Science & Education 9: 577598, 2000.

2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

577
How Do Humans Acquire Knowledge? And What
Does That Imply About the Nature of Knowledge?
ANTON E. LAWSON
Department of Biology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85297-1501, USA
Abstract. This paper offers a resolution to the debate between constructivists and realists regarding
the epistemological status of human knowledge. Evidence in the form of three case studies and
one experimental study is presented. The conclusion drawn is that knowledge acquisition involves a
pattern of idea (representation) generation and test that, when cast in the form of a verbal argument,
follows an If/then/Therefore pattern. Self-generated ideas/representations are tested by comparing
expected and observed outcomes. Ideas may be retained or rejected, but can not be proved or
disproved. Therefore, absolute Truth about any and all ideas, including the idea that the external
world exists, is unattainable. Yet learning at all levels above the sensory-motor requires that one
assume the independent existence of the external world because only then can the behavior of the
objects in that world be used to test subsequent higher-order ideas. In the nal analysis, ideas
including scientic hypotheses and theories stand or fall, not due to social negotiation, but due
to their ability to predict future events. Although the knowledge acquisition process has limitations,
its use nevertheless results in increasingly useful representations about an assumed to exist external
world as evidenced by technological progress that is undeniably based on sound scientic theory.
The primary instructional implication is that science instruction should remain committed to helping
students understand the crucial role played by hypotheses, predictions and evidence in learning.
Much recent debate has centered on the relative merits of various constructivist
positions of knowledge acquisition and epistemology. For example, Staver (1998)
in staking out an extreme version of constructivism for science education wrote:
For constructivists, observations, objects, events, data, laws, and theory do not
exist independent of observers. The lawful and certain nature of natural phenom-
ena are properties of us, those who describe, not of nature, what is described.
. . . constructivists begin this work without rst assuming an independent reality
(p. 503). And Driver et al. (1994) emphasized the social aspect of constructivism
when they stated: . . . scientic knowledge is symbolic in nature and socially nego-
tiated. The objects of science are not the phenomena of nature but constructs that
are advanced by the scientic community to interpret nature (p. 5). And lastly,
Fosnot (1996) described a theory of constructivism that . . . describes knowledge
as temporary, developmental, nonobjective, internally constructed, and socially and
culturally mediated (p. ix).
578 ANTON E. LAWSON
Realism stands in contrast to these constructivist views. Hwang (1996) denes a
realist as one who believes that: . . . .the world exists and is organized independent
of us, our language, and our methods of inquiry (p. 345). Realist critics of con-
structivism, such as Matthews (1995), have argued: For all its faults, the scientic
tradition has prompted rationality, critical thinking and objectivity. It instills a con-
cern for evidence, and for having ideas judged not by personal or social interest,
but by how the world is (p. 2.). In a similar vein, Osborne (1996) concluded: This
[constructivism] has led to the portrayal of science as a process of constructing and
manipulating representations which bear no necessary relation to any ontological
reality. In so doing constructivists have forgotten that it is the world that imposes
constraints on human thought, and not human thought that imposes constraints on
the world (pp. 7677). More recently, Matthews (1998) summarized several key
differences between realist and constructivist beliefs as follows:
Realists believe that science aims to tell us about reality, not about our exper-
iences; that is knowledge claims are evaluated by reference to the world, not
by reference to their personal, social, or national utility; that scientic meth-
odology is normative, and consequently distinctions can be made between
good and bad science; that science is objective in the sense of being different
from personal, inner experience; that science tries to identify and minimize
the impact of noncognitive interests (political, religious, gender, class) in its
development; that decision making in science has a central cognitive element
and is not reducible to mere sociological considerations, and so on. (p. 166)
1. Knowledge Acquisition and the Nature of Knowledge
The purpose of the present paper is to offer a theoretical resolution to the debate
between these sorts of constructivist and realist positions. To do so, we will focus
on the knowledge acquisition process in selected cases and then step back and
identify common elements including the roles played by the learner and the envir-
onment. The present position is that focusing on knowledge acquisition in terms of
its underlying pattern will help resolve the debate. In other words, understanding
how humans acquire knowledge will inform us about the nature of the knowledge
acquired.
We start with a look at knowledge acquisition in a personal setting. We will
then explore learning on progressively more and less advanced levels including a
scientist working at the cutting edge of human knowledge acquisition and children
learning that hidden objects, although no longer in sight, continue to exist. We will
end with a discussion of the nature of knowledge so acquired and the extent to
which it can be said to be constructed.
HOW DO HUMANS ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE? 579
2. How Do People Learn? A Case of Practical Learning
Let us start in a setting in which introspection was used to identify key steps that
led to learning. Of course introspective analysis is difcult because thinking takes
place very rapidly and at least partially on a subconscious level. Also prior con-
ceptions about learning may distort the process. Nevertheless, one might correctly
identify steps in learning, particularly if consciously trying to do so and, as in this
case, one is trying to identify the steps immediately after the fact when memory
is not clouded by intervening experiences. Further, independent methods that do
not suffer from these potential pitfalls exist to test the validity of introspectively
discovered patterns. Consequently, the following example is offered for your
consideration.
Before I arrived home one evening, my wife had lit the gas barbecue and put
some meat on for dinner. Upon arriving, she asked me to check the meat. When
doing so, I noticed that the barbecue was no longer lit. It was windy so I suspected
that the wind had blown out the ames as it had a few times before. So I tried
to relight the barbecue by striking a match and inserting its ame into a small
lighting hole just above one of the unlit burners. But the barbecue did not relight.
I tried a second, and then a third match. But it still did not relight. At this point, I
suspected that the tank might be out of gas. So I lifted the tank and sure enough
it lifted easily as though it were empty. I then checked the lever-like gas gauge
and it was pointed at empty. So it seemed that the barbecue was no longer lit, not
because the wind had blown out its ames, but because its tank was out of gas.
2.1. THE RECONSTRUCTED PATTERN
What pattern of thinking was guiding this learning? Retrospectively, it would seem
that thinking was initiated by a causal question, i.e., Why was the barbecue no
longer lit? In response to this question, the reconstructed thinking goes like this:
If . . . the wind had blown out the ames (wind hypothesis),
and . . . a match is used to relight the barbecue (test condition)
then . . . the barbecue should relight (expected result).
But . . . when the rst match was tried, the barbecue did not relight (observed result).
Therefore . . . either the wind hypothesis is wrong or something is wrong with the
test. Perhaps the match ame went out before it could ignite the escaping gas. This
seems plausible as the wind had blown out several matches in the past. So retain
the wind hypothesis and try again (conclusion).
Thus,
If . . . the wind had blown out the ames (wind hypothesis),
and . . . a second match is used to relight the barbecue (test condition)
then . . . the barbecue should relight (expected result).
But . . . when the second match was used, the barbecue still did not relight (observed
result).
580 ANTON E. LAWSON
Therefore . . . once again, either the wind hypothesis is wrong or something is wrong
with the test (conclusion). Although it appeared as though the inserted match ame
reached the unlit burner, perhaps it nevertheless did get blown out. So again retain
the wind hypothesis and repeat the experiment. But this time closely watch the
match ame to see if it does in fact reach its destination.
Thus,
If . . . the wind had blown out the ames (wind hypothesis)
and . . . a third match is used to relight the barbecue while closely watching the
ame (test condition)
then . . . the ame should reach its destination and barbecue should relight (expected
result).
But . . . when the third match was used while closely watching the ame, the ame
appeared to reach its destination, but the barbecue still did not relight (observed
result).
Therefore . . . apparently there was nothing wrong with the test. Instead the wind
hypothesis is probably wrong and another hypothesis is needed (conclusion).
Perhaps the tank was out of gas. Thus,
If . . . the tank is out of gas (empty-tank hypothesis),
and . . . the tank is lifted (test condition)
then . . . it should feel light and should lift easily (expected result).
And . . . when the tank was lifted, it did feel light and did lift easily (observed result).
Therefore . . . the empty tank hypothesis is supported (conclusion).
Further,
If . . . the tank is out of gas (empty-tank hypothesis),
and . . . the gas gauge is checked (test condition)
then . . . it should be pointed at empty (expected result).
And . . . it was pointed at empty (observed result).
Therefore . . . the empty-tank hypothesis is supported once again (conclusion).
2.2. THE ELEMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION
The introspective analysis suggests that knowledge acquisition involves the gen-
eration and test of ideas and takes the form of several If/and/Therefore arguments
reminiscent of the hypothetico-deductive pattern previously identied by others
(e.g., Chamberlain 1965; Cohen and Nagel 1934; Hempel 1966; Lawson 1995;
Lewis 1988; Medawar 1969; Platt 1964; Popper 1959, 1965). Notice that the attain-
ment of evidence contradicting the initial wind hypothesis did not immediately lead
to its rejection. This is because the failure of expected results to match observed
results can arise from one of two sources a faulty hypothesis or a faulty test.
Consequently, before a plausible hypothesis is rejected, one has to be reasonably
sure that its test is not faulty.
In short, this knowledge acquisition seems to have involved the following
elements:
HOW DO HUMANS ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE? 581
1. Making an initial observation: The barbecue is no longer lit.
2. Raising a causal question: Why is the barbecue no longer lit?
3. Generating an initial possible cause (a hypothesis): In this case the initial hy-
pothesis was that the barbecue was no longer lit because the wind had blown
out its ames. The process of hypothesis generation is seen as one involving
analogies, analogical transfer, analogical reasoning, i.e., borrowing ideas that
have been found to work in one or more past related contexts and using
them as possible solutions/hypotheses in the present context (cf. Biela 1993;
Bruner 1962; Dreistad 1968; Finke et al. 1992; Gentner 1989; Hestenes 1992;
Hoffman 1980; Hofstadter 1981; Holland et al. 1986; Johnson 1987; Koestler
1964; Wong 1993). Presumably the wind hypothesis was based on one or more
previous experiences in which the wind had blown out ames of one sort or an-
other including the barbecues ames. Presumably the empty-tank hypothesis
was similarly generated. In other words, a similar experience was recalled (e.g.,
a cars gas empty tank led to a failure of its engine to start) and used this as the
source of the empty-tank hypothesis used in the present context.
4. Assuming that the hypothesis under consideration is correct: This assumption
is necessary so that the hypothesis can be tested and perhaps be found incorrect.
A test requires imagining relevant condition(s) that along with the assumed
hypothesis allows the generation of an expected result (a prediction).
5. Carrying out the imagined test: The imagined test must be carried out so that
its expected result (the prediction) can be compared with the observed result
of the actual test.
6. Comparing expected and observed results: This comparison allows one to draw
a conclusion. A good match means that the hypothesis is supported, but not
proven. While a poor match means that something is wrong with the hypo-
thesis, the test, or with both. In the case of a good match, the hypothesis has
not been proven correct with certainty because one or more unstated and per-
haps un-imagined alternative hypotheses may give rise to the same prediction
under this test condition (e.g., Hempel 1966; Salmon 1995). Similarly, a poor
match cannot disprove or falsify a hypothesis in any ultimate sense. A poor
match cannot be said to falsify with certainty because the failure to achieve a
good match may be the fault of the test condition(s) rather than the fault of the
hypothesis (e.g., Hempel 1966; Salmon 1995).
7. Recycling the procedure: The procedure must be recycled until a hypothesis is
generated, which when tested, is supported on one or more occasions. In the
present example, the initial conclusion was that the test of the wind hypothesis
was faulty. Yet on repeated attempts and a closer inspection of the test, the
wind hypothesis was rejected, which allowed the generation, test, and support
of the empty-tank hypothesis.
In this case at least, learning required feedback from the external world (albeit
ltered through sense receptors). In other words, the learning was accomplished
alone and the fact that the barbecue would not relight, in spite of repeated at-
582 ANTON E. LAWSON
tempts, was the key sensory evidence that eventually led to rejection of the wind
hypothesis. And only after the wind hypothesis was rejected, was the alternative
empty-tank hypothesis generated and tested.
3. How Do Scientists Acquire Knowledge?
If the above knowledge acquisition pattern is basic, then we should nd it else-
where. For example, we should nd it in the work of scientists. Let us examine a
research paper of a currently active scientist to see if the pattern can be identied.
Admittedly many scientic papers are not written in a way that reveals the thinking
patterns the author(s) may have employed (e.g., Medawar 1990). But several recent
papers in Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology reveal thinking that appears very
close to the identied pattern (e.g., Alcock 1996; Lambin 1997; Muehter et al.
1997). Let us consider the Alcock paper entitled Provisional rejection of three al-
ternative hypotheses on the maintenance of a size dichotomy in males of Dawsons
burrowing bee, Amegilla dawsoni.
3.1. ALCOCKS CAUSAL QUESTION
Alcocks paper suggests that his key causal question is: Why do (i.e., what causes)
male Dawsons bees to exist in two distinctly different size groups? Although
this question is not explicitly stated, the introduction does state: The presence of
both major and minor males in Dawsons burrowing bees is a special evolutionary
puzzle . . . (p. 182) This wording seems to adequately covey the key issue, i.e., the
key causal question.
3.2. GENERATING ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES
Here Alcock is very explicit. Not only does the papers title mention alternative
hypotheses, but so does its introduction. In Alcocks words:
. . . it is possible that females produce minor sons as part of an adaptive strategy
of selectively allocating brood provisions among male offspring.
There are, however, other possible explanations . . .
1. The rst hypothesis argues that minor males . . . are the incidental
byproduct of external environmental factors . . .
2. The second hypothesis states that females possess a conditional brood
allocation strategy that enables competitively disadvantaged individuals
(i.e., low body weight or congenitally impaired females) to salvage some
reproductive success by producing low-cost, low-payoff sons . . .
3. The third hypothesis is that females divide the resources they have avail-
able for making sons in such a way that they receive the same tness
payoff for a unit of brood provisions whether they invest it in a minor or
a major son. (p. 182)
HOW DO HUMANS ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE? 583
Based on these statements, it seems clear that Alcock has generated hypotheses
that he wishes to test. According to the proposed learning process, these hypotheses
came from Alcocks, and others, prior experiences. Once Alcock has generated
several hypotheses, does he plan tests that result in expected/predicted outcomes?
3.3. GENERATING PREDICTIONS
Alcock is very explicit about stating predictions. Again in his words:
The three hypotheses yield different predictions that I shall examine in light of
evidence collected from observations of Dawsons burrowing bees over three
ight seasons. (p. 182)
A prediction based on this hypothesis (hypothesis 1) is that there should
be substantial geographic and temporal variation in the size distribution of
both males and females . . . The hypothesis that small females or congenitally
handicapped foragers salvage tness by producing small sons that require less
brood provision leads to the prediction that smaller or weaker females should
specialize in the production of minors . . . The third hypothesis is that minor
males enjoy sufcient mating success . . . Here the key prediction is that the
tness benet to tness cost ratios (B/C) for the two types of males should on
average be equal. (pp. 183184)
These statements indicate that Alcock is using hypotheses and planned tests to
generate predictions. Presumably the next step is to compare predicted results with
observed results. Once again Alcock is explicit. The following remarks regarding
hypothesis 1 should sufce to substantiate this point:
A prediction based on this hypothesis is that there should be substantial
geographic and temporal variation in the size distribution of both males and
females . . . This prediction is not in accord with the observations. First, no one
has ever observed a size dichotomy among females in any population studied
to date (female head-widths are normally distributed with 90% falling in the
6.87.2 mm range, based on a sample of 81 specimens see Fig. 6 in Houston
1991). Yet a pronounced male size dichotomy appeared in all 13 populations
I examined in 1993, 1994, and 1995 as well as in those examined by Houston
(1991). (p. 183)
3.4. DRAWING CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE DEGREE OF MATCH
Presumably the nal step is to draw a conclusion about the extent to which each
hypothesis was supported, or not-supported, based on the degree of match between
expected and observed results. Although on this point Alcock is less explicit, the
following remarks seem to indicate that this is how he arrived at his conclusions:
This hypothesis (hypothesis 1) is not supported by the nding that males of
intermediate sizes are consistently rare . . . a second possibility (hypothesis 2)
584 ANTON E. LAWSON
is that minors represent the best of a bad job response of those females that
are small or otherwise disadvantaged. However, presumptive male siblings
sometimes include both majors and minors, a result not predicted from this
hypothesis (p. 181)
And after briey stating the third hypothesis and summarizing its predicted res-
ults (i.e., reproductive benets/costs from major and minor sons should be equal)
and observed results (i.e., the net gain to females from producing a minor son is
unlikely to equal that derived from a major son), Alcock concludes: Therefore the
third hypothesis must also be tentatively rejected . . . (p. 181)
3.5. A SUMMARY ARGUMENT FOR TESTING ALCOCKS FIRST HYPOTHESIS
In summary, the following If/then/Therefore argument can be constructed to
summarize the fate of Alcocks rst hypothesis:
If . . . the male size dichotomy in male Dawsons burrowing bees is caused by
external environmental factors (environmental factors hypothesis)
and . . . the sizes of both male and female bees are sampled from populations over a
wide geographic and temporal range with a wide range of climatic/environmental
conditions (test conditions)
then . . . both male and female sizes should vary from geographic location to another
and from season to season (expected result).
But . . . male and females sizes are very consistent from one geographic location to
another and from season to season (observed result).
Therefore . . . the environmental factors hypothesis is not supported (conclusion).
3.6. WHAT DOES ALCOCK THINK ABOUT HIS THINKING?
Thus, it seems safe to conclude that on the surface at least, Alcock is using
If/then/Therefore thinking to guide and report his research. But what does Alcock
think about his thinking? The following remarks made by Alcock in an interview
suggest that he was well aware of the thinking pattern and was very consciously
trying to use it to guide his research. Alcocks remarks appear in italics.
How do you do science? In other words, do you have a general plan of attack,
a general set of strategies, a general method, that you use from one study to the
next? Yes, in terms of selection of topics I am committed to studies of insect mating
behavior. The basic technique is the standard one. I am using evolutionary theory
to come up with questions. Once I have questions, I am developing hypotheses
that are consistent with selection theory and testing them the old-fashioned way.
What is the old-fashioned way? By using them to generate predictions for which
it is possible to collect data so that we can examine the validity of the predictions.
Once you have data, how do you examine their validity? Well, by matching the
expected results against the actual ones. How do you draw conclusions from that?
HOW DO HUMANS ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE? 585
Or do you? Yes, in my case the conclusions are invariably in the form of the data
that support or invalidate the particular hypothesis.
How generalizable is this technique of generating and testing hypotheses? For
example, is it limited to your eld of research? I believe it is fundamental to all
science. It is the essence of what is called the scientic method. The scientic
method? Is there only one? I think, well, there is descriptive science, which is
the foundation for asking causal questions. And the kind of science which has the
greatest signicance for everybody the causal question answering science for
which this hypothesis-testing technique is, I believe, fundamental. I have never seen
any study, never had anyone explain to me how any study did not use this particular
approach, even if they claimed that there are multiple scientic approaches. Does
the scientic method, this thinking process actually guide your research? Very self
consciously, yes.
Thus, Alcock claims to self consciously employ the If/then/Therefore pattern of
hypothesis testing in his work. But Alcock is only a single scientist. What about
other scientists? Do they also try to use a process in which hypotheses lead to
predictions, which then are compared with subsequent observations so that conclu-
sions can be drawn? To nd out, the following two questions were submitted to 31
other scientists who are members of a biology department at a large university in
the United States. The number of biologists selecting each answer choice is shown
in parentheses.
1. Testing biological explanations
(a) always involves the generation of an expectation. (22)
(b) often involves the generation of an expectation, but sometimes involves
only making observations. (4)
(c) involves the generation of an expectation about half the time and only
making observations about half the time. (2)
(d) often involves only making observations, but sometimes involves the
generation of an expectation. (2)
(e) always involves only making observations. (1)
2. To arrive at a biological conclusion one must
(a) always make observations. (0)
(b) often make observations, but sometimes compare expectations with obser-
vations. (1)
(c) about half of the time make observations and about half of the time
compare expectations with observations. (5)
(d) often compare expectations with observations, but sometimes make obser-
vations. (5)
(e) always compare expectations with observations. (20)
Based on the present view of the leaning process, the correct answer choices are
(a) for item 1 and (e) for item 2 choices selected by 22 and 20 biologists respect-
ively. As these numbers represent 71% and 65% respectively, we can conclude that
the majority of these biologists agree with Alcock that this is the way science is
586 ANTON E. LAWSON
done. But what about the others? Do they think science is done some other way?
Or do they in fact use the If/then/Therefore process without being aware of what
they are doing? The following additional remarks made by Alcock support this
latter view.
How did you come to use this method? At this stage, I can not recreate the steps
that led to my current rm views. But it did have something to do with thinking
through teaching biology to undergraduates. How about when you were a graduate
student at Harvard? Did you use the method then? I was denitely unaware of what
I was doing, just following through. Well, the scientic method is common sense,
logic Id say, and not that obscure. But I wasnt self conscious. It was intuitive
and intuitive throughout much of my early career. I only became aware of it in the
past 10 to 15 years, perhaps in conjunction with teaching undergraduates. I do not
know.
4. Does Sensory-Motor Learning Employ the Same Pattern?
The previous examples suggest that knowledge acquisition, whether in a familiar
setting or at the level of modern science employs a pattern of If/then/Therefore
thinking. Let us now return to pre-verbal, sensory-motor learning and ask how chil-
dren initially learn about their world. Are the objects in that world simply seen,
or does their perception require an active use of the process? Van Senden (in Hebb
1949) reported observations of congenitally blind adults who had gained sight fol-
lowing surgery. Initially these newly-sighted persons could not distinguish a key
from a book when both lay on a table in front of them. Also they were unable to
report seeing any difference between a square and a circle. Only after considerable
experience with the objects including touching and holding them, were the newly-
sighted persons able to see the obvious (to others) differences. Observations such
as these strongly suggest that visual experience alone is insufcient for learning.
4.1. LEARNING THAT OBJECTS ARE PERMANENT
How then do children learn about the objects in their world? Consider Piagets
classic object permanence task in which children eventually learn that common
objects continue to exist even when out of sight. During the task, an experimenter
in full view of the infant hides a ball under one of two covers. Diamond (1990)
found that infants of ve months, but not younger, will reach under the cover for
the hidden ball indicating that they retain a mental representation of the ball even
though it is out of sight. Such behavior suggests that the infant has learned that
objects are permanent more or less in the following way:
If . . . the ball no longer exists when it is no longer visible
and . . . I reach under the cover where it was last seen (test condition)
then . . . I should not nd the ball (expected result).
But . . . I do nd the ball (observed result).
HOW DO HUMANS ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE? 587
Therefore . . . apparently I was wrong. Perhaps the ball, and other similar objects,
continue to exist even when not directly visible (conclusion).
Conversely,
If . . . the ball continues to exist even through it is no longer visible
and . . . I reach under the cover where it was last seen (test condition)
then . . . I should nd the ball (expected result).
And . . . I do nd the ball (observed result).
Therefore . . . it seems that the ball, and other similar objects continue to exist even
when not directly visible (conclusion).
Of course the claim here is not that infants are using verbally-mediated argu-
ments of this sort. The claim is merely that they propose representations about
how the world might work and that these are tested by using them as the basis for
the generation of an expectation. Then a comparison of this expectation with what
actually happens allows the infant to either reject or retain their initial represent-
ations. Importantly, one of the rst conclusions drawn by use of this method is
that the world consists of permanent objects. This conclusion is not only crucial
for successful behavior in their sensory-motor world, but it is also crucial for sub-
sequent intellectual development because the behavior of those permanent objects
can then used to test subsequent higher-order representations. This point will be
returned to later.
4.2. LEARNING THAT BOTTLES HAVE TWO DIFFERENT ENDS
Another example of learning about the objects in the infants sensory-motor world
was reported by Piaget while making observations of his son Laurent (from seven
to nine months of age). Piaget (1954) reports:
From 0:7 (0) until 0:9 (4) Laurent is subjected to a series of tests, either before
the meal or at any other time, to see if he can turn the bottle over and nd the
nipple when he does not see it. The experiment yields absolutely constant
results; if Laurent sees the nipple he brings it to his mouth, but if he does not
see it he makes no attempt to turn the bottle over. The object, therefore, has
no reverse side or, to put it differently, it is not three dimensional. Neverthe-
less Laurent expects to see the nipple appear and evidently in this hope he
assiduously sucks the wrong end of the bottle. (p. 31)
Laurents initial behavior consisted of lifting and sucking whether the nipple
was oriented properly or not. Apparently Laurent does not notice the differences
between the bottom of the bottle and the top and/or he does not know how to
modify his behavior to account for the presentation of the bottom. Thanks to his
father, Laurent has a problem.
Let us return to Piagets experiment. On the sixth day of the experiment when
the bottom of the bottle was given to Laurent, . . . he looks at it, sucks it (hence tries
to suck glass!), rejects it, examines it again, sucks it again, etc., four or ve times
588 ANTON E. LAWSON
in succession (p. 127). Piaget then held the bottle out in front of Laurent to allow
him to simultaneously look at both ends. Although his gaze oscillated between the
bottle top and bottom, when the bottom was again presented to Laurent he still
tried to suck the wrong end.
The bottom of the bottle was given to Laurent on the eleventh, seventeenth, and
twenty-rst days of the experiment. Each time Laurent simply lifted and began
sucking the wrong end. But by the thirtieth day he, . . . no longer tries to suck the
glass as before, but pushes the bottle away, crying (p. 128). Interestingly, when the
bottle was moved a little farther away, . . . he looks at both ends very attentively
and stops crying (p. 128).
Finally two months and ten days after the start of the experiment, when the
bottom of the bottle was given to Laurent he was successful in rst ipping it over,
. . . he immediately displaces the wrong end with a quick stroke of the hand, while
looking beforehand in the direction of the nipple. He therefore obviously knows
that the extremity he seeks is at the reverse end of the object (pp. 163164).
Laurents learning behavior, although relatively simple, follows a pattern that
consists of an initially successful behavior driven in part by a response to an
external stimulus and in part by hunger. The initially successful behavior is con-
tradicted when it is misapplied beyond the situation in which it was acquired. This
leads to frustration (reminiscent of Piagets concept of disequilibrium) and to an
eventual shutting down of incorrect behavior so that he can attend more closely to
the external stimulus that initially provoked the behavior. Attention, once aroused,
allows the child to notice previously ignored cues and/or relationships among the
cues, which in turn allows him to couple those cues with modied behavior to deal
successfully with the new situation. Hence, a new procedure has been actively ac-
quired as has a more differentiated and useful representation of his external world,
i.e.:
If . . . the bottle consists of an object with but a single end or perhaps one with two
identical ends (initial undifferentiated representation)
and . . . I lift and suck whenever the bottle is visible (test condition)
then . . . I should get a drink of milk (expected result)
But . . . on several occasions, I do not get a drink of milk (observed result).
Therefore . . . either there is something wrong with my initial undifferentiated
representation or with my test (conclusion).
Notice that like the case of the unlit barbecue where it took three unsuccessful
tries to relight the barbecue before the wind hypothesis was rejected, it took several
unsuccessful attempts by Laurent to get milk from his bottle before he modied his
behavior and differentiated his initial representation of the bottle into one with two
different ends:
If . . . the bottle consists of an object with a nipple present on only one of two
different ends (differentiated representation)
and . . . I lift and suck on the bottle when the nipple is visible (test condition)
then . . . I should get a drink of milk (expected result).
HOW DO HUMANS ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE? 589
Further,
If . . . the bottle consists of an object with a nipple present on only one of two
different ends (differentiated representation)
and . . . I ip the bottle over when the nipple is not visible (test condition)
then . . . I should get a drink of milk (expected result).
5. Can Use of the Learning Pattern Be Demonstrated Experimentally?
As evidence that knowledge acquisition employs active use of an If/then/Therefore
pattern of thinking, the previous examples all suffer from the same shortcoming.
Each consists of after-the-fact reconstructions of prior learning. Thus, the iden-
tied pattern may exist only in the mind of the reconstructor - not in the minds
of the learners. Can evidence of the patterns use be experimentally demonstrated
independently? Lawson (1993) used several tasks involving descriptive concept
acquisition that attempted to do so. One of the tasks appears in Figure 1. As shown,
the top row contains several Mellinarks (Elementary Science Study 1974). None of
the creatures in the second row are Mellinarks. The task is to gure out which
creatures in the third row are Mellinarks.
Previously Lawson et al. (1991) found that substantial percentages of children
fail to solve Mellinark-type tasks when administered without prior instruction.
To nd out if these failures were due to developmental deciencies or to easily
resolved confusion regarding task objectives, the Lawson (1993) study employed
brief one-on-one training that amounted to showing children a similar task and
then verbally describing how the If/then/Therefore pattern could be used to solve
the task. If children learn in this way, then the brief verbal training should enable
them to successfully employ the pattern to solve the tasks. On the other hand, if
they do not normally learn this way, then the training should be confusing and they
should not be successful.
For example, suppose one glances at the Mellinarks in the rst row and sees that
they all contain one large dot. Could one large dot be the key feature of Mellinarks?
This idea can be tested as follows:
If . . . Mellinarks are creatures with one large dot (proposed key feature),
and . . . we look at the non-Mellinarks in row two (test condition),
then . . . none of them should contain a large dot (expected result).
But . . . when we actually look at row two, we see that creatures one, two, and four
in row two each contain a large dot (observed result).
Therefore . . . Mellinarks are not creatures dened solely by the presence of one
large dot. So we need to generate and test another idea (conclusion).
Interestingly none of the 30 six-year-olds were successful as evidenced by their
complete failure to solve any transfer tasks. However, 15 of the 30 seven-year-olds
solved the transfer tasks as did virtually all of the eight-year-olds (29 of 30), and
all of the 9 through 16-year-olds. Thus, the results provide experimental evidence
that the If/then/Therefore pattern can easily be assimilated and used by children
590 ANTON E. LAWSON
Figure 1. Which of the creatures in row three are Mellinarks? What reasoning did you use to
nd out?
ages 8 and older to learn in this context. Therefore, we have experimental evidence
that supports the hypothesis that knowledge acquisition involves active use of the
If/then/Therefore pattern, at least among children eight years and older.
6. Does the External World Really Exist?
Having identied a thinking pattern that appears to underlie knowledge acquisition
at different ages and different levels of intellectual development (cf. Levine 1975),
HOW DO HUMANS ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE? 591
two key points about the nature of the knowledge acquired can be made. First, it
should be emphasized that this view regards learning as a hypothesis generation
and testing enterprise where the term hypothesis is dened in its broadest sense,
i.e., any statement under test, no matter whether it purports to describe some par-
ticular fact or event or to express a general law or some other more complex causal
proposition. Importantly, in order to test any and all such hypotheses, each hypo-
thesis must rst be assumed to be true. This may seem backwards. But according
to our examples, this is the way learning occurs. Importantly, hypotheses include
entities such as ghosts, photons, vital forces and phlogiston. This means that we
have to assume that these entities exist so that test conditions can be imagined and
predictions can be drawn. In the end we may decide that the entities do not exist.
But to arrive at this conclusion, we rst had to assume that they do exist.
To emphasize this point, briey consider the NeedhamSpallanzani controversy
over the concept of the vital force. As you may recall, during the 1700s, John
Needham, among others, believed that living things possessed a special vital force.
Further, when this force entered dead material it would spontaneously give it life.
But Lazzaro Spallanzani thought otherwise. So to test Needhams vital force idea,
Spallanzani reasoned something like this:
If . . . the vital force exists and acts on nonliving matter to bring it to life (vital force
hypothesis),
and . . . some bottles are heated for a few minutes and others for an hour, and some
are corked and others sealed with a ame (Spallanzanis planned test),
then . . . after several days, microbes should be found in all the bottles (expected
result). All bottles should contain microbes because the vital force should act
regardless of length of bottle heating or method of sealing (theoretical rationale).
But . . . days later after conducting his experiment, all of the corked bottles were
full of microbes. The sealed bottles boiled only a short time were also teaming
with microbes. However, no microbes were in the bottles boiled for an hour and
then sealed (observed results).
Therefore . . . Spallanzani concluded that Needhams vital force does not exist
(conclusion).
Thus the key point is that entities such as the vital force, epicycles, heavy water,
and N rays must be assumed to exist in order to test their existence and to possibly
conclude that they do not exist after all. Awareness of this aspect of the knowledge
acquisition process is extremely important because it allows us to set aside the
debate about the existence or non-existence of the external world. In short, the
debate is not settled by concluding that the external world exists independent of
an observer (the realist position). Rather the debate is set aside by the realization
that to learn at higher levels, the learner must assume the external worlds inde-
pendent existence, regardless of whether it actually exists or not. Thus, contrary to
the constructivist position advanced by Staver (1998) in which . . . constructivists
begin this work without rst assuming an independent reality (p. 503) to learn at
higher levels one must begin by assuming that the external world exists (and that
592 ANTON E. LAWSON
it is knowable). In fact this proposition and its alternative (i.e., the external world
does not exist unless it is in direct view) has already been generated and tested
by every single child during their sensory-motor stage of development. Thus as a
scientist, if you fail to make the initial assumption that the external world exists
you get nowhere. Worse yet, if you refuse to assume the independent existence
of the external world in spite of your sensory-motor knowledge that is telling you
otherwise, you could suffer some rather unfortunate consequences. Suppose, for
example, you nd yourself in the middle of a freeway staring down an oncom-
ing car and fail to make the assumption. If you do, you will likely end up dead.
Clearly it pays to make the assumption that the oncoming car exists, even though
the present analysis reveals why we can not be certain that it does.
But where does a scientist arrive if s/he starts with the assumption that the
external world exists and is knowable? The answer turns out to be somewhere short
of absolute Truth (for the reasons stated above), but certainly closer to developing
workable mental representations of that assumed-to-exist external world than social
constructivists would have us believe. This is because, in addition to our ability to
argue the merits and demerits of our various representations with others, we have
our assumed-to-exist external world against which we can test our representations,
i.e., our hypotheses and theories. Thus, the issue amounts to one of whether or not
science makes progress. The answer is that it does, but that progress is by no means
without ts and starts and some backtracking. Convincing evidence for scientic
progress surrounds us everywhere from computers that run on electrons, to cars
and airplanes that run on exploding fossil fuels, to doctors that save lives each day
with prescriptions of antibiotics, not to mention satellites that orbit the earth, and
space ships that have gone to the moon and back. To deny that these technological
advances rest on sound scientic theory is simply nonsense.
An additional point should be made. It makes sense to refer to the initial mental
representations as constructions in the sense that they are not directly given in the
context of current learning experiences. Instead, mental representations are either
culled from past experiences stored in long-term memory or are constructed
from sensory input. For example, neurological research reviewed by Mishkin and
Appenzeller (1987) makes it clear, at least with respect to vision, that complex
mental representations do not arise from direct sensory input. Rather, as shown
in Figure 2, visual sensory input is processed along two separate pathways and
that processing results in progressively more complex mental constructions. As
shown, initial processing of visual input, which arrives from the retina by way of
the lateral geniculate body, takes place in the striate cortex. Individual neurons
in the striate cortex respond to simple elements in the visual eld such as spots
of color and edges. Visual processing continues along the lower pathway, which
extends down toward the inferior temporal cortex. Along the way, a number of
diverging and converging channels construct broader properties of objects, such
as overall shape and color. At the lower end of the pathway neurons are sensitive to
a variety of properties and a broad expanse of the visual eld, which suggests that
HOW DO HUMANS ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE? 593
Figure 2. Neutral pathways used to process visual input and construct the visual world (after
Mishkin and Appenzeller 1987).
fully processed information about objects converge there. Also as shown in Figure
2, spatial relationships among two or more objects are processed along an upper
cortical pathway.
7. A Further Thought About the Primacy of Physical Feedback
Several years ago following administration of the task shown in Figure 3, two boys
were overheard arguing. The argument went something like this. First boy: I think
the water will rise higher when the steel marble sinks because it is heavier than the
glass one. Second boy: No, you are wrong! They will push the water up the same
amount because both marbles are the same size. Weight does not matter. First boy:
Yes, weight matters. My brother is a lot heavier than I am and when he gets in the
bath tub the water goes up a lot higher than when I get in!
How can this dispute be settled? How do these boys, or anyone for that matter,
learn which variable, weight or volume, is key? It would seem that no amount of
social negotiation will do. Rather what needs to be done is to perform two simple
experiments more or less as follows:
If . . . the amount of water rise depends on an objects weight (weight hypothesis)
and . . . two objects of different weight, but equal volume, are submerged in water
(test conditions)
then . . . the heavier object should produce more water rise (expected result).
But . . . the heavier object does not produce more water rise (observed result).
Therefore . . . the weight hypothesis is not supported (conclusion).
On the other hand,
If . . . the amount of water rise depends on an objects volume (volume hypothesis)
594 ANTON E. LAWSON
Figure 3. The displacement volume task.
and . . . two objects of different volume, but equal weight, are submerged in water
(test conditions)
then . . . the larger object should produce more water rise (expected result).
And . . . the larger object does produce more water rise (observed result).
Therefore . . . the volume hypothesis is supported (conclusion).
Thus, the present view is that physical feedback (i.e., the water rises the same in
the rst experiment and higher in the second) is the primary vehicle for resolving
disputes about alternative knowledge claims. The primacy of physical feedback in
knowledge acquisition is at odds with social constructivism in which, according
to Latour and Woolgar (1979, 1986), success depends on a theorys proponents
ability to extract compliance from others (cf. Slezak 1994a, 1994b). This is not to
say that social interaction may not be helpful. But it can not be the central means
of knowledge acquisition. In fact, as Gardner (1994) points out, the acquisition of
new knowledge is typically associated with distinctly asocial behavior. Based on
detailed case studies of seven highly creative people, Gardner concludes, . . . at the
time of greatest breakthrough, our creators were in one sense very much alone.
Often they had physically withdrawn from other individuals (p. 154). And in
reviewing several decades of research on the nature and measurement of creativity,
Eysenck (1994) makes much the same point when he lists several characteristics
associated with creative people such as quarrelsomeness, asocialability and even
outright hostility. As mentioned, this is not to argue that social interaction can not
be helpful. It can be helpful in many ways (e.g., in sharing and clarifying prob-
lems, in suggesting alternative hypotheses, in suggesting possible test conditions,
in criticizing conducted tests, in collecting and analyzing results). But in the end,
feedback from the physical world is the ultimate arbitrator of which knowledge
claims are accepted or rejected.
HOW DO HUMANS ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE? 595
8. The Existence of Stages of Intellectual Development
Before turning to instructional implications, a word about stages of intellectual
development seems in order. In short, the present view of learning implies the
existence of stages although not necessarily discontinuous stages. Initially sensed
colors, lines, and angles and the childs ability to create undifferentiated wholes
provide the mental representations that are either rejected or retained by virtue
of their ability to produce expectations that are either met or unmet in a world
of sensory-motor feedback (e.g., lifting the cover either does or does not reveal
the ball, sucking on the bottle either does or does not produce milk). Once such
sensory-motor representation testing has created a stable world of interacting ob-
jects, these objects and their characteristics and behaviors can then be used to test
the validity of mental representations at higher stages. In other words, intellectual
development is a process in which the products of one stage must be largely in
place before progress can be made on subsequent stages because prior construc-
tions are used to test subsequent higher-order representations. For example, Dalton
compared predicted and observed outcomes regarding the measurable weights of
gases to test the hypothesis that nonmeasurable atoms exist. Similarly, Mendel
compared predicted and observed outcomes regarding the ratios of observable pea
plant characteristics to test the hypothesis that unobservable genes exist. And Pas-
teur compared predicted and observed outcomes regarding the observable growth
of microbes to test the hypothesis that an unobservable vital force exists. None of
these tests could have been conducted had the scientists not previously construc-
ted a sensory-motor world of interacting and observable objects during their early
childhoods.
9. Instructional Implications
According to Matthews (1994), . . . Western science is not natural, is does not
automatically unfold as children either confront the world, or participate in culture
(p. 161). In a sense, the difculty that many adolescents and adults experience in
using If/then/Therefore thinking in theoretical contexts supports this view (e.g.,
Lawson 1992). Yet the main implication of the present argument is that at least
at its roots, If/then/Therefore thinking is natural. Indeed, it is one way in which
we all learn, presumably because evolutionary forces (i.e., natural selection) have
wired the mind to work this way. But this is not to say that use of the pattern at
lower stages (e.g., levels that involve constructing language, constructing descript-
ive classicatory schemes), means that it will automatically be used at higher stages
(e.g., constructing causal relationships where the causal agents are observable,
constructing causal theories where the causal agents are merely imagined).
One might wonder how characteristic this learning pattern is of learning in the
science classroom. Clearly, if instructional tasks are of the sort in which students
are told specic facts (e.g., the phases of mitotic cell division are prophase,
metaphase, anaphase and telophase) and asked to recite these facts on tests,
596 ANTON E. LAWSON
then the learning pattern is of little or no use. However, if the instructional task
allows students to generate and test ideas about how multicellular organisms might
grow including by mitotic cell divisions, among several other possibilities (e.g.,
Lawson 1991), then the pattern is of considerable use. Further, whenever students
encounter conceptual change instruction (e.g., Wandersee et al. 1994) in which
concepts introduced during instruction contradict prior concepts, then pattern is
also called into use. Recall the previously described debate between the two boys
over which variable weight or volume determines water displacement in the
task shown in Figure 3.
Clearly knowing how to help students develop skill in using If/then/Therefore
thinking at the highest level, the level of scientic thought, is still an unmet educa-
tional challenge. Importantly, the present view of the learning process implies that
progress toward this goal will not be made by adoption of a social constructivist
view that ignores or denigrates the key role played by the external world in the
test of alternative hypotheses and theories, even though we can not be absolutely
certain that such an external world really exists.
Acknowledgements
This material is based upon research partially supported by the National Science
Foundation under grant No. DUE 9453610. Any opinions, ndings, and conclu-
sions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and
do not necessarily reect the views of the National Science Foundation.
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