.
d) ANP helps improve the security 43 39 13 5
e) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have com-
34 37 18 8
mitted crimes so that they can be brought to justice
40 Afghanistan in 2009

Overall, respondents assess the ANP favorably. More than four out of five respon-
dents agree that the ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people (83%) and helps
improve security (82%). Nearly three-quarters (71%) believe that the ANP is effi-
cient at arresting those who have committed crimes so they can be brought to justice.
However, an equally high proportion (70%) agree that the ANP needs the support
of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself. Over half (58%) think that the ANP
is unprofessional and poorly trained.

Perceptions of the operational capacity of the ANP have been improving since
2007. Fewer respondents now think that the ANP is unprofessional and poorly
trained (58% in 2009 compared to 65% in 2007) or that it needs the support of
foreign troops to operate (70% in 2009 compared to 77% in 2007). However, this
does not translate into greater satisfaction with police performance. Slightly fewer
respondents in 2009 agree that the ANP helps to improve security (82% in 2009
compared to 86% in 2007), or that it is honest and fair (83% in 2009 compared to
86% in 2007).

Table 3.10: Public agreement (strongly agree and agree somewhat) with statements about the ANP
(Q-53 a-e, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

Agree (%)
(Strongly agree & agree somewhat)
2007 2008 2009
a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people. 86 80 83
b) ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained. 65 60 58
c) ANP needs the support of foreign troops and can-
77 69 70
not operate by itself.
d) ANP helps improve the security 86 80 82
e) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have com-
- 73 71
mitted crimes so that they can be brought to justice

3.7 Perceptions of the Afghan National Army

The survey also attempted to gauge public perceptions of the other most significant
national security force, the Afghan National Army (ANA). A similar series of state-
ments about the ANA was read out to respondents and they were asked to indicate
whether they agree or disagree. The responses to these statements are summarized
in the table below.
Security 41

Table 3.11: Public agreement and disagreement with statements about the ANA (Q-52 a-d,
Base 6406)

Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly


agree somewhat somewhat disagree
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people. 57 34 5 2
b) ANA is unprofessional and poorly trained. 19 33 28 17
c) ANA needs the support of foreign troops
30 39 18 9
and cannot operate by itself.
d) ANA helps improve the security 54 33 8 3

Overall, the public has an even more positive perception of the ANA than it does
of the ANP. Nine out of ten respondents (91%) agree that the ANA is honest and
fair with the Afghan people as compared to eight out of ten (83%) who say the same
about the ANP. A similarly high proportion agree that the ANA is helping to im-
prove the security situation in the country (87%) as compared to 82 percent for the
ANP. These responses are consistent with the finding that the Afghan National Po-
lice and the Afghan National Army enjoy the highest levels of confidence amongst
public institutions in Afghanistan (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3).

However, respondents also register similar concerns about the capacity of the ANA
to operate, as they do for the ANP. More than two thirds (69%) agree that the ANA
cannot operate without the support of foreign troops. Around half (52%) agree that
the ANA is unprofessional and poorly trained.

As with the ANP, perceptions of the operational capacity of the ANA are also rising
over time. Fewer respondents now say that the ANA is unprofessional and poorly
trained (52% in 2009 compared to 62% in 2007), or that it needs the support of for-
eign troops to operate (69% in 2009 compared to 77% in 2007). However, percep-
tions of the ANA’s performance remain stable.

Table 3.12: Public agreement (strongly agree and agree somewhat) with statements about the ANA
(Q-52 a-d, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

Agree (%)
(Strongly agree & agree somewhat)
2007 2008 2009
a) ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people. 90 89 91
b) ANA is unprofessional and poorly trained. 62 55 52
c) ANA needs the support of foreign troops and
cannot operate by itself. 77 69 69

d) ANA helps improve the security 89 86 87


42 Afghanistan in 2009

3.8 Expectations regarding security

The survey also aimed to examine public expectations regarding the security situa-
tion in the future. Respondents were asked how they expect the security situation in
their local area to be in a year’s time. Overall, the majority of respondents (75%) are
optimistic. Nearly half (46%) say they expect it will be much better and just under
a third (29%) say that it will be somewhat better. There are, however, significant
variations between regions. More than half of respondents in the South West (51%)
think that the security situation will be worse in a year from now. This is true for 41
percent in the South East and at least one-fifth of respondents in the East (23%).
The results suggest that in these regions where insecurity is a major problem respon-
dents are much less optimistic about future improvements.

What is your expectation for the security situation in your area a year from now – much better,
somewhat better, somewhat worse or much worse? (Q-17e, Base 6406) BY REGION
70%
62% 64%
60%
54%
48% 47%
50%
41%
40% 32%
27% 29% 30%
29% 27% 28% 26% 28% 22%
30%
21% 23%
20% 16% 18%
20% 14%
12%
10% 6%
7% 7%
10% 6% 5% 3% 4%
2%
0%
Central South East North North West South Central
Kabul East East West West Hazarjat

Much better Somewhat better Somewhat worse Much worse

Fig 3.9
Economy and Development 43

4 Economy and Development

4.1 Economy of Afghan Households: Past and present

The survey sought to ascertain how people perceive their level of economic well
being. Respondents were asked to assess their current level of economic prosperity
compared to different periods in the past. They were first asked to compare their
current economic condition with their circumstances under the Taliban Government
(1996-2001). Around half (54%) of respondents report that their families are more
prosperous today than they were during the days of the Taliban regime. One-fourth
(24%) say that they are now less prosperous. Fourteen percent say their economic
circumstances are the same, while the remainder were absent during Taliban rule.

The proportion of respondents who say they are more prosperous is the highest since
2006 (when it was also 54%). The more positive assessment of family economic pros-
perity in 2009 may be correlated with the increase in the proportion of people who
say that things are going in the right direction since 2008 (see Chapter 2, 2.1 Direction of
the country). It may also be related to the fact that fewer people in 2009 identify high
prices as one of the biggest national problems compared to 2008 when this appeared
as a major issue (see Chapter 2, 2.4 Afghanistan’s biggest problem: National level).

If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less
prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? (Q-38) COMPARISON
BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

60%
54% 54%
49%
50%

40% 39% 36%


28%
30% 26%
24%
16%
20%
12% 14% 14%
10% 7% 8% 7% 6%

0%
More prosperous Less prosperous About as prosperous Absent during Taliban
rule

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 4.1
44 Afghanistan in 2009

Urban residents have a more positive view of their family’s current economic pros-
perity than their rural counterparts. Just under two thirds (63%) of urban dwellers
think that they are more prosperous today than they were under the Taliban regime,
compared to just over half (52%) of rural residents. Compared to other communi-
ties, Pashtuns tend to have a more negative assessment of their current level of
economic prosperity. A little over a third of Pashtuns (39%) think that they are more
prosperous today than under Taliban rule, compared to nearly two thirds for most
other groups.

If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less
prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? (Q-38, Base 6406) BY
SETTLEMENT AND BY ETHNICITY
80%
63% 68% 65% 64%
70%
58%
60%
52%
50%
39%
40%
25% 31% 24% 26%
30%
15% 20% 22% 17% 18%
20%
6% 9% 7% 9% 8% 9% 11%
6% 8%
10% 5% 3% 4%
0%
Rural Urban Pashtun Tajik Uzbek Hazara Other

More prosperous Less prosperous About as prosperous Absent during Taliban rule

Fig 4.2

There are also significant differences in perceptions of current economic prosperity


between regions. Fewer than one in five respondents in the South West (18%) and
just over one in three of respondents in the South East (36%) feel that they are more
prosperous today then they were under the Taliban regime, compared to at least
half of respondents in the other regions. These two regions also record the highest
proportion of respondents who are pessimistic about the overall direction of the
country (see Chapter 2, 2.1 Direction of the country).
Economy and Development 45

If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less
prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? (Q-38, Base 6406) BY
REGION

80%
68% 64% 68%
70%
53% 56%
60%
51%
50%
36% 34% 38%
40% 36%
31% 18% 18%
30%
20% 21% 12% 21% 20% 17% 18% 13%
20%
7% 5% 8% 5% 10% 7% 10% 6% 10%
10% 4% 3%
0%
Central South East East North East North West West South Central
Kabul West Hazarjat

More prosperous Less prosperous About as prosperous Absent during Taliban

Fig 4.3

The survey also asked respondents to compare their current level of economic pros-
perity with a period further back in time during the period of the Soviet occupation
(1979-1989). Half (50%) of respondents say that their family is more prosperous
now than during the period of the Soviet occupation. Another third (32%) say that
they are now less prosperous than during the Soviet period while 10 percent say that
their circumstances are about the same.

Now, going even further back to the period of the Soviet occupation, if you think about your family
then and now, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as
prosperous as under the Soviet occupation government? (Q-39, Base 6406)

60%
50%
50%

40%
32%
30%

20%
10% 6%
10%

0%
More prosperous Less prosperous About as prosperous Absent during Soviet
rule/ occupation

Fig 4.4
46 Afghanistan in 2009

The South West has the lowest proportion of respondents (Fewer than one in five
– 19%) who say that they are more prosperous now than during the Soviet period.
This is less than half the figure recorded in other regions

4.2 Economic Situation of Afghan Households

The survey also endeavored to examine the economic situation of Afghan households
in more detail by comparing the situation of households today with their situation
one year ago in terms of financial and physical well-being, as well as access to basic
services and amenities. The proportion of respondents who report improvements in
their situation during the last one year is summarized in the following table.

Table 4.1: Percentage of people whose situation has improved compared to one year ago in various
domains (Q-45a-h, Base 6406)

Better
(%)
Access to schools 40
Health well-being of your family members 32
Financial well-being of your household 31
Quality of your food diet 23
Electricity supply 23
Physical conditions of your house/dwelling 20
Availability of products in the market 19
Employment opportunities 11

The greatest improvement has been in access to schools, mentioned by 40 percent of


respondents. More people in urban areas (51%) report such improvements as com-
pared to their rural counterparts (37%). Improvements in access to schools are re-
ported by more than half of respondents in the North West (53%) and East (52%),
and by more than a third in the Central/Kabul (44%), North East (44%), Central/
Hazarajat (37%) and South East (35%) regions. However relatively few respondents
report improvements in the West (29%) and South West (14%) regions.

Around one-third of respondents report improvements in the health (32%) and


financial well-being (31%) of their families. Health improvements are reported most
often in the East (47%), Central/Kabul (34%), South East (34%) and North West
(33%) regions. However, around a quarter of respondents in the North East (24%)
and South West (29%) actually say that their health status has worsened during the
last year. Improvements in financial well-being are most often reported in the East
Economy and Development 47

(43%), South East (38%), Central/Kabul (34%) and North West (34%) regions. Not
surprisingly, low income households are less likely to report improvements in their
financial situation than those with higher incomes. Thirty-one percent of house-
holds with a monthly income of less than 2000 Afs say their financial wellbeing has
improved in the last year compared to 36 percent of those earning over 10,000Afs.

Around a fifth of respondents also mention improvements in the quality of their diet
(23%), electricity supply (23%) and the physical conditions of their house/dwelling
(20%). Improvements in electricity supply in the past year are most often mentioned
in the Central/Kabul region (42%).

Respondents report the least improvement in employment opportunities (11%). The


lowest levels of improvement in this regard are recorded in the South West (7%),
South East (8%), West (9%) and North East (10%) regions. These responses re-
confirm the identification of unemployment as one of the biggest problems facing
Afghanistan at both national and local levels (see Chapter 2, 2.4 - Afghanistan’s biggest
problem: National level and 2.5 Afghanistan’s biggest problem: Local level).

4.3 Availability of basic amenities

The survey also attempted to measure the current condition of basic infrastructure and
essential public services. The table below summarizes respondents’ views on the avail-
ability of a range of basic amenities in the villages and neighborhoods where they live.

Table 4.2: Present condition of basic amenities in localities (Q-16a-d,f-h, Base 6406)

Very Quite Quite Very


good good bad bad
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) The availability of clean drinking water 22 41 25 12
b) The availability of water for irrigation 16 37 31 14
c) The availability of jobs 5 19 40 36
d) The supply of electricity 13 21 27 38
f) The availability of clinics and hospitals 11 38 35 16
g) The availability of medicine 11 33 39 16
h) The availability of education for children 25 42 22 10

Overall, respondents report the greatest satisfaction regarding the availability of ed-
ucation for children with two-thirds (67%) saying this is quite good or very good in
their local area. This is consistent with the finding that access to schools has shown
the greatest improvement in the last year (see Table 4.1). A similarly high proportion
48 Afghanistan in 2009

of respondents (63%) judge the availability of clean drinking water to be good or


very good, and around half say the same about water for irrigation (53%) and the
availability of clinic and hospitals (49%).

On the other hand, people are least satisfied with the availability of jobs. More than
three quarters (76%) of respondents say the availability of jobs in their local area is
quite bad or very bad. About two thirds (65%) say the supply of electricity in their
local area is bad. These findings are entirely consistent with the identification of lo-
cal problems discussed in Chapter 2 (see Chapter 2, 2.5 - Afghanistan’s biggest problem:
Local level).

The present condition of basic amenities varies widely between regions. The avail-
ability of education for children is judged to be good or very good by a clear majority
in all regions except the South West where only a third (34%) of respondents think
this. The availability of jobs is judged to be bad by more than three quarters of re-
spondents in the South West (79%), West (78%), and North East (78%), which is
much higher than in other regions.

Despite the progress identified by respondents in a number of areas, overall assess-


ments of the availability of basic amenities and services have not improved sub-
stantially over time. In fact, although the greatest progress is reported in access to
education (see Table 4.1), the proportion of respondents who judge this to be good
in their local area has been falling since 2007 (from 72% to 70% in 2008 and 67%
in 2009). The same is true for the availability of clinics and hospitals (from 56% in
2007 to 51% in 2008 and 49% in 2009). These findings suggest that expectations
and desire for improvement continue to remain ahead of the implementation of
improvements themselves.

Table 4.3: Present condition of basic amenities in localities (Q-16a-d,f-h) combination of quite
good and very good responses, COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%)
a) The availability of clean drinking water 63 62 63
b) The availability of water for irrigation 59 47 53
c) The availability of jobs 30 21 24
d) The supply of electricity 31 25 34
f) The availability of clinics and hospitals 56 51 49
g) The availability of medicine - 49 44
h) The availability of education for children 72 70 67
Economy and Development 49

4.4 Future expectations for infrastructure and services

Respondents were also asked about their expectations for basic infrastructure and
services in the coming year. The majority of respondents expect to see improvements
in their local area in all the amenities and services mentioned. More than four fifths
of respondents expect to see improvements in the availability of clean drinking wa-
ter (85%) and the availability of education for children (81%). About three quarters
expect improvement in the availability of water for irrigation (78%), the availability
of clinics and hospitals (75%) and medicines (74%). Respondents are less optimistic
about the prospects for improvements in electricity supply (67%) and the availability
of jobs (64%), although a clear majority still think that these will get better.

Table 4.4: People’s expectations for improvements in basic infrastructures and services in local areas
in the next year (Q-17a-i, Base 6406)

Much Somewhat Somewhat Much


better better worse worse
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) The availability of clean drinking water 48 37 9 4
b) The availability of water for irrigation 41 37 14 5
c) The availability of jobs 37 27 20 12
d) The supply of electricity 41 26 16 14
e) The security situation 46 29 13 8
f) The availability of clinics and hospitals 41 34 17 6
g) The availability of medicine 40 34 17 6
h) The availability of education for children 50 31 12 5
i) Your freedom of movement - the ability
46 32 13 6
to move safely in your area or district

Optimism about future improvements in basic infrastructure and services has not
changed substantially since 2007 despite some minor fluctuations. However, in 2009
there is an increase in the proportion of respondents who are optimistic about im-
provements in the electricity supply (67%) as compared to 62 percent in 2008 and 61
percent in 2007. This may be correlated with the higher proportion of respondents
in 2009 who say that the electricity supply in their local area is good, even though
they are still the minority (see Table 4.3).
50 Afghanistan in 2009

Table 4.5: People’s expectations for improvements in basic infrastructures and services in local areas
in the next year (Q-17a-i,) combination of somewhat better and much better responses, COM-
PARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%)
a) The availability of clean drinking water 85 83 85
b) The availability of water for irrigation 78 74 78
c) The availability of jobs 64 62 64
d) The supply of electricity 61 62 67
f) The availability of clinics and hospitals 79 76 75
g) The availability of medicine - 76 74
h) The availability of education for children 85 82 81

4.5 Important development issues

The survey also examined how people prioritize development needs, particularly in
terms of basic infrastructure such as electricity supply, water, roads, health care and
education. Respondents were asked to rank these issues in order of priority; from
1 - most important to 5 - least important.

Survey results show that at the national level, roads and power are ranked equally as
the top priorities followed by water supply, health care and education, although the
difference in priority accorded to these five issues is not substantial. There has, how-
ever, been a shift in the public’s priority since last year. In 2008 power was identified
as the top priority whereas in 2009 electricity supply is in second place and the top
priority is again roads, as it was in 2007.

Table 4.6: Importance of development issues in rank order (Q-14 a-e) COMPARISON BE-
TWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2007 2008 2009


Development Issue
(Rank) (Rank) (Rank)
Importance of roads 1 3 1
Importance of power 3 1 2
Importance of water 2 2 3
Importance of health care 5 4 4
Importance of education 4 5 5

The priorities for development differ between regions. Roads emerge as the top pri-
ority for inhabitants of the Central/Kabul, South West, North East and North West
regions, while those living in the South East rank power supply as the top priority.
Economy and Development 51

The top priority in the West is water supply and in the East it is health care. Respon-
dents in the Central/Hazarajat give equal weight to power supply and water supply.

Table 4.7: Importance of development issues in rank order (Q-14a-e, Base 6406) BY REGION

Development Issue Central/ South North North South Central/


East West
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank)
Importance of roads 1 3 3 1 3 1 4 1
Importance of power 2 5 1 2 2 2 1 2
Importance of water 4 4 2 3 1 3 2 4
Importance of health
care 3 1 4 4 4 4 5 3

Importance of
education 5 2 5 5 5 5 3 5

4.6 Electricity supply

Electricity is regularly identified as a priory issue for communities. For this reason
the survey sought to obtain a more detailed picture of access to electricity across
Afghanistan. When asked about their electricity supply at home, one third (33%) of
respondents report that they have no access to any kind of electricity whatsoever.
However, the proportion with no access to electricity is lower in 2009 than that
recorded in previous years (43% in 2008, 41% in 2007 and 42% in 2006). This sug-
gests that there have been some improvements in the supply of electricity to Afghan
homes. The highest proportions of respondents with no access to electricity are in
the North East (50%), South West (44%) and West (40%) regions.

One fifth of respondents (20%) have access to government electricity with a direct
line dedicated to the house and 3 percent have access to government supplied elec-
tricity by other means. However, while around nine in ten houses in rural areas have
no access to state-supplied electricity, two thirds (67%) of urban households have
access to electricity provided by the government.

The remainder rely mostly on generators which are either community owned (16%),
privately owned (12%) or owned by neighbors (11%). Across the country, 4 percent
of respondents say they have access to electricity generated by solar panels. These
are mostly mentioned by rural (5%) rather than urban (1%) respondents, and are
particularly prevalent in Central Hazarajat (12%), South East (10%), South West
(8%) and East (5%).
52 Afghanistan in 2009

Table 4.8: Kinds of electricity supply used at the house (Q-41a-g, Base 6406) BY RURAL-
URBAN SETTLEMENT

Electricity supply used


All Rural Urban
(%) (%) (%)
No access to electricity 33 39 10
a) Neighbor’s generator that provides electricity to your and
11 12 8
other households in the area
b) Privately, self-owned (non-neighbor) generator 12 14 7
c) Community owned generator, which provides electricity to
16 17 10
your household
d) Government electricity – direct line dedicated to your house 20 9 60
e) Government electricity – other sources, but not directly
3 3 7
connected to your home
f) Large batteries/ invertors (such as for running TV, lights, etc.) 6 7 4
g) Solar panels for producing electricity 4 5 1

The survey then sought to examine the cost effectiveness of the electricity supply to
afghan homes. The table below summarizes the various types of electricity people
use at home, their daily hours of electricity consumption and their monthly spending
on electricity.

Table 4.9: Kinds of electricity supply used at home (%), average consumption of electricity (hours)
and average monthly expenses on electricity (Afs) (Q-41a-g; Q-42a-g; Q-43a-g, Base 6406)

Electricity Consumption Expense on


supply of electricity electricity
(%) (hours) (Afs)
a) Neighbor’s generator that provides electricity
11 3.6 591
to your and other households in the area
b) Privately, self-owned (non-neighbor) generator 12 3.5 1010
c) Community owned generator, which provides
16 4.4 480
electricity to your household
d) Government electricity – direct line dedicated
20 18.8 903
to your house
e) Government electricity – other sources, but
3 14.7 640
not directly connected to your home
f) Large batteries/ invertors (such as for running
6 3.2 248
TV, lights, etc.)
g) Solar panels for producing electricity 4 4.8 194
Economy and Development 53

The table indicates that those receiving government supplied electricity use the most
electric power on a daily basis. On average they have access to electricity for between
14 and 19 hours a day. Average monthly spending on government supplied electricity
ranges from 640 Afs for those accessing government supply through other sources
to 903 Afs for those with a direct supply to their house. However, given the extended
periods of supply this is amongst the cheapest forms of electricity available, averag-
ing about 1.5Afs per hour of electricity supplied. Government supplied electricity is
more than six times cheaper than electricity from a private generator whose average
cost is around 10Afs per hour of supply. The only source of electricity that is cheap-
er than public supply is solar power. The small proportion of respondents using
this form of electricity generation (4%) on average pay 194 Afs a month for up to
5 hours daily supply. This works out at around 1.3 Afs per hour of electricity. These
figures suggest that solar power might be a cost effective solution to rural energy
provision, particularly if the quantity of electricity supplied can be increased

4.7 Main source of energy for lighting, cooking and heating

Electricity is the most commonly used source of energy for lighting (46%), particu-
larly in urban areas. Four fifths (80%) of urban respondents say they use electricity as
the main source of energy for lighting, compared to just over a third (37%) of rural
respondents. The other major sources of energy for lighting are kerosene (26%) and
bottled gas/LPG (15%).

However, more than half of the respondents (52%) use firewood as their main
source of energy for cooking. Other main sources of energy for this purpose include
bottled gas/LPG (23%) and animal dung/manure (16%). Use of firewood for cook-
ing is significantly higher in rural (59%) than urban (26%) areas, while the use of
bottled gas/LPG is significantly higher in urban (66%) than rural (11%) settings.

Firewood is the main source of energy for heating (39%) in both rural and urban
areas. There is also significant use of electricity (28%), particularly in the urban areas,
and use of animal dung/manure (17%) and charcoal (14%).

Overall firewood is the most widely used source of energy in Afghan households
(70%) and is used for both cooking and heating. Electricity is the next most widely
used, although mostly for lighting. Electricity is the main source of energy in urban
areas (81%). Bottled gas/LPG (38%) is the next most widely used source of energy
and is used for all purposes, although only a small minority use this for heating.
54 Afghanistan in 2009

Table 4.10: The main source of energy for lighting, cooking and heating (Q-44a-c; Base 6406)
(Percentages based on multiple responses)

All Lighting Cooking Heating


(%) (%) (%) (%)
Firewood 70 - 52 39
Electricity 47 46 - 8
Bottled gas/LPG 38 15 23 4
Animal dung/ manure 30 - 16 17
Kerosene 27 26 - 1
Charcoal 16 - 2 14
Coal 11 - 2 10
Grass or other biomass 12 - 6 7
Diesel 8 7 - -
Candles 3 3 - -
Petrol 2 2 - -

4.8 Development Programs and Public Awareness of Foreign Aid

The international community and donor agencies are supporting a wide variety of
projects and programs in Afghanistan. The survey sought to gauge respondents’
knowledge about the implementation of development programs in their local area.
All respondents were asked whether they knew of, or had heard of, any project or
program implemented with foreign aid in their area or district in the last 12 months.
Respondents were then given a list of the kinds of development programs that
might be present in their area.

More than half (54%) of respondents say that they are aware of projects relating
to education (reconstruction/opening of schools, training teachers etc.), which is
consistent with the general perception that access to education is the service that
has shown the greatest improvement over the past three years (see 4.2 - Development
for Afghan Households).

A similar proportion say that they are aware of reconstruction projects involving the
building of roads and bridges (52%). Projects related to water supply for drinking are
mentioned by 42 percent of respondents and healthcare programs, such as primary
health centers and regular visits of doctors, are mentioned by 40 percent.

Responses in this regard in 2009 are broadly similar to those recorded in previous
years. Awareness of education and reconstruction programs has topped the list for
four consecutive years. This suggests that the majority of development programs
mostly respond to the development issues that are generally prioritized by the people
Economy and Development 55

(see 4.4 – Important development issues). However, just over a quarter (28%) of respon-
dents report being aware of development programs targeting the electricity supply
which remains one of the most pressing issues for Afghans.

Table 4.11: Percentage of the people who knew of or heard of any development project or program
implemented with foreign aids in their localities (Q-34a-m, Base 6406)

Knew/heard of
Development project
(%)
Education (reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers etc.) 54
Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges 52
Water supply for drinking 42
Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.) 40
De-mining 33
Demilitarization / disarmament 29
Electricity supply 28
Water supply for irrigation 26
Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, shelter,
26
production materials etc.
Building new mosques 23
Reconstruction/programs in agriculture 22
Reconstruction/programs in industry 13

In order to measure public perceptions of who is primarily responsible for provid-


ing aid for development projects, respondents were asked whether they thought the
Afghan Government, foreign sponsors or both were responsible for these activities
in various sectors. The findings reveal that the Afghan Government is seen to be
the primary agency responsible for the supply of electricity (55%), supply of water
for irrigation (55%) and the in the development of education by reconstruction of
schools or opening of new ones (54%). The government is seen to contribute a lot
into building new mosques (70%). The Afghan Government is also seen to be lead-
ing in the field of reconstruction programs in agriculture (49%), demilitarization and
disarmament (47%), reconstruction programs in industry (47%), provision of water
for drinking (46%) and healthcare (45%). Almost equal credit is given to the govern-
ment and to foreign donors for programs dealing with the reconstruction or building
of roads and bridges or in humanitarian programs. Foreign donors are seen to have
a leading role in de-mining programs.
56 Afghanistan in 2009

Table 4.12: Has the Afghan government or foreign sponsors been primarily responsible for provid-
ing most of the aid for the projects? (Q-35a-l, Base 6406)

Afghan Foreign
Both
Development project Govt. sponsor
(%)
(%) (%)
Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges 34 39 27
Water supply for drinking 46 31 22
Water supply for irrigation 55 25 19
Electricity supply 55 22 21
Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.) 45 27 27
Education (reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers etc.) 54 20 26
De-mining 33 43 23
Demilitarization / disarmament 47 26 25
Reconstruction/programs in agriculture 49 25 25
Reconstruction/programs in industry 47 27 26
Building new mosques 70 16 12
Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, shelter,
31 35 33
production materials etc.
Other projects 50 31 16

Respondents who identified foreign sponsors, alone or alongside the Afghan Gov-
ernment, as the primary agencies responsible for implementing projects in their area or
district (70% of all respondents) were also asked which countries they think have pro-
vided this assistance. The country mentioned most often is the USA (41%) followed by
Germany (8%) and Japan (7%). This finding largely matches those of 2006, 2007 and
2008. However, the figures in 2009 are slightly lower than in previous years.

Which country do you think has provided the most aid for the projects you mentioned to have been
implemented in this area, district? (Q-36, Base 4494)
50%
41%
40%

30%

20%

8% 7%
10%
5% 3% 3% 2% 2%
3%
0%
USA Germany Japan India France PRT Foreign Turkey Sweden
team countries

Fig 4.5
Economy and Development 57

The United States is identified as the major donor in all regions (41%), followed by
Germany (8%), Japan (7%) and India (5%). Many respondents also mention the
local Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) (3%) or foreign countries (3%) as the
major donor without identifying any specific country providing the assistance.

Respondents were then asked to mention any other countries which they think have
provided aid for the projects in their area or district. Overall, the countries seen to
provide the most aid to Afghanistan (either as the major donor or alongside other
donors) are still the USA (31%), followed by Germany (13%), Japan (12%) and
India (10%) which are seen to be active in all regions. However, a number of other
donors are mentioned by a significant proportion of respondents in regions where
they are particularly active. For example, in the East respondents mention China
(10%), Pakistan (7%), Sweden (6%) and Saudi Arabia (5%). In the South East they
identify Poland (5%) as well as the PRT (7%). In the South West respondents men-
tion Canada (9%), the UK (5%) and Saudi Arabia (5%) as well as local PRT (7%). In
the West, Iran (8%), Italy (8%) and France (5%) are identified as significant donors.
France is also mentioned in the North East (10%). In the Central/Kabul region,
France (7%), Turkey (7%) and China (5%) are identified most often. However, in the
Central/Hazarajat region comparatively few respondents identify donor countries
other than the major four.
58 Afghanistan in 2009

Table 4.13: Which country do you think has provided the most aid for the projects you mentioned
to have been implemented in this area, district?, Which other countries have provided aid for the
projects in your area, district? (Q-36 and 37, average score), Base 4494)

Central/ South North North South Central/


All East West
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(%) (%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
USA 31 32 31 34 30 30 33 29 20
Germany 13 14 14 15 20 7 11 5 14
Japan 12 14 10 22 10 8 12 12 5
India 10 8 9 19 5 5 12 9 11
France 5 7 4 3 10 4 5 4 4
United King-
3 4 3 4 2 1 4 5 3
dom (Britain)
Pakistan 3 2 2 7 2 1 2 2 0
China 3 5 1 10 3 3 2 1 1
Iran 3 3 2 3 2 2 8 3 4
Saudi Arabia 3 3 3 5 3 2 1 5 2
Turkey 3 7 1 1 1 5 2 0 0
Italy 3 2 2 2 1 1 8 1 2
Sweden 3 2 4 6 3 3 0 0 0
PRT team 3 1 7 3 1 2 2 6 2
Canada 2 3 1 3 1 1 2 9 1
Holland 2 1 0 1 2 1 1 5 0
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 0 0
Australia 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0
Russia 1 1 0 2 2 1 2 0 0
Denmark 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 1
Poland 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Government 59

5 Government

The survey attempted to examine Afghans’ experience of interacting with a range of


governance institutions at the national and local levels. These include local administra-
tive authorities such as Provincial and District Governors and Municipalities and elect-
ed representatives at national and local levels including Members of Parliament (MPs),
Provincial Council and Community Development Council representatives. Respon-
dents were asked about the performance of these institutions and their responsiveness
to people’s needs including whether or not they have been successful in addressing
local problems. In addition, the survey collected people’s views on the representation
of different social groups at the community level and on the role of particular groups
in political decision-making processes including consultation with religious leaders.

5.1 Performance of National Government

When asked to assess how well the national government is carrying out its respon-
sibilities, almost three quarters of respondents (71%) give a positive assessment,
including one in five (19 %) who say that the government is doing a very good job.
In 2008, only two thirds of respondents (67%) gave a positive assessment, which
indicates that 2009 has seen a small increase in satisfaction with the national govern-
ment. However, the assessment of government performance is still less positive than
in 2007 when four out of five respondents (80%) said the government was doing a
good job, including one in four (25%) who said it was doing a very good job.

Thinking of the National Government, how do you feel about the way it is carrying out its responsi-
bilities? (Q-59) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

60% 56% 51%


52%
50%

40%

30% 24%
22% 20%
16% 19%
20%
14%
8% 6%
10%
4%
0%
Very good job Somewhat good job Somewhat bad job Very bad job

2007 2008 2009

Fig. 5.1
60 Afghanistan in 2009

Women have a more positive view of national government performance than men.
Three quarters of women (75%) say the government is doing a good job compared
to around two thirds of men (66%). Public perception of the government’s perfor-
mance is most favorable in the East (86%), North West (82%) and North East (75%)
regions, but least favorable in the South West (59%), Central/Hazarajat (61%) and
South East (63%). However, even in these regions the majority of respondents still
judge government performance favorably.

The survey then sought a more in-depth understanding of these responses by in-
vestigating respondents’ views on the government’s performance in specific areas
such as education, healthcare, creating job opportunities, maintaining relations with
neighboring countries, reviving/developing the economy, fighting corruption and
providing security.

The government’s performance is judged most positively with regard to the provision
of education, healthcare and security which are the basic public services. More than
four-fifths of respondents (83%) say the government is doing either a somewhat good
job or a very good job providing education. Just under two-thirds (63%) say the same
about the provision of healthcare and a similar proportion (61%) have the same view
with respect to the provision of security. The majority of respondents also give a posi-
tive assessment of government performance in maintaining relations with neighboring
countries (58%). On the other hand, a significant majority of respondents say that the
government is doing a bad job in creating jobs (71%), fighting corruption (68%) and
reviving/developing the economy (62%). These findings are consistent with respon-
dents’ views of the situation in their local area where the majority are most satisfied
with the availability of education for children, but least satisfied with the availability of
jobs (see Chapter 4, 4.3 Availability of basic amenities). This correlation clearly indicates that
the public’s assessment of government performance is closely related to the ability of
the national government to provide the basic services and amenities that people need.

Table 5.1: Perceptions of the performance of the National Government in specific areas (Q-60a-g,
Base 6406)

Very good Somewhat Somewhat Very bad


Job good job bad job job
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Education 37 46 12 4
b) Healthcare system 17 46 27 9
c) Creating job opportunities 6 22 38 33
d)Maintaining relations with neigh-
16 42 26 10
boring countries
e) Reviving/Developing the economy 7 29 36 26
f) Fighting corruption 7 23 31 37
g) Security 23 38 22 16
Government 61

People living in urban areas give a more positive assessment of the performance of
the national government in all domains. The largest differences of opinion concern
the provision of security (71% of urban respondents say the government is doing
a good job in this regard, compared to 58% of respondents in rural areas) and the
provision of healthcare (73% of urban respondents give a positive assessment of
government performance as compared to 61% in rural areas).

Across the country the most positive assessments of government performance in


all domains is recorded in the North West and Eastern regions. Whereas, the low-
est levels of satisfaction are consistently recorded in the Central/Hazarajat, South
West and West. The lowest level of satisfaction regarding the provision of security
is recorded in the South East.

Table 5.2: Perceptions of the performance of the National Government in specific


areas (Q-60a-g, Base 6406), ‘somewhat good job’ and ‘very good job’ responses, BY
REGION

Central/ South North North South Central/


East West
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Education 87 80 89 85 92 82 63 82
b) Healthcare system 71 60 71 55 72 63 54 47
c) Creating job opportunities 25 29 38 25 33 24 25 26
d) Maintaining relations with
59 59 66 54 66 55 49 38
neighboring countries
e) Reviving/Developing the
33 46 42 30 35 33 38 23
economy
f) Fighting corruption 26 25 46 29 37 26 28 18
g) Security 68 35 73 75 86 41 38 62

However, in understanding the factors that influence respondents’ assessments of


the government performance, it is interesting to consider the level of actual contact
people have with government institutions and services. A separate set of questions
reveal that a substantial proportion of respondents have had no contact with gov-
ernment agencies in the last year. This ranges from a third (33%) who have had no
contact with public health services to 38 percent who have had no contact with the
Afghan National Police (ANP), to 44 percent who have had no contact with state
electricity services or with the courts to around half who have had no contact with
the Afghan National Army (ANA) (47%). Moreover, levels of contact vary widely
between regions. Notably, in the Central/Hazarajat region, the majority of respon-
62 Afghanistan in 2009

dents have had no contact with any of these government services in the past year.
These figures indicate that the presence and accessibility of government institu-
tions is likely to be a factor that influences respondents’ perceptions of govern-
ment performance.

Table 5.3: Percentage of the people who have no contacts with government officials in the last year
in various facets of life (Q-29c-g, Base 6406)

Central/ South North North South Central/


All East West
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(%) (%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
c) Afghan National Police 38 47 19 23 40 47 42 20 61
d) Afghan National Army 47 58 27 30 58 54 50 26 63
e) Judiciary / courts 44 59 28 30 47 49 44 24 59
f) State electricity supply 44 49 35 36 50 49 44 31 63
g) Public healthcare service 33 45 12 23 37 37 32 23 51

The survey also asked respondents to identify what they thought was the most im-
portant achievement of the current government in the past few years. Respondents
were asked to mention up to two important achievements. The most commonly
mentioned achievement of the current government is reconstruction (32%) fol-
lowed by establishing peace and security (27%) and a better education system (26%).
These findings are largely coherent with the reasons for optimism mentioned by
respondents who say that the country is moving in the right direction (see Chapter 2,
2.2: Reasons for optimism).

What in your opinion is the most important achievement of the current government in the past few
years? And what is next? (Q-61a&b, Base 6406) (Percentages based on multiple responses)

40%
32%
30% 27%
26%

20%

8% 7% 7%
10%
6%

0%
Re- Establishing Better Freedom of Having ANP Don’t Know Elections
construction peace and education speech and ANA
security system

Fig. 5.2
Government 63

Reconstruction is most often mentioned as the most important acheivement of the


current government in the Central/Kabul (39%), North East (37%), West (33%) and
North West (31%) regions, but least often mentioned in the Central/Hazarajat (18%).
Similarly, establishing peace and security is mentioned by a little less than half of
respondents in the North West (46%) and North East (42%), but only one in ten
in the South West (10%) and South East (11%). Again this suggests that there are
wide disparities across the country in the impact and perceptions of government
performance in these domains. On the other hand, the proportion of respondents
who identify a better education system or freedom of speech as the most important
government achievements shows little variation between regions.

In the same vein, the survey asked respondents about the most important failing of
the current government. The most commonly mentioned government failings are
insecurity (31%), administrative corruption (29%), lack of job opportunities (20%),
weak economy (15%) and weak government (13%). Eight percent of the respondents
are unable or unwilling to identify any failures of the current government. These are
the same issues highlighted by those respondents who say that the country is moving
in the wrong direction (see Chapter 2, 2.3: Reasons of pessimism).

What in your opinion is the most important failing of the current government in the past few years?
And what is next? (Q-62a&b, Base 6406) (Percentages based on multiple responses)

40%

31% 29%
30%

20%
20%
15%
13%
10% 8%

0%
Insecurity Administrative Lack of job Weak Weak Don’t Know
corruption opportunities economy Government

Fig. 5.3

Insecurity is most often mentioned in the South West (41%), South East (39%), and
West (33%), which are the areas in which the majority of respondents rate the secu-
rity in their local area as poor or very poor (see 3, 3.1 Security Situation). This is also the
case in the Central/Kabul region (34%) where insecurity is the top issue mentioned.
Respondents in these same areas most often mention weak government as a major fail-
64 Afghanistan in 2009

ing, suggesting again that the government’s capacity to ensure security is amongst the
most important factors that influence perceptions of government performance. Weak
government is also mentioned often in the Central/Hazarajat region where satisfaction
with government performance is lowest across all domains (see Table 5.2). The lack of
job opportunities and the weak economy are most often mentioned in the North West,
North East and Central/Kabul regions. Other major government failings which have
particular resonance in certain regions include removing the Taliban mentioned by one
in six respondents in the West (15%) and one in ten in the East (11%) and South West
(10%), removing drugs mentioned by one in ten respondents in the West (10%) and
preventing civilian casualties mentioned by one in seven respondents in the East (14%)
and around one in ten in the South West (9%) and South East (8%).

Given the importance of security issues in perceptions of government performance,


the survey sought to examine public opinion on certain aspects of the government’s
approach to security. In particular, the survey asked respondents whether they ap-
prove or disapprove of the current government’s efforts at negotiation and recon-
ciliation with armed anti-government elements. Nearly three-quarters of respon-
dents (71%) say they approve of these efforts, although 43 percent express some
reservations. A quarter of respondents (25%) say they disapprove of this approach,
although only one in ten (10%) strongly disapproves. These findings indicate that
Afghans support the government’s efforts to address state security issues through
talks with opposition groups, rather than by military means exclusively.

Do you strongly approve, approve somewhat, disapprove somewhat or strongly disapprove of the
Afghan Government’s reconciliation efforts and negotiations with armed Anti-Government ele-
ments? (Q-64a, Base 6406)

50%
43%
40%

30% 28%

20%
15% 10%
10%
4%
1%
0%
Strongly Approve Disapprove Strongly Refused Don’t know
approve somewhat somewhat disapprove

Fig. 5.4
Government 65

Support for efforts to negotiate and achieve reconciliation with armed opposition
groups varies little between regions, with the exception of the Central/Hazarajat
where just over half (52%) of respondents say they approve of this approach and
one in three (33%) say they disapprove.

The survey also asked respondents about their level of sympathy for the reasons why
anti-government groups have used violence during the past year. Responses show
that a slight majority (56%) say that they have some level of sympathy with the mo-
tivations of armed opposition groups, including around one in five (22%) who say
they have a lot of sympathy. These results certainly help to explain the high levels of
support for a conciliatory approach to addressing anti-government violence.

Thinking about the reasons anti-government groups used violence during the past year, would you
say that you in general have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for the
reasons these anti-government groups choose to use violence? (Q-64b, Base 6406)

40%
34% 36%

30%
22%
20%

10%
3% 5%

0%
A lot of sympathy A little sympathy No sympathy at Refused Don’t know
all

Fig. 5.5

Levels of sympathy with anti-government violence are higher in rural areas (57%)
than in urban settings (48%). There is relatively little variation between ethnic groups
in their sympathy for the motivations of armed opposition groups. The majority of
all groups record some level of sympathy with the highest levels recorded by Uzbeks
(60%) and Pashtuns (59%) and the lowest by Tajiks (51%). Responses vary more
significantly between regions. The highest levels of sympathy are recorded in the
South East (66%) and East (65%) where two thirds of respondents say they have
some sympathy with the reasons that armed opposition groups use violence, how-
ever this is the case for fewer than half of respondents in the Central/Kabul (46%)
and Central/Hazarajat (48%) regions.
66 Afghanistan in 2009

5.2 Performance of provincial government

Respondents were also asked to assess the performance of the provincial govern-
ment in their area. Three-quarters of respondents (75%) give a positive assessment
and nearly a quarter (24%) say that the provincial government is doing a very good
job. These findings are entirely consistent with the findings of previous years.

However, assessment of the performance of provincial government varies between


regions. Although the overall assessment of the performance of provincial govern-
ment is positive in all regions, the highest levels of satisfaction are recorded in the
East (85%) and North West (81%) where more than four out of five respondents say
that the provincial government is doing a good job. These high levels of satisfaction
are recorded in eight individual provinces: Balkh (94%), Laghman (90%), Baghlan
(88%), Badakhshan (88%), Badghis (89%), Panjshir (87%), Nangarhar (87%) and
Sar-i-pul (83%)

The highest level of dissatisfaction is recorded in the South West where around
one in three respondents (36%) say the provincial government is doing a bad job.
Around two-thirds of respondents in Zabul (67%) and Uruzgan (63%) say that their
provincial Government is doing a bad job, nearly twice the figure recorded in other
provinces.

Turning to your Provincial Government, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job, some-
what good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? (Q-65a, Base 6406) BY REGION
70%
58% 58%
60%
53% 53% 51% 47%
46%
50%
43%
38%
40%
32% 27% 28%
30%
16% 16% 22% 17%
19% 19% 18% 15% 13% 18%
20%
11%
6% 6% 9% 7% 8% 8%
10% 6%
2% 4%
0%
Central/ South East Eastern North East North West Western South Central/
Kabul Western Hazarajat

Very good job Somewhat good job Somewhat bad job Very bad job

Fig 5.6
Government 67

5.3 Performance of municipal and local authorities

The survey also asked about the performance of municipal and local authorities.
People living in urban areas (21% of all respondents) were asked questions pertain-
ing to municipal authorities.

Again the majority of respondents living in urban areas (58%) think that the municipal
authority in their local area is doing a good job, including 17 percent who say it is doing
a very good job. However, the level of satisfaction with municipal government perfor-
mance is significantly lower than the proportion of respondents who say the central
government (71%) and provincial government (75%) are doing a good job. Forty per-
cent of respondents give a negative assessment of the performance of the municipal-
ity in their locality, including around one in six (15%) who say it is doing a very bad
job. Yet despite these relatively low levels of satisfaction compared to other levels of
government, in 2009, levels of satisfaction with the performance of municipal au-
thorities increased compared to 2008, and the proportion of respondents who say that
municipal authorities are doing a very good job is higher than in previous years.

The most positive assessment of the performance of municipal authorities is in the


North West where almost nine in ten respondents (88%) say their local municipality
is doing a good job. However, significant majorities say the same in the East (71%),
South East (71%) and North East (62%). On the other hand, the highest level of
dissatisfaction is recorded in the Central/Kabul region where nearly half of respon-
dents (49%) say that their local municipal authorities are doing a bad job.

What do you think about the job done by your municipal authorities? Do you think that overall
it is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? (Q-65b, Base
1377) BY REGION
60%
52% 50% 47%
50%
41% 44%
42% 38%
39% 37% 37%
40%
35%
27% 29% 25% 28%
28%
30%
22% 22%
14%
19% 19%
20%
12%
10% 12%
11%
7% 8% 8% 9% 9%
10%
3%
0
0%
Central/ South East Eastern North East North West Western South Central/
Kabul Western Hazarajat

Very good job Somewhat good job Somewhat bad job Very bad job

Fig 5.7
68 Afghanistan in 2009

The survey asked a similar question about the performance of local authorities at
the district level to people living in rural areas (79% of all respondents). Overall,
more than two-thirds of respondents (69%) rate the performance of their district
authorities positively, considerably more than those who give a positive assessment
of the performance of municipal authorities in urban areas (58%). Around a quarter
of rural respondents (23%) say their local district authorities are doing a very good
job. However, 28 percent think the district authorities in their localities are doing a
bad job. These findings show almost no variation from 2008.

The largest proportions of respondents who say that their local district authority is
doing a good job are in the North West (81%), East (77%) and North East (76%)
followed by the West (67%). However the highest levels of dissatisfaction are re-
corded in the South West, where nearly half (48%) of respondents say that their
district authorities are doing a bad job. Over one in three respondents say the same
in the South East (38%) and Central/Hazarajat (37%) regions.

What do you think about the job done by your Local authorities, do you think that overall it is
doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job? (Q-65c, Base 5029)
BY REGION

60%
53% 50%
48% 49%
50% 46%
40%41% 41%
40% 36%
27% 34%
28% 29% 26%
30%
20% 20%
20% 17% 17%
20% 16% 16% 14%
14% 14% 11%
10% 10%
8%
10% 6% 6% 5%
4%

0%
Central/ South Eastern North East North Western South Central/
Kabul East West Western Hazarajat

Very good job Somewhat good job Somewhat bad job Very bad job

Fig 5.8

The overall picture of public perceptions of the performance of different levels


of government shows that respondents are most positive about the performance
of their provincial government, followed by the national government and rural
district authorities. They are least satisfied with the performance of municipalities.
However, since 2007 satisfaction with provincial and national level authorities has
fallen, whereas satisfaction with municipal authorities is now about the same as it
was two years ago.
Government 69

Table 5.4: Proportions of respondents who say the national government, provincial government,
municipality and district authorities are doing a good job (combination of very good job and some-
what good job) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%)
National government 80 67 71
Provincial government 80 74 75
Municipality 57 50 58
District authorities - 67 69

5.4 Corruption

One of the major problems facing Afghanistan identified by respondents is the is-
sue of corruption including administrative corruption. (See 2, 2.4 Afghanistan’s biggest
problems: National level). The level of corruption in public institutions is an important
measure of government performance, both in terms of equity and efficiency. The
survey therefore sought to measure public perceptions of the prevalence of cor-
ruption at different levels of government and in various facets of life. Respondents
were asked whether they think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem or
no problem at all in their daily life, their neighborhood, their local authorities, their
provincial government and in Afghanistan as a whole.

Results show that the majority of Afghans think that corruption is a major problem
in all facets of life and at all levels of government. Moreover, as in previous years,
perceptions of the prevalence of corruption rise as the level of the institution rises.
While just over half of respondents (53%) say that corruption is a major prob-
lem in their local authorities, just under two thirds (61%) say the same about their
provincial governments, and around three quarters (76%) say this with regard to
Afghanistan as a whole. Conversely, while only one in twenty respondents say that
corruption is not a problem for the country as a whole (5%), three times as many say
that it is not a problem in their daily life (15%).
70 Afghanistan in 2009

Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no
problem at all in Afghanistan as a whole, your provincial government, your local authorities, your
neighborhood, your daily life (Q27a-e, Base 6406)

90%
76%
80%
70% 61%
60% 53% 50% 53%
50%
34% 35%
40%
29% 31%
30%
16% 13% 15%
20%
5% 10%
10% 6%

0%
Afghanistan as a Provincial Local Authorities Neighbourhood Daily Life
whole Government

Major problem Minor problem Not a problem

Fig 5.9

This pattern is consistent with previous years. However, while the perception of cor-
ruption in Afghanistan as a whole has remained stable, the proportion of respondents
who identify this as a major problem in their daily life and in their neighbourhood has
been rising steadily since 2006. Encouragingly, the proportion that identify corruption
as a major problem in their provincial government has fallen (from 66% in 2006 to
61% in 2009). However, the reverse is true for local authorities. Under half (48%) of
respondents said that corruption was a major problem at this level of government in
2007, but more than half had this opinion in 2008 (53%) and 2009 (53%).

Table 5.5: Percentage of the people who think corruption is a major problem in various facets of
life and levels of government (Q-27a-e) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008
AND 2009

2006 2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%) (%)
In Afghanistan as a whole 77 74 76 76
In your provincial government 66 60 63 61
In your daily life 42 47 51 53
In your local authorities - 48 53 53
In your neighborhood 40 43 48 50
Government 71

To further explore trends in public perceptions of corruption, respondents were


also asked to compare the level of corruption now with one year ago. Over half
(54%) of respondents think that the amount of corruption has increased in Afghan-
istan as whole, while 41 percent think that it has done so at provincial government
level. A third (32%) of respondents think that corruption has increased in their local
authorities and around a quarter believe this is true in their neighborhood (24%) and
in their daily lives (23%). The findings suggest that respondents are more likely to
identify an increase in corruption in domains where they perceive corruption to be
generally high. However, since 2006 there has been a consistent fall in the proportion
of respondents who say there been an annual increase in corruption in Afghanistan
as a whole (from 60% in 2006 to 54% in 2009) and in their provincial government
(from 50% in 2006 to 41% in 2009).

Table 5.6: Percentage of the people who think the amount of corruption has increased in various
facets of life and levels of government (Q-28a-e)

2006 2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%) (%)
In Afghanistan as a whole 60 57 57 54
In your provincial government 50 45 45 41
In your local authorities - 31 33 32
In your neighborhood 28 21 25 24
In your daily life 24 21 24 23

The survey also attempted to measure respondents’ personal experience of corrup-


tion in various facets of public life by asking how often in the past year they had to
give cash, a gift or perform a favor for a government official. Responses show that
the majority of contacts with government institutions do not involve corruption.
This suggests that people’s overall perception of the prevalence of corruption is
higher than their personal experience of it. The situations in which respondents
have most frequently encountered corruption (either in all cases when they had con-
tact or in most cases) are in receiving official documents (30%), applying for jobs
(27%), and dealing with the judiciary/courts (26%). However, around one in five
respondents report encountering corruption in receiving public healthcare services
(21%), dealing with officials in the municipality (21%), getting admissions to schools
or universities (20%), dealing with the ANP (19%) and dealing with state electricity
supply (19%) or the customs office (19%). The lowest incidence of corruption is
recorded in dealings with the ANA, although corrupt practices are still reported by
one in ten respondents (11%).
72 Afghanistan in 2009

Table 5.7: Percentage of the people who have corruption-related experience (based on respondents
who had contacts with the organization/area) (Q-29a-j, Base 6406)

In all cases Most cases Total cases


(%) (%) (%)
To receive official documents 11 18 30
When applying for a job 8 19 27
Judiciary/courts 9 17 26
Officials in the Municipality 8 15 23
Public healthcare service 5 16 21
Admissions to schools/university 7 13 20
Afghan National Police 6 13 19
State electricity supply 5 13 19
Customs office 6 13 19
Afghan National Army 3 8 11

Respondents’ experience of corruption in various institutions is broadly correlated


with the low levels of public confidence expressed in these same institutions. Insti-
tutions in which respondents frequently report corrupt practices also register par-
ticularly low levels of public confidence including municipalities (46% confidence),
the government justice system (46%), government ministries (53% confidence) and
the public administration as a whole (57% confidence) (see Chapter 2, 2.6: Confidence in
specific institutions and organizations).

5.5 Contact with local government to solve local problems

Respondents were asked whether, at any time in the past five years, they had asked
for the help of a government official or a government agency to resolve an issue
that concerned everybody in their area but which they could not resolve on their
own. The majority of respondents (71%) say that they have not had such a problem.
However, just under a quarter (23%) report that they have sought assistance from a
government agency to resolve a problem of this kind.

Among those who have sought assistance (23% of all respondents), most people
have done this to resolve problems related to a lack of water and electricity (21%)
or disputes over land (17%). Respondents have also sought help from government
agencies in relation to other problems with basic infrastructure such as reconstruc-
tion of roads and bridges (10%). Security issues have prompted requests for assis-
tance from 10 percent while a small proportion has asked for help to resolve tribal
disputes (6%).
Government 73

Sometimes people and communities have problems, related to an issue that concerns everybody in
their area, that they can’t resolve on their own and so they have to ask for the help of a government
official or a government agency. In the past 5 years, has your community had such a problem in your
area that you had to ask for help or cooperation to resolve it? ( YES responses) - What kind of
problem was/is that? (Q-47, Base 1486)
25%
21%
20%
17%
15%
10% 10%
10%
6% 5% 5%
5%

0%
Lack of Dispute over Re- Security Tribal Economic Robbery/
water and land construction problems problems problems burglary
electricity

Fig 5.10
When asked who they approached to solve the problem, one-third of respondents
(34%) mention elders of local shura or jirga, demonstrating the continuing impor-
tance of informal community governance structures in resolving problems at the
community level. A significant proportion report taking their problem to the local
administration, with a higher proportion seeking help from district authorities (20%)
than from authorities at the provincial level (17%). Twelve percent have sought the
help of the Afghan National Police which has a clear responsibility for law enforce-
ment at the local level. Ten percent say they approached a semi-formal malik or
khan at the village level to help solve their problem. A similar proportion say they
asked for assistance from government agencies (9%) or from elected representatives
including community development councils (9%) and MPs (7%).

Who did you approach/ask to solve the problem? (Q-48, Base 1486) (Percentages are based on
multiple responses)
40%
34%
30%
20% 17%
20%
12%
10% 9% 9%
10%

0%
Elders of the District Provincial Afghan Malik/Khan Government Community
local authorities governor/ National agency/office Development
shura/jirga authorities Police Council

Fig 5.11
74 Afghanistan in 2009

When asked whether the problem for which they sought help has been resolved,
respondents’ experience was divided. Around half (47%) report that the problem
has been resolved while a slightly smaller proportion (44%) say the problem is still
pending resolution.

A high proportion of those who approached the state security services have had
their problem resolved. This is the case for over half of those who took their prob-
lem to the ANA (58%) and ANP (57%). The majority of people who approached
traditional institutions at the community level such as mullah (55%), malik/khan
(50%) and shura/jirga (49%) had their problems solved. The efficacy of these insti-
tutions in resolving local issues may help explain why levels of public confidence in
them is relatively high (see Chapter 2, 2.6 - Confidence in specific institutions and organiza-
tions). Bodies close to the local level also resolved just under half of the problems
presented to them, including District Authorities (48%) and Community Develop-
ment Councils (43%)

By contrast, only around a third (35%) of respondents, who approached govern-


ment authorities at the provincial level and a quarter (24%) who sought help from
national government offices, have had their problems resolved. This may also offer a
partial explanation for the relatively low levels of public confidence recorded in the
public administration (see Chapter 2, 2.6 - Confidence in institutions and organizations).

Table 5.8: Proportion of those who mentioned that the problem has been resolved BY AGENCY

Problem resolved
(%)
Afghan National Army 58
Afghan National Police 57
Mullah 55
A Member of Parliament 52
Malik / Khan 50
Elders of the local shura/jirga 49
District authorities 48
Community Development Council 43
NGO 37
Human Rights Commission 37
PRT 36
Provincial governor/ authorities 35
Government agency/office 24
Foreign forces 24
Government 75

5.6 Role of elected representative bodies

The survey sought to examine people’s perceptions of elected representative bodies


including parliament and members of parliament (MPs) at the national level, Pro-
vincial Councils (PC) at the provincial level and Community Development Councils
(CDC) that operate at villages and community level in rural areas.

To assess perceptions of the responsiveness of national level representatives to


meeting the needs of the people, respondents were asked whether they agree or
disagree with the statement: “The Parliament is addressing the major problems of
people in our country.” Overall, more than two-thirds of respondents (68%) agree
with this statement including around a quarter (24%) who strongly agree. However,
just under a third of respondents (30%) disagree, including one in ten (10%) who
disagree strongly. These findings are broadly similar to those recorded in 2008.

Levels of agreement are particularly high in the North West (77%), Central/Hazara-
jat (73%), Central/Kabul (70%) and East (70%), while disagreement is highest in the
South East (38%), West (36%) and South West (34%) regions.

“Do you agree or disagree with the statement: “The Parliament is addressing the major problems of
people in our country”?” (Q-90a, Base 6406)

50%
44%
40%

30%
24% 20%
20%
10%
10%
1% 2%
0%
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Refused Don't know
agree somewhat somewhat disagree

Fig. 5.12

The majority of respondents (58%) also agree with the statement: “My MP is ad-
dressing the major problems of my constituency in the Parliament”, including one
in five (20%) who strongly agree. However, more than a third of respondents (39%)
disagree with this statement.
76 Afghanistan in 2009

The highest levels of agreement are in the North West (72%), Central/Hazarajat
(64%) and East (61%), which are also the regions that report the highest levels of
satisfaction with the responsiveness of Parliament to the needs of the country as a
whole. On the other hand, nearly half of respondents disagree with this statement
in the South East (49%) and South West (49%).

“Do you agree or disagree with the statement: “My MP is addressing the major problems of my
constituency in the Parliament?” (Q-90b, Base 6406)

50%
38%
40%
25%
30%
20%
20%
14%
10%
3%
1%
0%
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Refused Don't know
agree somewhat somewhat disagree

Fig. 5.13

Overall, levels of satisfaction with the performance of MPs in addressing the major
problems of their constituencies in the Parliament has fallen steadily since 2006, sug-
gesting increasing disenchantment with the ability of MPs to address local problems
through the parliamentary channel. However, results in 2009 show a small improve-
ment compared to 2008.
Government 77

“Do you agree or disagree with the statement “My MP is addressing the major problems of my
constituency in the Parliament”?” (Q-90b) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008
AND 2009
50% 47%
41%
38% 38%
40%
32%
30%
23% 23% 23% 25%
20%
18%
20% 17%
14%
11% 10%
8%
10%

0%
Strongly agree Agree somewhat Disagree somewhat Strongly disagree

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig. 5.14

5.7 Contacts with Members of Parliament (MPs)

The survey also sought to examine in greater detail people’s perceptions of the re-
sponsiveness of MPs in addressing problems in their constituencies by looking at
their involvement in resolving local problems experienced by individuals and com-
munities. Respondents were asked: “Have you ever contacted your MP for help in
solving any of your personal or local problems?” Only around one in eight respon-
dents (12%) report ever having contacted their MP for help of this kind. Men (16%)
are twice as likely as women (8%) to have done so. Respondents living in villages
(14%) are also twice as likely to have done so as those living in urban areas (7%).
Contact with MPs for this purpose is most frequently reported by respondents in the
South East (19%) and East (17%) of the country.

Those respondents who had contacted their MP for help in solving local problems
(12% of all respondents) were then asked what kind of problem was involved.
Problems relating to basic infrastructure and services are the most common reasons
why respondents have contacted their MPs, including lack of water and electricity
(19%), lack of roads and bridges (12%), lack of security (8%) and lack of teachers
in schools (8%). One in ten respondents (10%) mention land disputes and one in
fifteen (6%) mention tribal problems. More urban (26%) than rural residents (18%)
have contacted their MP about water and electricity problems, whereas problems
related to land dispute are more frequently raised by rural residents (11%) than those
living in urban areas (1%).
78 Afghanistan in 2009

Have you ever contacted your MP for help in solving any of your personal or local problems? (YES
responses) - For what kind of problem did you contact the MP? (Q-83, Base 772)

25%
19%
20%

15%
12% 10%
10% 8% 8%
6%
5%

0%
Lack of water Lack of Land dispute Lack of Lack of Tribal
and roads and security teachers at problems
electricity bridges school

Fig 5.15

Respondents were then asked whether their MPs tried to help to resolve the prob-
lem. A small majority (53%) say the MP tried to help, while 43 percent say they did
not. This finding seems consistent with the proportion of respondents who agree
that their MP is addressing the major problems of their constituency in the parlia-
ment (58%) (see 5.6 - Role of elected representatives).

Finally, respondents were asked whether the problem had been resolved, regardless
of who helped. Slightly more than half (53%) say that the problem has not been
solved, whereas 43 percent report that it has.

5.8 Contacts with Provincial Council representatives

Respondents were asked the same question about contacting a representative of the
Provincial Council (PC) for help in solving any personal or local problems. Again,
an overwhelming majority (82%) has not done this, however almost one in six (15%)
say they have contacted a PC representative for assistance. This figure has remained
broadly the same since 2006.

Respondents who had contacted a PC representative for help (15% of all respon-
dents) were further asked for what kind of problem they had sought help. The re-
sults show that people contact PC members about the same kinds of issues that they
take to MPs. These include problems related to basic infrastructure and services such
as electricity and water (23%), roads and bridges (11%), building schools (6%), and
building clinics (5%). Likewise, disputes over land (10%) and tribal problems (7%)
are also a commmon reason for contacting PC representatives.
Government 79

Have you ever contacted a representative on the Provincial Council for help in solving any of your
personal or local problems? (YES responses) - What kind of problem was it? (Q-87, Base 970)

25%
23%

20%

15%
11%
10%
10%
7% 6%
5% 5%
5%

0%
Problems Roads and Land Tribal Building Building Economic
related to bridges dispute problems schools clinics problems
electricity
and water

Fig 5.16

Problems related to electricity and water account for the greatest number of requests
for help from PC representatives in almost every region, although they are almost as
common as issues relating to roads and bridges in the Central/Kabul region (22%)
and land disputes in the East (17%) and South West (21%). The exception is the
Central/Hazarajat region where problems related to teachers and schools are the
main reasons why respondents had contacted their Provincial Council representa-
tive. Respondents in the South West, West and South East are twice as likely to have
contacted their PC representative about tribal problems as those in other regions,
whereas respondents in the Central/Kabul and Central/Hazarajat regions are twice
as likely to have approached a PC member about economic problems in contrast to
other parts of the country.
80 Afghanistan in 2009

Have you ever contacted a representative on the Provincial Council for help in solving any of your
personal or local problems? (YES responses) - What kind of a problem was it? (Q-87, Base 970)
BY REGION

35%
30% 29% 28%
25%
25% 22%
22%
21% 20% 21%
20%
16% 17% 17%
15% 13%
11% 11%
9% 9% 9% 10% 9%9%
10% 6% 8% 5% 6%6% 6% 6%
5% 4% 4%
5% 3%
1%
0%
Central/ South Eastern North North Western South Central/
Kabul East East West Western Hazarjat

Electricity and water Roads and bridges Land dispute Building Schools

Fig 5.17

Respondents were further asked whether, when asked for assistance, the PC repre-
sentative tried to help resolve the problem. Nearly two-thirds of respondents (62%)
say their PC representative tried to help which is a significantly higher proportion
than those who said the same about their MP (53%). The remaining third (35%) said
the PC representative did not try to assist.

Finally, respondents were again asked whether the problem was resolved, regard-
less of who helped. Just under half (47%) of respondents report that the problem
was solved, whereas a similar proportion (49%) say it was not. The proportion of
problems taken to PC members which have been resolved is slightly higher than for
those taken to MPs (43%).

5.9 Role of Community Development Councils

Community Development Councils (CDCs) have been established as part of the


National Solidarity Program as elected community development governance bodies
in rural areas. CDCs currently cover 23,180 rural communities, accounting for 72
percent of villages4 across Afghanistan, with plans to achieve full national coverage
over time. The role of CDCs is defined in a specific bylaw to provide the “social and
development foundation at community level, responsible for implementation and
supervision of development projects and liaison between the communities and gov-
4
Source: Information provided by National Solidarity Program (NSP), Afghanistan (September 2009)
Government 81

ernment and non-government organizations.” Current government policy indicates


that CDCs are likely to play the role of Village Councils provided for in the Afghan
Constitution until appropriate legislation is passed and elections are held to formally
constitute such bodies.

The survey attempted to measure public awareness and views about CDCs. Respon-
dents received a brief explanation about CDCs and were then asked whether they
are aware of such institutions in their neighborhood. Forty-four percent of the re-
spondents say they are aware of a CDC in their area, while just over half (51%) say
they are not. As CDCs operate essentially in rural areas, awareness is more than twice
as high amongst rural respondents (49%) as amongst urban dwellers (23%). More-
over, across the country as a whole, awareness of CDCs has been steadily rising in
recent years. Although only around a third of respondents said they were aware of
CDCs in 2006 (37%) and 2007 (32%), the figure is close to half (44%) in 2009.

Are you aware of an institution called a Community Development Council formed in your neighbor-
hood/settlement? (Q-91) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

70%
63%
58%
60%
53% 51%
50%
42% 44%
37%
40%
32%
30%

20%

10%

0%
Yes, I am aware of CDC No, I am not aware of CDC

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 5.18
The level of public awareness of CDCs varies between regions, which is to be ex-
pected as the program has not yet covered the entire country. The majority of re-
spondents say they are aware of a CDC in their local area in the East (57%) and
North West (50%), however, this is true for only around a third of respondents in
the South West (36%) and Central/Hazarajat (33%) regions.
82 Afghanistan in 2009

Are you aware of an institution called a Community Development Council formed in your neigh-
borhood/settlement? (Q-91, Base 6406) BY REGION

70%
59% 59%
60% 57% 56%
56% 48% 50%
48% 48% 45% 45%
50%
40% 40%
38%
40% 36% 33%
30%
20%
5% 5% 6% 8%
10% 4%
3% 1% 3%
0%
Central/ South Eastern North North Western South Central/
Kabul East East West Western Hazarajat

Yes, aware of CDC in the neighborhood/settlement


No, not aware of CDC in the neighborhood/settlement
Don't know

Fig 5.19

Respondents who are aware of a CDC in their neighborhood (44% of all respon-
dents) were also asked to indicate which social groups are members of the CDC. A
list of groups was read out and respondents were asked to say whether these groups
are represented on the CDC in their area. Traditional local leaders are most often
mentioned as members of CDCs. Around three-quarters of respondents say that
elders of the local shura/jirga (77%) or a local Malik/Khan (71%) are members.
Around half also mention other influential members of the community such as
mullahs (56%) and local teachers (48%). A third say local commanders (32%) are
members. However, a significant proportion of respondents also indicate that their
local CDC includes representation of less powerful social groups such as ordinary
farmers (45%), shopkeepers (40%) and landless agricultural workers (36%). Around
a quarter (27%) of respondents say that women are represented on their local CDC.
Just under a quarter (23%) mention public officials from the municipality or district
administration amongst the members of their local CDC. These findings are broadly
similar to those in 2007 and 2008.
Government 83

Table 5.9: Percentage of the people who think that there is a representation of various groups in
the Council (Q-92a-k, Base 2796)

Representation
Group
(%)
Elders of the local shura/jirga 77
Local Malik/Khan 71
Mullah 56
Local teacher 48
Ordinary farmers 45
Shopkeepers 40
Landless agricultural workers 36
Local commanders 32
Women 27
Officials from municipal/district administration 23
Doctor 19

These same respondents were also asked about their level of satisfaction with the job
their local CDC is doing. Overall, more than three quarters of respondents (78%) say
they are satisfied with the performance of their local CDC, including a third (32%)
who are very satisfied. Only around one in five (19%) respondents express some level
of dissatisfaction. This finding is also largely similar to those of 2007 and 2008.

How satisfied are you with the job this Community Development Council is doing? (Q-93,
Base 2796)

50%
46%

40%
32%
30%

20%
11% 8%
10%
2%
0%
Very satisfied Somewhat Somewhat Very Don't know
satisfied dissatisfied dissatisfied

Fig 5.20
Respondents were asked whether they think the CDC is capable of representing
their interests before the provincial authorities and the Government of Afghanistan.
84 Afghanistan in 2009

About four-fifths (81%) say that their CDC is capable to represent their interests
before the provincial authorities, while just under two thirds (62%) say it is capable to
do so before the national government. Confidence in the representative capabilities
of CDCs in relation to provincial authorities has not changed since 2008, however,
a much smaller proportion judge their CDC capable of representing their interests
at the national level in 2009 (62%) than in 2008 (82%) when respondents judged the
CDC equally capable to represent them at the provincial and national levels. This
may indicate that in 2009, which is an election year at the provincial level, respon-
dents are making a clearer distinction between the different levels of government
and their functions than they have done in the past.

Still speaking of the same Community Development Council, to what extent do you think this
Council is capable to represent your interests before the Provincial authorities? (Q-94a)
AND … To what extent do you think this Council is capable to represent your interests before the
Government of Afghanistan? (Q-94b) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2008 AND 2009
60%
56%
51%
50%
50%

39%
40%
31%
30%
30% 26%
23% 23%

20%
11%
10% 11%
10% 7%
4% 5% 6%

0%
Very Capable Somewhat capable Not so capable Not capable at all

Provincial Authority level 2008 Provincial Authority level 2009


Government of Afghanistan level 2008 Government of Afghanistan level 2009

Fig 5.21
Justice System 85

6 Justice System

6.1 The formal and informal justice system in Afghanistan

In the last few years the Afghan Government, with the help of the international
community, has sought to strengthen the formal judicial system and establish the
rule of law. However, a significant proportion of the Afghan population continues
to rely on informal tribal or traditional systems of justice to address issues of crime
or resolve disputes. In 2009, the survey again attempted to examine public percep-
tions of both formal and informal justice mechanisms and the recourse people have
to them for reporting and redressing crime and for dispute resolution.

6.2 Perceptions of state courts

To examine public perceptions of state courts a series of statements related to the


qualities and performance of these institutions was read out and respondents were
asked to say whether they agree or disagree. Levels of agreement with each of the
statements are shown in the table below.

Table 6.1: Public’s agreement or disagreement with various statements about state courts (Q-95
a-f, Base 6406)

Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly


Agree Somewhat Somewhat Disagree
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) State Courts are accessible to me. 20 48 20 9
b) State Courts are fair and trusted. 11 39 33 13
c) State Courts are not corrupt compared
11 36 34 14
to other options of settling a dispute.
d) State Courts follow the local norms and
12 37 32 14
values of our people.
e) State Courts are effective at delivering
15 36 30 15
justice.
f) State Courts resolve cases timely and
12 28 32 23
promptly.

The most positive assessment of state courts relates to accessibility. The survey
shows that over two-thirds (68%) of respondents feel that state courts are accessible
to them, including one fifth (20%) who agree strongly with this statement. However,
29 percent do not feel that they can access state courts easily. More urban dwellers
86 Afghanistan in 2009

agree that state courts are accessible to them (76%) than their rural counterparts
(66%), and more men (73%) than women (63%) say the same.

Do you agree or disagree with “State courts are accessible to me”? (Q-95a, Base 6406) BY GEN-
DER AND SETTLEMENT
60%
51% 51%
45% 47%
50%

40%
25%
30%
22% 23% 21%
19% 18% 19% 17%
20%
11%
7% 10% 6%
10%

0%
Male Female Rural Urban

Strongly agree Agree somewhat Disagree somewhat Strongly disagree

Fig 6.1

The proportion of respondents who say that state courts are accessible to them also
rises with level of education. Only 65 percent of respondents who never went to
school agree with this statement as compared to around 70 percent who attended
secondary school and 80 percent who completed secondary or higher education.

Around half of respondents agree that state courts are fair and trusted (50%), follow
the local norms and values of the people (49%), and are effective at delivering justice
(51%). Respondents in urban areas tend to have a more positive assessment of state
courts than those in rural areas.

Opinion is almost equally divided about whether state courts are not corrupt com-
pared to other options for settling disputes. Just under half (47%) of respondents
agree with this statement, and almost the same proportion (48%) disagree. This is
consistent with the finding that around half (51%) of those who have had contacts
with the judiciary and courts in the past year report having encountered some in-
stance of corruption (see Chapter 5, 5.5: Corruption, Table 5.4).

However, only 40 percent of respondents agree that state courts resolve cases timely
and promptly. The majority (55%) disagree with this statement, including around a
quarter (23%) who strongly disagree. Indeed, respondents show the greatest levels of
dissatisfaction with this aspect of the performance of state courts.
Justice System 87

Respondents in the North West, East and Central/Kabul regions consistently give
a more positive assessment of state courts across all domains, whereas the lowest
levels of satisfaction are recorded in the South West.

The high level of ambivalence about the performance of state courts with regard to
their fairness, honesty, effectiveness and timeliness is consistent with the relatively
low level of trust respondents report in the state justice system compared to other
public institutions (see Chapter 2, 2.6: Confidence in specific institutions and organizations,
Table 2.3).

Satisfaction with the performance of state courts in all these areas has fallen since 2007,
however, there have been no substantial shifts in opinion between 2008 and 2009.

Table 6.2: Proportion of those who agree with the following statements about state courts (Q-95a-f)
COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

Agree
2007 2008 2009
(%) (%) (%)
a) State Courts are accessible to me 78 68 68
b) State Courts are fair and trusted 58 50 50
c) State Courts are not corrupt compared to other op-
56 47 47
tions of settling a dispute
d) State Courts follow the local norms and values of
57 50 49
our people
e) State Courts are effective at delivering justice 58 52 51
f) State Courts resolve cases timely and promptly 51 38 40

Respondents were also asked: “If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act,
how much confidence would you have that the governmental law-enforcing organi-
zations and judicial system would punish the guilty party?” Over half of respondents
(57%) say they would have a significant level of confidence in the formal justice
system to do this, while 41 percent say they would have little or no confidence in-
cluding 18 percent who say they would have no confidence at all. This reveals that a
sizeable proportion of the population does not believe that the state’s formal justice
system is able to bring the guilty party to justice. This finding mirrors those of 2007
and 2008.
88 Afghanistan in 2009

If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that
the governmental law-enforcing organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party?
(Q-25, Base 6406)

50%
41%
40%

30%
16% 23% 18%
20%

10%
2%
0%
A great deal of A fair amount of Not very much No confidence at Don't know
confidence confidence confidence all

Fig 6.2

Confidence in the formal justice system is particularly low in the South East, West
and South West where around half of respondents have little or no confidence that
state law enforcing organizations and the judicial system would punish the guilty
party. These are also the regions which report the highest levels of insecurity (see
Chapter 3, 3.1 Security Situation) which suggests the poor capacity of the state to en-
force the rule of law in these areas.

If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that
the governmental law-enforcing organizations and judicial systems would punish the guilty party?
(Q-25, Base 6406) BY REGION
50%
44% 43% 45%
41% 39%
40% 36% 37%
34%
30% 31% 32% 25%
30%
19% 21% 21% 20% 21% 17% 19% 16%
17% 18% 21% 18% 16% 19%
20% 16% 17%
14%
10% 10% 9%
10%

0%
Central/ South East North North West South Central/
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat

A great deal of confidence A fair amount of confidence


Not very much confidence No confidence at all

Fig 6.3
Justice System 89

6.3 Perceptions of local shura and jirga

To assess the differences between perceptions of formal and informal justice mech-
anisms, respondents were asked about the quality and performance of local jirga and
shura in the same way they had been asked about state courts. Levels of agreement
with each of the statements are summarized in the table below.

Table 6.3: Public’s agreement or disagreement with various statements about the local shura/jirga
(Q-96a-e, Base 6406)

Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly


Agree Somewhat Somewhat Disagree
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Local jirga/ shura are accessible to me. 35 44 13 5
b) Local jirga/ shura are fair and trusted. 24 48 20 5
c) Local jirga/ shura follow the local norms
25 45 21 5
and values of our people.
d) Local jirga/ shura are effective at
25 44 21 7
delivering justice.
e) Local jirga/ shura resolve cases timely and
24 40 23 9
promptly.

As with state courts, local jirga and shura are assessed most positively regarding their
accessibility. More than three-quarters (79%) of respondents agree that shura/jirga
are accessible to them. Also like state courts, more men (84%) than women (74%)
say local shura/jirga are accessible to them. However, unlike the courts, more rural
respondents (81%) agree with this statement than urban residents (76%).

Do you agree or disagree with “Local jirga/shura are accessible to me”? (Q-96a, Base 6406) BY
GENDER AND SETTLEMENT
50%
44% 44% 46%
44%
40% 37%
40%
30%
30%
30%

20%
16% 15%
13%
11% 7% 6%
10%
4% 5%

0%
Male Female Rural Urban

Strongly agree Agree somewhat Disagree somewhat Strongly disagree

Fig 6.4
90 Afghanistan in 2009

Over two-thirds of respondents agree that local shura/jirga are fair and trusted
(72%), follow the local norms and values of the people (70%) and are effective at
delivering justice (69%). All of these figures are considerably higher than those re-
corded for state courts, where between 50 and 60 percent of respondents agree with
these statements. If urban residents have more positive views toward state courts,
rural residents give more positive assessments of local shura/jirga. There are also
differences between regions. More than four-fifths (84%) of respondents in the
North West say that local shura/jirga are fair and trusted, compared with less than
two thirds who say the same in the West (64%) and South West (65%).

Do you agree or disagree with “Local jirga/shura are fair and trusted”? (Q-96b, Base 6406) BY
REGION
60%
54%
48% 50% 50% 48%
50% 47% 45%
44%
40%
34%
27% 29% 27%
30% 24%
24% 24%
20% 21%
19% 18% 18% 16% 18% 18%
20%
11% 6%
6% 8%
10%
4% 3% 4% 4%
2%
0%
Central/ South East North North West South Central/
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat

Strongly agree Agree somewhat


Disagree somewhat Strongly disagree

Fig 6.5

As with state courts, assessments of local shura/jirga are least positive with regard
to their timeliness and promptness. Around two-thirds (64%) of respondents agree
that local jirga/shura resolve cases promptly. However, this is significantly higher
than the proportion who say the same about state courts (40%).

Since 2007, positive assessments of local jirga/shura have fallen slightly, although
responses in 2009 show some improvement in the public’s assessment of the tradi-
tional justice system compared to 2008.
Justice System 91

Table 6.4: Proportion of those who agree with the following statements about local jirga and shura
(Q-96a-e, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

Agree
2007 2008 2009
(%) (%) (%)
a) Local jirga, shura are accessible to me 83 76 79
b) Local jirga, shura are fair and trusted 78 70 72
c) Local jirga, shura follow the local norms and values of
76 69 70
our people
d) Local jirga, shura are effective at delivering justice 76 69 69
e) Local jirga, shura resolve cases timely and promptly 72 59 64

The table below compares people’s assessments of state courts and shura/jirga. On
all five counts the traditional justice system is seen to fare better than the modern
state justice system. In addition, although positive assessment of both the formal
and informal justice systems have declined since 2007, the drop in satisfaction has
been more severe regarding the performance of state courts than it has for shura
and jirga.

Table 6.5: Percentage of the people who agree (combination of strongly agree and somewhat agree)
with respect to various statement related to state courts and jirga/shura (Q-95a-f and Q-96a-e,
Base 6406)

Agree
State Court Shura/Jirga
(%) (%)
a) Are accessible to me. 68 79
b) Are fair and trusted. 50 72
c) Follow the local norms and values of our people. 49 70
d) Are effective at delivering justice. 51 69
e) Resolve cases timely and promptly. 40 64

Overall, these results demonstrate that many Afghans continue to view traditional
dispute resolution mechanisms such as jirga and shura more positively than the mod-
ern formal justice system such as state courts. These findings corroborate the higher
levels of public confidence recorded for shura and jirga (67% confidence) than for
the state justice system (46% confidence) (see Chapter 2, 2.6: Confidence in specific institu-
tions and organizations, Table 2.3).
92 Afghanistan in 2009

However, a poor assessment of state courts does not automatically imply a posi-
tive assessment of traditional justice mechanisms. Respondents who give a positive
assessment of state courts often give a similarly positive assessment of local jirga/
shura in the same domains. For example, the North West region records the most
positive assessments of both formal and informal justice mechanisms. This suggests
that people do not see formal and informal justice mechanisms as rival institutions
but rather take them both as possible options for accessing justice.

6.4 Dispute resolution

In addition to examining perceptions of formal and informal justice mechanisms in


dealing with crime, the survey sought to examine public opinion of these same insti-
tutions in terms of resolving disputes within communities. Respondents were asked
whether, in the past two years, they had a dispute or a formal case that they could
not settle with another party and had to go to a state court or village/neighborhood
based shura/jirga to resolve it. Around one in six respondents (16%) report having
taken a dispute for resolution to one of these bodies.

A higher proportion of men (20%) than women (10%) report taking a dispute for
formal resolution. Likewise, more rural (18%) than urban (7%) residents report do-
ing so. A significantly higher proportion of respondents in the South East (29%),
East (22%), West (22%) and South West (21%) say they took a dispute to one of
these bodies for resolution than those living in other regions.

In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn’t settle with the other
party and had to go to a state court or village/neighborhood based shura/jirga to resolve it? (Q-97,
Base 6406) BY REGION

100%
91% 89%
85% 77% 81%
78% 75%
80%
70%

60%

40%
29%
22% 22% 21% 15%
20%
8% 11% 8%

0%
Central South East North North West South Central
Kabul East East West West Hazarjat

Yes No

Fig 6.6
Justice System 93

Respondents who had taken disputes for resolution (16% of all respondents) were
then asked where they had taken their case. Just under half (47%) say they took the
case to a shura or jirga, while 38 percent say a state court. One in ten (10%) report
taking their case to both institutions. Results in 2009 show that since 2007 the pro-
portion of respondents taking cases to state courts has fallen (from 46% to 38%),
whereas those taking cases to shura and jirga has risen (from 43% to 47%).

Table 6.6: Where have you taken this case or dispute? (Q-98, Base 997) COMPARISON
BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%)
State Court 46 39 38
Village, neighborhood based Shura/Jirga 43 42 47
Both 10 17 10

Respondents living in urban areas tend to go to state courts (46%), while the largest
proportion of those living in rural areas go to local shura or jirga (48%). Recourse to
state courts is highest in the Central/Hazarajat region where more than two thirds
(69%) of respondents say they used these to resolve disputes. More respondents also
took disputes to state courts than to informal dispute resolution mechanisms in the
West (48%) and North West (46%). On the other hand, the majority of respondents
say they took their disputes to jirga or shura for resolution in the South West (60%),
Central/Kabul (56%) and East (52%).

In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn’t settle with the
other party and had to go to a state court or village/neighborhood based shura/jirga to resolve
it? (YES responses).
Where have you taken this case or dispute? (Q-98, Base 997) BY REGION
80%
69%
70%
56% 60%
60%
47% 52%
46% 48%
50%
38% 42% 42% 37% 39%
40%
31% 33%
27%
30%
17% 22%
20%
9% 7% 13% 8% 6%
6% 8%
10%
0%
Centra/ South East North North West South Centra/
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat

State Court Village, neighborhood based Shura/Jirga Both

Fig 6.7
94 Afghanistan in 2009

Respondents who have taken their case to a state court (8% of all respondents) were
asked a follow-up question regarding their use of professional legal services. More
than half (52%) report that they pleaded their case alone or were helped by friends
or relatives. Only 39 percent say they used the professional legal services of a lawyer.
Even though the proportion of those who used legal services is small, it has grown
significantly since 2007 (35%) and 2008 (22%).

When taking a case to a state court or being a party in settling case in a state court, have you used
any professional legal services (from a lawyer) or you pleaded your case alone or helped by friends/
relatives? (Q-99, Base 483)

60%
52%
50%
39%
40%

30%

20%
8%
10%
1%
0%
Professional legal Alone/ helped by Both Don't Know
services friends, relatives

Fig 6.8

Wherever they had taken their case, respondents were asked what kind of case or
dispute they had taken for resolution. More than half of cases are disputes over land
(52%) which is by far the most common cause of contention. Property disputes
other than land are the second most common cause (11%), followed by commercial
disputes (8%) and physical assault (8%).
Justice System 95

In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn’t settle with the other
party and had to go to a state court or village/neighborhood based shura/jirga to resolve it? (YES
responses).
What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Q-100, Base 997)

60%
52%
50%
40%
30%
20%
11% 8% 8% 5%
6% 5%
10%
0%
Dispute Other Commercial Physical Robbery / Murder Don't Know
over land property dispute assault burglary
dispute, not
land

Fig 6.9

Since 2007, disputes over land have consistently been the most common kind of
dispute taken for resolution. However, there is a slight downward trend in the pro-
portion of respondents approaching dispute resolution mechanisms with matters of
an essentially criminal nature that could be dealt with by the police, such as physical
assault (from 10% in 2007 to 8% in 2009), robbery/burglary (from 9% in 2007 to
6% in 2009) and pick-pocketing (from 2% in 2007 to 1% in 2009). The exception to
this is murder which concerns around 5% of cases taken for dispute resolution.

Table 6.7: What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Q-100) COMPARISON BETWEEN
2007, 2008 AND 2009

2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%)
Dispute over land 48 47 52
Other property dispute, not land 14 9 11
Commercial dispute 9 7 8
Physical assault 10 12 8
Robbery / burglary 9 8 6
Murder 4 5 5
Don’t know 0 4 5
Divorce 4 6 3
Pick-pocketing 2 1 1
96 Afghanistan in 2009

The data also reveals is that there is no substantive difference between the kinds of
cases taken to state courts and shura/jirga. Slightly more respondents have gone to
state courts (56%) than to shura/jirga (54%) to resolve disputes over land, whereas
more respondents have gone to state courts (10%) than local shura/jirga (7%) to
resolve commercial disputes. Where such problems are taken to a dispute resolution
body, informal justice system seems to be preferred for resolving cases of robbery
or burglary (7% are taken to shura/jirga compared to 4% to state courts) and physi-
cal assault (10% taken to shura/jirga compared to 7% taken to state courts).

Table 6.8: What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Q-100, Base 997) BY PLACE WHERE
CASE OR DISPUTE WAS TAKEN

State Court Shura/Jirga


(%) (%)
Dispute over land 56 54
Other property dispute, not land 10 10
Commercial dispute 10 7
Divorce 4 3
Pick-pocketing 1 1
Robbery / burglary 4 7
Physical assault 7 10
Murder 5 4

Finally, respondents who have referred a dispute for resolution to either formal or
informal institutions (16% of all respondents) were asked whether they are satis-
fied with the outcome of the proceedings. Half of respondents (50%) say they are
satisfied while a third (33%) say they are not. These figures show a fall in satisfac-
tion since 2007 when 59 percent of respondents said they were satisfied with the
outcome of their case. There has been no change since 2008.

Levels of satisfaction are slightly higher amongst respondents who have taken
cases to local shura/jirga (55%) than those who have taken their case to the
state courts (51%).

The highest levels of satisfaction are reported in the East (69%). Also, the majority
of respondents say they are satisfied with the outcome of their cases in the Central/
Kabul (55%), South East (50%), West (49%), South West (50%) and Central/Haz-
arajat (50%). It is interesting to note that in most of these regions more people take
their cases to local shura or jirga for resolution than to state courts. Only in the West
and the Central/Hazarajat do more people use formal rather than informal dispute
resolution mechanisms.
Justice System 97

However, results in 2009 show that over time the proportion of respondents who
report being satisfied with the outcomes of cases taken to shura/jirga continues
to fall (from 67% in 2007 and 65% in 2008, to 55% in 2009), whereas those who
say they are not satisfied has almost doubled between 2007 (16%) and 2009 (30%).
Indeed, the difference in levels of satisfaction between the outcomes of cases taken
to formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms is much smaller now than in
previous years.

Table 6.9: Were you satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings? (Q-101) BY PLACE
WHERE CASE OR DISPUTE WAS TAKEN (COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007,
2008 AND 2009)

2007 2008 2009


Satisfaction with State Shura/ State Shura/ State Shura/
outcomes Court Jirga Court Jirga Court Jirga
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Yes 56 67 36 65 51 55
No 27 16 42 18 38 30
Not finished yet 17 13 17 9 9 10
98 AFGHANISTAN IN 2009
Democratic Values 99

7 Democratic Values

7.1 Perceptions of democracy

Afghan political actors and the international community have worked towards re-
storing democratic government in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
For this reason, since 2004, the survey has sought to examine how Afghans under-
stand and perceive democracy and how these perceptions are changing over time.

In order to ascertain whether Afghans think they will gain any perceptible ben-
efits from the introduction of democracy to the country, respondents were asked
to identify the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will bring them
personally. They were allowed to mention more than one response. Half (50%) of
respondents mention freedom and 41 percent say peace as the greatest personal
benefits they expect from democracy. These responses highlight the expectation of
many Afghans that the consolidation of democracy will end war, conflict and inse-
curity. They also indicate that public perceptions of the success of the democratic
system are closely related to its ability to ensure freedom and peace.

Significant numbers of respondents also mention aspects of good governance and


the rule of law as benefits they expect to gain from democracy. These include rights
and law (24%), women’s right (21%), government of the people (19%) and less
corruption (17%). Nearly a quarter (23%) specifically mention Islamic democracy,
highlighting the importance respondents place on the integration of democratic
practices and values with other core values in Afghan society. A small proportion of
respondents mention material benefits such as prosperity (15%).

What, if anything, is the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will bring you
personally? (Percentages based on multiple responses) (Q-54, Base 6406)

60%
50%
50%
41%
40%

30%
24% 23%
21% 19% 17%
20%

10%

0%
Freedom Peace Rights and Islamic Women’s Government Less
law democracy rights of the corruption
people

Fig 7.1
100 Afghanistan in 2009

Although peace and freedom have consistently been the most commonly mentioned
benefits of democracy identified by survey respondents, a significantly higher pro-
portion mention these in 2009 than in previous years, indicating that these issues
have gained greater importance for Afghans in the last year. Indeed, the proportion
of respondents who mention peace as the most important benefit of democracy has
increased from 34 percent in 2007, 35 percent in 2008 to 41 percent in 2009. The
proportion who have mentioned freedom has moved up from 30 percent in 2007 to
50 percent in 2009. Responses in 2009 also appear to reverse the trend of the last few
years with people giving greater importance in this year’s survey to core democratic
values such as rights and law, women’s rights and Islamic democracy, but showing
less confidence in the likelihood of democracy delivering more tangible benefits
such as less corruption or prosperity.

What, if anything, is the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will bring you
personally? (Percentages based on multiple responses) (Q-54) COMPARISON BETWEEN
2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

60%
50%
50%
41% 41%
40% 37% 34%
33% 35%
30% 33%
31%
30% 29%
23%24% 22% 23% 23%
21% 22% 22%
19% 23% 21%
19% 17% 19%
19% 16%
20% 16% 17%
16%
15%

10%

0%
Freedom Peace Rights and Islamic Women’s Government Less Prosperity
law democracy rights of the people corruption
2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 7.2

Respondents were then presented with some general statements about democracy
and asked to give their views. The first statement said: “Democracy may have its
problems, but it is better than any other form of government”. Over three-quarters
(78%) of respondents say they agree with this statement, including almost a third
(31%) who agree strongly, while only around one in seven (16%) disagree. This
closely matches the findings in 2008.

More women (81%) agree with this statement than men (76%). Agreement is also
slightly higher in the younger age ranges than amongst older peoples (80% amongst
Democratic Values 101

those aged 18-24 compared to 76% amongst those aged over 55). More urban dwell-
ers (83%) than rural residents (77%) agree. There are also significant differences
between regions. More than four out of five respondents say that democracy is the
best available form of government in the North West (86%), Central/Kabul (83%)
and North East (82%) regions. However, almost a quarter say they disagree in the
South East (24%), East (22%) and South West (22%).

Respondents were then asked for their reaction to the statement: “Politicians seek
power for their own benefit and don’t worry about helping people”. Three quar-
ters of respondents (75%) also agree with this statement, including 41 percent who
strongly agree.

Since 2006, there has been a clear drop in the proportion of respondents who agree
that democracy is the best form of government available (from 84% in 2006 to 78%
in 2009). The proportion of respondents who say that politicians only serve their own
interests has also declined, but to a much smaller degree (from 79% in 2006 to 75% in
2009). Thus, while responses indicate falling confidence in democracy as a system, the
decline in confidence seems to be more closely related to the inability of the system to
fulfill the expectations of Afghan citizens in delivering the desired benefits.

Table 7.1: Proportion of those who agree (combination of strongly agree and somewhat agree)
with the following statements about democracy (Q-80a-b) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006,
2007, 2008 AND 2009

Agree
2006 2007 2008 2009
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Democracy may have its problems, but it is
84 85 76 78
better than any other form of government.
b) Politicians seek power for their own benefit
79 79 76 75
and don’t worry about helping people.

The growing disenchantment with the democratic system is further demonstrated


by respondents’ answers to the direct question asking how satisfied or dissatisfied
they are with the way democracy works in Afghanistan. More than two-thirds of
respondents (68%) say that they are satisfied, including one fifth (20%) who are very
satisfied. However, over a quarter (28%) are either somewhat or very dissatisfied.

Again, since 2006 there has been a steady fall in the proportion of respondents who
say they are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (from 76% in
2006, to 73% in 2007 and 68% in 2008 and 2009). This has been accompanied by a
corresponding rise in those who say they are dissatisfied (from 21% in 2006 to 25%
in 2007 to 27% in 2008 and 28% in 2009).
102 Afghanistan in 2009

Table 7.2: On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in
Afghanistan? (Q-81) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2006 2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%) (%)
Very satisfied 21 18 15 20
Fairly Satisfied 55 55 53 48
Not very satisfied 15 16 16 17
Not at all satisfied 6 9 11 11

Again, satisfaction is higher amongst women (72%) than men (63%), amongst those
aged 18-24 (70%) compared to those over 55 (65%) and amongst urban dwellers (74%)
as compared to rural residents (65%). This closely mirrors attitudes related to democ-
racy as the best available form of government. Satisfaction with the way democracy is
working in the country is also highest in the North West (80%), followed by the North
East (75%) and East (74%). The proportion of respondents reporting dissatisfaction
is highest in the South East (43%), South West (43%) and West (32%) of the country.
These are also the regions where insecurity is identified as a major local problem (See
Chapter 2, 2.5 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: Local level), and therefore where the expected
benefits of democracy such as peace and freedom are least evident.

7.2 Attitudes toward democratic principles, processes and political activities

The survey endeavored to assess public attitudes regarding a number of fundamen-


tal principles associated with democratic governance. A series of statements was
read out and respondents were asked to say whether they agree or disagree with
them. A summary of responses is presented in the table below.

Table 7.3: Public agreement or disagreement with various democratic principles (Q-58a,b&e, Base
6406)

Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly


agree somewhat somewhat disagree
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) It is a good thing that the government should allow
38 39 12 6
peaceful opposition
b) Everyone should have equal rights under the law,
regardless of their gender, ethnicity or religion 49 31 13 4

e) The government should include representatives from


all major regions and ethnic groups in the country 48 33 13 3
Democratic Values 103

More than four-fifths of respondents (81%) agree with the statement: “The govern-
ment should include representatives from all major regions and ethnic groups in the
country”. However, levels of support for this statement vary significantly between
regions. Over four in five respondents agree with this statement in the North West
(88%), Central/Kabul (84%) and South East (84%) regions, whereas around a quar-
ter of respondents in the West (23%) and South West (23%) disagree. There is no
significant difference in views between different ethnic groups.

A similar proportion (80%) agree with the statement: “Everyone should have equal
rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, or religion”. Interestingly,
slightly more men (81%) than women (79%) say they agree with this statement.
However, there are more significant differences in views between ethnic groups.
More than four-fifths of Hazara (87%), Tajik (84%) and Uzbek (81%) respondents
agree with this statement, as compared to three-quarters of Pashtuns (75%) and
other ethnic groups (75%). On a regional level, more than four-fifths of respon-
dents agree with this statement in all regions except the South West where this is true
for just over half (59%). Moreover, 38 percent of respondents in the South West say
they disagree, which is more than twice the proportion recorded in other regions.
Overall agreement with the principle of equal rights continues to fall over time (from
90% in 2006 and 2007 to 84% in 2008 and to 80% in 2009).

More than three-quarters of respondents (77%) say they agree that: “It is a good
thing that the government should allow peaceful opposition”. Public support for
allowing peaceful opposition is highest in the Central/Kabul region (85%) and over
70 percent agree with this statement in all other regions except the Central/Hazarajat
(67%). However, levels of disagreement are highest in the East (28%) and South
East (24%), followed by the Central/Hazarajat (23%), West (21%) and South West
(21%). Here too, levels of support for allowing peaceful opposition has fallen over
the years. In 2006, 84 percent of respondents agreed with this statement. This fell to
81 percent in 2007, 78 percent in 2008 and 77 percent in 2009.

The survey also asked a number of questions related to basic democratic practices.
In this regard, respondents were asked whether political parties should be allowed
to hold meetings in their area. Just over half (54%) say that political parties should
be allowed to hold meetings, while more than a third (37%) say that they should not.
However, unlike the previous statements which show falling support for fundamen-
tal democratic values, the proportion of respondents who are in favor of allowing
key democratic processes such as local meetings of political parties increased signifi-
cantly between 2008 (44%) and 2009 (54%), almost reaching the level recorded in
2006 (57%) (the year that followed election years in 2004 and 2005). This is accom-
104 Afghanistan in 2009

panied by a corresponding fall in opposition to local political party meetings (from


47% in 2007 to 43% in 2008 and 37% in 2009).

Do you think that political parties should be allowed to hold meetings in your area? (Q -55) COM-
PARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

60% 57%
54%
46% 47%
50%
44% 43%
39%
40% 37%

30%

20%
12%
10% 9%
4% 6%

0%
Yes No Don't know
2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 7.3

Respondents were also asked whether they think that all political parties, even the
ones most people do not like, should be allowed to hold meetings in their area. Only
a third (34%) of respondents say this should be the case, while the majority (57%)
disagree. Here too, responses in 2009 reverse the trend that was seen in previous
years with more respondents than ever expressing support for this idea. Agreement
fell from 32 percent in 2006 to 31 percent in 2007 and 29 percent in 2008, but rose
to 34 percent in 2009. Support for allowing the activity of all political parties is high-
est in the East (42%), but lowest in the North West (28%), North East (27%) and
South East (30%).

Responses to this question are also influenced by level of education. While 32 per-
cent of those who never went to school agree with this statement, this rises to 38
percent of respondents who have completed tenth grade or beyond.

Finally, the survey sought to ascertain whether differences in political party affiliation
could have an impact on interpersonal relationships. Respondents were asked: “Sup-
pose a friend of yours supported a party you do not like. Would you accept that, or
would it end your friendship?” Just under half (48%) of respondents say they would
accept the situation while 40 percent say that this would end the friendship.
Democratic Values 105

A clear majority of respondents in the East (66%) and South West (58%) say they
would accept such a difference in opinion, whereas the majority in the North East
(56%) say that this would end their friendship.

Over time, acceptance of differences in political allegiances between individuals has


been declining. Those who say they would accept such a situation has fallen from the
majority in 2006 (54%) and 2007 (54%) to 48 percent in 2009, whereas those who
say this would end their friendship has risen from 38 percent in 2006 to 40 percent
in 2009.

Suppose a friend of yours supported a party you don’t like. Would you accept that, or would it end
your friendship? (Q-57) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

60%
54% 54%
48%
50%
44% 42%
38% 37% 40%
40%

30%

20%
13%
8% 9%
10%
6%

0%
Would end friendship Would accept it Don't know
2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 7.4

7.3 Personal efficacy: Influence of individuals on government

The survey sought to measure the degree of influence people think they can have
over government decisions. More than half (56%) of respondents feel they can have
a significant degree of influence over government decisions, while more than a third
(38%) say they do not have much influence, including a fifth of respondent (21%)
who say they have no influence at all.

The results of the 2009 survey are close to the figures recorded in 2006 and 2007
However, they do show a small but significant trend towards greater confidence in
personal efficacy over time. The proportion of respondents who say they can have
106 Afghanistan in 2009

“some” influence over government decisions has been rising steadily (from 35% in
2006 to 42% in 2009). Similarly, the proportions who say they have very little or no
influence have been falling.

How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions? (Q-63)
COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009
50%
42%
40% 41%
40%
35%

30% 27%
25%
22% 21% 21% 21%
17%
20%
14% 15% 15%
12% 13%

10%

0%
A lot Some Very little None at all

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 7.5

Respondents in rural areas are still less likely to say they can influence decision mak-
ing (54%) than urban residents (60%). Similarly, as has been noted in previous years,
confidence in personal efficacy rises with level of education. Just over half (54%) of
respondents who have never been to school say they can have some level of influ-
ence on government decisions, but this rises to around 60 percent amongst those
who have completed some degree of secondary education. However, there is no
significant difference between men (56%) and women (55%) in their perceptions of
their ability to influence government decisions.

The highest levels of confidence in the ability to influence government decisions are
recorded in the East where two thirds of respondents (66%) say they can have some
level of influence, whereas only 42 percent of respondents say this in the South East.
On the other hand, more than half (55%) of respondents in the South East say they
have little or no influence on government decisions, including almost a third (29%)
who say they can have no influence at all.
Democratic Values 107

How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions? (Q-63,
Base 6406) BY REGION

60%

50% 47%
45% 44%
41% 41% 39%
40% 37%
32% 29%
26% 25% 26%
30% 23% 13% 21% 21% 22%
14% 19% 17%
15% 20% 17%
20% 16%
13% 15% 15% 13% 13% 13%
10% 9%
10%

0%
Central/ South Eastern North North Western South Central/
Kabul East East West Western Hazarajat

A lot Some Very little None at all

Fig 7.6

7.4 Attitudes toward elections

The survey also attempted to assess people’s sense of efficacy to influence public
decision-making specifically through the electoral process. Respondents were asked
whether they think that voting can lead to improvements in the future or whether
they believe no matter how one votes things will never change. More than two-thirds
(70%) say that voting can change things, while just over one-fifth (22%) say that
things are not going to get better regardless of how they vote.

Although there has been a steady decline in the proportion of people who have con-
fidence in the efficacy of their vote between 2006 and 2008, results in 2009 reveal a
certain renewed confidence in the electoral process. While three-quarters (75%) of
respondents said they believe that voting can change things in 2006, this had fallen to
72 percent in 2007 and around two-thirds (65%) in 2008. However, in 2009 the figure
rose again to 70 percent of respondents who say that voting can lead to improvements
in the future. This may be a reflection of the fact that 2009 is an election year. This
finding is also consistent with the slight increase in positive assessments of the perfor-
mance of the central government and the parliament recorded in 2009 (see Chapter 5,
5.1 Performance of National Government & 5.6 Role of elected representative bodies).
108 Afghanistan in 2009

Do you think that voting can lead to improvement in the future or do you believe that no matter
how one votes, things never change? (Q-77) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008
AND 2009
90%
80% 75% 72%
65% 70%
70%
60%
50%
40%
24% 24%
30%
22% 22%
20%
4% 10% 7%
10% 3%
0%
Voting can change things Things are not going to get Don't know
better
2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 7.7

Attitudes in this regard vary between regions. The highest levels of confidence on
voting are in the North East and North West where around 80 percent of respon-
dents think that voting can change things. This is also true for 75 percent of respon-
dents in the East and 72 percent in the Central/Kabul region. However, just over
half (55%) of respondents in the South West believe in the efficacy of voting to
bring about improvement.

Do you think that voting can lead to improvement in the future or do you believe that no matter how
one votes, things never change? (Q-77, Base 6406) BY REGION
90%
75% 81% 80%
80%
72% 63% 66%
70%
60% 55%
60%
50%
37%
40% 32%
24% 27% 18%
30%
17% 12% 12% 17%
20%
4% 8% 7% 6% 7% 9% 7%
10%
0%
Central South East North North West South Central
Kabul East East West West Hazarjat

Voting can change things Things are not going to get better Don't know

Fig 7.8
Democratic Values 109

It is interesting to note, that across almost all regions, respondents express higher
levels of confidence that voting can change things than they do in their own ability
to influence government decision-making. Only in the South West do slightly more
respondents think they can have influence (57%) than believe that voting can bring
about change (55%).

How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government decisions? (Q-63,
Base 6406) BY REGION, and
Do you think that voting can lead to improvement in the future or do you believe that no matter how
one votes, things never change? (Q-77, Base 6406) BY REGION

90%
81% 80%
80% 75%

72% 66% 66%


70% 63%
60% 54%
60% 58% 57%
55% 56% 56% 55%
52%
50% 41% 39%
42%
37% 38%
40% 36% 37%
32% 33%
31%
30% 27%
24%

20% 17% 12% 17%

12%
10%

0%
Central/ South East North North West South Central/
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat

Some or a lot of influence Voting can change things


Little or no influence Things are not going to get better

Fig 7.9

Some light may be cast on this apparent paradox by the answers to a set of further
question related to the ways in which individuals should use their vote. When re-
spondents were asked their opinion about the statement: “A person should vote the
way his or her community votes, not how they feel individually”, the majority (59%)
say they agree. Just over a third (36%) of respondents think that voting should be
based on personal preferences. More men (61%) than women (57%) agree with
this statement and agreement is also higher amongst rural (61%) than urban (55%)
respondents. More respondents over 45 (62%) agree with this statement than those
under 24 (58%). The majority of respondents agree with this statement in all regions
except the Central/Hazarajat (48%). However, support for voting according to com-
110 Afghanistan in 2009

munity preferences fell significantly between 2008 (65%) and 2009 (59%). Similarly,
only a small majority (57%) of respondents say that women should decide for them-
selves who how to vote (see Chapter 8. 8.3 Women’s political participation).

7.5 Electoral participation

The survey also sought to measure public awareness regarding the elections in Af-
ghanistan scheduled in 2009. The survey was conducted in June 2009 and the Presi-
dential and Provincial Councils elections were scheduled for August. Respondents
were asked if they are aware of the upcoming elections due to take place in the next
few months. An overwhelming majority (82%) said they were aware, but nearly one
in six respondents (16%) said they were not. Levels of awareness were higher among
men (85%) than women (78%).

Are you aware of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan in the next few months? (Q-67, Base
6406) ALL AND BY GENDER

100%
85%
82% 78%
80%

60%

40%
21%
16%
20% 12%
2% 2% 1%
0%
All Male Female

Yes No Don’t know

Fig 7.10

When people had been asked about their awareness of the 2009 elections the previ-
ous year, just over half (53%) of respondents had said they were aware. The fact that
more than four-fifths (82%) of respondents were aware of the upcoming elections
in June 2009 suggests that efforts to increase public awareness about the elections
have been largely successful.

Respondents were also asked whether they had received any information regarding the
elections or regarding their participation in the elections in the previous days or weeks.
Half (50%) of respondents said they had received such messages while just under half
Democratic Values 111

(48%) said they had not. More rural residents (51%) than urban dwellers (44%) said
they received information. Nearly two-thirds of respondents in the East (63%), and
more than half in the North West (59%) and North East (55%) reported having re-
ceived such messages. However, more than half of respondents in the Central/Kabul
(59%), South West (55%) and Central/Hazarajat (53%) regions said they had not.

Respondents who were aware of the elections were then asked to identify their main
source of electoral information. The most commonly mentioned source of infor-
mation was radio (44%) followed by TV (25%), then followed by friends, family and
neighbors (16%). Radio was the most common source of information on elections
for rural residents (49%), while most urban dwellers (61%) said they get their elec-
tion information from TV. This is also consistent with national patterns of media
usage (see Chapter 9, 9.4: Sources of information on national and local events). The Central/
Kabul region is the only region where the majority of respondents identified TV as
their main source of information. Radio remains the main source of information in
the rest of the country.

The survey also asked all respondents whether they had registered to vote in the 2009
elections. Just over three quarters (77%) of respondents said they had done so, while
around one in five (21%) said they had not. While more than four-fifths (85%) of
men said they had registered, this was true for just over two-thirds (69%) of women.
A lower proportion of respondents on higher incomes had registered to vote than
those in lower income brackets. While more than four-fifths (83%) of respondents
who earn less than 2000 Afs a month had registered, only around three-quarters
(76%) of respondents who earn more than 3,000 Afs a month had done so.

Respondents with higher levels of education were also more likely to have registered to
vote. Almost nine out of ten (89%) respondents who have completed high school and
four-fifths (81%) of those who have some level of secondary education had registered.
This fell to under three-quarters (73%) of respondents who never went to school.
112 Afghanistan in 2009

Have you registered yourself for the elections? (Q-69, Base 6406)

100%

77%
80%

60%

40%
21%
20%

1% 1%
0%
Yes No Refused Don’t know

Fig 7.11
The survey asked those respondents who said they had not registered for the elec-
tions (21% of all respondents) whether they knew where to register to vote. Only
around one in five (22%) said they did, while about three-quarters (73%) said they
did not, suggesting that lack of information about electoral procedures may still
constitute a significant reason why Afghans may have failed to register to vote. Only
half as many women (17 %) as men (31%) said they knew where to register to vote.

Respondents were then asked how likely they were to vote. Around three-quarters
(73%) said they were likely to vote, including almost half (48%) who said this was
very likely. However, one in five (20%) said they were unlikely to vote, including one
in seven (14%) who said this was very unlikely. Considerably more men (53%) than
women (41%) said they were very likely to vote. These results suggest that the dis-
parity in electoral participation between men and women that was seen in the 2004
and 2005 elections was likely to be repeated in the elections in August 2009.

How likely are you to vote in the coming elections? (Q-72, Base 6406)

60%
48%
50%

40%
25%
30%

20%
14%
6% 5%
10%
1%
0%
Very likely Somewhat Somewhat Very unlikely Refused Don't know
likely unlikely

Fig 7.12
Democratic Values 113

More than four out of five respondents said they were likely to vote in the Central/
Hazarajat (87%), East (85%), North East (83%) and North West (82%). However,
more than one in three respondents in the South West (35%) and at least one in
four in the South East (29%), Central/Kabul (27%) and West (25%) said they were
unlikely to vote.

Respondents who said they were unlikely to vote in the upcoming elections (20% of
all respondents) were then asked why this was so. A quarter of respondents (26%)
said this was because they are not interested. Security concerns (18%) were the sec-
ond most commonly cited reason.

Lack of interest was the most common reason cited by respondents in the Central/
Kabul (35%), East (23%), North East (28%), North West (33%) and West (25%),
while insecurity was the main reason identified in the South East (25%) and South
West (30%).

The proportion of respondents who report having no interest in participating in the


elections has more than doubled since 2004 (from 12% to 16% in 2005, 18% in 2008
and 26% in 2009).

More than a quarter (26%) of women who said they were unlikely to vote said this
was because they would not be permitted to vote. No men mentioned this as a reason.
More than a third (34%) of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region said that this
was the reason they were unlikely to vote making it the most frequently mentioned
reason in this region. Given that this region registered the highest level of intentions
to vote, it seems likely that it was mostly women in the Central/Hazarajat who were
excluded from the electoral process. However, just under a quarter of respondents in
the North East (23%) and Central/Kabul (22%) also said this was because they would
not be permitted to vote, more than twice as many as in the other regions.
114 Afghanistan in 2009

You said it is somewhat or very unlikely that you would vote in the upcoming elections. Why do you
say that? (Q-73a, Base 1319)
30%
26%
25%

20% 18%
15%
15%
10% 9%
10% 8% 7%
5%

0%
Not Insecurity Will not be Don't Fear of Elections Do not
interested permitted to support any intimidation wouldn’t understand
vote / candidate / make politics
women not party difference /
allowed to disillusioned
vote

Fig 7.13

Respondents who said they were likely to vote in the upcoming elections (73%
of all respondents) were then asked about their motivation for voting. More than
a quarter (28%) of respondents said it was because it is their right to vote. An-
other 22 percent said they believe voting contributes to peace, while 20 percent
expressed the desire to choose their leaders. Motivations for voting did not differ
significantly across the country.

What is the most important reason why you want to vote? (Q-73b, Base 4687)

35%
28%
30%

25%
22%
20%
20%

15%
8%
10%
6% 5%
5%

0%
It is my right To bring To choose my It will help the To bring It is my
peace leaders country prosperity / obligation as a
reconstruction citizen to vote

Fig 7.14
Democratic Values 115

Respondents were also asked whether they thought the upcoming elections would be
free and fair. Before asking this question, respondents were briefed about what the
terms ‘free’ and ‘fair’ mean in this regard. In an electoral context ‘free’ means that all
people have the chance to vote as they wish and that they are not forced to vote for
a particular party or candidate. ‘Fair’ means that all candidates and parties are given
equal access to public channels of communications, that they are not prevented from
getting their message across to voters and that votes cast are counted correctly and
results are not manipulated. Just under two-thirds (64%) of respondents said that
the upcoming elections would be free and fair, while around a fifth (22%) said they
would not. Doubts about the elections being free and fair were highest in the South
West (37%), South East (29%), Central/Kabul (25%) and West (23%).

Do you think the upcoming elections will be free and fair, or do you think they will not be free and
fair? (Q-75, Base 6406) BY REGION
80% 74%
72% 72%
70% 64%
59% 63%
60%
52% 51%
50%
37%
40%
29% 26%
30% 25%
23%
18% 17% 15% 17%
20% 15%
12% 11% 11%
9% 9% 10%
10%

0%
Central South East North North West South Central
Kabul East East West West Hazarjat
Will be free and fair
Will not be free and fair
Don’t Know

Fig 7.15

Respondents who said that the coming elections would not be free and fair (22% of
all respondents) were also asked for the reason. Well over a third (39%) said there
would be cheating in the vote count, while another third (33%) mentioned buying of
votes. Just under one in ten (9%) said that husbands will not let their wives vote, and
a similar proportion (8%) mentioned intimidation against voters or party activists.

When responses about the likelihood of the elections being free and fair are analyzed
alongside voting intentions a clear correlation emerges. Respondents who are likely
to vote are also those who believe that the elections will be free and fair. More than
116 Afghanistan in 2009

three-quarters (77%) of respondents who are very likely to vote also think the elec-
tions will be free and fair. The same is true for around two-thirds (64%) of respon-
dents who are somewhat likely to vote. However, well under half (43%) of those
who are somewhat unlikely to vote think that the elections will be free and fair, and
this is true for an even smaller proportion (38%) of those who are very unlikely to
vote. This indicates that confidence in the integrity of the electoral process has a sig-
nificant impact on people’s willingness to participate is these democratic processes.

Table 7.4: Do you think the upcoming elections will be free and fair, or do you think they will not
be free and fair? (Q-75, Base 6406) BY THOSE WHO ARE VERY LIKELY, SOME-
WHAT LIKELY, SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY AND VERY UNLIKELY TO
VOTE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS

Somewhat Somewhat Very


Very likely
likely unlikely unlikely
(%)
(%) (%) (%)
It will be free and fair 77 64 43 38
It will not be free and fair 13 22 44 43
Refused 1 1 3 2
Don’t know 10 13 10 16

Another factor that influences people’s decision to vote is the belief that their votes
will bring about change. Those who are likely to vote in the upcoming election are
those people who believe in the efficacy of their vote to achieve improvement. A
much higher proportion of those who say they are very likely to vote (84%) and
somewhat likely to vote (71%) think that voting can change things, compared to
those who are somewhat unlikely to vote (46%) and very unlikely to vote (43%). This
suggests that people are likely to use their voting rights if they believe that voting can
lead to improvement and changes in the future.

Table 7.5: Do you think that voting can lead to improvement in the future or do you believe
that no matter how one votes, things never change? (Q-77, Base 6406) BY THOSE WHO
ARE VERY LIKELY, SOMEWHAT LIKELY, SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY AND
VERY UNLIKELY TO VOTE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS

Very Somewhat Somewhat Very


likely likely unlikely unlikely
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Voting can change things 84 71 46 43
Things are not going to get better 11 21 44 49
Refused 0 0 2 1
Don’t know 5 7 8 8
Democratic Values 117

7.6 Freedom of expression

The survey also sought to measure pubic opinion on freedom of expression as an-
other cornerstone of democratic practice. Respondents were asked whether most
people feel free to express their political opinions in their local area. Forty percent
of respondents say they do but an almost equal proportion (39%) say they do not.
Around one in five respondents (18%) is either unable or unwilling to give an opin-
ion. These percentages have not changed significantly since 2007.

However there are significant regional differences. Over half of respondents in the
East (53%), and more than forty percent in the North West (48%), Central/Hazarajat
(45%), North East (44%) and Central/Kabul (43%) regions say that people feel free to
express their political opinion in their local areas. In contrast, over half of respondents
in the South West (53%) and South East (52%) and 43 percent in the West say that
this is not the case. In addition, at least a quarter of respondents in the West (27%)
and Central/Hazarajat (25%) and at least a fifth in the North West (22%) and Central/
Kabul (20%) regions, are unable or unwilling to express an opinion in this regard.

Do most people feel free to express their political opinions in the area where you live? (Q-31, Base
6406) BY REGION
60%
52% 53% 53%
48%
50%
43% 44% 41% 43% 45%
36%
40%
34% 28%
30% 28%
27% 27% 27%
30%
25%
20% 22% 15%
16%
20%
13%
9%
10%

0%
Central South East North North West South Central
Kabul East East West West Hazarjat

Yes No Don't know

Fig 7.16

Respondents who say that most people feel free to express their political opinions in
their local area (40% of all respondents) were then asked what changes or reasons
have made this possible. Respondents were invited to give two reasons. More than
half (55%) of respondents say this is because freedom of speech is guaranteed.
Over a third (37%) mention good security conditions in their areas. Around one in
seven respondents say the reason is peace and democracy (14%) or the removal of
local militias (14%). This suggests that physical security conditions, as well as the
legal guarantee of freedoms, are important in ensuring freedom of expression for
citizens. A third of respondents (33%) do not identify any particular factor to which
they could attribute freedom of expression in their area.
118 Afghanistan in 2009

What changes compared with the past, or reasons, do you think have made most people to feel free to
express their political opinions in the area where you live? (Q-32a&b combined, Base 2544)

60%
55%
50%
37%
40%

30%

20%
14% 14%
11%
10% 5%

0%
Freedom of The security The removal of Peace and Good Having a legal
speech is conditions are local militias democracy Government constitution
guaranteed good (in our
area)

Fig 7.17
Respondents who say that most people do not feel free to express their political opin-
ions in their area (39% of all respondents) were also asked why they think this is so.
They were invited to mention two reasons. Physical security conditions account for
the overwhelming majority of responses including fear for safety (34%), bad security
conditions (29%), presence of the Taliban (21%) and presence of warlords (7%). In
addition, 40 percent of respondents do not give a definitive answer to this question
which also suggests a level of concern about the possible consequences of doing so.
The lack of guaranteed rights also features prominently amongst responses including
the government not allowing freedom of political opinions (12%), women being under
the control of men (9%) and government not taking note of people’s opinions (9%).
Why don’t people in your area have the freedom to express their political opinions? (Q-33a&b
combined, Base 2521)
50%

40%
34%
30% 29%
21%
20%
12%
10% 9%

0%
Fear for their Security Presence of The Government Women are
safety conditions are Taliban in the doesn’t allow under the control
bad in this area area freedom of of men
political opinions

Fig 7.18
Democratic Values 119

The proportion of respondents who identify fear for their safety and bad security
conditions as the reason for lack of freedom of expression in their area has fallen in
2009 compared to 2008. Indeed, the proportion mentioning poor local security con-
ditions is lower in 2009 (29%) than in any previous year (40% in 2006, 36% in 2007,
38% in 2008). The proportion of respondents who explicitly mention a threat from
the Taliban had fluctuated substantially since 2006, but has risen in 2009 (21%) com-
pared to 2008 (18%), whereas those who mention the presence of warlords continues
to fall (from 32% in 2006 to 18% in 2007, 8% in 2008 and 7% in 2009). Twelve per-
cent of the respondents mention government prohibition of freedom of political ex-
pression in 2009 as opposed to 15 percent in 2008, 22 percent in 2007 and 17 percent
in 2006. On the other hand, more than twice as many respondents have mentioned
women being under the control of men as a reason for limited freedom of expression
in 2009 (9%) and 2008 (10%) as in 2006 (4%) or 2007 (4%).

Why don’t people in your area have the freedom to express their political opinions? (Q-33a&b
combined) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009.

50%
41%
40% 38%
40%
36%
34% 34% 33%
30% 29%
30%
25% 21% 22%
18% 18%
20% 16% 17%
15%
12% 10%
9%
10% 8% 7% 5%
4% 4% 3% 3% 4%

0%
Fear for Security Presence of Presence of Government Women are Don't Know
safety conditions Taliban warlords not allow under the
are bad freedom of control of
political men
opinions
2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 7.19

7.7 Democratic spirit of government

In order to assess how citizens relate to the government, the survey asked all respon-
dents to say whether they agree or disagree with a number of statements related to
the application of democratic principles. The first statement was: “I don’t think the
government cares much about what people like me think”. Around three quarters
of respondents (74%) agree with this statement including over a quarter (28%) who
strongly agree. Just under a quarter (22%) disagree with the statement.
120 Afghanistan in 2009

The second statement was: “It is generally not acceptable to talk negatively about
the Government in public”. Sixty-one percent of respondents agree with this state-
ment including 23 percent who strongly agree. Over a third (35%) disagree. A higher
proportion of residents in the South West (43%) and South East (41%) say it is
acceptable to talk negatively about the government than in other regions. These are
also the regions that report the highest levels of dissatisfaction with government
performance (see Chapter 5, 5.1 Performance of National Government).

Table 7.6: Public agreement and disagreement toward the statements related to the democratic spirit
of the government (Q-15a-b, Base 6406)

Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly


Agree Somewhat Somewhat Disagree
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) I don’t think that the government cares
28 46 16 6
much about what people like me think
b) It is generally not acceptable to talk
23 38 25 10
negatively about the Government in public

Over time there have been small fluctuations in the proportion of respondents who
say that the government does not care about the views of people like them. How-
ever, there has been a consistent fall in the proportion of respondents who say it is
unacceptable to talk negatively about the government (from 69% in 2007 to 61%
in 2009). This is significant given that the proportion of respondents who say that
people feel free to express their political opinions in their local area has not changed
significantly over this period (see section 7.6 first paragraph). These findings confirm that
the major obstacles to freedom of expression in Afghanistan do not come from the
government but from other factors in the environment and society.

Table 7.7: Proportion of those who agree (combination of strongly agree and agree somewhat)
toward the statements related to democratic spirit of the government (Q-15a-b, Base 6406) COM-
PARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2006 2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%) (%)

a) I don’t think that the government cares much ab


77 79 76 74
out what people like me think
b) It is generally not acceptable to talk negatively
- 69 62 61
about the Government in public
Democratic Values 121

7.8 Involvement of religious leaders

Finally, the survey sought to assess public opinion regarding the involvement of
religious leaders in government decision making. Respondents were offered two al-
ternative viewpoints: “Some people argue that local religious leaders should be regu-
larly consulted on the problems facing an area while others argue that politics and
religion should not mix”, and asked which is closer to their view. About two-thirds
of respondents (67%) say that religious leaders should be consulted while around
a quarter (27%) say that politics and religion should not mix. The proportion of
respondents who say religious leaders should be consulted has been higher in 2008
and 2009 than it was in 2006 and 2007, when only around 60 percent of respondents
were in favor of such consultation.

Some people say that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an
area while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view?
(Q-66) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

80%
69% 67%
70%
61% 60%
60%

50%
37% 36%
40%
26% 27%
30%

20%

10%

0%
Religious leaders should be consulted Politics and religion should not mix

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 7.20

Public opinion in this regard varies between regions. Although the majority of re-
spondents in all regions are in the favor of consulting with religious leaders, this
is true for a much higher proportion of people in the East (82%) and South West
(72%) of the country than in other regions. Opposition to the involvement of re-
ligious leaders is highest in the West where a third of respondents (32%) say that
politics and religion should not mix.
122 Afghanistan in 2009

Some people say that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an
area while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view?
(Q-66, Base 6406) BY REGION

90%
82%
80%
66% 66% 69% 72% 65%
70%
63% 59%
60%
50%
40%
29% 29% 26% 29% 32% 26% 26%
30%
16%
20%
4% 5% 5% 7% 8% 8%
10%
2% 2%
0%
Central/ South East North North West South Central/
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat

Religious leaders should be consulted Politics and religion should not mix Don't know

Fig 7.21

Despite the relatively low levels of support for the view that politics and religion
should not mix, 71 percent of respondents say they agree with the statement: “Re-
ligious authorities should lead people in obeying the obligations of their faith while
political leaders should make decisions about how the government is run”. However,
support for the separation of the roles of religious authorities and political leaders
has also fallen over the years. Over four-fifths of respondents (82%) agreed with
this statement in 2006. This fell to 80 percent in 2007, 75 percent in 2008 and 71
percent in 2009. This trend is therefore consistent with the increasing support for
consultation with religious leaders to help the government to resolve local problems
(see Fig.7.20).
Women and Society 123

8 Women and Society

8.1 The biggest problems faced by women

The survey sought to understand the particular challenges faced by women in Afghan
society. All respondents (men and women) were asked to identify the two biggest
problems women face in Afghanistan. Nearly half (49%) of respondents mention
lack of education and illiteracy. More than a quarter identify the lack of job opportu-
nities for women (28%) and around a fifth (21%) say lack of women’s rights.

Slightly more men (50%) than women (47%) identify lack of education and illit-
eracy as one of biggest problems faced by women. Men also tend to place greater
emphasis on the availability of basic services for women such as access to general
healthcare (12% of men compared to 9% of women) and pregnancy related health-
care (10% of men compared to 5% of women). However, more women mention
lack of job opportunities (31% compared to 26% of men) and issues related to
equality including lack of women’s rights (24% of women, 18% of men), domestic
violence (14% of women, 9% of men) and that women can’t leave their homes (10%
of women, 7% of men).

The problem of job opportunities for women is a significantly higher priority for low
income households. This is mentioned by 37 percent of households with a monthly
income of less than 2000Afs compared to 27 percent for those earning over 3,000
Afs a month, 24 percent for those earning over 5,000 Afs a month and 19 percent
for those in the highest income category. Conversely, the lack of women’s rights and
domestic violence are more frequently identified by higher income households.

Across the country, the lack of education and illiteracy is identified as the biggest
problem facing women in all regions. However, the proportion of those who iden-
tify the lack of job opportunities for women is particularly high in the North West
(42%) and North East (40%). More than a fifth (21%) of respondents identify the
lack of women’s rights in all regions except North East (12%) and Central/Kabul
(16%)5.

5
In 2009, in three provinces in the South; Paktika, Uruzghan and Zabul, women were not sampled due to the
deteriorated security situation in the region that restricted freedom of movement, making it unsafe to employ
female interviewers (see Appendix 2: Methodology).
124 Afghanistan in 2009

What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? (Q-102a&b combined,
Base 6406)

60%
49%
50%
40%
28%
30%
21%
20% 11%
11% 10%
10%
0%
Education / Lack of job Lack of rights / Domestic Poverty General health
illiteracy opportunities women’s rights violence care
for women

Fig 8.1

Since 2006, lack of education has consistently been identified as the biggest problem
for women in Afghanistan. However, over the same period there has been a con-
sistent rise in the proportion of respondents who identify the lack of employment
opportunities for women as a significant issue (from 1% in 2006 to 19% in 2007,
24% in 2008 and 28% in 2009). While concern about the lack of women’s rights has
remained relatively stable (fluctuating between 24% and 21% in the last four years),
the proportion of respondents who identify domestic violence as a major problem
for Afghan women has declined (from 23% in 2006 to 15% in 2007, 12% in 2008
and 11% in 2009).

What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? (Q-102a&b combined) COM-
PARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009
60%
48% 49%
45%
50%
41%
40%
24% 28% 24%
30%
24% 23% 23%
19% 21% 15%
20%
12%11%
10%
1%
0%
Education Lack of job Lack of women’s Domestic violence
opportunities for rights
women
2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 8.2
Women and Society 125

8.2 Gender equality

The survey also endeavored to measure public opinion on the issue of gender equal-
ity. Respondents were first asked whether they agree with the statement: “Women
should have equal opportunities like men in education”. Well over four-fifths (87%)
of respondents say they agree with this statement, including more than half (55%)
who strongly agree. Only around one in eight (12%) express some level of disagree-
ment. This finding closely matches that of 2008.

Not surprisingly, a higher proportion of women (92%) than men (83%) support
equal opportunities in education. Urban residents are also more likely to support
equal educational opportunities for women (93%) compared to their rural counter-
parts (85%).

Across the country at least 85 percent of respondents express support for equal
educational opportunities for women in all regions except the South West (73%). In
the South West around a quarter (26%) of respondents oppose such equality at least
twice the figure recorded in any other region.

Table 8.1: Some people say that women should have equal opportunities like men in education? Do
you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Q-103, Base 6406) BY REGION

Central/ South North North South /Central


East West
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Agree 92 88 86 89 90 86 73 89
Disagree 7 12 13 10 8 12 26 8

These responses are broadly consistent with the high level of stated support for
equal rights under the law, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion (80%) (see Chap-
ter 7, 7.2 Attitudes to democratic principles, processes and political activities).

Respondents were then asked to give their opinion on whether women should be al-
lowed to work outside the home. Just over two-thirds of respondents (67%) say that
women should be allowed to work outside the home, while 29 percent say that they
should not. Public opinion in this regard has not changed significantly since 2006,
although the proportion who say that women should be allowed to work outside the
home has decreased marginally each year to its lowest level in 2009 (from 71% in
2006 to 67% in 2009).
126 Afghanistan in 2009

Table 8.2: Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. What is your
opinion about this? (Q-104) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2006 2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%) (%)
Women should be allowed to work outside the home 71 70 69 67
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home 27 28 27 29
Refused 1 1 0 1
Don’t know 2 2 4 3

There is a considerable difference of opinion between the sexes on whether women


should be allowed to work outside the home. Four-fifths of women (80%) think that
they should, compared to just over half (55%) of men. Younger respondents also
tend to be more favorable to this idea. Seventy-one percent of respondents aged
between 18 and 24 are in favor of women working outside the home compared to
only 62 percent among those aged over 55. Similarly, more urban (79%) than rural
(64%) residents hold this opinion. Respondents with lower incomes are also more
favorable to this idea than those in higher income categories. Sixty-nine percent of
respondents earning less than 2000 Afs a month are in favor compared to 61 percent
of people earning more than 10,000 Afs.

Support for women being allowed to work outside the home is strongest in the
Central/Hazarajat (82%), North West (75%), Central/Kabul (73%) and North East
(71%) regions. Opposition to this idea is strongest in the South West (49%), South
East (38%) and East (37%) of the country.

Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion
about this? (Q-104, Base 6406) BY REGION
90%
75% 82%
80%
73% 71% 65%
70%
59% 60%
60% 49%
49%
50%
38% 37%
40%
23% 28%
24% 21%
30%
16%
20%
10%
0%
Central South East North North West South Central
Kabul East East West West Hazarjat
Women should be allowed to work outside the home
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home

Fig 8.3
Women and Society 127

8. Women’s political participation

The survey attempted to ascertain whether respondents’ views on gender equality in


general carry through into support for women’s political participation. Respondents
were asked whether they think women should be allowed to vote in elections. A
large majority of respondents (83%) say that they should, demonstrating that the
principle of universal suffrage is broadly accepted in Afghanistan. Only 14 percent
of respondents disagree with women being allowed to vote. More women (88%)
than men (79%) say women should be allowed to vote, as do more respondents in
urban (91%) than rural (81%) areas. Likewise, those with higher levels of education
are more likely to support the electoral participation of women. Eighty-eight percent
of respondents who have completed secondary school agree with this, compared to
around 82 percent of those with lower levels of education.

There is also variation between regions. Support for women voting is highest in the
North West (90%), Central/Hazarajat (90%), North East (89%), Central/Kabul (88%)
and East (83%). However, at least a third of respondents in the South West (35%) and
a quarter in the South East (25%) say women should not be allowed to vote.

Do you think women should be allowed to vote in the elections? (Q-74, Base 6406) BY REGION

100%
88% 89% 90% 87% 90%
83%
73%
80%
61%
60%

35%
40%
25%
15%
20%
11% 9% 7% 9% 6%
0%
Central South East North North West South Central
Kabul East East West West Hazarjat

Yes No

Fig 8.4

Respondents were then asked whether they thought that, when voting in elections,
women should decide for themselves how to vote or whether they should receive ad-
vice from men. A small majority (57%) say that women should decide for themselves,
while around a third (23%) say men should advise them. Almost one in five respon-
dents (19%) think that women should decide for themselves, but in consultation with
men. There has been almost no change in public opinion on this issue since 2006.
128 Afghanistan in 2009

Table 8.3: If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or should they receive
advice from men? (Q-105) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2006 2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%) (%)
Women should decide for themselves 57 56 58 57
Men should advise them 24 25 22 23
Women should decide for themselves but in consulta-
19 19 18 19
tion with men
Don’t know 1 1 2 2

Again more women (62%) than men (51%) say that women should decide for them-
selves and fewer women (17%) say they should be advised by men, compared to
male respondents (27%). However, an equal proportion of both groups say that
women should decide in consultation with men (19%).

If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or should they receive advice
from men? (Q-105, Base 6406) BY GENDER

70% 62%
60%
51%
50%
40%
27%
30% 19%
17% 19%
20%
10%
0%
Women should decide for Men should advise them Women should decide for
themselves themselves but in
consultation with men

Men Women

Fig 8.5

More than two-thirds of respondents in the North West (69%), North East (67%)
and Central/Hazarajat (67%) regions think that women should decide for them-
selves on how to vote, while almost a third of respondents in the South East (31%),
South West (31%) and around a quarter in the East (26%) say that women should
be advised by men. An almost equal proportion in these three regions thinks that
women should decide in consultation with men (28% in the South East and South
West and 25% in the East).
Women and Society 129

Respondents were also asked whether they agree with the statement: “In the election,
everyone must vote for themselves. Men cannot vote in place of women. Women
must vote for themselves”. More than four-fifths (86%) of respondents agree with
this statement while around one in ten (11%) disagree. Again, more women (91%)
agree with the statement than men (83%).

Again the same regional divergence is seen. More than four-fifths of respondents
agree with this statement in the North East (94%), Central/Kabul (92%), Central/
Hazarajat (90%), North West (88%), East (88%) and Western (86%). However, more
than one in four respondents (27%) in the South West and around one in five (19%)
in the South East say it is acceptable for men to vote in the place of women.

Respondents’ views on women’s independent participation in electoral processes are


clearly correlated with their other views on gender equality.

For example, 70 percent of respondents who think that women should be allowed
to work outside the home also say that women should decide for themselves how
to vote. On the other hand, 70 percent of those who think that women should not
be allowed to work outside the home do not think that women should be allowed to
decide for themselves how to vote (44% of them think men should advise and 26%
think women should decide in consultation with men). These findings closely match
those of 2006, 2007 and 2008.

Table 8.4: If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or should they
receive advice from men? (Q-105, Base 6406) BY PEOPLE WITH OPINIONS WOMEN
SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK OUTSIDE HOME -
COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

Women should not be al-


Women should be allowed
lowed to work outside the
to work outside the home
home
(%)
(%)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
Women should decide for
68 68 70 70 31 27 29 28
themselves
Men should advise them 15 16 14 13 47 47 43 44
Women should decide in
17 16 15 16 22 25 25 26
consultation with men
130 Afghanistan in 2009

Similarly, 61 percent of those who agree that women should have equal opportuni-
ties in education also say that women should decide for themselves how to vote.
On the other hand, 69 percent of those who think that women should not have
equal educational opportunities also do not think that women should decide for
themselves how to vote (44% of them think men should advise them and 25% think
women should decide in consultation with men). These findings closely match those
of 2006, 2007 and 2008.

Table 8.5: If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or should they
receive advice from men? (Q-105, Base 6406) BY PEOPLE WITH OPINIONS WOMEN
SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT HAVE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES LIKE MEN
IN EDUCATION - COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

Women should have equal Women should not have


opportunities like men in equal opportunities like
education men in education
(%) (%)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
Women should decide for
61 61 63 61 20 15 17 28
themselves
Men should advice them 21 20 19 20 53 60 47 44
Women should decide in
18 18 17 18 24 23 27 25
consultation with men

8.4 Political leadership

The survey also asked a series of questions pertaining to women playing leadership
roles in politics. Respondents were first asked whether they think that political leader-
ship positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women or whether both men
and women should have equal representation at leadership level. A little less than half
(47%) of respondents say that both men and women should have equal representation,
while more than a third (39%) say leadership positions should be mostly for men, and
just one in ten (10%) say that leadership positions should be mostly for women.

The survey shows that women have a much stronger belief in equality of representa-
tion than do their male counterparts. Almost twice as many women (60%) as men
(35%) say there should be equal representation in political leadership. More than
half of male respondents (54%) believe that political leadership positions should be
mostly for men, while only around one in six (15%) female respondents think that
leadership positions should be mostly for women.
Women and Society 131

Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do
you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?
(Q-108, Base 6406) BY GENDER

70%
60%
60%
54%
50%

40% 35%

30% 22%
15%
20%
10% 6%

0%
Mostly for men Mostly for women Equal for both men and
women

Men Women

Fig 8.6
The majority of respondents support equal representation of men and women in the
Central/Hazarajat (66%), North West (54%), North East (53%) and West (50%) re-
gions, while nearly half of respondents in the South West (49%), East (48%) and South
East (45%) think that political leadership positions should be occupied by men.

Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do
you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?
(Q-108, Base 6406) BY REGION
70%
66%

60%
53% 54%
49% 48% 50% 49%
50%
45% 42%
40% 37%
40%
35% 32% 34%
28%
30%
16% 21% 21%
20%

7% 8% 9% 6% 9% 6%
10%

0%
Central South East North North West South Central
Kabul East East West West Hazarjat

Mostly for men Mostly for women Equal for both men and women

Fig 8.7
132 Afghanistan in 2009

In order to investigate public attitudes to women in political leadership roles in more


detail, the survey asked respondents whether they are opposed to being represented
by a woman on various governance bodies from the local to the national level. Just
over half of respondents say they have no objection to being represented by a wom-
an on any of these bodies. The only exception to this is at Provincial Council level
where the figure is just below half (49%).

Table 8.6: Are you opposed to a woman representing you in the following organizations? (Q109-
a-e, Base 6406)

Yes No
(%) (%)
a) In National Parliament 48 50
b) In your Provincial Council 48 49
c) In your Community Development Councils 45 52
d) In your District Development Assembly 42 54
e) In your local Shura or Jirga 43 53
Average 45 52

Respondents record the least opposition to being represented by a woman in their


District Development Assembly (DDA) (54% say they have no objection while 42%
say they are opposed). This may reflect the impact of the systematic policy of pro-
moting active female representation incorporated into the approach for the estab-
lishment of DDAs. The highest levels of opposition are at the level of the National
Parliament (50%) and the Provincial Council (49%). In these institutions a quota
system has been the main mechanism for supporting women’s representation.

There is a little difference between the responses of men and women on this issue. On
average, 50 percent of men and 53 percent of women say they have no objection to
being represented by a woman on these bodies. There are significantly lower levels of
objection to female representation in the Central/Hazarajat than in other regions.

However, results in 2009 show a significant decline in support for female represen-
tation compared to previous years. The greatest fall concerns representation on a
Provincial Council (PC). In 2008, 59 percent of respondents had no objection to
being represented by a women on the PC, but this has fallen to under half (49%) in
2009. A similar fall in support is evident regarding representation in the national par-
liament (from 57% to 50%), on a Community Development Council (58% to 52%)
and in local shura or jirga (58% to 53%). The smallest drop concerns acceptance of
being represented by a woman on the District Development Assembly (57% to 54%)
which has shifted from having amongst the highest levels of opposition to female
representation to having the lowest level in the space of a single year.
Women and Society 133

Table 8.7: Proportion of those who are not opposed to a woman representing them in the following
organizations (NO responses only) (Q-109a-e) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008
AND 2009

2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%)
a) In National Parliament 55 57 50
b) In your Provincial Council 58 59 49
c) In your Community Development Councils 58 58 52
d) In your District Development Assembly 59 57 54
e) In your local Shura or Jirga 56 58 53
Average 57 58 52

The table below further breaks down responses regarding female political repre-
sentation by region. Support for women taking a representative role is consistently
highest in the Central/Hazarajat region regarding national (60%) and provincial
(58%) level representation, and in the East in terms of female representation at the
community level, including District Development Assemblies (68%) and local shura
or jirga (65%). Both regions express equally high levels of support for women’s
representation on Community Development Councils (60%). Support for female
representation on governance bodies in the Central/Hazarajat region are clearly cor-
related with more general views on women’s political participation. Respondents in
this region are amongst the most supportive of women being able to vote (90%),
to decide for themselves how to vote (67%) and for women being allowed to work
outside the home (82%). The Central/Hazarajat also records the highest levels of
support in the country for political leadership positions being shared between men
and women (66%) (see Fig.8.7). The picture is more complex for the East region
which records a high proportion of respondents who say they are not opposed to
women in leadership position in various bodies, but where nearly half (48%) say that
political leadership positions should be mostly for men, and more than a third (37%)
say that women should not be allowed to work outside the home.
134 Afghanistan in 2009

Table 8.8: Are you opposed to a woman representing you in the following organizations? (Q109-
a-e, Base 6406) NO Responses BY REGION

Central/ South North North South Central/


East West
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) In National Parliament 46 49 54 51 52 51 46 60
b) In your Provincial Council 49 45 53 50 50 52 42 58
c) In your Community Devel-
50 49 60 51 52 52 51 60
opment Councils
d) In your District Develop-
51 53 68 54 53 53 55 56
ment Assembly
e) In your local Shura or Jirga 51 53 65 53 49 54 54 55
Average 49 50 60 52 51 52 50 58

8.5 Awareness of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs

In 2002, the Afghan government created the Ministry of Women’s Affairs to pro-
vide a focus for policy on gender equality and enhance the participation of women
in Afghan society. In 2009, for the second year, the survey attempted to measure
public awareness of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs at the national and local levels.
Respondents were first asked whether they were aware of the government ministry
known as the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. More than half (58%) of respondents
say that they are aware of the Ministry, while 39 percent say they are not aware of it.
There has been no substantive change in the level of awareness in the last year.

More men (66%) than women (48%) are aware of the existence of this Ministry.
This is likely to be a reflection of the higher levels of literacy and education amongst
men and the greater role taken by men in public life in Afghan society.
Women and Society 135

Are you aware of the government ministry known as the Ministry of Women’s Affairs? (Q-107a,
Base 6406) BY GENDER
70% 66%

60%
49%
48%
50%

40%
31%
30%

20%

10%
3% 2%
0%
Male Female
Yes No Don't know

Fig 8.8

Awareness is also greater amongst respondents with higher levels of education. More
than three quarters (78%) of respondents who have completed high school and
around two thirds of those who have some secondary education (69%) or completed
primary school (64%) are aware of the existence of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs,
compared to less than half (49%) of respondents who never went to school.

Awareness of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs is highest in the South East (72%)
and Central/Kabul (71%) regions. Around half of respondents are aware of the
Ministry in the North East (53%), North West (50%), West (50%) and South West
(57%). On the other hand, over half of respondents living in the East (51%) and
Central/Hazarajat (58%) regions have not heard about the ministry.

Table 8.9: Are you aware of the government ministry known as the Ministry of Women’s Affairs?
(Q-107a, Base 6406) BY REGION

Central/ South North North South Central/


East West
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Yes 71 72 48 53 50 50 57 35
No 28 26 51 43 46 44 40 58
136 Afghanistan in 2009

Respondents who say they are aware of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (58% of all
respondents) were then asked whether there are any local offices of the ministry in
the district or province where they live. Around 60 percent of them say they know
of local offices of this Ministry while 36 percent say they do not. Awareness of the
local offices of the ministry is highest in the North East (73%), Central/Hazarajat
(65%) and West (64%). However, half of respondents in the East (50%) and more
than 40 percent in the South East (44%) and South West (41%) do not know of any
local offices of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs.
Information Sources and Media Use 137

9 Information Sources and Media Use

Since 2006, the survey has sought to explore how Afghans access and receive infor-
mation. Once again, this year, the survey examined listenership of radio, viewership
of television and the way people use the media. It also assessed how Afghans access
communications technology such as radio, television, computers, fixed phone lines
and mobile phones and assessed their preferences for receiving information through
these and other channels including informal community networks.

9.1 Access to communications technology

Radio is the most accessible media for Afghan households. More than four-fifths
(81%) of respondents say they have a functioning radio in their household, and there
is only a slight difference in access between urban (81%) and rural (77%) areas. How-
ever, other communications technologies are much more accessible to urban resi-
dents than to those living in rural areas. More than twice as many urban (80%) as rural
(30%) households have access to a television. The same is true for mobile phones.
More than four-fifths (81%) of urban residents say they have a mobile phone while
only 44 percent of rural residents say so. Although only a small proportion (6%) of
Afghan households own a computer, six times more urban (18%) than rural (3%)
residents do so. Ownership of functioning fixed phone line is rare in Afghanistan.

Table 9.1: Proportion of respondents who have the following communications technologies in func-
tioning order in their households (Q-1) ALL, RURAL AND URBAN SETTLEMENT
(Q-1, Base 6406)

All Rural Urban


(%) (%) (%)
Radio 81 81 77
TV set 41 30 80
Mobile phone 52 44 81
Computer 6 3 18

Ownership of all kinds of communications technology rises steadily with both in-
come and educational level. The disparity is smallest with respect to radio owner-
ship, but it is still significant. More than four-fifths (84%) of all households earning
over 3,000Afs a month own a radio, but this is true for just over two thirds (69%) of
households earning under 2,000Afs. These disparities underline the challenges that
remain in providing information through technological means to the poorer sections
of Afghan society.
138 Afghanistan in 2009

Radio ownership is highest in the South East (96%), East (89%) and South West
(87%). However, it is relatively low in the Central/Hazarajat (59%) and North West
(66%) regions. Access to television is highest in the Central/Kabul region (64%) fol-
lowed by the West (47%) and North West (38%). Mobile telephone penetration is
also highest in the Central/Kabul region (78%) followed by the East (68%), South
East (57%) and North West (46%). The Central/Kabul region also has a significantly
higher proportion of households that own a computer (14%) than any other region.

Table 9.2: Regional comparison of ownership of communications technologies (Q-1, Base 6406)

Central/ South North North South Central/


East West
Kabul East East West West Hazarajat
(%) (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Radio 81 96 89 80 66 78 87 59
TV set 64 35 27 33 38 47 24 18
Mobile
78 57 68 38 46 34 34 30
phone
Computer 14 5 5 3 4 5 5 2

Although radio continues to be the most accessible form of communications tech-


nology in Afghanistan, the proportion of respondents who own a functioning radio
has been declining steadily since 2007 (from 88% to 84% in 2008 and 81% in 2009).
On the other hand, the proportion of respondents who own a working television
set continues to rise (from 37% in 2007 to 38% in 2008 and 41% in 2009). However,
the most dramatic increase has been in mobile telephone ownership which has risen
from 42 percent in 2007 to over half (52%) of respondent households in 2009.

Table 9.3: Proportion of respondents who have the following communications technologies in function-
ing order in their households (Q-1) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%)
Radio 88 84 81
TV set 37 38 41
Mobile phone 42 40 52
Computer - 5 6

9.2 Radio listenership

The survey also sought to examine the use of different media. Respondents were first
asked how many days a week they listen to the radio. Forty four percent say they listen
to the radio every day or almost every day and 21 percent say they listen three or four
days a week. One-fifth (20%) of respondents say they never listen to the radio.
Information Sources and Media Use 139

How many days a week do you listen to the radio, if any? (Q-2, Base 6406)
50%
44%
40%

30%
21% 20%
20%
10%
10% 5%
1%
0%
Every day or Three or four One or two Less than Never Don't know
almost every days a week days a week once a week
day

Fig 9.1
Along with radio ownership, radio listenership has also been falling in recent years.
In 2006, more than half (53%) of respondents said they listened to the radio every-
day, however, this has fallen to 44 percent in 2008 and 2009. Conversely, those who
say they never listen to the radio has risen from one in eight respondents (12%) in
2006 to one in five (20%) in 2009.

How many days a week do you listen to the radio, if any? (Q-2) COMPARISON BETWEEN
2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

60%
53%
48%
50%
44% 44%

40%

30%
23% 22%
22% 21% 16% 20%
20%
11% 14%
12%
10% 10% 10% 5% 5%
10%
4%
4%
0%
Every day or Three or four One or two days Less than once a Never
almost every day days a week a week week

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 9.2

Respondents who say they listen to the radio (80% of all respondents) were then
asked for how many hours they listen on an average day. Around three in five re-
spondents (59%) say they listen for under an hour, including one in five (21%) who
listen for less than 30 minutes. A quarter (25%) of radio listeners listen for up to two
hours while around one in six (16%) listen for more than two hours a day.
140 Afghanistan in 2009

How many hours do you listen to it on an average day every time when you listen to radio? (Q-3,
Base 5078)

50%
38%
40%

30%
25%
21%
20% 16%
10%

0%
Less than 30 31 min to 1 hour 1 hour to 2 hrs More than 2 hours a
minutes day

Fig 9.3

9.3 Television viewership

The survey then asked about television viewership. Respondents were asked how
many days a week they watch TV, if any. More than half (56%) say they never watch
television. This is a much more common response in rural (66%) than urban (18%)
areas, where television ownership is much higher (see Table 9.1). Around a quarter
(26%) say they watch television everyday or almost everyday.

How many days a week do you watch TV, if any? (Q-4, Base 6406) ALL AND BY RU-
RAL-URBAN
80%
66%
70%
61% 56%
60%
50%
40% 26%
30% 18%
20% 16% 13%
10% 9% 4% 4% 4%
10% 2% 2% 2%
0%
Everyday/ 3 or 4 days a 1 or 2 days a Less than once Never
almost week week a week
everyday

All Rural Urban

Fig 9.4
Unlike radio usage, television viewing patterns have not changed significantly since
2006.
Information Sources and Media Use 141

How many days a week do you watch TV, if any? (Q-4, Base 6406) COMPARISON BE-
TWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

70%
61%
55% 56%
60%
54%
50%

40%
27% 26% 26%
30%
21%
20%
11%
10% 8% 10%
10%
4% 4% 5% 4%
3% 2% 3% 2%
0%
Every day or 3 or 4 days a 1 or 2 days a Less than once a Never
almost every day week week week

2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig 9.5

Respondents who say they watch television (42% of all respondents) were then
asked how many hours they watch TV on an average day. The survey shows that
people watch television for longer periods than they spend listening to the radio.
Thirty-seven percent of respondents watch television for less than an hour a day,
compared to 59 percent who say the same about listening to the radio. Around a
third of respondents (32%) watch television for more than two hours a day, com-
pared to 16 percent who listen to the radio for the same length of time.

How many hours do you watch TV on an average day every time when you watch television? (Q-5,
Base 2654)
40%

27% 30% 32%


30%

20%

10%
10%

1%
0%
Less than 30 31 minutes to 1 1 hour to 2 hrs More than 2 Don't Know
minutes hour hours a day

Fig 9.6
142 Afghanistan in 2009

9.4 Sources of information on national and local events

The survey also endeavored to ascertain public preferences regarding sources of


information on national and local events. Respondents were first asked to identify
their main source of information about what is happening in the country. Just under
half (47%) identify radio as their main information source, while one fourth (25%)
say TV. Around one-fifth of respondents (18%) say they normally get information
on national events from friends, family and neighbors. A small proportion of re-
spondents say they prefer to get information about what is happening in the country
from community leaders (6%) or religious leaders (2%).

Although the radio remains the most common source of information for what is
happening in the country, 2009 is the first year in which less than half (47%) of re-
spondents identify it as their main source of information. In 2006, the figure was 55
percent and this fell to 54 percent in 2007 and 51 percent in 2008. This is in keeping
with the fall in radio ownership and radio listenership measured over this period.

Table 9.4: Which is the main source from where you normally get information about what is hap-
pening in the country? (Q-6, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2006, 2007, 2008
AND 2009

2006 2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%) (%)
Radio 55 54 51 47
TV 22 26 21 25
Friends, family and neighbors 15 14 18 18
Village chief/community leaders 5 3 5 6
Religious leader 2 1 2 2

However, radio remains the main source of information for the majority of rural
residents (53%), while most urban residents identify TV (62%) as their most impor-
tant information source. Recourse to friends, family, and neighbors as the principle
source of information on national and local events is more than twice as high in
rural areas (20%) as in urban areas (9%).
Information Sources and Media Use 143

Which is the main source from where you normally get information about what is happening in the
country? (Q-6, Base 6406) BY RURAL-URBAN SETTLEMENT

70%
62%
60%
53%
50%

40%
24%
30%
20%
20% 14%
9%
10% 7% 3%
0%
Radio TV Friends, family and Village chief
neighbors /community leaders

Rural Urban

Fig 9.7

Women (23%) are nearly twice as likely as men (13%) to identify family, friends
and neighbors as their preferred source of information on current national events.
Those with lower levels of education also tend to rely more on family, friends and
neighbors to get information. Significantly more respondents who never went to
school (22%) say they get their information this way, than those who completed
primary school (16%), those who attended high school (10%) and those who have
completed secondary or higher education (8%).

In order to examine in greater depth who in their communities people turn to in


order to find out what is happening locally, the survey asked: “If you wanted to
find out about something important happening in your community who, outside
your family, would you want to tell you about it?” Results show that, in general, re-
spondents prefer to get such information from personal acquaintances rather than
leadership figures within their community. Around a quarter of respondents (23%)
say friends and another fifth (21%) mention neighbors or villagers. Around one in
six (17%) say they would prefer to get this information from village chiefs or com-
munity leaders and around one in eight (13%) from a mullah. More men (19%) than
women (15%) prefer to get their information from community leaders, as do more
respondents living in villages (18%) than in urban areas (13%). Fewer than one in
ten respondents say they prefer to get this kind of information from local radio sta-
tions (7%) or international radio stations (9%).
144 Afghanistan in 2009

However, the proportion of respondents who say they prefer to receive informa-
tion on local events from personal acquaintances has been falling steadily in recent
years. In 2006, around a third (34%) of respondents said they would like to get such
information from neighbors. This figure fell to 30 percent in 2007, a quarter (25%)
in 2008 and a fifth (21%) in 2009. On the other hand, 2009 records the highest
proportion of respondents who say they prefer to get information from influential
people such as village chiefs, community leaders or mullahs. Interestingly, although
the popularity of radio as a source of general information is falling (see Table 9.4), the
proportion of respondents who say they use local and international radio stations to
access local news in increasing.

Table 9.5: If you wanted to find out about something important happening in your community, who,
outside your family, would you want to tell you about it? (Q-7) COMPARISON BETWEEN
2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2006 2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%) (%)
Friend 28 30 26 23
Neighbors/ villagers 34 30 25 21
Village chief/ Community leader 15 13 14 17
Mullah 6 11 10 13
International radio stations 0 0 8 9
Local Afghan Radio stations 0 0 5 7
Co-workers 6 5 3 4
Worker at community centers 6 5 3 3
Shopkeepers 4 4 3 3

The survey also attempted to ascertain how often people use different forms of
print and electronic media such as newspaper, magazines, internet and SMS text
messaging and informal means such as meetings in the community and sermons in
mosques as their major source of information about current events. The great ma-
jority of Afghans say they never use newspapers (75 %), magazines (78%), SMS text
messaging (81%) or the internet (97%) for this purpose. This is likely to be largely
due to a combination of low access to communications technologies and relatively
low levels of literacy amongst the Afghan population as a whole. However, the use
of informal means to get news and information is high. Nearly half of respondent
use meetings in the community (53%) or sermons in mosques (47%) for this pur-
pose. This demonstrates that traditional means of information dissemination con-
tinue to remain important in Afghanistan.
Information Sources and Media Use 145

Table 9.6: How often do you use the following media to get news and information about current
events? (Q-8a-f, Base 6406)

Every day Three or One or Less than


or almost four days two days once per Never
every day a week a week week (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Newspapers 3 5 6 10 75
b) Magazines 1 4 7 10 78
c) The Internet 0 0 0 0 97
d) SMS 2 3 6 8 81
e) Meetings in your community 6 13 16 18 46
f) Meetings or sermons at your
16 12 11 8 53
mosque

Despite small fluctuations, there have not been substantial changes since 2007 in
the use of different means of communication for accessing information on cur-
rent events, with the exception of the use of SMS text messaging which has risen
dramatically from 9 percent in 2007 and 10 percent in 2008 to 19 percent in 2009.
This is consistent with the significant rise in mobile phone ownership in the last year
which has meant that for the first time the majority of respondents (52%) now have
access to this kind of technology (See Table 9.1).

Table 9.7: Proportion of those who use the following means to get news and information about cur-
rent events (Q-8a-f, Base 6406) COMPARISON BETWEEN 2007, 2008 AND 2009

2007 2008 2009


(%) (%) (%)
a) Newspapers 25 19 24
b) Magazines 22 15 22
c) The Internet 4 2 0
d) SMS 9 10 19
e) Meetings in your community 51 48 53
f) Meetings or sermons at your mosque 56 55 47
146 Afghanistan in 2009
Appendix 1: Target Demographics 147

10 Appendix 1: Target Demographics

A total of 6406 respondents were surveyed in the study, out of which 5029 (79%)
were from rural areas and 1377 (21%) were from urban areas Of all respondents
interviewed, 53% were male and 47% were female The following tables provide
demographic and socio-economic details of the respondents including a rural-urban
breakdown They also provide the employment status, occupation, educational status,
income status and marital status of the respondents

Gender and Region

All Rural Urban


Characteristics
6406 5029 1377
Gender % % %
Male 53 54 51
Female 47 46 49
Region % % %
Central/Kabul 23 14 54
South East 11 13 2
East 10 11 4
North East 15 16 10
North West 14 15 13
West 13 15 8
South West 11 12 9
Central/Hazarajat 3 4 1

Employment Status and Age Group

All Rural Urban


Characteristics
6406 5029 1377
Employment % % %
Working 36 37 33
Retired 1 1 2
Housewife 43 42 44
Student 6 5 7
Unemployed 14 14 13
Other 1 1 1
Age Group % % %
18 – 24 27 26 28
25 – 34 26 27 25
35 – 44 22 22 22
45 – 54 15 16 14
55 – 64 7 7 7
65 + 3 3 5
148 Afghanistan in 2009

Main Occupation

Main Occupation All Rural Urban


Base: Currently working and retired
2389 1912 478
respond ents
(%) (%) (%)
Farmer (own land / tenant farmer) 30 36 7
Farm labourer (other’s land) 14 16 4
Labourer, domestic, or unskilled worker 9 7 14
Informal sales/ business 12 11 18
Skilled worker/artisan 10 9 12
Government office - clerical worker 4 3 6
Private office - clerical worker 1 1 4
Government office – executive/manager 1 1 4
Private office – executive/manager 1 1 2
Self-employed professional 4 3 8
Small business owner 4 4 7
School teacher 6 6 7
University teacher 0 0 0
Military/Police 2 1 5
Other 0 0 0

Farming Land

Farming Land All Rural Urban


Base: Farmers who own land or tenant farmers 722 690 32
(%) (%) (%)
Less than 1 Jerib 12 11 22
1 – 2 Jerib 25 24 32
21 – 3 Jerib 27 27 22
More than 3 Jerib 36 36 25

* Jerib: One Jerib is equal to one-fifth of a hectare


Appendix 1: Target Demographics 149

Average Monthly Household Income

All Rural Urban


Income
6406 5029 1377
(%) (%) (%)
Less than 2,000 Afs 16 18 10
2,001 – 3,000 Afs 18 19 16
3,001 – 5,000 Afs 24 24 23
5,001 – 10,000 Afs 23 21 29
10,001 – 15,000 Afs 9 8 10
15,001 – 20,000 Afs 5 5 7
20,001 – 25,000 Afs 2 2 2
25,001 – 40,000 Afs 1 1 2
More then 40,000 Afs 0 0 0

Marital Status

All Rural Urban


Marital Status
6406 5029 1377
(%) (%) (%)
Single 22 21 23
Married 75 76 75
Widower/ Widow 3 3 2

Educational Status

All Rural Urban


Educational Status
6406 5029 1377
(%) (%) (%)
Never went to school 60 63 46
Primary School, incomplete 9 9 9
Primary School, complete 7 7 5
Secondary education, incomplete 5 5 6
Secondary education, complete 4 4 5
High School 12 10 22
University education or above 2 1 6
Appendix 2: Methodology 151

11 Appendix 2: Methodology

1. Distribution of sampling points by region and urban/rural strata

The survey was conducted among 6406 respondents in a single wave. Fieldwork for
the survey was conducted by the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion
Research (ACSOR-Surveys), Kabul, between June 17 and July 6, 2009 by a team of
648 trained interviewers (300 women and 348 men). The survey consisted of in-
person interviews with a random, representative sample of 6406 Afghan citizens, 18
years of age and over and resident in Afghanistan.

The survey included both urban and rural respondents in all provinces of
Afghanistan. The Sheharwali (municipal administration in Afghanistan) defines the
urban population as those living within municipal boundaries. By default, the rural
population comprises those who are living outside the municipal limits. Rural areas
are defined neither in terms of population density nor remoteness.

The country is divided into eight geographical regions covering all 34 provinces. The
sample was distributed proportional to geographic and residential characteristics of
the population in each province. Within each province, districts were selected by first
listing them by size of population and then applying a random selection method
from this list.

For provinces with low population density, such as Nimroz, Panjshir and Nooristan,
five interviews per sampling point were conducted, rather than eight as in other
provinces, to offer broader geographic distribution.

The margin of sampling error is calculated at a cumulative of +/-3.7 percent at 95


percent confidence interval. The stochastic error is +/-2.4 percent while the systemic
error is +/- 1.3 percent. The systemic error appears because of the areas not accessible
for surveying this year. The systemic error percentage is based on the retrospective
calculation of the contribution of the inaccessible areas in the data for 2008.

2. Selection of sampling points and replacement of sampling points

The interviews were completed using multi-stage random sampling. Due to local
cultural traditions, the sample was first divided into male and female sub-samples. Each
region, province and further strata was allocated an equal number of male and female
respondents per sampling points. Field researchers of the appropriate gender were
allocated to conduct the interviews for each sub-sample. However, in 2009, in three
southern provinces; Paktika, Uruzghan and Zabul, the deteriorated security situation
restricted the freedom of movement, making it unsafe to employ female interviewers.
This meant that no women were included in the sample in these provinces.
152 Afghanistan in 2009

Moreover, in 2009, there were greater restrictions on the movement of survey


researchers than in previous years. A number of districts in the country could not
be surveyed because of inaccessibility due to logistical problems, natural disasters
and security. Overall 208 of the 882 sampling points had to be replaced. The
replacements were made by selecting other sampling points in the same region. The
instability and frequent fighting in some provinces caused 102 of the sampling points
across the country (12%) to be adjusted or replaced to keep interviewers out of areas
affected by active violence. This was a significant change from 2008 when only 17
sampling points (3%) had to be replaced for security reasons. The regions most
severely affected by these restrictions are the South East (18 replacements), South
West (17 replacements) and West (15 replacements). There were 13 replacements
each made in the East, Central/ Kabul, and North East regions. In other regions
significant numbers of sampling points had to be changed for security reasons
in individual provinces including Faryab (10 replacements) in the North West,
Kunduz (8 replacements) in the North East, Logar (5 replacements) and Kabul (4
replacements) in the Central/Kabul region. Helmand was the only province were
sampling point replacements did not have to be made.

Replacement of the sampling points and the reason for replacement is described
in the following table

Projected District/
Province SP Replaced with Reason
Village
CENTRAL/KABUL
Dara Murghazar No village found
94 Dara Mirdad Village
Village with such name
Wolaswali Bagrami No village found
97 Qala Bakar Village
Village with such name
Markaz Tapa Sewom
1. Kabul 99 Kargo Ya Kargo Village Security problem
Village
107 Kotakar Wochkaraiz Village Muhen Khil Village Security problem
Sang Naweshta
108 Rahmat Abad Village Security problem
Village
110 Shamamzaye Village Khurd Kabul Village Security problem
Appendix 2: Methodology 153

111 Karaiz Mira Khail Village Khugi Village Security problem


The way to
the settlement
122 Lalma Village Towachyan Village
2. Kapisa blocked, under
reconstruction
Ibrahim Khail Dara
123 Jor Qul Village Security problem
Pachaghan Khail Village

Darab Shah Khil No village found


126 Shabi Khail Village
Village with such name
No village found
127 Khosh Dara Village Tutumdara Village
with such name
3. Parwan
Transportation
140 Sakandara Sardary Village Durani Village
problem
Ali Khalja Payeen Transportation
141 Shemi Village
Village problem
Sampled in recent
144 Mir Baig Khail Village Ghanjo Village
surveys
Sang Nekhshan No village found
150 Khamba Village
Village with such name
No village found
33. Panjshir 903 Howdak Village Dar Nama Village
with such name
No village found
907 Dolana Kona Village Jangalak Village
with such name
Sampled in recent
913 Tond Khoi Village Qalha Turkha Village
surveys
Aallah Yar Khail Bala
234 Aman Khil Village Security problem
4. Wardak Village
235 Kharani Village Tangi Village Security problem
154 Afghanistan in 2009

Barakat Mohammad No village found


249 Joyek Village
Sarwar Village with such name

253 Din Mohammad Village Deh Yahya Village Security problem

255 Zahrab Shah Village Baboki Village Security problem


Kunjak Ya Rasool Khail Dara Surkh Ab No village found
5. Logar 257
Village Village with such name
263 Qarya Alif Village Doshankak Village Security problem
No village found
265 Spori Kalay Village Bala Deh Bala Village
with such name
266 Azra District Khoshi District Security problem
267 Azra District Khoshi District Security problem
EAST
No village found
153 Hawza Char Village Ali Khil Village
with such name
Shah Buhran Agha No village found
165 Hazrati Village
Village with such name
169 Meya Gan Village Sra Qalha Village Security problem

181 Dowake Gollaye Village Do Kalay Village Security problem

Koz Kalay Sar Kand The bridge to the


182 Atawal Village
Village village destroyed
10. Nangarhar No village found
184 Seya Village Matrani Village
with such name
No village found
187 Atmanzaye Payen Village Ghazgai Village
with such name
Markazi Gushta Transportation
192 Paitow Ya Lal Kalay Village
Village problem
Transportation
193 Zeyarat Dag Village Banda Village
problem
Fight between
194 Lalmi Village Surobi Village
two tribes
196 Amori Village Tarnaw Village Security problem
199 Sarki Village Qalha Banda Village Security problem
200 Chapa Dara District Dar-i- Pech District Security problem
201 Chapa Dara District Dar-i- Pech District Security problem
200 Durge Village Jobi Village Security problem
12. Kunar 201 Paitow Tental Village Sandari Village Security problem
202 Narit Village Barkana Sir Village Security problem
204 Babura Village Adnahi Bila Village Security problem
205 Chengay Village Donahi Village Security problem
206 Dacheno Kalay Village Lahor Dag Village Security problem
207 Chehl Gazi Village Warsak Village Security problem
Appendix 2: Methodology 155

No village found
214 Walkank Village Shangnah Village
with such name
Manko Abo Khil No village found
217 Dak Maly Village
Village with such name
11. Laghman
No village found
219 Nolo Village Gal Gal Village
with such name
No village found
220 Gumrahi Village Islam Abad Village
with such name
No village found
228 Atat So Village Shir Gul Village
13. with such name
Nooristan Transportation
918 Awyak Village Mamo Kalay Village
problem
CENTRAL/HAZARAJAT
Gunbad Shahidan Transportation
797 Qoul Ali Bala Village
Village problem
No village found
798 Mahajeren Zerbat Village Dawodi Village
with such name
Male residents
801 Kata Khak Village Dehan Ghar Village blocking the
interviews
Transportation
802 Dahan Palan Village Surkh Kawak Village
problem
Transportation
803 Dorashtak Village Sar Asyab Village
problem
32. Bamyan
Transportation
804 Ghorband Village Lokitak Village
problem
Transportation
805 Pasheda Balena Village Gunbadi Village
problem
Sar Zowlech Jowkari Deh Now Dara Ali Transportation
806
Jowshzako Sheena Village Village problem
Transportation
808 Ghar Ghara Salih Village Dew Khana Village
problem
Transportation
810 Char Tak Village Panja Madad Village
problem
156 Afghanistan in 2009

Security problem
Tamzan Malik Abdul Baqi Wager Tamzan
813 and presence of
Village Village
Taliban
Sabz Sang Wager
814 Seranj Village Language problem
34. Dehkundi Village
Fight between two
817 Aghil Sang Village Sozak Charkh Village
tribes
Transportation
818 Dahana-i-Nur Village Tay Rah Village
problem
SOUTH EAST

269 Kala Ghach Sufla Village Ali Lala Village Security problem

281 Madom Wal Village Qalha Qadam Village Security problem

283 Shaliz Village Haidar Abad Village Security problem


Masjed Eidgah
284 Zelzela Village Security problem
Village
300 Dahi Haji Village No Burja Village Security problem
6. Ghazni Khowja Umary
299 Giro District Security problem
District
Khowja Umary
300 Giro District Security problem
District
301 Nawa District Gelan District Security problem

302 Nawa District Gelan District Security problem


303 Abband District Muqur District Security problem
304 Abband District Muqur District Security problem
306 Wacha Lagara Village Lagli Village Security problem
7. Paktia 316 Waza Zadram District Ahmad Khil District Security problem
317 Waza Zadram District Ahmad Khil District Security problem
331 Waza Khwah District Jani Khil District Security problem
8. Paktika
332 Waza Khwah District Jani Khil District Security problem

338 Sabari District Bak District Security problem


9. Khost
339 Sabari District Bak District Security problem
Appendix 2: Methodology 157

SOUTH WEST
Deh Godarano Kocha No village found
381 Moy Mubarak Village
Village with such name
Mirza Mohamamd
382 Wali Khan Kalay Village Security problem
Khan Qalha Village
Aji Ahmad Ali
383 Daro Mashenan Village Security problem
Masjed Village
De Mula Moh Asan
Kocha Mir Hazar No village found
384 Hamam Makhamakh
Village with such name
Sarak Village
De Maski Zai Timor
391 Barkiano Village Security problem
Zai Kalay Village
Shah Usain Hotak No village found
393 Mawla Dad Kalai Village
Village with such name
Aji Khaleq Dad Kalai Ghulam Mohammad
395 Security problem
Village Village
No village found
396 Akhtar Moh Kalai Village Kabuli Kalay Village
with such name
Fazl Mohammad No village found
397 Ato Kalai Village
Kalay Village with such name
28. Kandahar No village found
398 Burj Kalai Lowal Village Kadni Pol Village
with such name
Mayubino Kalay
399 Aji Baloch Kalacha Village Security problem
Village
406 Char Qalha Alia Village Sar Deh Safla Village Security problem
Lot Baba Kocha
407 Aji Khunin Village Security problem
Village
Qalha Shah Mardan
408 Akhtar Kariz Village Security problem
Village

Manan Chawk
409 Achekzai Yuzni Village Security problem
Village

Aji Mohammad Esa


410 Darbazan Village Security problem
Village

Akhund Zada Khil


411 Dabroyel Village Security problem
(Barzayi) Village
No village found
413 Anzargi Village Zarifa Mina Village
with such name
Monawar Andam No village found
414 Byaban Kalai Village
Kalay Village with such name
158 Afghanistan in 2009

Security problem
Abdullah Khan
29. Zabul 425 Shar Mila Village and presence of
Village
Taliban
No village found
765 Skech Village Kotal Village
with such name
No village found
767 Shen Ghola Village Shin Nahrla Village
with such name
30. Urozgan 770 Shaheed-i-Hasas District Chora District Security problem
771 Shaheed-i-Hasas District Chora District Security problem
958 Shaheed-i-Hasas District Chora District Security problem
959 Shaheed-i-Hasas District Chora District Security problem
No village found
445 Mah Wali Village Alaqa Dar Village
with such name
This village
452 Mir Ali Village Malgi Village destroyed due to
26. Nimroz flood
No village found
940 Shamsudin Village Nad Ali Village
with such name
Mohammad Osman Presence of
949 Khair Abad Village
Village Taliban
WEST
430 Murghab District Ab- Kamari District Security problem
431 Murghab District Ab- Kamari District Security problem
436 Jawand District Qadis District Security problem
23. Badghis 437 Jawand District Ab-Kamari District Security problem
438 Jawand District Qala-i-Now District Security problem
443 Ghormach District Muqur District Security problem
444 Ghormach District Muqur District Security problem
Rubat Kabuli Ha
467 Akhund Jamshedi Village Security problem
Village
No village found
472 Asya Buz Bast Village Buzdang Village
with such name
24. Herat
473 Momen Abad Village Sar Tapan Village Security problem
Sawa Safid Rawan No village found
474 Qala Safidak Village
Village with such name
481 Chaka Village Ardo Bagh Village Security problem
511 Bala Blook District Anar Dara District Security problem
512 Bala Blook District Anar Dara District Security problem
25. Farah 515 Kariaz Kotak Village Narmaki Village Security problem
Security problem
516 Kariaz Hakim Village Barangat Village and presence of
Taliban
No village found
31. Ghor 777 Sopar Man Village Dara Ghazi Village
with such name
Appendix 2: Methodology 159

No village found
778 Seya Ab Village Dara Kasi Village
with such name
No village found
779 Khalawi Village Family Ha Village
with such name
NORTH EAST
Charmaghz Dara The way destroyed
524 Sholesh Dara Village
Village due to flood
Towaraq Kalam Ya Maida Do Ghalat The way destroyed
527
Madrasa Village Village due to flood
The way destroyed
534 Chehl Kam Shahr Village Rubat Kalkak Village
due to flood
Dasht Qarinak The way destroyed
535 Kord Bala Village
Village due to flood
Ghaz Morgh Payen The way destroyed
543 Sar Shar Village
Village due to flood
The way destroyed
544 Kaida Village Dand Village
due to flood
The way destroyed
546 Lakeow Village Zardan Village
due to flood
The way destroyed
547 Gamaow Village Naw Abad Village
due to flood
The way destroyed
550 Chaka Kha Village Lagher Village
14. due to flood
Badakhshan The way destroyed
551 Shaikhan Village Faqlayee Village
due to flood
The way destroyed
544 Sheghnan District Zebak District
due to flood
The way destroyed
545 Sheghnan District Zebak District
due to flood
Arghanj Khwa The way destroyed
546 Shiki District
District due to flood
Arghanj Khwa The way destroyed
547 Shiki District
District due to flood
The way destroyed
548 Kofab District Wardug District
due to flood
The way destroyed
549 Kofab District Wardug District
due to flood
Shar-i- Buzurg The way destroyed
550 Khwahan District
District due to flood
Shar-i- Buzurg The way destroyed
551 Khwahan District
District due to flood
No village found
566 Kata Qeshlaq Village Zar Mikh Village
with such name
15. Takhar
Taqcha Khana The way destroyed
580 Da Morsalan Village
Payeen Village due to flood
160 Afghanistan in 2009

Security problem
583 Haji Nadir Village Aji Nawab Village and presence of
Taliban
No village found
587 Haji Gulagha Village Badozi Village
with such name
Security problem
Naqelin Haji Abdullah Wa
590 Panjshiri Ha Village and presence of
Mohammad Rafiq Village
Taliban
16. Baghlan Shaikhan Khowja Bai No village found
594 Talab Bay Village
Village with such name
No village found
595 Showra Zar Village Chehl Ghuri Village
with such name
596 Ta Poorak Village Kaftar Khana Village Security problem
Abandoned
598 Naqelin Village Shahr Kuhna Village
settlement
602 Paghonda Village Gadi Ha Village Just a few residents

629 Dasht-i-Archi District Hazrat- Emam District Security problem

Hazrat- Emam
630 Dasht-i-Archi District Security problem
District
Hazrat- Emam
631 Dasht-i-Archi District Security problem
District
17. Kunduz 632 Char Darah District Ali Abad District Security problem
633 Char Darah District Ali Abad District Security problem
634 Char Darah District Ali Abad District Security problem
Kunduz Rural
635 Qala-i-Zal District Security problem
District
Kunduz Rural
636 Qala-i-Zal District Security problem
District
NORTH WEST
No village found
639 Aji Salah Frosh Village Karta Bakhtar Village
with such name
Qaria Qabchaq Transportation
651 Qeshlaq Saye Village
Village problem
Taka Turkman Asfehan
653 Bagh Raq Village Security problem
Village
Transportation
18. Balkh 658 Kangori Village Sar Asyab Village
problem
Char Bagh Saidan
659 Zardyan Mahjer Village Security problem
Village
664 Mazar Qara Village Arab Nardara Village Security problem
Sukhta Bakhtar No village with
670 Now Seli Village
Village such name
No village with
674 Qara Khowal Village Maghz Zar Village
such name
Appendix 2: Methodology 161

The way destroyed


682 Qawetash Village Safed Kotal Village
due to flood
The way destroyed
684 Bariki Village Naw Azan Village
due to flood
The way destroyed
19. Samangan 686 Tewa Tash Village Char Toot Village
due to flood
The way destroyed
687 Qar Ahmad Village Khana Sangi Village
due to flood
The way destroyed
953 Pitawak Village Tajwar Village
due to flood
No village found
696 Enol Mal Village Alti Khwaja Village
with such name
Salmandal Uzbekia Abandoned
698 Mir Shakar Sufla Village
Village settlement
20. Jawzjan
Fatah Abad Watani Transportation
706 Arsanji Village
Village problem

Transportation
707 Alim Lik Bala Village Aranji Village
problem
No village found
712 Shah Gul Village Emam Jahfar Village
with such name
No village found
715 Haji Bacha Village Achabar Village
with such name
District governor
of Kohistanat
717 Kohistanat District Sangcharak District
didn’t allow the
interview
District governor
of Kohistanat
718 Kohistanat District Sangcharak District
didn’t allow the
interview
21. Sar-i-Pul District governor
of Kohistanat
719 Kohistanat District Sangcharak District
didn’t allow the
interview
District governor
of Kohistanat
720 Kohistanat District Sangcharak District
didn’t allow the
interview
Qatghan Mast No village found
721 Akbar Abad Village
Village with such name
Maimana Qeshlaq No village found
723 Ya Ahoo Village
Village with such name
162 Afghanistan in 2009

Aq Gunbad Ghulam Nabi


734 Chaghanak Village Security problem
Village
Kohi Khana Qaisar
738 Kamrak Gul Agha Village Security problem
Village
Naw Wari Qalha
739 Jagdelak Village Security problem
Village
740 Ayta Salaq Village Sofi Qalha Village Security problem

741 Ata Salaq Sarbaz Village Sar Asyab Village Security problem

742 Baid Qeshlaq Village Baloch Village Security problem


22. Faryab
Khowja Zangi Ghalbala
747 Qapich Lik Village Security problem
Village
Kaftar Khan Gozar Yatim Qeshlaq
748 Security problem
Village Village
749 Badshisi Village Sar Fasl Village Security problem
No village found
753 Dasht Yaz Village Pakhal Tughi Village
with such name

Mohmmad Azam Shor


756 Awlia Shay Village Security problem
Darya Village

3. Selection of starting points within each sampling point

The settlements within districts were selected at random by the field director. Each
sampling point was assigned a starting point and given direction. The starting points
were recognizable locations like mosques, schools, bazaars etc within each of the
selected settlements for the survey.

4. Household Selection

In urban areas, from the given starting point the interviewer headed in the assigned
direction and stopped at the 1st street/lane on the right hand side of his/her route.
From there on, the 2nd contacted household was the fourth house on the right from
the beginning of the street. Further on, the selected household was each 3rd inhabit-
able house on the right side of the interviewer’s route. In apartment buildings the
selection method was each 5th apartment.

In rural areas, the interviewer started from the center of the village or the ba-
zaar, mosque, etc. and went to the right selecting each third inhabitable house
on his/her route. Compounds containing two or more houses behind a com-
mon wall were treated as detached houses, counting them counter-clock-wise
from the gate to the compound.
Appendix 2: Methodology 163

5. Respondent Selection

After selecting a household, interviewers used a Kish grid for randomizing the target
respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed with their
names and ages in descending order.

6. Respondent Substitution

Using the Kish Grid, under no circumstances were interviewers allowed to substitute
an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent
refused to participate or was not available after callbacks, the interviewer moved on
to the next household according to the random walk.

7. Call-backs (rate, method, and results)

Typically interviewers were required to make two call-backs before replacing the
designated respondent. Due to security-related fears in previous deployments field
researchers had difficulty meeting the requirement of two call-backs prior to substi-
tution. In this survey, while field researchers were able to complete some call-backs,
the majority of the interviews were completed on the first attempt (979%), 19% of
the interviews were completed on the second attempt, and 2% of interviews were
completed on the third attempt. Due to the high rate of unemployment, and choos-
ing the appropriate time of day for interviewing, completion on the first attempt is
the norm in Afghanistan.

8. Training of Interviewers

ACSOR first held extended training sessions with supervisors on the Interviewers’ Man-
ual which covers all the main aspects of the field researchers’ work. This was followed
by a briefing for interviewers on the survey questionnaire. At the end of the detailed
review of the questionnaire each supervisor conducted a monitored mock interview in
the office, and was further assigned to conduct a pilot interview in the field.

On the next day, the completed pilot interviews were reviewed for proper adminis-
tration. A briefing session was held to discuss any problems discovered during the
pilot interviews. Each supervisor repeated the entire process with the interviewers in
the respective province. The training typically lasted two to three days.

The briefings with supervisors were held in Kabul. Each supervisor then organized
his/her own briefing sessions with the interviewers. The briefing on the main ques-
tions was conducted by the Project Managers Mr. Zemarak Mohsini and Mr. Jameel
164 Afghanistan in 2009

Rahmany. The Field Managers, Mr. Toryalai Tajmal Zai and Mr. Rahmatullah Faizi
reviewed the sampling procedures. Mr. Matthew Warshaw provided guidance and
monitored the sessions in Kabul and The Asia Foundation staff and consultants
attended briefings as well. Issues emphasized during the briefing were: a) proper
household and respondent selection, b) review of the questionnaire content, c) ap-
propriate interviewing techniques, and d) conducting pilot interviews to master logic
and concept of questions.

9. Refusals/Non-Contacts/Completed Interviews

Result Category Number % of Category


Non-Contact
No one at home after three visits 437 5.6 %
Respondent long-term absence /for the field work period 467 6.0 %
No adults (18+) after three visits 192 2.5 %
Sub-Total 1096 14.1 %
Refusals
Not feeling informed to answer the questions 114 1.5 %
Prefers head of the house to be interviewed 81 1.0 %
In a hurry/ No time 111 1.4 %
Aborted in the course of interview
Sub-Total 306 3.9 %
Completed Interviews 6406 82.0 %
Total Contact Attempts 7808 100%

10. Quality Control Methods

After the return of the questionnaires from the field, most of the completed ques-
tionnaires were subject to logical control for proper administration.

Actual interviewing was monitored directly by a supervisor for 7.1% of the sam-
ple. Another 19% of the completed interviews were back-checked by a supervisor
in person. 3.8 % of the completed interviews were back-checked from ACSOR’s
central office. The Asia Foundation also contributed to the quality control by back
checking 188 (2.9%) of the interviews across 10 provinces. The issues verified dur-
ing in person back-checks included proper household and respondent selection and
correct recording of answers to five randomly selected questions from the main
body of the questionnaire.

In total, 212 interviews were rejected due to the low quality of interviewers’ work.
These interviews were not kept in the final data set. Three interviewers were dis-
missed due to poor performance.
Appendix 2: Methodology 165

11. Weighting

The data set includes a weight to adjust for over-sampling and under-sampling at the
provincial level. The data was weighted to be representative of national population distri-
bution according to the population statistics available from the Afghan Central Statistics
Office. Below is the entire list of weights assigned to rural and urban areas by province.

Weighting Factor
Province
Rural Urban
Kabul 1.05173871 1.03198431
Kapisa 1.04713488 .
Parwan 1.02202014 1.00282393
Wardak 1.03033593 .
Logar 0.92394254 .
Ghazni 1.05384182 1.03404792
Paktia 0.99759945 0.97886192
Paktika 1.25174745 .
Khost 1.06873138 1.04865782
Nangarhar 1.02539635 1.00613673
Laghman 1.04713488 .
Kunar 0.97233954 .
Nooristan 0.35262394 .
Badakhshan 1.00771821 0.98879063
Takhar 1.07542261 1.05522336
Baghlan 1.05616826 1.03633066
Kunduz 1.03153690 1.01216194
Balkh 1.03922357 1.01970424
Samangan 0.87429206 0.85787058
Jawzjan 1.19106055 1.16868932
Sar-i-Pul 0.99025604 0.97165645
Faryab 1.21380692 1.19100846
Badghis 1.01428359 .
Herat 1.07732556 1.05709058
Farah 1.02410003 1.00486476
Nimroz 0.34971683 0.34314823
Helmand 1.02519695 1.00594108
Kandahar 1.08230925 1.06198066
Zabul 0.72585078 0.71221740
Uruzghan 0.85936827 0.84322709
Ghor 1.05464661 .
Bamyan 0.97364571 0.95535810
Panjshir 0.35588898 .
Dehkondi 1.04968861 1.02997272
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 167

12 Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire

Region

%
Central/Kabul 23
South East 11
Eastern 10
North East 15
North West 14
Western 13
South Western 11
Central/Hazarajat 3

Geographic Code

%
Villages 79
Towns 5
City 5
Metro (Kabul) 11

Province

%
Kabul 14
Kapisa 2
Parwan 2
Wardak 2
Logar 1
Ghazni 5
Paktia 2
Paktika 2
Khost 2
Nangarhar 6
Laghman 2
Kunar 2
Nooristan 1
Badakhshan 4
Takhar 4
168 Afghanistan in 2009

Baghlan 3
Kunduz 4
Balkh 5
Samangan 1
Jawzjan 2
Sar-i-Pul 2
Faryab 4
Badghis 2
Herat 7
Farah 2
Nimroz 1
Helmand 3
Kandahar 4
Zabul 1
Uruzghan 1
Ghor 3
Bamyan 2
Panjshir 1
Dehkondi 2

NOTE TO INTERVIEWERS:

REMEMBER THAT THIS IS A CONVERSATION. MAKE THE RESPON-


DENT COMFORTABLE. MAKE EYE CONTACT.

DO NOT TRY TO LEAD THE RESPONDENT DURING THE INTERVIEW


OR GET THE “DESIRED” ANSWERS FROM THEM. MAKE SURE YOU
TELL THEM THAT THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS, YOU
JUST WANT THEIR OPINIONS.

DURING THE INTERVIEW, BE POLITE BUT INQUISITIVE. DO NOT


ACCEPT ONE-WORD ANSWERS. DRAW OUT RESPONDENTS TO GIVE
DETAILED RESPONSES BY FURTHER PROBING - SAY: “WHY DO YOU
SAY THAT?” “ANYTHING ELSE?” “TELL ME MORE.”

Asalaam Valeikum, I am from ACSOR-Surveys, an independent research organiza-


tion. We regularly conduct surveys among people like you to find out what you feel
about issues of public interest. ACSOR-Surveys has no relation to the government.
I just want to ask you some questions about “matters of interest to Afghans”. I am
interested in your opinion. Your answers will be kept confidential and your name
will not be given to anyone and your views will be analyzed along with those of
thousands of others.
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 169

Q-1. Do you own any of the following here in your household in functioning order?

Don’t
Yes No Refused
Know
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Radio 81 19 0 0
b) TV set 41 59 0 0
c) Fixed phone line 0 100 0 0
d) Mobile phone 52 48 0 0
e) Bicycle 47 53 0 0
f) Motorcycle 29 71 0 0
g) Computer 6 93 0 0
h) Car 14 86 0 0

Q-2. I’ll ask you some questions about your listener-ship of the radio. How many days a
week do you listen to the radio, if any?

(%)
Every day or almost every day 44
Three or four days a week 21
One or two days a week 10
Less than once a week 5
Never 20
Refused 0
Don’t Know 1

Q-3. (Filtered. Ask all those who listen to radio, answers ‘1’ to ‘4’ in Q-2) You said
that you listen to the radio ________________ (mention response in Q-2). How
many hours do you listen to it on an average day every time when you listen to the
radio?

(%)
Less than 30 minutes 21
31 min to 1 hour 38
1 hour to 2 hrs 25
More than 2 hours a day 16
Refused 0
Don’t Know 0
170 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-4. (ASK ALL) Now I’ll ask you some questions about your viewership of the television.
How many days a week do you watch TV, if any?

(%)
Every day or almost every day 26
Three or four days a week 10
One or two days a week 4
Less than once a week 2
Never 56
Refused 1
Don’t Know 2

Q-5. (Filtered. Ask those who watch TV, answers ‘1’ to ‘4’ in Q-4) You said that
you watch television ________________ (mention response in Q-4). How many
hours do you watch it on an average day every time when you watch television?

(%)
Less than 30 minutes 10
31 minutes to 1 hour 27
1 hour to 2 hrs 30
More than 2 hours a day 32
Refused 0
Don’t Know 1

Q-6. (ASK ALL) Which is the main source from where you normally get information
about what is happening in the country? [Do Not Read Out Answers]
Write Answer:____________________________

(%)
TV 25
Radio 47
Newspapers 1
Village chief /community leaders 6
School teacher 1
Religious leader 2
Friends and family and neighbors 18
Refused 0
Don’t Know 1
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 171

Q-7. If you wanted to find out about something important happening in your community,
who, outside your family, would you want telling you about it? [Do Not Read Out
Answers]
Write Answer:____________________________

(%)
Mullah 13
Village chief/ Community leader 17
Worker at community centers (school, health center, etc.) 3
Friend 23
Co-workers 4
Shopkeepers 3
Neighbors/ villagers 21
Local Afghan Radio stations 7
International radio stations (such as BBC, Azadi, or Ashna) 9
TV stations 0
Other 0
Refused 0
Don’t Know 1

Q-8. People get information about news and current events from many different sources.
For each one of the sources I mention, please tell me how often you use that source
to get news and information about current events: daily /most days a week, 3 or 4
days a week, 1 or 2 days a week, less than once per week, or never?

Less
SHOW CARD. Every day Three or One or Don’t
than Never Refused
rotate or almost four days two days Know
once per
STARTING every day a week a week
week
POINT.
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Newspapers 3 5 6 10 75 0 0
b) Magazines 1 4 7 10 78 0 0
c) The Internet 0 0 0 0 97 0 2
d) SMS (text
messaging on a 2 3 6 8 81 0 1
mobile phone)
e) Meetings
in your 6 13 16 18 46 0 2
community
f) Meetings
or sermons at 16 12 11 8 53 0 1
your mosque
172 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-9. Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the
right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

(%)
Right direction 42
Wrong direction 29
Some in right, some in wrong direction 21
Refused 1
Don’t Know 7

Q-10a. (Filtered. If ‘1’ in Q-9): Why do you say that things are moving in the right
direction? (Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)
Write 1st Mention:__________________________________________

Q-10b. (Filtered. If ‘1’ in Q-9): Why else? (Do NOT read codes. Write down
answer)
Write 2nd Mention:__________________________________________

[Do not print list in final questionnaire]

Q-10a Q-10a&b
1st mention 1st & 2nd mentions
(%) (%)
Good security 31 44
Reconstruction / rebuilding 20 36
Schools for girls have opened 9 21
Good government 7 12
Democracy / elections 6 10
Peace / end of the war 5 9
Having active ANA and ANP 3 7
Economic revival 2 6
Freedom / free speech 2 5
International assistance 2 5
Free movement / travel possible 2 4
Disarmament 1 3
Having a legal constitution 2 3
Road reconstruction 1 3
More job opportunities available 1 2
National unity 1 2
Removing the Taliban 1 2
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 173

Women can now work 1 1


Women have more freedom 0 1
Refugees return 0 1
Reduction in level of administrative
0 1
corruption
Reduction in poppy cultivation 0 1
Removing the terrorism 1 1
More resection to human rights 1 1
Clinics have been built 0 1
Development in agriculture system 0 1
Development in healthcare system in
0 1
general
Having Parliament 0 1
More electricity supply now than before 0 1
Don’t Know 0 12

Q-11a. (Filtered. If “Wrong direction” in Q-9): Why do you say that things are
moving in the wrong direction?
(Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)

Write 1st Mention:__________________________________________

Q-11b. (Filtered. If “Wrong direction” in Q-9): Why else? (Do NOT read codes.
Write down answer)

Write 2nd Mention:__________________________________________

[Do not print list in final questionnaire]

Q-11a&b
Q-11a
1st & 2nd
1st mention
mentions
(%) (%)
Insecurity 29 42
Bad government 15 25
Corruption 8 17
There is unemployment 5 15
Bad economy 4 11
Administrative corruption 5 10
Too many foreigners are getting involved 4 7
174 Afghanistan in 2009

Presence of Taliban 3 7
No reconstruction has happened 3 6
Suicide attacks 3 6
Innocent people being killed 3 5
Poor education system 2 4
Ethnic problems 2 4
Poor leadership 1 3
Lack of coordination between ISAF/ Coalition forces
1 3
and ANP/ANA during fights with AGE
Presence of Warlords 1 3
People disenchanted with the government 1 3
High price 1 3
Lack of aid / no development assistance 1 2
Western influence is too great 1 2
Neighboring countries cause problems 1 2
Increase in level of drug trade 0 2
There is no progress 0 1
Foreign aid causes problems 0 1
There is danger to Islam 1 1
Disarmament didn’t take place 0 1
Kidnapping children 0 1
Water and power problems 0 1
Too much luxury 1 1
Unfair elections 1 1
Terrorism 0 1
Don’t Know 0 11
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 175

Q-12a. (ASK ALL) In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a
whole? (Do NOT read codes. Write down answer)

Write 1st Mention:__________________________________________

Q-12b. And after that, what is the next biggest problem? (Do NOT read codes. Write
down answer

Write 2nd Mention:__________________________________________

[Do not print list in final questionnaire]

Q-12a Q-12a&b
Biggest Biggest & next
problem biggest problem
(%) (%)
Insecurity / attacks / violence/ terrorism 24 36
Unemployment 17 35
Poor Economy 9 20
Corruption 8 17
Poverty 6 11
Education / schools / literacy 5 11
Presence of Taliban 5 8
High prices 2 7
Interference of foreign countries 4 7
Government / weak government / central
3 6
authority
Drugs smuggling 2 5
Suicide attacks 2 4
Presence of warlords 2 3
Scarcity of electricity 1 3
Reconstruction / rebuilding 1 2
Roads 1 2
Tribe/ Partisanship 1 2
Innocent people being killed 1 2
Discriminations 1 2
Health care / clinics / hospitals 1 1
Drinking water 1 1
176 Afghanistan in 2009

Water for irrigation 0 1


Lack of (proper) shelter 0 1
Crime 0 1
Agricultural problems 0 1
Lack foreign assistances 0 1
Lack efficient ANA and ANP 1 1
Kidnapping children 0 1
Too much luxury 0 1
Irresponsible armed people 0 1
Injustice 1 1
Don’t Know (volunteered only) 1 5

Q-13a. What is the biggest problem in your local area? (Do NOT Read codes. Write
down answer)

Write 1st Mention:__________________________________________

Q-13b. And what is the next biggest problem in your local area? (Do NOT Read codes.
Write down answer and then code in the second column below)

Write 2nd Mention:__________________________________________

[Do not print list in final questionnaire]

Q-13a&b
Q-13a
Biggest & next biggest
Biggest problem
problem
(%) (%)
Unemployment 14 26
Electricity 14 26
Roads 14 24
Water 12 22
Health care / clinics / hospitals 9 20
Education / schools / literacy 7 15
Insecurity / attacks / violence 9 13
Poor Economy 3 8
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 177

Poverty 3 6
High prices 2 4
Reconstruction / rebuilding 2 3
Government / weak government /
1 3
central authority
Water for irrigation 1 3
Presence of warlords 1 2
Taliban 1 2
Corruption 1 2
Ethnic problems 1 2
Lack of (proper) shelter 1 1
Drugs smuggling 0 1
Crime 1 1
Transportation problems 0 1
Lack of agricultural tools /equipment 1 1
No problems 1 1
Presence of foreigners 0 1
Innocent people being killed 0 1
Women rights 0 1
Don’t Know 1 7

Q-14. Which one of following issues is more critical or important to your needs at
present? Please, rank in order of priority, whereby the most important rank as ‘1’,
the next important rank as ‘2’ and so on, up to the least important as ‘5’. (Show
Card and read responses)

Average importance of Roads 2.8


Average importance of Power 2.8
Average importance of Water 2.9
Average importance of Health care 3.1
Average importance of Education 3.4
Don’t Know 1
178 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-15. Turning to another subject, tell me, do you strongly agree, agree somewhat,
disagree somewhat or strongly disagree with the following statements?

Ref. DK
SA AS DS SD
(vol.) (vol.)

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

a) I don’t think that the


government cares much about what 28 46 16 6 0 3
people like me think

b) It is generally not acceptable


to talk negatively about the 23 38 25 10 0 4
Government in public

Q-16. I would like to ask you about today’s conditions in the village/neighborhood
where you live. Would you rate (insert item here) as very good, quite good, quite
bad, or very bad in your area?

Check Starting Item, Rotate


VG QG QB VB Ref. DK
Starting Item Between A to G
(vol.) (vol.)
only

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)


a) The availability of clean
22 41 25 12 0 0
drinking water
b) The availability of water for
16 37 31 14 0 2
irrigation
c) The availability of jobs 5 19 40 36 0 0
d) The supply of electricity 13 21 27 38 0 0
e.) The security situation 25 39 22 13 0 0
f) The availability of clinics and
11 38 35 16 0 0
hospitals
g) The availability of medicine 11 33 39 16 0 0
h) The availability of education
25 42 22 10 0 0
for children
i) Your freedom of movement—
the ability to move safely in your 25 40 26 9 0 1
area or district
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 179

Q-17. What is your expectation for (insert item here) in your area a year from now?
Do you expect it to be much better, somewhat better, somewhat worse, or much
worse? [INTERVIEWER: Start with same item used to start in Q-16]

MB SwB SwW MW DK (vol.)

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)


a) The availability of clean drinking
48 37 9 4 2
water
b) The availability of water for
41 37 14 5 3
irrigation
c) The availability of jobs 37 27 20 12 3
d) The supply of electricity 41 26 16 14 3
e.) The security situation 46 29 13 8 3
f) The availability of clinics and
41 34 17 6 2
hospitals
g) The availability of medicine 40 34 17 6 2
h.) The availability of education for
50 31 12 5 2
children
i) Your freedom of movement—
the ability to move safely in your area 46 32 13 6 3
or district

Q-18. How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your
family these days? Often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

(%)
Often 16
Sometimes 35
Rarely 16
Never 32
Refused 0
Don’t Know 1

Q-19. Have you or has anyone in your family been a victim of violence or of some
criminal act in your home or community in the past year?

(%)
Yes 17
No 81
Refused 1
Don’t Know 1
180 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-20 (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘1’ in Q-19) What kind of violence or crime did you
or someone in your family experience in the past year? READ LIST (Multiple
Response)

(%)
Physical attack or beating 30
Racketeering / extortion 15
Burglary/looting 15
Pick-pocketing 7
Motor vehicle theft / Property taken from your
7
vehicle or parts of the vehicle stolen
Kidnapping 6
Livestock stolen 10
Militants/Insurgent actions 9
Police actions 4
Army actions 3
Foreign forces actions 9
Murder 1
Suicide attack 0
Refused 0
Don’t Know 2

Q-21. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘1’ in Q-19) You said that you’ve been a victim of
violence or some criminal act in the past year. Did you report it to any authority?

(%)
Yes 61
No 33
Refused 0
Don’t Know 5
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 181

Q-22. (Filtered. Ask if answered “Yes” in Q-21) To what agency or institution did
you report the crime? (Multiple Response) [Do Not Read Responses, Record
All That Respondent Mentions, Specify If Other Mentioned]
Write Down All Mentioned By Respondent, Code __________________

(%)
Afghan National Army 18
Afghan National Police 41
Shura/ Elders 12
Local militia (police) 4
Tribal leader / Malik 18
Local Commander or Warlord 3
Mullah Saheb 6
Local PRT 1
Office of UN organization(s) 0
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 1
District Governor/ Woleswal 23
Provincial authority 9
Central Government 3
Public prosecutor 3
Courts 0
Press or other media 0
Taliban 1
My family 0
Don’t Know 2

Q-23. (Ask if answered “No” in Q-21) Why didn’t you report the crime? (Multiple
Response)
[Do Not Read Responses, Record All That Respondent Mentions, Specify
If Other Mentioned]
Write Down All Mentioned By Respondent, Code ___________________

(%)
It makes no difference 23
Danger or fear of retaliation 22
Lack of evidence 12
It wasn’t serious 20
Didn’t know where to report it 11
Lack of trust on government officials 14
Lack of legal counsel 4
Other 0
Refused 1
Don’t Know 9
182 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-24. (ASK ALL) If you were a witness to a crime, to whom would you report it?
(Multiple Response)
[Do Not Read Responses, Record All That Respondent Mentions,
Specify If Other Mentioned]
Write Down All Mentioned By Respondent, Code ________________

(%)
Afghan National Army 16
Afghan National Police 48
Shura/ Elders 13
Local militia (police) 3
Tribal leader / Malik 23
Local Commander or Warlord 4
Mullah Saheb 10
Local PRT 1
Office of UN organization(s) 1
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 1
District Governor/ Woleswal 15
Provincial authority 5
Central Government 2
Public prosecutor 2
Courts 1
Press or other media 0
Taliban 0
My family 0
No one 1
Refused 0
Don’t Know 3

Q-25. If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would
you have that the governmental law-enforcing organizations and judicial systems
would punish the guilty party? (Read Out Answers)

(%)
A great deal of confidence 16
A fair amount of confidence 41
Not very much confidence 23
No confidence at all 18
Refused 0
Don’t Know 2
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 183

Q-26a. In your view, what is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan? (Open-ended
question. Write down answer)

Write 1st Mention:__________________________________________

Q-26b. And after that, what is the next biggest cause of crime? (Open-ended question.
Write down answer

Write 2nd Mention:__________________________________________

Q-26a
Q.26a&b
Biggest cause of
Next biggest
crime
cause of crime

(%) (%)
Unemployment 21 37
Corruption 13 22
Poverty 11 22
Insecurity 12 21
Illiteracy 7 16
Lack of Gov’t attention/ weak Gov’t 6 12
Drugs 5 10
Taliban 4 8
Lack of law implementation 3 6
Discriminations 3 5
Terrorism 2 4
Existence of irresponsible armed groups 2 4
Pakistan’s interference 2 3
Having a weak/low-paid police 1 2
Western countries 1 2
Presence of international forces 1 2
Lack of reconstruction 0 1
Don’t Know 6 16
184 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-27. Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor
problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. (Circle ’8’ for Refused or
’9’ for Don’t Know, if volunteered.)

Major Minor Not a Refused Don’t know


Problem Problem Problem (vol.) (vol.)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) In your daily life 53 31 15 1 1
b) In your
50 35 13 0 1
neighborhood
c) In your local
53 34 10 1 2
authorities
d) In your
provincial 61 29 6 1 2
government
e) In Afghanistan
76 16 5 1 3
as a whole

Q-28. Compared to a year ago, do you think the amount of corruption overall in
… (Read out options below one by one) has increased, stayed the same
or decreased?

Stayed Refused Don’t know


Increased Decreased
the same (vol.) (vol.)

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)


a) In your daily life 23 52 23 1 2
b) In your
24 53 22 0 2
neighborhood
c) In your local
32 48 17 1 3
authorities
d) In your provincial
41 41 14 1 3
government
e) In Afghanistan
54 30 11 1 4
as a whole
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 185

Q-29. Whenever you have contacted government officials, how often in the past year have
you had to give cash, a gift or perform a favor for an official? If you had contacts with
such officials in the past year, was it in all cases, most of the cases, in isolated or in no
cases? How about your contacts with…. (Rotate items on the list)

In all Most Isolated No Had no


Ref. DK
cases cases cases cases contacts
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Officials in the
4 7 11 26 50 1 2
Municipality
b) Customs office 3 5 9 25 55 1 2
c) Afghan National
3 8 17 31 38 1 2
Police
d) Afghan National Army 1 4 8 36 47 1 3
e) Judiciary / courts 5 9 15 25 44 1 2
f) State electricity supply 3 7 13 30 44 1 2
g) Public healthcare
3 10 18 32 33 1 2
service
h) When applying for
5 10 15 25 43 1 2
a job
i) Admissions to
4 7 10 31 45 1 2
schools/ university
j) To receive official
6 10 12 25 45 1 2
documents

Q-30. Now I will read you six different activities that you could participate in. Please,
tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities with ‘no fear’,
‘some fear’ or a ‘lot of fear’?

Don’t
No Some A lot of Refused
know
fear fear fear (vol.)
(vol.)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) When participating in
resolving problems in your 57 33 7 1 2
community
b) Voting in a national election 47 35 16 1 2
c) Participating in a peaceful 32 39 22 2 4
demonstration
d) To run for a public office 31 37 21 3 7
e) When encountering ANP 46 36 14 1 3
officers
f) When traveling from one
part of Afghanistan to another 28 42 27 1 2
part of the country
186 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-31. Do most people feel free to express their political opinions in the area where you live?

(%)
Yes 40
No 39
Refused 3
Don’t Know 18

Q-32. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘1’ in Q-31) What changes compared with the past,
or reasons, do you think have made most people to feel free to express their
political opinions in the area where you live? (Pre-coded. Do NOT read out.
Write down up to two answers and code to the list)
a) _____________________________________________________________
b) _____________________________________________________________

Q-32a Q-32a&b
(%) (%)
The removal of local militias 9 14
Freedom of speech is guaranteed 37 55
The security conditions are good (in our area) 23 37
Having (working) parliament and local shuras 1 2
Peace and democracy 6 14
Presence of ISAF / Coalition forces 1 1
Presence of CDC 0 1
Presence of PC 0 1
(Respect for) Human rights 2 4
Disarmament 0 1
Reconstruction 1 3
Freedom of press is guaranteed 2 4
Having a legal constitution 2 5
Corruption has decreased 0 1
More attention to Women rights 1 3
Good Government 5 11
Better education 2 4
Better Justice system 0 1
Taliban removal 1 2
People’s cooperation with the Gov’t 0 1
Having ANP and ANA 0 1
Don’t Know 3 3
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 187

Q-33. (If answered “No” in Q-31) Why don’t people in your area have the freedom
to express their political opinions? (Pre-coded. Do NOT read out. Write down
up to two answers and code to the list)
a) _____________________________________________________________
b) _____________________________________________________________

Q-33a Q-33a&b
(%) (%)
Fear for their safety 24 34
Security conditions are bad in this area 19 29
Presence of Taliban in the area 14 21
The Government doesn’t allow freedom of political
7 12
opinions
Women are under the control of men 5 9
The Government doesn’t care about people’s opinion 5 9
Presence of warlords 4 7
Fear of police 2 5
Lack of awareness of legal rights 2 4
Not interested in/Lack of information about politics 4 4
Lack of education 2 4
No real democracy 2 3
Ethnic discrimination 1 3
Elders / Mullahs don’t allow freedom of opinions 1 3
Fear of Maliks 2 3
Fear of Coalition/foreign forces 1 2
Corruption 1 2
No disarmament 1 1
Don’t Know 4 4
188 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-34. (ASK ALL) Various projects and programs have been implemented or are being
implemented in some places of our country. Speaking of the past 12 months, do
you know of, or have you heard of any project or program in this area, district,
implemented in the following fields?

(%)
Reconstruction/ building of roads, bridges 52
Water supply for drinking 42
Water supply for irrigation 26
Electricity supply 28
Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.) 40
Education (reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers etc.) 54
De-mining 33
Demilitarization / disarmament 29
Reconstruction/programs in agriculture 22
Reconstruction/programs in industry 13
Building new mosques 23
Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, shelter, production
26
materials etc.
Other 3

Q-35. (If answered “Yes”, Code 1, in Q-34, ASK) Has the Afghan Government or
Foreign sponsors been primarily responsible for providing most of the aid for
the projects?

Q-35 Who has


Q-34. Aware of Ref/ provided the Afghan Foreign Ref/
Yes No Bo-th
project DK most aid for the Gov’t Sponsor DK
project?

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

a) Reconstru-
a) Reconstruction/
ction/building
building of roads, 52 47 1 34 39 27 1
of roads,
bridges
bridges
b) Water supply b) Water supply
42 57 1 46 31 22 1
for drinking for drinking
c) Water supply c) Water supply
26 73 2 55 25 19 0
for irrigation for irrigation
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 189

d) Electricity d) Electricity
28 71 1 55 22 21 1
supply supply

e) Healthcare
e) Healthcare
(primary
(primary health
40 59 2 health center, 45 27 27 1
center, regular visits
regular visits of
of doctors, etc.)
doctors, etc.)

f) Education
f) Education
(reconstru-ction/
(reconstruction/
54 44 1 opening of 54 20 26 1
opening of school,
school, more
more teachers etc.)
teachers etc.)

g) De-mining 33 64 2 g) De-mining 33 43 23 1
h) Demili-
h) Demilitarization tarization /
29 68 3 47 26 25 1
/ disarmament disarma-
ment
i) Reconstr-
i) Reconstruction/
uction/
programs in 22 75 3 49 25 25 1
programs in
agriculture
agriculture
j) Reconstr-
j) Reconstru-
uction/
ction/ programs 13 84 3 47 27 26 1
programs in
in industry
industry
k) Building new k) Building
23 75 2 70 16 12 2
mosques new mosques

l) Humanitarian l) Huma-
nitarian programs
programs –
– help in food,
help in food,
26 72 2 medicines, - 31 35 33 1
medicines, shelter,
shelter, produ-
production ction materials
materials etc. etc.
m) Other
m) Other (specify) 3 95 2 (specify)
50 31 16 2
190 Afghanistan in 2009

(Ask if respondent is aware of foreign sponsors of any project—answered


Code 2 or 3 in Q-35; Otherwise skip to Q-38)

Q-36. Which country do you think has provided the most aid for the projects you
mentioned that have been implemented in this area, district? (Single response)
[Do Not Read List]

Write country:__________________________
DO NOT SHOW CODE LIST IN THE DARI OR PASHTO QQ

(%)

USA 41

United Kingdom (Britain) 1


Germany 8
Japan 7
India 5
Pakistan 1
China 1
Iran 1
Saudi Arabia 1
Turkey 2
Italy 1
Korea 0
Canada 1
France 3
Sweden 2
Spain 1
Australia 1
Norway 0
Bangladesh 0
Holland 1
Denmark 0
Hungary 0
Uzbekistan 0
Tajikistan 1
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 191

Belgium 0
Turkmenistan 0
Russia 0
Switzerland 0
Finland 0
PRT team 3
Lithuania 0
National Solidarity Program 1
France 1
Foreign countries 3
WFP 1
World Bank 0
UN agencies 2
ECHO agency 0
Indonesia 0
Kuwait 0
Ibn-e-Sena Foundation 0
Egypt 0
DAKAR agency 0
Red Cross 0
South Africa 0
Foreign NGOs 1
Poland 0
DAFA organization 0
Kazakhstan 0
Don’t Know 5
192 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-37. Which other countries have provided aid for the projects in your area, district?
PROBE: Any other?
(Multiple response) [Do Not Read List]

Write down all that apply, then code:_______________________________


DO NOT SHOW CODE LIST IN THE DARI OR PASHTO QQ

(%)
USA 20
United Kingdom (Britain) 5
Germany 17
Japan 17
India 14
Pakistan 4
China 5
Iran 5
Saudi Arabia 4
Turkey 3
Italy 4
Korea 0
Canada 3
France 7
Sweden 3
Spain 0
Africa 0
Australia 1
Norway 2
Bangladesh 0
Holland 2
Denmark 1
Hungary 0
Uzbekistan 0
Tajikistan 1
Belgium 0
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 193

Turkmenistan 0
Russia 2
Switzerland 0
Finland 0
PRT team 2
Lithuania 2
National Solidarity Program 0
Foreign countries 3
WFP 1
World Bank 0
UN agencies 1
Indonesia 0
Kuwait 0
Egypt 0
South Africa 0
Foreign NGOs 1
Poland 1
Greece 0
Kazakhstan 0

ECONOMY

Q-38. (ASK ALL) Now I would like to ask you a few questions about the economy of
Afghanistan. If you think about your family, would you say that today your family
is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban
government?

(%)
More prosperous 54
Less prosperous 24
About as prosperous 14
Absent during Taliban rule 6
Refused 0
Don’t Know 1
194 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-39. Now, going even farther back to the period of the Soviet occupation, if you think
about your family then and now, would you say that today your family is more
prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Soviet occupation
government?

(%)
More prosperous 50
Less prosperous 32
About as prosperous 10
Absent during Soviet rule/ occupation 6
Refused 0
Don’t Know 2

Q-40. (Intentionally left blank)

Q-41. At this house where you live, do you have the following kinds of electricity supply?
(Read out options)
Q-42. (Ask for each kind of electricity supply answered with “Yes” at Q-41) On an
average day composed of 24 hours, how many hours a day do you use electricity
provided by…? (Fill in actual hours)
Q-43. (Keep asking for each kind of electricity supply answered with “Yes” at
Q-41) And thinking of monthly expenses, how much in Afghanis do you spend
on an average month on electricity provided by…?

Q-41. Kinds of electricity supply used at the Q-42. Hours Q-43. Amount
house a day spent in a month
Ref./ Ref./
Yes No Ref. DK Hours Amounts
DK DK
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (Afs) (%)
a) Neighbor’s generator that
provides electricity to your and 11 88 0 1 3.64 0 590.55 8
other households in the area
b) Privately, self-owned
12 87 0 1 3.50 0 1010.23 9
(non-neighbor) generator
c) Community owned
generator, which provides 16 84 0 1 4.41 0 479.63 5
electricity to your household
d) Government electricity
– direct line dedicated to 20 79 0 1 18.77 0 902.89 3
your house
e) Government electricity –
other sources, but not directly 3 95 0 1 14.66 1 640.03 8
connected to your home
f) Large batteries/
invertors (such as for 6 93 0 1 3.22 0 247.67 13
running TV, lights, etc.)
g) Solar panels for
4 94 0 1 4.82 0 194.37 72
producing electricity
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 195

Q-44a. (ASK ALL) What is your main source of energy for cooking? / What do you
cook on most? (Code in the first column below)
Q-44b. And what do you heat your house with most? / What is your main source of
energy for heating? (Code in the second column)
Q-44c. And what do you mostly use for lighting? / What is your main source of energy
for lighting? (Code in the third column below)

Q-44c.
Q-44a Q-44b. Main
Main
Main source of source of
source of
cooking heating
lighting

(%) (%) (%)


Animal dung/ manure 16 17 0
Bottled gas/LPG 23 4 0
Candles 0 0 3
Charcoal 2 14 0
Coal 2 10 0
Diesel 0 0 7
Electricity 0 8 46
Firewood 52 39 0
Grass or other biomass 6 7 0
Kerosene 0 1 26
Petrol 0 0 2

Q-45. Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household
has got better, remained the same or got worse with respect to the following?

The
Better Worse Ref. DK
same
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

a) Financial well-being of your household 31 55 14 0 0


b) Employment opportunities 11 40 47 0 1
c) Availability of products in the market 19 48 30 1 2
d) Quality of your food diet 23 53 23 0 1
e) Physical conditions of your house/dwelling 20 55 23 0 1
f) Health well-being of your family members 32 48 19 0 1
g) Electric supply 23 36 37 2 2
h) Access to schools 40 44 15 0 1
196 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-46. Now, to change the subject. Sometimes people and communities have problems
related to an issue that concerns everybody in their area, that they can’t resolve
on their own and so they have to ask for the help of a government official or a
government agency. In the past 5 years, has your community had such a problem
in your area that you had to ask for help or cooperation to resolve it?

(%)
Yes 23
No 71
Refused 1
Don’t Know 5

Q-47. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-46). What kind of problem was/is that?
(Open-ended. Write down first mentioned answer)

(%)
Lack of water and electricity 21
Dispute over land 17
Building mosque 1
Reconstruction of roads and bridges 10
Building clinics 4
Building schools and kindergartens 4
Robbery and burglary 5
Poor transportation system 0
Economic problems 5
Unemployment 2
Tribal problems 6
Presence of Taliban 2
Security problems 10
Agricultural problems 2
Murder 1
Disarmament 0
Lack of shelter 1
Lack of women rights 1
Business problems 1
Foreign forces searching homes 0
Environmental problems 0
Refused 1
Don’t Know 6
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 197

Q-48. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-46): Who did you approach/ask to solve
the problem? (Multiple response. Code each mentioned) [Do Not Read
List, Write Answer Then Code Response]______________

(%)
Elders of the local shura/jirga 34
A Member of Parliament 7
Government agency/office 9
Afghan National Army 5
Afghan National Police 12
Malik / Khan 10
Provincial governor/ authorities 17
Community Development Council 9
District authorities 20
PRT 4
NGO 3
Human Rights Commission 1
Foreign forces 1
Mullah 3
Other 0
Don’t Know 4

Q-49. (Filtered. Ask if contacted Government agency/office, answer ‘3’ in Q-48).


You said you contacted a government agency/office to resolve your problem.
Which government agency/office is that? (Open-ended. Write down first
mentioned answer)

(%)
District Governor 41
Directors in MRRD 12
Courts 4
Ministry of Public Health 1
Parliament 2
Ministry of Education 2
Municipality 2
Directorate of Water and Power 13
Directorate of Women Affairs 1
Refused 1
Don’t Know 21
198 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-50. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ to Q-46) Has this problem been resolved or
it’s still pending resolution?

(%)
Resolved 47
Pending resolution 44
Refused 0
Don’t Know 9

Q-51. (ASK ALL) I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions and
organizations in our country. I will read these out to you. As I read out each,
please tell me how much confidence you have in each of the institutions and
organizations and officials to perform their jobs. Do you have a great deal of
confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence, or no
confidence at all in…

A great A fair Not very No Refused Don’t


deal of amount of much confidence (volunteered Know
confidence confidence confidence at all only) (vol.)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Afghan National
55 36 5 2 1 1
Army
b) Afghan National
46 38 11 4 1 1
Police
c) Political parties 11 36 31 14 1 7
d) The Government
10 36 32 17 1 4
Justice system
e) Government
13 40 28 13 1 5
Ministers
f) Independent
23 44 18 9 1 5
Election commission
g) Public adminis-
15 42 25 9 1 7
tration
h) The Municipality 12 34 28 17 2 8
i) Local militias 10 27 28 26 2 7
j) Community
19 44 21 8 1 6
Development Councils
k) Provincial Councils 20 42 24 9 1 4
l) Community Shuras/
24 44 19 7 1 5
Jirgas
m) National NGOs 20 42 22 9 2 6
n) International
25 41 19 9 1 5
NGOs
o) Electronic media
32 38 17 7 1 5
such as radio, TV
p) Newspapers, print
24 38 17 9 2 11
media
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 199

Q-52. I’m going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army
(ANA). Please tell me if you agree with each. (Read out statement, wait for
response and then ask): Strongly or somewhat?

Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Refused DK


agree somewhat somewhat disagree (vol.) (vol.)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) ANA is honest and
fair with the Afghan 57 34 5 2 0 1
people.

b) ANA is
unprofessional and 19 33 28 17 0 3
poorly trained.
c) ANA needs the
support of foreign
30 39 18 9 0 2
troops and cannot
operate by itself.
d) ANA helps improve
54 33 8 3 0 1
the security

Q-53. I’m going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Police
(ANP). Please tell me if you agree with each. (Read out statement, wait for
response and then ask): Strongly or somewhat?

Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Refused DK


agree somewhat somewhat disagree (vol.) (vol.)

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

a) ANP is honest and fair with the


Afghan people.
47 36 11 5 0 1

b) ANP is unprofessional and poorly


trained.
22 36 27 12 0 2

c) ANP needs the support of foreign


troops and cannot operate by itself.
32 38 20 8 0 2

d) ANP helps impr6ove the security 43 39 13 5 0 1


e) ANP is efficient at arresting
those who have committed
34 37 18 8 0 2
crimes so that they can be
brought to justice
200 Afghanistan in 2009

DEMOCRACY

Q-54. What, if anything, is the most important thing that democracy in Afghanistan will
bring you personally? (Probe): Anything else? (Open ended. Multiple response.
Do Not Read Code List Write down and then code each mentioned)

(%)
Freedom 50
Rights and law 24
Government of the people 19
Peace 41
Prosperity 15
Women’s rights 21
Communism 2
Islamic democracy 23
Less corruption 17
Better Government services 13
Good security 1
I don’t want democracy 0
Access to more schools 0
Good relations with other countries 0
More job opportunities 1
Nothing 2
Others 0
Refused 0
Don’t Know 2

Q-55. Do you think that political parties should be allowed to hold meetings in your area?

(%)
Yes 54
No 37
Refused 1
Don’t Know 9

Q-56. Do you think that all political parties, even the ones most people do not like,
should be allowed to hold meetings in your area?

(%)
Yes 34
No 57
Refused 1
Don’t Know 8
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 201

Q-57. Suppose a friend of yours supported a party you do not like. Would you accept
that, or would it end your friendship?

(%)
Would accept it 48
Would end friendship 40
Refused 3
Don’t Know 9

Q-58. I’m going to read some ideas. Please tell me if you agree with each. (Read out
statement, wait for response and then ask): Strongly or somewhat?

Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Refused DK


agree somewhat somewhat disagree (vol.) (vol.)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) It is a good thing
that the government
38 39 12 6 1 4
should allow peaceful
opposition
b) Everyone should
have equal rights under
the law, regardless of 49 31 13 4 0 2
their gender, ethnicity or
religion
c) Religious authorities
should lead people in
obeying the obligations
of their faith while
33 38 18 7 0 3
political leaders should
make decisions about
how the government
is run
d) A person should
vote the way his or
her community votes, 24 35 21 15 1 3
not how they feel
individually.
e) The government
should include
representatives from
48 33 13 3 1 3
all major regions and
ethnic groups in the
country
202 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-59. Thinking of the National Government, how do you feel about the way it is
carrying out its responsibilities? Is it doing a very good job, somewhat good job,
somewhat bad job or a very bad job?

(%)
Very good job 19
Somewhat good job 52
Somewhat bad job 20
Very bad job 6
Refused 0
Don’t Know 3

Q-60. And speaking of particular aspects of its work, do you think the National
Government is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or
a very bad job in the following fields? (Ask for each on the list)

Very Somewhat Somewhat Very bad Don’t


Refused
good job good job bad job job Know

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)


a) Education 37 46 12 4 0 1

b) Healthcare
17 46 27 9 0 1
system

c) Creating job
6 22 38 33 0 1
opportunities

d) Maintaining
relations with
16 42 26 10 1 5
neighboring
countries
e) Reviving/
Developing the 7 29 36 26 0 3
economy
f) Fighting
7 23 31 37 0 2
corruption
g) Security 23 38 22 16 0 1
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 203

Q-61. In your opinion, what is the most important achievement of the current
government in the past few years? And what is the next? (Open-ended. Write
down first two mentions]
a) ______________________________________________________
b) ______________________________________________________

Q.61a Q.61a&b
1st mention 1st & 2nd mentions
(%) (%)
Reconstruction 19 32
Establishing peace and security 18 27
Better education system 14 26
Freedom of speech 4 8
Having ANP and ANA 4 7
Elections 4 6
Having a strong government 3 6
Improving economy 2 5
No achievements 4 4
Having a good relationship with foreign countries 0 4
Improving healthcare system 2 4
Attracting foreign aid 2 3
Creating job opportunities 1 3
Removing poppy cultivation 2 3
Removing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda 2 3
Observing women/human rights 1 3
Establishing Constitution 1 3
Supplying water and power 1 3
Having Parliament 1 2
Disarmament 1 2
Removing administrative corruption 1 2
Building circle roads 1 2
National unity 1 2
Improving communication system 0 1
Improving media 0 1
Creating Development Councils 0 1
Returnees 0 1
Refused 1 1
Don’t Know 7 23
204 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-62. And what, in your opinion, is the most important failing of the current
government in the past few years? And what is the next? (Open-ended. Write
down first two mentions]
a) ______________________________________________________
b) _____________________________________________________

Q.62a&b
Q.62a
1st & 2nd
1 mention
st
mentions
(%) (%)
Insecurity 21 31
Administrative corruption 17 29
Lack of job opportunities 9 20
Weak economy 7 15
Weak Government 7 13
Not removing the Taliban 5 9
Not preventing civilian casualties 3 6
Bad education system 2 5
No/ lack of reconstruction/roads/bridges 2 5
Not removing drugs 2 5
Not achieving National unity 2 4
Not removing Terrorism 2 3
Foreign forces in the country (long time) 2 3
Lack of/no relations with foreign countries 1 2
Weak ANA and ANP 1 2
Not fulfilling it’s commitments 1 2
Not observing Islamic rules 1 2
Injustice 1 2
Lack of foreign assistance 1 1
Lack of healthcare centers 0 1
Lack of freedom of speech 1 1
Not achieving disarmament 1 1
Not protecting human rights 0 1
Kidnappings 0 1
Poor supply of water and power 1 1
No failures 1 1
Refused 1 1
Don’t Know 8 22
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 205

Q-63. How much influence do you think someone like you can have over government
decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all?

(%)
A lot 14
Some 42
Very little 17
None at all 21
Refused 0
Don’t Know 5

Q-64a. Do you strongly approve, approve somewhat, disapprove somewhat or strongly


disapprove of the Afghan Government’s reconciliation efforts and negotiations
with armed Anti-Government elements?

(%)
Strongly approve 28
Approve somewhat 43
Disapprove somewhat 15
Strongly disapprove 10
Refused (volunteered only) 1
Don’t know (volunteered only) 4

Q-64b. Thinking about the reasons anti-government groups used violence during the past
year, would you say that you in general have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or
no sympathy at all for the reasons these anti-government groups choose to use
violence?

(%)
A lot of sympathy 22
A little sympathy 34
No sympathy at all 36
Refused (volunteered only) 3
Don’t know (volunteered only) 5

Q-65a. Turning to your Provincial Government, do you think that overall it is doing a very
good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job?

Q-65b. [URBAN RESIDENTS ONLY] And what do you think about the job done by
your municipal authorities, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job,
somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job?
206 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-65c. [RURAL RESIDENTS ONLY] And what do you think about the job done
by your local authorities, do you think that overall it is doing a very good job,
somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job?

Very good Somewhat Somewhat Very bad Refused DK


job good job bad job job vol.) (vol.)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Provincial
24 51 16 6 0 3
Government
b) Municipal
17 41 25 15 0 1
authorities
c) Local
23 46 20 8 0 2
authorities

Q-66. Some people say that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the
problems facing an area while others think that politics and religion should not
mix. Which is closer to your view?

(%)
Religious leaders should be consulted 67
Politics and religion should not mix 27
Refused 1
Don’t Know 5

Q-67. Are you aware of the upcoming elections in Afghanistan in the next few months?

(%)
Yes 82
No 16
Refused 0
Don’t know 2

Q-68. (Filtered. Ask if answered “Yes” in Q-67) What was your main source of
information about the elections? [Do Not Read Out Answers]

(%)
Radio 44
TV 25
Friends and family and neighbors 16
Village chief/community leaders 8
Religious leader 3
School teacher 2
Pamphlet 2
Newspapers 1
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 207

Q-69. (ASK ALL) Have you registered yourself for the elections?

(%)
Yes 77
No 21
Refused 1
Don’t know 1

Q-70. (Filtered. Ask if answered “No” in Q-69) Do you know where to register to vote?

(%)
Yes 22
No 73
Refused 1
Don’t Know 5

Q-71 (ASK ALL) In the last few days/ weeks, have you received any messages regarding
the elections or regarding your participation in the elections?

(%)
Yes 50
No 48
Refused 0
Don’t Know 2

Q-72. How likely are you to vote in the coming elections?

(%)
Very likely 48
Somewhat likely 25
Somewhat unlikely 6
Very unlikely 14
Refused 1
Don’t Know 5
208 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-73a. (Filtered. Ask if answered Somewhat Unlikely or Very Unlikely, answers “3


or 4” in Q-72) You said it is somewhat or very unlikely that you would vote
in the upcoming elections. Why do you say that? (Single Response only. Ask
for most important reason. Do NOT read options) [RECORD ANSWER:
CODE POST FIELDWORK] _________________________

(%)
Not interested 26
Insecurity 18
Will not be permitted to vote / women not allowed to vote 15
Don’t support any candidate / party 10
Fear of intimidation 9
Elections wouldn’t make difference / disillusioned 8
Do not understand politics 7
Personal reasons: too old, sick, etc. 4
Don’t Know 3

Q-73b. (Filtered. Ask if answered “Somewhat Likely” or “Very Likely”, Codes


“1” or “2” in Q-72) What is the most important reason why you want to vote?
(Single Response only. Ask for most important reason. Do NOT read
options) [RECORD ANSWER: CODE POST FIELDWORK]

(%)
It is my right 28
To bring peace 22
To choose my leaders 20
It will help the country 8
To bring prosperity / reconstruction 6
It is my obligation as a citizen to vote 5
New government will be established 4
Strong government 3
I want to express my views 2
Don’t know 1

Q-74. (ASK ALL) Do you think women should be allowed to vote in the elections?

(%)
Yes 83
No 14
Refused 1
Don’t Know 2
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 209

Q-75. When people talk about elections, they often describe them as free and fair. By
“free,” they generally mean that all people had the chance to vote as they wished,
and that they were not forced to vote for a particular party or candidate. By
“fair”, on the other hand, people generally mean that all candidates/parties were
given equal access to public channels of communications, that they were not
prevented from getting their message across to voters, and that the cast votes
were counted correctly and not manipulated. Thinking about what is meant by
“free” and “fair”:

Do you think the upcoming elections will be free and fair, or do you think they
will not be free and fair?

(%)
Will be free and fair 64
Will NOT be free and fair 22
Refused 1
Don’t Know 13

Q-76. (Filtered. Ask if answered “will not be free and fair” in Q-75). You said that
you think that the elections will not be free and fair. What makes you think so?
(OPEN RESPONSE, Write down response and then code after field)

WRITE RESPONSE:____________________________________________

(%)
Cheating in the vote count 39
Buying of votes 33
Husbands not letting wives vote 9
Intimidation against voters or party activists 8
Finding out for whom people voted without their knowledge 5
Refused 2
Don’t Know 5

Q-77. (ASK ALL) Do you think that voting can lead to improvement in the future or
do you believe that no matter how one votes, things never change?

(%)
Voting can change things 70
Things are not going to get better 22
Refused 1
Don’t Know 7
210 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-80. (ASK ALL) Now I will read a series of statements about democracy. For each
statement, tell me if you agree or disagree. (Read out statement, wait for
response and then ask): Strongly or somewhat?

Strongly Agree Strongly Refused DK


agree somewhat disagree (vol.) (vol.)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Democracy may have its prob-
lems, but it is better than any 31 47 4 1 5
other form of government.
b) Politicians seek power for
their own benefit and don’t 41 34 5 0 4
worry about helping people.

Q-81. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works
in Afghanistan. Are you …

(%)
Very satisfied 20
Somewhat satisfied 48
Somewhat dissatisfied 17
Very dissatisfied 11
Refused 1
Don’t Know 4

Q-82. Have you ever contacted your Member of Parliament (MP) for help in solving
any of your personal or local problems?

(%)
Yes 12
No 85
Refused 1
Don’t Know 2
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 211

Q-83. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-82) For what kind of a problem did you
contact the MP? (Open ended. Write down answer)

(%)
Lack of water and electricity 19
Lack of roads and bridges 12
Land dispute 10
Lack of security 8
Lack of teachers at school 8
Tribal problems 6
Economic problems 5
Lack of hospitals 4
Unemployment 4
Problems related to trade 3
Problems in the area 3
Family problems 2
Problems at workplace 1
Lack of women rights 1
Murder 1
Building mosques 1
US airstrikes on civilians 1
Foreign forces searching houses 1
Refused 1
Don’t know 10

Q-84. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-82) Did the Member of Parliament (MP)
try to help to resolve the problem?

(%)
Yes, the MP tried to help 53
No, not MP did not try to help 43
Refused 0
Don’t Know 3

Q-85. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-82) In the end, regardless of who helped,
was the problem resolved or not?

(%)
Yes, resolved 43
No, not resolved 53
Refused 0
Don’t Know 4
212 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-86. (ASK ALL) Now let’s talk about Provincial Councils. Have you ever contacted a
representative on the Provincial Council for help in solving any of your personal
or local problems?

(%)
Yes 15
No 82
Refused 1
Don’t Know 2

Q-87. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-86) What kind of problem was it? (Open
ended. Write down answer)

(%)
Problems related to electricity and water 23
Roads and bridges 11
Land dispute 10
Tribal problems 7
Building schools 6
Building clinics 5
Security problems 5
Economic problems 5
Lack of assistance to teachers 4
Family problems 3
Lack of reconstruction 2
Unemployment 2
Agricultural problems 2
Bombardment by foreign troops 1
Transportation problems 1
Murder 1
Business problems 1
Taliban 1
Refused 0
Don’t Know 9
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 213

Q-88. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-86) Did the Provincial Council try to
help to resolve the problem?

(%)
Yes, the council tried to help 62
No, council did not try to help 35
Refused 1
Don’t Know 3

Q-89. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-86) In the end, regardless of who helped,
was the problem resolved or not?

(%)
Yes, resolved 47
No, not resolved 49
Refused 1
Don’t Know 4

Q-90. (ASK ALL) Now I will read some statements about our elected representatives.
For each statement, tell me if you agree or disagree (Read out statement, wait
for response and then ask): Strongly or somewhat?

Strongly Agree Strongly Refused DK


agree somewhat disagree (vol.) (vol.)
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) The Parliament is addressing the ma-
24 44 10 1 2
jor problems of people in our country
b) My MP is addressing the major
problems of my constituency in 20 38 14 1 3
Parliament

Q-91. Community Development Councils have been established as part of the National
Solidarity Program and members of the Council are representatives of various
groups in your community. Tell me, are you aware of such an institution formed
in your neighborhood/settlement?

(%)
Yes, aware of CDC in the neighborhood/ settlement 44
No, not aware of CDC in the neighborhood/ settlement 51
Refused 1
Don’t Know 4
214 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-92. (Filter. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-91) Which of the following groups are
members of the Community Development Council in your neighborhood/
settlement? Ask for each and code

Refused DK
Yes No
(vol.) (vol.)
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Local Malik / Khan 71 26 0 3
b) Elders of the local shura/jirga 77 19 0 4
c) Mullah 56 39 0 5
d) Local commanders 32 62 0 6
e) Women 27 67 0 5
f) Local teacher 48 47 0 5
g) Doctor 19 54 0 26
h) Officials from municipal/district
23 69 1 7
administration
i) Ordinary farmers 45 49 0 6
j) Landless agricultural workers 36 57 0 7
k) Shopkeepers 40 54 0 6

Q-93. (Filtered. Ask if ‘1` in Q-91) How satisfied are you with the job this Community
Development Council is doing? Are you…

(%)
Very satisfied 32
Somewhat satisfied 46
Somewhat dissatisfied 11
Very dissatisfied 8
Refused 0
Don’t Know 2

Q-94. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes` in Q-91) Still speaking of the same Community
Development Council, to what extent do you think this Council is capable to
represent your interests before the Provincial authorities. Do you think that it is
very capable, somewhat capable, not so capable or not capable at all to represent
your interests before the Provincial authorities? (Code in the first row below
and ask) And how capable is this Council to represent your interests before the
Government of Afghanistan? (Code in the second row below)
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 215

Some-
Very Not capable Refused DK
what
Capable at all (vol.) (vol.)
capable
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Before Provincial authorities 31 50 5 0 2
b) Before the Government of
23 39 11 0 3
Afghanistan

Q-95. (ASK ALL) Tell me, do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat,
or strongly disagree with the following statements about State Courts?

StA ASw DSw StD REF DK


(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) State Courts are accessible to me. 20 48 20 9 0 2
b) State Courts are fair and trusted. 11 39 33 13 0 3
c) State Courts are not corrupt compared to
other options of settling a dispute (informal 11 36 34 x14 1 4
systems such as local jirga & shura)
d) State Courts follow the local norms
12 37 32 14 1 3
and values of our people.
e) State Courts are effective at delivering
15 36 30 15 1 4
justice.
f) State Courts resolve cases timely and
12 28 32 23 1 4
promptly

Q-96. And now let’s turn to village/neighborhood based Jirga/ Shura, Tell me do you
strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or strongly disagree with the
following statements about the village/neighborhood based Jirga/ Shura?

StA ASw DSw StD REF DK


(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
a) Local jirga/ shura are accessible
35 44 13 5 0 2
to me.
b) Local jirga/ shura are fair and
24 48 20 5 0 3
trusted.
c) Local jirga/ shura follow the
local norms and values of our 25 45 21 5 1 3
people.
d) Local jirga/ shura are effective
25 44 21 7 1 3
at delivering justice.
e) Local jirga/ shura resolve cases 24 40 23 9 1 3
timely and promptly
216 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-97. In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn’t
settle with the other party and had to go to a State Court or village/neighborhood
based Shura/Jirga to resolve it?

(%)
Yes 16
No 82
Refused 1
Don’t Know 1

Q-98. (Filtered. If answered ‘Yes’ to Q-97) Where have you taken this case or
dispute?

(%)
State Court 38
Village, neighborhood based Shura/Jirga 47
Both 10
Other 1
Don’t Know 4

Q-99. (Filtered. If answered ‘State Court’, code 1, or ‘Both’, code ‘6’ in Q-98)
When taking a case to a State Court, or being a party in settling case in a State
Court, have you used any professional legal services (from a lawyer) or did you
plead your case alone or helped by friends/relatives?

(%)
Professional legal services 39
Alone/ helped by friends, relatives 52
Both 8
Refused 0
Don’t Know 1
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 217

Q-100. (Filtered. Ask all with case or dispute, answer ‘1’ in Q-97) What kind of a case
or dispute was it? (If More Than One Case Or Dispute, Ask For The Most
Recent One)

(%)
Dispute over land 52
Other property dispute, not land 11
Commercial dispute 8
Physical assault 8
Robbery / burglary 6
Murder 5
Don’t Know 5
Divorce 3
Pick-pocketing 1

Q-101. (Filtered. Ask all with case or dispute, answer ‘1’ in Q-97) Were you satisfied
with the outcome of the proceedings?

(%)
Yes 50
No 34
Not finished yet 12
Refused 0
Don’t Know 5

WOMEN ISSUES

Q-102a. (ASK ALL) Now let’s talk specifically about women-related issues. What is the
biggest problem facing women in this area today? (Code in the first column of
the table below) [Do Not Read Code List]
(a) Write Answer:___________________________________

Q-102b. And the next biggest? (Code in the second column below) [Do Not Read
Code List]
(b) Write Answer:___________________________________
218 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-102b
Q-102a
Biggest & next
Biggest problems
biggest problems
(%) (%)
Education / illiteracy 30 49
Lack of job opportunities for women 14 28
Lack of rights / women’s rights 11 21
Domestic violence 6 11
Poverty 5 11
General health care 6 10
Can’t leave homes 4 8
Pregnancy related health care 5 8
Forced marriages/ dowry 4 7
Security 3 6
Lack of professional courses 2 5
Women have no problems 4 4
Under control of men / men have power 2 3
Government not paying attention to women 1 3
Lack of electricity and water 1 2
Transportation problems 0 1
Lack of shelter 0 1
Freedom and democracy 1 1
Don’t Know 2 15

Q-103. Some people say that women should have equal opportunities like men in
education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Wait for response and
then ask): Strongly or somewhat?

(%)
Strongly agree 55
Agree somewhat 32
Disagree somewhat 8
Strongly disagree 4
Refused 0
Don’t Know 1

Q-104. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home. What
is your opinion about this?

(%)
Women should be allowed to work outside the home 67
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home 29
Refused 1
Don’t Know 3
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 219

Q-105. If women vote, do you think that women should decide for themselves or should
they receive advice from men?

(%)
Women should decide for themselves 57
Men should advise them 23
Women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men 19
Refused 0
Don’t Know 2

Q-106. In the election, everyone must vote for themselves. Men cannot vote in place
of women. Women must vote for themselves. What do you think about this
statement? Do you agree or disagree? (Wait for response and then ask):
Strongly or somewhat?

(%)
Strongly agree 58
Agree somewhat 28
Disagree somewhat 6
Strongly disagree 5
Refused 0
Don’t Know 2

Q-107a. Are you aware of the government ministry known as the Ministry of Women’s
Affairs?

(%)
Yes 58
No 39
Refused 0
Don’t Know 3

Q-107b. (Filtered. Ask if answered ‘Yes’ in Q-104a) Are there any local offices of the
Ministry of Women’s Affairs in the district or province where you live?

(%)
Yes 60
No 36
Refused 0
Don’t Know 4
220 Afghanistan in 2009

Q-108. (ASK ALL) Do you think that political leadership positions should be mostly for
men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have
equal representation in the political leadership?

(%)
Mostly for men 39
Mostly for women 10
Equal for both men and women 47
Other 0
Refused 0
Don’t Know 4

Q-109. Are you opposed to a woman representing you in the following organizations?

Yes No Refused DK
(%) (%) (%) (%)
a) In National Parliament 48 50 0 2
b) In your Provincial Council 48 49 0 2
c) In your Community Development Councils 45 52 1 2
d) In your District Development Assembly 42 54 1 2
e) In your local Shura or Jirga 43 53 1 3

DEMOGRAPHICS

D-1. Gender

(%)
Male 53
Female 47

D-2. (Ask All) How old were you on your last birthday? (Record actual age; if
respondent refuses, please estimate)

(%)
18-24 y.o. 27
25-34 y.o. 26
35-44 y.o. 22
45-54 y.o. 15
55-64 y.o. 7
Over 65 y.o. 3
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 221

D-3. Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or
looking for work?

(%)
Housewife 43
Working 36
Unemployed 14
Student 6
Retired 1
Other 1

D-4. (Filtered. Ask if working or retired): What is your main occupation? (Write
down and then code. If retired, ask for previous occupation and then code)
Occupation: ______________________________________

(%)
Farmer (own land / tenant farmer) 30
Farm laborer (other’s land) 14
Informal sales/ business 12
Skilled worker/artisan 10
Laborer, domestic, or unskilled worker 9
School Teacher 6
Government Office - Clerical worker 4
Self employed Professional 4
Small business owner 4
Military/ Police 2
Private Office - Clerical worker 1
Government Office – Executive/ Manager 1
Private Office – Executive/ Manager 1
Don’t Know 1

D-5. (Filtered. Ask if “Farmer”, code ‘1’ in D-4) How much land do you farm?

(%)
Less than 1 Jerib 12
1 - 2 Jerib 25
2.1- 3 Jerib 27
More than 3 Jerib 36
Refused 0
Don’t Know 1
222 Afghanistan in 2009

D-6. (ASK ALL) What is the highest level of school you completed? (Write down
response and code)

Education :_________________________

(%)
Never went to school 60
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5) 9
Primary School, complete (finished class 6) 7
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8) 5
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9) 4
High School (classes 10 to 12) 12
University education or above 2

D-7. Which languages can you read? (Multiple response. Code each mentioned)

(%)
Cannot Read 54
Dari 36
Pashto 30
English 5
Uzbeki 1
Urdu 1

D-9. Are you married or single?

(%)
Single 22
Married 75
Widower/ Widow 3
Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire 223

D-11. (Ask All) How many people live here at this address? (Record Number Below)

(%)
1-5 pers. 10
6-7 pers. 20
8-9 pers. 25
10-11 pers. 18
Over 12 pers. 28

D-13a. For statistical purposes only, we need to know your average monthly household
income. Will you please tell me which of the following categories best represents
your average total family monthly income? (Show Card and read out)

(%)
Less than 2,000 Afs 16
2,001 – 3,000 Afs 18
3,001 – 5,000 Afs 24
5,001 – 10,000 Afs 23
10,001 – 15,000 Afs 9
15,001 – 20,000 Afs 5
20,001 – 25,000 Afs 2
25,001 – 40,000 Afs 1
More then 40,000 Afs 0
Refused 0
Don’t Know 2

D-13b. Do female members of the family contribute to this household income?

(%)
Yes 14
No 85
Refused 0
Don’t know 1
224 Afghanistan in 2009

D-13c. [ASK IF YES AT D13b] How much of your household’s total income comes
from female members of the household?

(%)
Less than 25 (up to one quarter) 65
Between 26 and 50 (up to one half) 28
Between 51 and 75 (up to three quarters) 4
Between 76 to 100 (more than three quarters) 2
Don’t Know 2
Appendix 4: Afghanistan Provincial and Regional map 225

13 Appendix 4: Afghanistan Provincial and Regional map


A F G H A N I S TA N I N 2 0 0 9

A Survey of the Afghan People

CMYK Match PMS581

CMYK Match

A F G H A N I S TA N I N 2 0 0 9
PMS581 @ 70%

CMYK Match PMS1807

CMYK Match
PMS1807 @ 70%

House # 48 & 50
Street No. 1, Hajji Yaquob Square C:12 M:2 Y:1 K:0

Kabul, Afghanistan
CMYK Match PMS5115

A Survey of the Afghan People


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