Held: The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and

the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 548 is an exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Thus, rules and regulations complained of aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstruction of national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of t he road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to who is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. The proper distinction the court said was this: The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation.

DANTE M. POLLOSO, Petitioner, vs. HON. CELSO D. GANGAN

FACTS: The National Power Corporation (NPC) entered into a service contract with Atty. Benemerito A. Satorre. Under said contract, Satorre was to perform the services for the Leyte-Cebu and Leyte-Luzon Interconnection Projects of the NPC specifically for the supervision, coordination and control of right-of-way activities in the project. In consideration for services rendered, Satorre would receive a monthly salary plus representation and transportation allowance. The Unit Auditor Alexander A. Tan, issued Notice of Disallowance No. 95-0001-135-94 for the payment of the services rendered by Atty. Satorre. The main reason was cited for said disallowance: 1).... The contract for services did not have the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Corporate Counsel and concurrence of the Commission on Audit as required under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986. Accordingly, the officers of NPC were held to be personally liable for the amounts due to Atty. Satorre. Thereafter, a petition for review from the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA), was filed by herein petitioner Dante M. Polloso, from the disallowance by the COA Unit Auditor of the amount representing payment of legal services rendered by Atty. Benemerito A. Satorre to the National Power Corporation (NPC). ISSUE: DOES THE PROHIBITION UNDER COA CIRCULAR NO. 86-255 DATED APRIL 2, 1986 AND SEC. 212 OF THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING MANUAL IMPOSED ON GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FROM HIRING PRIVATE LAWYERS "TO HANDLE THEIR LEGAL CASES" APPLY TO A LAWYER HIRED BY VIRTUE OF A SERVICE CONTRACT BUT WHO ACTUALLY HANDLE PURELY RIGHT-OF-WAY MATTERS (EXCLUDING HANDLING OF COURT CASES)? Held: The payment out of public funds of retainer fees to private law practitioners who are so hired or employed without the prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Office of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, as well as the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit shall be disallowed in audit and the same shall be a personal liability of the officials concerned. Government agencies and instrumentalities are restricted in their hiring of private lawyers to render legal services or handle their cases. No public funds will be disbursed for the payment to private lawyers unless prior to the hiring of said lawyer, there is a written conformity and acquiescence from the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel. On the claim that COA Circular 86-255 is not applicable in this case because the inhibition provided for in said Circular relates to the handling of legal cases of a government agency and that the contractor was not hired in that capacity but to handle legal matters (sic) involving right-of-way, it is maintained that the contracted service falls within the scope of the inhibition which clearly includes "the hiring or employing private lawyers or law practitioners to render legal services for them and/or to handle their legal cases. It bears repeating that the purpose of the circular is to curtail the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public funds to private lawyers for services rendered to the government. This is in line with the Commission on Audits constitutional mandate to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. Hence, as the hiring of Atty. Satorre was clearly done without the prior conformity and acquiescence of the Office of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as well as the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit, the payment of fees to Atty. Satorre was correctly disallowed in audit by the COA. WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of showing that the respondents committed a reversible error.

CENON S. CERVANTES vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL FACTS: This is a petition to review a decision of the Auditor General denying petitioner's claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation, otherwise known as the NAFCO. ) which orederd that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such allowance. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the said quarter allowance? HELD: The petition for review is dismissed. NAFCO is Government controlled corporation subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 51 and the executive order (No. 93) promulgated in accordance therewith. Consequently, it was also subject to the powers of the Control Committee created in said executive order, among which is the power of supervision for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in the operations of the corporation and also the power to pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the board of directors. The granting of the allowance amounted to an illegal increase of petitioner's salary beyond the limit fixed in the corporate charter and was furthermore not justified by the precarious financial condition of the corporation. The second ground ignores the rule that in the computation of the time for doing an act, the first day is excluded and the last day included (Section 13 Rev. Ad. Code.) As the act was approved on October 4, 1946, and the President was given a period of one year within which to promulgate his executive order and that the order was in fact promulgated on October 4, 1947, it is obvious that under the above rule the said executive order was promulgated within the period given. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION FACTS: The court ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. , the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He assails the decision on the following grounds: "The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance and of value which, if considered, would alter the result of the case, thus: I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing of an extradition petition in court and a preliminary investigation. II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of fundamental fairness. III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no higher objective. IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine Extradition Law is intended to prevent flight. V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government and the rights of an individual. VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice and hearing may be dispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion. VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch necessitating notice and hearing. VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme Court has encroached upon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two co-equal branches of government. IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process? HELD: The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis: "An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty." There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case." Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.

ARANETA vs. GATMAITAN

FACTS: San Miguel Bay, is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region. trawl1 operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this region most of them settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area. Thereafter, the President issued an Executive Order prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay which brought for the institution of an action by the opposing party to assail the constitutionality of the said EO. ISSUE: Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Order banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay, or, said in other words, whether said Executive Order were issued in accordance with law? HELD: The court declared that Executive Order of the President is valid and issued by authority of law. Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines prescribes: SEC. 10 (1). The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows: SEC. 63. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION. Administrative acts and commands of the President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the general performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be made in executive orders. Regarding department organization Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code also provides that: All executive functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under the Executive Departments subject to the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines in matters of general policy. The Departments are established for the proper distribution of the work of the Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that each branch of the administration may have a chief responsible for its direction and policy. Each Department Secretary shall assume the burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of the Government under his control and supervision. For administrative purposes the President of the Philippines shall be considered the Department Head of the Executive Office. One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural Resources which by law is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines (Sec. 75, R. A. C.). Moreover, "executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective Department" (Sec. 79-A, R.A.C.), and there can be no doubt that the promulgation of the questioned Executive Orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.