Immigration Geopolitics Beyond the MexicoUS Border

Mathew Coleman
Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA; coleman.373@osu.edu

Abstract
Despite the centrality of MexicoUS border policing to pre- and post-9/11 US immigration geopolitics, perhaps the most significant yet largely ignored immigration-related fallout of the so-called war on terrorism has been the extension of interior immigration policing practices away from the southwest border. As I outline in this paper, these interior spaces of immigration geopoliticsnominally said to be about fighting terrorism, but in practice concerned with undocumented labor migration across the MexicoUS borderhave not emerged accidentally. Rather, the recent criminalization of immigration law, the sequestering of immigration enforcement from court oversight and the enrollment of proxy immigration officers at sub-state scales have been actively pursued so as to make interior enforcement newly central to US immigration geopolitics. I argue here that these embryonic spaces of localized immigration geopolitics shed new light on the spatiality of US immigration governance, which has typically been thought of by geographers as active predominantly at the territorial margins of the state. I conclude the paper with some thoughts as to how geographers might rethink the what and where of contemporary US immigration geopolitics.

Introduction
After 9/11, US lawmakers and administration officials scrambled to present undocumented migration as a possible national security threat. The reasoning, as Malkin (2002:8) echoed bluntly in her post-9/11 bestseller Invasion: How America Still Welcomes Terrorists, Criminals, and Other Foreign Menaces to Our Shores, was that undocumented migrants and terrorists make similarly surreptitious use of US borders: The September 11 hijackers all came through the front door, but illegal immigration . . . is the passageway of countless terrorist brethren. As such, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, immigration law reform and border enforcement were quickly positioned as frontline defenses against terrorism, as they had following the 1993 World Trade Center and 1995 Oklahoma City bombings. Although Canadas immigration policies and the CanadaUS border received an unusual share of attention (Andreas 2003), the border with Mexico playedand continues to playa prominent role in this discussion (Ackleson 2005a; Garcia 2003; Waslin 2003). For example, the Congressional Immigration Reform Caucuswhose website tells of al Qaeda cells working with Mexican smugglers to
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sneak across the US southwest border between official ports of entry endorsed a reading of the border as Terrorist Alley.1 That the 9/11 hijackers did not cross into the US from Mexicoor in fact across any land borderis apparently besides the point (Ackleson 2005b). It would be misleading, however, to claim that 9/11 ushered in novel US immigration enforcement practices at the MexicoUS border. For example, pre- and post-9/11 US immigration policing strategies are underwritten by a comparably racialized and nationalist discourse of threat which typifies the MexicoUS border as a site where masses of immigrants from the global south are poised to overthrow the ethno-cultural and economic territorial sanctity of the US (Purcell and Nevins 2005). But also in a more grounded sense, the Bush administrations war on terrorism, brought to bear in the US southwest, is but an augmentation of the immigration policing practices engineered and fine-tuned under the former Clinton administration (Ackleson 1999; Andreas 2003; Coleman 2005). In this sense, the current expansion of immigration agents, fences, and surveillance technologies at the borderfinanced by the largest border enforcement budgets ever contemplated by Congressreplays the rigid either/or territorial logic of the immigration enforcement strategies initiated in the mid-1990s under President Clintons Operation Gatekeeper, well documented by Nevins (2002). Moreover, current immigration enforcement at the border echoes the Clinton era in that it, too, makes increasingly indistinct military and police practiceswhat Bigo (2001:106) calls the blurring of the line between what belongs to internal security and what belongs to external security or defense (see also Andreas and Price 2001). Predictably, this has ensured that immigrant deaths due to the militarization of immigration policing remain a pressing problem at the border (Cornelius 2001; Eschbach, Hagan and Rodr guez 2003; Nevins 2003; Reyes, Johnson and van Swearingen 2002).2 The point is that post-9/11 US immigration policing at the southwest border is part of a decades-old expansion of low-intensity warfare tactics there (Dunn 1996) and as such is best understood in terms of a longstanding politics of anxiety in the US concerning Mexican undocumented migration (Heyman 1999). This said, 9/11 did signpost a change of accent insofar as the events of that day surfaced new spaces of immigration-related geopolitical practice. Despite the obvious importance and continuity of border policing per se to pre- and post-9/11 immigration geopolitics, then, perhaps the most significant yet largely ignored immigration-related fallout of the recently conceived war on terrorism has been the growth of interior immigration policing practices, nominally geared to fight terrorism but in practice often concerned with a broader problematic of undocumented labor migration. Properly speaking these practicesand the laws that inform themdate from the 1990s. However, these interior immigration enforcement practices have
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been recently extended and deepened to assume a newly central place in US immigration enforcement efforts. In order to get at these interior spaces of immigration geopolitics and at how they work, I will document two recent shifts in US immigration policing which, in conjunction with the border militarization process sketched out above, I take to be definitive of the post-9/11 immigration enforcement landscape. First, lawmakers since the mid-1990s have sought to bind immigration control to criminal law enforcement, such that a criminal conviction can be used as grounds for deportation from the US. I refer to this as the criminalization of immigration law. As part of this process, lawmakers have carved out a paradoxical space in which immigration policing occurs. This space, while strictly speaking codified in law, is ultimately about limiting the legal review of immigration and criminal charges brought against undocumented migrants and others. As I will argue below, this mode of immigration governance means that immigration law is ultimately exempted from judicial review, even as it works largely on the basis of criminal law. Second, there has been a concerted effort on the part of lawmakers and the Bush administration, particularly since 9/11, to use local proxy forcesor non-federal delegatesto enforce immigration law. I argue that together, the criminalization of immigration law, as well as the enrollment of proxy immigration officers at sub-state scales, constitute a new localized or rescaled geopolitics of immigration policing. Although intended broadly as a border policing initiative, these practices take place at some significant remove from US borders, and specifically from the MexicoUS border. And although conducted under the pretext of counterterrorism, these laws and practices implicate for the most part a more general category of undocumented migrants. These newly materializing spaces of immigration geopolitics are important to consider because they demonstrate that border enforcement and immigration policing are neither one and the same thing nor coterminous. Indeed, I argue that these embryonic spaces of immigration policing shed new light on the spatiality of US immigration policing efforts, which typically have been thought of by geographers as active primarily at the territorial margins of the state. But by suggesting that immigration-related geopolitics at the border have been supplemented in the interior and away from the border, my point is not to reify the local as a discrete arena of politicking (Cox 1998). Nor is it my point to insist that state territoriality belongs to a now defunct era usurped by local, regional, and/or global governance structures (Mansfield 2005). Rather, my goal is, first, to refuse the state writ large as the only meaningful scale at which governance regarding immigration is operative, and second, to explore the local as something more than a site nested neatly and subordinately within the national. The point is to refuse both a methodological territorialism and methodological nationalism in the study of
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contemporary immigration geopolitics (Brenner 2004:38). The former assumes that relations of power are bound to discrete state territorialities, and the latter that relations of power are territorialized coherently at and across the national scale. In sum, I hope to show that in the case of immigration enforcement, the spatiality of state governance is now much more complicated than the straightforward enforcement of an either/or territoriality at the edges of the state. By pointing to the complex rescaling and localized contestation of immigration policing after 9/11, I argue that state geopolitical power is undergoing an adjustment mostly at the municipal scale, and that the outcome of immigration-related strategies of governance are as a result less than clear. In the next section, I outline the rapprochement between criminal law and immigration enforcement that took place during the 1990s and after 9/11, as well as how this development relied on the gradual limitation of court oversight over immigration enforcement. In a second section, I discuss the exceptional constitution of federal immigration law, and the relevance of the so-called plenary power doctrine to that exceptionalism. Third, I look to the spatiality of current immigration enforcement practices, and in detail at the post-9/11 enrollment of sub-state proxy forces by federal immigration authorities. I argue that the power to police immigration has been devolved to local scale peace officers who until very recently were not permitted to enforce immigration law. I conclude the paper by asking how the two major trends discussed in the paperthe development of a criminalized and exceptional immigration law, and the devolution of immigration policingmight compel geographers to think differently about the location and substance of US immigration enforcement efforts of relevance to the MexicoUS border.

The Criminalization of Immigration Law

Congress passed a bevy of laws in the mid-1990s intended to obstruct undocumented migration to the US.3 These laws resulted from widespread bipartisan panic concerning the professed links between urban crime, welfare abuse, terrorism, inner city drug addiction, the failure of the melting pot citizenship model and the growth of undocumented migration. The legislation in question can be considered a complex of instrumental, expressive and symbolic statutes which sought to revise immigration law by disrupting existing judicial practices concerning immigration enforcement, which lawmakers on the whole believed to be overly lenient (Tushnet and Yackle 1997).4 Together the laws treated an overwhelming volume of amendments to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (Gimpel and Edwards 1999), and in conjunction with the Clinton administrations then newly conceived US Southwest Strategic Doctrine of Border Control, resulted in a significant militarization of the MexicoUS border. However, two important but often
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underacknowledged shifts in immigration enforcement brought about as a result of this period of frenzied immigration lawmaking did not deal directly with border enforcement. These provisions expanded the criminal grounds for deportation from the US and limited the scope of judicial review over immigration enforcement.5 Although as a whole the laws were concerned to increase immigration enforcement directly at the MexicoUS border, these measures were intended explicitly to bolster immigration enforcement efforts in the interior and thereby reduce undocumented migration, primarily across the MexicoUS border, by heightening disincentives to migrate. These changes are important insofar as they constitute the conceptual and practical scaffolding of post-9/11 immigration-related lawmaking and enforcement. Immigration law reform efforts in Congress during the 1990s significantly enlarged the category of crimes which could count as aggravated feloniesa specific class of crimes committed by non-citizens, applicable only in the context of immigration law, and warranting deportation from the US. The aggravated felony charge was initially legislated in the late 1980s to deport drug kingpins under murder, firearms and weapons trafficking charges. In the 1990s, the charge was expanded repeatedly to embrace a huge assortment of crimes, including many misdemeanors or minor offenses (Johnson 2001). The principal goal was to make a broad array of controlled substances and general property offenses count towards immigration inadmissibility. The result was a literal grab bag of convictions (Coonan 1998:600) with no overall coherence which could provoke deportation from the US. For example, the aggravated felony was made to include prostitution, car theft, forgery, bribery, undocumented entry following deportation, perjury, shoplifting, counterfeiting, drug possession, drug addiction, petty theft, simple battery, tax evasion, and more generally any offense with an imposed sentence of one year or more.6 This detailed expansion of the aggravated felony charge to account for a good deal of non-violent crimes was accompanied by a far-reaching recalibration of what counted as terms of conviction and imprisonment for immigration admissibility purposes. As concerns conviction, the laws mandated that potential aggravated felony adjudications deferred by judges, regardless of the absence of sentencing, were still to count as convictions warranting deportation from the US if immigration authorities could find sufficient evidence that a crime was committedsuch as an initial admission of guilt or some finding excluded from the courtroom (Marley 1998). The result was that individuals could be identified as deportable aggravated felons without an explicit conviction for an aggravated felony. As concerns imprisonment, the laws legislated that any sentence of one year or moreserved or suspendedcould count as evidence of an aggravated felony. As a result, convictions both postponed and suspended by the courts were to count as grounds for
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deportation (Morawetz 2000). To this, the laws added that the aggravated felony charge could be applied retroactively without limit, and that conviction would entail a permanent bar on re-entry to the US for all deported aliens, without exception (Candioto 1997; Krasker 1998; Morawetz 1998). Moreover, the laws legislated mandatory and indefinite incarceration for those charged and awaiting deportation, as well as lengthy jail terms for aggravated felons caught re-entering the US (Cox 2001; Legomsky 1999). The result of these provisions was an increasingly deep convergence between the criminal and immigration justice systems, such that a criminal conviction was likely to trigger detention, deportation and permanent exclusion from the US (Kanstroom 2000a), as well as a bizarre multiplier effect whereby minor infractions from decades past could be resuscitated in the present to effect deportation from, or deny entrance to, the US.7 To substantiate the expansion of the aggravated felony charge, immigration law reform undertaken at this time sought also to restrict court oversight of immigration enforcement. This was done because lawmakers considered that aggravated felons and persons unlawfully present in the country had too many channels of legal petition which resulted in too many stalled deportation hearings. Two basic remedies were legislated. First, the laws stripped the courts of many powers of review over aggravated felony criminal cases, and refused access to many legal procedures or petitions that could delay removal from the US for those charged with an aggravated felony (Marley 1998; Gelernt 2001). So, while aggravated felons in the early 1990s had the ability to petition their removal from the US, for example through application for a stay of deportation or for political asylum, the new laws implemented a historic series of due process restrictions which limited the judicial and administrative channels available to aggravated felons to contest the deportation process. Second, the laws introduced a wider sphere of new procedures of expedited deportation similarly removed from close legal scrutiny, to apply broadly to undocumented aliens (McKenzie 1997; Solbakken 1997). Rather than distinguish between aliens who had entered the US and those who had not, the new laws introduced the concept of admission, or authorized and inspected entry to the US. All unadmitted (ie undocumented) aliensregardless of geographical location, at the border or in the interiorwere deemed to be permanently in the process of unlawfully seeking entry or arriving until actually apprehended, and thus were labeled as automatically inadmissible (ie deportable) upon apprehension. Recategorized as never having made a legitimate entry into the US, undocumented aliens were thus treated extra-territorially as subjects standing at US border ports of entry, and were made subject to summary exclusion by federal immigration officers without defense or relief through the courts. This second restriction of legal oversight over immigration enforcement marked a
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significant change to what previously stood as the entry doctrine, which had afforded due process protections to undocumented aliens apprehended in the US on the grounds that they were within the territorial jurisdiction of the federal US court system (Chen 2000; Foster 1997). The single protection left was a substantially overhauled habeas corpus review which sought only to properly identify deportees prior to their removal. The mid-1990s severity revolution (Simon 2001) in immigration lawmaking and enforcement was ratcheted up by the events of 9/11. Indeed, the current zero tolerance scrutiny of the aggravated felony charge in order to effect deportations, nominally concerned to thwart threats to national security but in reality occupied with a class of much less serious offenses such as undocumented entry, means perhaps a final criminalization of immigration law (Morris 1997). In other words, 9/11 has brought about a near conclusive blurring of what by the late 1990s amounted to an already well-faded distinction between the legal offenses of undocumented laboring, criminal activity by aliens and terrorism (Miller 2005). The June 2004 street-level immigration sweeps in southern California are evidence of this development. Resulting in a staggering 11,000 ad-hoc interrogations and some 450 formal detentions and deportations, the roving Border Patrol operationsreminiscent of the mass deportations under Operation Wetback in 1954were justified under the broad post-9/11 umbrella of securing the border region and protecting national security, even as they targeted exclusively Mexican nationals suspected of working without papers in the US (Martinez 2004; Nu nez-Neto 2005:2728; Wilson and Murillo 2004a, 2004b). At the same time, recent immigration enforcement practice, as intended by the earlier wave of 1990s laws, has sought to again distance immigration enforcement from the purview of the courts in the form of substantial legal rollbacks (Akram and Johnson 2002; Ashar 2002; Morawetz 2005; Papandrea 2005; Reza 2002; Tumlin 2004; Williams 2004). The 2001 PATRIOT Act, for example, authorizes federal officers to arrest and imprison a broad class of non-citizens on immigration grounds without legal review and without public disclosure of the specific charge for a period of seven days, or for a maximum of six months if the case is deemed a national security risk. Importantly, this lack of legal oversight portends the use of immigration law for ends that do not relate directly to immigration enforcement per se (Kanstroom 2003, 2004). For example, Operation Predator, an initiative run by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in July 2003and televised on the show Americas Most Wantedrounded up nearly 2000 alien sex offenders on immigration charges (DHS 2005a, 2005b). The operation was not intended to police immigration law infractions. Instead, the goal was to deport criminal alien sex offenders through immigration channels, which provide fewer judicial hurdles for detainment, disclosure of
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evidence and eventually, deportation (US Congress, House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary 2004). In sum, if before 9/11 immigration law was already well on its way to becoming deeply bound to criminal law enforcement, the war on terrorism has facilitated an even deeper convergence between the two (Kanstroom 2005). At the same time, the events of 9/11 provoked even further restrictions on judicial oversight over immigration law enforcement practices related broadly to alien criminal activity. The point is that the double-pronged approach to immigration enforcement in the 1990swhich in effect expanded the criminal grounds for deportation and limited the reach of legal oversight over these procedureswas deepened and extended after 9/11.

The Exceptional Spaces of Immigration Law

How does one best conceptualize the above developments? Without doubt current immigration law as well as the broad gatekeeping function of contemporary immigration enforcement is rooted in the post-Civil War Chinese Exclusion Acts (Lee 1999). These actsarticulated on the gendered, racialized, and class exceptionality of Chinese immigrants suspended working class and independent female Chinese immigration to the US, barred the re-entry of previously admitted Chinese laborers, initiated an identity registry for Chinese families in the US, made undocumented Chinese immigration a deportable crime, and perhaps most importantly, subjected Chinese immigrants to expanded and nonuniform deportation and exclusion practices whose contestability in the courts was gradually eroded (Sayler 1991). More accurately, however, current immigration lawmaking and enforcement owes its existence to the plenary power doctrine over immigration which developed as a consequence of the Chinese Exclusion Acts. The plenary power doctrine transferred the specific exceptionality of Chinese immigration to the immigration power writ large, in order to insulate immigration enforcement from the judiciary. As a result of numerous cases brought by Chinese nationals before the courts in the wake of the Exclusion Laws, the Supreme Courteager to find a home for the power to control immigrationruled that the immigration mandate was tantamount to the plenaryor unconditional and unimpairedpower of the government to conduct international relations and commerce. As a result, the court concluded that the power to regulate immigration should be an unequivocally federal mandate and that it could not be subject to constitutional or judicial oversight. In short, the plenary power doctrine awarded congressional representatives and the executive branch of government the absolute and unchecked sovereign power to regulate the admission and expulsion of immigrants with limited judicial oversight, and without adherence to otherwise generally held legal principles. As
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Wishnie (2003:739740) puts it, the Court . . . linked immigration law to foreign affairs and national security and insisted on substantial deference [of the courts] to the judgments of the political branches. The basis of the ruling was that immigration is a national security matter akin to waging war, whose pressing geopolitical constitution trumps the need to extend judicial protections to non-nationals in the US or seeking entry to the US (Olafson 1999; Holland 2000; Wishnie 2001a; Engle 2004). From this perspective, immigration law and enforcement is only partially about public policy analysis (Bigo 2002; Tichenor 2002). It is this same foreign-policy-centric plenary power of lawmakers and the executive to make and implement laws governing immigration which lies at the core of the immigration lawmaking and enforcement efforts today. But contemporary immigration lawmaking suggests that there is more to this power than simply the straightforward exorcism of judicial review in the name of national security and geopolitical strategy. The plenary power over immigration does not simply jettison the law. Rather, it works paradoxically through the law as it at once holds the law at bay. In other words, present-day immigration enforcement works by closing the gap between immigration control and criminal law offenses as it at once widens the gap between on-the-ground enforcement and judicial review. In this way, the contemporary expression of the plenary power over immigration presents us with the puzzle of an extra-legal law: immigration law and enforcement is about curtailing aliens rights of due process while at once making them the object of laws which hold them closely accountable to standards (and definitions) of criminal justice which would certainly be contested if court scrutiny of the process was permitted, or if these same standards were applied to US citizens. We might say that current US immigration law works by placing the subjects of immigration lawfor the most part undocumented migrants, as we shall see belowin the position of being legally answerable to increasingly detailed criminal provisions codified in law which at once are themselves subject to increasingly narrow channels of legal contestation. From this perspective I think that immigration law is somewhat of a misnomer. Properly stated, the plenary power enables immigration enforcement practices which floatby designseparately from the rule of law. In this sense, the plenary power to make immigration law is about delineating a space of policing practicesa juridical voidwhich cannot be subject to constitutional review and/or protection, notwithstanding its reliance on the criminal justice system as well as its own formal codification as law in the INA. The point is that immigration law works less as a law and more as a sort of (permanent) state of emergency in which the concrete, authoritarian power of the sovereign (in this case, lawmakers) comes down decisivelyor, exceptionallyon migrant bodies, in the
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name of public security, via a selective deployment of the law (Schmitt, 1985 [1933]). In this sense, I find that recent discussion of the force of law (Agamben 2005) offers a compelling way of conceptualizing contemporary immigration law and enforcement in the US. The turn of phrase force of law, or force of law without law, means that sovereign powerwhich generally declares nothing to be outside the law works paradoxically through the postponement of generally held legal norms and practices. However, these postponements, or more accurately sovereign exceptions to law, do not imply a simple topographical opposition (inside/outside) in which the law and the political are hermetically sealed spaces bridged by the sovereign, who moves arbitrarily between the two when the need arises (Agamben 2005: 23). Rather, the state of exception functions as the decisive moment within a larger context of liberal constitutionalism (Agamben 1998). The force of law, then, describes a contradictory, but ultimately effective, liberal juridico-political governmentality characterized by an indistinction between law and violence. Here, the sovereign obliges bodies to the law by making their conduct dependent on it, but in so doing may at once and in the same place forsake them to the political, or to a sphere of extra-juridical violences, in the event that a state of emergency (ie a threat to national security) is said to exist. In this sense, the declaration of a state of emergency is the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes into law and law passes over into violence (Agamben 1998:32).What is produced given some contravention of the lawin this case, immigration lawand the abandonment of (non-citizen) bodies to the political, then, is an unmediated, extra-juridical space of punishment in which there is limited recourse to the courts to contest the sovereigns exercise of power.

Interior Enforcement and the Devolution of the Immigration Power after 9/11
The above typification of US immigration law as a collection of sovereign decrees is meant to indicate how immigration enforcement practices are paradoxically sequestered to an exceptional space carved out by lawmakers who decide what shouldand more importantly, what should notbe included under the umbrella of legal review as concerns the power to police immigration. But at the same time, this exceptional space of immigration lawmaking is in no easy sense sovereign, if the latter term means exercised between blocks of undifferentiated state space and with particular vigor at the territorial margins of the state. Indeed, despite its explicit affiliation with the power to conduct foreign affairs and commerce, which are typically thought relevant only outside the black box of the state and in terms of inter-state relations,
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the sovereign exceptionality of immigration law corresponds to a rescaling of immigration enforcement in still emerging localized spaces of immigration geopolitics. This is so in two senses. First, there has been a marked increase in immigration policing operations away from borders in the interior. Second, and perhaps more surprisingly, there has been a devolution of the federal immigration power to non-federal officers, who have a greater presence in these interior immigration enforcement spaces. In concert, the growth of interior enforcement operations and the devolution of the federal power to police immigration are about pushing border enforcement inwards toward the municipal scale and away from the margins of the state. This is not to suggest that the MexicoUS borderamong other bordershas been rendered insignificant. Rather, it is to suggest that US immigration policingin addition to its conventional location at the borderhas been down-scaled in important ways as a result of the 1990s period of lawmaking, and especially as part of the war on terrorism. In other words, these new spaces of immigration geopolitics suggest that the borderand border enforcementis increasingly everywhere. I will tackle interior enforcement and the devolution of the immigration power in turn below. The expansion of the aggravated felony charge and the limitation of judicial review over deportation have combined on the ground to produce a remarkable spike in interior immigration enforcement operations, at least as measured by annual deportation statistics. This should not be surprising, as the laws passed over the 1990s and after 9/11 have snowballed, first, to vastly expand the population of aliens subject to deportation; and second, to hasten the removal of aliens under accelerated, extra-judicial channels, particularly if found to be unlawfully in the US or if charged as aggravated felons in some other capacity. Between 1992 and 2003, for example, during exactly the period when the aggravated felony charge was being expanded and court oversight of immigration policing was being curtailed, deportable aliens located in the interior of the US as a percentage of immigration apprehensions at the southwest border more than doubled. Whereas in 1992 immigration apprehensions by investigations districts (ie in the interior) made up approximately 5% of total immigration apprehensions made by the Border Patrol at the southwest border with Mexico, by 2003 immigration apprehensions in the interior had jumped nearly threefold to approximately 13% of southwest border apprehensions, with the single largest increases coming in 1997directly after a major bout of immigration lawmaking in 1996 dealing with the aggravated felony offenseand then again in 2002 directly after 9/11 (Immigration and Naturalization Service 2002:242, 2003:244; DHS 2004:155). The overwhelming bulk of these cases involve nationals from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, who presumably entered at some point across the MexicoUS border.
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Thus, even if MexicoUS border region apprehensions continue to make up the vast majority of total apprehensions, interior immigration enforcement numbers are proportionally on the rise, and deserve attention as an increasingly important component of this total. Moreover, we should anticipate a further escalation of interior enforcement operations. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) branch of the DHS, for example, is readying to vastly expand immigration policing in the interior as part of the war on terrorism (General Accounting Office 2004) while the Bush administration (as well as prominent members of Congress) intonate regularly that any future immigration legislation concerning Mexico will necessitate stepped-up immigration-related criminal enforcement operations in the US interior, away from the MexicoUS border (US Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary 2005). While a wide range of legally resident aliens and refugee claimants were affected by this recent expansion of interior immigration enforcement (Lagenfeld 1999; Martin 1999; Kanstroom 2000b), undocumented aliens were doubtlessly the primary focus of the law reform movement. For example, the undocumented migrant was consistently referenced by lawmakers as the central subject of the 1990s laws, often due to the supposed threat it posed to unemployed American workers, statefunded welfare programs, urban safety, etc. (Coleman 2005). Indeed, it is safe to say that without the perceived threat posed by the undocumented migrant, and the way undocumented migrants were inflated and held accountable for a number of different social ills (Nevins 2002), the above changes to the INA around the aggravated felony charge would never have been contemplated by lawmakers. But in a more tangible sense, too, undocumented migrants were in the sights of the laws as lawmakers sought explicitly to render insecure the conditions of possibility of undocumented laboring in the US. For example, the expansion of the aggravated felony category over the 1990s to include the crime of unauthorized entry, and particularly unauthorized re-entry following an aggravated felony deportation (for which undocumented entry counts), meant that significant numbers of undocumented laborers could be deported from the US with extremely limited ability to petition their removal via either judicial or administrative channels. DHS data show that a major impact of this period of lawmaking was not simply an increase in the number of formal deportations but more specifically a large jump in the number of aliens detained and deported for being present without documentation in the interior. In 1991 this number totaled some 13,000 individuals; this number has now increased almost sixfold to more than 70,000 cases annually (DHS 2004:157). This heightened scrutiny of undocumented aliens in the interior proceeds, of course, without overtly policing the physical workplace a move unpopular with agribusiness and other major beneficiaries of undocumented labor (Calavita 1989). In fact, there appears to be an
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inverse relationship between workplace enforcement and interior immigration enforcement. Whereas interior immigration policingmeasured in terms of the above deportation versus border enforcement ratio increased throughout the 1990s and after 9/11, workplace enforcement declined precipitously after 1997. In that year there were some 17,000 workplace enforcement cases; in 2000 there were 1000; by 2003 this number had dropped to 445 (DHS 2004:147, 157). Indeed, year-end Department of Homeland Security data show that the bulk of interior enforcement operations are extra-workplace investigations. On the whole, deportees are located by immigration officers surveying the US inmate population and court dockets for aggravated felons; as a result of streetlevel criminal investigations to which federal immigration officers are party; and, via entitlements and services fraud investigations launched by state and local authorities and reported to the DHS. We can conclude, then, that one major upshot of the most recent 16-year bout of immigration law reform has been the legal transformation of undocumented migrants in the interior into permanent criminals subject to expanded and expedited deportation practices outside the workplace (Kanstroom 2004). This said, I do not mean to imply some uniform interior federal territoriality throughout which immigration enforcement occurs. Rather, what we now see emerging is an uneven urban geography of immigration law enforcement which is more strict in some areas than others, and which at times pitches the federal government against local governments. This has come about due to municipal laws which contest the application of federal immigration law, and federal counter-attempts to undo or otherwise circumvent these practices after 9/11 by devolving immigration enforcement to willing local authorities. Many cities have non-compliance ordinances on the books which prohibit municipal employeesparticularly police officers and emergency workersfrom cooperating in federal immigration enforcement efforts, for instance, by communicating the immigration status of their clients to federal authorities. These dont askdont tell policies date back to the 1980s sanctuary movement in which churches and synagogues provided safe haven to migrants escaping Central America. Refugees at the time were unlikely to be recognized as legitimate claimants due to the Reagan administrations tacit support for the governments they were fleeing, and so a vast underground network of human rights activists and church members evolved to provide illegal shelter for them (Bau 1994; Coutin 1993). The sanctuary movementwhich in essence created a multiplicity of spaces of protest where federal immigration law was de facto exemptedspread to municipal and sometimes state levels. By the end of the 1980s, for example, entire states like New Mexico and Oregon, as well as a slew of major cities up and down the California coastline, had declared themselves sanctuary sites
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(Cunningham 1995:6266). A surprising number of major US cities Los Angeles, San Francisco, Detroit, Seattle, Albuquerque, Denver, New York, Austin, Houston, Durham, Minneapolis, Baltimore, Ann Arbor, Portland, Chicago, and Atlanta, to name but a fewstill had these ordinances intact after 9/11 (Seghetti, Vi na and Ester 2004:2122). In the wake of 9/11 these municipal-scale obstructions to federal immigration law have come under intense scrutiny (US Congress, House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary 2003b), and have been referred to by leading restrictionist lobby groups as a growing impediment to combating the wave of illegal aliens residing in the country (FAIR 2003). Lawmakers, increasingly interested in the possibility for a more effective interior immigration enforcement strategy (US Congress, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims 2002), have explicitly called for the abolition of sanctuary ordinances on national security grounds, as well as for concerted federal legal court action against non-compliant cities and states. Indeed, Congress is considering legislation which if passed would forcibly compel state and local law enforcement agencies to make immigration-related arrests, specifically in those cities where sanctuary laws currently stand (US Congress, House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary 2003a). If passed, the legislation will cut off federal monies for local law enforcement offices which refuse to cooperate with federal immigration authorities. The Bush administration has also become keenly interested in getting around sanctuary ordinances. For instance, following 9/11 the Department of Justice repealed a long-standing legal opinion which held that local police officers did not have the authority to make immigrationrelated arrests (White House 2002). The now deposed ruling denied that non-federal peace officers could enforce immigration law on the basis that states and localities cannot pass or enforce laws that either contradict or complement extensive federal legislation, in this case as regards immigration violations (Benitez 1994). In place of the old opinion is a new reading on the local enforcement of immigration law which argues that non-federal officers indeed have the inherent authority to arrest aliens for immigration violations, and that local peace officers have the subsequent power to transfer to federal authorities aliens imprisoned for entering the country without documentation (Lewis et al 2002; Seghetti, Vi na and Ester 2004:79; Wishnie 2001b). Because this new reading on the devolvability of the immigration power to local authorities is not available for public consumption, the rationale behind the change to the old rulingthat is, beyond the logic that the current war on terrorism constitutes a state of exceptionremains unclear. However, the concept of federal immigration enforcement by local proxies has been corroborated enthusiastically in Congress. For example, lawmakers re-legislated
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an unenforced section of the INA in the 2001 PATRIOT Act, which deals with the local enforcement of immigration law (Chisti 2002). The relevant section encourages state and local law enforcement authorities to sign special memorandums of understanding with the Department of Homeland Security so that local officers can identify, process, and when appropriate, detain immigration offenders they encounter during their regular, daily law enforcement activity (DHS 2005c). As one observer puts it, the goal here is to enhance enforcement of immigration laws by adding 650,000 state police officers to the 20,000 federal border patrol agents, of whom only 1947 have been employed for internal enforcement (Herman 2004:1221).8 And perhaps most importantly, given that the Bush administration and Congress have requested and not compelled cooperation, is that localities are responding favorably. Florida, Virginia, and Alabama have filed memorandums of understanding which allow their state troopers to report the immigration status of detained individuals to federal authorities, and to make immigration arrests. Likewise, under pressure from the Bush administration, Mayor Bloomberg announced the termination of New York Citys sanctuary laws in May 2004. Similarly, the Los Angeles and Orange County police departments have unofficially agreed to report undocumented migrants to the DHS, and moreover have arranged for special immigration law enforcement training for their officers (Winton 2005; Winton and Blankstein 2005). Moreover, the grassroots Proposition 200 in Arizona, which compels that states law enforcement officers to make immigration-related arrests, has been recently expanded under the national umbrella group Protect America Now to seven states: Virginia, Arkansas, Alabama, Washington, Nebraska, Georgia, and Massachusetts (Barry 2004).9

Conclusion
Borders and border policing are important and ongoing components of immigration enforcement in the US. And, as noted at the outset of the paper, the present clampdown at the borderas with Operations Holdthe-Line and Gatekeeper, initiated in the mid-1990stranslates into large numbers of fatalities there as undocumented migrants are forced to navigate treacherous landscapes adjacent to increasingly fortified urban corridors. This said, the argument I have tried to make in this paper is that there is more going on than borders and border policing when it comes to understanding how the US is dealing with immigration enforcement. I will conclude with three thoughts about how geographers might think differently about the location and substance of US immigration enforcement efforts of relevance to the MexicoUS border. First, immigration enforcement can be rethought in terms broader than the straightforward deployment of troops and immigration agents
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directly at the external frontiers of the state. Part of what I have tried to conceptualize above is a shift in the where of immigration policing: that US immigration policing, particularly after 9/11, and through the lens of counterterrorism, has shifted gears insofar as interior enforcement has taken on a renewed importance since that date. Indeed, the emerging complementarity between immigration policing efforts at the border and new spaces of immigration geopolitics in the interior, via local and state actors who previously enjoyed little or no power to enforce immigration law, is what I take as the most significant aspect of post-9/11 immigration lawmaking. For this reason, geographers might differentiate between border policing (ie directly at the territorial margins of the state) and a spatially looser configuration of boundary policing practices. By boundary policing I mean practices of internal organization and external bounding constitutive of state territoriality (Agnew 1997), but undertaken by a multiplicity of federal and local actors and not geographically limited to the territorial margins of the state. In other words, boundary policing might refer to border policing and practices of immigrant regulation which take place away from state borders, even if they are in the end concerned to regulate the flow of bodies across the latter a sort of border enforcement from afar. Moreover, using the Operation Predator example discussed above, immigration-related boundary policing need not have immigration enforcement strictly speaking as its goal, even if the deportation of aliens is achieved through the latter. Indeed, boundary policing, at least in terms of the discussion above, can be conceptualized as a far-reaching mode of extended border control in which undocumented migrants and others are harbored subject to the whim of the government and may be deported whenever the government so desires . . . a shifting, even retroactive, regime of deportation sanctions dependent on political context rather than strictly on the transgression of immigration law (Kanstroom 2000a:1907). Second, to take up immigration enforcement as suchie in terms of localized relations of social control, which while disproportionately impacting undocumented laborers does not entail an increase in workplace investigationsalso means that geographers give renewed attention to the what of immigration enforcement. Immigration law has typically (and with good reason) been side-stepped by geographers in favor of a more grounded focus on immigration enforcement practices themselves, which at least in the MexicoUS case study raise a number of immediate and pressing social justice questions. But the expansion of interior immigration enforcement in the US over the 1990s and after 9/11, as I have tried to demonstrate, has to do with the criminalization of immigration law; or, with how lawmakers have merged and then sequestered criminal law and immigration law to an exceptional space of immigration enforcement practices paradoxically beyond judicial reproach. In this sense, practices of immigration enforcement are rooted squarely in the
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geopolitics of immigration law, which we might define as the strategic bracketingor placing asideof the reach of constitutional law. This strategic bracketing ensures the expedited removal of undocumented migrants and others under criminal law charges, now increasingly at the hands of local authorities and under the generally unproblematized guise of counterterrorism. While geographers have dealt broadly with the intersection of law, power and space, this specific nexus between law and immigration enforcementand indeed, the geopolitical role played by immigration lawmakingrequires more research. Lastly, to focus on the legal basis of immigration policing brings us to the problem of the uneven spatiality of immigration enforcement. To examine the geopolitics of immigration law is at once to examine how statecraft is about increasingly irregular and uncertain localized conditions of possibility rather than about coherent, macro-scale strate Tuathail 2005; gies of state governance (see generally, Dahlman and O Graham 2004; Warren 2002). In addition to rethinking immigration enforcement away from the border and in terms of immigration law and the exceptional practices it authorizes, I think it important to underline how immigration enforcement is being multiplied and activated unevenly across sites which, although typically thought marginal or at least tangential to geopolitical practice, are increasingly otherwise. As noted above, the post-9/11 devolution of immigration law enforcement to local proxy forces has occasioned a patchwork municipal geography of interior immigration enforcement, as certain localities sign immigration enforcement memorandums with the Department of Homeland Security while others do not. But the situation is arguably more complex than simply the production of an uneven geography of participating and non-participating localities. In other words, the problem is not simply one of regional differentiation. At stake is a larger question about the myriad, conflicting scales of immigration policing in the US, a problem rarely if at all noted in the academic literature. In the case of municipal non-compliance related to immigration, federal immigration law is obstructed on the ground via municipal ordinances whichin a sort of mirroring of the exceptionality of federal immigration lawdeclare cities as exceptional sites exempt from federal immigration laws. While immigration law works increasingly, then, via an exception to the domestic rule of law, municipal immigration-related ordinances themselves work via an exception to immigration law. And of course this is challenged by the post-9/11 extension of federal immigration proxies into select urban centers, which brings the exceptionality of federal immigration law to bear directly on urban spaces, albeit by non-federal agents. The result is a convoluted hierarchy of interpenetrating scales of exception or exemption in relation to the law, in which the final territorial jurisdiction of immigration enforcement remains fundamentally unsettled.
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Acknowledgements
My sincere thanks to Bruce DArcus, Joe Nevins, Joe Heyman, Mary Thomas and Melissa Wright for their insightful and constructive comments on this paper.

Endnotes
http://tancredo.house.gov/irc/welcome.htm Border deaths slowed after 9/11 but remain well above those registered before the Gatekeeper operations commenced (Eschbach, Hagan and Rodr guez 2003; Nevins 2003). The National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (2005) reports that between October 2004 and September 2005 some 460 migrant bodies were recovered from the border region. 3 The 1990 Immigration Act, the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. 4 Instrumental statutes effect a change to legal practice; expressive statutes communicate values through legislation; and, symbolic statutes make a political statement, with little intention to change law. 5 Technically, this bout of lawmaking eliminated deportation. The concept of removal was introduced in its place to do away with the procedural distinctions between exclusion (ie denial of entrance at the border) and deportation (ie removal from the interior). The goal was to purge court protections offered under the latter. I use the word deportation to refer to removals. 6 For a list of aggravated felonies, see Coonan (1998), Cook (2003) and Marley (1998). 7 Marley (1998:886887): The results of these combined effects can border on bizarre. For example, an offense that, when committed in 1958 was only a minor infraction is transformed . . . into a heinous act, an aggravated felony; a deferred adjudication for the 1958 offense that emphatically was not a conviction metamorphosizes into a conviction in 1996; a suspended sentence not worthy of a single day in jail for a 1958 transgression transmogrifies itself into imprisonment worthy of deportation in 1996. 8 There are approximately 11,500 border patrol agents, not 20,000. 9 Some localities are maintaining their independence. New Haven is considering municipal identification cards for undocumented aliens to allow greater security from deportation when dealing with local police (Yardley 2005). Longmont, CO has hired an immigrant integration coordinator to integrate documented and undocumented migrants safely and more fully into the city (Johnson 2005).
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