Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 34, No.

1
March 1996
The Politics of Identity and
Political Order in Europe
BRIGID LAFFAN
Department of Politics,
University College Dublin, Ireland
Abstract
This article explores the link between identity, legitimacy and political order
in Europe. The central argument is that the politics of identity have enormous
salience in the new Europe and for the European Union at this juncture of its
development, because the Union is moving from issues of instrumental
problem-solving to fundamental questions about its nature as a part-formed
polity. Problems of identity are raised by the politicization of immigration, the
fragmentation of the post-war order, regionalism, the revival of the ultra Right
and the process of European integration itself. The article concludes with an
assessment of the affective dimension of integration.
I. Introduction
Far from having a single identity, Europe is made up of a co-existence of
particular, varied identities. All of them, during their life-span, tucked into
spaces of varying sizes and functions. Certain spaces are defined administrative
territories limited by man-made borders. . . . Most people are citizens of various
territories with diflering rights and duties, and the image of Europe as a frame
sheltering these diferences is the profound wish of many.
(BBV Foundation, 1993)
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82 BRIGID LAFFAN
The resurgence of European integration since the mid-1980s and the 1992
process, followed by the collapse of the post-war order and the Maastricht
ratification crisis bring questions of political order, legitimacy and identity
sharply into focus in Europe. The role of Germany in the new Europe, pressures
for a continental enlargement of the European Union, the growth of regionalism
and the challenge of immigration all beg questions about Europes boundaries,
European identity and the relationship between identity and the European
project. Questions of how much Europe and whose Europe reverberate in
domestic and transnational debates on the future European order. The difficult
passage of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) politicized European integra-
tion in a manner that was not evident in the past. National parliaments,
constitutional courts, political parties and the wider public have joined govern-
ments, European institutions and committed federalists in an intense debate
about governance in Europe. Europe has become a powerful and contested
issue of political debate.
This article seeks to address some of the issues surrounding the link between
identity, legitimacy and political order in Europe. The central argument is that
the politics of identity have enormous salience in the new Europe and for the
European Union at this juncture in its development because the Union is moving
from issues of instrumental problem-solving to fundamental questions about its
nature as a part-formed polity (Cable, 1994; Garcia, 1993; BBV Foundation,
1993). It is argued in this article that official nationalism has embraced and
accommodated the European project in many states and that integration took
the sting out of nationalism in western Europe to a significant extent. However,
uncertainty about the balance between national, local, regional and European
identities has re-emerged in a variety of guises. There has been a resurgence of
political nationalism in some European states because of the growing salience of
immigration. The emergence of political forces favouring a Europe of the
Regions affects political order in many European states as historical regions
reassert their identity and presence in the European arena. The collapse of
communism led to a revival of ethno-nationalism with all its inherent dangers in
the eastern part of the continent. Historically, European nation-states developed
on the basis of a relative congruity between bounded territory, functional tasks
and a shared identity. This congruity is no longer assured as the link between
territory, governance and identity is eroded at national level and is not replaced
by an equivalent set of institutions and shared symbols elsewhere.
The European project itself adds a new dimension to the politics of identity
in the Member States and in the wider Europe. The dynamic of integration has
implications for how different states and communities define themselves cultur-
I am endebted for this point to Phillipe Schmitter who addressed the issue of the future of the nation-state
at a plenary session of the ECSA Conference, Charleston, South Carolina, May 1995.
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THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND POLITICAL ORDER IN EUROPE
83
ally, politically and economically. The goal of a Europe without frontiers
changes the nature of borders as systems of inclusion and exclusion. Market
regulation can threaten long-held traditions (the politics of local beer, cheese or
snuff!) in different localities. The growing salience of the EUs external borders
as an arena for free movement and a common visa area adds an additional
boundary to the pre-existing national ones. The concept of EU citizenship forces
a redefinition of national citizenship at a time when many west European states
are grappling with the challenge of immigration and its implications for national
identities.
Identities are being examined and redefined as individuals, cities, regions and
states come to terms with the dynamics of the new Europe. Uncertain identities
at the national and local level feed into debates about the desirability and
feasibility of a European identity which may be essential if the European Union
is to enhance its legitimacy and become a genuine political realm. Once again
attention is being paid to integration as we feeling and not just institution-
building and policy integration. The question of how much political cement or
glue is necessary for European integration is highly contested. Political cement
rests on three core dimensions, namely, co-operative institutions, instrumental
benefits and affective attachment. The neofunctionalists tended to privilege the
institutional and instrumental dimensions of political cement; for Haas, institu-
tion-building came first leading to a shift of elite loyalties over time (Haas, 1958).
Integration would thus be built on the shared benefits of economic co-operation
structured by dense institutions with a supranational dimension. Deutsch and
more recently W. Wallace emphasized the importance of a sense of community
or the affective dimension of political integration. Community-building is
fostered by communication and intense interaction which generate a shared
identity (Deutsch, 1957; W. Wallace, 1990). The Monnet method wasessentially
a neofunctionalist strategy, described by Pascal Lamy, Delors Chef de Cabinet,
in the following terms: the people werent ready to agree to integration, so you
had to get on without telling them too much about what was happening (quoted
in Ross, 1995, p.194). The politicization of integration and its expansion into
sensitive political space necessitates renewed attention to questions of commu-
nity-building and the affective dimension of integration. Questions of who are
we and who belongs to which political community are deeply problematic at
a time when national political communities and European institutions are faced
with questions of inclusion/exclusion. The legitimacy crisis in the Union
demonstrates the limits of the Monnet method at a time when national govern-
ance structures are challenged; shared values and even identities matter if the
Union is to become a focus for legitimacy in the New Europe. The growing
salience of identity politics takes place against a backdrop of considerable
economic and not just political change. The globalization of technology and the
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ensuing competitive pressures on European economies have placed considerable
strain on Europes model of economy and society, particularly on social
provision which has underpinned stable politics in western Europe.
11. The National Component of European Governance
In both public discussion and academic research on European integration, the
Member States are explicitly or implicitly accorded great significance. The
continuing existence of European nations and the significance of national
identities for contemporary governance receive less serious attention. One of the
main difficulties in assessing the national component of European governance
is the overarching but elusive character of nationalism and the variety of
nationalist experiences, some successful, others not. Nationalism as the univer-
sal criterion for legitimate government is a product of the French Revolution and
popular sovereignty. During the nineteenth century, the nationality principle
became so pervasive that no state could survive or be legitimate without it
(Llobera, 1993, p. 65). National self-determination meant that each nation
should possess its own state, and that it should be permitted to use politics to
construct its own economic, social and spiritual life in accordance with its own
national genius (Garvin, 1990, p. 66). A symbiotic relationship evolved between
the state and nation; in some cases successful nationalist movements created
states, whereas in other cases powerful states, embodied in the notion of peasants
into Frenchmen, forged nations. If nations are imagined communities to use
Andersons oft-quoted phrase, the fusion of nation with state power provided the
ingredients for a very powerful social organization (Anderson, 1991, pp. 5-7).
Successful nationalist movements needed statehood and successful states need-
ed the legitimating force of nationalism. The nation became the largest commu-
nity which, when the chips are down, effectively commands mens loyalty,
overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which
cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society (Emerson, 1960,
p. 95). States used their enormous resources and symbols, rewards and punish-
ments, to inculcate a sense of loyalty and identification with the national political
community. The symbolic dimension of state power sustains the ethical and
moral needs of citizens, not just their material ones (Krasner, 1984, p. 233). The
nation-state developed not just as a boundary creating or maintaining device, but
as a system of symbols and shared identity.
Historically nationalisms drew on the materials to hand in the building of
national consciousness and markers of division, notably, language, religion,
historical myths, and invented or re-invented traditions. National stories, myths,
monuments and ethnic markers were used by nation builders in a variety of ways
to determine who fell into the category of us and who remained outside as
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THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND POLITICAL ORDER IN EUROPE
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them. The main elements of the western idea of this form of collective identity
are:
0 a historic territory or homeland
0 common myths and historical memories
0 a common mass political culture
@ common legal rights and duties for all members
8 a common economy with territorial mobility for members. (Smith, 199
P-14)
These elements embrace two dimensions of nationality, namely, its ethnic ar i
civic attributes. The ethnic dimension of nationality draws on the notion of a
common ancestry and on the consciousness of shared identity and the civic
dimension rests on citizenship and legal equality, a legacy of the Enlightenment.
Some European nationalisms give more weight to ethnicity, others to the civic
dimension. Notwithstanding the excesses of nationalism in Europe, ethnic
nationhood has, according to Schopflin, crucial functions in the maintenance of
communities, in the definition of identities, in providing expression for the
affective dimension of collective life (Schopflin, 1994, p.139). The civic
dimension, on the other hand, comprises the rules and regulations that govern
the everyday relationship between rulers and ruled (Schopflin, 1994, p.139).
The ethnic dimension appeals to the emotions however non-rational, whereas the
civic dimension is fashioned through political processes from reason and rational
discourse.
Three attributes of nationalism have particular significance for a discussion
of political integration and the political cement it requires. First, nationalism has
produced one of the most powerful and emotive forms of collective identity in
the world which poses a distinct challenge to the search for a European identity
and may define its limits. Second, nationalisms symbiotic relationship with
state power endows it with a central role in legitimizing political power within
state boundaries which in turn makes the legitimization of European and
internationalized governance structures highly problematic. Third, a revival of
political nationalism using the symbols and rituals of traditional nationalism in
the Member States and the wider Europe can act as a strong countervailing force
to political and constitutional development in the EU. Political nationalism may
lead to pressures for national closure and a return to a fragmented Europe
(Haas, 1990; Miall, 1994).
Integration and Oficial Nationalism
Breuillys distinction between official, political and cultural nationalism is
useful to the analysis of the national component of European governance
(Breuilly, 1985, pp. 65-75). The Member States of the Union bring their own
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historical trajectories and state identities to bear on European integration. Some
states and state traditions fit easily into the governance structures of the Union,
whereas for others there is a high degree of dissonance. The emphasis in the
literature on the economic and instrumental dimensions of integration ignores
the importance of the European project to states and their peoples as a symbol of
their place in the world and as part of national modernization projects.
Of the three large founding Member States in the EU, it could be argued that
Germany and Italy sought to embed their state identity in a supranational
framework, whereas France sought to maintain a strong state identity while
pursuing supranational aspirations. The French elite, driven by their sense of
Frances state tradition, opted for an integrationist solution to enable France to
remain a European power in the face of German economic might. Economic
modernization, an opening to the outside world, motivated Monnet as head of the
French Planning Commission to promote liberalization. However, the tension
between the desire to maintain a strong and independent state identity and the
European arena was clearly evident in de Gaulles search for a Europe des
putries. In the 1980s, President Mitterrand promoted a supranational aspiration
of La France par IEurope. Mitterrand supported the development of EU
governance structures with as many state-like qualities as possible - a political
and defence identity and its own values (Waxer, 1990, p. 481). The notion of
projecting France onto the European scene is echoed in a statement by a French
European Minister who argued in 1987 that:
I believe today the more one is nationalist, the more one is European. In
tomorrows world, there is no chance of being a major power [grand], free and
respected without working through Europe. (Bosson, 1987, p. 59)
The French political elite is once again grappling with the tension between their
national identity and the European context.
Germany and Italy embraced the European project as a means of dealing with
the problem of state identity. Integration has to be understood as part of the
German reasons of state (Hrbek and Wessels, 1984, p. 521), providing a safe
framework for the emergence of a state identity in a divided country and
continent. Unlike France, German political leaders eschewed notions of national
grandeur and leadership. Content with a Deutschmark identity, West Germa-
ny turned its energies to the economic realm. Rapid German unification in 1990
has disturbed what was a reasonably satisfied albeit young state identity; the new
Germany is confronted with the need to redefine its identity, to bond the peoples
of two states and to forge an international identity in a rapidly changing world.
For Italy, the European project provided a countervailing force to endemic
governmental instability and was critical to regime maintenance in Italy. Central
to Italian considerations was also the search for economic and social moderni-
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87
zation by opening up the Italian economy to foreign competition and seeking to
have norms of economic management imposed from outside.
For the peripheral states - Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece - economic
and social modernization was also of critical importance. Europe became the
project for their future. Although the emphasis may have been on materialistic
considerations, the European project also provided important symbolic assur-
ance for these states by affirming their place in the European Order. The Irish
political elite embraced the European project as necessary to consolidate the
economic foundations of political independence and nationalist arguments were
deployed to legitimize involvement in integration. For the Mediterranean states
EU membership symbolized the end of dictatorship, an acceptance of democratic
values and an external barrier against the reappearance of authoritarian rule. For
Spain in particular, EU membership meant a reversal of a process which had led
to a de-Europeanization of Spain from the time of Philip I1 to the last quarter
of the twentieth century.
It is striking that the two long-time Member States whose state identities
could not be enhanced by the European project, the United Kingdom and
Denmark, are most half-hearted about the political dimension of integration. For
the United Kingdom, membership of the EC spelt the end of empire and a
diminution of a world role that had contributed so much to how the UKexplained
itself to itself. Moreover, EU membership has provided a new and not always
welcome framework for a debate on the national issue within the United
Kingdom. British political leaders continue to focus on national autonomy and
identity: a highly centralized state structure, a pragmatic political culture, and the
sovereignty of Parliament all serve in addition to reinforce the fact that the UK
fits rather uneasily into the Unions governance structures. Denmark likewise is
one of the oldest constitutional states in Europe with a surfeit of national identity
and an extra-national identity based on the Nordic model of economy and
society. For Denmark, it can be argued, there is a zero-sum game between the
European project and the Danish nation-state. The European project was
necessary for economic well-being but fills no psychological need for a state
identity.
The proposition offered so far is that the European project has been
embraced by many of the Member States as a means of strengthening their
existing state identities and an as arena within which to project their state
identities. Hence for many states there has been a high degree of compatibility
between the national project and European integration. The very pliability of
nationalism allows national elites to embrace projects like European integration
and to sell them to domestic audiences as part of the national project. The Treaty
on European Union ratification crisis suggests, however, that the official
nationalism may have come up against the political nationalism of the electorate.
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The rise of the Right, a revival of ethnic nationalism in the eastern part of the
continent, and the emergence of regionalism are evidence of uncertainty about
the salience and intensity of national, local and regional identities.
Uncertain Identities: Political Nationalism
The legacy of the war weakened national myths in many states and gave national
political elites an incentive to practise new strategies of statecraft and new
strategies for domestic political management.2 A gradual but nonetheless histor-
ical decline in the intensity of nationalism in western Europe is asserted by many
writers. Inglehart claims that [tlhe feeling that the nation state incarnated a
supreme value, as the haven and the sole defence of a unique way of life, has
largely vanished in contemporary western Europe (Inglehart, 1990, p. 412).
Dogan, in an analysis that looked at such indicators as pride in ones country,
confidence in the army, willingness to fight for ones country, and trust in ones
neighbours concluded that west Europeans express limited national pride, are
not fully confident in their countrys army, are less willing to fight for their
country, and have growing trust in other west Europeans (Dogan ,1993,1994).
He found that the decline in nationalistic fervour was most prevalent among the
younger generation and the more educated strata of the population. However, the
excesses of nationalism have not been entirely tamed in Europe and political
leaders can stiIl appeal to national myths.
The salience of identity politics is accentuated by the increasing politiciza-
tion of immigration in the domestic politics of many west European countries.
West European states face a multicultural future, notwithstanding the fact that
mass publics have been less than receptive to the changing patterns of immigra-
tion (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994, p. 6). Most west European societies
face the challenge of integrating large numbers of people (an estimated 14
million of resident aliens in 1991, some 2 million illegal immigrants and a
growing number of asylum seekers) of different cultures in their societies and
polities. Immigration raises questions of national identity, traditional ethnic
markers and political community. It challenges concepts of self and other in
an acute manner because [olthers now reside in Europe, settled in metropolitan
colonial centres for decades where they have raised families and established
institutions. They see themselves as European as well: Afro-Europeans,
Arab-Europeans and Asian-E~ropeans~~ (McDonogh, 1993, p. 146).
The revival in the political fortunes of nationalist populist parties during the
198Os, in Austria (Freedom Party), Germany (Republikaner, DVU), Belgium
(Vlaams Blok), Norway (Progress Party), France (Front National) and Italy
(MSI) suggests that important segments of west European society continue to
Ernst Haas defines the new strategies for domestic management as the triumph of liberal nationalism in
Western Europe after the war.
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value a closed and exclusive view of national identity. These parties are deeply
xenophobic and have succeeded in making the immigration issue one of the
central political issues of the time (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994). The
populist parties play on peoples fears of being swamped by non-nationals, of
losing their national lifestyles and identities, of being less at home in their
countries and of being challenged for housing and employment.
The integration project itself may well have been partly responsible for the
revival of the right as sections of west European society react against the growing
cosmopolitanism of European society and the reduction of barriers implicit in the
1992 programme. It has been argued that in many European states there is a
semi-educated and resentful under-class which defiantly takes as its symbols
the national flags abandoned by the elites (Robbins, 1989). The voting patterns
in the three national referendums on the TEU highlight the impact of socio-
economic factors on attitudes towards the Treaty. In France, the majority of
people with university degrees voted for the TEU, while the Nos included many
who had none. Managers, and professionals voted Yes, while employees and
workers tended to vote No. In Denmark unskilled workers were more negative
than skilled workers and white-collar middle- ranking public servants were more
negative than their counterparts in the private sector or high functionaries (de la
Serre and Lequesne, 1993, p. 154; Petersen, 1993, p. 6). This suggests that
workers and the poorer sections of society see little benefit and many dangers in
the Europeanization of the contemporary state. Europes disadvantaged may
see their rights and welfare entitlements squeezed by the competitive pressures
of the single market, further globalization and the Maastricht convergence
criteria.
The TEU ratification process showed just how sensitive is the question of
who belongs to a political community. EU citizenship awakened a powerful
reaction in France and Denmark as people struggled with the notion that their
identity might be redefined and membership of their national political commu-
nities expanded. The concept of joint citizenship was rejected by a very large
majority of Danes; a post-referendum survey found that only 15 per cent
accepted the concept of joint citizenship with 73 per cent against. More Danes
objected to this aspect of the Treaty than to any other (Petersen, 1993, p. 9). I n
France, supporters of the No campaign, the Front National, the Parti Commu-
niste, and the anti-Maastricht elements of the Socialist and the Gaullist parties,
equated the TEU with the destruction of France as a nation-state. President
Mitterrand argued that the extension of citizenship rights was part of Frances
universal tradition and merely an extension of the values of the Enlightenment.
J ean-Marie le Pen, on the other hand, maintained that foreigners who remain in
France for short periods could not develop a love of the patrie and its specific
culture and traditions, and hence should not have the vote in municipal elections.
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Political loyalty and affiliation to the political system depends on the ethnic and
not just the civic element of nationhood, according to this view (U. Holm, 1992,
p. 12) For le Pen, the legacy of the Enlightenment should be preserved in France
for the French.
Uncertain Identities: A Europe of the Regions, Cities, Trans-European
Networks?
It is necessary to analyse the new regionalism in any attempt to assess issues
of identity and political order in western Europe (Harvie, 1994; Keating, 1991).
Territorial politics assumed a new salience in Europe with processes of decen-
tralization, federalization and regionalization in many states. Regional identi-
ties, long submerged in existing national states, have been rediscovered and are
asserting themselves. European integration has acted as a catalyst for a re-
examination of relations between different levels of government in west Euro-
pean states and has led many regions, islands, cities and coastal areas to re-
evaluate where they are in Europes emerging political and economic order.
In the 1960s, the resurgence of regional political and cultural movements
took many European governments by surprise. The revival of regionalist/
nationalist politics was particularly apparent in Scotland, Wales, Brittany,
Corsica, Catalonia, the Basque country and in Belgium. The regionalist move-
ments aim radically to restructure the balance between central, regional and local
power in the states to which they belong. The process of restructuring has gone
furthest in Belgium which gradually assumed the traits of a federal system
between 1980 and 1993. Post-Franco Spain granted considerable autonomy to
the Autonomous Communities, especially those like Catalonia and the Basque
country with long histories. In 1972, the provisions of the post-war Italian
constitutional provisions on regions were finally activated. This was followed in
1982 by the creation of directly elected regional councils in France, which
represented a significant decentralization of the French state. The United
Kingdom remains the only large unitary state left in western Europe.
What is striking about regionalist movements is the extent to which they see
European integration as providing a roof or a home within which to assert
regionaVnationa1 identities that had been undervalued or trapped inside exist-
ing national states. The integration project, by disturbing existing political
spaces, created new political arenas. Europe provides the possibility of break-
ing away from a single and often conflictual relationship with a particular state
(J affe, 1993, p.61). Hence the Scottish Nationalist Party calls for Independence
in Europe and the Lega Lombarda asserts that it is Nearer to Brussels than to
Rome. The Commission has encouraged these sentiments by establishing direct
links with regions in the Member States and by promoting the concept of
partnership across levels of government.
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The development of integration itself has an impact on political order within
the Member States. The German Gnder, fearful that their powers within the
German federation were being diluted, have become very vigilant since the
ratification of the Single European Act. They have extracted concessions from
the German government which enhance their involvement in the preparation of
the German negotiating position and in representing Germany in the European
Council. The assertiveness of the knder has acted as an incentive to other
regions to increase their presence in Brussels as well. The acceleration of
regional mobilization and the growth of transnational linkages since the mid-
1980s are distinct characteristics of this phase of integration. The number of
regional representative offices has grown from two in 1985 to 50 in 1994 ; the
Association of European Regions and the Council of European Municipalities
and Regions, the Atlantic Rim Association increasingly provide a transnational
focus for regional and local communities. Since the mid-l980s, Europes cities
have joined the regions in the search for representation and networks beyond the
borders of their states. The Euro-cities Association, founded in 1985 by six cities,
now represents 38 cities.
Regional movements seek to participate in the structures of a wider Europe
while asserting their autonomy within their own states. The inclusion of the
Committee of the Regions in the TEU is explicit recognition of the growing
significance of the regional dimension of integration. However, the Committee
is more important for what it might become than for what it is. Some regional
actors highlight a vision of a Europe of the Regions in which the European
nation-states will dissolve in time. At its most extreme, proponents of regional-
ism would like to see a reversal of national integration, the disintegration of
Europes historical states and their replacement by older ethnic regions and
cities. According to its proponents, a Europe of the Regions would be more
democratic, efficient and economically dynamic.
Uncertain Identities: East-Central Europe
The collapse of communism raises other dimensions of identity politics in the
New Europe. Nationalism in the eastern part of the continent differs in both tone
and intensity from that of western Europe. The former communist states are not
mature nation-states, emerging as they did in 1919 from the collapse of the
Romanov, Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires. Although informed by the principle
of national self-determination, the states that emerged from the Versailles
settlement did not represent neatly delineated ethnic homelands because of the
complexity of settlement in the former empires. Significant minorities found
themselves trapped inside the wrong states which in turn impaired national
integration and the emergence of stable relations between neighbouring states.
A strong correlation between religion, ethnicity, language and nationality
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developed in Eastern Europe; peoples were forced to develop their nationality on
an ethnic basis and not within secure states (Dogan, 1993, p. 181). Rather,
truncated experiences of national independence and subsequent Soviet domina-
tion sharpen the national dimension of politics in the former communist bloc.
Following the collapse of communism, the regions two multinational states,
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, could not peacefully contain secessionist
tendencies; the break-up of these states and of Czechoslovakia added 17 new
states to the European continent. The process of secession has heightened the
intensity of nationalism in this part of Europe, and underlines the potential for
remaining ethnic faultlines to translate into conflict. Minority problems are
potentially explosive because of the historic weakness of liberalism in this part
of Europe. The nation-state link is very different in the two parts of Europe
because of radically different stages of development.
The argument so far in this article is that the pattern of identity politics in the
new Europe is patchy and confused as states, nations, regions, cities and
individuals come to terms with a changing political and economic order and their
place in it. The congruity between bounded territory, specific governance tasks
and attachment to a hierarchical political order is breaking down. European
integration is one - but only one - factor feeding into the transformation of
governance in Europe. The integration project generates pressures for a renewed
assertion of national identities, offers others a frame for asserting new or
submerged identities, and is also bound up in the search for an overarching
European identity.
111. Identity and Legitimacy
Historically the struggle for democracy took place within national political
spaces whereas diplomacy characterized interstate relations. State executives
were largely unfettered in their practice of diplomacy which remained weakly
linked to national democratic processes. European integration had as its objec-
tive to democratize and domesticate interstate relations which, according to
Allott, involved an attempt to make the well-being of all of the peoples of
Western Europe . . . part of the common concern of each of the peoples of Western
Europe and to raise the communal interest to the level of the aggregate of the
peoples of Western Europe (Allott, 1991, pp. 2491-3). This aspiration is
reflected in the Preamble of the Treaty of Paris which resolved to substitute for
age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing
an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among
peoples long divided by bloody conflicts (Treaty of Paris, 1951). Economic
integration bore the burden of building apolity. Yet the Union has great difficulty
in breaking free of its economic shackles: market integration, a level playing
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pitch, and the criteria of economic rationality form the leading constitutional
values of this system (Muller and Wright, 1994). There is thus a disjuncture in
the EU system between economic and political integration.
The crisis of confidence in the current integration model and the apparent gap
between national elites and their publics raise important questions about democ-
racy and legitimacy in the Union. In the early years of integration, the Union
could rely on a reservoir of legitimacy transferred to it from the Member States.
Once integration enabled national governments to achieve more effective
governance and prosperity, the consent and participation of Europes electorates
was not so necessary. This has now changed. The breadth and depth of
integration bite more deeply into national policy-making than ever before. The
Union has been involved in a long drawn-out process of constitution-building
since the mid-1980s which has placed considerable strain on Member States
political and parliamentary systems. The problem of democracy and legitimacy
in the EU has many dimensions, notably a weakness of politics, the nature of the
Unions governance structures and the weakness of political community in the
Union.
A Weakness of Politics
The European Union does not represent a shared public realm in any meaningful
sense of the term. The novel idea of transforming diplomacy into democracy
faces considerable barriers. Technocratic impulsion and intergovernmental
bargaining transform issues of politics into issues of diplomacy (ODonnell,
1993, p. 21) Choices are not made on the basis of values, political programmes
and preferences, but on the basis of the so-called national interest, however
defined. The governance structures of the Union serve to dilute political
preferences because an all-part y Commission faces an all-part y Council and
Parliament. The need for parliamentary majorities in the EP blurs the left-right
divide and forces the Christian Democrats and the Socialists into almost
permanent alliances.
Furthermore, the traditional link between the nation-state and the exercise of
legitimate government in Western Europe contributes to a weakness of politics
at the heart of the Union. Representative politics is still largely national which
constitutes a barrier to the emergence of a genuinely European political realm.
The public space remains fragmented into national units (Habermas, 1991). The
profusion of administrative and governmental ties which characterize the Un-
ions governance structures are not matched by comparable linkages between
other parts of the political systems. Europeanization is far more pronounced at
the level of public policy-making than of politics. The transmission belts,
particularly political parties and the media, which animate and structure national
representative democracy are underdeveloped or weakly developed in the
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Union. The German Constitutional Court, in its judgment on the TEU, placed
considerable emphasis on the need for democracy to go beyond the formal
principle of accountability to include a continuous free debate between oppos-
ing social forces, interests, and ideas, in which political goals become clarified
and change course and out of which a public opinion emerges which starts to
shape a political will (TEU judgment, German Constitutional Court, 12 October
1993). European Parliament elections, with a 56 per cent turn out in 1994, do not
provide the kind of democratic validation for the conduct of EU policy as general
elections provide in the national context ( Franklin et al., 1994). Political office-
holders in the Member States, competing for national office, have no incentive
to draw the attention of their electorates to the fact that political authority is
shared and that functions are ebbing away to new centres of power. It is far easier
to obfuscate on European matters rather than to address the problem of power in
contemporary governance. Defending the national interest, bringing home the
bacon, taking credit for Union policy or scapegoating it are all part and parcel
of electoral politics in the Member States.
A Problem of Accountability and Scale
The Unions fragmented and opaque decision-making processes give rise to a
weakness of accountability. The Council meets in secret and is not collectively
accountable at the EU level. Informal politics, and backroom deals between the
three policy-making institutions characterize the process. The vast majority of
decisions are taken by delegated officials, a fact which greatly privileges expert
power over political power. The Commission lacks any direct democratic
mandate although it is held accountable by the EP. Integration has eroded the
powers and presence of national parliaments and removed important areas of
public policy from within their ambit. Qualified majority voting means that
Member States implement and enforce decisions that did not necessarily receive
the support of the national representatives in the Council system.
The growth of intense patterns of internationalized governance raises a
critical problem of scale in contemporary governance. Participation and the
responsiveness of political institutions to the people can more easily be achieved
in relatively small-scale political spaces. The problem of scale distorts the
relationship between the individual citizen and the Union. Apart from the
opportunity to vote every five years, the Union engages people as consumers and
workers, but not really as active citizens. The benefits of integration can come
at the cost of submerging national democratic government into larger and less
democratic transnational political spaces (Dahl, 1994, p. 23). There is a trade-off
between the consequences of integration for national democracies and the need
to participate in structures that help manage interdependence. The paradox is
posited by Dahl in the following manner:
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THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND POLITICAL ORDER IN EUROPE
95
In very small political systems a citizen may be able to participate extensively
in decisions that do not matter much but cannot participate much in decisions
that really matter a great deal. (Dahl, 1994, p. 28)
National electorates in the Union vary greatly in their attitude to the trade-off
between effectiveness and participation, as do national governments in their
willingness to allow their electorates to give their views on this trade-off.
A Weakness of Political Community
The Unions governance structures lack a sense of wholeness (captured by a
newspaper headline as A Union whose Parts do not yet Add Up) both in terms
of constitutional design and political community. It could be argued that
integration does not need the development of political community. The Union
could remain a system designed to deliver a high degree of market integration
involving interested actors engaged in rule-making and competing in the market
place. In this Europe of traders, merchants and bankers, market integration does
not necessarily need political integration, but can rely on the imperatives of
economic interdependence, market access and rational self-interest. Political
forces who view the EU narrowly in terms of a soulless market adopt this
approach to political integration and see no necessary link between political and
economic integration.
This vision of integration, which has powerful political proponents, can be
rejected on a number of grounds. Markets and systems of economic governance
are not created in a vacuum. They need political processes to bind and maintain
them. In themselves market zones, natural-geographic or political-administra-
tive, do not create attachments (Anderson, 1991, p. 53). An emphasis only on
the material benefits of integration will not guarantee continued commitment to
the process. As J acques Delors once remarked, You dont fall in love with a
common market; you need something else (quoted in the European, 3 Novem-
ber 1994, p. 13) The importance of the affective dimension of integration will be
accentuated if the Union moves to a single currency and a European system of
central banks. In any case, the history of policy integration tells us that many
Union policies which were originally justified on market building grounds
gradually assumed an important political and legal dimension.
The Flickering Gleam of a Transnational Political Community
Political communities are based not just on rational calculation but on sentiment,
solidarity and a degree of political cohesion. The nation-state model is predicated
on the existence of a demos or one people. Although Europe cannot create a
demos in the traditional sense, some actors in the integration project have always
stressed the state-building and community-building aspects of their joint enter-
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96 BRIGID LAFFAN
prise. The need to create a peoples Europe and to strengthen the publics
identification with the European project has been a recurring theme in official
thinking on European integration since the end of the 1960s. Regardless of its
feasibility, the Commission, the European Parliament and some national polit-
ical leaders have promoted a peoples Europe and a European identity as
something highly desirable. The search for a peoples Europe stems from a
belief that the creation of a political community needs the emergence of a sense
of community and that the maintenance of economic integration rests in some
measure on political integration. This may seem a vain hope in many respects,
but we should not forget that regions are talked and written into existence.
Neumann argues that [tlhe existence of regions is preceded by the existence of
region-builders, political actors who, as part of some political project, imagine
a certain spatial and chronological identity for a region, and disseminate this
imagined identity to others (Neumann, 1994, p. 58).
Willy Brandts support for Europe with a human face and the endorsement
of political rights for Member States nationals found echoes in the deliberations
of the Adonnino Committee (1985) which was set up to address issues relating
to a peoples Europe. The Committee put forward proposals on the rights of
citizens, youth exchange, culture, health, free movement of people, town
twinning and symbols of EU identity. The objective of the package of policies
that flowed from the Addonino Committee is gradually to change peoples
consciousness of political realities and the political domain to which they belong.
This is a deliberate process of manufacturing and legitimizing a European
identity from the top down. Commission reports refer with considerable
frequency to Europes cultural heritage, of spreading European messages
across borders and of showing that Europe existed for the people and to
convince them of the benefits inherent in the construction of Europe (CEC,
1994). There is a tendency to equate an identity for the EU with Europe as a
whole. J ust as nation-states are imagined communities, official policy in the
Union is to construct Europe as an imagined community.
There are three lines of policy designed to show that Europe exists for the
people. These are :
I the move from consumer to citizen
0 the politics of identity and symbols
I the creation of non-economic cross-national networks
The development of individual rights in the Union has been a slow process; it
began with the free movement provisions of the Paris Treaty and was gradually
expanded by proactive policies on the part of the Commission and landmark
judgements of the European Court of J ustice (ECJ ). The ECJ expanded the
interpretation of workers and established the framework for the emergence of
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individual rights. Member States acquiesced to these changes although they
strongly contested them before the Court. The inclusion in the TEU of a chapter
on Citizenship of the Union which lists seven rights, including two limited
political rights, begins the process of redefining the boundaries of political
community in Europe. Although the rights are limited and based on citizenship
of one of the Member States, the TEU marks an important shift from EU
consumer to EU citizen. The dynamism inherent in the development of EU
citizenship is captured by Meehan, when she argues that a new kind of
citizenship is emerging that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but which is
multiple in enabling the various identities that we all possess to be expressed, and
our rights and duties exercised through a complex configuration of common
institutions (Meehan, 1993, p. 185).
Since the 1980s political actors in the Union have adopted traditional nation-
building strategies by fashioning emblems such as the European flag, passport,
driving licence, the European anthem and European sporting occasions. New
symbols and rituals have been added to the existing national emblems that have
played such a powerful role historically in national polities. The blue flag with
its golden stars is now flown from public buildings, industrial enterprises and
even on beaches that conform to EU environmental standards. In many regions
and towns throughout Europe, the name of the region or commune is contained
within the 12 stars of the Union. Individual travellers arriving at airports or ports
are reminded of their status as Cives Comunifatis Europeue or EC Nationals,
although the Schengen Agreement establishes yet another marker of difference.
The boundaries of inclusion no longer end at national borders.
The Commissions strategy of fostering cross-national networks and of
encouraging mobility provides an important channel for the emergence of a
European civil society and an alternative form of politics. The Unions budget
is increasingly used to promote links and networks between social groups and
regions within the Member States. Mobility programmes such as Erasmus, Petra,
Lingua and Comett have financed the mobility of 250,000 students and young
workers since 1987. Although small in relation to the total size of the student
population, these programmes add a cosmopolitan flavour to all university
campuses. Research and Development programmes, which began in the early
1980s, have spawned extensive inter-industry and transnational research net-
works throughout. The Unions regional policies have promoted the growth of
cross-border and transnational linkages and relationships between areas faced
with similar problems such as Europes coal fields or cities in crisis.
Notwithstanding the dominance of producer groups in the Unions configu-
ration of interests, voluntary organizations increasingly see the need to organize
at an EU level. The Commission itself has deliberately created and funded some
of these networks, notably, the European Network of Women, the European
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98 BRIGID LAFFAN
Womens Lobby, the European network of One Parent Families, the European
Network of the Unemployed and the Anti-Poverty Network. In addition, there
are hundreds of non-funded social networks in Brussels (Harvey, 1992). These
groups are no longer constrained by their national political arenas as they seek
alternative and additional forms of political activity. They use their participation
in Brussels to get access to EU funding, to learn alternative lobbying strategies
and to participate in additional channels of influence. Involvement in trans-
national groupings is used tactically to influence agenda setting and policy
output at national level. These groups get considerable empowerment from
involvement in political activity outside the confines of their individual states
(Bennington and Harvey, 1994).
Inevitably the construction of a political community in the Union is highly
contested and subject to considerable ambiguity about goals and means. The
causal link between top-down strategies pursued by official Union policy and
attitudinal changes is far from clear. There are misgivings about the feasibility
of creating a European identity, uncertainty about the historical ingredients that
can be used to invent such an identity and doubts about the compatibility of
national identities with a European identity. Smith, who has written extensively
on nationalism, argues that national identities continue to :
possess distinct advantages over the idea of a unified European identity. They
are vivid, accessible, well established, long popularised and still widely
believed in broad outline at least. In each of these respects, Europe is deficient
both as an idea and as a process. Above all, it lacks a pre-modem past - a pre-
history which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical depth.
(Smith, 1992, p. 62)
According to Smith, the idea of Europe is not capable of competing with the
existing rich tapestry of national identities. Europe cannot arise without myth
or shared memories because all durable collective identities need them, accord-
ing to this view (Smith, 1992, p. 74). Perhaps Smith overstates the intensity of
national identity in contemporary western Europe where identities are not fixed
but fluid and thus open to new definitions and frameworks. While Smith is
undoubtedly right in arguing that a putative European identity would be much
weaker than pre-existing national ones, national identities may well be more
malleable than Smith suggests (Howe, 1995).
A shared European identity is possible only if based on notions of multiple
identities, of the continuing existence of European peoples rather than a Euro-
pean people. A European identity can be one of many identities held by people.
A European identity is not likely to transcend national identities but may develop
as a weaker form of identity in a hierarchy or circle of identities. For some
Europeans, Europe is already part, albeit a weak part, of their identity structure.
Reifs analysis of Eurobarometer data concludes that attachment to village (85
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THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND POLITICAL ORDER IN EUROPE 99
per cent), region (87 per cent), and country (88 per cent) far outweigh attachment
to Europe (48 per cent). Although some 62 per cent of respondents saw a sense
of European identity as being compatible with a sense of national identity, 51
per cent said that they never felt European (Reif, 1993). Hence the notion of a
hierarchy of identities cannot necessarily be generalized. Some states may try to
contain the emergence of multiple identities by preventing or seeking to
delegitimize the Unions state-building activities. Moreover, those Europeans
who continue to see identity in exclusive closed terms are unlikely to see
themselves as part of a larger European community, and will resist erosion of
their national identities. Others will be open to identification with a community
that transcends national boundaries. The danger is that a European identity may
be the preserve of Europes elites for whom Europe is already a social space, or
that it may constitute a mechanism of fragmentation and exclusion.
If we accept that political integration needs a sense of community and shared
identity, the challenge is to construct a European identity that embraces
inclusive political values (Garcia, 1993, p. 173). What are the principles on
which an inclusive identity should rest? (Garcia, 1993; E. Holm, 1994; BBV
Foundation, 1993; Cable, 1994). First, the importance of appeals to the future,
of a shared destiny, is potentially powerful. The image of a collective future has
been used by political leaders in the past to give political cement to multicultural
states such as the US. Second, is the idea that diversity itself is a value that must
be protected in the New Europe. The EU cannot and should not seek to produce
a European people. The BBV Foundation study argues that
To be European will mean being part of a rich diversity through which alone
the all-European identity exists, and whose components are mutually accept-
ed and recognised as equal. One would be a European through being German,
Italian, Danish etc. or also: a Sicilian, a Bavarian, a French Corsican, a British
Indian, or a Russian Jew. (BBV Foundation, 1993, p. 52)
Put another way, different Europeans experience their Europeanness in different
ways. Tolerance would be institutionalized insofar as the recognition of other
would be a condition for the recognition for each particular identity. This leads
to a third factor in the development of an inclusive identity: the sense that a
European identity must be built on the civic dimension of nationality, such as
citizenship, rather than myths of dubious historical validity.
IV. Conclusions
This article has focused on the role of identity politics in contemporary Europe
and the consequences for the Unions political order. A central thrust of the
argument is that identity politics are of enormous salience in the New Europe, but
that the pattern is confused and uncertain for politics within states, in the Union
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and the wider Europe. Problems of identity are raised by the politicization of
immigration, the fragmentation of the post-war order, regionalism and the
revival of the ultra right. The evident taming of nationalism in western Europe
is juxtaposed with the revival of ethno-nationalism in the eastern part of the
continent. Regionalism points to a fragmentation of hierarchical political order
within states and to the assertion of identities in new political arenas, including
the EU. On the other hand, the rise of the right, its antipathy towards European
integration and its exclusive view of who belongs point to a nostalgia for the
past and stable national myths. Aclosedview of national identity is still treasured
by some Europeans and their political leaders.
The article argues that the affective dimension of the European project is
critical to the Union at this juncture because the Monnet method of integration
has reached its limits and the prospect of a continental enlargement looms.
Whatever we think about the feasibility of a European identity, the experience
of the TEU ratification crisis suggests that the emergence of a stronger sense of
community is necessary if the Union is to overcome its shallow political roots.
The route towards a Union based on inclusive political values lies in embedding
the civic dimension of nationhood in a European-wide political process. The
Unions top-down strategies of state-building have a role to play in altering
perceptions of the political space to which individual Europeans belong. This
does not mean that the Union should set out to replace national identities, even
if it could, but that the extension of political space beyond the nation-state
provides a shelter for multiple identities be they local, regional or national. The
EU could be, and in some senses already is, a catalysing agency for inculcating
certain political norms and rights within the EU and enticing non-EU states
towards similar values as the price for entering the club. In this way political
Europe may join economic Europe.
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