On Social Cohesion in Greece

Andromachi Hadjiyanni
The Tocqueville Review/La revue Tocqueville, Volume 31, Number
1, 2010, pp. 7-40 (Article)
Published by University of Toronto Press
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The Tocqueville Review/La Revue Tocqueville, Vol. XXXI, n 1 2010
ON SOCIAL COHESION IN GREECE
Andromachi HADJIYANNI
In this article we will focus on social cohesion in modern Greek
society by presenting aspects of social life where there is either
evidence of social cohesion or evidence to the contrary.
The study of social cohesion is not an easy task owing to the fact
that the concept has become a battleground of opposing forces
engendering heated debates between writers who have attempted,
over the last two decades, to give an explicit and comprehensive
definition of the concept.
1
Some argue that this concept has not been
conceptually processed in an adequate way. Consequently, it is
characterized by uncertainty and has become construed in numerous
ways to suit a variety of situations/agendas. As a result, this term has
been adapted to the requirements and the limitations of public action
and, for this reason, has been widely disseminated.
2
Some others
claim that the concept of social cohesion is not a well-defined
concept and, as such, does not (and cannot) lead to a clear socio-
political project. The vagueness of the concept is not due to poor or
contradictory academic work, but to the fact that its content is the
subject of multiple rapport de forces between social groups and
political organizations that are trying to impose their own project of
social cohesion.
3
In a recent paper, Fors and Parodi (2009) propose A theory for
social cohesion adapting the view that social cohesion is a
multidimensional concept whose definition is not obvious because it
8 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
describes, simultaneously, a situation and a procedure, while, at the
same time, provides arguments about the real (real society) and the
ideal (a society with ideal configuration) according to the citizens
view.
4
However, the basic idea, according to analysts around which
this theory is organised, is that in our societies, social justice a
concept already present in the work of Durkheim is at the heart of
social cohesion.
5
According to Fors and Parodi, we can estimate the
social cohesion of a society based on empirical evidence but this
estimate must be based on opinions as well as practices, in facts as
well as in rights.
Thus, to what extent can we talk about social cohesion in Modern
Greek society and in which areas can we detect it? To answer this
question, we have studied three main areas where we believe that
social solidarity and, consequently, social cohesion can be identified:
- The area of work (which encompasses the issues of employment,
unemployment, poverty and social inequalities),
- The area of social bonds (which encompasses the issues of social
capital and of civil society, the issues of family and the welfare state,
the issue of trust in other persons and trust in institutions), and
- The area of national identity (which encompasses the issues of
religion and religious minorities as well as the issue of immigration).
Before we refer to the aspects of social cohesion in Greece in the
recent years, we should highlight some milestones of the political,
social and economic life in Greece in the post war era which will
facilitate an understanding of our investigation.
Greece, at the end of World War II, had a civil war which left the
country deeply split, politically polarized and in a cycle of continuous
political crises.
6
During the period following the war, there was a large
internal migration flow of the mainly agricultural population to urban
areas and, at the same time, emigration to the United States, Canada
and Western Germany. Within two decades, the country changed
dramatically from an agricultural to an urban society: the way of life
as well as consumption habits changed. Consequently, a high level of
economic development took place. This period after the war was
characterised by limited or one could say troubling democracy a
contradictory democratic period consisting of elements of
authoritarianism and democracy.
7
It concluded with the instalment of
the dictatorship from 1967 until 1974. This was an especially difficult
On Social Cohesion in Greece 9
and painful period on a political and social level because all rights
were suppressed within Greece whereas the country was isolated
internationally.
After the fall of the dictatorship, democracy reappeared in Greece
which has been experiencing a 35 year period of democratic
stabilization. The social reconciliation among the political forces of
the country was promoted allowing Greece to enter the European
Union (in 1981) and, subsequently, the Economic and Monetary
Union (in 2001).
This entire period is characterised as having economic prosperity,
the infrastructure and the standard of living have been significantly
improved, the democratic character of the institutions has been
reinforced as well as the European orientation of the country.
Moreover, the massive influx of immigrants during the decades of
1990 and 2000 has contributed to the economic development of the
country.
During this post-dictatorship era, political parties (mainly the two
larger parties that alternate in power PASOK, the socialist party and
New Democracy, the conservative central-right party) became the
most powerful institutions in the country. They served to mobilize
large portions of the Greek population around them. Greeks wanted
to participate in massive organisations and for the first time were
becoming members of political parties. At the same time, other
institutions such as unions, professional organisations, co-ops, etc.
became substantially larger as well but remained dependent on
political parties within a framework of a clientelist political party
system. This system has tried to promote reforms (in education, in
health, in public administration, etc) but has largely proven to be
ineffective. This partycization of civil society institutions led to other
consequences as well. On the one hand, it led to a great number of
disillusioned citizens who had earlier joined only to subsequently
become discouraged. On the other hand, it encouraged corruption
since participatory institutions submitted to party interests as well as
to private interests.
8
The post war era of prosperity during which time the European
identity of the country was established, soon reached its limits. Since
2008, signs of a deep economic slump and social crisis
9
have become
obvious and have culminated in an economic crisis that Greece has
10 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
been facing since the beginning of 2010. At the moment, it is clear to
everyone that Greece will only emerge from the current crisis after
enduring a particularly difficult and painful journey.
I - EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND INCLUSION
The possibilities that a society offers to its members with respect
to finding employment as well as the working conditions for available
employment positions (e.g. labour stability, full-time work with
benefits, etc.) affect the possibilities people have for a decent
standard of living as well as a decent life. This situation determines, to
a great extent, whether and how much these people will be integrated
into the labour market and the society as a whole. On the contrary, if
the members of this society, instead of working in stable jobs, are
obliged to work in such situations as the black market, part-time
positions, short-term employment contracts, or if they are
unemployed (especially for a long period of time), while the social
protection system is hardly protecting them at all, then these people
and/or groups are faced with great difficulties as far as integration is
concerned and are more or less marginalised in this society.
10
The
question we will try to explore is whether Greek society is offering
possibilities for social integration through labour market participation
and if so, to what extent.
Employment
Before addressing the core characteristics and the long- term
trends of employment and unemployment, we will briefly examine
some critical characteristics of the Greek labour market and economy
as well as the Greek society at large. The Greek labour market is
characterised by the highest percentage of self-employment in the
EU-15 and the second highest in the EU-27. The percentage of wage
labour, while increasing rapidly recently, remains among the lowest in
the EU. At the same time, the percentage of so-called unpaid family
assistants, who are traditionally working in small family businesses,
remains high despite its decreasing trend over the last two decades.
Remarkably, about one third of the countrys productive population
in 2007 did not actually participate in the labour market. One should
also note the massive number of immigrants both legal and illegal-
entering the country since the beginning of the 1990s.
On Social Cohesion in Greece 11
When we examine the aggregate changes in total employment, it is
difficult to recognize the changes occurring within specific
employment categories. For example, from 2000 to 2005, a period of
significant economic development, the overall increase in
employment was rather low. There was a 297,000 net increase in
employment positions during this period yielding an average yearly
employment growth rate of 1.4%. However, during the same period,
a large increase in wage labour took place: wage labourers increased
by 407,000 positions, which indicates a 17.2% increase for the five
year period. Also during this same period, a small increase in the
number of employers took place (22,000 people, or a percentage
increase of 6.9%) and at the same time the unpaid family assistants
decreased by a large amount (114,000 positions or a percentage
decrease of 30.1%). During the same period, self-employment
decreased by 18,000 positions.
11
If we look over a longer historical period, the changes in the
sphere of employment in the last three decades and especially during
the last 15 years have been significant as shown in Table 1. The
number of self-employed decreased by 6 percentage points in 14
years: it was 27.4% of total employment in 1993 and had declined to
21.3% by 2007. During this same period, there was a corresponding
5.6 percentage point drop in the number of unpaid family assistants
from 12% in 1993 to 6.4% in 2007. On the contrary, the category of
wage labourers increased by 10 percentage points; in 1993 wage
labourers were 53.3% of total employment, while in 2007 they were
64.1% of total employment. There was also a small increase in the
number of employers resulting in an increase in their percentage in
total employment by 1 percentage point. However, the most
important development was a decrease in self-employment and
unpaid family assistants on the one hand and the corresponding
increase in wage labour on the other. Even with these changes, wage
labour in Greece is still considerably lower compared to the other
European countries (the EU average is about 84%).
We should also note that in the past several years, there have been
significant changes with respect to the employment of women. A
great part of the increase in wage labour has been due to women
whose numbers correspondingly decreased in the category of unpaid
family assistants. The growth rate for wage labour and total
employment for women is rapidly increasing; wage labour has
12 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
increased from 62% in 2000 to 68.7% in 2005 and was greater than
the equivalent percentage for men in 2005 which was 61.9%.
Table 1- Employed by occupational status, Greece 1993, 2002 2007
(Btrimester)
1993 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Labour Force 3.715 4.016 4.104 4.330 4.382 4.453 4.520
% composition


Employer
7.2 7.6 7.3 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.2
Self-employed
27.4 24.8 24.7 22.2 22.1 21.6 21.3
Employee
53.3 59.5 59.7 63.4 63.6 63.6 64.1
Unpaid family
assistant 12.0 8.2 8.3 6.3 6.3 6.5 6.4
Source: NSSG, Labour Force Surveys, 1993, 2002-2007, (B trimester)
Part-time employment in Greece was 5.8% of total employment in
2007 (4.1% in 2001) and remains at the same low level with minor
fluctuations over the past two decades. A significant portion of part-
time employment is due to the lack of full-time jobs. Additionally,
more than 65% of part-time employees are women. Flexible types of
employment, in general, and part-time employment, in particular, are
not widespread in Greece. Numerous reasons could be responsible
for this outcome. Perhaps an important explanation is low wages but
also the fact that employers prefer to assign overtime work to the
people already employed in their companies instead of hiring part-
time employees. Moreover, the existing institutional framework
creates obstacles for employers with respect to the expansion of part-
time work as well as insecurity for workers themselves who believe
that part-time work lacks appropriate employment protection. Finally,
another reason for the low percentage of part-time employment is the
dominant social belief concerning the low social status part-time
employment imparts.
12
In general, with respect to new forms of
employment, the Greek labour market is characterised by widespread
use of fixed-term contracts, project contracts (or quasi-self-
employment), subcontracting work and various forms of informal
employment (illegal flexibility).
Temporary employment accounts for 11.1% (2007) of wage
labour and mainly comprises fixed-term contracts and contracts
On Social Cohesion in Greece 13
through employer-lending companies. However, it seems that the
number of temporary employees is increasing mainly in the public
sector both in its narrow sense (including national government and
state companies) and in its broad sense (which includes the local
government and other semi-public companies). Consequently, we
notice that more recently, the state, as an employer, has reinforced
flexibility including temporal employment at the expense of
permanent employment, reproducing the conditions of insecurity
experienced by employees at the private sector.
13

Unemployment
Until the 1980s, Greece had one of the lowest unemployment
rates among EU countries, but since the middle of that decade, there
has been a rapid increase in unemployment. In fact, in the past 15
years, Greece has had higher unemployment rates than the EU
average. In 1980 the unemployment rate was 2.8%; in 1990 it was
7.0% while in 1999 it reached 11.6%. However, since 1999, the
unemployment rate began to decrease and reached 7.2% in 2008, yet
since then, the unemployment rate has been increasing constantly due
to the international as well as the Greek economic crisis (Figure 1).
Lets examine the characteristics of unemployment in Greece. The
two groups that are impacted the most by unemployment are young
people aged 15-29 years old and women. Indeed two out of three
unemployed people are women. The long-term unemployed have
particularly bad circumstances. Since 2000, there has been a
significant decrease in the number of unemployed in all categories.
The unemployment rate for women has dropped from 18.2% in 1999
to 10.9% in 2008. The percentage of unemployed who are new
entrants into the labour market as a proportion of the total number
of unemployed dropped from 49.2% in 1998 to 36.5% in 2008. The
percentage of long-term unemployed dropped during the same period
from 56.6% to 51.5%. However, despite this decrease, the long-term
unemployed still amount to half of the unemployed population.
14 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
Figure 1- Unemployment rate, Greece 1974-2009
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% of Unemployment
Source: NSSG, Labour Force Surveys, 1974-2009, (B trimester).
Inequality
Among the countries of the EU-15, Greece has recently been
characterized as having the second highest level of inequality with
respect to the income dispersion indicator (behind Portugal); this
ranking did not change considerably even when different inequality
indicators were considered (Papatheodorou et al., 2008).
Studying inequality over time, we notice that the overall inequality
in the country decreased significantly during the first period
immediately following the downfall of the dictatorship (1974-1982),
whereas later, it remained rather stable, showing some fluctuations
from year to year (Papatheodorou et al., 2008).
It is noteworthy that according to the data since 1996, Greece
increased social welfare spending considerably (roughly 25-30%). It
now ranges around the EU-15 average. Nevertheless, this spending
has not had any impact since neither inequality nor poverty have been
reduced despite the fact that social program funding has actually been
generously increased and Greeks currently pay the same proportion
of their wealth for social policy programs as the average European
(about 26%).
14

A crucial question is why social transfers (including pensions and
all other forms of benefits) have not managed to lower inequality and
poverty in Greece like they have in other European countries that
spend almost the same amounts. The reason is that social policy
On Social Cohesion in Greece 15
expenditures (primarily pensions) are not directed towards the
poorest but, instead, are directed toward the middle and richer strata
of the population: the richest strata actually receives pensions that are
three time higher than the poorer ones receive on the basis of the
reciprocity principle
15
(Table 2). Thus, pensions exaggerate income
inequality instead of reducing it. The poor have no priority in
receiving social benefits; therefore, social transfers do not effectively
result in the reduction of inequality.
Table 2 - Distribution of social benefits and pensions by income category (in )
Income category
1
st
poorest
2nd 3rd 4rth
5th
richest
Total available
income
3,574 6,043 8,275 11,401 18,601
Income from
pensions
2,327 3,144 3,845 4,893 6,937
Income from
social benefits
(without
pensions)
420 569 524 439 464
Percentage of
households
receiving a social
benefit
23% 30% 27% 20% 15%
Source: Calculations from raw data EU-SILK 2004 (the table is presented at
Lymberaki A., 2008).
When we examine the overall inequality of the various population
groups with regard to some key socio-economic characteristics of the
people composing these groups (e.g. size or the composition of the
household, the degree of urbanity, age, gender, educational level,
professional status, etc.), it becomes obvious that a larger proportion
of inequality is due to the income dispersion within these groups.
However, it seems that the degree of urbanity is one of the factors
that explain a great proportion of the overall inequality in the country
because it reflects the higher proportion of the population that live in
rural areas in Greece and thus have a low income and high poverty
level.
16 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
Poverty
It is known that Greece and Portugal are the countries
characterized by the highest poverty rates in the EU, regardless of the
methodology used to measure poverty rates. In addition, the four
countries of Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain) are
characterized as having higher poverty rates compared to the other
EU countries.
Despite a significant increase in GDP in Greece during the last
decade, poverty and inequality remain almost invariable. In 2006,
Greece had the highest poverty rate in the EU-15 (20.1%), and the
second highest rate in EU-27, while it had the highest percentage in
the poverty gap and in long-term poverty.
16
One can notice that
Greece does not simply have a higher number of poor people but,
additionally, the average income of these poor people is far below the
poverty threshold; moreover, those that are poor remain in poverty
for a long period of time.
But who are the poor in Greece? In general, the groups
characterized as having high poverty risk do not change dramatically
overtime. People with low educational levels, pensioners, members of
households whose leader is unemployed and members of rural
households are the groups with poverty indicators that are much
higher than the national average. In the past, there were an
exceptionally high proportion of farmers who were in poverty
whereas more recently, the largest group of poor has been pensioners
due to the shrinkage of the rural sector and the ageing of the
population.
17
According to a dominate view in the social dialogue and the
official government rhetoric, economic development and a decrease
in unemployment are the central and necessary preliminary
requirements for the reduction of relative poverty. However, this
view is not supported by empirical evidence. In the last decade, the
rate of economic development in Greece has been higher than the
average EU rate without leading to a reduction in poverty. Among
countries with similar levels of economic development, the
differences in poverty rates are explained only by the differences in
each countrys social protection system. The reduction in
unemployment in Greece does not seem to have had a significant
effect on its poverty rate.
On Social Cohesion in Greece 17
Although the unemployed in Greece run a higher poverty risk
than those who are working, they constitute a small proportion of the
total in poverty. The great majority of poor people are either
employed or retired. Moreover, part-time employees have similar
poverty rates compared to the unemployed, a fact that raises
questions about the effectiveness of policies promoting flexible
working relations and part-time employment, in particular, as a means
of reducing poverty. On the contrary, an increase in salaries and
pensions seems to be necessary for the reduction of poverty.
18

Satisfaction from life
The satisfaction that members of a society feel, regarding their life,
is an important indicator demonstrating the extent to which they feel
they belong to this society in the sense that they participate in the
making of the present and the future of the society. In the past few
years, discontent among Greek citizens with their daily life has been
increasing (56% of the citizens report that they were discontent in the
spring of 2009) chiefly due to the dire situation in the Greek
economy. However, their discontent also stems from their feelings of
insecurity caused by the uncertainties in the labour market, the high
cost of living, and also, in general, because of their (poor) quality of
life. This percentage is significantly higher then the EU-27 average of
22%.
19

At the same time, Greeks are continuing to rank the general
economic situation and inflation as the most important problems they
are facing at the personal level, with percentages 47% and 43%
respectively while these percentages are significantly higher than the
European average (26% and 38% respectively). They also believe that
Greece is moving in the wrong direction; that it needs more reforms
to tackle the problems of the future (88%). They argue that these
reforms, which should be instituted to benefit future generations,
must be carried out even if the current generation has to endure some
sacrifices.
20
Through this position, they are standing in solidarity
because it is becoming increasingly obvious
21
to both working and to
retired people especially since the beginning of the economic crisis
two years ago and the adverse economic situation Greece finds itself
in that the situation will become much worse for future generations.
18 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
II SOCIAL TIES
Family and welfare state
When we are talking about social solidarity issues and issues
relating to the integration of people and groups into Greek society,
we need to refer to the development of the welfare state and the role
of the Greek family as a multi-operational support institution.
The development of the welfare state in Greece has been
problematic and fragmented and is characterized by the fact that
social protection is limited to the granting of benefits whereas the
delivery of public services falls short of what is required (Matsaganis,
2003). More emphasis is given to benefits instead of providing
adequate services. Furthermore, the services that are provided are
granted mainly for the fulfilment of traditional needs (such as
retirement which represents 90% of social transfers) resulting in
relatively acceptable protection for certain groups (e.g. the employed
and pensioners) and inadequate protection for other groups such as
the unemployed, the temporarily employed or those that are below
the poverty threshold.
Another characteristic of the welfare state in Greece is the lack of
a legal framework for ensuring a minimum income at the personal or
family level (Flaquer, 2003), while the overall spending for social
protection is low (lower than the EU average).
Many analysts find similarities between the welfare of Greece and
the welfare states of the other southern European countries (Italy,
Spain and Portugal). They often refer to the Southern-European
model (Moreno, 2006; Flaquer, 2003; Papadopoulos, 2006), which is
characterized by the central role of the family in all areas of social
protection and particularly in the creation and distribution of income
and services. This strong presence of the family covers the disparities
and inefficiencies of the social protection system (the provision for
day care services as well as services for the elderly is especially
inadequate). The family offers significant services for the care of its
members based on strong family solidarity across generations, which
shows the durable interdependence of the family members: the
younger members are dependent on the older ones and eventually the
older members are dependent on the younger ones. For this exchange
of services to be possible, new couples often live in very close
On Social Cohesion in Greece 19
proximity to their parental residence, if not living in the same building
(Maloutas, 1990).
Therefore, the care of the elderly and the children remains mainly
a family task, especially for women, whether they are working or not.
However, the continuing massive participation of women in the
labour market, in addition to gender equality declarations, impinges
on the lack of infrastructure (e.g. childcare facilities) but also on the
lack of opportunities for part-time employment. As a result, it is
resolved at the personal level within each household: grandparents
take care of their grandchildren and older members of the household
are taken care of by their children. At the same time, existing care
needs are covered partially by the private sector (private childcare
centers and senior citizens assisted living facilities) as well as by the
immigrant women who are working in private households taking care
of the older people and the children at their homes (where they often
stay themselves).
Essentially, the Greek family offers a protective shield for its
unemployed members by providing an alternative source of living
instead of letting them drop below the poverty threshold as indicated
in recent studies (Soulios and Boukouvalas, 2008). The Greek family
offers to its adult children a place to live, economic and emotional
support as well as the possibility to postpone their entry into the
labour market until a satisfactory choice presents itself.
This arrangement is related to another characteristic of Greek
households, namely the delayed departure of the adult children from
the family residence even beyond their educational period.
Consequently, the family provides its young members the opportunity
to enter the labour market and obtain an adequate job without
enduring the stress that result from the pressure of immediate
vocational rehabilitation. Simultaneously, the family activates its social
network to find an appropriate job for its younger members. This
practice is quite common in Greece as well as in the other Southern
European countries (Hadjiyanni, 2006).
Discussing the multi-functional role of the family and the critical
contribution of women, we have to comment about the position and
role of women in the Greek family as well as in Modern Greek
society.
20 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
To begin with, during the last three decades Greek women have
made important steps with regard to their full presence in the political
and economic life of the country. They are currently educated
equivalently with men
22
and participate increasingly at the decision
centers (e.g. the government, the judicial system, etc). At the same
time, their employment percentages increase year after year. However,
these changes do not invalidate the dominant traditional model and
the traditional division of roles between the genders. According to
this traditional model, women, whether working or not, are
responsible for the housework, the children and the elderly whereas
men contribute much less to these activities.
23
Consequently, women
are relegated to inferior positions of employment which would be
expressed in such ways as having a brief career, stagnating
opportunities to rise in the company hierarchy, lower pay, smaller
accumulation of work experience as well as holding employment
positions that are more insecure or temporary. Consequently, they
accept the view that family care is primarily their responsibility.
At the same time, the lack of policies for the conciliation of family
and work as well as the incongruity between social timetables (the
operating hours of public organisations and the institutions of the
social infrastructure in general) and the working hours of the great
majority of workers hinders the provision of services to employees
working full-time. An example of this is that public schools finish at
13:30-14:00 while full-time employees do not finish their work before
15:30 at the earliest. Moreover, at most schools, keeping the kids for
longer periods is not possible.
The civil society
Every social scientist studying civil society in Greece or
documenting and measuring social capital at the societal level (a
concept that is cognate with that of civil society) agrees that civil
society in Greece is cachectic, atrophic or fragile.
24
There are several
reasons why civil society (in the sense of citizens participation in
collective bodies, associations, unions and voluntary organizations of
any kind as well as the participation in informal and non-
institutionalized collective activities) in Greece has not managed to
develop until recently. The primary reason appears to be the
dominant role of the state and the development of particularly strong
political parties through which citizens have participated in the
On Social Cohesion in Greece 21
political and social life of the country. Political parties, as dominant
institutions, have always controlled the professional associations and
trade unions through the mainly cliental relationships with the
citizens whose collective action has been limited to the participation
in these organizations.
25

The situation seems to be changing in recent years (indeed since
the beginning of the 1990s) because the relationship between citizens
and the political parties, the unions and politics in general, shows
clear signs of crisis. Simultaneously, Greeces participation in the EU
and the effort to Europeanize state politics has provided fresh
incentives for collective action and the motivation of civil society.
Other reasons that have contributed to the strengthening of civil
society are the crisis of the social state, the decline of social
movements from the 1970s and the 1980s, many demands of which
have been integrated into state policies (e.g. gender equality,
environment protection, etc), as well as new conceptions about self-
organization, self-help and self-management.
26
One should not
overlook, however, that in parallel to the institutional type of citizens
participation in organizations of every kind, there are also non-
institutional, atypical forms of participation that take place at the
micro level. Some researchers
27
claim that these latter types of
participation have been multifaceted and dense especially in Greece
during the past two decades. Hence, although it is not easy to
measure this unofficial and informal civil society, we can delineate
it since, it appears in the form of informal gatherings and unofficial
interactions among individual citizens, small initiative groups,
periodic meetings and gatherings in closed or open public areas as
well as with the operation of networks facilitated by the fast spread of
the use of the internet.
28

Along with the weak but steady development of the civil society
through the citizens participation in every sort of organization
(NGOs, voluntary organizations, clubs, unions etc.), there is interest
among social scientists in the documentation, measurement and
analysis both of the civil society and of the social capital in the
country. These efforts have taken place largely within the framework
of some European or international programs and are quite
fragmentary due to the lack of an institutional framework, within
which all data about the organizations themselves, their members and
their activities would be recorded.
22 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
The most systematic documentation and analysis of social capital
namely through the political participation of citizens, their
involvement in communal activities, the operation of social networks,
the measurement of sociability, and finally through the expression of
trust in people, institutions and values, was conducted through the
European Social Survey in 2003. The results of this research
concerning the participation of citizens in organizations of every sort
(voluntary, non-governmental etc.) confirm the more general
tendency towards low participation recorded in previous studies.
Nevertheless, they still detect a tendency towards a larger degree of
mobilization among citizens, approximately 20% of whom state that
they do take part in one or more organizations, unions or political
parties. Most of these citizens, however, (2/3) declare that they take
part only in non-governmental organizations (Table 3).
Table 3 - Participation of Greeks in any kind of organisation for the year 2003
Participation by kind of
organisation
Number of people
(thousands) %
No participation 2.042 79.5
Participation only in non-
governmental organisations
392 15.3
Participation only in political and/or
professional organisations
71 2.8
Participation in several types of
organisations
61 2.4
Total 2.566 100.0
Source: European Social Survey, Greece 2003, National Centre for Social Research
Trust in people
The issue of social trust, that is, of the trust running through
human relations in every society and often referred to as social
capital, is also a significant indicator of development, in the sense that
trust among a societys members fosters mutual support and
collective action.
29

There is little available empirical data showing to what extent
Greek citizens trust each other, and the data that is available comes
mainly from the different waves of the European Social Survey,
which poses certain questions on trust or mistrust of others (Table 4).
Thus the question: can we trust or should we be cautious of other
people, was answered by 47.4% of the respondents stating we
On Social Cohesion in Greece 23
should be cautious (the respective percentage in 2003 was 51.4%);
while only 15.9% of people responded that we should trust most
people.
Table 4 - Trust in others
Can we trust the others or should be cautious in our relationships with others?
2003 2005 2009
We should
always be
cautious
with people
We can
trust most
people
We should
always be
cautious with
people
We can
trust most
people
We should
always be
cautious with
people
We can trust
most people
51.4% 14.8% 46.8% 17.0% 47.4% 15.9%
Would most people try to take advantage of you if they had the opportunity or would
they be fair with you?
2003 2005 2009
Most people
would try to
take
advantage of
me
Most
people
would try
to be fair
with me
Most people
would try to
take
advantage of
me
Most
people
would try
to be fair
with me
Most people
would try to
take
advantage of
me
Most people
would try to
be fair with
me
49.9% 14.6% 47.7% 11.7% 49.1% 11.2%
Do people often help others or care mostly about themselves?
2003 2005 2009
People care
mostly
about
themselves
People try
to help
others
People care
mostly about
themselves
People try
to help
others
People care
mostly about
themselves
People try to
help others
63.3% 8.6% 58.3% 9.1% 58.3% 9.8
Source: ESS 2003, 2005, 2009, Greece: First results, National Centre for Social
Research
Equivalent responses were also obtained from the question Do
you believe that most people would try to take advantage of you if
they had the opportunity or would they be fair with you where half
of the respondents, (49.1%), responded that most people would try to
take advantage of them. Only 11.2% of Greeks believed that most
people would be fair with them. These percentages have scarcely
changed during the last decade.
Finally, the question Do you believe that people often help each
other or they care mostly about themselves, had more than half of
24 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
the respondents (58.3%) answering that people care mostly about
themselves.
Through these responses we clearly see evidence of a general
suspiciousness and mistrust of others but, also, an atmosphere of
individualism, which has been highlighted by many researchers
30
as
characteristics of Greek society in recent decades. These results are
not surprising for anyone who is aware that during the political
changeover (after 1974), the political parties that came to power did
not attempt to engender a climate of trust, neither with respect to the
basic state institutions nor among citizens, because they operated in a
clientel way and often distributed benefits to groups according to
their political orientation and the pressure power they had.
31

We should note, however, that some researchers have detected a
certain dualism in the attitudes of those citizens, who, on the one
hand, express a self-centred model of social behaviour, while, on the
other hand, in a variety of special cases or in natural disasters
(earthquakes, fires, Olympic games, fund-raising for people in need)
promptly express their social solidarity in various informal forms of
mutual help.
32
Trust in institutions
Citizens trust in the institutions of the country as well as their
trust in the efficient operation of institutions that guarantee the
smooth operation of democracy is one of the most important
indicators for the successful operation of a specific society and, at the
same time, a critical indicator of social cohesion.
33

In Greece, citizens are mistrusting of the central institutions that
are directly connected with the implementation of state power such as
the Parliament, government, public administration and political
parties (Table 5). A high level of mistrust is expressed by Greeks for
political parties (81%) both in 2002 and in 2009, articulating in this
way, their disappointment concerning the parties political action as
well as their method of operation. In this respect, the responses of
Greeks can not be differentiated from the answers of the other
European citizens, 79% of whom say that they mistrust political
parties. Additionally, a significant proportion of Greek citizens,
(54%), mistrust the Greek government as well as the Parliament
(52%). The equivalent European averages are 65% and 63%
On Social Cohesion in Greece 25
respectively. Finally, 52% of Greeks mistrust their local and regional
administrations. This percentage is quite different from the EU-27
average which is 43%
34
.
Table 5 - Which institutions do the Greeks trust?
2002 2009
Institutions Not trusted Trusted Not trusted Trusted
Parliament 50.8 52.0
Government 55.3 54.0
Local
authorities/Public
administration
65.3 52.0
Political parties 80.9 81.0
Justice 61.1 52.0
Military 80.3 69.0
Source: Eurobarometer No 57(2002), Eurobarometer No 72 (2009)
Greek citizens appear to trust two institutions: the judicial system
and the military. The judicial system is trusted by 52% of Greeks
(61.1% in 2002) while the military is trusted by 69% (80.9% in 2002).
However, there is evidence that even for the two most trusted
institutions by Greeks, there has been a significant decrease in trust
recently. According to some analysts
35
the expression of mistrust in
the institutions is associated with the participation of citizens in non-
governmental organizations or by the total lack of participation in any
organization, union etc. Thus, citizens who actively take part in non-
governmental organizations or similar unions appear to be the most
mistrustful towards the various political institutions (Parliament,
parties, politicians), clearly because these are people who have
distanced themselves completely from politics or people who have
tried to be socially active through alternative organizational forms.
To conclude, we could say that there are certain indications that
Greeces civil society seems to be growing slowly but steadily.
However, Greece still seems to be quite distant from other European
countries, even in the South, concerning this characteristic.
26 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
III NATIONAL IDENTITY, IMMIGRANTS AND RELIGION: US AND THE
OTHERS
National identity and religion
As a result of a number of historical factors connected to the
establishment and consolidation of the Modern Greek state, the
Greek national identity has become synonymous with an ethnic
identity wherein the Eastern Orthodox religion became its main
component (Polis, 1999). As a consequence, orthodoxy continues to
remain a part of the identity for the great majority of modern Greeks
who essentially declare that they are Christian Orthodox.
Concurrently, relatively small religious minorities continue to exist,
although accurate data concerning them is scarce. According to
estimates, Muslims, Jews, Christian Catholics, Christian Protestants,
Jehovah Witnesses and Old Calendarists account for approximately
10% of the countrys population.
36
Others, however, estimate this
proportion to be 5%.
37
In actuality, the religious and ethnic minority
of Muslims in Thrace is the only officially recognized minority in the
country. Following the 1990s, significant changes occurred regarding
the issue of religious minorities in Greece because of the influx of
about one million immigrants, most of whom have been Muslims
from neighboring countries such as Albania.
Although the Greek constitution protects free religious practice
for all known religions, religious minorities face legal and
administrative obstacles in the actual practice of their religious duties.
They confront great difficulties in the establishment of churches or
temples and in the foundation of religious associations, while the
non-Christian Orthodox educators rarely get appointed in public
schools. Additionally, the legal status of many religious minorities is
not recognized which encumbers the practice of their religious tasks.
Recently, under the pressure of appeals to the European Court of
Human Rights and as a result of the activities of the Greek
Ombudsman (an independent authority established in 1998 which
protects among other things religious minorities), measures have
been adopted fostering the respect for the rights of religious
minorities. One example of this new respect is the abolition (in 2006)
of the requirement for the permission or the advice of the church
authority representing the Greek Orthodox Church for the
foundation, erection or operation of a church or temple of any
On Social Cohesion in Greece 27
dogma or religion. However, these measures, as well as the relevant
European Court decisions, are rarely implemented due to the
opposition of the Greek Orthodox Church which continues to wield
considerable leverage within the entire public administration as well
as in the Greek society as a whole.
Orthodox Church and Greek Society
The reason we discuss, in the present article, the Greek Orthodox
Church and its relationship to the Modern Greek state with its
different manifestations of religious expression in Greek society, is
because the separation between church and state has not come about
in Greece. The presence of the Greek Orthodox Church in public life
remains strong while the official religion of the country is Christian
Orthodox as designated by the constitution (owing to the fact that it
is the prevailing religion).
The relationship between the national identity of Greeks and the
religious tradition of the Orthodox Christian Church has been and
remains tight
38
while the presence of the Greek Orthodox Church is
evident in many facets of the social, political and cultural life of
Greeks. Examples include divinity courses at school, students
attending religious mass, the oath of the President, Prime Minister
and Ministers of the government before the Archbishop of Greece,
and Orthodox priests positions as civil servants salaried by the
Greek state. Furthermore, religious marriages and specifically, Greek
Orthodox marriage ceremonies are preferred by the majority of those
deciding to wed which is one of the clearest examples of its strong
presence in Greek society.
But what is the relationship of Orthodox Greeks with their
religion and how secularized is Greek society at present? If we
consider issues such as attending mass, praying and self
characterization of the strength of religiosity (ranging from not
religious to very religious) as some of the critical factors
determining the extent of secularization in a society, then modern
Greek society is not characterized very much by secularization.
Instead, it can be more accurately characterized by the phrase
diffused religiosity.
39
This diffused religiosity is represented by a very high percentage
(75%) of people who are self-characterised as fairly or very
28 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
religious. Additionally, a significant proportion of the population
claim that they pray daily (46%) while, on the contrary, the percentage
of those who attend church regularly is not equivalently high (26%),
according to a European Community Social Survey of 2003.
40
It is a
remarkable point for the Greek case considering the low percentages
of those reporting to be not religious (1.7%), those who are not
attending church at all, and those who are never praying (4.1%).
These low percentages, relative to other European countries, are a
relatively recent phenomenon since the percentage of those Greeks
who never prayed was 16% in 1985. According to some analysts,
41
this emerging phenomenon coincides with Greece entering the new
environment of Economic and Monetary Union as well as the
enlargement of the EU, a fact that seems to provoke fear and
insecurity among a proportion of citizens. These people may be
turning to the church because it is a traditional institution that creates
an identity and cultivates feelings of socio-cultural stability and
continuity.
Greeks and immigrants
Since the end of the 1980s, Greece has been faced with an
unprecedented phenomenon, namely a massive influx of immigrants
into the country. Before this period, Greece was considered a country
of emigration (in the decades of the 1950s, 60s and 70s and, to a
lesser extent, the decade of the 1980s, Greek emigrants went to
Canada, the USA and Australia and later on to Western Europe and
particularly Germany).
Consequently, Greece has been unprepared to receive and
manage the one million immigrants that have entered the country.
The 2001 Census reported that, from a total population of 11 million,
762.000 people had foreign nationality (7% of the population,
compared to 177.000 or 2% in 1981).
42
According to estimates, the
real population of immigrants has been, at the same time,
considerably greater due to a significant portion of immigrants
avoiding inclusion in the census. These are mostly illegal immigrants,
specifically those who have not been able to have their status
recognized or legalized. As a result, according to these estimates, the
percentage of immigrants in the population is 9% while their
proportion in the labour force is 12%.
43
We should note that 70% of
the immigrants reported by the Census are from eight Eastern
On Social Cohesion in Greece 29
European countries (more than half are from neighbouring Albania)
and only 15% from other western countries. The presence of
immigrants is quite significant in certain areas of the country. In the
broader metropolitan region around the capital their percentage
exceeds 10% and in areas including Thessaloniki and the Greek
islands, the proportion of immigrants is also higher. In other regions
of the country their presence is relatively low (below 6%).
With regard to recent immigration flows, we can identify different
phases of immigration policy in Greece which relate to the way
immigration has been treated by the Greek authorities, the
implementation of certain policies, and the institutionalisation of
measures or the lack of such measures.
44
Thus, in the first period
(until 1997), the authorities denied the existence of an issue and did
not admit to the problem. All the immigrants at that time had an
illegal status (i.e. had no official documents allowing them to stay in
the country) because there was no legal framework for immigration
and, hence, for any legalisation procedure. Immigrants were often
arrested and deported/repatriated by the police. In 1997 the first
pieces of legalisation were designed for those who had a dependent
employment relationship. In subsequent years it could be said that
there was a general tolerance of immigrants. In 2001, the first
comprehensive and extensive legalisation was implemented entitling
400,000 immigrants to become legalised. Nevertheless, a considerable
number of immigrants remained illegal either due the lack of
necessary funds to pay the legalisation fees or because they did not
fulfil the requirements outlined in the legalisation applications (e.g.
dependent work) or for other reasons. In 2005, a second package of
legislation was introduced. During this period, special social policies
were introduced in order to satisfy the need for incorporating
European Union law into Greek law. By then, public debate had been
transformed and daily life with immigrants had become a more
positive experience. Unfortunately, soon after that, we shifted to a
period of economic crisis, which continues to the present. Currently,
there is a surge in racial violence and xenophobia which is primarily
due to the economic crisis. Immigrants have become targets while
more and more Greeks are demanding that the state should legally
regulate issues pertaining to second-generation immigrates who
cannot get the Greek citizenship and lack political rights.
45
The same
is true for immigrants that have been (legally) residing in the country.
30 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
Simultaneously, there are problems related to the continuous influx of
new immigrants, largely from the coast of Turkey, and the living
conditions at the reception centres. While this is happening, state
officials are still failing to control the immigration flow.
Another important aspect of the immigration situation is the
education of second-generation immigrants. The significant presence
of foreign students (mostly Albanians) at all levels of the educational
system has not only brought about the introduction of cross-culture
education, the creation of reception classes, and tutorial courses but
also the creation of cross-cultural schools. However, the majority of
foreign students attend classes at regular public school.
46
During the
2005-2006 school year, the percentage of foreign students at all
educational levels was 8.5%, with a strong presence in kindergarten,
primary school and technical high schools but a much smaller
presence at general high schools. We should note that the language of
the foreign students is not taught in any of the Greek schools.
Because of the difficulties foreign students face in Greek public
schools, they typically experience a high drop rate predominantly after
the end of compulsory education. Many non-governmental
organisations offer teaching lessons in the Greek language for
immigrants in Athens and other cities but there is not such an
equivalent offer from state organisations (e.g. first or second level
local government).
Immigrants in Greece are working in specific economic sectors,
such as construction, hotels and restaurants, private households
(where they take care of the elderly and children and do housework)
and in agriculture. These are the sectors that use mostly unskilled
labour, making the immigrants vulnerable to fluctuations in the
activities of these sectors. Immigrants are characterised in general as
having proportionally higher participation in the labour force
compared to Greeks and having lower unemployment rates as well.
47
In the Greek countryside the restructuring of agriculture has been
based, to a great extent, on the massive entry of immigrants in the
rural areas of the country. Immigrants do not work exclusively in
agriculture but also in non-agricultural activities as well as in tasks
supporting elderly households, especially in mountainous and
deprived rural areas. In this way, immigrants have taken a structural
position in rural labour markets at the same time that their presence
On Social Cohesion in Greece 31
has accelerated the modernisation of agricultural production.
Particularly in the instances of seasonal and intensive crops,
immigrants offer the necessary labour for the restructuring of the
techniques of agricultural production and the application of new
technologies. Nevertheless, they do not act as a substitute for the
labour of the indigenous population. Their contribution to the local
economy and agricultural operations is recognised as positive by the
majority of the rural population.
48
The larger problem of immigrants with respect to labour and thus
their social integration in Greece is the illegal status of a great number
of them (due to legal requirements and the expensive deposit
required). This circumstance obliges them to work in the informal
sector earning much lower wages and being uninsured. An additional
aspect is that the proportion of uninsured immigrants differs with
respect to their country of origin and is also larger for women
(24.2%) compared to men (16%).
49
Us and the others
How has Greek society reacted to this massive influx of
immigrants over such a short period of time and to what extent has
the society welcomed them? Our first albeit brief answer to this
question is that the immigrants have been received with great
cautiousness and even negativity. Analysing empirical data on the
attitudes against immigrants and to any kind of otherness (from the
Euro barometer and the European Social Survey) for the period
1988-2003, Kafetzis
50
remarks very accurately that there is an
intolerant attitude (among Greeks) against what en bloc is different.
Thus, in a special Eurobarometer survey of 2003 with the theme
Citizenship and sense of belonging, Greeks ranked first by a wide
margin when compared to citizens of other countries in the survey,
stating that they agree (83% percent) that it is better for a country if
almost everybody is sharing the same customs and traditions.
Furthermore, the majority disagreed with the opinion that it is better
if a country is comprised of many religions. In the same survey, 70%
of Greeks agreed that immigrants are a threat to our way of living
and it ranked first in its harsh attitude rejecting foreigners/immigrants
on the basis of their non-sameness. This result indicates Greece
differs greatly from the European average (42%) and from the
32 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
responses from countries with long-term and massive immigration
such as Belgium and the United Kingdom.
51
These negative attitudes of the Greek people against otherness in
general and not against specific foreigners/immigrants emanates from
a strong devotion to the view of a national and cultural homogeneity
which they feel is probably the most important part of their identity
as Greeks. This attitude of Greeks against any kind of foreignness
that is depicted in surveys is not mirrored in any equivalent way in the
everyday life of people. In many Greek households, the household
assistant is a foreigner. This person is usually taking care of the elderly
parents and/or the small children of the family and usually stays in
the house with the family. Additionally, the children have foreigners
as classmates, foreigners help with household repairs, and they often
work in small family businesses.
This familiarization seems to diminish prejudices at a personal
level, but at the same time, there is still a fear about the other,
especially when there is a high concentration of the others within the
country (it is often heard in public debates that the problem is not the
mere presence of immigrants but, rather, their presence in high
numbers). We should also note that a significant number of non-
governmental organisations and associations have taken action over
the past few years by providing help, protection and support for the
rights of immigrants.
CONCLUSION
In the afore-mentioned analysis, we have undertaken the task of
identifying elements that show both the existence and absence of
social cohesion in Modern Greek society in the areas of labour, social
attachments as well as in the areas of national identity and attitudes
towards others. Lets first examine, briefly, the elements that reduce
social cohesion.
We saw that regarding the issue of poverty, Greece is
characterized by alarming indicators of the lack of social cohesion
compared to the EU average, and, that inequalities have not
diminished in recent years. Poverty strikes, to a greater extent, the
unemployed, the retired, and people with low educational attainment
but also working people in part-time positions (especially women that
cannot find full-time employment). Although overall economic
On Social Cohesion in Greece 33
inequality in the country was significantly lowered in the period
immediately following the fall of the dictatorship, it stubbornly
remained at that level since then, regardless of how much social
policy expenditures increased. And this situation has occurred during
the period of three decades in which the country has been
characterized by relative prosperity as well as an improvement in the
standard of living.
Recent empirical evidence and trends in the areas of employment
and unemployment are also quite pessimistic and ominous. Long-
term unemployment persists; part-time employment is more common
for women but does not represent, in the majority of cases, their
choice of employment; at the same time certain types of work
organization have become more evident (fixed contracts, project
contracts, subcontracting work and unsecured work) as well as
different forms of informal work. These characteristics create an
environment and a reality of employment relations in which it
becomes continuously more difficult for those already facing
problems in the labour market (the unemployed, youth who are trying
to enter the labour market, women or immigrants) to enter and
advance in their careers.
In this environment of labour insecurity, for a significant portion
of the population, (and additionally because of the recent severe
economic crisis that is expected to affect all Greek citizens), we
expect to see signs of expressed discontent about peoples current
circumstances as well as prospects for their daily life in the near
future.
We have observed that religious minorities face legal and
administrative obstacles in the practice of their religious duties even
though, over the past few years, measures have been increasingly
adopted providing for the respect of their rights. However, these
measures are scarcely implemented due to the reaction of the Greek
Orthodox Church which continues to exercise significant influence
on the public administration as well as Greek society in general. At
the same time, a great proportion of (Orthodox) Greek citizens self-
report high religiosity and maintain a loose but unfailing relationship
with the Greek-Orthodox religion and the Greek Orthodox church
because they believe that this encompasses a piece of their national
identity.
34 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
The more significant problems faced by immigrants in Greece,
regarding their integration in the Greek society, are, on the one hand,
difficulties with respect to their legalization process and, on the other
hand, the mistrust and/or negativity the Greeks have toward them.
The negative attitudes of Greeks against otherness in general and
not against specific foreigners/immigrants in particular, seems to be
connected to a fear that the presence of immigrants will affect their
national and cultural homogeneity which they believe is an element of
their identity.
In Greece, people seem to mistrust the basic institutions that are
directly connected with the exercise of state power such as the
Parliament, the government, the public administration and the
political parties. On the contrary, they do trust the judicial system and
the military. Greeks not only mistrust institutions, they also mistrust
their fellow citizens. This lack of a trusting climate among the
citizens and the mistrust against the others characterizes Modern
Greek society.
Finally, we have observed that, until recently, civil society in
Greece has been rather weak while only after the 1990s, has there
been evidence of weak but stable development of the civil society.
Additionally, the participation of citizens in NGOs, voluntary
organizations, clubs and unions has increased.
The characteristics that reinforce social cohesion are not only few
but they appear to be losing strength or their existence is being
threatened to a greater or lesser extent as time passes. These
characteristics include strong family ties and the supporting role of
the family, the increased participation of women in the labour market
and a strong national identity.
We have also witnessed that the welfare state in Greece has always
been inadequate in the sense that social protection is limited to the
dispensing of benefits whereas the public supply of services is lacking
significantly and social protection expenditure is low. The
inefficiencies of the social security system are masked by the
presence of the family which offers its services in a variety of fields:
care for children and the elderly, protection of the unemployed
members of the family, and the emotional and economic support for
the adult children that face difficulties entering the labour market and
remain in the parental home beyond their educational period.
On Social Cohesion in Greece 35
However, this type of family solidarity was largely based on women
and a family model in which women were housewives. Recent
economic developments and the continuously increasing employment
rates of women will certainly call into question the effectiveness of
this model as time passes. At the same time, the increased
employment rates of women and the decline of their employment as
unpaid assistants in family businesses, is an element strengthening
social cohesion through the advancement of gender equality in the
labour market.
Lastly, with respect to national identity, perhaps its most
important element is national and cultural homogeneity (an aspect of
which is the Greek-Orthodox religion). The massive influx of
immigrants in the country, as well as the decision by many of them to
stay in Greece permanently (mostly second-generation Albanian
immigrants), appears to be creating a crack in national and cultural
homogeneity and is influencing national identity in a negative way.
The evidence we have presented indicates how limited social
cohesion has been and remains in Modern Greek society. We have
highlighted the extent to which poverty, unemployment, inequalities,
immigration and changes in the family as well as factors relating to
national identity are threatening the current level of social solidarity in
the country at least for the next few years as the country continues to
face a severe economic crisis.
NOTES
[1] Helly D., 2002, Maloutas Th. and Pandelidou-Malouta M., 2004.
[2] Guibert Lafaye C., 2009, Bernard P., 1999.
[3] Maloutas Th. and Pandelidou-Malouta M., 2004, p. 452.
[4] Fors ., Parodi ., 2009, p. 25.
[5] Ibid, p. 25.
[6] The left parties remained outside the law following the civil war that
occurred after WWII until the fall of the dictatorship in 1974. During
this period many politically left citizens were prosecuted and lived for
years in exile.
[7] Voulgaris Y., 2008.
[8] Voulgaris Y., 2008, p. 97.
36 Andromachi Hadjiyanni
[9] The rebellion of youth in December of 2008 initially in Athens and later
in the rest of Greece is characteristic of a social value crisis.
[10] Fors ., Parodi ., 2009.
[11] Kikilias E., 2007.
[12] Lymberaki A., Dendrinos Y., 2004.
[13] INE/GSEE, 2008.
[14] Lymberaki A., 2008.
[15] Papatheodorou Ch., Petmetzidou M., 2004, Lymberaki A., 2008.
[16] Papatheodorou Ch., 2008.
[17] Tsakloglou P., 2008.
[18] Papatheodorou Ch., 2008.
[19] Eurobarometer No 71, Spring 2009.
[20] Eurobarometer No 72, Autumn 2009.
[21] More and more citizens are talking about this public debate that is
taking place in the occasion of the reform of the insurance system.
[22] While the percentage of women succeeding in the entrance test for
tertiary education has surpassed the equivalent percentage for men and
more women than men graduate from tertiary education, men, more
often than women, enroll in post-graduate studies while women look for
employment positions compatible with the traditional role they have in
the family (i.e. they often work as teachers, employees in health services,
work as social workers, office clerks, etc) and are much less satisfied with
their employment situation (Hadjiyanni A., 2001).
[23] Symeonidou, H. et al., 2001.
[24] Panagiotopoulou R., 2007.
[25] Voulgaris Y., 2007, p. 316.
[26] Panagiotopoulou R., 2007, p. 231.
[27] Sotiropoulos D., 2004.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Fukuyamma F., 1995.
[30] Panagiotopoulou R., 2007.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Sotiropoulos D., 2004.
[33] Fors ., Parodi ., 2009.
[34] Eurobarometer No 57(2002), Eurobarometer No 72 (2009).
[35] Lymberaki A., Paraskevopoulos C., 2002.
[36] Polis A., 1999, p. 179.
[37] Filos A., 2004.
[38] Often in public debate there is reference to the Greek-Christian
civilization as if the Greek tradition cannot be separated from the
tradition of the Christian orthodox one.
[39] Georgiadou V., Nikolakopoulos H., 2007, p. 144.
[40] Ibid, p. 142.
[41] Ibid, p. 143.
[42] Kotzamanis V., 2008.
[43] Triandafilidou A., 2005.
[44] For an analytic presentation of the Greek immigration policy, see
Paulou M., 2009.
On Social Cohesion in Greece 37
[45] At the time of the writing of this paper there is a process of public
consultation concerning a bill for acquiring Greek citizenship by second-
generation immigrants and for acquiring political and social rights for the
immigrants legally residing in the country.
[46] Mavrommatis Y., Tsitselikis K., 2004.
[47] Nikolitsa D., 2008.
[48] Kassimis Ch., 2008.
[49] Kanellopoulos K., 2008.
[50] Kafetzis T., 2009.
[51] Ibid.
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