Identity, the Group, and the Social Construction of Reality

David P. Levine
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver
Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society 4,1: pp. 81!1 "Sprin# 1!!!$
1.
%o&ever i'portant esta(lishin# a relationship &ith reality 'ay (e for the
individual)s survival, &e should never underesti'ate the dan#er individuals perceive reality
to pose for the'. *he dan#er to &hich I refer here is not the dan#er of this or that version
of reality, (ut of reality itself, &hich is to say of a sphere of e+istence outside the
individual)s su(,ective control. -ecause of the threat reality poses, the individual)s life
pro,ect as often as not (eco'es that of dis'issin# reality rather than livin# creatively in
relation to it.
.ur a'(ivalence to&ard reality is no&here (etter e+e'plified than in the idea that
"social$ reality is /socially constructed./ *his idea atte'pts to deny social reality any clai'
to o(,ectivity #rounded in a relationship &ith natural i'peratives, for e+a'ple as their
sy'(olic e+pression. 0t the sa'e ti'e, ho&ever, that social construction e'phasi1es the
sui generis 2uality of social reality, it also calls into 2uestion those 2ualities that could
'a3e our social (ein# real: that it is nonar(itrary, and that it endures. If it does not endure,
in &hat sense is it real4 5ould it not (e (etter, then, in thin3in# a(out the e+perience of the
social &orld, to focus attention on its contin#ency and indeter'inacy "-ha(ha 1617$4
0 specific application of the idea that social reality is /constructed/ is of special
i'portance: its application to understandin# the individual. *o understand reality as a
social construct 'eans to understand the individual as a social construct, as a 'eetin# point
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of socially produced identities. -ut, social construction has 'ore si#nificance than this. 0t
the sa'e ti'e that it locates the individual in the intersection of social identities, it also
su##ests a pro,ect, &hich is to under'ine the definition of the individual on the (asis of
identity. *his pro,ect is supported (y the ,ud#'ent that identity is on the surface, and does
not reach do&n to the depths of our (ein# "-ha(ha 48$. Identity is on the surface (ecause it
is a product of the &ay &e are seen (y others.
*he de'and of identificationthat is, to (e for an .therentails the
representation of the su(,ect in the differentiatin# order of otherness.
"-ha(ha 48$
*his association (et&een identity and (ein# for other is the first indication that identity, and
thus our social construction as the 'eetin# point of identities, is i'posed on us, and is a
for' of deprivation, thou#h &hat &e are deprived of is not clearly e+pressed.
5e 'i#ht sur'ise that identity is connected to &hat Donald 5innicott refers to as
the /false self/ since, li3e the false self, identity is 'eant to hide &hat is vital. 0nd, li3e the
false self, identity is (ein# for other as true self is (ein# for self. Since identity places us in
the /differentiatin# order of otherness/ &e can only escape the deprivation i'plied in (ein#
identified as the /other/ (y (eco'in# invisi(le to those in &hose eyes &e are other. *hus,
those points &here &e cannot (e seen and &here &e pass (eyond identity are of special
i'portance.
2
9ach ti'e the encounter &ith identity occurs at the point at &hich
so'ethin# e+ceeds the fra'e of the i'a#e, it eludes the eye, evacuates the
self as site of identity and autono'y and'ost i'portantleaves a resistant
trace, a stain of the su(,ect, a si#n of resistance. "-ha(ha 4!8:$
*his connection of identity to (ein# for other is vital, as is the dou(t e+pressed that
havin# an identity can (e anythin# 'ore than the loss of "true$ self. 0s &e &ill see, the
connection ,ust referred to incorporates a si#nificant ,ud#'ent a(out the &ay identity
depends on reco#nition, ,ust as it incorporates a si#nificant ,ud#'ent a(out the i'plication
of the effort to 'a3e social (ein# real.
Insistin# that identity depend on ho& &e are seen (y others 'a3es identity
contin#ent on conte+t, &hich 'a3es it less real than it appears &hen &e i'a#ine that
identity is an endurin# internal 2uality of the individual. *hus, the social construction of
reality 'eans (oth the do'ination of the individual (y his or her identities and the
contin#ency of identity. Identity is an over&hel'in# reality for the individual, and yet in
another sense it is no reality at all, (ut only appearance "for others$. *he effort to co'(ine
t&o opposed 2ualities in this &ay tells us so'ethin# vital a(out the idea that social reality
and thus social identity are socially constructed. *his idea of social construction actually
incorporates t&o ideas: that &e e+ist only in the eyes of others, and that to e+ist in the eyes
of others is to lose so'ethin# vital a(out e+istence. *here is in this (oth a profound need
for and fear of (ein# identified, &hich is to say, (ein# 3no&n (y others.
2.
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.ur concern here is &ith reality, and 'ore specifically &ith social reality. *his
'eans that our concern is &ith the e+istence and status of a sphere outside the individual)s
su(,ective (ein#. 5hat 'a3es so'ethin# real, then, is this 2uality of (ein# e+ternal. Put
another &ay, &hat is real endures independently of our "individual$ su(,ective attitude
to&ard it, for e+a'ple our desire for it or our hatred of it. *o (e e+ternal, and thus to
endure independently of, also places reality outside the control of the su(,ect. *his 'eans
that reality e+ists only so far as su(,ect and o(,ect are separate. 0n attac3 on reality is an
attac3 on the separateness of the o(,ect, &hich is an effort to su(su'e the o(,ect into the
inner &orld, the &orld of hatred and desire, of hope and fear.
Social reality poses a special pro(le' insofar as its e+ternality to the su(,ect is not
derivative of any physical opposition. Indeed, (ecause it is real thou#h not 'aterial, &e can
say that social reality is su(,ective. *his does not 'ean that it e+ists at the &hi' of, or is
controlled (y, the su(,ect, (ut only that it is in so'e sense the o(,ective e+istence of hu'an
su(,ectivity. *he 2uestion re'ains a(out the nature of this hu'an su(,ectivity that
(eco'es o(,ective as social reality.
*he su(,ective 2uality of social reality is so'eti'es attri(uted to its (ein#
controlled (y a collective su(,ective, especially a #roup. *he idea of social construction
endo&s the social &ith a special 'eanin#, one that 'a3es it contin#ent on historically or
culturally specific fra'e&or3s for interaction, especially fra'e&or3s instantiated in #roup
constitutin# 'odes of co''unication. *hus, as one student puts it, /discourse is the
process throu#h &hich social reality co'es into (ein#/ "9sco(ar ;!$. <urther, /discursive
practice/ esta(lishes rules of the #a'e that deter'ine /&ho can spea3, fro' &hat points of
vie&, &ith &hat authority, and accordin# to &hat criteria of e+pertise/ "9sco(ar 41$.
4
Discourse #ains its stren#th fro' its rootin# in the interests of #roups &hose po&er
is protected (y their a(ility to control &hat is said and thou#ht (y controllin# the 'ediu'
throu#h &hich spea3in# and thin3in# ta3e place. *here is, of course, a pro(le' in this
since, if discourse constructs the social, then it 'ust also construct the #roup, &hich 'eans
that it cannot si'ply (e the e+pression of the #roup)s interests. Indeed, the notion of
discourse 'a3es do'ination less a 'atter of individual or #roup action and intent, 'ore a
'atter of adoptin# a 'ode of co''unication= it constitutes, rather than si'ply servin# the
interests of, the su(,ect of po&er. /Discourse trans'its and produces po&er= it reinforces
it, (ut also under'ines and e+poses it, renders it fra#ile and 'a3es it possi(le to th&art it/
"<oucault 1:1$. *his is not (ecause the discourse faces an opposin# discourse of those
&ithout po&er, (ut (ecause it contains its o&n opposin# pole, so that the discourse of
others is not a separate discourse fro' that &hich they &ould overthro&.
3.
>ootin# social reality in its dependence on #roup &ill is not, ho&ever, inevita(le.
*he idea of the social construction of reality often does attri(ute &hat reality there can (e in
social interaction to that interaction)s su(ordination to #roup ends. *hen, it is (ecause the
#roup endures, and to the e+tent that the #roup endures, that &e can spea3 of social reality.
%ere, I &ill approach the pro(le' so'e&hat differently. *o do so, I &ill (e#in (y focusin#
attention on the &ay e+ternal reality is constituted (y and for the individual su(,ect. *his is
a 'atter of the relation (et&een the internal and e+ternal &orlds. *he relationship (et&een
these &orlds is a dyna'ic one, involvin# the processes of internali1ation "identification and
incorporation$, and e+ternali1ation "especially pro,ection$ throu#h &hich the individual
5
atte'pts to use &hat is outside to achieve psychic ends.
?onsider, for e+a'ple, pro,ection, the process (y &hich &e attri(ute our feelin#s
and selfstates to others. Pro,ection attri(utes 2ualities of the su(,ect to the e+ternal &orld.
*hese 2ualities, since they are not in the &orld (ut in the su(,ect)s e+perience of it, are not
real. Pro,ections can (e 'ade 'ore real if &e not only e+perience our feelin#s and self
states outside ourselves, in others, (ut also provo3e others to have those feelin#s and states.
If &e are successful in this, then our su(,ective e+perience (eco'es so'ethin# alien fro'
"outside of$ us. @ust as our su(,ective life (eco'es so'ethin# outside ourselves, so the
e+ternal &orld no& (eco'es essentially su(,ective, havin# only those 2ualities &e put into
it. *hus, &e are no lon#er an#ry or afraid, others are. -ut others 'ust (e 'ade an#ry or
afraid so that &e &ill not (e, or &ill not 3no& that &e are. *hen, others serve a su(,ective
end of ours and not ends of their o&n= they are not an o(,ective reality for us. 0t the sa'e
ti'e, since they contain our su(,ective e+perience of our selves and our &orld, &e have lost
(oth our su(,ectivity and the o(,ectivity of the e+ternal &orld.
*o su''ari1e, pro,ection can (e involved in our e+perience of the outside &orld=
(ut it can also (e involved in our atte'pt to create &hat is real for us. In the latter case,
pro,ection, or &hat is so'eti'es ter'ed pro,ective identification, is construction of reality,
&hich involves the need to control o(,ects in the outside &orld so they act as appropriate
containers for &hat ori#inates &ithin us. *he distinction (et&een e+periencin# our feelin#s
outside and controllin# the outside &orld so that it validates our pro,ections and
identifications is an i'portant one since it is the latter that involves shapin# institutions and
interactions.
6
*o understand this possi(ility, &e need to thin3 of institutions servin# a psychic
purpose additional to, or even in place of, the ostensi(le purpose &ith &hich they are
nor'ally associated.
1
*his psychic purpose can include the validation of the
psychodyna'ic processes participants e'ploy to deal &ith psychic conflict. 5hile
individuals 'ay see3 to, and so'eti'es succeed in, controllin# o(,ects in &ays that serve
psychic need, esta(lishin# institutions and #roups &ith the purpose of 'aintainin# control
over o(,ects ta3es the process a step further. *his is (ecause of the special po&er
institutions and #roups have to create a su(stitute reality. *his su(stitute reality has an
i'portant 2uality, one that &e often confuse &ith the 2uality of (ein# real: it carries the
a#ree'ent of the #roup. 5e &ill not (e surprised, then, if &e find 'any students ar#uin#
that the only reality is the one sanctioned (y the #roup, &hich is assu'ed to create reality.
*his i'plies that reality can (e &hatever the #roup &ills it to (e. *his creation of reality is
also, ho&ever, the destruction of reality. *hat is, creation of reality (y and for the #roup is
'eant to displace any reality that 'i#ht e+ist for the individual outside the #roup. *he
po&er of #roups and institutions, then, is that they can dis'iss, and even destroy, reality, so
far as reality e+ists apart fro' and stands a#ainst #roup consciousness.
In psychodyna'ic accounts, #roups consist of face to face encounters (et&een
individuals "-ion, Aern(er#, 0lford$. In these accounts, a /lar#e/ #roup is still s'all
enou#h to 'eet to#ether in ti'e and space. Groups of this 3ind can and do create their o&n
realities, even ele'ents of their o&n discourse, (ut the realitycreatin# po&er of #roups to
&hich those co''itted to the social construction idea refer is not restricted to, or pri'arily
a 'atter of, #roups of this sort. *he #roups that construct social reality are 'ore a(stract,
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even ideal: ethnic #roups, co''unities, classes, and so on. <or the psychoanalytic
understandin# of #roups, these are not #roups at all.
Bet, clearly, if &e &ish to focus attention on the transfor'ation of interaction fro'
a transient e+perience into an endurin# reality, the 'ore a(stract #roup has a special part to
play. Indeed, it is the very distance of this #roup fro' the contin#ency of face to face
interaction that helps assure that it &ill endure as a transcendent reality of the individual)s
life. *his transcendent #roup has the po&er to instantiate 'odes of conduct and interaction,
and in this sense, to create social reality.
5hen I spea3 of the #roup as transcendent, I refer to its 2uality of endurin#
independently of the particular individuals &ho co'pose it at a particular 'o'ent in ti'e.
*ranscendence does not 'a3e the #roup a 'aterial reality, althou#h 'e'(ers 'ay i'a#ine
its e+istence e'(odied in 'aterial o(,ects. *hese physical 'anifestations of the #roup)s
endurin# reality i'press its 2uality of per'anence on the individual. *hey are sy'(ols of
the #roup. -ut, if the #roup is neither a concrete e+perience in ti'e and place nor the
'aterial o(,ects that sy'(oli1e it, then &hat sort of entity is the #roup4 .ne ans&er to this
2uestion is that the "transcendent$ #roup is essentially an idea, &hich 'ay (e sy'(oli1ed
(y physical o(,ects, or other&ise e+perienced as e'(odied in 'aterial 'anifestations. *his
ideal 2uality of the #roup is captured (y the notion of discourse as the #roup constitutin#
process. *hat is, &hile a face to face #roup 'ay (e constituted out of co''unication, (oth
ver(al and nonver(al, the lar#er 'ore a(stract #roupentity is constituted not si'ply (y
co''unication, (ut (y the structured co''unication around a centerin# idea &e refer to as
discourse. *his last notion can also (e e+pressed in the lan#ua#e of ideolo#y, &hich &e
can understand as the discourse appropriate to the construction of a #roup.
8
5e can (e so'e&hat 'ore specific a(out the ideal 2uality of the transcendent
#roup. *he core idea of the #roup is an idea a(out identity, one that 'a3es havin# an
identity a 'atter of ta3in# on contin#ent 2ualities &hose 'eanin# is that they esta(lish the
individual not as an individual (ut as a 'e'(er. *he si#nificance of the concrete attri(utes
that constitute #roup identity lies in their 2uality of (ein# shared. It is not so 'uch &hat
they are, &hich in the end does not really 'atter, (ut that they are i'posed on the 'e'(er
as the price of (elon#in#. *his 2uality transfor's those contin#ent 2ualities fro'
'eanin#less accidents to #roup constitutin# ideals= it ta3es the' fro' the concrete to the
a(stract.
5e can say that #roup identity is i'posed on the 'e'(ers, and in this sense is a
(urden for the'. *he idea of identity as a (urden recalls the criti2ue of identity &ith &hich
I (e#an this discussion. *o adopt a #roup identity is to (e for other. *hus t&o 2ualities of
identity &or3 to#ether: that it endures and in this sense is real, and that it esta(lishes #roup
'e'(ership, and thus 'eans (ein# for other.
*he idea of identity also endo&s identity, so far as it connects us to a #roup, &ith a
'oral si#nificance. 5hat 'a3es the #roup an ideal is the attach'ent of 'oral ,ud#'ent to
its concrete &ay of (ein#, &hich in the a(sence of such 'oral ,ud#'ent has no reality for
the individual or the #roup, and re'ains contin#ent, even ephe'eral. *he connection of
'oral ,ud#'ent to the constitution of the #roup follo&s fro' the psychic 'eanin# of the
#roup, &hich is that the #roup represents for the 'e'(er the prospect of attainin# a state of
connectedness. Psychically, connection is &hat is #ood= the #ood o(,ect is the o(,ect that is
and re'ains connected to the child and in that connection affir's the child)s #oodness.
-ad refers psychically to disconnected, &hich is to say re,ected. .f course, (ein# (ad is
9
initially the #round for disconnection. *hen, (ein# (ad causes disconnection, ,ust as (ein#
#ood causes connection. Bet, that it provo3es or disrupts connection 'a3es an action #ood
or (ad, so the ter's can (e thou#ht to refer to the t&o states, connected and disconnected.
*he #roup taps into this psychic 'eanin#, and indeed is shaped in relation to it. -ecause of
this, the #roup is inherently, and inevita(ly, a 'oral construct. *he reality that the #roup
see3s to instantiate is a 'oral reality, a per'anent connection that 'a3es the 'e'(ers
per'anently #ood "and (y the sa'e lo#ic, 'a3es those &ho are not 'e'(ers (ad$.
5hat 'a3es the 'oral reality of the #roup real is that it transcends the individual in
ti'e and in space. In this sense, the 'oral reality of the #roup e+ists outside the individual,
and is real. 5e can see this di'ension of #roup e+perience in the e+cessive effort #roups
underta3e to preserve o(,ects, 'e'ories, 'yths, and &ays of life throu#h ti'e. .nly (y
preservin# o(,ects, 'e'ories, and 'yths can they (e endo&ed &ith the 2uality of (ein#
real, a 2uality they 'ust have if the #roup itself is to (e real. 5e can say of #roups of the
sort &ith &hich &e are concerned here that they ta3e the concrete interactions and &ays of
life e+perienced (y individuals and constitute the' as a(stract ideals of conduct and
e+perience. -ut, &e can also reverse the relation and spea3 of the individual)s day to day
e+periences as instantiations of the ideals that &e associate &ith the #roup. *his is the
sense in &hich the #roup precedes, and can (e said to constitute, the 'e'(er. 5hat &e
really 'ean in spea3in# this &ay is that the ideal "&hich is the transcendent #roup$ #overns
the individual)s day to day life, or vital di'ensions thereof.
Spea3in# of discourse as the reality of the #roup, and thus of discourse as
do'inatin# life, fits this &ay of thin3in# &ell enou#h. Bet, spea3in# this &ay also tends to
o(scure the sense in &hich &e are spea3in# of a #roup. 5hy not si'ply refer to ideals, or
10
to discourse centered on ideals4 ?an &e distin#uish ideals that constitute #roup do'ination
of the individual fro' ideals that do not4 I return to this 2uestion further on.
-efore pursuin# the possi(ility that social reality 'i#ht 'ean so'ethin# other than
the reality of the #roup, &e should consider &hy the individual i'a#ines that the #roup has
a special po&er to create reality, especially if the individual does not. *he ans&er to this
2uestion involves the fantasy of o'nipotence that e+ists at the center of the notion of the
creation of reality. 5hether &e i'a#ine reality can (e created (y acts of individual &ill, or
only (y a putative #roup &ill, in either case &e i'a#ine that &ill can create reality. *his
'eans that, for us, reality is not so'ethin# outside, (ut a part of that sphere &ithin &hich
our su(,ectivity e+erts control. *his is the sphere of fantasy, &here &e do indeed create a
"su(stitute$ reality. 5hat constitutes this sphere is the pri'ary fantasy: that &e can create
reality (y &ishin# and &illin#.
5e can ans&er the 2uestion posed a(ove a(out &hy the individual i'a#ines that
the #roup can create reality if he or she cannot, then, in t&o &ays. <irst, &e can consider
the #roup the repository, via pro,ection, of the o'nipotent fantasies of its 'e'(ers, &ho
i'a#ine that those fantasies can (e safely e+perienced if they are displaced to the #roup "or
so'eti'es its leader$. Second, &e can consider ho& the individual)s fantasies of
o'nipotence involve others, that is, ho& o'nipotence itself depends on control over the
&ay others act and the &ay they perceive the &orld. Since the po&er of the #roup is the
po&er of control over o(,ects, that po&er is inherently derivative of interaction of a
particular 3ind.
Put another &ay, those &ho see3 the alternative reality offered (y #roups are
dependent on interaction &ith others in a special sense. In .tto Aern(er#)s &ords, they
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e+hi(it a /chronic overdependence on e+ternal o(,ects/ "1;$. *heir need to control o(,ects
follo&s fro' this overdependence on the', since this overdependence 'a3es the o(,ect)s
response to, and e+perience of, the individual a selfconstitutin# or selfdestroyin#
e+perience. *o assure that the o(,ect)s response to and e+perience of the individual are
consistent &ith his or her "psychic$ survival, that e+perience and response 'ust (e
controlled. <or such individuals, the #roup does, indeed, have a considera(le po&er, the
po&er to 'aintain or destroy the individual hi' or herself. *his creates a need for the
special reality constructed (y the #roup.
If &e consider the /chronic overdependence on o(,ects/ to &hich I have ,ust
referred as typical of those individuals 'ost in need of #roup reality, and 'ost li3ely to
do'inate in #roups, then &e can readily understand the special i'portance of the #roup,
and of its alternative reality. 5ithout the #roup, the dependence of the individual on others
appears as a dependence on transient interactions, &hich 'ust (e repeated and reproduced.
*hese interactions cannot create the needed reality, or at least they cannot secure it as an
endurin# presence. -y contrast, #roups can transfor' transient and contin#ent interactions
&ith particular persons into an endurin# reality independent of the finite individual and his
or her &hi's. In this sense, #roups that instantiate a particular 2uality of interaction are
also the endurin# reality of interaction, and thus of the selfe+perience that only co'es
alive there. *hey 'a3e real the selfe+perience constituted in relation to o(,ects on &hich
these individuals are chronically overdependent.
5e 'i#ht assu'e that those e+hi(itin# the chronic overdependence ,ust considered
&ill find co'fort in the creation of #roups and institutions capa(le of #ivin# the sta'p of
reality to the effort to e+ternali1e psychic conflict and to enlist others in the effort to deal
12
&ith the an+iety such conflict creates. *his conclusion &ould find support, as &e have
seen, in the effort underta3en (y such individuals to esta(lish #roup reality. Bet, in sayin#
this, &e should not lose si#ht of the dan#er reality poses for individuals, includin# the
dan#er posed (y the hoped for and needed #roup reality.
*o see this, consider one i'plication so'eti'es attached to the idea of social
construction of reality, and &hich I e'phasi1e a(ove: that it 'a3es reality contin#ent. *his
contin#ency of social for's 'a3es the' 'allea(le. In so doin# it overco'es that 2uality
of institutions that poses a threat to those individuals 'ost in need of #roup reality: their
independence of our &ill. .verdependence on o(,ects ste's fro' the need to cope &ith
inner conflict (y esta(lishin# the su(,ective in the &orld outside. *his 'a3es the o(,ective
su(,ective in a special sense: it incorporates it into the inner &orld, &hich is the &orld of
o'nipotent control. Should, ho&ever, the effort to constitute e+ternal reality as the
e+ternali1ation of inner conflict (e too successful, should, that is, the real (eco'e
so'ethin# separate fro' the su(,ect)s need, standin# a#ainst the su(,ect, then it too 'ust (e
overco'e.
*hus, the social construction of reality enco'passes t&o radically opposed ideas,
&hich nonetheless share a co''on root. *he first involves the need to esta(lish the
su(,ective 'eanin# of o(,ects as their o(,ective reality, &hich is their 'eanin# for others.
*he second is the need to assure that all e+ternal reality re'ains contin#ent on su(,ective
need, and therefore ephe'eral. *he need to instantiate interaction so that its 'eanin# for
the individual can endure, and ta3e on a life to so'e de#ree independent of the transient
interactions &ith particular others, is also a need to institutionali1e interaction. 0nd the
dan#er of the institution to the individual)s need for o'nipotent control re2uires that the
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individual attac3 the sa'e institutions created to #ive the sta'p of reality to su(,ective
processes.
%o& does the individual cope &ith the contradiction ,ust considered4 *he solution
that follo&s fro' the ter's of the pro(le' is or#ani1ational chan#e "Levine Creativity$.
Su(,ectin# or#ani1ations to a continual process of transfor'ation si'ultaneously
su(ordinates the' to the individual)s &ill &hile affordin# the individual the opportunity to
'a3e real the needed selfsupportin# interactions (y institutionali1in# the'. In li#ht of this
result, there is nothin# surprisin# in the ideolo#y of chan#e that do'inates institutions in
conte'porary society.
It is interestin# to note that the socially constructed reality, &hich see's, in contrast
to the prevailin# notions of &hat is real, to (e essentially su(,ective, is not so for the
individual. >ather, the socially constructed reality confronts the individual as the loss of
su(,ectivity, even if this loss is in a sense the individual)s o&n &or3. Indeed, as &e have
seen, this loss of su(,ectivity is the purpose of the displace'ent of feelin#s and self
e+periences fro' self to other, a purpose &ellserved not only (y other individuals (ut (y
the other &e refer to as the #roup. 5hat the individual #ains (y the i'plied
i'poverish'ent of su(,ective e+perience is a 3ind of po&er, or the illusion of po&er, over
the &orld. *his is the po&er to create reality (y assertion of #roup &ill. In other &ords,
su(,ectivity is transferred fro' individual to #roup, &ith the e+pectation and hope that the
#roup su(,ect &ill have the po&er to create reality, includin# the reality of the individual.
*he purpose of this ne&ly created reality is co'ple+, as &e &ill see. .n one level, it is to
reali1e illusions of o'nipotence and fantasies of 'er#er. -ut, on another level, the purpose
of the ne&ly created reality is to 'a3e inevita(le the loss of su(,ectivity that is the 'eanin#
14
of the #roup for the individual. I return to this second di'ension of #roup e+perience
further on.
*here is an i'portant connection (et&een the i'pulse drivin# or#ani1ational
chan#e and the attac3 on identity associated &ith the idea of social construction considered
at the (e#innin# of this essay. *he i'pulse for or#ani1ational chan#e develops out of a
contradiction: on one side the need to instantiate interaction of a particular 3ind in order to
'a3e it real, on the other side the need to overco'e the (urden of this reality, &hich
challen#es the su(,ect)s control over the o(,ect. *he attac3 on identity develops out of the
(urden of "i'posed$ identification for the individual, &hich is overco'e "in thou#ht$ (y
'a3in# identity so'ethin# on the surface, a false self used to hide the real self fro' the
threatenin# #a1e of the other. 5e 'ust, then, protect ourselves fro' our identity (y
'a3in# identity e+ternal, transient, and indeter'inate. <or identity, as for the instantiation
of identity in or#ani1ations, the i'pulse is to 'a3e the real less so or not real at all, (y
ta3in# fro' it its definin# characteristic: that it endures.
*he overdependence on o(,ects, &hich plays such a pro'inent role in #roup
pheno'ena, also connects the pursuit of #roup reality to the fear of identification
considered at the (e#innin# of this essay. *he fear of identification ste's fro' the
presu'ption that identity results fro' the act of (ein# identified (y the /other,/ and
therefore fear of identity is fear of (ein# su(su'ed into the other)s su(,ective sphere.
%avin# an identity is the result of (ein# #iven an identity as a hostile act. *his &ay of
thin3in# #ives reco#nition a special slant. >eco#nition does not affir' an inner reality= it
creates and destroys reality for the individual. *hus, the attac3 on identity lin3s up &ith the
15
attri(ution of a special po&er to reco#nition, and &ith the overdependence on o(,ects
already considered.
*his special po&er is real, at least so far as &e consider the process (y &hich
identity is for'ed for the individual. 9arly in its develop'ent, the self lac3s the de#ree of
inte#ration needed to 'aintain its identity a#ainst potentially hostile e+ternal i'positions.
In <. von -roe'(sen)s &ords, this pri'itive self /does not have the co#nitive or affective
resources to resist a hostile, coloni1in#, definition of itself/ ";;;$. .nce coloni1ed, the
tra,ectory of develop'ent, especially re#ardin# identity for'ation, e+presses an alien
presence &ithin the self that i'pedes reali1ation of its aspiration to selfdeter'ination.
In this conte+t, not only is reco#nition 'isreco#nition, it i'poses rather than
affir'in# identity. 5ith this as its prototype, identity is essentially, if not purely, a
relationship (et&een self and other, rather than a constitutin# internal 2uality of the self that
shapes interaction &ith others. *he result of the for'ative process alluded to a(ove is that
the individual does indeed (eco'e overdependent on others, does indeed find his or her
su(stance of (ein# outside hi' or her self.
5e can put this another &ay. *he interpretation of identity that e2uates it &ith
identification in the eyes of others leaves out of account the activity of the self in
identifyin# &ith others. Identification can (e an active process of shapin# and reshapin# an
e+ternal reality into a part of the self. *he 'ove'ent, then, (e#ins inside, dra&in# upon
&hat the self finds in the e+ternal &orld accordin# to internal need. .r, identification can
(e a defense a#ainst a dan#erous e+ternal environ'ent, a &ay of copin# &ith a &orld in
&hich (ein# yourself 'eans (ein# disconnected fro' those on &ho' you 'ust depend,
(oth 'aterially and psychically. *he idea that &e 'ust overco'e identity derives fro' the
16
assu'ption that identification is a defensive adaptation. *his assu'ption 'a3es
reco#nition an act that deprives rather than affir'in# the true self.
4.
*he transcendent #roup has its ulti'ate e+istence not in face to face interactions,
thou#h these are vital, (ut in the institutions created to esta(lish the per'anence of the
'eanin# for the individual that those interactions are 'eant to carry. Groups, then, e+ist
throu#h institutions or or#ani1ations, and they do so precisely in order to esta(lish their
reality, the reality of the ideals they e'(ody, and the reality of the 'e'(ers as constituted
&ithin the #roup. *he clai' associated &ith the idea of social construction is, of course,
that this reality is the only "social$ reality, that the individual is constituted as such only (y
displayin# #roup characteristics and conductin# hi' or herself in accordance &ith #roup
nor's. *he 2uestion is &hether this reality is the only reality, and further &hether it is a
reality deservin# of the na'e.
%o& 'i#ht &e understand another reality, the reality created not in the alienation of
su(,ective e+perience, (ut in its retrieval (y the su(,ect, and thus re'oval fro' the &orld
outside4 *he other reality, the reality not constituted (y and for the #roup, consists of
o(,ects e+istin# in a &orld #enuinely outside the su(,ectCs internal &orld and e+perience.
*his reality is &hat the individual finds &hen displaced feelin#s and selfe+periences are
retrieved fro' the o(,ects used to contain the'.
7
5hat the individual then finds re'ainin#
outside is real only in the sense that it is separate fro' and independent of his or her
control. *his reality 'ust (e dis'issed, even destroyed, if inner conflict is to (e dealt &ith
(y displace'ent of unaccepta(le content onto o(,ects. *he su(,ective purpose of #roups
17
and institutions (eco'es, for those &hose psychic need includes control in the sense
considered here, to dis'iss this reality of a #enuinely e+ternal &orld of o(,ects over &hich
the su(,ect does not e+ert control. *his su(,ective purpose can easily over&hel' the
ostensi(le purpose of #roups and institutions to solve pro(le's, satisfy needs, facilitate
individual creativity, and so on. *here are, then, t&o realities: the reality of control over
o(,ects, and the reality of a &orld apart.
*he distinction ,ust dra&n applies directly to our understandin# of institutions.
Institutions can e+ist to facilitate the controlDcreation of reality as a su(,ective 'atter.
0lternatively, they can facilitate the individual)s effort to live in reality. *o live as an
individual in the &orld 'eans to have a su(,ective life in t&o senses. <irst, it 'eans to
have an inner e+perience of the self= and, second, it 'eans to 'a3e a connection (et&een
that inner e+perience and the &orld outside. Put another &ay, &e can say that institutions,
rather than insistin# on the loss of individual su(,ectivity, can facilitate the individual)s
effort to (e hi' or her self in the &orld.
%o&ever i'portant the atte'pt to dis'iss reality, its attain'ent is also a profoundly
i'portant o(,ective for the individual, &ho finds hi' or herself divided (et&een the need
to have and to avoid the reality of a &orld apart. *hus far I have considered the need to
dis'iss reality as connected to the need for o'nipotent control. -ut the effort to control
reality, althou#h it tends to deny the pri'ary 2uality &e associate &ith reality, &hich is its
2uality of (ein# e+ternal to the su(,ect, also asserts the presence of an e+ternal sphere
&hich 'ust (e overco'e. In other &ords, the effort to dis'iss reality (y su(stitutin# for it
another reality (oth insists upon and see3s to overco'e reality= it e+presses a need for a
relation &ith reality and a need to escape fro' reality)s pri'ary i'plication for the su(,ect.
18
5hy, then, do &e need a relationship &ith reality, and &hy does esta(lishin# such a
relationship pose a pro(le' for us4
I a' spea3in# here of a psychic need. ?learly, the individual has a 'aterial need
for a relationship &ith reality since &ithout that relationship the individual &ill not survive.
Eonetheless, the reco#nition of reality (y the individual 'ust (e understood as a psychic
acco'plish'ent that serves a psychic need, ,ust as denial of reality is a retreat fro' that
acco'plish'ent, a retreat that also serves a psychic need. Let 'e (e#in &ith the need
served (y the denial of reality, then consider the need served (y the reco#nition of reality.
*o understand the need served (y dis'issin# reality, &hich is also the "psychic$
need served &hen &e atte'pt to su(stitute for it the #roup reality considered a(ove, &e
have to understand &hat the su(stitute reality constitutes a fli#ht fro'. @ohn Steiner
su##ests that denial of reality is denial of three funda'ental aspects of reality.
;
*he first is
the ina(ility of the infant to create the #ood o(,ect, &hich, therefore does not reside &ithin
hi' and is not under his control. *he second is the /painful e+perience of feelin# e+cluded
fro' the pri'al couple./ 0nd the third is the /fact of the reality of death/ "!4!$. 0ll of
these aspects of reality e+press the finiteness of life for the individual. *heir denial
e+presses fli#ht fro' the pain associated &ith reco#nition of the li'itations of the
individual, of his effectivity, creativity, and of his (ein# in the &orld.
*he relationship to reality involves dependence on that &hich is e+ternal to the
individual, and &hich he or she does not control. 5ithout the dependence on &hat is
outside, reality &ould have no "psychic$ 'eanin# for the individual. -ut, this dependence
is also a li'it. *o ac3no&led#e this li'it, &hich is to ac3no&led#e reality, constitutes a
loss. 0cceptin# this loss is not si'ply a 'atter of the inevita(le reco#nition of &hat is and
19
of &hat &e are= rather, it follo&s fro' a psychic need for reality, &hich also 'ust (e
considered. *his psychic need is precisely the need to (e li'ited in re#ard to the infinite
possi(ilities of life. *his li'itednes is our (ein# so'ethin# finite, and therefore real.
-ein# finite 'eans #ivin# up all possi(ilities in order to reali1e one, or only a fe&.
0cceptance of li'its is also &hat &e 'ean (y havin# an identity, &hich is the
individual)s attach'ent to particular 2ualities. *o (e a self is to (e selfidentical, that is to
have continuity of (ein# across ti'e and space, &hich is also across differin# conte+ts of
interaction &ith others. *o have an identity, then, is an i'portant part of &hat it 'eans to
(e a particular person. .nly throu#h (ein# so'ethin# finite and particular, therefore
li'ited, can personhood (e 'ade real. Individual identity is the reality of the individual in
the &orld "9ri3son Ego Identity, von -roe'(son$.
0s &e have seen, the idea that reality is socially constructed contains the notion that
identity is contin#ent on conte+t. *his is the idea that &ho &e are varies &ith the
reco#nition others (esto& "or i'pose$ upon us, so it depends on the specific others &ith
&ho' &e interact at a particular ti'e and in a particular place. 0(ove, I connect this idea
to the /chronic overdependence on o(,ects/ Aern(er# attri(utes to certain individuals. Bet,
&e can also see ho& this ,ud#'ent a(out identity, &hile placin# the individual under the
control of others, also li(erates the individual fro' any re2uire'ent that he or she (e
so'eone in particular, fro' the li'its associated &ith (eco'in# this particular person.
9ven as the idea that identity depends on conte+t su(,ects the individual to the do'ination
of others and of #roups, it also e+presses the fantasy of o'nipotence in that it denies the
si#nificance of li'its to identity, that &ho &e have (eco'e li'its &ho &e can (e. Bet, in
20
denyin# the li'its of identity, &e also lose so'ethin# i'portant, the possi(ility of 'a3in#
identity real for self and other.
5hat is si#nificant "psychically$ a(out #ainin# the reality of the finite self is that it
is the only &ay &e can (e real, and it is the only &ay &e can esta(lish for ourselves a
particular, distinct reality that is, in the end, ours and ours alone. *he ans&er to the
2uestion, then, &hat do &e need reality for, is that &e need it to (e our "separate$ individual
selves, and thus to have rather than to lose our su(,ective lives. @ust as it is the desire for
separate (ein# that fuels the develop'ent of a relation to reality, it is the dan#er of
separation and loss that #ets in the &ay of our acceptin# reality, and that fuels the
'ove'ent to dis'iss reality or su(stitute for it so'ethin# 'ore tolera(le.
*he social construction of reality, understood in li#ht of these considerations,
constitutes a 'iddle point, or co'pro'ise, (et&een acceptance and denial of reality. It
neither co'pletely denies reality nor co'pletely accepts it.
4
*hose en#a#ed in #roup
reality of the 3ind considered a(ove e+press a need for others and for a dependence on an
e+ternal sphere. 0t the sa'e ti'e, they insist on 'aintainin# o'nipotent control throu#h
the #roup, and in this sense e+perience the #roup as a &ay of dis'issin# the reality of a
finite life and of the acceptance of li'its. Social construction, then, see3s to retain the
possi(ility of an e+ternal reality, &hile denyin# that doin# so li'its the su(,ect. *his
contradiction is &ell e+pressed in the effort to see reality as 'ere appearance, as contin#ent
and indeter'inate. In this &ay, the idea that reality is socially constructed represents (oth
reco#nition of reality and an attac3 on it.
5e can thin3 a(out this co'ple+ relation to reality in the lan#ua#e of loss. *o
accept reality 'eans to lose the control over o(,ects needed to use the' as containers for
21
unaccepta(le parts of the self, &hich is also the loss of o'nipotence and of li'itless
possi(ilities. *he use of o(,ects as containers for parts of the self i'poverishes the self at
the sa'e ti'e that it secures the self a#ainst the dependence associated &ith ac3no&led#in#
e+ternal reality. Givin# up control over o(,ects secures the su(,ect as a &hole person, a
particular individual, (ut one livin# &ithin the li'its of a separate reality on &hich he
depends and &hich e+ists independently of his &antin# and &illin#. 0cceptin# reality
'eans vie&in# the o(,ect /'ore realistically, no lon#er distorted (y pro,ections of the self,/
&ith the result that /the e#o is enriched (y reac2uirin# the parts of the self &hich had
previously (een disavo&ed/. *he vital ele'ent in acco'plishin# this end is 'ournin#,
since /it is throu#h 'ournin# that the pro,ective identification is reversed and parts of the
self previously ascri(ed to the o(,ect are returned to the e#o/ "Steiner ;8$. If 'ournin#
reverses the ori#inal pro,ection, it 'a3es the e+ternality of the &orld a reality for the
individual. If &e consider that, at a pri'itive level, /all e+perience of separateness F is
felt as a loss/ "G7$, then &e can see ho& 'ournin# loss is (ound up &ith the acceptance of
reality.
*he si#nificance of loss for the construction of reality applies &ith special force to
the su(stitute reality associated &ith #roup e+perience. In this connection, &e can i'a#ine
that #roups are essentially a(out the denial of separation, and the refusal to 'ourn the loss
of o'nipotence. 0s <reud e'phasi1es, they are also a(out copin# &ith envy (y re2uirin#
that all #ive up the hope of attainin# &hat has (een lost. Groups do not allo& others to
have &hat &e do not have, or dou(t &e can attain. In this sense, #roups are a(out
controllin# self and other in &ays that cope &ith an+iety.
22
*his last o(servation leads, once a#ain, to an i'portant conclusion a(out the
individual and the #roup, &hich is the threat the latter poses to the for'er "Aern(er#
?hapter 11$. *his is the threat of loss of identity, and the attendant dan#er associated &ith
the e'er#ence of pri'itive a##ression. *he loss of identity in the #roup not only poses a
threat to the 'e'(er= it also confir's that aspect of the 'e'(er)s psychic reality that is
or#ani1ed around the loss of identity. *he #roup has the po&er not only to i'pose this loss
of identity on others as a &ay of copin# &ith envy, it has the po&er, or is hoped to have the
po&er, to 'a3e loss of identity an o(,ective rather than a psychic reality. *his is, once
a#ain, the #roup)s po&er to destroy and create reality.
*he #roup 'a3es loss of identity an o(,ective 'atter (y 'a3in# the e+perience of
loss the central ele'ent of #roup identity, so that the #roup is held to#ether (y shared loss.
*hus, the cele(ration of oppression, &hich is so co''on in #roups constituted (y the
e+perience of shared loss, see3s to turn deprivation into the positive (asis of identity. *his
'eans that &ithout the loss of identity, the individual has none. So, for e+a'ple, those
outside the #roup, &ho have not e+perienced the #roup)s constitutin# loss, are understood to
have an i'poverished self precisely (ecause they lac3 the e+perience of deprivation.
In this &ay, the #roup constituted around deprivation destroys the reality of
individual identity, and creates the reality of the loss of identity. *he cost of doin# so is not
only the loss of identity itself, (ut also the 'o(ili1ation of pri'itive a##ression and the
further dan#er this poses to the individual. *he increased dan#er and enhanced an+iety
provo3e pri'itive defenses, &hich typically play a lar#e role in #roup pheno'ena.
*he effort to control o(,ects in the &orld denies, or see3s to overco'e, their
separateness fro' us. *his separateness of o(,ects fro' us not only puts the' outside our
23
sphere of control, it also esta(lishes a line that separates us as su(,ects fro' o(,ects outside.
*his line is the (oundary (et&een self and not self. *he stru##le over reality, &hich I have
here characteri1ed as a stru##le (et&een t&o realities, i'plicates the esta(lishin# and
'aintainin# of self(oundaries. *o understand the 'eanin# of reality for the individual, &e
need to consider the (oundary (et&een &hat is internal to the individual)s 'ental life and
&hat is outside "Aern(er# 18$.
Social construction does not create reality= it creates, or atte'pts to create, a
su(stitute for reality &ithin &hich o(,ects can (e controlled to the end of dealin# &ith
psychic conflict. @ust as the social construction of reality atte'pts to put a #roup reality
into place, it see3s to dis'iss, even destroy, the reality that e+ists for the individual &ho
ac3no&led#es rather than disavo&in# his or her feelin#s and selfe+perience, and &ho
ac3no&led#es rather then denyin# the loss of o'nipotence. *his loss can alone ena(le the
individual to reco#ni1e a #enuinely separate sphere of reality.
7.
If the reality that e'er#es &hen the illusions associated &ith the #roup are #iven up
is not /socially constructed,/ does this 'a3e it an e+pression of, or response to, natural
i'peratives4 5hat is the 2uality of the reality that &e find &hen &e cease usin# o(,ects as
containers for su(,ective e+perience, and relate to the' as e+istin# outside our sphere of
control4
5e 'i#ht ans&er the 2uestions ,ust posed (y considerin# the distinction (et&een
social reality and #roup reality, (et&een the construction of the social and the life of the
#roup. *his distinction can (e e+pressed in the lan#ua#e of culture understood as the
24
concrete e+pression and 'anifestation of social (ein#. ?ulture can (e considered a #roup
reality, or it can (e considered a conte+t of 'eanin# in &hich the individual finds and
develops a uni2ue "individual$ identity. *o (orro& a phrase *svetan *odorov uses to
distin#uish types of nationalis', culture can (e a 'anifestation of #roup reality, or a
vernacular for an individual life "167, ;8G6$. *his is the difference (et&een a culture that
defines identity for the individual, includin# appropriate conduct and &ays of life, and a
culture that provides a conte+t for individual selfdeter'ination. In the for'er
interpretation, culture is irreduci(ly particular in that it li'its and ulti'ately deter'ines the
'eanin# of interaction for the 'e'(er. In the latter, culture is a &ay of e+pressin# ideas
and shapin# a life that includes possi(ilities as yet un3no&n: ideas yet unthou#ht, and &ays
of life yet to (e e+perienced. In this sense, treatin# culture as a vernacular 'eans treatin#
it as a 'ediu' for creativity and the e+pression of individual selfdeter'ination.
Institutions can instantiate interaction, and thus create an endurin# social reality (y
su(ordinatin# the individual to predeter'ined 'odes of conduct. *his is the social reality
of the "transcendent$ #roup, and of its do'ination over the individual)s identity.
0lternatively, institutions, rather than instantiatin# conduct and &ays of life in an effort to
'a3e real the 'e'(er)s fantasies and illusions, can afford the individual &hat 9ri3 9ri3son
refers to as the /freedo' of opportunities yet undeter'ined/ "Insight 1G17$. *his includes
the freedo' to pursue a course of life e+pressive of a personal 'eanin#.
<acilitatin# selfdeter'ination and instantiatin# interaction e+press t&o different
'eanin#s for the develop'ent of or#ani1ations and of the institutions that lend per'anence
to the 'eanin# those or#ani1ations e+press. *he dan#er to the individual afforded (y the
#oal of instantiatin# interaction is the loss of su(,ectivity into the #roup or institution,
25
particularly the disappearance of individual identity into #roup identity. *his dan#er is
overco'e either (y su('er#in# the institution into an endless cycle of or#ani1ational
chan#e, or (y transfor'in# it fro' an institution or#ani1ed to instantiate interaction to one
or#ani1ed to facilitate selfdeter'ination.
Institutions either create reality for the individual, or facilitate individual creativity.
*he social construction of reality is an e+pression of the for'er idea, one that ta3es it to (e
inevita(le. In this sense, for all its tal3 a(out overco'in# do'ination, the discourse of
social construction insists on, rather than 'appin# a path of escape fro', do'ination.
Endnotes
26
1
<or a discussion, see Hen1iesLyeth. I discuss an i'portant e+a'ple of this in Hatred.
2
<or a discussion of this retrieval as a #oal of psychoanalysis, see Sandler and Dreher "1:46$
3
Steiner)s discussion of the denial of reality is (ased on HoneyAyrle.
4
Steiner discusses this 'i+in# of denial and acceptance of reality in relation to perversion "ch. !$.