Table of Contents:

1) Introduction of the Committee Directors.3

2) Introduction of the Secretary Generals5

3) Introduction of the CIU..7

4) Introduction to Topic Area A9

5) Impediments to Internet Access.11

6) Limits on Content..14

7) Violation of User Rights.19

8) Current Situation24

9) Questions a Resolution Must Answer..26

10) Topic B...................................................................................27

11) Introduction to Topic Area B28

12) Overview of the Security Challenges to Pakistan..28

13) Major Conflict Stricken Zones.31

1

14) Karachi Power Dynamics.39
15) Drone Attacks and its Viability.41

16) Ongoing Sectarian Conflicts44

17) Religious Extremism and Shia Genocide44

18) Terrorism.46

19) De-Weaponisation47

20) Kashmir Issue48

21) Pakistan Nuclear Security52

22) Key Groups.53

23) Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)...54

24) Border Insecurity.58

25) Conclusion...59

26) Questions a Resolution Must Answer...59




2

Message from the Committee Directors:

Greetings Delegates,
so we shall be meeting again. Before everything else, welcome to the
Pakistan Cabinet at PAFMUN 2014. I, Ramsha Wasti, shall be your
committee director alongside the very talented Khushhal Nadir Hadi.
I am a first semester student at IBA, and have had the honor of being
associated with PAFMUN since its inception back in 2012; serving as an
ACD in 2012, and then as the President of PAFMUN 2013. I was
introduced to Model United Nations a couple of years ago, and since
then, it has been a fast paced journey. I have attended various MUNs in
varying capacities, participating both as a delegate as well as the
member of several secretariats. Honestly speaking, I was thoroughly
disappointed when I was forcibly placed in Pakistan National Security
Council at ZABMUN 2013. I never had any intention to go to PNSC, but
those four days, which were extremely grueling, made me realize the
importance of this very council, and harvested my interest in Pakistani Politics. It is easier to sit in the comfort
of our homes, and blame our politicians for the worsening conditions of the country. But it is rather difficult to
put ourselves in their shoes, analyze the issues deteriorating Pakistan and then to come up with pragmatic and
implementable solutions. It is comparatively easier for us to blame the government for the Kashmir issue,
insurgencies in Balochistan, and riots and killings in Karachi or all across the country, for that fact, but it is
utmost difficult and challenging to assume the roles of these very politicians and devise a future strategy or a
security policy for Pakistan. So before you come to this committee, I want you to realize that you yes, you, as
an individual, do have the potential to make an effort and bring about a change no matter how small or
insignificant it may be in your opinion. Pakistans Cabinet helps, and takes you to the first step of change by
giving you an insight into the politics of Pakistan ranging from the defense policy to the foreign one.
Moreover, over the course of my MUN career, I have heard a whole lot of people complain that MUNs are
generally monopolized by those delegates who can speak well in English. Well, you dont need to worry about
that anymore because at Pakistan Cabinet, PAFMUN14, you can speak in Urdu, English, or in a mixture of
both. In the midst of all this, dont forget the piles of research because I have a habit of questioning the
delegates and grilling them to a great extent which ultimately makes you a better debater. While your aim
with respect to the conference should be to research well, critically analyze everything, and practice the art of
diplomacy, my aim is to make sure that you gain something positive out of the conference and you feel like
you have improved when you walk out of the gates of PAF Chapter. Lets just say that Pakistan Cabinet shall
test you to the limits and will develop your personality over the course of four days. See you guys soon.
Godspeed!

Syeda Ramsha Wasti,
Committee Director Pakistan Cabinet,
PAFMUN 2014.
3

Greetings, Delegates!
I am Khushhal Nadir Hadi, and I have the esteemed honour of
serving as your Committee Director for the Pakistan Cabinet
at PAFMUN 2014. I also have the pleasure of chairing
alongside the multi-talented and versatile Ramsha Wasti, a
very dear friend of mine.
A little bit about me would be welcome, I suppose, since that
seems to be the point behind this intro. I am currently in my
first year MBBS at the Khyber Medical College, Peshawar.
Having been a part of PAFMUN since its conception, in
various capacities, I have witnessed firsthand the wonders of
PAFMUN 2012 as well as the excellence that was PAFMUN
2013. Public Speaking is like second nature to me, having
being involved in it over the past decade. I love swimming,
football, Sherlock/Arrow/Game of Thrones, and am a DOTA-
addict (oh yes, we medical students have spare time too ) The rest of my credentials and
qualifications are no more than a short question away, as I do not wish to bore you with such
tedious details, For the moment, at least.
This is the very first time PAFMUN is hosting a Pakistan Cabinet, so naturally both Wasti and I
are looking forward to seeing how you delegates are going to cope with the duress of a
specialized, personality-based committee. We have some rather entertaining ideas about the
Pakistan Cabinet, so be wary: this isnt for those with tachycardia. If youre weak at heart, do
not, I repeat, do not select the Pakistan Cabinet as your committee. If you do decide that this
is for you, then we expect you to be well-researched, confident, and most importantly,
spontaneous. Because we will NOT hesitate at throwing surprise after surprise at you; after all,
this is Pakistan were talking about, where spontaneous, sudden events are the very norm!
That will be all delegates. May the odds be ever in your favor!

Regards,
Khushhal Nadir Hadi,
Committee Director Pakistan Cabinet,
PAFMUN 2014.


4

Message from the Secretary Generals:

Dear Delegates and all our friends,
It is my distinct pleasure, and my honor to welcome you to the
third annual edition of The City School PAF Chapter Model
United Nations (PAFMUN) Conference.
Over the duration of the conference we aim to present to all
participants of PAFMUN 2014 a comprehensive and unique
simulation of the political impetus that drives the intricacies of
international relations. With a host team and secretariat boasting of some of the most
experienced and knowledgeable individuals nationally, PAFMUN looks to continue acting as a
pioneer for all such conferences as it shall continue to strive for unparalleled academic
excellence.
The nine committees at PAFMUN 2014 have been hand-picked by the members of our
secretariat and as a collective they shall put forth a large selection of topics that shall look to
challenge every facet of a delegates ability and preparation. PAFMUN 2014 shall also once
again consist of a historical committee in order to push delegates understanding of the impact
of past decisions and mistakes.
PAFMUN has always looked to push the boundaries of excellence within both academics and
its organizational power and this year shall be no different as our team works around the
clock relentlessly in order to ensure an experience that is thoroughly enjoyable for all
participants, from the best academic content around, to the most entertaining socials.
I hope to see you all at the beautiful PAF Chapter campus in February to share a story of epic
proportions alongside myself and the rest of the PAFMUN team.
Regards,
Yelmaz Waris Mujtaba,
Secretary General,
PAFMUN 2014




5

Greetings Delegates,
It is with immense pleasure that I welcome you all to the Third
edition of the largest school-based MUN conference in Pakistan,
PAFMUN 2014.
I am an A level student at The City School PAF Chapter, also
serving as the President of the schools Public Speaking Society,
along with Co-Presidents Yasir Thara and Syeda Amna Zubia.

We started off two years back with a vision to achieve, succeed
and excel in all aspects of intellectual thinking, social cooperation
and enhancement of analytical comprehension of the most significant issues which the world
faces today, I take immense pride to say that we have served our word by comprising a large
score of delegates in the past and aim to take this legacy of excellence to a whole new level
this year.

What distinguishes PAFMUN from all other conferences is the ultimate amount of stress
provided by the governing body upon the real essence of the conference The debates. This
year, we aim towards providing the most challenging, thought provoking and excruciating
topics in the wide range of committees which we have. From a historical committee to
Pakistans very own cabinet, we have covered every possible aspect a delegate needs to
address when attending such a conference, providing him the knowledge and exposure of a
lifetime.

Our aim is not just to intellectually stuff our delegates but also give them a chance to socially
groom and grow, which we provide through our enthralling social events, where diplomacy is
the name of the game.
The tireless hard work and utmost dedication by Team PAFMUN is proof enough to show the
credibility and sincerity of the conference to the event and to its attendees, promising an
unforgettable four day event.
With all that written above, I hope to see you all as a part of PAFMUN this February.

Regards,
Muhammad Usman Baig,
Deputy Secretary General,
PAFMUN 2014.
6

Message from the CIU:

It was said a few years ago that if the human race is wiped
out in the next 50 years, it will not be because of disease or
an asteroid hitting the earth, but because of foreign policy
and international relations. In a world where thousands of
nuclear weapons exist and more countries are trying to
acquire them, where suicide terrorist strikes come without
warning and thousands die each day from poverty caused by
the way the international system operates, we need to know
about and understand international affairs. Greetings, I am Rahim Rasool and as being part of
the executive council of Pafmun 2014, I welcome you all to this highly prestigious event. Ill be
heading the Central Intelligence Unit along with my hardworking partner Rumail Jawed. For
the past 4 years I am involved in the Model United Nation circuit. Attending my first ever MUN
some few years back, came to me a strong realization of being inherently attached to this; my
extensive love for international relations and geo-politics was the significant reason. Unlike
other departments of the organizing committee, the Central Intelligence Unit will directly be
managing the affairs of all the committees at Pafmun 2014. Likewise CIU will be responsible
for setting the course of the committee, ensuring the intellectual level of debate and
determining crisis!! Pafmun encourages delegates representing their allotted countries, to
share their thoughts on international matters and form connections that will enable them to
implement their visions for the future and hence create a better tomorrow. As form of advice
from CIU, participation in committee, constructive input to discussion and leadership
potentials are all admirable aspects for a delegate. Best of luck, see you in February.

Regards,
Rahim Rasool
Central Intelligence Unit,
PAFMUN 2014.




7

Honorable Delegates
With immense delight and pride I extend to you the
heartiest of welcomes to PAF model United Nations of
2014. I am Rumael Jawed Baig currently in the final year of
my A levels from the City School PAF Chapter. I have been
associated with MUNs since last year and ever since I
dived in the ocean of diplomacy there is no way of coming
back. Along with my very talented partner and debater,
Rahim Rasool I will be rendering the services of the
Central Intelligence Unit and will be adding the spices and
essential salts to the committee proceedings so that the
delegates achieve excellence at MUNning . By adding
different crisis situation and turning the direction of the committee we, the CIU, will guide the
delegates to success, fun and far away from boredom. By partaking in this opportunity to
engage with fellow students on critical issues, my endeavor is to help and give impetus in
transforming all of you into better diplomats of the future who are not only aware of current
affairs and international relations, but are also able to analyze global dynamics.
In this conference you will be able to be able to bring to affect your negotiations, writing,
researching and debating skills and mix these ingredients to cook up the perfect recipe of
diplomacy. I wish all of you the best of luck.
See you guys in February.
Regards,
Rumael Jawed Baig
Central Intelligence Unit,
PAFMUN 2014.




8


Topic Area A:

INTERNET
CENSORSHIP
LAWS WITHIN
PAKISTAN


9

Introduction to topic:
Pakistan has seen an increase in citizen
journalism and online activism in recent
years, despite numerous social and political
obstacles to internet access. Successive
military and civilian governments have
adopted various measures to control the
internet in Pakistan, which they frame as
necessary for combatting terrorism and the
preservation of Islam. However, censorship
decisions often reflect political motives, as
coverage of political independence
movements is consistently censored or the
influence of religious extremists who believe
information and communications
technologies (ICTs) spread obscenity. While
internet penetration continued to improve in
2012 and early 2013, internet freedom in
Pakistan looks increasingly precarious, a
trend that could have significant
consequences for the countrys
socioeconomic development.
Long-awaited general elections to the
countrys national assembly took place on
May 11, 2013, unseating the coalition led by
the Pakistan People's Party and its co-chair,
President Zardari, who remained in office
until his term expired in September
2013. The Pakistan Muslim League under
Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister,
formed the next government in June.
In the run-up to the polls, information
restrictions were focused on maintaining
security. An anti-Islamic video on YouTube
that sparked unrest around the Muslim
world caused the government to block access
to the entire site in September 2012,
followed by an additional 20,000 websites
deemed to contain offensive content.
Authorities also blocked mobile phone
networks throughout major urban centers
during many religious or national holidays.
These supposed security measures, while
restricting ICT usage for hundreds of
thousands of users, failed to curb the rate of
violent, often fatal attacks on journalists and
internet users. Islamic militant groups
targeted internet cafs and mobile phone
stores with explosive devices, and the
Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for
the shooting of 15-year-old blogger and
rights activist Malala Yousufzai in Swat. A
worldwide social media campaign of support
for the teenager was launched; she survived
10

skull surgery and now lives in the United
Kingdom.
Legal measures also threatened digital rights,
particularly over sensitive religious issues. At
least two of the 23 criminal investigations
launched in 2012 under Pakistans strict
blasphemy laws, which carry the death
penalty, involved content sent by mobile
phone. A Twitter spat escalated into a
defamation suit after a political website
accused a religious leader of inciting hatred.
Moreover, in January 2013, the regulatory
authority chairman Farooq Ahmed Khan
announced that a blocking mechanism to
filter un-Islamic, pornographic, and
blasphemous material from websites would
be activated in Pakistan within 60 days.
Whether such technology is now in place,
however, and how closely it relates to a 2012
proposal by the National ICT Research and
Development Fund for a national internet
firewall which was ostensibly scrapped due
to public opposition, is unclearas are the
surveillance implications of the mechanism
for private communications sent via ICTs. In
February 2013, the upper house of
parliament passed the counter-terrorist Fair
Trial Act 2012, which allows security agencies
to monitor electronic communications;
though the surveillance requires a judicial
warrant, some fear the Acts broad wording
leaves it open to abuse.
Despite a proactive defense of internet
freedom by engaged civil society groups and
their embrace of online tools to promote
electoral transparency, recent developments
indicate a worrisome movement from ad hoc
censorship towards systematized filtering
and monitoring that the authorities
preferred not to acknowledge before the
international community. Subsequent to a
Universal Periodic Review of its human rights
practices in late 2012, Pakistan was elected a
member of the United Nations Human Rights
Council for 2013-2015. While its pledge to
the council supporting its candidacy
referenced Pakistans free media and
vibrant civil society, the countrys UN
mission made no mention of the internet at
all, or its recent moves to curtail citizens
digital rights.
IMPEDIMENTS TO INTERNET ACCESS:

11

Internet penetration in Pakistan stood at 10
percent in 2012, according to the
International Telecommunications Union. A
local report put the figure at 16 percent in
mid-2013. Mobile penetration was at 67
percent. Low literacy, difficult economic
conditions, and cultural resistance have
limited the proliferation of ICTs in
Pakistan. Poor copper wire infrastructure and
inadequate monitoring of service quality by
the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority
(PTA) have historically stymied the expansion
of broadband internet. While the cost of
internet use has fallen considerably in the
last few years, access remains out of reach
for the majority of people in Pakistan, and
most users go online at their workplace or
school. Cyber-cafes are largely limited to
major cities, and recent news reports about
employees stealing data to harass female
clients online have contributed to public
perceptions that they are unsafe.

Better quality broadband services remain
concentrated in urban areas like Karachi,
Lahore, Peshawar, Hyderabad, Faisalabad,
and Islamabad. According to 2012 data, there
are 50 operational internet service providers
(ISPs) throughout Pakistan, along with ten
broadband service providers and five hybrid
fiber-coaxial operators providing broadband
internet. All ISPs are controlled by the
government through the PTA. For its
backbone, the country is connected via the
government-controlled Pakistan Internet
Exchange with the SEA-ME-WE 3 and 4
cables, along with backup bandwidth
provided by Trans-World Associates. Local
media reported under-sea fiber optic cables
sustaining damage in two separate incidents
in March 2013, disrupting to up to 50
percent of the countrys connections.

Most remote areas lack broadband, while
slow, intermittent connections render any
meaningful online activities, such as
multimedia training for students and
entrepreneurs, challenging. Conflict-stricken
areas like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly
North West Frontier Province) and the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
have significantly reduced internet
access. Pakistan faced frequent electricity
shortfalls throughout 2012, resulting in
12

outages lasting several hours across the
country. The situation was particularly grim
in rural areas where rolling blackouts
extended to as many as 20 hours a day.

Bureaucratic hurdles have also slowed the
development of 3G or 4G networks, and
wireless service providers using the high-
capacity data network WiMax or high-speed
broadband technology EVDO, along with
mobile operators Mobilink, Ufone, Telenor,
Warid, and Zong have struggled to attract
consumers due to high prices and poor
coverage. In late 2012, a National Assembly
standing committee declared the PTA had
violated rules in auctioning 3G licenses. The
prime minister approved a new 3G policy for
Pakistan and began auctioning contracts to
service providers in January 2013.

The PTA is responsible for issuing licenses to
telecommunications companies and internet
and mobile service providers through a
bureaucratic process that includes hefty
licensing fees. By contrast, internet cafes do
not require a license to operate, and opening
an internet cafe is relatively easy. However,
in January 2012, the provincial cabinet in
Punjab approved a Net Cafe Regulations Act
(Punjab Cyber & Gaming Cafe Regulation Act
2012), which some analysts noted would
oblige cafe owners to register their
businesses, among other requirements that
could potentially restrict user anonymity. The
document was never made public, and after
provincial elections in May 2013 reshuffled
the local administration, it was unclear when
the regulations would be implemented, or if
other provinces would follow suit.

Pakistani authorities often deliberately
obstruct ICT access in the southern province
of Balochistan, where a conflict between
Baloch nationalists and state security forces
or anti-separatist militias has persisted since
1948. During the national March 25 Pakistan
Day celebrations in 2012, mobile service was
cut in the entire province based on Interior
Minister Rehman Maliks order to
implement national security policy,
according to the chairman of the PTA. At
least one local official denied security
concerns and characterized the shutdown as
13

routine maintenance, but many Baloch
people saw the move as discriminatory.

The same tactic was used throughout the
year in cities facing possible security threats.
PTA and security officials partially suspended
mobile networks in urban areas around the
country for a religious holiday in November
2012, during a religious procession in January
2013, to thwart attacks on a political march
on Pakistans capital city led by a reformist
cleric, and on New Years Eve and Eid-ul-
Fitr. Civil society groups consider these
actions an attack on citizens freedom of
expression, and an international service
provider is seeking damages from the PTA
and the information ministry for loss of
revenue.

The prime minister appoints the chair and
members of the PTA, which reports to the
ministry of information technology and
telecommunication. International free
expression groups and experts have serious
reservations about the PTAs openness and
independence as a regulatory body.
LIMITS ON CONTENT:
The governments efforts to systematize
website blocking by creating and installing
new equipment for nationwide content
filtering were among the most concerning
developments of 2012 and 2013. While the
first attempt was supposedly quashed in
March 2012, PTA officials were still voicing
their intent to implement new blocking
technology in 2013. They received an
unexpected boost by the battle over
YouTube, which was unilaterally blocked in
Pakistan in the wake of an offensive, anti-
Islamic upload. Since Google declined to
remove the video, the government refused
to restore access to its video-sharing
platform until it would block the unwanted
content directly. In May 2013, the status of
the new firewall remained unclear.
Since January 2003, the government of
Pakistan has taken steps to censor some
online content, and the system for doing so
has become increasingly sophisticated. A
wide variety of government agencies are
involved in the censorship of online content,
but the PTA is the main one. Authorities can
14

block URLs at the internet exchange point
through the PIE, and individual ISPs are
required to carry out content-related
directives issued by the PTA or have their
license suspended. Individuals or groups also
play a role, petitioning courts to order the
ministry to enact moral bans on online or
traditional media content. Presumably, the
PTA maintains the list of sites to filter, but
the details are not known. There are no
published guidelines outlining how or why
content is blocked or what mechanisms are
available to challenge it. Error messages seen
by users trying to access blocked websites
usually refer to the censored content as
blasphemous or state that the site is
restricted.

Censorship targets some content, such as
pornography, on moral grounds and can be
inconsistent across ISPs, according to an
August 2012 Open-Net Initiative report. A
range of provisions, in the 1996 Pakistan
Telecommunications Act, supports
censorship for the protection of national
security and Islam. Authorities also cite
Section 99 of the penal code, which allows
the government to restrict information that
might be prejudicial to the national interest,
to justify filtering anti-military, blasphemous,
or anti-state content. Critics believe these
issues can serve as a cover for politically
motivated censorship of dissenting voices.
Information disseminated by Balochi and
Sindhi political dissidents, for example, is
among the nations most systematically
censored content. In 2010, authorities
blocked the regions first English-language
news website The Baloch Hal a year after its
launch.

Information perceived as damaging to the
image of the military or top politicians is also
targeted, such as a satirical music video
about military generals, which was replaced
on video-sharing site Vimeo by a page telling
viewers that it was prohibited within
Pakistan in mid-2013. The website of the Lal-
Masjid mosque in Islamabad has been
blocked since 2007 when it became the
center of a government stand-off with
conservative clerics. In July 2011, the website
of the popular American music
magazine Rolling Stone was blocked by at
15

least 13 ISPs after the site published a blog
post discussing Pakistan's insane military
spending. Rollingstone.com remains
blocked as of February 2013 along with the
website of the Toronto Sun newspaper,
supposedly because it published articles by
Canada-based secularist and journalist
TarekFateh criticizing the Pakistani military.

Since website blocking was first observed in
Pakistan, much of it has targeted social
media and communication apps. In 2006, the
PTA, responding to widespread public
pressure, instructed ISPs to block websites
displaying controversial cartoon images of
the Prophet Mohammed, many on Googles
blog hosting platform Blogger. In 2010, over
10,500 websites were blocked, including
many on Facebook, YouTube, Flickr and
Wikipedia, after the Lahore High Court ruled
in favor of a legal appeal made by the Islamic
Lawyers Movement over the Facebook page,
Everybody Draw Mohammed Day. Mobile
phone providers also completely halted
Blackberry services; functionality was only
gradually restored, though web-browsing
functions remained restricted for
longer. While most social-networking and
blog-hosting platforms were available and
widely used throughout 2012 and early 2013,
there were several temporary disruptions of
Facebook and Twitter services, and different
religious groups persistently exerted
pressure on the Pakistani courts to ban
Facebook completely. Groups and individuals
affiliated with political and religious parties
have also filed court petitions against
YouTube.

The most wide-reaching ban in 2012 was
imposed after a Californian internet user
uploaded a 14-minute video to YouTube
ostensibly promoting a movie he had created
to denounce Islam titled The Innocence of
Muslims. In September, the clip was dubbed
into other languages, garnering hundreds of
thousands of views and sparking violent anti-
American protests in several Muslim
countries. In Pakistan, they resulted in at
least 19 deaths. Google, which owns
YouTube, temporarily blocked versions of the
video in some countries but declined to
remove it altogether, and it remained
accessible in Pakistan, despite Prime Minister
16

Raja Pervez Ashrafs request that it be taken
down. News reports in Pakistan attributed
this to the lack of a Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty with the U.S., a legal agreement
through with countries can negotiate over
companies compliance with local laws, but
how far this affected Googles decision is
unclear. In response, the information
ministry instituted a site-wide block on
YouTube on September 17, 2012. By October
9, another 20,000 websites were blocked,
not just for featuring the anti-Islamic movie,
but also for hosting material that the PTA
characterized as objectionable.

Prior to this incident, many blocks were
implemented on a temporary basis to calm
protests against online content. In 2012,
however, civil society groups protested
against the ban, which affected more than
seven million users of the service in Pakistan,
to no avail, and it continued almost
uninterrupted through May 2013. The civil
society organization Bytes for All filed a
petition against the block in the Lahore High
Court in January; hearings are
ongoing. Students who frequently refer to
YouTube online lectures were particularly
affected, and one institution, Pakistans
Virtual University, moved all educational
material formerly hosted on YouTube to its
own servers. In early 2013, Pakistani officials
stated that the ban would stay in place until
Google removed the content or until a
nationwide filtering mechanism was in place,
allowing them to control what YouTube
content is available for themselves.

The government set out to acquire such a
mechanism in February 2012 on grounds that
the ISPs and backbone providers were unable
to manage the volume of blacklisted sites
manually. The National ICT Research and
Development Fund invited ICT companies to
submit proposals to develop and operate a
national level URL Filtering and Blocking
System, preferably one able to handle a
block list of up to 50 million URLs with a
processing delay of not more than 1
millisecond. Websites with blasphemous,
un-Islamic, offensive, objectionable,
unethical, and immoral material would be
targeted, according to the notice. After
widespread protest from civil society, the
17

request for proposals was apparently
shelved, although that change was
announced in the media rather than an
official press release. In January
2013, PTA Chairman Farooq Ahmed Khan
announced that an apparently unrelated
new mechanism for blocking un-Islamic,
pornographic, and blasphemous material
from websites would be activated in Pakistan
within 60 days, according to the Pakistan
Today newspaper. Other news reports were
less clear about the timing for implementing
new filtering devices, possibly reflecting
internal disputes between the PTA and the
information ministry over costs and
responsibility for the project.

Authorities also target users seeking to
access blocked content. In August 2011, the
PTA sent a legal notice to all ISPs in the
country urging them to report customers
using encryption and virtual private networks
(VPNs), technology that allows internet users
to go online undetected, access blocked
websites, and conceal communications from
government monitoring, on grounds of
curbing communication between
terrorists. International and civil society
organizations in Pakistan raised effective
voice against this repressive
development; however, the order still stands
as of early 2013.

Despite existing limitations on online
content, and looming new ones, Pakistanis
have relatively open access to international
news organizations and other independent
media, as well as a range of websites
representing Pakistani political parties, local
civil society groups, and international human
rights organizations. ICTs, particularly mobile
phones, promote social mobilization,
especially on free expression issues. The
2010 floods in Pakistan, for example, inspired
many Pakistani citizens and members of the
diaspora to mobilize and raise funds
online. Nevertheless, most online
commentators exercise a degree of self-
censorship when writing on topics such as
religion, blasphemy, separatist movements,
and womens and LGBT rights.

18

The relationship between citizen journalism
and traditional media in Pakistan is mutually
reinforcing. In 2013, reports of election
rigging spread via Facebook and Twitter,
prompting traditional media coverage. Social
media advocacy also advanced a police
investigation into the shooting murder of 20-
year old uptown Karachi resident Shahzeb
Khan in December 2012. The mainstream
media and police initially responded with
apathy to news of the attack, perhaps
because one of his alleged assailants was
well-connected. However, a cameraman
uploaded footage of the incident to YouTube
for users still accessing the banned service
via proxy servers. Thousands subsequently
expressed concern for Shahzeb on Twitter
and Facebook until the chief justice of the
Supreme Court directed Karachi police to
expedite the investigation. A court sentenced
two perpetrators to death and their
accomplices to life imprisonment in June.
VIOLATIONS OF USER RIGHTS:

In February 2013, the upper house of
parliament granted security agencies
permission to monitor private e-mails and
mobile phone communications collect
evidence of terrorist activity when they
passed a piece of 2012 legislation governing
trials. Other legal challenges faced by ICT
users included a defamation suit stemming
from comments made via Twitter, and of the
23-odd blasphemy cases reported in 2012, at
least two involved text messages, causing
one family to flee their home and one arrest.
Though attacks on journalists from
traditional media far outstripped those on
bloggers and internet users, both groups
received threats. In a case which resounded
around the world, insurgents shot and
seriously injured MalalaYousufzai for creating
online content for the BBC about her life as a
school-girl in a Taliban-controlled region of
Pakistan.
Article 19 of the Pakistani constitution
establishes freedom of speech as a
fundamental right, although it is subject to
several restrictions. Pakistan also became a
signatory to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in 2010. In 2011,
Pakistan Peoples Party lawmaker Sherry
Rehman, now ambassador to the United
19

States, introduced the Right to Information
Bill in the National Assembly, a law that
would prevent all public bodies from
blocking a requesters access to public
records. A Senate sub-committee reviewed
the draft in June 2013 in preparation for
tabling it for parliament to pass.

Section 124 of the Pakistan penal code on
sedition by words or visible
representation is broadly worded, though it
has been used infrequently to punish
journalists and online speech. However,
Section 295(c), which covers blasphemy, has
been invoked to limit freedom of expression
and has featured in most recent cases
concerning internet speech. In 2010, police
initiated legal proceedings against Facebook
founder Mark Zuckerberg over the page
titled, Everyone Draw Mohammad
Day. The maximum punishment for
blasphemy is life imprisonment or the death
penalty, though the charges against
Zuckerberg appear to have been quietly
dropped after they were ridiculed in the
press.

At least 23 blasphemy cases involving 27
defendants were reported in 2012, according
to the Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan. Some of these involved electronic
media. In October 2012, for example,
neighbors filed a police complaint against a
16-year-old Christian boy in Karachi for
allegedly sending them a blasphemous text
message.Reflecting the difficulty of proving
intent in such cases, media reports published
conflicting accounts of the message, some
reporting that the unnamed boy
acknowledged forwarding a message but
denied creating it, and others saying the
message was sent when his mobile phone
was commandeered by friends. His family
fled the area and neighbors ransacked their
house. A second text message resulted in the
arrest of the sender, even though he claimed
to have circulated the blasphemous content
to resolve a dispute with a customer.

Accusing someone of blasphemy leaves them
vulnerable to attack, regardless of whether it
has foundation, while attempts to reform the
punitive laws leave even politicians
vulnerable. In January 2013, the Supreme
20

Court ordered an investigation into
Ambassador Sherry Rehman after a
businessman accused her of blaspheming the
Prophet during an October 2010 television
talk show appearance to defend proposed
changes to the blasphemy laws; police and
lower courts had refused to consider the
case. Three months after that TV
appearance, Salman Taseer, the governor of
Punjab, was murdered by his own bodyguard
for criticizing the same laws.

The 2004 Defamation Act allows for
imprisonment of up to five years, and
observers fear a chilling effect if it is used to
launch court cases for online expression,
particularly since internet users are already
seeking to prosecute their rivals. In January
2013, a Twitter feud escalated into a
defamation suit when TahirAshrafi, head of
the Pakistan Ulema Council of Muslim clerics
and scholars, announced that he would
initiate civil proceedings against Let Us Build
Pakistan, a political website, for allegedly
inciting sectarian violence. A writer on the
site, which critics censure for spreading hate
speech, had accused Ashrafi of forming
alliances with banned extremist groups.

Government surveillance is a concern for
activists, bloggers, and media
representatives in Balochistan, as well as
ordinary internet users wishing to comment
openly on the state or religion, notably
atheist groups. Pakistani authorities,
particularly intelligence agencies, appear to
have been expanding their monitoring
activities in recent years, while provincial
officials have been exerting pressure on the
central government to grant local police
forces greater surveillance powers and
location tracking abilities, ostensibly to curb
terrorism and violent crimes. ISPs,
telecommunications companies, and SIM
card vendors are required to authenticate
the National Identity Card details of
prospective customers with the National
Database Registration Authority before
providing service. Furthermore, under the
Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance, a
2007 bill that required ISPs to retain traffic
data for a minimum of 90 days, among other
regulationstelecommunications companies
21

were required to keep logs of customer
communications and pass them to security
agencies when directed by the PTA. While
the bill officially expired in 2009, the practice
is reportedly still active.

In February 2013, the upper house of
parliament passed the Fair Trial Act 2012,
which had been approved by the National
Assembly in December. The legislation allows
security agencies to seek a judicial warrant to
monitor private communications to
neutralize and prevent a threat or any
attempt to carry out scheduled offenses;
and covers information sent from or received
in Pakistan or between Pakistani citizens
whether they are resident in the country or
not. The bill was proposed by Law Minister
Farooq Hamid Naek to thwart terrorism, but
its critics counter that the acts wording
leaves it open to abuse, and that it grants
powers to a broad range of agencies. Under
the law, service providers face a one-year jail
term or a fine of up to PKR 10 million
($105,000) for failing to cooperate with the
warrant.

In 2013, a report by Citizen Lab indicated
that Pakistani citizens may be vulnerable to
oversight through a software tool present in
the country. The Governmental IT Intrusion
and Remote Monitoring Solutions known as
FinFisher Suite described in the report
includes the FinSpy tool, which attacks the
victims machine with malware to collect
data including Skype audio, key logs, and
screenshots. The analysis found FinFishers
command and control servers in 36 countries
globally, including Pakistan, on the PTCL
network. This does not confirm that actors in
Pakistan are knowingly taking advantage of
its capabilities. Nevertheless, civil society
organizations called on PTCL to investigate
and disable FinFisher tools.

Pakistan is also reported to be a long-time
customer of Narus, a U.S.-based firm known
for designing technology that allows for
monitoring of traffic flows and deep-packet
inspection of internet communications, and
some media reports say Pakistani authorities
have also acquired surveillance technology
from China. In 2013, when news reports
described the possible introduction of new
22

filtering software to address the YouTube
crisis, some said the information ministry
objected to its additional capacities for
monitoring communications. PTA chief
Farooq Ahmed Khan denied any intent to use
it for surveillance.

Several free expression activists and bloggers
have reported receiving death threats. Many
publicize them, and sometimes attract more,
on Twitter. Most are sent via text message
from untraceable, unregistered mobile
phone connections, often originating from
the tribal areas of the country, and several
include specific details from the recipients
social media profiles or other online activity.
In addition, some militant Islamic groups in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA attack
cybercafs, which they consider sites of
moral degradation. In January 2012, an
explosion outside an internet cafe in
Peshawar, provincial capital of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, killed two people; at least
three more attacks on cybercafs or mobile
phone stores were reported in different
areas of the country in the first half of 2013.

Technical attacks against the websites of
NGOs, opposition groups, and activists are
common in Pakistan but typically go
unreported due to self-censorship. Minority
organizations such as the Catholic-run
human rights advocacy group National
Commission for Justice and Peace have also
been subject to technical attacks. The
websites of government agencies are also
commonly attacked, often by ideological
hackers attempting to make a political
statement. In March 2013, an unidentified
hacker defaced the electoral commissions
website in advance of election. Hackers
defaced websites belonging to the Supreme
Court and the PTA in October 2011
demanding stricter controls for online
pornography. Hackers have also infiltrated
Pakistans internet registry PKNIC, which
manages the countrys top level domains,
including major news websites and Microsoft
and Google regional homepages. The first
attack came on November 24, 2012 and
resulted in several sites being defaced,
including Googles search engine, which was
replaced with an image of penguins and a
Turkish-language message reading Pakistan
23

Downed. The PKNIC failed to adjust its
security and was infiltrated again on
February 4, 2013, apparently to highlight
ongoing vulnerabilities.
Current Situation:
On September 17, 2012 Islamabad blocked
access to the popular video-sharing
website after it aired a trailer for a low-
budget American film deemed offensive to
Islam and the Prophet Mohammed.
Pakistan summoned the most senior
diplomat of the United States present in
the country to protest against Innocence
of Muslims, demanding that the film be
removed and severe action taken against
its producers.
A year later, the film is barely mentioned
but YouTube, whose parent company is US
multinational Google Inc, is still banned in
Pakistan, as it is in China and Iran. Pakistan
is no stranger to censorship. Foreign
television programmes deemed offensive
are blocked while scenes considered too
daring are censored in films shown at
cinemas.But the YouTube ban is in name
only.
Internet users can easily access the site
through a simple proxy or Virtual Private
Network (VPN). Only 10 per cent of
Pakistan's estimated 180 million people
have access to the Internet, one of the
lowest rates in the world.
This ban has no impact, a Pakistani
declares, who still feels guilty about
logging onto YouTube. As a Muslim, I'm
ashamed... because 'Innocence of
Muslims' defiled Islam.
Pakistan blocked the site only after Google
was unable to block access to the film
because it has no antenna in the country.
Although Google's executive chairman Eric
Schmidt defended hosting the film, the
company did have the technology to block
access to it in countries such as Egypt,
India and Saudi Arabia.
Aside from blocking the popular video-
sharing website, the Pakistani government
also ordered that websites be monitored
for anti-Islamic content. The Citizen Lab
24

at the University of Toronto, which
specializes in Internet censorship, says
Pakistan has used Canadian company
Netsweeper to filter websites relating to
sensitive religious topics and unreliable,
independent media. The researchers also
say that pornographic content and
political websites from Balochistan
Pakistan's southwestern province which
has been gripped by separatist insurgency
for the past few years are among those
blocked.
Shortly after former military ruler Pervez
Musharraf was arrested in April, Pakistan
shut down access to a satirical song
posted on YouTube's rival, Vimeo that
poked fun at the army.
People believe that the authorities are
bent on a wider campaign of Internet
censorship, not just restricting access to
items considered blasphemous in the
Muslim nation.
Shahzad Ahmad, director of Internet rights
campaign group, Bytes for All, believes
that online censorship serves a wider
political agenda than just shutting down
blasphemous content. The government is
trying to curtail, limit and curb citizen
freedom of expression, Ahmad declared.
He says citizens are waging a cyberwar
against Pakistani institutions who are
blocking and filtering Internet content.
There is a very clear defiance from users,
particularly from the youth on
government filtering, he added. Bytes For
All has gone to court in Lahore, demanding
an end to illegal and illegitimate
censorship of the Internet.
The fight is vital to stop the government
developing tools of censorship that
threaten the security and private lives of
individuals, says Farieha Aziz, a director at
the Bolo Bhi advocacy group that is closely
following the case, which encompasses
the YouTube ban.
Software surveillance FinFisher, developed
by British company Gamma and able to
access content on personal computers,
has been detected recently on Pakistani
servers. Although it is unclear whether it
has been deployed by Pakistan's own
intelligence agencies or foreigners, the
25

National Security Agency (NSA) scandal in
the United States has greatly heightened
suspicions. In Pakistan, the cyber war has
only just begun.
Questions a Resolution Must
Answer:
What measures must be taken to prevent
offensive content?
What can be done to block specified
content instead of the entire site(if
applicable)?
Which key organizations must regulate
the content over internet?
To what extent must internet freedom be
provided in Pakistan?
What modifications can be brought in
Internet Regulation Bill?
How to ensure transparency in
monitoring of illicit content?
How to control content on social media
that incites ethnic conflict?
How to ensure that democratic principles
are conserved in regards of censoring
content that may target government
authorities?
Is there a need to revamp the current
definition of 'offensive content' provided
by the PEMRA?









26

TOPIC AREA B:
DEVISING A
SECURITY AND
DEFENSE
POLICY FOR
PAKISTAN
27

Introduction:
Pakistan is passing through probably the
most critical phase of its history. Despite the
succession of the second civil government, it
seems as if nothing has changed in the
country. There is much confusion between
the major political parties on some of the
most challenging issues. However, the worst
matters consist of those related to national
security.
It is the basic duty of the state to protect the
life and property of its citizens. Any failure in
doing so creates disharmony between the
state and its inhabitants. Pakistan is facing
serious security issues from Gilgit to Karachi
while politicians and state institutions appear
to be crippled. The politics of so-called right
and left has divided public opinion. The law
and order situation is the worst in decades.
Besides, there is no consensus on the line of
action to cope with.
The mess is everywhere, be it FATA,
Baluchistan, Karachi, interior Sindh or
Punjab. One may hardly hear anything
soothing from the center. In one of his recent
statements, the law minister of Punjab
clearly stated that his party, the government
and security establishment were not on the
same wavelength in terms of security policy
for the country.
It is surprising and somewhat heartbreaking
that the PML-N despite its tall electoral
claims has so far failed to provide any
direction to deal with state-threatening
security challenges. The basic of needs is
safety and security whereas the PML-N
government is focusing on other trivial
matters.
State institutions not only remain lacking in
capacity but are badly suffering at the hands
of political interference, an example of which
is the Sikandar incident in the heart of
Islamabad. Retreat of the state is providing a
boost to outlaws in all parts of the country.
The deteriorating security situation is also
giving Pakistan a notorious name on an
international level, the price of which every
Pakistani pays when he travels abroad.
Pakistan has been turned into a burning kiln
for its own people. Nations rise from the
ashes and reach the skies. There is always an
opportunity in the worst of times. The state
and government must act in unison and take
Pakistan out of its quagmire.
Overview of Security Challenges to
Pakistan:
The pivotal concern of Pakistans national life
is security, both internal and external i.e.
countrys defense from hostile forces from
within and without. Pakistan is facing
28

extensive challenges to its security which
have direct linkages to external threats. The
vulnerable security of any state is a sweet
dish for major key players of international
politics as well as for regional players to
secure their interests. Nevertheless, rise of
terrorism in the aftermath of American
attack on Afghanistan in October 2001 has
worsened the security situation of the county
to an unprecedented degree. Moreover it
has brought a lot of foreign influence in the
region but especially in Pakistan because
Pakistan has a special geo-strategic location
in the region.
Pakistans security challenges can be
categorized in traditional challenges and
non-traditional ones.
As far as traditional challenges are
concerned, terrorism remains to be the
primary threat to the internal security of
Pakistan. However, crimes do have a strong
nexus. Drug cartels, criminal gangs have
joined hands with terrorists for economic
gains. Terrorism and crime are the main
challenges with hosts of threats enablers and
multipliers.
These traditional threats have peculiar
manifestation in various regions of Pakistan.
It may be noticed that the main players
involved in the internal security environment
are polity, clergy, militants, feudal elite, tribal
chieftains and criminal mafias. Foreign
players are virtually a rider clause in each
case.
One of the most vital region in witch these
activates are carried out is Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is the
chief boiling point and a source of terrorism
in the country. It not only promotes
terrorism in different parts of the country
but is also a safe heaven for terrorists and
criminal gangs. The terrorists of this region
are continuously challenging the authority of
the government. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP) is the chief organization which is
operating in these areas, which is a
composition of twenty eight different
groups.
Along with the trans-nationalist TTP, the
evidence of foreign players intervention in
the region has been noticed various
times. The modern weapons and training of
these high profile terrorists show the
participation of foreign players in Pakistani
areas.
About 4000 people had been killed in 2012
among which 600 were security personnel
and the remaining were civilians. Terrorists
attacked 1485 times on security forces and
the security forces arrested 1138 terrorists
during 2012. These facts and figures show
the wide range activities of terrorists in all
29

the parts of the country and chiefly in tribal
areas.
Beside these two regions Karachi, the
economic hub of Pakistan, is facing
numerous tides of instability. But Karachi has
different dynamics of instability as compared
to FATA and Baluchistan. Vital security issues
in Karachi are street crimes, car snatching,
burglary, kidnapping and the most critical
target killing. Each act of crime is lamentable
and cannot be endorsed. Certainly more than
the crimes, it is processional religiosity and
dirty politics (political mafias) which are
responsible for the miserable plight of the
metropolis. Different political parties are
involved in this filthy game. These political
parties are occupied in different areas of the
city. They are involved in killing the opposite
members of their rival panty. They collect
money by using force in their dominated
areas. This situation has a worse impact upon
the economy of the country because the city
generates the lion share of 67% for the
national exchequer and 35% of the GDP.
Processions and law and order situation
stops the wheel of industry and according to
an estimate, one day procession costs the
loss of approximately three to five billion
rupees. Certainly Karachi needs a different
kind of treatment in internal security
campaign of the country.
Beside these areas, Madrassas or religious
seminaries too have a role in security related
issues in Pakistan. These Madrassas are
promoting extremism because they are
teaching purely sect-based education which
results in extremism. This extremism leads to
intolerance for other sects and adds
extremism in the society. Starting with about
189 in 1947, Pakistan today has thousands of
Madrassas but no one knows the exact
number, estimate ranges from 12,000 to
40,000.
Sectarian violence is also a serious threat to
Pakistan national security. In the recent years
Pakistan faced sharp sectarian violence.
Inter-faith violence is also common involving
violence against members of non-Muslims
faiths, particularly Ahmadis, Hindus and
Christians, who along with Parsis, Sikhs and
Buddhists account for fewer than 4% of 180
million strong populations. Sectarian
violence on the other hand, unfolds between
the two main sects of Islam, Shias and
Sunnis, but violent incidents between the
Braveli and Deobandi sub sects of Sunni
Islam are also on rise. The current sectarian
violence can be traced to the rise of Pakistani
Taliban in the mid 2000s. This sectarian
violence certainly is the outcome or
aftermath of the U.S led war against
terrorism.No doubt sectarian violence is the
most dangerous threat to Pakistans national
security after terrorism.
30

Another security threat to Pakistan is the
deployment of 700,000 troops of India in
Jammu and Kashmir. Indian troops
withdrawal from Kashmir is vital to prevent
another Indo-Pak war. The conflicts between
India and Pakistan are a permanent source of
threats to national security of both countries.
Indian authorities have been quick to look
towards Pakistan as the main cause of Indias
internal security issues such as the attack at
Mumbai in November 2008.
On the other hand, Pakistani forces have
recovered weapons of Indian origin in
operations against non-state actors in
Baluchistan and the Swat valley, suggesting
that there has been a serious attempt on the
part of India to destabilize Pakistans internal
security.
The ongoing US led war against terrorism in
Afghanistan also has a dramatic effect on
Pakistans security. Pakistan is already facing
a tough battle against militants in tribal
areas. Moreover, greater number of militants
would add to the miseries of already fragile
security of Pakistan.
Major Conflict Stricken Zones:
Bal uchi stan:
The cur r ent scenar i o of t he conf l i ct
i n Bal uchi st an st ar t ed bui l di ng up
when t he f eder al aut hor i t i es i n
Paki st an i ni t i at ed devel opment of
Gwadar Por t wi t h r oad and r ai l
l i nks. The devel opment pr oj ect s of
t he coast al hi ghway and t he Gwadar
por t have been al so opposed by
Bal och nat i onal i st s. Bal ochi
r esi st ance t o def y gover nment s
ef f or t s t o st ar t Gwadar was based
on t he char ge t hat i t wi l l change
Bal ochi et hni c cul t ur e.
Bal ochi di saf f ect i on gr ew mor e i n
t he af t er mat h of t he at t ack on t he
Tal i ban i n Af ghani st an and t he
est abl i shment of US bases i n Pasni ,
Gwadar , Dal bandi n and J acobabad
i n Si ndh. Thi s was not so much
because of t he US mi l i t ar y
pr esence, but because of
admi ni st r at i on s deci si on t o
est abl i sh some ar my cant onment s
i n Bal ochi st an.
Dur i ng t he ei ght year s of
Mushar r af s mi l i t ar y r ul e i n
Paki st an, t he absence of pol i t i cal
pr ocess t hat was necessar y t o deal
wi t h t he i nsur genci es r esul t ed i n
t he f ur t her al i enat i on of even
moder at e Bal och nat i onal i st f r om
t he Feder at i on of Paki st an. I t shut
t he door s of negot i at i on pr ocess
wi t h t he Bal och Leader s.
31

Thi s conf l i ct became mor e i nt ense,
i n 2006, when NawabBugt i , t he
Bal och t r i bal l eader and ex- chi ef
mi ni st er and gover nor of
Bal uchi st an, was ki l l ed i n an ar my
oper at i on. He had been accused by
Paki st an s gover nment f or car r yi ng
out ser i es of bomb bl ast s, ki l l i ngs
of hi s own peopl e and mai nl y t he
r ocket at t ack on t he Pr esi dent of
Paki st an. He was l auded as a l eader
of Bal och by t he nat i onal i st s who
had di ed f i ght i ng f or t hei r cause
and was t ur ned i nt o a her o.
Dur i ng t hi s t i me, t he pol i t i cal
par t i es di d not pl ay t hei r r ol e t o
r ai se t he i ssue of depr i vat i on and
negl ect ed i t at ser i ous l evel . Thi s
was not l i mi t ed t o t he r ul i ng
par t i es; unf or t unat el y opposi t i on
al so i gnor ed t he Bal uchi st an i ssue.
I n t he Al l Par t i es Conf er ence t hat
was hel d i n 2007, t o pl an a
col l ect i ve l i ne of act i on t o deal wi t h
t he di f f er ent pr obl ems f aced by
Paki st an, t he Bal uchi st an pr obl em
was not even i ncl uded i n t he
agenda.
The danger , as ment i oned ear l i er , i s
t wo- f ol d. The educat ed mi ddl e cl ass
i n Bal och t owns has st ar t ed r al l yi ng
behi nd nat i onal i st s and even
sar dar s. These sar dar s wi l l never
del i ver but l i ke t he ot her
Paki st ani s, ar e bei ng f ool ed i nt o
ut opi an i deal i sm. Secondl y var i ous
vest ed l ocal , nat i onal and
i nt er nat i onal i nt er est s ar e t r yi ng t o
t ake advant age of t hi s si t uat i on.
To summar i ze, t he nat i onal i st s
compl ai nt s ar e mi x of ol d and new.
Ol der compl ai nt s consi st of l ack of
aut onomy, expl oi t at i on of r esour ces
and l ack of devel opment . I n
addi t i on, t he new compl ai nt s ar e
t hat hundr eds of peopl e ar e mi ssi ng
i n act i on and t her e has been a
si l ent war t hat nat i onal i st s al l ege
st at e i s wagi ng upon t hem.
This region has different dynamics of
militancy. In Baluchistan, there are
militant groups with some 159 training
camps in various areas of the province
(40 are allegedly supported by Indian
Raw), housing some 2000 to 5000
guerrillas who are operating hundreds
of militant acts. These groups are not
only targeting security forces, but also
destroying state assets. Hosts of foreign
players are also supporting unrest in
the province due to its resources and
geo strategic location. Raw is accused
certainly for playing negative role in
Baluchistan.
32

Some scholars also referred to an
undeclared proxy war between Iran and
Saudi Arabia in the province of
Baluchistan. Baluchistan poses a serious
threat to national security, sovereignty
and integrity of Pakistan.
The province of Baluchistan increased
its efforts for political and economic
autonomy from Islamabad, with armed
groups attacking gas pipelines, railways
and power transmission lines and
launching rocket attacks on military
targets. The military is said to have
placed 123,000 troops in the Province in
attempts to maintain control.
Both Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch have reported that
government forces (the military,
intelligence agencies and the
paramilitary Frontier Corps) have
engaged in "kill and dump" operations
including targeted killings of opposition
leaders and activists and enforced
disappearances Baloch armed groups
have also been accused of killing
civilians and destroying private
property. They have claimed a series of
bombings on the gas infrastructure.
Teachers and other government
workers seem to have been particularly
targeted. Also, the Hazara Shi'a
community in Baluchistan has
claimed to have hundreds of its
members killed by Taliban and Sunni
extremists since 2004.
Human Rights Watch documented
continued disappearances and an
upsurge in killings of suspected Baloch
militants and opposition activists by the
military, intelligence agencies, and the
paramilitary Frontier Corps. Baloch
nationalists and other militant groups
also stepped up attacks on non-Baloch
civilians, teachers, and education
facilities, as well as against security
forces in the province. Pakistan's
military continued to publicly resist
government reconciliation efforts and
attempts to locate ethnic Baloch, who
had been subject to disappearances.
The government appeared powerless to
rein in the militarys abuses.
Human Rights Watch recorded the
killing of at least 200 Baloch nationalist
activists during the year, as well as
dozens of new cases of disappearances.
Since the beginning of 2011, human
rights activists and academics, critical
of the military, have also been killed in
the province. They include Siddique
Eido, a coordinator for the
nongovernmental Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP); Saba
Dashtiyari, a professor at the University
of Balochistan and an acclaimed Baloch
33

writer and poet; and Baloch politician
Abdul Salam.
North and South Wazi ri stan:
The regions bordering Afghanistan,
North and South Waziristan, continued
to see conflict between supporters of
the regions strengthening Taliban, and
the Pakistani government. In early
2008, for example, there were reports
that up to 90 fighters were killed in
clashes in the tribal region of South
Waziristan, near the Afghan border,
where militants have been openly
challenging the army. Clashes continued
with a report in mid-January of Uzbek
fighters being killed in an assault on the
house of a local administrator. It was
claimed by AFP that Pakistan had
deployed more than 90,000 troops to
this tribal belt to combat Taliban
and Al-Qaeda-linked militants who fled
Afghanistan after the 2001 invasion by
US-led forces invaded the country.
In April 2007, President Pervez
Musharraf admitted publicly for the
first time that the army was helping
tribal fighters battling foreign militants.
In late January 2008, Pakistan sent
reinforcements to the South Waziristan
region on the Afghan border to target
an Islamic rebel commander accused of
involvement in the assassination of
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.
Shortly afterwards, the army claimed to
have killed 40 Islamic militants and
arrested 30 more during two days of
fighting along its border with
Afghanistan. In 2009, there
were reports of helicopter gunships
stepping up attacks aimed at suspected
militant hideouts in Waziristan. The USA
has offered to train Pakistani security
forces in their fight against Al-Qaeda-
linked militants. American drone
attacks have also taken place in
Waziristan, with their
number estimated at 51 in 2009 and
increasing to 118 in 2010. In 2012,
Pakistani lawmakers called on the US to
stop its drone incursions in the country.
Swat val l ey:
Beginning in April 2009, the Pakistani
army conducted a sustained offensive
against Taliban militants in the Swat
valley, in the north of the country. This
came after sharia law was imposed in
the region as part of a deal between
authorities and the Taliban, with the
latter failing to disarm completely and
even spreading to neighboring regions.
Early in the fighting, Human Rights
Watch called on the Pakistani army to
stop its use of landmines and human
34

shields as they placed civilians at
unnecessary risk. In July 2009, the
Government declared the operation a
success and refugees began returning to
the region. Several
militants surrendered. However,
pockets of resistance remained,
including revenge suicide attacks
and accusations of extrajudicial killings
of suspected militants by army forces
continued to surface. Human rights
groups and local residents have
also reported findings of mass graves.
Moreover, as of spring 2011,
Pakistan continued to deny that it was
involved in a non-international armed
conflict in the northern part of the
country and consequently refused to
grant detainees there the rights
afforded them by international law.
FATA:
FATA has remained in international focus,
particularly since the turbulent Cold War
years. Owing to its geostrategic location, the
region became a playground for the rival
forces competing to extend their spheres of
influence. On departure of Soviet forces from
Afghanistan, FATA lost its importance
temporarily, only to re-emerge on the global
scene after 9/11. Tribesmen, who have
guarded their independent status for
centuries, were however quick to realize the
extreme sensitivity of the situation arising
out of the 9/11 when the government of
Pakistan decided to deploy troops along the
western border. The tribesmen rose to the
occasion and in an impressive display of
patriotism not only gave a rousing welcome
to the troops but joined them physically to
guard the border. Some areas which had
been inaccessible in the past were thus
opened up for the first time in history
without a single shot being fired.
Today, the situation in FATA is extremely
volatile having dangerous repercussions not
only for the area but also for the country, for
the region and for the entire world. So, it
becomes important to understand the
situation and then look for a way forward.
There are hardly any easy solutions to this
very complex problem as a number of visible
as well as invisible factors are involved. The
current situation in FATA, indeed, cannot be
seen in isolation. One has to see it in the
backdrop of US attack on Afghanistan in 2001
and the following state of affairs.
In the first week of December 2001, the
Allied Forces launched an operation in Tora
Bora which lies just opposite to Kurram
agency. These are the low hills of Koh-e-
Sufaid (White Mountain) on the Afghanistan
side, very close to the Pakistan border.
Pakistan and its military command were not
35

informed by the US/NATO about this
operation and they came to know about it
through media.
In the face of this Tora Bora operation, some
fleeing militants might have crossed over to
the tribal areas in search of refuge as there
was no presence of law enforcing agencies
and government officials in these "No-go
areas". There was realization of this possible
movement on the Pakistan side and as
Pakistan did not want it to happen, the
decision was taken to deploy Pak army in the
area. As a result of this decision, there were
more than 240 people who came across and
were caught without a shot being fired. This
happened with the assistance and support of
the tribesmen, showing how patriotic and
cooperative these people were who have
now gone hostile. Pakistan army was also
taken very peacefully into Khyber agency and
"No-go areas" such as Tirah, east of Kurram
agency.
Next was Mohmand Agency. Almost one-
fourth of Mohmand agency area was
inaccessible; Pakistan got reports from Allied
Forces that a lot of Al-Qaeda people are
hiding there. Pakistan said that it will block
the border and launch an operation in its
territory to find Al-Qaeda people. Pakistan
army started its movement at 3'o clock in the
morning on 20
th
of June 2003 and by 6'o
clock in the evening reached the Afghan
border. Pakistan army says it was not an
operation and just a walkover as the
tribesmen were very cooperative. They
marched with the army. By August 2003, all
the erstwhile inaccessible areas were under
army's control. Pak troops were deployed on
the border, on the zero line.
Pakistan's military operations continued after
that and are still continuing in Bajour and
Mohmand while some limited operation is
taking place in Khyber Agency. Also, there is
operation in Swat - in its settled area. Exact
figures of casualties of all these operations
are not available but the estimates are that
Pakistani forces have killed approximately
over 2500 people believed to have links with
Al-Qaeda elements, including the local
militants. Over 1,800 of Pakistan's own
troops have been killed and over 3,000 have
been wounded. Regarding the foreigners
present and killed in FATA, different
nationalities are mentioned. Foreigners
apprehended were over 600 including 240
apprehended in December 2001.
Pakistan during last few years tried to bring
the militants onboard by holding talks with
them; on some occasions, agreements were
reached. The agreements, however, were
never allowed to succeed. It is quite evident
that Americans did not want such
agreements. The famous Shakai agreement
of April 2004 with militant leader Nek
36

Mohammad was the first such deal. It was
made after there were bloody clashes in
Wana starting on the 16
th
of March, 2004.
Nek Muhammad was killed in a US missile
strike within one week of signing the
agreement; fighting erupted within hours
after his death and continued till the end of
2004.
In the case of Bajour, Pakistani authorities
decided to get an undertaking from the
tribesmen, not a formal agreement. As per
the undertaking, tribesmen were to refrain
from certain acts and concede that
government will reserve the right to act
against them if they did not conform to the
undertaking. The then governor had got the
undertaking approved. It was decided for the
tribesmen to come and sign the undertaking
on October 30, 2006 at 9 a.m. Somehow this
news leaked out and at 5 a.m. on October
30,

the Madrassah involved in negotiations
was bombed. Bajour has never recovered
since.
The present government in NWFP also signed
some deals with the militants. However, all
such deals have been strongly opposed and
sabotaged one way or the other. The
argument is that the truce resulting from the
agreements gives the militants time to
regroup and reorganize. However, it is
deliberately ignored that military operation
has been resulting in the spread of militancy
from one tribal area to another and also to
settled areas. People have been provoked to
disregard agreements and get back to
fighting.
The reaction to such sabotaged deals and
military operations is fatal, for instance
in Dargai, 42 innocent recruits were killed by
a suicide bomber. Militancy is fast spreading.
Nobody could have ever imagined that there
will be any operation in Mohmand as it was
peaceful until recently; Khyber is also
simmering. It is a very dangerous trend,
indeed.
Situation of Karachi:
Karachi is Pakistans only metropolitan city,
despite other cities having being designated
as metropolitan areas for the purposes of
local government, which has overwhelming
numbers of population that belong to all
segments of Pakistani society. It is known as
the largest Pashtun city in the world: the city
hosts more Pashtuns than any other city in
the world, even in Pakistans Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province, or Afghanistan, the
traditional Pashtun homeland. Rural-to-
urban migration in Sindh has always been
directed more towards Karachi than towards
Hyderabad or other settled cities because of
the vast, multidimensional economic
opportunities it affords to its residents. And
just as the importance of Karachis economy
37

cannot be understated for the daily or
monthly livelihood of a Karachi citizen, the
same cannot be underemphasized for the
economy of Pakistan, and more importantly,
its tax base and tax revenues.
The poor state of law and order resulting
from the 201011 surges in ethno-political
violence enabled militant groups to
consolidate their presence and launch
attacks in Karachi. There have been
unconfirmed reports of the Afghan Taliban
leadership relocating to the city. The TTP, an
umbrella movement uniting militant factions
in Pakistans northwestern tribal areas, has
increased its fundraising and recruitment
activities in the city and launched several
high-profile attacks. Additionally, Karachi has
witnessed a resurgence of militant groups
with a sectarian agenda. The multiple and
frequently intersecting strands of militancy,
described in depth below, are potentially the
most destabilizing element in Karachis short-
term future.
Despite the exorbitant spike in violence
against citizens over the past 5-to-10 years,
the city keeps humming and the resilient
residents of Karachi continue to go about
their daily lives forever under the shadow
of instant death, or the specter of something
worse (like kidnapping, or torture). No less
than a dozen citizens of Karachi die every day
every single day in violent, crime-related
incidents, and the citys yearly crime
statistics are horrific: under the previous PPP
government, which has its home base in
Sindh since its formation, the citys yearly
crime statistics registered between 2,000 and
3,000 deaths, with the highest being 2,500
reported deaths in 2012 noted as the
bloodiest year in Karachi so far. The daily
statistics alone show that over a hundred
people die in Karachi every month because
of crime alone. And crime in Karachi is not a
simple phenomenon to explain: poverty,
inequality and easy access to unregistered
weaponry is compounded by the fact that
ethnic, political, and even economic rivalries
can lead to a spike in violence, often
targeting a specific community or people
from a particular ethnic or religious
background. With all the troubles Pakistan is
facing and has been facing since 2001
Karachi is truly the melting pot which
represents a cross-section of all those
problems; but the melting pot is bubbling
and ready to burst because ineffective
policing (mainly due to politicized hiring at
the lower cadres) and citizens
disenchantment with existing governance
mechanisms have transformed the melting
pot into a powder keg on a haystack. All it
needs is someone to light a match and throw
it in the wrong direction and there are
many who possess the matchbox.
38

Sources in the security apparatus deployed in
Karachi, including the Rangers, and in the
intelligence community say that Karachi is
the typical example of a city wrought by
proxy warfare in what they call the New
Great Game: an intricate web of alliances
and enmities at the global, regional, and local
level that ultimately translates into Pakistanis
killing Pakistanis for a variety of motives.
While policies can go only as far as paper,
policy implementation is the most important
consideration for the government and the
bureaucracy. The proper incentives must be
offered to both law enforcement operatives
and intelligence operatives in the field within
Pakistan so that reactive policing measures
can become proactive and preventative
policing activities. To this effect,
amendments and updates in the anti-terror
laws of Pakistan (as opposed to anti-terror
policies) are also desperately needed: near
the end of its parliamentary tenure, in March
2013, the previous National Assembly and
Senate finally enacted new anti-terror
legislation, while Pakistan had bled for
almost a decade.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has recently
stated that a new, much more potent anti-
terror law was in the final stages of
legislation and enactment, and those
charged under this law would not be allowed
release on bail. For the stabilization of
Karachi, the Sindh government promulgated
a witness protection law on September 18
that will go a long way in protecting those
who identify criminal elements and testify
against them in court: it is no secret that
journalists, lawyers, prosecutors, and even
judges have been targeted for assassination
in the past.
Karachi Power Dynamics:
Historically, target killers and criminals have
been deployed in ethno-political violence
between Karachis Mohajirs, represented by
the MQM party, and Pashtuns, represented
by the ANP. As recently as 2007 a political
showdown between the MQM and ANP
threatened to spark widespread ethnic
violence: Since the May 12, 2007, clashes,
the ANP has consolidated its political
presence in Karachi. For the first time the
party won two seats out of forty-two from
Karachi in the Sindh provincial assembly
during the 2008 general elections; the MQM
won thirty-four, while the PPP secured six
seats. By adopting a narrative of ethnic
victimization, the ANP claims to represent
Karachis Pashtun population, which it
estimates to be 22 percent of the total, up
from about 12 percent in 1998. The partys
reach has been bolstered by the migration of
over 300,000 Pashtuns, who have fled to the
city in recent years to escape the fallout of
military operations against militants in
Pakistans tribal belt and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province.
39

The ANPs political and demographic gains
have led the MQM to fear that it is losing the
grip over Karachi that it has enjoyed since a
landslide victory in the 2005 general
elections. The party previously won control
of the city during the 1988 general elections.
Mohajirs currently make up 48 percent of
Karachis population, but the MQM, unlike
the ANP and PPP, has no provincial base
from which to draw new supporters. The
recent surge in ethno-political violence is
therefore understood to be a show of
strength before the 2013 general elections,
during which, some analysts argue, the MQM
resorted to all measures necessary to
maintain its dominant political position. In
this context, frequent target killings aim to
discourage further migration to the city. But
violence is also used to accommodate for the
citys shifting demographics: Since the
transfer of a few thousand votes from one
constituency to another can greatly affect
election results, target killings have been
used to terrorize members of an ethnic
group into relocating to safer, ethnically
homogenous areas. As such, violence has
been used to demarcate electoral zones
along ethnic lines.
The ethno-political clashes between Mohajirs
and Pashtuns are no longer the only violent
ethnic dynamic in the city: Ethnic Sindhis and
Balochis, represented by the PPP,
increasingly have taken part. Like Pashtuns,
Sindhis have migrated to Karachi, the
provincial capital of the Sindh province, in
significant numbers in search of
employment. Refugees affected by
successive summers of flooding in 2010 and
2011 also relocated to Sindhi goths (villages)
that cluster around the citys periphery,
particularly near entry and exit points along
the National Highway. With a growing
constituency in the city, the PPP is eager to
gain access to the citys limited land, utilities,
and financial resources with which to woo
potential voters. The PPP is also seeking
better representation in Karachi: In the 2008
elections it won over a quarter of the popular
vote in Karachi, but only three out of the
twenty National Assembly seats from the city
owing to outdated electoral districting.
Thus, while the violent history is rooted in
specific tensions between rural and urban,
province and city, bureaucracy and
decentralized local governance, it is
ultimately a clash between the rural-Sindh-
based PPP and Karachi-based MQM over the
citys resources and administration. Karachi
contains 30 percent of Sindhs total
population, employs 71.6 percent of the total
industrial labor force of Sindh, generates
74.8 percent of the provinces total industrial
output, and provides 78 percent of all private
sector jobs in the province. Without Karachi,
Sindh is relatively underdeveloped and
impoverished, and yet Sindhis struggle for
political representation and access within the
provincial capital. Sindhi nationalist political
40

parties, such as the Sindh TarraqiPassand
Party, Jeay Sindh QaumiMahaz (JSQM), and
AwamiTehrik (AT), often cite this grievance.
More recently, some PPP elements also have
seized the narrative of greater Sindhi
representation in Karachi. In 2011, former
Sindh home minister and PPP representative
ZulfiqarMirza began championing Sindhi
rights and issuing anti-MQM comments. His
diatribes led to intense ethno-political
clashes in the summer of 2011. Whatever
relationship the PPP and MQM establish,
Sindhis are likely to have a growing voice in
Karachis political dynamic. In March 2012
the JSQM staged a rally in Karachi to call for
an independent Sindh province. A few days
later, to protest government delays in
investigating the cause of the sudden death
on April 7 of the partys leader, Bashir
Qureshi, the JSQM announced a strike. The
strike call was observed across the city as
markets closed, public transport halted, and
three men were killed in firing incidents,
demonstrating the increasing street power of
Sindhi nationalist parties. Two months later,
on May 22, the Sindhi nationalist party AT
organized a rally to oppose the increasing
appearance of graffiti calling for a separate
mohajir province to be carved out of Sindh.
Unidentified snipers opened fire on the rally,
leading to clashes throughout the city in
which thirteen people were killed and thirty-
five injured.
The seesawing between systems has
exacerbated the lack of governance and
effective service delivery at the grassroots
level across Karachi. It has also highlighted
how widespread urban violence is used as a
political tool for parties to gain the upper
hand during deadlocked negotiations and
extract concessions from their rivals. As such,
Karachis violence can be understood as a
symptom of debilitated democratic
processes.
Disagreements on the composition of
electoral lists led to violent clashes for
control over polling stations during general
elections. Concerns about voter listsas well
as contradictory political narratives by the
MQM, PPP, and ANP about Karachis shifting
demographics, stem partly from delays in
conducting the national census. The lack of
accurate census data on Karachi perpetuates
problems of inadequate service delivery and
poor governance. It also fuels violence as
political parties exaggerate or underestimate
their total constituencies in the service of
narratives of ethnic marginalization that, in
turn, fuel interethnic clashes.
Drone Attacks and its Viability:
U.S. drones have struck targets in Pakistan an
estimated 140 times since 2004. Property
and homes have been destroyed and
thousands have been killed or injured. While
many challenge U.S. drone strikes as a
matter of strategy, there are also serious
41

concerns over the fundamental legality of
such strikes. The U.S. is not at war with
Pakistan, yet conducts air strikes in its
territory on a near daily basis. Individuals are
targeted for killing without any due process
of law or attempts to detain. Almost nothing
is known about how the program operates or
what measures are taken to ensure
compliance with international law.
Drone strikes killed 181 people in Pakistan
including some senior militant commanders.
Since 2004, the CIA operated drones have
killed 3306 people in 391 strikes inside
Pakistan, most of them unknown suspected
militants including hundreds of civilians.
During 2013, 22 drone strikes were carried
out in North Waziristan killing 131 people
while 83 were reportedly injured. Four
strikes were witnessed in South Waziristan
where 44 people were killed and 24 injured.
The CIA also extended its drone strikes
beyond FATA in 2013, and hit a madrassa in
Hangu district of KP.
In 2013, Nawaz Sharif became first Pakistani
ruler who raised the issue of drone attacks at
UN General Assembly since 2004 when the
CIA started its covert controversial campaign
in Pakistan. Previous governments used to
condemn drone attacks but ignored to raise
the issue at international level. During the
year, Pakistan gained some achievements at
diplomatic front against drone strikes. In
December 2013, UN General Assembly
declared that drone strikes are violation of
international law. While federal government
initiated campaign against drone strikes at
international level in 2013, Pakistan Tehreek-
e-Insaf and Jamat-e-Islami kept the public
protest alive.
A change in approach was visible during the
year 2013, as the CIA had tried to limit
signature attacks in which generally
unknown suspected militants were killed.
Mounting public pressure in Pakistan and
criticism at international level forced
powerful American agency to focus more on
militant commanders and lowering collateral
damage. However, the damage had already
been done as excessive use of drone strikes
against suspected militants, funeral prayers
and, rescue teams sparked international
condemnation of the drone campaign. UN
special rapporteur Ben Emmerson declared
that drone strikes violated Pakistans
sovereignty. Recently UN General Assembly
has also declared that drone strikes are
against International Law.
Drone strikes remained most controversial
issue between U.S. and Pakistan. The CIA has
kept alive its tradition of droning , during or
right after high level visits of Pakistani
leaders/officials to U.S. Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif criticized drone attacks in his
speech in UN General Assembly and termed
42

them the violation of Pakistan sovereignty
and international law. However, the CIA
responded with drone attacks on 29
th
and
30
th
of September, respectively just two and
three days after his speech. A welcome
drone attack was also carried out on
September 22 when Nawaz Sharif left
Pakistan for U.S. to attend the UNGA session.
Elimination of Hakeemullah Mehsud by
drone strike during back-door negotiations
sparked public protest in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa where ruling political party
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf along with its
religious ally Jamat-e-Islami blocked NATO
supply through the province with use of
public support. The protest forced NATO to
stop supply to and from Afghanistan through
Torkham border and resorted to Chaman
crossing in Balochistan. Despite continuous
public protests, blockade of NATO supply and
condemnation at international level, U.S. has
not shown any signs that it will abandon
drone strikes in Pakistan. Three drone
attacks have been reported after PTI-JI
started blockade of NATO supply including
one attack in Hangu district of KP province.
One legal issue too often overlooked is
Pakistans legal obligations when it comes to
drone strikes. Even if Pakistan has consented
to such strikes, obviating concerns regarding
national sovereignty, Pakistan still has a
responsibility to respect and protect the
human rights of its own citizens and other
individuals within its territory.
Extrajudicial killing is prohibited under
international law and Pakistan cannot
support or even acquiesce in the extrajudicial
killing of individuals within its territory by
other states unless certain conditions are
met. If Pakistan were itself engaged in armed
conflict with those groups or individuals
being targeted by U.S. drones, then it could
consent to such killings. For some groups,
such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, it
seems clear that Pakistan is in a state of
armed conflict and could legally target
members of the group as combatants.
However, it seems doubtful that Pakistan is
in a state of armed conflict with many other
groups targeted by U.S. drones, such as al-
Qaeda or the Haqqani network. Pakistan may
therefore be violating its obligations under
human rights law in consenting to the
extrajudicial killing of members of such
groups. Such individuals should be arrested
and tried, an obligation that cannot be
skirted by permitting a foreign state to
engage in summary execution.
It is also worth emphasizing that Pakistani
consent to U.S. strikes should also bring with
it a responsibility to ensure such attacks
conform to International Humanitarian Law
(IHL). Pakistan should demand more
information from the U.S., including
43

increased transparency and articulating of
clear policies on distinction and
proportionality. Any Pakistani consent should
be conditioned upon the U.S. demonstrating
its activities conform to IHL.

Ongoing Sectarian Conflict:
While Punjabis represent the majority of the
population, Pakistan is home to a
constellation of communities based on
regional, religious, or historical identities:
Bengalis, Baluchs, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Sunni,
Shia and Ahmadi Muslims, Sikhs, Jains,
Hindus, Christians and Jews, Muhajirs and
refugees from Bangladesh, Afghanistan and
Gujarat. Sectarian and religious violence have
been a recurrent feature of Pakistans history
since 1947, both in the form of violent
conflict between religious communities, and
in the form of one-sided violence against
religious minorities. Inter-religious conflicts
surfaced as early as in the early 1950s, when
religious parties, and in particular the
Jamaat-e-Islami, called for excluding
Ahmadiyya community from Islam. Ahmadis
have consistently experienced severe
discrimination both from the government
and from other Muslim sects. Hindus are
generally second-class citizens facing daily
structural violence punctuated by occasional
episodes of mass anti-Hindu violence and
massacres.
Sectarian conflict further escalated after the
Taliban victory in Afghanistan, as a pattern of
assassinations of sect leaders and activists
emerged. After 1997, mass killings of civilians
on a sectarian basis became more frequent.
Sectarian violence has involved groups on
both sides, including the Shia group Sipah-e
Muhammad Pakistan (SMP; the Army of
Muhammad) created in 1991. However, anti-
Shia violence has been on the rise, and since
the 1990s there has been marked anti-Shia
violence perpetrated armed militant groups
with ties to Saudi Arabia operating in
Pakistan.
Armed groups have also been involved in
violence against non-Muslims. In August
2009, a mob, guided by Sipah-e-Sahaba and
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, attacked Christians on
alleged desecration of Quran in the city of
Gojra (Toba Tek Singh district). In
this episode, seven Christians were killed and
20 were injured, and 50 homes were burnt.
Religious Extremism and Shia
Genocide:
Shia Muslims make up nearly 20% of
Pakistans 200 million population i.e. 40
million and are spread across the country
with the northern Gilgit Baltistan region and
Kurram Agency on Afghanistan border being
the only Shia majority regions.
44

Using the ideology of Takfir, due to which
Shia are declared infidels and worthy of
being killed, several thousand Shia have been
killed, injured or disabled for life by anti-Shia
militants. The worrying fact is that these
militants run organized intimidation
campaigns against the Shia and create
resentment for them in the society to gather
support and sympathy for their cause of
exterminating the Shia. The state has turned
a blind eye to the organizations and militants
killing the Shia and they operate freely, their
leaders enjoying public space. One notorious
anti-Shia organization Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal-
Jamaat (ASWJ) has continued its task of
killing the Shia. Its sister organization
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) regularly claims
responsibility of attacks on the Shia. Both of
these are known to have links with the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
According to independent estimates, nearly
12,000 Shia have been killed in Pakistan as a
result of direct attacks on them for their
faith. Another 9000 10,000 Shia have been
killed as part of the terrorism which have
engulfed the country. An Amnesty
International report from 2002 states that
only in the city of Karachi between the 1992
2002, seventy Shia doctors were killed. In
total, nearly 200 Shia doctors have been
killed while other professionals killed include
lawyers, academics, educationists,
sportsmen, entrepreneurs and poets to
mention. Shia processions or Imam Bargahs
(worship places) are attacked regularly every
year across the country in the Muslim month
of Muharram; and more than a hundred such
incidents have been recorded.
Other than killings en masse, they are also
victim of targeted killings across the country
where individuals are shot dead just because
of their Shia faith. On paper, the anti-Shia
militant organizations are banned but they
operate freely ad publicly take responsibility
of killing the Shia after every attack. Their
leaders are on record having said that they
will make it so tough for Shia in Pakistan
that they (Shia) will say where we go now
and that is precisely what has happened. It
appears as if all state institutions in Pakistan
including the security agencies and Judiciary
are working in partnership to exterminate
Shia from Pakistan.

The Shia community has remained peaceful
and there is no history of even a single
incident of indiscriminate violence by Shia on
anyone. Even retaliation or reprisal attacks
have been nonexistent for several years but
violence has not stopped. It is high time that
the community be protected before it is too
late.

45

Human Right organizations like Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan and Asian Human
Rights Commission usually release the data
on number of Shia killed in a year but this
data is not accurate for the simple reason
that they do not use independent sources to
get this information but rely purely on
mainstream media. The problem with this
approach is that there is a tendency in
Pakistani media not to use the word Shia
while reporting any incident of violence
against the Shia whether it is targeted killing
or bombing for mass killing. Therefore, only a
small proportion of total Shia killings are
counted in the statistics of Human Rights
groups. Let us consider the gruesome
incident of Chillas massacre which happened
on 3rd April 2012 when six passenger buses
enroute the Shia majority region of Gilgit
Baltistan were stopped, passengers were
offloaded and their Identity cards were
scanned for Shia names and backs were
checked for marks of self-flagellation (a Shia
practice). All of those identified as Shia were
shot dead on spot. This was not the only
incident of its kind. Similar incidents when
Shia were killed are proper identification
include the Kohistan massacre of February
2012 and Mastung Baluchistan incident of
September 2011 and January 2014. The
media did report these incidents but failed to
mention the word Shia. Because of this
reason and the fact that medias reporting on
Shia killings is limited to major cities and
incidents from remote towns and villages go
unreported, the statistics of Shia killings
released by Human Rights organizations are
extremely lowered down.
The Jihadis (militants) produced by the
madressahs which the military funded are
inherently anti-Shia and in their free time,
when they are not busy in Afghanistan or
elsewhere, routinely kill the Shia across
Pakistan. For the countrys security
establishment, the violence against the Shia
is a collateral damage in-house, a price they
have to pay for the strategic depth they
want. Some organizations, however, were
formed with the sole reason to intimidate,
threaten and kill the Shia.
Terrorism:
Security situation in Pakistan remained tense
and volatile. There have been various
security incidents which describe the grave
nature of situation in FATA, Swat and other
parts of NWFP as well as violence reported
from insurgency hit province Baluchistan.
Security forces operations with more focused
intensity continued in Mohmand Agency,
Khyber Agency, Swat and settled areas of
NWFP. The backlash from the militants
groups in the conflict zone was pronounced
and vigor, resulting into more number of
casualties among the security forces as well
46

as civilians. The militants also carried out
abduction of government and civil persons in
Khyber Agency, Swat and Kohat area. The
government's writ in Swat has shrunk to
lowest ebb amid increased violence and
organized attacks by the hard core militants
of MaulanaFazlullah. The militants in Swat
continued attacks on government schools
and property of political figures / opponent
groups. After attacks on security forces in
Swat and Mohmand Agency, military
launched ground and air attacks on
suspected hideouts of militants network /
HQ's. However the militants suffered heavy
casualties in Mohmand Agency.

Violence in Pakistan has been on the rise,
particularly since 2007, as terrorist groups
have targeted political leaders, the military
and police, tribal leaders, and schools.
Though virtually unheard of a decade ago,
suicide bombings have become ubiquitous in
recent years, a reflection of al-Qaeda's
influence, experts say. Three such attacks
were documented in 2002 and 2003
combined; at the trend's peak in 2009 there
were seventy-six attacks, and there were
thirty-seven in the first ten months of 2013,
according to the New Delhibased South Asia
Terrorism Portal (SATP).
Besides providing militant groups in Pakistan
with technical expertise and capabilities, al-
Qaeda also promotes cooperation among
them. CTC's Rassler wrote in 2009 that al-
Qaeda "assumed a role as mediator and
coalition builder among various Pakistani
militant group factions by promoting the
unification of entities that have opposed one
another or had conflicting ideas about
whether to target the Pakistani state."
The Taliban, meanwhile, has become ever
more entrenched in Pakistan, building a
nationwide network by finding common
cause with terrorist groups that target the
Shia and the Pakistani state
while establishing roots, and a lucrative
criminal enterprise, in Karachi. Pakistani
paramilitary Rangers launched a campaign in
September 2013 to address the city's
criminal and terrorist groups,
reportedly arresting over 1,500 suspects in a
month. Meanwhile, Pakistan's political
parties advocated negotiations with the
Taliban in part to stave off even higher levels
of violence in Punjab and other populated
areas, Tankel writes. SATP reported 2,745
civilians and 601 security forces killed in
terrorist violence in the first ten months of
2013, roughly on pace with the prior two
years.
Deweaponization:
The major supply line of firearms can be
traced back to the tribal areas. Durra Adam
47

Khel, not very far from the provincial capital
Peshawar, is known the world over for its
legendary arms bazaar and weapon
manufacturing units. Seasoned gunsmiths
over the decades have been involved in the
business, manufacturing firearms of small,
medium and long range caliber, known for
high quality. Some of the widely sought after
automatic brands like AK47 and 7MM are
replicated here with precision and
perfection.
Weapons produced in Durra were a helpline
to the jihadists against the Soviet Union and
Kashmir wars but that supply line has dried
up now and these arms are finding place in
many parts of the country through known
and unknown routes. No amount of raids,
hold-ups and recoveries can help tackle the
problem unless the main sources of supply
are vigilantly monitored with effective
control.
It is time to regulate the production and
supply of weapons. This has to be completely
in concert with the stakeholders by taking
them on board. The tribesmen on balance
are an amenable lot, having faith in the
consultative process. The federal
government, in this regard, should prepare a
roadmap and policy framework, seeking
professional input from the Pakistan
Ordnance Factories (POF). The provincial
governments should simultaneously
undertake a campaign for the registration of
unregistered arms. Unless we have complete
information and data about arms in
circulation, the policy of de-weaponisation
will be a non-starter. Illicit arms-holders
should either surrender arms or get them
registered. A one-time amnesty will have to
be given in this regard. This should be
followed by campaigns for recovering
leftover arms. According to a conservative
estimate, over 50 per cent of weapons in the
country are not registered. Pakistan stands
amongst the top six countries in the world in
terms of private ownership of firearms.
A very heavy responsibility rests on the
shoulders of major political stakeholders.
They need to rein in their armed wings. In
the past, it was just one party which was
allegedly singled out in this regard. Now, all
key stakeholders and sectarian outfits in the
country fall in this category. The political,
religious and sectarian outfits have to off-
guard their militants, lest some other force is
constrained to perform this unavoidable
task.
Kashmir Issue:
From a Pakistani perspective Kashmir is the
core issue and the root cause of tension with
India. It maintains that India is in unlawful
occupation of J&K and it is the right of the
people of the state to determine their future
in accordance with their aspirations. Pakistan
48

has made great sacrifices to pursue a
proactive Kashmir policy and its defense and
foreign policy is significantly influenced by
this attitude.
Here, the nuclearization of South Asia,
impact of events of 9/11 on the region,
demands of globalization and the
destabilizing effect on the internal polity for
the support to militants were major factors
that brought about a change in Pakistan to
seek a path of cooperation and engage in a
peace process. For India too, the
consequences have been no less grim,
although being a much bigger country with
more resources it can mask the real picture.
New Delhi feels that its clout with major
powers is sufficiently high to contain any
adverse fallout from human right violations.
Nonetheless, Kashmir remains a serious
barrier to actualization of Indias full
economic and political potential and is a
black spot on its otherwise ascending
international image.
External and internal factors led both
governments to agree to a composite
dialogue nearly four years ago. Three
rounds of talks covering an agreed basket of
subjects ranging from Jammu & Kashmir,
peace and security, resolution of Siachen and
Sir Creek and economic and cultural issues
have been completed. As the fourth round
was due to take place in July 2006, an
unfortunate terrorist attack on a train near
Mumbai killed hundreds of innocent
passengers. India, without any concrete
evidence blamed certain elements in
Pakistan for the incident and suspended the
dialogue process. The impasse was only
broken when the President of Pakistan and
the Prime Minister of India, meeting on the
side-lines of the Havana Non-Aligned
summit, decided to resume the composite
dialogue and reiterated their commitment to
the peace process. It is significant that both
leaders also agreed to an institutionalized
framework for combating the common
threat of terrorism. Both India and Pakistan
in the course of the last three rounds have
been able to develop certain conventional
and nuclear Confidence Building Measures
(CBMs) aimed at regulating the dynamics of
their security competition. Some progress
has also been made in creating conditions for
developing economic and cultural interaction
between the two parts of Kashmir. For
example, the agreement on a cease fire
along the 750 kilometer line of control and
Siachen glacier is still holding. A host of CBMs
covering travel between the two sides of
Kashmir and allowing leaders of the
resistance movement (APHC), and other
Kashmiri leaders, to travel to Pakistan has
had a favorable impact in reducing tensions.
Nonetheless, lack of progress on settlement
of the Kashmir dispute as well as relatively
less difficult issues such as Siachen, Sir Creek
and the Baghliar dam remain a major
impediment towards normalization of
49

relations between the two countries.
Pakistan is not prepared to accept the status
quo as a permanent solution to Kashmir
because that is the problem and cannot be
the solution. It realizes Indias constraints
and sensitivities to any major territorial
adjustments. As a compromise, self
governance has been suggested for Kashmir
that would give the state of J&K a special
status in the Indian constitution. Islamabad
maintains that details of this proposal can be
worked out in consultation with the
resistance groups, represented by APHC and
other elements in J&K and Pakistan. It aims
at devolution of maximum administrative,
financial and executive powers to the State,
while retaining only communications,
defense and foreign affairs with India. This
could give Kashmiri people a sense of
participation in running their affairs.
Withdrawal of Indian military from J&K is
another major precondition that Pakistan
and the APHC is demanding for moving the
peace process forward. India so far has been
unwilling, as it does not want to loosen its
authoritarian grip on the people. Any viable
solution to the Kashmir conflict will need to
address not only the interests of India and
Pakistan but more so of the Kashmiris.
Bringing the militants into the political
process at some stage would also be
necessary for ensuring durable peace.
There is a general awareness of the
complexity of the Kashmir problem but given
political will it is surely possible to make
significant progress in the resolution of the
dispute. For India to keep harping on cross
border infiltration and trying to view Kashmir
through the prism of terrorism would be a
travesty of truth and would keep India away
from finding a viable solution to the
protracted conflict. This policy may have
found resonance in Western capitals and was
an expedient measure to keep pressure on
Islamabad to stop supporting the Kashmir
cause, but has not worked. This is because it
fails to address the root cause for the deep
alienation of the people, especially those
living in the Valley and in Muslim majority
districts of Jammu. Here, human suffering is
widespread, gross atrocities are committed
by security forces and a large presence of the
military and Para-military forces
approximating 600 000 to 700 000 enforce a
coercive regime on the people.
This generates a cycle of violence, based on
the action-reaction syndrome. In reality,
Kashmir represents a live, ongoing, human
problem and even if Pakistan were to totally
withdraw and put the question of J&K at the
back burner, insurgency will not go away just
as the insurgency in Palestine would not fade
away.
The delegates of this committee in this case,
while addressing the issue at session, are
required to lay out an explicit plan which can
be effective to sooth the ongoing conflict
that majorly influences the defense and
50

security of Pakistan. In this regard they are
also required to discourse on the various
active militias and the spur of terror that
rises from the both the sides of border that is
tearing Pakistan to its fragile seams.
Pakistans Nuclear Security:
Chronic political instability in Pakistan and
the current offensive against the Taliban in
the northwest of the country have called
attention to the issue of the security of the
countrys nuclear weapons. Some observers
fear that Pakistans strategic nuclear assets
could be obtained by terrorists, or used by
elements in the Pakistani government.
Pakistans nuclear energy program dates
back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a bloody war
with India that probably triggered a political
decision in January 1972 (just one month
later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons
program. Deterring Indias nuclear weapons
and augmenting Pakistans inferior
conventional forces are widely believed to be
the primary missions for Islamabads nuclear
arsenal. Observers point to Indias 1974
peaceful nuclear explosion as the pivotal
moment that gave additional urgency to the
program. Pakistan produced fissile material
for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-
based uranium enrichment technology,
which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-
enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two types
of fissile material used in nuclear weapons;
the other is plutonium. The countrys main
enrichment facility is a centrifuge plant
located at Kahuta; Pakistan may have other
enrichment sites.
Pakistani efforts to improve the security of
its nuclear weapons have been on-going and
include some cooperation with the United
States. Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian
nuclear tests, the international community
has increased attention to reducing the risk
of nuclear war in South Asia. The two
countries most recently came to the brink of
full-scale war in 1999 and 2002, and, realizing
the dangers, have developed some risk
reduction measures to prevent accidental
nuclear war. Islamabad has also developed
its command and control systems and
improved security of military and civilian
nuclear facilities. Since the 2004 revelations
of an extensive international nuclear
proliferation network run by Pakistani
nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan, as well as
possible connections between Pakistani
nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, Islamabad
has made additional efforts to improve
export controls and monitor nuclear
personnel. The main security challenges for
Pakistans nuclear arsenal are keeping the
integrity of the command structure, ensuring
physical security, and preventing illicit
proliferation from insiders.
51

Pakistan continues to produce fissile material
for weapons and appears to be augmenting
its weapons production facilities, as well as
deploying additional delivery vehiclessteps
that will enable both quantitative and
qualitative improvements in Islamabads
nuclear arsenal.
In the fall of 2007 and early 2008, some
observers expressed concern about the
security of the countrys arsenal if political
instability were to persist. Former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto said in a November
5, 2007, interview that, although then-
President Musharraf claimed to be in firm
control of the nuclear arsenal, she feared this
control could weaken due to instability in the
country. Similarly, Michael Krepon of the
Henry L. Stimson Center has argued that a
prolonged period of turbulence and
infighting among the countrys President,
Prime Minister, and Army Chief could
jeopardize the armys unity of command,
which is essential for nuclear security.
During that time, U.S. military officials also
expressed concern about the security of
Pakistans nuclear weapons. Director General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, also has
expressed fears that a radical regime could
take power in Pakistan, and thereby acquire
nuclear weapons. Experts also worry that
while nuclear weapons are currently under
firm control, with warheads disassembled,
technology could be sold off by insiders
during a worsened crisis. Pakistans
command and control over its nuclear
weapons is compartmentalized and includes
strict operational security. The governments
command and control system is based on
C4I2SR (command, control,
communication, computers, intelligence,
information, surveillance and
reconnaissance). Islamabads Strategic
Command Organization has a three-tiered
structure, consisting of the National
Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic
Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces
Commands.
Pakistani officials argue that Islamabad has
taken a number of steps to prevent further
proliferation of nuclear-related technologies
and materials. For example, Islamabad
adopted in September 2004 new national
export controls legislation which includes a
requirement that the government issue
control lists for goods, technologies,
material, and equipment which may
contribute to designing, development,
stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons and
related delivery systems. According to a
February 2008 presentation by Zafar Ali,
Director of Pakistans Strategic Export
Controls Division (SECDIV),102 the lists,
which were issued in October 2005 and are
to be periodically updated, include items
controlled by multilateral export control
52

regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile
Technology Control Regime. The export
controls legislation also includes a catch-all
clause, which requires exporters to notify the
government if they are aware or suspect that
goods or technology are intended by the
end-user for use in nuclear or biological
weapons, or missiles capable of delivering
such weapons.
Pakistan has pledged no-first-use against
non-nuclear-weapon states, but has not
ruled out first-use against a nuclear-armed
aggressor, such as India. Some analysts say
this ambiguity serves to maintain deterrence
against Indias conventional superiority; the
Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May
21 that there are acquisitions of
sophisticated weaponry by our neighbor
which will disturb the conventional balance
between our two countries and hence, lower
the nuclear threshold. Other analysts argue
that keeping the first-use option against New
Delhi allows Islamabad to conduct sub-
conventional operations, such as support for
low intensity conflict or proxy war in
Kashmir, while effectively deterring India at
the strategic level. Pakistan has reportedly
addressed issues of survivability through
pursuing a second strike capability, possibly
building hard and deeply buried storage and
launch facilities, deploying road-mobile
missiles, deploying air defenses around
strategic sites, and utilizing concealment
measures.
Key groups:
The numerous terrorist groups operating in
Pakistan have tended to fall into one of the
five categories laid out by Ashley J. Tellis, a
senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, in a January 2008
Congressional testimony:
1. Sectarian: Religiously motivated groups
such as the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Shia Tehrik-e-
Jafria that are engaged in violence within
Pakistan.
2. The Pakistani Taliban: A coalition of
extremist groups in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), led by
Mullah Fazlullah.
3. Anti-Indian: Groups focused on the
Kashmir dispute that operate with the
alleged support of the Pakistani military
and the intelligence agency Inter-Services
Intelligence(ISI), such as Lashkar-e-Taiba,
Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Harakatul-
Mujahadeen
4. Afghan Taliban: The original Taliban
movement and especially its Kandahari
leadership centered around Mullah
Mohammad Omar, believed to be based
in Quetta
53

5. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates: The global
jihadist organization founded by Osama
bin Laden and led by Ayman al-Zawahiri;
Other militant groups fall outside of Tellis'
framework, including secessionist groups
such as the Balochistan Liberation Army in
southwest Pakistan and the Haqqani
network.
Inter-Service Intelligence:
For the West there is arguably at present no
more important intelligence organization
than Pakistans Directorate of Inter-Service
Intelligence (ISI), yet after decades of close
co-operation the ISI remains an enigma.
The ISI was established within the Pakistan
Army to supplement the existing Military
Intelligence (MI) as a means to address the
lack of inter-service intelligence co-operation
which had proven so disastrous for Pakistan
in the 1947 Indo-Pak war. Trained from its
early days by UKs Military Intelligence, and a
little later by the CIA and, for a short spell,
the French SDECE, the ISI originally had no
role beyond that of military intelligence-
gathering except in relation to the disputed
region in Pakistan Administered Kashmir and
the Northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan.
The assumption of martial law in Pakistan for
this first time in 1958 under Lt Gen Ayub
Khan brought the ISI into the political realm.
It was tasked by Ayub with three roles which
continue to define it: (a) to safeguard
Pakistans interests, (b) to monitor political
opposition, and (c) to sustain military rule in
Pakistan. It is clear from these functions that
the ISI from 1958, if not before, viewed its
raison detre first and foremost in terms of
the Pakistan military rather than in relation
to any broader concept of the defense and
security of the nation-state or of the people
of Pakistan. Moreover, Ayub Khans
formulation gave the ISI primacy amongst
the other intelligence agencies in Pakistan
the MI and the civilian Intelligence Bureau
(IB) because it combined in the one agency
the dual roles of internal and external
intelligence. Unlike the UKs MI5 and MI6 or
the USs FBI and CIA, the ISI faces no
equivalent turf-war with a powerful internal
rival, and is thus able to integrate the
internal and external facets of its work with
profound implications for the way it operates
and the power it is able to exercise within
Pakistan and outside it.

The Haqqani Network:
The Haqqani Network, whose operations
straddle the porous Afghan-Pakistani border
known as the Durand Line, has proven a
valuable ally to the Pakistani Taliban in some
of these pursuits. The Haqqanis have not
only fought alongside the TTP and Afghan
54

Taliban in Afghanistan, but have also served
as influential mediators between the TTP and
Islamabad. Pakistan has long been a
supporter and beneficiary of the Haqqanis,
according to CTC. The network has helped
Islamabad manage militant groups in FATA,
and provided leverage against India in the
struggle over Kashmir. Pakistan sees the
Pashtun group, which has been among the
most lethal to NATO forces in Afghanistan, as
a potential source of leverage after the
scheduled withdrawal of coalition troops at
the end of 2014.
Police and law-enforcement agencies:
As the army drives Taliban fighters from their
strongholds in the Swat Valley and
elsewhere, the militants have shifted their
attention to Pakistan's cities and civilian law
enforcement must shoulder the burden for
fighting terrorism, especially poorly equipped
police. Underpaid, poorly trained and ill-
equipped Pakistan's policehas become
crucial fighters in the war to rid the country
of Taliban militants.

"The police in this situation are not trained,
equipped or geared to fight insurgency," said
Malik Naveed Khan, inspector general of the
North-West Frontier Province police and the
conflict zone's top cop. "It's a very serious
war. You're fighting the shadows of an
invisible army."

For a force of 50,000, Khan's department has
7,500 bulletproof vests and 17,000 automatic
rifles. The department lacks explosives-
detection equipment, a computerized
fingerprint database and updated forensic
equipment. The microscopes that technicians
use to conduct ballistics examinations, Khan
said, "are the same ones used in high
schools."
It is generally believed in the West that
military action can resolve the terrorism
problem in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
region as well as help efforts to thwart
violent radicalism throughout the region.
This idea, while sounding sensible when
peering at Pakistan from the outside, misses
an important reality on the ground:
according to a new report released by the
Asia Society, it is the domestic police force
that can best root out terror networks, find
and disable their financial support, and even
manage de-radicalization programs in
association with local communities.

When faced with a serious internal security
crisis, it is crucial that a state pursue reform
that entails capacity building not just in the
military and civilian government, but within
the law enforcement sector. Pakistan is a
case in point. The state is facing a variety of
internal security challenges that are severely
55

limiting its citizens' potential as well as
creating tension between neighbors and
potential allies abroad. Without police and
law enforcement reform, stability is likely to
continue eluding Pakistan.
Meaningful reform is not going to be an easy
endeavor. A high number of terrorist attacks
and increasingly troubling crime patterns tell
the story of a state under siege. An increase
in targeted killings of political and religious
leaders, attacks on armed forces and police,
kidnapping for ransom by the Taliban, and
mob justice' incidents show just how
daunting the challenges for the police have
become. Pakistan's efforts to combat crime
and to counter terrorist activities are being
outpaced by the innovation and agility of
criminal networks and protean terrorist
organizations. Radicalized elements within
the political and religious spheres further
complicate security challenges.
Interestingly, the international support
provided to Pakistan for antiterrorism
operations in the last decade was largely
geared towards the defense sector, and very
little of that ever reached police. This created
a situation in which military control trumped
local knowledge and know-how. A balanced
approach is needed to help Pakistan tackle
both internal and external challenges more
effectively.
Few know that Pakistan is among the top five
police-contributing countries to the United
Nations over the last decade, and the
professional performance of Pakistani
officers in UN peacekeeping operations is
rated highly. However, Pakistan has no
mechanism in place to utilize the services of
these officers in such a way that police
institutions in-country might benefit from
this experience. Many Pakistani police
officers were successful in getting Fulbright
scholarships and Hubert Humphrey
fellowships in the United States in recent
years as well. Thus, there is a lot of untapped
potential in the country that can help
transform the law enforcement institutions.
Evidence suggests that a law enforcement
model, which by its very nature is linked to
rule of law as well as democracy, offers the
best bet to confront the menace of
terrorism, transnational crime, as well as
insurgencies. Placing a priority on law
enforcement reform can help improve
Pakistans security in more ways than one.
Negotiations with the Pakistani
Taliban:
Supporters of the Afghan Taliban who sought
refuge in Pakistan's tribal areas morphed into
a distinct entity following the Pakistani
army's initial incursion into the
semiautonomous region in 2002. In
56

December 2007, about thirteen disparate
militant groups coalesced under the umbrella
of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known
as the Pakistani Taliban, led by
BaitullahMehsud of South Waziristan.
After a U.S. drone strike killed Baitullah in
August 2009, his cousin and deputy
HakimullahMehsud assumed leadership of
the TTP. Hakimullah was reportedly prepared
to take part in imminent peace talks with
Islamabad when he was killed in a U.S. drone
strike along with a top deputy in November
2013. But analysts say the prospects for
peace talks were dim. Hakimullah declared
war against the state, saying in October
2013: "Pakistan's system is un-Islamic, and
we want it replaced with an Islamic system.
This demand and this desire will continue
even after the American withdrawal [from
Afghanistan]." Stephen Tankel, scholar at the
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, notes that if talks had been allowed to
fail, Pakistani public opinion would have
turned more decisively against the Taliban
rather than the United States, whom many
blame for the insurgency's resilience.
A shura council chose hard-liner Mullah
Fazlullah as Hakimullah's successor shortly
after his death. Fazlullahrejects talks with the
government. Analysts question whether
Fazlullah can maintain TTP cohesion as the
first emir from outside the Mehsud tribe.
The predominantly Pashtun group draws
membership from all of FATA's seven
agencies as well as several settled districts of
Khyber Pakhtunkhawa in the northwest. The
TTP has declared jihad against the Pakistani
state, seeks to control territory, enforces
sharia, and fights NATO forces in
Afghanistan. "We will target security forces,
government installations, political leaders,
and police," AsmatullahShaheen, head of the
shura council that selected Mullah Fazlullah,
told Reuters, adding, "We will not target
civilians, bazaars, or public places. People do
not need to be afraid."
It's difficult to assess the size of the Pakistani
Taliban. "There are not reliable estimates of
how large the TTP is, largely due to
challenges associated with even defining the
borders of the group and the loose-knit
nature of how it is organized along either
sub-tribal or sub-regional lines," CTC's
Rassler says.
The Pakistani Taliban has targeted security
forces and civilians alike; among its most
audacious attacks have been bombings of
Islamabad's Marriott Hotel in September
2008, which killed at least sixty people, and
Peshawar's Pearl Continental Hotel in June
2009, in which seventeen were killed. TTP
expressed transnational ambitions when it
claimed responsibility for a failed bombing in
New York's Times Square in May 2010.
57

The Punjabi Taliban, a loose conglomeration
of militant groups of Punjabi origin, gained
prominence after major 2008 and 2009
attacks in the cities of Lahore, Islamabad,
and Rawalpindi. The network has both
sectarian and Kashmir-oriented aims. It has
chafed at the Pakistani Taliban's central
leadership, Jane's Intelligence Review
reported in late August 2013, but is uniquely
capable of "mounting complex operations in
urban environments," particularly in Punjab,
Pakistan's most populous and politically
significant province.
Border Insecurity:
The porous and volatile border with
Afghanistan poses the greatest threat in form
of illegal movement, smuggling of arms /
stolen vehicles, and drug trafficking. 10,000
to 30,000 people cross Chaman and Torkham
border points daily, which include legal
immigrants, traders, personnel from NGOs
and NATO assets. Besides, 5000 to 6000
illegal crossings take place daily using
frequented and unfrequented routes. This
happens despite the fact that there are some
821 border posts held by Pakistans security
forces on Pakistani side of the border and
around 120 NATO and Afghan posts on
Afghan side. The greatest threat along Pak-
Afghan border is from movement of militant
elements and drug traffickers. To increase
control on Pak-Afghan Border, official
immigration points along the border should
be increased. There is a need to have at least
one immigration point for each province so
as to check the tendency of illegal crossing.
In the recent past, US Defense Secretary
Robert Gates and some high officials alleged
that Pakistans failure to stop insurgents
from Pakistani side of the border has
resulted into 40 per cent rise in the militants
attacks in east Afghanistan.Also stating that
infiltration of insurgents in Afghanistan takes
place from the safe-havens of FATA. They
have also been accusing Pak Army and
Pakistans intelligence agency, ISI of close
contact with the Afghan Taliban. Their media
has also left no stone unturned for blaming
Pakistan for cross-border terrorism in
Afghanistan, also involving ISI.
It is mentionable that on June 1, more than
500 heavily armed militants who entered
Pakistans Upper Dir area from Afghanistan
killed more than 30 police and paramilitary
soldiers. Police said that well-trained
terrorists, who targeted a check post, also
destroyed two schools and several houses
with rocket and gunfire attacks, while killing
a number of innocent people. The exact
location of armed assault, carried out by
militants, lies about 20 kilometers inside the
Pakistani territory, which shares a common
border with Afghan province of Kunar.
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It is notable that during the Swat and
Malakand military operations, ISPR
spokesman, Maj-Gen Athar Abbas had
revealed in various press briefings that a
number of foreigners from Chechnya,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, Libya
and India including Afghans, having
connections with the enemy countries were
arrested. In one of briefings, he had disclosed
that 400 foreign fighters were captured along
with huge caches of sophisticated weapons,
made of India and American-Afghan fighters
had been infiltrated into Pakistan with the
help of some external agencies bordering
Afghanistan.
Conclusion:
Security is a shared responsibility of state
and society. However, it is the primary
obligation of the state not only to ensure
security using all instruments of statecraft,
but also to take on board all segments of the
nation. The kind of complex internal security
environment that we live in today cannot be
patched up without breaking foreign
nexuses. This makes a case of stronger
exterior maneuver and international
cooperation. Yet again, internal security can
be mathematized as 90% internal expression
and 10% external influence. If we put our
house in order internally, we cannot fear of
external manipulations. We need to move
beyond a general state of denial both as a
state and society. The first step is diagnosis
of the problems persisting within the edi ice
of our society and next comes the remedial
therapy. This all is possible only if we carry
out bold analysis of internal issues facing
Pakistan and employ a multi-pronged
strategy transparently. If done, the dream of
a secure, stable and prosperous Pakistan can
certainly come true.
Questions a Resolution Must Answer:
What absolute security plan should be
implemented by the Government?
How could transparency of security
agencies be assured?
Which is the best way to limit the
manufacture and proliferation of arms
in Pakistan?
To what degreeshould drone attacks
be permitted in Pakistans territory?
What mechanism should be employed
to prevent ethnic genocide?
How to ensure the preventionof
deterioration of order in Baluchistan?
What is the most effective
Deweaponization mechanism that
should be in process by the
Government?
In what way to can target killings in
Karachi be prevented?
To what extent must civil intelligence
agencies need to be involved?
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What powers shall be granted to law
enforcement agencies such as Police,
FIA, Rangers, CID, and FIA etc.?
Is negotiation with the Taliban a viable
option for peace and stability in the
northern areas of Pakistan?
If yes, on what basis will these
negotiations occur? Who will act as
the negotiating parties (the PTI, the
PML-N, TTP representatives, in what
proportion etc.)?
If no, then on what scale should there
be an operation in militancy rife
regions? What areas are to be
targeted, how many forces are to be
deployed and over what period of
time?
What is the future path Pakistani
foreign policy needs to take with
regards to growing criticism from
international quarters, especially India,
Afghanistan and the US, with prime
focus on the War on Terror and
Baluchistan?
Suggest ways to improve surveillance
capability and vehicle checking by
posts on borders.
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