CREATION AND ABOLITION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

Sec. 6, LGC: Authority to create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be created divided,
merged, abolished or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province,
city, municipality or any other political subdivision of by ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
Sangguniang Panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such
limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.

A. Requisites for creation of Local Government Units
1. Income. It must be sufficient based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the LGU
concerned.
2. Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants of the within the territorial jurisdiction of
the LGU concerned.
3. Land Area. It must be contiguous unless it comprises 2 or more islands or is separated by an LGU
independent of the other properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to provide
for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be arrested by the Department of Finance, the NSO and the Land
Management Bureau of the DENR.

B. Decided cases:
b. 1 Pelaez V. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
Facts: In 1964, President Macapagal issued several EOs creating 33 new municipalities, mainly in Northern
Luzon and Mindanao. The President based his power from Sec. 68 of the Revised Penal Code of 1917. Vice
President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, restraining him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
order and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Pelaez contends that: 1) Sec 68 of the Revised Administration Code has been impliedly repealed by R.A
2370, the Barrio Charter Act. 2) Sec. 68 is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and 3) Sec. 68
can allow the president to interfere in local government affairs.

Held: Pelaez is correct. Reasons:
1. The Barrio Charter Act states that barrios may not be created nor their boundaries altered or their names
changed except by act of Congress of the corresponding municipal board upon petition of the majority of voters in the
areas affected and the recommendation of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated
This implies that if the President cannot create barrios, what more municipalities? (But I think this is not a very good
argument coz its implying way too much).
2. A law must be: a) Complete in itself so that there is nothing left for the delegate to do but to implement the
statute and b) Fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinable The standard set by Sec. 68 is as the
public welfare may require This standard, in relation to the law in question, is so broad that is virtually unfettered.
3. The creation of Municipal Corporation is essentially legislative in character. If the president can create
municipalities, situations may arise where he can submit local officials to his dictation by creating a new municipality
and including therein the barrio wherein the officials preside, thus said officials positions would suddenly becomes
vacant. The power of control by the president over local government is denied by the 1935 Constitution

b. 2 Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727
Facts: B.P. No. 885 was passed allowing for the creation of the province of Negros del Norte on the Island of
Negros. Petitioner Patricio Tan claimed that B.P. no 885 violated Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution which states:
No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval
by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Specifically, the remaining areas in the province
of Negros Occidental were not allowed to participate in the plebiscite for the creation of Negros del Norte. Petitioner
also claims the proposed province of Negros del Norte failed to meet the requirements of Sec. 197 of the LGC of
1983, specially that a future province must have at least an area of 3,500 sq. km. Negros del Norte, Petitioner avers,
is actually only 2,856.56 sq km. Respondent claims the issue was already rendered moot and academic as the new
province of Negros del Norte was already proclaimed. Moreover, the area of Negros del Norte is really 4,019.95 sq
km, since the waters falling under the jurisdiction and control of Negros del Norte must be included in the total area of
the province.

Held: Tan is correct. The plebiscite is declared null and void Reasons:
1) The phrase subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected must be construed to mean that the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental should have been
allowed to participate in the said plebiscite. The reason is that cities belonging to Negros Occidental will be added to
Negros del Norte, thus Negros Occidentals land area will be dismembered. Certainly, the people of Negros
Occidental should have been allowed to vote in the plebiscite as they are directly affected by the diminution in land
size of their province.
2) A reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC of 1983 says. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands. The use of the word territory clearly reflects that the law
refers only to the land mass and excludes the waters over which the political unit has control. In other words, Negros
del Norte failed to meet the required land area of 3,500 sq. km for it to become a province.

b. 3 Paredes v. Executive Secretary 128 SCRA 6
Facts: By virtue of B.P. Blg 56, certain barangays in the municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao held a plebiscite to
determine whether they want to constitute themselves into the new municipality of Aguinaldo. Governor Zosimo
Paredes et. al. however claimed that the rest of the barangays on Mayoyao should be allowed to participate in the
plebiscite by virtue of Art. XI, Sec of the 1973 Constitution as the other barangays are also affected by the creation of
the municipality of Aguinaldo.

Held: Paredes is wrong. Presumption of constitutionality should be applied in this case. B.P. Blg. 56 is a reflection
of local autonomy on the part of the barangay wanting to constituent themselves into a new municipality. Said
barangays should be given leeway in becoming self-reliant communities. Moreover, the people in said barangays are
the ones who will constitute the new municipality of Aguinaldo, not the other barangays of Mayoyao excluded from
B.P. Blg. 56

b. 4 Mun. of Candijay, Bohol v. Ca 251 SCRA 182
Facts: The municipality of Candijay petitioned the RTC of Tagbilaran, Bohol, claiming that its boundary line
actually covered barrio Pagahat, since the municipality of Alicia claims to have current territorial jurisdiction over said
barrio. The RTC awarded Pagahat to Candijay Alicia appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of Alicia
on the grounds that 1) applying the rule of equiponderance of evidence (a principle in Civil Procedure) with Candijay
as plaintiff and Alicia as defendant in the lower court, the court must rule in favor of the defendant. The
equiponderance of evidence rule states: Where the scale shall stand upon equipoise and there is nothing in the
evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. Under said principle, the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of defendants claim. Even if the evidence
of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such
evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action. In this case, both municipalities failed to satisfactorily
back their claims that they owned barrio Pagahat: and 2) if Candijays boundary line claim was true, then not only
would they claim Pagahat but also other certain barrios as well, which would as a result, certainly expand Candijays
territory far beyond than what the law allows her, Candijay petitioned is review on certiorari with the SC, claiming that
1) the CA misapplied the equiponderance of evidence rule and 2) the municipality of Alicia had no juridical
personality, having been created under avoid E.O. ( E.O. No.265) since Sec. 68 of the RAC of 1917 from which the
said E.O. derived its authority, was declared unconstitutional in Pelaez v. Audition General (See III-b 1).

Held: The Municipality of Candijay is incorrect Reasons:
1. The SC sees no need in reviewing the equiponderance rule as it was not arrived whimsically or capriciously by
the CA
2. The Municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of E.O. 265 in 1949. 16 years late when Pelaez v. Auditor
General was promulgated. And yet even after, various government acts, most notably the recognition by the 1987
Constitution of Alicia as one of the 20 municipalities of the Third District of Bohol, indicate the States recognition and
acknowledgement of the existence thereof. Alicia therefore, can claim the benefits of Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC of 1991
which states Municipal District organized pursuant to presidential issuances and E.O. and which have their respective
set of municipal officials holding officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities. Sec. 442 (d) is therefore a curative law in favor of Alicia. The objection against it
being a municipal corporation should have been done before the LGC was enacted in 1991.

b. 5 Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr. 265 SCRA 182
NOTE: Dates in this case are important because essentially Jimenez lost on account of the slow wheels of
justice
Facts: In 1949, President Quirino issued E.O. 258, creating the municipality of Sinacaban in the Province of
Misamis Occidental. In 1988 by virtue of said E.O. Sinacaban filed a claim with the provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental against the municipality of Jimenez territorial possession of about 5 barrios. Jimenez in its reply with the
provincial Board that same year and later on with the RTC in 1990, said that Sinacaban had no juridical personality to
file a suit because it was created under a void E.O. as promulgated in Pelaez Auditor General and 2) the disputed
barrios belong to Jimenez since in 1950 the municipalities entered into an agreement duly approved by the Provincial
Board of Misamis Occidental back then which recognized Jimenezs jurisdiction over the disputed barrio in 1992, the
RTC ruled in favor of Sinacaban using as its basis the curative benefits of Sec. 2 of the LGC of 1991. Angrily, Jimenez
added in its petition with the Supreme Court the RTCs decision was null and void because it failed to decide the case
within one year mandated by the LGC of 1983 and the Constitution.

Held: Jimenez is incorrect Reasons:
1. Sinacaban can claim the benefits of Sec.442 (d) of the LGC of 1991, since various government acts
through the years after the Pelaez case of 1965 indicate the recognition by the years after the Pelaez case 1965
indicate the recognition by the state of the municipality of Sinacaban, most notably when the 1987 Constitution
recognized Sinacaban as part of the 2
nd
District of Misamis Occidental.
2. Whatever agreement Sinacaban and Jimenez entered into 1950 must still conform with the territorial metes
and bounds set forth in E.O. 258, otherwise the agreement in void (A relocation survey was ordered but the results of
the survey was not stated in the case)
3. Even granting that the RTC was deliberately slow, its decision is not rendered void. The only remedy left
would be to file administrative sanctions against it.

b. 7 Mathay v. CA 320 SCRA 703
NOTE: Dont confuse CSU with CSC
Facts: During his term, Mayor Brigido Simon appointed 16 people to positions in the Civil Service Unit (CSU)
of the local government of Quezon City. Simons authority to appoint was based upon P.D. 51. The Secretary of
Justice rendered an Opinion, stating that P.D. 51 was never published in the Gazette, therefore, conformably with the
Tanada v. Tuvera ruling P.D. 51 never became law at all. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) thus ordered the
revocation of all appointments in the CSU. However, the effects of such revocation were temporarily cushioned when
the city council issued an ordinance creating the Department of Public Order and Safety (DPOS). All present
personnel of the CSU, the said ordinance stated are to be absorbed into the DPOS.
However, the regular positions in the DPOS never got filled due to insufficient number of said positions and
lack of funds.
Simon and later on his successor, Mayor Ismael Mathay, remedied the situation by offering the CSU
personnel contractual appointment. When Mathay refused to renew their appointments, the CSU personnel
complained to the CSC. The CSC replied by issuing resolutions ordering the CSU personnel reinstated. Mathay now
asserts that the CSC cannot order him to reinstate the said personnel as it is. In effect, giving the appointing power he
possesses, as city Mayor to the CSC.

Held: Mathay is correct. Reasons:
1) First of all, the law applicable is B.P. 337 or the old LGC and not the LGC of 1991 since the material events
of the case took place during the time of the old LGC.
2) Under B.P. 337, the power to appoint rests in the local chief executive in the case the Mayor. When the city
council issued the ordinance allowing for the absorption of CSU personnel into the DPOS, it specifically made use of
the wordings Present Personnel and not positions, thus the city council arrogated upon itself the appointing power by
dictating who shall occupy the DPOS positions. Even in the local government level, the separation of powers must be
respected.
3) The reasoning in no. 2 also applies to the CSC. The CSC claims that by virtue of the ordinance enacted by
the city council, the CSU personnel became regular employees and such they have gained the protection of the Civil
Service Law. Such reasoning is wrong because in the first place the CSU never existed at all, thus they were never
part of the Civil Service to begin with. Thus when Simon and later on Mathay offered them contractual appointments,
they were at the mercy of the appointing power of the said mayors, as they have the option not to renew their
appointments

b. 8 Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53
Facts: R.A. 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays in Quezon City.
Quezon City councilor Moises Samson questioned the constitutionality of said R.A. claiming that 1) certifications as to
income, land area and population of Novaliches were not presented during the deliberations that led to the passage of
R.A. 8535 2) a certification attesting to the fact that the mother LGU, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by
the creation of Novaliches city in terms of income, land area and population, was also not presented 3) a copy of the
petition of concerned barangays calling or the creation of City of Novaliches was not presented to the Quezon City
Council, as mandated by the Implementing Rules of the LGC, 1991 and 4) R.A. 8535 failed to specify the seat of
government of the proposed City of Novaliches as mandated by Sec. 11 (a) of the LGC, 1991.

Held: Samson is wrong. Reasons:
1. The presumption of constitutionally of laws shall be applied in this case, meaning that Samson has
burden of proof to show that R.A. 8535 was unconstitutional. Samson did not present any proof that no certifications
were presented during the deliberations. And even granting that no certifications were indeed presented, the
representatives of the DOF, NSO, DENR and even Quezon City mayor Ismael Mathay were present during the
deliberations. The official statements attesting to the income, land area and population of Novaliches could serve the
certifications contemplated by law
2. Mathay was present during the deliberation. If Quezon City would object to the creation of the City of
Novaliches, he would be the first representative to do so. But he didnt.
3. The failure to provide the QC council a petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City
of Novaliches is not fatal as such petition is meant only to inform the QC council of such creation. With the mass
media publicizing the creation of the city of Novaliches, Samson could not claim he was not informed of the proposed
creation
4. The failure of R.A.8535 to provide a seat of government for Novaliches is not fatal. Sec. 12 of the LGC
provides that a government center shall be established by the LGU as far as practicable. Government centers can
also serve as seats of government.
5. The fact that the City of Novaliches was not included among the 17 cities and municipalities listed in the
ordinance attached to the 1987 constitution does not mean that a constitutional amendment is necessary in order for
Novaliches to become a city. The ordinance attached to the Constitution merely apportions the seat of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere, does it provide that Metro Manila shall be
forever composed of 17 cities and municipalities.
NOTE: the proposed City of Novaliches was later voted down in a plebiscite held for that purpose

CAWALING,JR. VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806which created the City of Sorsogon and
the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No.
8806, an "ActCreati ng The Ci ty Of Sorsogon By Mergi ng The Muni ci pal i ti es Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Provi nce
Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon andSorsogon and
submi tted the matter for rati fi cati on procl ai med the creati on of the Ci ty of Sorsogon as havi ngbeen ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present
petition for certiorariseeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:A. The December 16, 2000 pl ebi sci te was
conducted beyond the requi red 120-day peri od from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; andB.
Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive informationcampaign in the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional
,contending, inessence, that:1. The creati on of Sorsogon Ci ty by mergi ng two muni ci pal i ti es vi ol ates Secti on 450(a) of
the Local GovernmentCode of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipalityor a
cluster of
barangays
may be converted into a component city"; and2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon
and the (b) abolitionof the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed bySection
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.Peti ti oner contends that under Secti on 450(a) of the Code, a component ci ty may be
created onl y byconverting "a municipality or a cluster of
barangays
," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806has done.
Issue:
(1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order tocreate the City of Sorsogon(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule
enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of theConstitution(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional
Hel d:
Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "Amunicipality or a cluster of
Barangays may beconverted into a component city" is not a criterion but simplyone of the mo de s by which a city may be created.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the
merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay i n accordance wi th the cri teri aestablished by
the Code. the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a di visi onor a me r g e r
of existing local government units is recogni zed
under the Consti tuti on, provi ded that such merger or di vi si onshal l compl y wi th the requi rements prescri bed by the
Code.

F. Settlement of boundary disputes( Sec. 118, LGC, Sec 15-19, IRR)
* Section 118. Judicial Responsibility for settlement of Boundary Dispute. Boundary dispute between and
among LGUs shall, as much as possible. Be settled amicably. To this end:
a. Boundary disputes involving 2 or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for
settlement to the Sangguniang Panlungsod Sangguniang Bayan concerned.
b. Boundary disputes involving 2 or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for
settlement to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned.
c. Boundary dispute involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred
for settlement to the Sangguniang of the province concerned.
d. Boundary dispute involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on
the other or 2 or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective Sangguniang of
the parties
e. In the event the Sangguniang fails to present an amicable settlement within 60 days from the date the
dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter the dispute shall be formally tried by
the Sangguniang concerned which shall decide the issue within 60 days from the date of the certification referred to
above.

*Sec. 15 definition and policy. There is a boundary dispute when a portion or a whole of the territorial area of
an LGU is claimed by 2 or more LGUs. Boundary disputes between or among LGUs shall, as much as possible, be
settled amicably.

* Sec.16 Jurisdictional Responsibility. Boundary disputes shall be referred for settlement to the following:
a. Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang for those involving 2 or more barangays in the same city or
municipality as the case may be.
b. Sangguniang Panlalawigan for those involving 2 or more municipalities with in the same province.
c. Jointly, to the Sanggunian of provinces concerned, for those involving component cities or municipalities of
different provinces.
d. Jointly, to the respective Sangguniang for those involving a component city or municipality and highly
urbanized city of 2 or more highly urbanized cities.

* Sec. 17 Procedures for settling Boundary Disputes they are 1) filing of petition 2) contents of petition 3)
documents attached to petition (e.g. provincial, city or barangay map as the case may be technical description of the
boundaries of the LGUs concerned 4) Joint hearing 5) failure to settle amicably (a certification shall be submitted to
the effect 6) Decision 7) Appeal (To the proper RTC)

*Sec 18. Maintenance of Status Quo. Pending final resolution of the dispute, the status of the affected area
prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all purposes.

* Sec 19. Official Custodian. The DILG shall be the official custodian of all documents on boundary disputes of
LGUs.

f 1. City of Pasig v. COMELEC et.al. 314 SCRA 179
Facts: 2 petitions were raised by the City of Pasig and the municipality of Cainta respectively. Both
Questioned the priority of the suspension of the scheduled plebiscites for the proposed creation of Barangay
Karangalan and barangay Napico (pursuant to 2 ordinances passed by both cities) Cainta had contended that the
proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute between her and Pasig; hence the suspension of
the scheduled plebiscites is justified. Pasig however contends otherwise. Despite this, the COMELEC ruled against
Cainta and the plebiscite for the creation of barangay Napico pushed through. The core issues now are 1) whether or
not the said barangay dispute is a prejudicial question which must be resolved before any plebiscite can be held and
2) Whether the plebiscite already conducted ratifying the creation of Barangay Napico has rendered the issue as to it
moot and academic.

Held: Cainta is correct. Reasons
1. Pasig cannot deny that there is a pending boundary dispute between her and Cainta Surely, whether the
area in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of the
Pasig has material bearing to the proposed barangay Karangalan and Napico. The importance of drawing with precise
strokes the territorial boundaries of an LGU cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define
the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of an LGU. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the
limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of LGUs will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of government powers which will ultimately the peoples
welfare.
2. As was done before in Tan v. COMELEC, the plebiscite already conducted for the creation of Barangay
Napico can be annulled and set aside.
Held: SC held that the plebiscite should be held in abeyance.

f. 2 DILG Opinion No. 161-1994 (still to search)
C. How are existing sub-provinces converted to provinces?

* Sec. 10 LGC: Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the voted cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120
days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless the law or ordinance fixes
another date.

* Sec. 462 LGC: Existing Sub-provinces Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces
upon approval of the voters cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub provinces and the original provinces directly
affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections following the
effectivity of this code.
The new legislative district created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress
by the duly elected representatives of the original districts out of which said new province or districts were created unit
their own representative shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections and qualified
The incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold
office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or
resulting from expiration of resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case of negative votes in the plebiscite
results, shall be filled by appointment by the President. The appointees shall hold office until their successors shall
have been elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. After effectivity
of such conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly created province through
appointment if none has yet been appointed to the same as hereinbefore provided, and shall also appoint a vice
governor and other members of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold office unit their
successors shall have been elected in the next local election and qualified.
All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said sub-provinces at the time of
their conversion into regular provinces shall continue in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulation.

C 1. Grino v. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 672
Facts: Pursuant to Sec. 462, LGC, a plebiscite to determine whether the sub-province of Guimaras (its mother
province was Iloilo) wants to become a regular province was held simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections. The
participants in the said plebiscite were the residents of Iloilo (except Iloilo city) and the 3 municipalities of Guimaras.
Surprisingly, the ballots issued in the said 3 municipalities did not provided any space for the election of governor,
vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Iloilo. LDP Iloilo governor-
candidate Simplicio Grino claims that the COMELEC erred in not allowing the said 3 municipalities to vote for the
provincial officials of Iloilo, since at the time of the plebiscite Guimaras was still a sub-province of Iloilo. Grino says if
Guimaras voted for regular provincehood then there would have been no need for them at all to vote for the
provincial officials of Iloilo. But what if Guimaras votes to remain as a sub-province? Should special election be held
for the 3 municipalities so that they can vote for the provincial official of Iloilo?

Held: Obviously, Grinos petition was rendered moot and academic when Guimaras voted to become regular
province. Besides its too late to undo what COMELEC has done. If Guimaras did vote to remain as a sub province,
Grinos petition would have been meritorious.