99.

PP VS MALIMIT
Facts:
The accused killed the owner of a store. He took the wallet of the victim, which contained his
residence certificate, identification card, and a bunch of keys. Such items were later on
recovered from the accused. He was charged with robbery with homicide. He argued that the
wallet, together its contents, were inadmissible in evidence because of his right against self-
incrimination.
Issue:
WON the contention of the accused is correct
Held:
No. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the use of legal process to extract from
the lips of the accused admission of his guilt against his will. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination statement but an object evidence.

100. PP VS RONDERO
Facts:

The accused was seen by the victims father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at
the well. The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her
vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several
circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison
with the strands of hair found in the victims right hand at the scene of the crime as well as
blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers
the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence
of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-
incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Issue:
WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellants hair strands can be admitted as
evidence against him?
Held:

Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what are actually proscribed is the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion
of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the
body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and
morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him.
Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from
him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in
evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are
inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police
officers. Accused-appellants wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband
in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never
rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the fruit of the
poisonous tree, evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other
evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
Simply put, accused-appellants garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional
right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.




101. MARCELO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
A letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office disclosed to his chief the existence of a group
responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. For this reason, the latter sought
the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in apprehending said group.
The NBI agents arrested and brought Pasicolan, Romero and herein petitioner Marcelo to their
headquarters, plus the bag of unsorted mail found in their possession.
The three were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. According to
Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very
same letters confiscated from them.
The Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the
crime of qualified theft.
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in admitting in evidence the letters signed by
him because he was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel. The following provisions of the Constitution are invoked by petitioner:
Article III, 12(1). - Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
. . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Issues:
1. Whether the letters affixed with petitioners signature are admissible in evidence
2. Whether the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence


Held:
1. NO. They are inadmissible in evidence.
The purpose for securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to
authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. However, this
purpose and petitioners signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the testimony of
prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from petitioner were those given to him and
Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of petitioner. Since these signatures are actually
evidence of admission obtained from petitioner and his co-accused under circumstances
contemplated in Art. III, 12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For
indeed, petitioner and his co-accused signed following their arrest. Hence, they were at the
time under custodial investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a
significant way. Under the Constitution, among the rights of a person under custodial
investigation is the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice and if the person cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be provided with
one.

2. YES. The letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence.
The letters were validly seized from petitioner and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A
ruling that petitioners admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and
his companion on February 17, 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the
exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the
fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in
the possession of petitioner and his companion and seized from them was shown by the
testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted
solely on the basis of the signatures found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the
testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution witnesses.

102. BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
Facts:

By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the
transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners
and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what
they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez." At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may
"unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed for a
TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate.
He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas,
filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.

Issue:
Whether or not the inquiry violates rights against self Incrimination.
Held:
A congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action including the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One
of these rights is the right of an individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain
silent is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the
nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the petitioners
may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence
before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of
the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government as ordained by the Constitution.

103. PP VS GALLARDE
Facts:
Accused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. The trial court convicted him of
murder only. The trial court rejected the photographs taken of the accused immediately after
the incident on the ground that the same were taken when the accused was already under the
mercy of the police.
Issue:
WON the trial court was correct in rejecting the photograph as evidence


Held:
The taking of pictures of an accused, even without the assistance of counsel, being purely a
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his
body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the
prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is
testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to
physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit
to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination
as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel
morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with
bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

104. COMELEC VS TAGLE

Facts:
In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, candidate for Mayor Florentino A. Bautista filed
a complaint against Mayor Federico Poblete et al. for vote buying in violation of Sec 261 (a)
and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No.
7034-99 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Subsequently, a complaint for vote-selling in violation of Sec
261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code was filed with the Prosecutors Office as witnesses in
Criminal Case No. 7034-99 and the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite filed separate
Informations for vote-selling against said witnesses. On appeal, the COMELEC en banc declared
that the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 were exempt from criminal prosecution
pursuant to 4th paragraph of Sec 28, RA No. 6646, otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987 which grants immunity from criminal prosecution to persons who voluntarily give
information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling. The Law
Department of the COMELEC moved to dismiss the Informations against the said witnesses but
the RTC in Imus, Cavite denied the motion to dismiss.

Issue:
WON the immunity shall be granted?

Held:
Yes.
1. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting
those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose
vote was bought. Sec 28 of RA No. 6646 concludes with the following paragraph:
The giver, offeror, the promissory as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator
referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as
principals: Provided, that any person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily
gives information and willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or
proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference
to which his information and testimony were given: Provided, further, that nothing herein shall
exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony.

2. To avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers, especially by the latters
opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn vote-sellers who denounce the vote-buying that they
could be liable for perjury or false testimony should they not tell the truth.
3. The prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 are exempt from criminal
prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28, RA
6646. At the time when the complaint for vote-selling was filed with the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, the respondents had already executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt
practice of vote-buying. It cannot then be denied that they had already voluntarily given
information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in Crim. Case No. 7034-99.

4. The COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same. The Chief State
Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their respective assistants are, however, given
continuing authority, as deputies of the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute the same. This authority may be
revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, in its judgment, such revocation or
withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the common
good, or when it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the
COMELEC. When the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, it in effect
withdrew the deputation granted by the COMELEC.

105. RA 9745, ANTI-TORTURE ACT OF 2009
AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR
Section 1. Short Title. - This Ad shall be known as the "Anti-Torture Act of 2009".
Section 2. Statement of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State:
(a) To value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human rights;
(b) To ensure that the human rights of all persons, including suspects, detainees and prisoners
are respected at all times; and that no person placed under investigation or held in custody of
any person in authority or, agent of a person authority shall be subjected to physical,
psychological or mental harm, force, violence, threat or intimidation or any act that impairs
his/her free wi11 or in any manner demeans or degrades human dignity;
(c) To ensure that secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of
detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity, are prohibited; and
(d) To fully adhere to the principles and standards on the absolute condemnation and
prohibition of torture as provided for in the 1987 Philippine Constitution; various international
instruments to which the Philippines is a State party such as, but not limited to, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDA W) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all other relevant international human rights instruments
to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Section 3. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Torture" refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third
person information or a confession; punishing him/her for an act he/she or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed; or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third
person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a person in authority
or agent of a person in authority. It does not include pain or Buffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
(b) "Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment" refers to a deliberate and
aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a
person in authority or agent of a person in authority against a person under his/her custody,
which attains a level of severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the
latter.
(c) "Victim" refers to the person subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment as defined above and any individual who has suffered harm as a
result of any act(s) of torture, or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.
(d) "Order of Battle" refers to any document or determination made by the military, police or
any law enforcement agency of the government, listing the names of persons and organizations
that it perceives to be enemies of the State and that it considers as legitimate targets as
combatants that it could deal with, through the use of means allowed by domestic and
international law.
Section 4. Acts of Torture. - For purposes of this Act, torture shall include, but not be limited to,
the following:
(a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment inflicted by a person in authority or
agent of a person in authority upon another in his/her custody that causes severe pain,
exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts of the body, such as:
(1) Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking, striking with truncheon or rifle butt or
other similar objects, and jumping on the stomach;
(2) Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food, animal or human excreta and other
stuff or substances not normally eaten;
(3) Electric shock;
(4) Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot oil, acid; by the rubbing of pepper
or other chemical substances on mucous membranes, or acids or spices directly on the
wound(s);
(5) The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with excrement, urine, vomit and/or
blood until the brink of suffocation;
(6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position;
(7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign objects into the sex organ or
rectum, or electrical torture of the genitals;
(8) Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body such as the genitalia, ear,
tongue, etc.;
(9) Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth;
(10) Pulling out of fingernails;
(11) Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and extreme cold;
(12) The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the head to the point of
asphyxiation;
(13) The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception, memory. alertness or will of a
person, such as:
(i) The administration or drugs to induce confession and/or reduce mental competency; or
(ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain symptoms of a disease; and
(14) Other analogous acts of physical torture; and
(b) "Mental/Psychological Torture" refers to acts committed by a person in authority or agent
of a person in authority which are calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or undermine a
person's dignity and morale, such as:
(1) Blindfolding;
(2) Threatening a person(s) or his/fher relative(s) with bodily harm, execution or other wrongful
acts;
(3) Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places;
(4) Prolonged interrogation;
(5) Preparing a prisoner for a "show trial", public display or public humiliation of a detainee or
prisoner;
(6) Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of liberty from one place to another,
creating the belief that he/she shall be summarily executed;
(7) Maltreating a member/s of a person's family;
(8) Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the person's family, relatives or any third
party;
(9) Denial of sleep/rest;
(10) Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked, parading him/her in public places,
shaving the victim's head or putting marks on his/her body against his/her will;
(11) Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any member of his/her family; and
(12) Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.
Section 5. Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. - Other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated
treatment or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in
authority or agent of a person in authority against another person in custody, which attains a
level of severity sufficient to cause suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. The
assessment of the level of severity shall depend on all the circumstances of the case, including
the duration of the treatment or punishment, its physical and mental effects and, in some
cases, the sex, religion, age and state of health of the victim.
Section 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, An Absolute Bight. - Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all circumstances. A state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability, or any other public emergency, or a document or any
determination comprising an "order of battle" shall not and can never be invoked as a
justification for torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.
Section 7. Prohibited Detention. - Secret detention places, solitary confinement,
incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried out with
impunity. Are hereby prohibited.
In which case, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and other law enforcement. agencies concerned shall make an updated list of all detention
centers and facilities under their respective jurisdictions with the corresponding data on the
prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein such as, among others, names, date of
arrest and incarceration, and the crime or offense committed. This list shall be made available
to the public at all times, with a copy of the complete list available at the respective national
headquarters of the PNP and AFP. A copy of the complete list shall likewise be submitted by the
PNP, AFP and all other law enforcement agencies to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
such list to be periodically updated, by the same agencies, within the first five (5) days of every
month at the minimum. Every regional office of the PNP, AFP and other law enforcement
agencies shall also maintain a similar list far all detainees and detention facilities within their
respective areas, and shall make the same available to the public at all times at their respective
regional headquarters, and submit a copy. updated in the same manner provided above, to the
respective regional offices of the CHR.
Section 8. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule; Exception. - Any confession, admission or
statement obtained as a result of torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings,
except if the same is used as evidence against a person or persons accused of committing
torture.
Section 9. Institutional Protection of Torture Victims and Other Persons Involved. - A victim of
torture shall have the following rights in the institution of a criminal complaint for torture:
(a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR and by agencies of government
concerned such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the PNP,
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the AFP. A prompt investigation shall mean a
maximum period of sixty (60) working days from the time a complaint for torture is filed within
which an investigation report and/or resolution shall be completed and made available. An
appeal whenever available shall be resolved within the same period prescribed herein,
(b) To have sufficient government protection against all forms of harassment; threat and/or
intimidation as a consequence of the filing of said complaint or the presentation of evidence
therefor. In which case, the State through its appropriate agencies shall afford security in order
to ensure his/her safety and all other persons involved in the investigation and prosecution
such as, but not limited to, his/her lawyer, witnesses and relatives; and
(c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner by which he/she testifies and presents
evidence in any fora in order to avoid further trauma.
Section 10. Disposition of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo and Habeas Data Proceedings and
Compliance with a Judicial 07'der. - A writ of habeas corpus or writ of amparo or writ of habeas
data proceeding, if any, filed on behalf of the victim of torture or other cruel, degrading and
inhuman treatment or punishment shall be disposed of expeditiously and any order of release
by virtue thereof, or other appropriate order of a court relative thereto, shall be executed or
complied with immediately.
Section 11. Assistance in Filing a Complaint. - The CHR and the PAO shall render legal assistance
in the investigation and monitoring and/or filing of the complaint for a person who suffers
torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or for any interested
party thereto.
The victim or interested party may also seek legal assistance from the Barangay Human Rights
Action Center (BRRAC) nearest him/her as well as from human rights nongovernment
organizations (NGOs).
Section 12. Right to' Physical, Medical and Psychological Examination. - Before and after
interrogation, every person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall have the
right to he informed of his/her right to demand physical examination by an independent and
competent doctor of his/her own choice. If such person cannot afford the services of his/her
own doctor, he/she shall he provided by the State with a competent and independent doctor to
conduct physical examination. The State shall endeavor to provide the victim with psychological
evaluation if available under the circumstances. If the person arrested is a female, she shall be
attended to preferably by a female doctor. Furthermore, any person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation, including his/her immediate family, shall have the right to
immediate access to proper and adequate medical treatment. The physical examination and/or
psychological evaluation of the victim shall be contained in a medical report, duly signed by the
attending physician, which shall include in detail his/her medical history and findings, and which
shall he attached to the custodial investigation report. Such report shall be considered a public
document.
Following applicable protocol agreed upon by agencies tasked to conduct physical,
psychological and mental examinations, the medical reports shall, among others, include:
(a) The name, age and address of the patient or victim;
(b) The name and address of the nearest kin of the patient or victim;
(c) The name and address of the person who brought the patient or victim for physical,
psychological and mental examination, and/or medical treatment;
(d) The nature and probable cause of the patient or victim's injury, pain and disease and/or
trauma;
(e) The approximate time and date when the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were
sustained;
(f) The place where the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained;
(g) The time, date and nature of treatment necessary; and
(h) The diagnosis, the prognosis and/or disposition of the patient.
Any person who does not wish to avail of the rights under this pr<;lvision may knowingly and
voluntarily waive such rights in writing, executed in the presence and assistance of his/her
counsel.
Section 13. Who are Criminally Liable. - Any person who actually participated Or induced
another in the commission of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment or who cooperated in the execution of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as
principal
Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or senior government official who
issued an order to any lower ranking personnel to commit torture for whatever purpose shall
be held equally liable as principals.
The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP or the immediate senior
public official of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies shall be held liable as a principal
to the crime of torture or other cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment for
any act or omission, or negligence committed by him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted
or allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the commission thereof by his/her subordinates. If
he/she has knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that
acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall be
committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his/her subordinates or by others
within his/her area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during or immediately after its commission, when he/she has
the authority to prevent or investigate allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment but failed to prevent or investigate allegations of such act,
whether deliberately or due to negligence shall also be liable as principals.
Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an accessory if he/she has knowledge that
torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is being committed
and without having participated therein, either as principal or accomplice, takes part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:
(a) By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the act of
torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) By concealing the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment and/or destroying the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its
discovery; or(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting m the escape of the principal/s in the act
of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment: Provided, That the
accessory acts are done with the abuse of the official's public functions.
Section 14. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
perpetrators of the following acts:
(1) Torture resulting in the death of any person;
(2) Torture resulting in mutilation;
(3) Torture with rape;
(4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in consequence of torture, the victim shall
have become insane, imbecile, impotent, blind or maimed for life; and
(5) Torture committed against children.
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on those who commit any act of
mental/psychological torture resulting in insanity, complete or partial amnesia, fear of
becoming insane or suicidal tendencies of the victim due to guilt, worthlessness or shame.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on those who commit any act of torture
resulting in psychological, mental and emotional harm other than those described 1n paragraph
(b) of this section. '
(d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed if, in
consequence of torture, the victim shall have lost the power of speech or the power to hear or
to smell; or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg; or shall have lost the use of
any such member; Or shall have become permanently incapacitated for labor.
(e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed if, in
consequence of torture, the victim shall have become deformed or shall have lost any part of
his/her body other than those aforecited, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been
ill or incapacitated for labor for a period of more than ninety (90) days.
(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or
incapacitated for labor for mare than thirty (30) days but not more than ninety (90) days.
(g) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be imposed if, in
consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for thirty (30)
days or less.
(h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts constituting cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment as defined in Section 5 of this Act.
(i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon those who establish, operate and
maintain secret detention places and/or effect or cause to effect solitary confinement,
incommunicado or other similar forms of prohibited detention as provided in Section 7 of this
Act where torture may be carried out with impunity.
(j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the responsible officers or personnel of
the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement agencies for failure to perform his/her duty to
maintain, submit or make available to the public an updated list of detention centers and
facilities with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained
therein, pursuant to Section 7 of this Act.
Section 15. Torture as a Separate and Independent Crime. - Torture as a crime shall not absorb
or shall not be absorbed by any other crime or felony committed as a consequence, or as a
means in the conduct or commission thereof. In which case, torture shall be treated as a
separate and independent criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable without prejudice to
any other criminal liability provided for by domestic and international laws.
Section 16. Exclusion from the Coverage of Special Amnesty Law. - In order not to depreciate
the crime of torture, persons who have committed any act of torture shall not benefit from any
special amnesty law or similar measures that will have the effect of exempting them from any
criminal proceedings and sanctions.
Section 17. Applicability of Refouler. - No person shall be expelled, returned or extradited to
another State where there are substantial grounds to believe that such person shall be in
danger of being subjected to torture. For the purposes of determining whether such grounds
exist, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Secretary of the DOJ, in
coordination with the Chairperson of the CHR, shall take into account all relevant
considerations including, where applicable and not limited to, the existence in the requesting
State of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.
Section 18. Compensation to Victims of Torture. - Any person who has suffered torture shall
have the right to claim for compensation as provided for under Republic Act No. 7309:
Provided, That in no case shall compensation be any lower than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00). Victims of torture shall also have the right to claim for compensation from such
other financial relief programs that may be made available to him/her under existing law and
rules and regulations.
Section 19. Formulation of a Rehabilitation Program. - Within one (1) year from the effectivity
of this Act, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the DOJ and the
Department of Health (DOH) and such other concerned government agencies, and human
rights organizations shall formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation program for victims of
torture and their families. The DSWD, the DOJ and thc DOH shall also call on human rights
nongovernment organizations duly recognized by the government to actively participate in the
formulation of such program that shall provide for the physical, mental, social, psychological
healing and development of victims of torture and their families. Toward the attainment of
restorative justice, a parallel rehabilitation program for persons who have committed torture
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment shall likewise be formulated by the same
agencies.
Section 20. Monitoring of Compliance with this Act. - An Oversight Committee is hereby created
to periodically oversee the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall be headed by a
Commissioner of the CRR, with the following as members: the Chairperson of the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the respective Chairpersons of the House of
Representatives' Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and the Minority Leaders of both
houses or their respective representatives in the minority.
Section 21. Education and Information Campaign. - The CHR, the DOJ, the Department of
National Defense (DND), the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and such
other concerned parties in both the public and private sectors shall ensure that education and
information regarding prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment shall be fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel,
civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in
the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest,
detention or imprisonment. The Department of Education (DepED) and the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) shall also ensure the integration of human rights education courses in
all primary, secondary and tertiary level academic institutions nationwide.
Section 22. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code
insofar as they are applicable shall be suppletory to this Act. Moreover, if the commission of
any crime punishable under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) and Title Nine (Crimes Against
Personal Liberty and Security) of the Revised Penal Code is attended by any of the acts
constituting torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as
defined herein, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period.
Section 23. Appropriations. - The amount of Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00) is hereby
appropriated to the CHR for the initial implementation of tills Act. Thereafter, such sums as may
be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.
Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOJ and the CHR, with the active
participation of human rights nongovernmental organizations, shall promulgate the rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of tills Act. They shall also ensure the full
dissemination of such rules and regulations to all officers and members of various law
enforcement agencies.
Section 25. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and
effect.
Section 26. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations
contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 27. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

106. PP VS ECHEGARAY
Facts:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant
for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime
in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death
Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme
penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister
motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of
rape against the accused. This was dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and
retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of
the Philippines.
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-
appellant.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed
factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue:
Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.
Held:
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened
and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws
thatdefine and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive
agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordance
with these laws.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of
whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte
Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty
remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their
private opinions,"
Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing
therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says
that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death
penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-
imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to
thisconstitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the
decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to
pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes.
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the
Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not
completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death
penaltyand gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No.
7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the
other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no
less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine
their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass
on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No.
7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This
is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need
be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly
impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the
flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of
Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death
penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as
a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of
their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not
completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of
Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes
enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there
was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their
cause.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-
imposethe death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not
subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1)
that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify
and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition
or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of
circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance
with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in
enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes."
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be
squarely applied.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and
are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting
and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects,
repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or
aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation,
these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said
provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said
provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge
of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine
the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No.
7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the
need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling
reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."



107. People vs Mercado
Facts:
The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder and
sentencing them the punishment of death. The defendants raised the constitutionality of death
penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment."
Held:
No the death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled in People vs. Echagaray, death penalty
is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power
to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil". Procedural and substantial
safeguards to insure its correct application are established.

107. PP VS MERCADO
Facts:
The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder and
sentencing them the punishment of death. The defendants raised the constitutionality of death
penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment."
Held:
No the death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled in People vs. Echagaray, death penalty
is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power
to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil". Procedural and substantial
safeguards to insure its correct application are established.


108. CUISON VS CA
Facts:
In a case of double homicide, the lower court convicted the accused for a criminal penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximium for each offense and a civil indemnity of P30,000.00. When
the case was appealed the appellate court rendered a decision which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the joint decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by ordering
accused Eduardo Cuison to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P50,000.00 and
the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency
The case then was remanded to the lower courts for the promulgation of decision, however,
the respondent judge only promulgated CAs decision only with respect to the modified civil
liability of the accused and did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his
sentence.
Upon motion for clarification of the prosecution the CA rendered a resolution which states: In
the dispositive portion of this Courts decision, We simply modified the appealed decision of
the court a quo in one respect only - the increase of the indemnity to be paid by the appellant
to the heirs of the victims from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 as ruled in various cases including
that cited in Our decision, People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646.
However, the accused filed a motion to set aside promulgation on the grounds that since the
said case was already promulgated, there is nothing to promulgate anymore, and to further
held the said promulgation will violate the accused constitutional right to jeopardy.
Issue:
WON the promulgation of the criminal liability of the accused a violation of his right against
double jeopardy.
Held:
NO. To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit
the same or is a frustration thereof.
And legal jeopardy attaches only:
(a) upon a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment;
(d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a
decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an
accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in
truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its
jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995,
and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of
discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since the criminal cases
have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy
cannot prosper as a defense.

109. ALMARIO VS CA

110. MANANTAN VS CA
Facts:
In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National Highway of Malvar, Santiago, Isabela,
George Manantan was driving a Toyota car going home. At that time, he was with Fiscal
Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas. Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from the opposite
direction hit the driver side of the car, driven by Manantan. Consequently, Manantan,
Ambrocio and Tabangin were injured while Nicolas died. Trial followed.
The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide. The respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the lower courts
judgment. Even if the accused was acquitted from his criminal liability, the Appellate Court held
him civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas.

Issue:
Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his civil liability?
Held:
The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Article 29 of the Civil
Code provides that a civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases. Therefore, the accused
cannot be exempted from paying civil damages which may only be proven by preponderance of
evidence.
Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the courts did not give merit to
this contention. The following elements must be present for double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) The first jeopardy must have terminated;
and (3) the third jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.
In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his discharge.
When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of
the criminal case. Thus, there could be no double jeopardy.

111. PP VS FELICIANO
Facts:
The prosecution sought the discharge of accused Rodel de la Cruz so that the latter could testify
against his co-accused Carlos Feliciano. Pending resolution by the trial court on the motion,
Carlos Feliciano and Rodel de la Cruz were arraigned. The two accused entered a plea of not
guilty. Later, the court a quo granted the motion of the prosecution and the name of Rodel de
la Cruz, an accused turned state witness, was forthwith stricken off from the Information.
When the trial concluded, the RTC found for the prosecution and pronounced accused Carlos
Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced
him to suffer the extreme penalty of death . In an automatic review before the SC, appellant
Carlos Feliciano raised the propriety of discharging de la Cruz to be a state witness.
Issue:
WON the trial court erred in discharging accused Rodel de la Cruz to be the state witness
against co-accused Carlos Feliciano despite strong objections from the defense

Held:
Yes. The Court is inclined to agree with appellant that state witness Rodel de la Cruz appears to
be far from being the inculpable young man who has simply been an unwitting and reluctant
accomplice to a gruesome crime. Several incidents militate against his innocence. The events,
related by him, make tenuous the purported threat and intimidation exerted by appellant over
him.
The evident attempt, nevertheless, of the accused turned state witness to mitigate his own
culpability did not adversely affect his discharge nor did it render completely weightless the
evidentiary value of his testimony.
In this jurisdiction, it is the trial court judge who has the exclusive responsibility of ensuring that
the conditions prescribed by the rules exist. This grant is not one of arbitrary discretion but
rather a sound judicial prerogative to be exercised with due regard to the proper and correct
dispensation of criminal justice. But that there would be the possibility of error on the part of
the judge is understandable. A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself
with absolute certainty at the outset of the trial as to everything which may develop in the
course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the
crime charged in the complaint. If that were possible, the judge would conveniently rely on
large part upon the suggestion and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer in
coming to the conclusion as to the "necessity for the testimony" of the accused whose
discharge is requested, as to the "availability of other direct or corroborative evidence," and as
to who among the accused is the "most guilty," and so the like. Then, there would be little need
for the formality of a trial. Thus, here, even while one might be convinced that state witness
Rodel de la Cruz would, on the basis of evidence ultimately submitted, appear to be equally as,
and not less than, guilty in conspiracy with appellant Carlos Feliciano, the hands of the State are
now stayed and the Court must assure the exemption of the witness from punishment.
It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness has the same
effect as an acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the
competency and quality of the testimony, nor would it have the consequence of withdrawing
his immunity from prosecution. A discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already
attached, is equivalent to an acquittal, such that further prosecution would be tantamount to
the state reneging on its part of the agreement and unconstitutionally placing the state witness
in double jeopardy. The rule, of course, is not always irreversible. In an instance where the
discharged accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and refuses to testify against his co-
accused, the benefit of his discharge can be withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the
same offense.
Despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his own participation in the crime, state witness de
la Cruz, nevertheless, did not renege from his agreement to give a good account of the crime,
enough to indeed substantiate the conviction of his co-accused, now appellant Carlos Feliciano,
by the trial court.

112. MERCIALES VS CA
Facts:
In a crime for rape with homicide against 6 accused, the prosecutor after presenting 8
witnesses (of which cannot establish the guilt of the accused), failed and refuses to present
evidence for the prosecution due to the fact that the court will not allow to discharge one of
the accused so that he may be a state witness in the case, however, the prosecutor continues
to ask for extension for the presentation of evidence.
Due to this, invoking his right for speedy trial, the accused motion demurrer to evidence and
was later on acquitted.
The mother of the victim then appeal the case to the CA stating that there was lack of due
process due to the fact that the judge has committed injustice by not requiring the prosecutor
to present all their evidence which eventually led to their suppression.
During the oral argument, the Solicitor General manifested that he is joining the cause of the
petitioner to prevent the miscarriage of justice. Petitioner, further maintains that reopening of
the case will not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy since the court
rendered its decision prematurely.
Issue:
WON the case may be reopened and will not constitute violation against double jeopardy.
Held:
Yes. Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in
court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due
process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done
without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal
at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy.
By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right of
the accused against double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when
the following elements concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the
accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the
case is dismissed without their consent.
Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be placed in
double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without
jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation,
necessarily null and void and does not exist.
Otherwise put, the dismissal of the case below was invalid for lack of a fundamental
prerequisite, that is, due process. In rendering the judgment of dismissal, the trial judge in this
case acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for a judgment which is void for lack of due
process is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Indeed, jurisdiction is the right to hear
and determine, not to determine without hearing.

113. POTOT VS PP
Facts:
Petitioner Potot was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the
charge. Thereupon, the trial court convicted Potot of homicide. The petitioner filed a
manifestation with motion that he is not appealing from the Decision. However, the wife of the
victim filed a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside and that
the case be heard again because there were irregularities committed before and during the
trial which caused miscarriage of justice. The trial court granted private complainant's
motion and set aside its Decision and ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the
corresponding charge. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the trial
court has no jurisdiction tissue the order as the Decision had become final, and that the said
order would place the accused in double jeopardy. This was denied for the reason that the
State is not bound by the error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does
not attach.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accused right against double jeopardy
will be violated upon re-trial of the same case.
Held:
Affirmative. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. Only the accused may ask
for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. And this he must do before the
said judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in
any of the following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the accused, except in case
of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; (b)when he has partially or
totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to appeal the judgment,
except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies
for probation. When one of these circumstances is present, the trial court which rendered the j
udgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke it. In this case, petitioner
filed a manifestation expressly waiving his right to appeal there from. Such waiver has the
effect of causing the judgment to become final and unalterable.
Thus, it
was beyond the authority of the trial court to issue the order setting aside its Decision which ha
dattained finality. A judgment which has acquired the status of finality becomes
immutable. Any error, assuming one was committed in the judgment, will not justify its
amendment except only to correct clerical errors or
mistakes.The assailed orders would violate the constitutional right of the petitioner against dou
ble jeopardy.
Such right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has
previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the
first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected t
o the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. To invoke the
defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused
has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against himd
ismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.



114. PP VS ASTUDILLO
Facts:
Astudillo brothers were convicted by the trial court for murder qualified by superior strenth. So
they filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the prosecution failed to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and, assuming that it did, the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superior strength, not having been alleged in the information, cannot be appreciated against
them. The motion was denied however, an Amended Decision was rendered where the phrase
abuse of superior strength was replaced with TREACHERY.
Issue:
WON there is double jeopardy when the court amended its decision?
Held:
It must be stressed, however, that the protection against double jeopardy in the foregoing rules
may be waived by the accused. Thus, when the accused himself files or consents to the filing of
a motion for reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the
accused waived his right not to be placed therein by filing such motion. His motion gives the
court an opportunity to rectify its errors or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and
conclusions of law and make them conformable with the statute applicable to the case in the
new judgment it has to render. The raison detre is to afford the court a chance to correct its
own mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals from being taken. In effect, a motion for
reconsideration or modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire
evidence open for the review of the trial court without, however, conducting further
proceedings, such as the taking of additional proof.
Clearly, therefore, appellants cannot dictate upon the trial court which aspects of the judgment
of conviction should be reviewed. Having filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the
court to acquit, or in the alternative, convict them of the lesser offense of homicide, appellants
waived the defense of double jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken at the trial
open for the review of the trial court. At any rate, the issue of the attendant qualifying
circumstance in the case at bar was squarely raised by the appellants in their alternative prayer
for conviction for the lesser offense of homicide in view of the erroneous appreciation of the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was not alleged in the
information. Hence, the court a quo is not only empowered but also under obligation to rectify
its mistake in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength instead of
treachery. Verily, it is precluded from considering the attendance of a qualifying circumstance
if the complaint or information did not allege such facts. Even before the Revised Rules on
Criminal Proceduretook effect on December 1, 2000, qualifying circumstances were required to
be so specified in the complaint or information, otherwise they cannot be appreciated against
the accused.

115. BAYOT VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Petitioner, an auditor, was charged with estafa through falsification of a public document
before the Sandiganbayan. Later on, he was elected mayor. B.P. Blg. 195 amended the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by providing for the suspension of any public officer charged
with any offense involving fraud upon public funds. The Sandiganbayan suspended petitioner
from office as mayor. Petitioner argued that to apply the law to him would make it ex post
facto.
Issue:
WON petitioner`s contention has merit
Held:
No. The suspension is not a penalty but is merely a preventive measure. Hence, his suspension
does not violate the prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws.

116. PP VS FERRER

Facts:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for
being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft,
and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge
2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of
safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being
members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and
similar associations penalizing membershiptherein, and for other purposes. It defined
the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the
Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP
is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the
Secretary of Justice be made prior tofiling of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty
forfurnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized
by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through
writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise
under freedom if thought, assembly and association.


Issues:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.


Held:
The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a
statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The
statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct.
(A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies
not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was
acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the
element of MEMBERSHIPwith KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a
members direct participation. Why is membership punished.Membership renders aid and
encouragement to the organization.Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after
approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act
is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance
with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary
changes having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the
Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of
Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements
in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses
that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition
of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of
DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to
proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be
established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is
to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a
FOREIGN POWER.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose.Membership is willfully
and knowingly done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme
Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.




117. RP VS KATIGBAK
Facts:
The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
The first was Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes
Katigbak. In their complaint they prayed that: (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined from filing a
complaint against them for forfeiture of property under the above mentioned R.A. No. 1379; (2)
said statute be declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture of properties
acquired before its approval, or, alternatively, a new preliminary investigation of the complaint
filed against Alejandro Katigbak by NBI officers be ordered; (3) properties acquired by Alejandro
Katigbak when he was out of the government service be excluded from forfeiture proceedings;
and (4) the NBI officers and the Investigating Prosecutor (Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to
pay damages.
The second action was Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition 4 filed by the Republic of
the Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking
the forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by
him illegally, in accordance with R.A. No. 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired while
Katigbak was holding various positions in the government, the last being that of an examiner of
the Bureau of Customs; and title to some of the properties were supposedly recorded in the
names of his wife and/or son.
The cases were jointly tried. The Trial court finds the contention of the Katigbaks not tenable.
Thus they move for a new trial but it was not granted.
The Katigbaks appealed.
Issue:
Whether RA 1379 is constitutional or not?
Held:
The Constitution is very clear in stating that no expost facto law shall be passed.
In the present case, the forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in
the nature of a penalty; and it being axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter
alia "makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful,"
it follows that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to
acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul of the Constitutional provision
condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder.
Thus it is inviolative of the provisions of the Constitution severing the constitutional rights of
the plaintiff.
118. WRIGHT vs. CA

Facts:
Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a
Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with
the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the
Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each
other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have
been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive
effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution.
Issue:
Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?

Held:
Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to
criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no
absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the
Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming
into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the
Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a
criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for
prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or
consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.



119. Lacson vs Executive Secretary
Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized
crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners
and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as
a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including
herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as
accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government
officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their
motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting
the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof.
Issue: Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
Held: No. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides
retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and
provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode
of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but
clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying
laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.