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Typeset in 11 on 13 pt Sabon
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C opyright Michael Mann and J ohn A. Hall 2011
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First published in 2011 by Poliry Press
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I SBN-13: 978-0-7456-5322-8
I SBN-13: 978-0-7456-5323-5(pb)
uction (J ohn A. Hall)
1
One: Powers in Motion
pter One: C apitalism
C bapt:er Two: Militarism
pter Three: Political Power
pter Four: An End toI deology?
pter Five: Patterns, C ages, I nterstices,
and a Dialectic
9
11
27
41
64
70
79
81
107
119
132
151
atureof Social C hange
pter Six: States, Strong and Weak
pter Seven: Group Agency
pter Eight: Outcomes
C hapter me: C ontingencies of Modernity
pter Ten: Our Looming C risis
nclusion
169
177
rences
1
MM:
6ov1ar.
tC ;
Capitalism
J AH:
Let us begin this discussion of thesources of social
power by considering matters economic. Your view
seems to bethat capitalism is now firmly entrenched
as thedominant economic system of theage.
Let mefirst briefly placecapitalism amid thesources
of social power. My overall claimisthat therearefour
principal sources, .deologifal, coI .!2!!!ic,militar , and~~- ..,.
olitica , and that in dealing with macro-sociological fW"O~r
pro emsonemust normally takeall four intoaccount.
I n analyzing theworld in thelong twentieth century,
up totoday, themost fundamental social institutions
havebeen a italis , though it has been contested by
socialist and fascist modes of production, and ation- . s.
states, though at first theleading states alsopossessed
empires and oneof them still does. Thus, for example,
globalization (a word that should really beplural)
involves threemain principles: theglobalization of
capitalism, theglobalization of thenation-state, and
theemergenceof thefirst global empire, theAmerican
Empire. C apitalism generates class struggle, while
nation-states and empires generategeopolitics, wars,
and sometimes civil wars. All generate ideologies,
MM: !"faybe; it isn't over yet. But therearecertainly two
improvernents over 1929. First, overnments laya
much larger rolein regulation now than then soit is
e~sier =themtointervenewith well underst;od poli-
eres, which havebeen around for a long time, and take
~" short-~erm corrective action. Second, and perhaps
~,..more l~portant, thereis far more(illternauonal col-
_ #tUN....... laboratio of theorganization of capitalism today
12
Capitalism
13
Power in the Twenty-First Century
which in this period ha vebeen mainly secular rather
than religious. Thesearethesubject matter of my mosi
recent work, especially of VolumeI I I of The Sources
of Social Power, which 1 amcurrently finishing.
han in 1929. Therewerethen competitivedevalua-
~'ons and tariffs in the1930s which madeit more
~ifficult for theworld economy torecover. I t isdifficult
tosay at themoment how quick therecovery will be,
but so far this seems likea great recession rather
rhan a Great Depression, and will likely not beas
significant as that of 1929. I t is also moreglobal in
thesensethat it shifted a littlebit theinternational
balanceof power within theglobal economy, away
from theWest, moretoward Asia. Recovery is being
led by Asia, not by theWest. This reveals that capital-
ismismoreglobally entrenched yet alsomoreglobally
varied.
I n answer toyour specific question, yes, capitalism is
very firmly entrenched in themodern world, and it
has gotten moreand moreentrenched. Asit has spread
across theworld, it has becometheonly economic
power gamein town. But capitalism has changed
through timeand comes in several yarieies. I n par-
ticular theri hts rkers in themoreadvanced
countries today areenormously greater than thosein
thenineteenth century. As capitalism has developed it
has becomemoresociall and leall constrained. Vir-
tually thewholepopulation has acquired ~t T. H.
Marshall called "social citizenship," theright toshare
inthesocioeconomic lifeof thenation-that is within ,
capitalismo Of course, it is still "capitalism" in the
sensethat thereis privateownership of themeans of
production, theworker is separated from control
of thosemeans, and moreand moreof social lifehas
been commodified, available for profit-seeking by
eapitalists.
J AH: I s it likely that capitalism will bemoreregulated after
this crisis, especially if it proves merely to bea great
recession? Banks in theUnited Stateswerevulnerable
toregulation for a short period when Barack Obama
becamePresident, but they now seemcapableof resist-
ing it.
MM: I expect a compromisethere. I think banks areactually
a littlemorevulnerableto political backlash in the
United States than they areinBritain. Republicans and
Democrats alikecounterpose "Wall Street" (thebad
guys) to"Main Street" (ordinary Americans). c
a . 1 i in theUSoBut despitethis,
thereis a third major differencebetween now and
(:) ()' 1929: theabsencenow of substantial organized and
s-vl) ideological osition toca ita I sm After 1929 there
weresurges in both leftist and rightist opposition,
socialism and fascismoI t is difficult toseeparallels to
that right now, another sign of how much more
entrenched capitalism is. Therewill probably bea little
moreregulation, varying somewhat between countries
though amid a littlemoreinternational collaboration.
But as I said, wein theWest havenot solved ca' - \{
i m's current problems.
J AH: But is capitalism also moreentrenched in thesense
that when it faced a considerablecrisis in 2007 and
2008 it was possibletodeal with that crisis much more
effectively then had been thecasein 1929?
14
Pou/er in the Twenty-First Century
Themain problem now is themuch greater roleand
ower of financecapitaP, theincreasing financializa-
~on of theeconomy. This means that governrnents
with largedebts and deficits feel theneed toappease
international financecapital. Their currencies or their
bonds may bevulnerabletoan attack. Sothey tailor
policies roward theneeds of bankers morethan their
citizens. Tosomeextent this has always beentrue-we
seeit in thepolitical economy of the 1920s, for
example. But it isrampant right now. Keynesian-styled
stimulus spending quickly gaveway-in Europe at
least-to deficit reduction and deflation toprotect the
valueof thecurrency and thegovernment bondJ he
first need isth~ecurity of theinvestor, and never mind
about the.res.u1t:iulWlllelm~lo_ y"met. And thebanks
themselves opposemuch regulation. They think they
havegot theperfect solution already: they makelots
of money in good times and when thebad times come
they get bailed out and capitalism gets saved. Sowhat
could be~t~ but ~orsefor u..?
~ooVr\~\
(tJ >.J .lAt
~~f
J AH: I f thereis littlenew regulation, onecan imaginea
futureinwhich new tools arecreated that again cause
crisis-I eading again tobailout.
MM: Yes,it seemsvery likely that therewill beanother crisis
of a similar naturea few years down theroad. We
should beentering a phaseof far moreregylation of
fulancecapital by government, but wemight not get
much of it. Power, not efficiency, rules theworld-in
J
~OI;. (\ my terms, distributive power dominates collective
, \0'-'
1ou'~~c ...J . power-and th.iLd~s rtlot')J roduceoptimal results for
- thepopulatiou.as a whole. TheUS actually has the
highest level of debt but beca useit is thereservecur-
rency thereis littlespeculativepressureagainst it. The
Europeans-sterling and theeuro, and especially the
weaker economies of Europe-are under pressure.
Governments areappeasing thespeculators by intro-
ducing deflationary measures that include slashing
.
~~
Capitalism
15
government expenditures. Many economists think this
will prolong therecession, but their adviceis ignored.
\l~l
~
Sovereign debt currently worries governments more
than anything else. lt is not impossiblethat wemight
now get a repeat of theGreat Depression, when a
stock market crash and somefinancial instability was
intensified intoreal depression by government cutting
of expenditure and tightening of credit. 1 think that
Europe's conservativegovernments, in Britain, ltaly,
France, and Germany, arealsotaking advantageof the
crisis to introduce welfarecuts that they havelong
wanted, but t.be basic pressureis coming from the
~, theI UOyeWelltS-Oifinancecapital.lt isbizarre
that a financial crisis caused by neoliberalism should-
after a~r of Keyxiisian solifin.I D-
turn
into
moreneoliberalism. lt is even morebizarrethat the
United States, thereal home(along with Britain) of
neoliberalism, should warn theEuropeans against this.
lt seems that theAmericans havelearned morelessons
from this great recession than havetheEuropeans.
But, 1 repeat, power, not efficiency, rules theworld.
J AH:
Thecontemporary absenceof tradewars and competi-
tivedevaluations is, for sure, so different from the
interwar periodoI s thereany likelihood of theerner-
genceof regional trading blocs, with a consequent
attack on freetrade?
MM: 1 don't think it's very likely. lt's just a possibility for
theUnited States itself. Onecould envisagea backlash
within theUnited States against international free
trade, if theright kind of political coalition wereput
together, though it is somuch against theinterests of
big American companies that 1 doubt it is going to
happen. But if you think about theinterdependence
that is arising between Asia and theUnited States and
Europe, and theimportant roleof theoverseas C hinese
through Asia, you seethat this is not a regionally
16
Power in the Twenty-First Century
segregated economy. About two-thirds of theglobei
significa~tly interdependent, and someof this issimpl;
transna tional.
J AH: I sthat thecasebecausetheUnited States still regulates
capitalism? Does multilateral cooperation depend
upon having a hegemonic leader?
MM: Not necessarily. I t's truethat inthepostwar period the
United States has been theleading power in interna-
tional organizations, which havebuilt upbit bybit. The
World TradeOrganization (WTO) now has legally
binding restrictions on what countries can do in the
way of tariffs and thelike, towhich theUSisbound as
well. I ndeed, theUS has been fined by theWTO. So
thereis something gradually building up that is more
than just theUnited States, and indeed thekinds of
economic things that theworld blames theUSfor, such
as structural adjustment programs, aredonewith the
100 percent collaboration of theEuropeans. Sorne-
times theJ apanesehavedeviated somewhat, but not
theEuropeans. I f this isa hegemonic order, it's not just
of theUnited States. I t's alsoof international capital-
ism, especially financeea italism, themost transna-
tional form of capitalismoSo1seeit as kind of a dual
hegemony.:-of both a class fraction and an American-
led geopolitical allianc; TheAmerican ~f this is
alsojust beginning tobeeroded. I nparticular wenow
seeemerging an economic interdependence between
theUnited States and C hina, plus J apan and theoil
states. C ountries other than theUnited Statesarepulling
theworld out of recession, especially C hina, whose
manufacturing industry and exports arerecovering.
J AH: So this is a mixed system. Nothing could happen
without theUnitedStates ecauseit has such a prorni-
nent role, but a multilateral element of agreement is
needed tomakeit work?
Capitalism
17
. Yes and that multilateralism is expanding. To the
. e){t~ntthat therehas been coordination, this has for
alrnos
t
rhefirst timecentered on theG20. I t has been
upgraded from a meeting of financeministers to one
of heads of sta te, and itscomposition reveals an exten-
sion of power from beyond theold West and J apan to
theBRI C countries: Brazil, Russia, I ndia, and espe-
cially C hina. That is a sign of movement in geopoliti- -
cal power across theworld.
o
J AH:
Thereis a counterargument to what you havesaid.
TheUnited States retains enormous power, seen in its
capacity to absorb most of theexcess capital of the
world economy. America might beweaker, but it's a
peculiar sort of weakness wheremost other leading
states seemdetermined toprop you up.
MM: That's true, and ilieshifts in owe will akea I on
time. Thedollar is going toremain a reservecurrency
for quitea whileyet. There's nopossiblereplacement
for it. Theeuro has shown its weakness. I t has no
singledirecting force, other than theBundesbank,
which is not capableof leading a continent. Greece
was bailed out, but mainly by Germany, and the
process was politically fraught and far from auto-
matic. Moreimportant, it isfar fromclear that a larger
European national economy might receivesuch aid
from Germany. And theC hinesecurrency is still con-
trolled and restricted in various ways. Te
~tat~is going to remain theindis ensibleecono
power for a whileyet. \,:)e~
J AH: And nobody really has a fundamental interest I n
knocking theUnited States off its perch?
MM: No. Theworld economy benefits from a stablereserve
currency and its principal actors arerisk-averse. They
donot want togothrough what they fear would bea
Capitalism
19
18
Power in the Twenty-First Century
chaotic transition period from thedollar to a bask
of currencies. That will eventually happen but rnosr ~~
therelevant power actors hope it will beslow and
long-drawn-out.
rhe quantity of the patents in the United States
SO I d dominate theworld. I don't know theextent to
wou . d hihl
hich in reality the US dorninates new an 19 Y
wofitable technologies. I assume, likeyou do, that
pr meAmerican dominance results from its relatively
~~en immig:ation po.licy and its fineuniv~~sities. I ?,
US engineenng faculues there arevery few Anglos,
as they say, among the graduate students; they are
substantially Asians and other foreign students,
perhaps Asian-Americans or recent migrants, though
most of them stay and become successful, and that is
very important. I f you seefigures of theethnic origins
of rheNobel Prizewinners, theUnited States is not
rhebiggest per capita winner of Nobel Prizes-Sweden
and Switzerland top thelisto
J AH: So. t~is situatio~ does not resemble that of Great
Britain at thebeginning of thetwentieth century facin
. . ' g
a major nval that had both economic and military
power.
MM: That is correct, but in theBritish case, even before
Germany became a serious threat, thepound as the
reservecurrency was being assisted by theother major
banks, by the German bank, theRussian bank, the
French bank. I t had become a partly multilateral
system, as Barry Eichengreen and others haveshown
well beforetherivalry with Germany became militar-
ily threatening.
J AH:
Still, someof theNobel Prizewinners from Sweden,
Switzerland, and elsewhere end up working in the
United States.
J AH: And theBritish case, in theend, is an example of being
knocked off your perch by military exhaustion and
hugedebts incurred in war.
MM: Exactly. Therehas also been considerable government
assistance in theUnited States for high-tech industries.
Part of it is military spinoff and part of it is just a
federal government commitment toj}.igh techo This
doesn't fit well with theimageof theUnited Sta tes as
being a country of very littlegovernment regulation
or intervention in industry. I n th eGt:oF-..alliJ ,
hi h tech more~zlL ther . evel of
overnment sponsorship o &D. J
MM: Yes, not merely by any intrinsic logic of capitalist
development, since that war was a product not of
capitalism but of older great-power rivalry.
J AH: A further question about theUnited States concerns its
re~aining economic strength. Reports about patent-
taking seem tosuggest that at thehigher end of product
cyc!es theUnited States still does very well. Further, the
United States has a notable capacity to absorb brain-
powe~, most recently that of I ndian engineers. Surely,
Amencan capitalism stilllooks rather strong?
MM: With patents I 'm never quitesureif there is a bias in
these statistics, since the Americans developed the
patent system and rush to patent things immediately,
J AH: I havesomequestions about capitalist behavior. There
is a sensein which your works suggests disappoint-
ment in capitalists: they spend their time making
money, and lack larger geopolitical visions. Haveyou
changed your mind about that?
MM: Well, I wouldn't go quite as far as you've said, but I
think I would view their behavior 'along those lines.
20 Power in the Twenty-First Century
Of course, there are institutions of collaboraf
among capitalists, likethink tanks and theWorld E
lon
. F d co.
norruc orum, an. some of themajor industries do
plan years ahead, liketheenergy industry, for exarn 1
But I don't seethem playing a largerolein geopolP
t
, e.
d
. forei . 1les
an m oreign policy unless firms have their
b
line jn vi OWn
ottom me m view, I n foreign policies relating
. l' to
particu ar countnes there are business lobbies. Bur
overall, I don't seethe directions of foreign poi'
bei d . ley
. eing eterrnined by theviews or interests of capital-
ism as a whole.
J AH: Theother w~y I can put this issuetoyou is to say thar
theworld might besafer if it thought more in terms
of economic advantage and disadvantage. That is a
softer language than that of pure power, which has
ended up killing so many morepeople.
MM: I think that is to an extent true, at least of advanced
or successfully developing countries, though across
largeswathes of theworld capitalists areusing coerced
forms of labor. ~ut ca italists aredealing with inputs
and outputs which arecalculable and they obviously
try ver~ hard to calculate profit and loss, so they
engage m more rational behavior than do state elit s
and political constituencies mobilized by the elites.
There has been so much motion-driven irrationa 1t
~n fore~gn policy in thelong twentieth century, and
it connnues today in the case of the United States
and its enemies. I tend to see that in most cases
few capitalists have wanted war. Had the state lis-
tened to capitalists they wouldn't have gone into so
many wars.
J AH: I 'd like to take a step backwards, away from this
moment of triumph for thecapitalist model to ask
about the failure of socialismo Should weconclude
than nonmarket systems simply do not work?
Capitalism 21
fi there is a long lineof research stretching
: ell, D~st Senghaas through Linda Weiss and J ohn
f
rn leter hli h .
ro Ha-J oon C hang and Atul Ko 1 s owmg
I -I obson te . . h h
es ful econormc development, W1t t epos-
that succ d ni h
ibleexceptio
n
of eighteenth- an mneteent -century
s .' has never been entirely the result of free
Bntaln, d h U . d S
roarkets. From early Germany an t ed~lteh tates
J
n and theEast Asian Tigers to I n la, t emost \]
to .a
d
P
l
a
developing capitalist economies have all
rapl y .
.o ed a high level of overnment rotect1on mc -)
e~ Y . .
ti ves, and overal!llluc~lLQlW.:l..tUlD-
I t is also thecasethat state socialism enjoyed ~fair
measure of economic success during its hey~ay m ~he
catch-up phase of industrialization. TheSoviet Union
rorn the1930s to the1960s grew its GDP morethan
any other country in that period except for J apan. And
C hina's later growth "grew out from the plan," as
Barry Naughton has shown. Of course~ ~e must set
that success against the terrible atrocines wr~u.ght
especially on peasants by Stalin's forced collectlvlza-
tion and Mao's Great Leap Forward. GDP growt
achieved thecost of millions dead is not a benefit
toits citizens. However, both regimes did at least learn
not to dosuch things again, and Vietnam learned from
them how togrow without massiveatrocities. Thefirst
and second industrial revolutions had seerned to rnap
out quitewell what a desirable economic [uture~oul?
beso that centralized lannin could hel bnn
about. I t specifically required sur pluses to betake~
from agriculture and invested in industry, and ~uthon-
tarian governments had sorne advantages m. t~at
respecto I the indust ializin e' d state sOC lahsm
aid of.
But theSoviet regime never managed to get beyo.nd
theindustrial phase into post-indus~rialism, t~ which
centralized state lannin seems less a ro nate. I ts
22 Power in the Twenty-First Century
economy was stagnating from the 1970s onw
C hina and Vietnam then learned from this to d ardo
tralizeand marketize whilestill retaining somemeecen_
f 1
- asur
o ~ntra control: Wedon't .know .ret w~ether th:
consequent boost m growth will contmue within th .
present framework of hi hly mixed form f pro elr
ownership, or whether they will move into a va ~rty
form of capitalismo But c um ete argued that cna~t
r 11 d apl-
t~lS~ ehxceb.e
l
. at what heca11ed "creative destruc_
non, t ea 1ity toshift gears togothrough crisis int
. h o
a. n:w :conom.l~ pase, and that does seem to bethe
distinctive ability of a decentralized, com e.. e
~omy such as capitalismo
Capitalism
. [jsrn and it rnay not even beon theroad to
t cap1ta 1 .'
ye . l' C hines
e
institutions that might seem capi-
P
lta 1sm
ea . likerhestock exchange, do not operate autono-
tahst'll and are substantially phony. The Parry has
(llous y . h fl' k f
in rhelast two years that lt can, at t e ic o
shown . . f
it h move massive resources mto m rastructure
a SWl c , hn l. .
. cts and alternative energy tec oogies m a way
prole .' . . 1.
haf overnments m capltahst economles can?ot. t is
t t state capitalism in Trotsky's sense smce the
no nomv is not controlled by a unified stateelite. The
eco f . ffici l
Party has actually lost control of ~any o ~tso era s
who aremaking money out of rheir effective poss~s-
sion of enterprises, though this is often shared with
~o lewho reall "are ~a ~talist. 1 call t~~Sheteroge-
neouS regime the C apltahst Party-State. I t controls
over 10 percent of theworld economy, a percentage
that will likely double over thenext two decades.
B~t theworld pe.rceives something much simpler than
thls.-that socialism ~ailed and capitalism succeeded,
penod. That percepnon has much more force in the
world than any morenuanced judgment. Sosocialism
as centralized planning is almost dead as an ideal. But
m! own final judgment is different: t at it.S;olitical
fall~~ was much clearer than its economic failure.
Socialist revolu~ion. brought swift and seerningly inevi-
tabledegeneration intoauthoritarianism sinceit never
possessed any mechanisms by which an a11-conquering
revolutionary elitewould cede ower to more demo-
cratic forces.
1 think most C hinese would regard its transition away
from statesocialism as being pretty closeto optimal.
Most would wish to havemore children and ideally
they would likemorecivil and political ~reedoms, ~ut
they seem willing totradethesefor growmg ~ros~ent.r
while maintaining social order. ns combmatlOn lS
most threatened b massivel growing ine uafit
between town and country, between regions, and
between classes. At thetop theParty is aware of the ~
need to rever sethese trends but it is unclear if they ~
will beableto do rnuch, given their commitment to
growth and their oss of control over their own cadres
J AH: But is capitalism really theonly game in town? The
success of contemporary C hina seems to suggest a
greater future for state-directed political economies
than you a11ow.
J AH: I s this tobecontrasted totheway in which themarket
spread within postcommunist societies?
MM: C a~italism is almost the only game in town. The
C hinese gam~ is a little different, since it_ inhines
much c~ntrahzed planrin by a ruling communist
party with e~terprises acting alrly ~mouslYJ on
markets, which are themselves mixtures of private
property and local officials' defacto property. I t is not
MM: For Russia it is a different story. Here thetransition
was tocapitalismo I t was alsorapid and involved whol-
esale seizure of public assets by private individu~ls,
especially by former Party and NKVD apparatchlks.
24 Power in the Twenty-First Century
I t brought not growth but collapse at first, and then '
brought only growth based on natural energy reso 1t
A
d j b h ", urees
n it roug t massive inequaliry, Putin is po l'
because heprovided minimal order out of much Ph
u
ar
d b h
caos
an ecause eseemed tobetaking on thenew cap'
, l' h ' I tal_
1Stoigarc s. eoliberals played a considerable rol '
hi f fail e1n
t lSstory o al ure, though onemust concedethat R
, , , , Us-
sia s transinon was much more difficult than C h1' ,
, , "na s
since1tSeconomy was dominated by inefficient ind
, 1 b h us-
tn,a eemoth,s. Neoliberals respond toaccusations of
faI lu~eby saymg that their models were never fully
applied. Thelatter part of thestatement is true, sine
pragmatic politicians realized they could never sta e
in power if they did introduce thewhole neoliberal
package.
But theSoviet-Rus sia transition reveals thefailure of
m~dels that regard economic modes of production as
p~l~ary and sel~-sustaining rather than having precon-
ditions emanatmg from the other sources of social
power. !n this casepolitical power was crucial. The
C hinese C ommunist Party retained political power
and managed a transition, to great effect. I n contrast,
theSoviet C ommunist Party was deliberately disman-
dedo I t then collapsed and there was a botched
transition.
J AH: What does this tell us about thechances of develop-
ment for poorer countries within thenewly dominant
capitalist world order?
MM: Wecan obviously bemore optimistic now than at
most points in thelast forty years. Many countries are
now achieving somegrowth. I t is not just thernuch-
publicized BRI C s, but also the whole of Southeast
Asia, Eastern Europe, Turkey, and even someAfrican
count.ries such as South Africa, Botswana, Uganda,
AI gena, and Nigeria. After thefailures of both "African
Capitalism
25
'1' "and neoliberalism, it seems that a mixed
OC la I Srn di d '1' d 1
s rno
de
of state-coor mate capita ist evei-
econorny '1 1 ' h
t varying accordmg to oca resources, mig t
opmen e' legitirnate and moresuccessful, though obvi-
be mor , ' h I d W
1
not in umform I ashion across t ewor. e
ous Y '1 b 1
, ht beshifting finally mto a near-g o a economy.
mlg
. 1haveonefinal question. Towhat extent arewereally
J A J - I . I king about capitalism in any case? Sure1ythesystem
ra a whole is American-dominated? I sn't it worth
::membering that both Karl Polanyi and Maynard
Keynes stressed theway in which markets aremade
by states?
MM: I t remains capitalism, though in theadvanc,ed c?un-
tries it is a reformed capitalism, onefrom Wh1C hnghts
for workers and for thecommunity havebeen wrested.
I t is only partially American, for it actually contains
threeprincipal elements: transnational, national (and
therefore also international), and American imperial.
I ndeed a fourth element often surfaces, the"macro-
,
regional," sothat thecapitalisms of theNordic coun-
tries or theAnglophone countries sharea certain sryle.
There is a big debate about "varieties of capitalism"
that has not yet been resolved. But 1think it is safeto
say that therearecertain national and macro-regional
styles that withstand some of thepressures imposed
by thetendency of capitalism to escape all national
boundaries, and by thedollar and US dominance of
someinternational agencies.
Somevariations through timearealso evident, and the
tension between plan and market sometimes appears
to have a cyclical element, as Polanyi noted. This is
not quite as regular as hesuggested, however, for it
comes from rather specific processes of interstitial
emergence in each period, and it is not dear that these
are actually solved by more state regulation. The
26
Power in the Twenty-First Century
1920s were beset by theentwining of economi
1
" 1 ' eand
geopo mea cnses; the1970s by theinterstitia1
f transnati emer_
gence o transnational finance capital networks:
h 1 fi
,a~
t eear y twenty- rst century will bebeset by theu
d
' Ldestructi nex_
pecte environmenta destructiveness of capital'
Th fi ' , I Sm
e rst crisis was managed by more regu1 t' .
d
' a I On
summe up mtheword "Keynesian'" thesecond "
, '11 ith ' , ' C rI SI S
~ssn wit us, and capitalist market interests arefight-
ing a very ,stron? ,batt~eagainst morestateregulation;
a~d thethird C ~I SI S might end with disaster, not plan-
mng. But wewill talk about this particular crisis later.
2
Militarism
-
J A H : Theword "revolution" is much abused, and certainly
overused. But in military affairs, there has been a
genuine revo1ution. Do you agreethat thecreation of
nuclear weapons has fundamentally changed the
nature of war?
MM: Yes, it has. And this is a casewhere a major crisis was
more or less solved with great success. Atomic and
hydrogen bombs were the first really socio10gically
significant thing about globalization. G10balization is
occurring and is important, but it is for themost part
not particu1arly socio10gically interesting because it
involves theexpansion of all thesocial structures that
we'veana1yzed in thepastoI f you 100k at theliterature
on globalization it still concerns classes, enterprises,
states, demographic transitions, idealism versus mate-
rialism, major structura1 identities against multip1e
identities, and soon. Yet if human activity fills up the
world and then rebounds back against human society
rather likea boomerang, transforming theconditions
of action, then weneed distinctive theories. At that
point globalization itself has become causally impor-
tantoWeapons that cou1d destroy theworld constitute