The Consolidation of The Ruling Class

The Consolidation of the Ruling Class and the New Elites in Saudi Arabia
Author(s): Mordechai Abir

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Apr., 1987), pp. 150-171
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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The Consolidation of the Ruling Class and the
New Elites in Saudi Arabia
Mordechai Abir
At the beginning of the twentieth century the Saudi population was mainly
a classless society. There was no upper class to speak of in Arabia at the time.
Only a small proportion of the merchants and the ulama in the towns of Hijaz
and Najd could be described as 'middle class'. The great majority of the
Arabians - townspeople as well as rural nomads and agriculturalists - lived
at subsistence level and could be regarded as 'lower class'. The unification
of the Saudi kingdom by Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud in the first decades of the
century, consolidated the power and authority of a new Saudi ruling class -
the aristocracy. The development of the kingdom's oil industry since 1938 and
the modernization of Saudi Arabia after the Second World War, produced
moreover - in addition to existing regional and other differences - new
classes and a relatively rigid social structure. The latter, largely a heritage of
the past, depends not so much on power, wealth and education as on regional
(Najd) and tribal (noble) origin. This article will examine the consolidation
and composition of the Saudi aristocracy and whether it has undergone a
change in recent decades under the impact of the rapid development of the
kingdom and its society and due to the rise of new elites.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SAUDI RULING CLASS
The reconquest of Riyadh in January 1902 is considered in Saudi annals as
the beginning of the third Saudi kingdom. The small army of Abd al-Aziz
ibn Saud was composed at the time of a few score brothers, uncles, cousins,
other relatives and in-laws and some bedouin followers. During this crucial
stage, Abdallah ibn Jilwi was said to have twice saved the life of his 'cousin'
Abd al-Aziz. Subsequently, the Jilwi family, a cadet branch of Al Saud,'
gained a key position in the kingdom's ruling class. Such a development is
typical of considerations which influenced the formation of that class in Saudi
Arabia. Indeed, all of Ibn Saud's partners in the conquest of Riyadh, as well
as members of his and other important families who helped him in the
consolidation of his kingdom in the first decades of the century, were in-
corporated into the Saudi aristocracy. At their side, the ulama led by Al al-
Shaykh,2 and important tribal and regional amirs also won a preferential
status and can be considered part of the Saudi ruling class.
Abd al-Aziz continued to expand his power-base by numerous matrimonial
arrangements with traditional regional rulers and important tribal shaykhs
(henceforth umara: singular amir).3 Not only could he as a Muslim marry
four wives but according to custom he could frequently divorce them and marry
others without casting dishonour on them and their relatives. Thus he incorpor-
ated in his regime an important element of the regional and tribal umara.
RULING CLASS AND NEW ELITES IN SAUDI ARABIA 151
In contradiction to the Wahhabi-Saudi jihads in previous centuries Ibn
Saud's military campaigns were to start with, not aimed at spreading the
Wahhabiyya in the conquered areas but rather at re-establishing in them the
authority of the House of Saud. The historical alliance between the Najdi
ulama, led by Al al-Shaykh and the House of Saud, led by Abd al-Aziz, has
not been automatically re-established this time. The Najdi ulama viewed Ibn
Saud's government with reservation, if not with suspicion. Some, who lived
under the protection of other Wahhabi rulers, even supported his enemies.
Eventually, however, most of the Najdi ulama agreed to recognize the
authority of the young ruler, but even then only on condition that, at least
temporarily, his father Abd al-Rahman would carry the title of imam.'
The relations between Ibn Saud and the Wahhabi ulama were also
somewhat soured by the fact that in this period Abd al-Aziz was not considered
by them sufficiently pious. He toyed with technological innovations which
they considered a bid 'ah (heretical innovation). He did not conduct jihads per
se against the polytheists (mushrikun) in the region and he was known to
associate with the British infidel authorities in the Persian Gulf.5
The cementing of the relations between Al Saud and Al al-Shaykh through
matrimonial arrangements and the preferential treatment accorded to the
ulama as a whole, undoubtedly contributed to the improvement of the relations
between the king and the
majority
of the urban Najdi alims. Moreover, in
order to establish a meaningful loyal military force to carry out his plans and
overcome the natural opposition of the bedouin tribes to law and order, Abd
al-Aziz established, or took under his patronage, about 1912, the Ikhwan
movement. Ulama (mutawwa'in lit. volunteers) were sent to teach the bedouins
the principles of the Wahhabiyya and land and funds were allocated for their
settlement. By 1930 this movement led to the settlement of approximately
150,000 bedouins in more than 200 military-agricultural villages (hujar).6
The Ikhwan armies were principally responsible after 1913 for Abd al-Aziz's
conquests including Jabal Shammar, the Hijaz and Asir. Thus, if Ibn Saud
was not truly in the debt of the bedouin tribal amirs and the ulama until the
establishment of the movement, this was not so any more thereafter. Sub-
sequently, the importance of the tribal umara and mutawwa'in7 who settled
in the hujar, and the Najdi ulama in general, rapidly increased.
After 1913 the Najdi ruler appeared to follow the Wahhabi code of
behaviour more strictly and he frequently consulted the ulama and the Ikhwan
leaders on different issues. But, as Ibn Saud became more dependent on them,
the leading tribal amirs, some of whom were Abd al-Aziz's bitter enemies in
the first decade of the century, and the more fanatic ulama, exploited their
new leverage to coerce the imam to accept their extreme interpretation of the
Wahhabiyya and their right to intervene in the running of the kingdom.
Although the attitude of the Ikhwan leaders increasingly infuriated Abd al-
Aziz's lieutenants, the Saudi ruler chose to overlook the Ikhwan's excesses
in order to avoid an open breach with them.
In the period following the first World War Ibn Saud accelerated his efforts
to establish a united centralized kingdom
in the Arabian Peninsula. For this
purpose he planned to introduce aspects
of modern administration and
Western technology which he considered essential for effective
government
152 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
and not contradictory to the principles of Islam. Moreover, aware of the
political realities in the region, he co-ordinated his activities, as much as
possible, with the British government and its local representatives.8
Abd al-Aziz's policy was anathema to the Ikhwan and to most of the Najdi
ulama. It was not only that their traditional xenophobia had been whipped
up by British activities in the region but they also considered Ibn Saud's policy
as betrayal of the Wahhabi principles. The fact that the ruler had also begun
to consolidate his dynastic rule and had taken to himself, instead of the
traditional title of the Amir of Najd, the title of 'Sultan of Najd and its
Dependencies' (1921) and later (1926) 'King of the Hijaz' only added fuel to
the fire.9 Indeed, both tribal shaykhs and the ulama, especially those con-
nected to the Ikhwan, realised that time was working against them and if they
were not to stop Ibn Saud, or at least limit his authority, at this stage they
would be incapable of doing so in the future.
The Ikhwan rebellion (1927-30)'? was not only a challenge to Ibn Saud's
policy but also a desperate attempt on the part of the leading Ikhwan amirs
and their ulama allies to preserve their power and the traditional socio-political
frameworks from which they derived it. Ibn Saud's final victory over the
Ikhwan in 1929-30 and the consolidation of the power of the Saudi state
thereafter by establishing a national army and a centralized administration,
deprived the tribal shaykhs and the ulama of the power to intervene, on their
own initiative, in the conduct of state affairs.
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE KINGDOM AND THE DECLINE OF THE UMARA-
ULAMA POWER
There are about 50 senior tribal amirs and a few hundred shaykhs (amirs) of
secondary tribes and sub-tribes in Saudi Arabia.1' The power and authority
of these amirs has been gradually declining since 1930 in relation to the
consolidation of the power and authority of the Saudi kingdom and its govern-
ment and the expansion of its administration. The foundations for the bedouin
'White Army' (later the National Guard) were laid already in 1930 and the
armed forces were established in the early 1940s. 2 Most important, Ibn
Saud's revenues increased from about ?100,000 sterling annually to about
?4-5 million after the conquest of the Hijaz and they spiralled to tens and
later to hundreds of millions of pounds, following the commercial exploitation
of oil in Saudi Arabia.'3
The relatively substantial funds at his disposal enabled King Abd al-Aziz
to purchase armaments and means of transport and to 'buy' the loyalty of
the tribesmen. Thereafter the amirs' potential to resist the concentration of
power in the hands of Al Saud was literally nullified. Subsequently, when faced
with the choice of either integrating in the Saudi provincial administration
and enjoying royal favour, or resisting Ibn Saud and losing whatever
authority
was left to them, even the remnants of the Ikhwan leadership opted for the
former.'4 Henceforth, the tribal amirs became part of the power-base of the
Saudi regime and they have a vested interest in its continuity. They
are to
be considered, therefore, together with the royal house and the
ulama,
a
component of the ruling class. Their
position within this
class, however,
is
secondary and depends as well on the importance of each amir in the Saudi
tribal structure.
Notwithstanding his victory over the Ikhwan and the consolidation of his
power after 1930, Ibn Saud continued to pamper the ulama, and especially
the al-Shaykhs. Their support was still essential for the legitimization of his
regime and its policy. It was also crucial for the process of national integration
through religion (Wahhabiyya), law (Shari'a) and traditional education. Yet,
consultations with the ulama rank and file during the king's daily majlis"5
and with the senior ulama in the far more important weekly
majlis,
could no
longer be considered a recognition of their supreme authority and their right
to participate in the decision-making process. Indeed, in matters which he
considered of secondary importance, Abd al-Aziz was still ready to accept the
ulama's opinions, even when they were opposed to his own. But, on more
important problems, although he consulted them when he saw fit, he made
his final decision according to what he considered right and, whenever
necessary, in contradiction to the ulama's opinion.
16
The ulama, who were coerced to accept the new status quo, realized that
in the new phase of their alliance with the House of Saud, while Wahhabi
hegemony and their special position in the kingdom were guaranteed, their
power and influence were to be dependent on the ruler's goodwill. But, even
as junior partners of the Sauds the ulama, led by Al al-Shaykh, enjoyed high
prestige, privileges and substantial influence and they were consulted regularly
by Ibn Saud. As the kingdom's government and administration developed they
were given key positions in it, in addition to control of the religious services,
justice and education systems.
Paradoxically, the role and authority of the ulama further declined after
the rise of King Faysal whom they helped bring to the throne in 1964.17
Known for his piety and related through his mother to Al aJ-Shaykh, Faysal,
who promoted the pan-Islamic movement in his struggle against pan-Arabism,
nevertheless eroded the ulama's power and influence. In addition to his
modernization programme, he abolished, or left vacant, key positions of
(judicial) power held by the ulama. Moreover, although he entrusted his new
Ministry of Justice to an Alim of Hijazi origin (usually more moderate than
the Najdi ones), Faysal gradually established secular administrative (non-
Shari'a) tribunals of different kinds."8 Frequently he ignored the ulama's
opposition to aspects of his accelerated modernization, sometimes even in
matters considered by them major issues.'9 Last but not least, he curbed the
authority and activities of the 'Committes for Encouraging Virtue and
Preventing Vice' (hay'at al-amr bi'l ma'ruf wa'l-nahi 'an al-munkar) and
their (morality) police, a major source of power of the conservatives.
The ulama, nevertheless, remain a major factor in the Saudi kingdom and
the Sauds' loyal partners, although junior ones, in its ruling class. Both the
Sauds and the ulama, each for their own reasons, have a vested interest in
the preservation of their historical alliance. On the one hand it contributes
to the regime's legitimization, stability and to national integration. On the
other hand it helps to preserve the Wahhabi character of the
kingdom and
the role of the ulama in its supervision.
The rise to power of King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd in 1975
signalled
a reversal of Faysal's policy. Senior members of Al al-Shaykh were appointed
to the positions previously left vacant at the head of the judicial system. Hijazi
ulama were no longer preferred to the more strict Najdi ones (as was the case
in other fields as well). The activities of the 'morality committees' and the
'morality police' were also somewhat stepped up, although their authority was
still limited.20
The Mecca incident at the end of 1979, an outcome of the revival of
Wahhabi fundamentalism (neo-Ikhwan), if anything only brought the ulama
and the Sauds closer together. The ulama, notwithstanding some extremist
alims who sympathize with neo-Ikhwan teachings,2' considered the rise of
fundamentalism not only a threat to the Wahhabi-Saudi kingdom but also
a challenge to themselves as part of the Saudi establishment. They did not
hesitate, therefore, to sanction the storming of the Holy Mosque and to
denounce the rebels and their 'heretic' beliefs. For their part, the Saudi rulers,
intimidated by the above phenomena and the rise of Iranian Shi'i funda-
mentalism, somewhat reinforced the ulama's control of daily life in Saudi
Arabia and tried to appear more devout and pious. Yet, in matters of policy
and substance, especially if concerned with the kingdom's government,
development or foreign policy, the ulama, as in the past, are rarely consulted.
Leaders of the Al Shaykh considered part of ahl al-hal wal-'aqd, however,
regularly participate in the meetings of the informal royal
majlis
al-shura.
Regardless of the decline in their power and influence, the ulama are still
an important component of the Saudi ruling class. They come immediately
after the royal house and its collateral and associated families, but above the
umara, in the scale of importance of the traditional elites. Indeed, in contra-
diction to the umara they are organized, have a hierarchical leadership,
state-supported institutions and common interests which unite them.22 The
activities of the al-Shaykhs, moreover, are no longer confined to the religious
and judicial hierarchies and they are to be found in key positions in the
administration, educational system, security services, the armed forces and
even in the private sector of the Saudi economy.23
THE MONARCHY, DECISION AND POLICY-MAKING AND THE RULING CLASS
It was generally accepted that until the 1970s the House of Saud, the ulama
and the umara - the most important components of the regime's power base
-
were in fact the Saudi ruling class. The size of this class is difficult to
determine. Al Abd al-Rahman and the other 'recognized' branches of Al Saud,
not to mention their associated important families, are generally estimated
to be about 5,000 strong. The number of ulama (in the wider sense) and all
the members of the religious hierarchy in Saudi Arabia is probably in the tens
of thousands. Indeed Al Shaykh is intermarried with all the other branches
of the ruling class, by itself believed to consist of 7,000-10,000 people. As
for the umara and their extended families, their number is probably equal to
that of the religious establishment. Thus, the traditional Saudi ruling class
in King Faysal's time (in the wider sense) was quite substantial.
Some scholars classify the Saudi kingdom as an autocracy. Others call it
a 'desert democracy'.24 The more appropriate description of the Saudi regime
after the death of Ibn Saud is probably an oligarchy whose pillars are the Saudi
royal house, the ulama and the umara. The conduct of its government follows,
especially since the last years of King Abd al-Aziz, the golden rule of consul-
tation (shura) and consensus (ijma'), within the ruling class.
The monarch has a power of veto over all the decisions of the executive
system (government and administration) which rapidly developed, and gained
power after Faysal became prime minister in 1958. Indeed, notwithstanding
the principles of shura and ijma' the king can also veto, at least in theory,
decisions of his informal
majlis
al-shura25 (Consultative Council), represen-
ting the Saudi oligarchy. Yet, on the other hand, in certain circumstances,
the Saudi oligarchy, through its unofficial leadership (ahl al-hal wal-'aqd -
those who bind and loose), may over-rule the king, limit his authority, and
in extreme cases, even depose him. Such prerogatives, however, were exercised
only in relation to King Saud (r. 1953-64) whose policy undermined the
kingdom's economic structure, its stability and the hegemony of the House
of Saud. Added to Faysal's manipulations, Saud's incompetent government
united most of the ruling class against him. It is unclear, therefore, whether
the authority of the king could be challenged, in normal circumstances, by
a section of ahl al-hal wal-'aqd, especially if the opposition to the king was
to be led by someone of lesser stature than Faysal. But in abnormal circum-
stances if the policy of the king or a financial crisis caused by him were to
threaten the stability of the kingdom and the hegemony of the ruling class,
a similar coalition to that which deposed Saud in 1962-64 could again emerge.
Information concerning ahl al-hal wal-'aqd in modern Saudi Arabia is
partial and vague. Most of the sources agree that membership in this author-
itative and powerful body is informal and limited to about 100 members of
Al Abd al-Rahman Al Saud and cadet branches of the family. Fifty additional
members of this body are said to belong to the aristocratic families associated
with the Sauds
-
Jilwi, Sudayri, Thunayan, Al-Shaykh
-
and some out-
standing ulama, not related to the latter, and a handful of extremely important
umara.26 The criteria for membership in ahl al-hal wal-'aqd, it seems, are
origin, seniority, prestige and leadership qualities, according to bedouin
tradition.
Leading ulama participated at the side of the other components of ahl al-
hal al-'aqd in consultations which preceded dramatic developments in Saudi
history. For instance, the discussions concerning Ibn Saud's succession in
1952-53, the appointment of Faysal as prime minister in 1958 and as prime
minister with full decision-making powers in 1962, the coerced abdication of
Saud in Faysal's favour in 1964, the succeeding of Faysal by Khalid in 1975
and of Khalid by Fahd in 1982, and the crushing of the Mecca rebellion in
1979. In several such instances fatwas (the proclaiming of religious-legal
opinion) were also issued by the leaders of the ulama. Yet, the ulama's
participation in the informal royal Consultative Council
(majlis
al-shura), the
kingdom's decision- and policy-making organ, is ad-hoc and conditional,
it
seems, on the need for religious sanction for a specific
decision or action.27
The tribal shaykhs and the members of the regional dynasties (umara)
provide, as mentioned above, the third leg of the tripod
of the Saudi dynasty's
traditional power-base. Yet, just
a handful of the most important umara are
considered ahl al-hal wal-'aqd. Indeed, only a few exceptionally important
amirs were invited, since Abd al-Aziz's death, to consultations of the informal
royal majlis al-shura largely in times of crisis or in relation to major policy
debates.28
Despite the subsidies they received from Ibn Saud and their role in the
provincial government, the importance of the umara, as mentioned above,
has been declining steadily since 1930 with the exception of a short period under
King Saud. This process was accelerated with Faysal's rise to power and his
reorganization and strengthening of the central government. That and the
introduction of five-year development plans (1970-75, 1975-80, 1980-85,
1985-90) continuously strengthen the new Saudi elites and the central
government. Conversely, the above and the extension of the government's
administration and welfare services to the provinces undermined the authority
of the provincial governors (umara al-manatiq), the sole representatives of
the royal authority in the provinces and districts between 1930 and the 1950s,
and, even more so, that of the tribal shaykhs (umara) and the regional and
urban notables (a'yan).29
The decline of the authority of the umara gathered momentum from the
1960s also due to Faysal's policy and the rapid urbanization of the bedouins
and settled rural population (hadr). Indeed, the average Saudi found himself
increasingly turning to the central government's representatives for services and
help rather than to his amir or headman.30 However, the umara regained some
of their previous importance when Fahd (then crown prince) began to strengthen
the authority of the traditional provincial government from about 1980.3'
The most important component of the Saudi ruling class and of ahl al-hal
wal-'aqd is, of course, the royal family. Indeed the royal family dominates
the government of the kingdom through the king and through its represen-
tatives in the royal Consultative Council and ahl al-hal wal-'aqd. It must be
determined, therefore, who can be rightly included in the term 'Saudi royal
house'.
After its meteoric rise to power in the first half of the eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth centuries, the Al Saud house split into different
branches which often fought each other for power. Such wars of succession
led to the decline of the power of the Sauds and the escape to Kuwait in the
last decades of the nineteenth century of Al Abd al-Rahman and other
branches of the family.
The term 'royal house' in modern Saudi Arabia is exclusively used to
describe the descendants of Abd al-Rahman ibn Turki ibn Faysal Al Saud and
foremost the offspring of his son Abd al-Aziz, as well as a few cadet branches
of the family. This definition received legal sanction in 1932 when only the
offspring of Abd al-Aziz, his brothers and the branches of the Sauds allied
to them by common history and marriage were to be considered royalty and
to receive a stipend.32
Abd al-Aziz and Faysal publicly denounced the use of royal titles and
protocol which contradicted Wahhabi puritanism. In an emotional speech
shortly after he came to power in 1964, Faysal said: 'I beg of you, brothers,
to look upon me as both brother and servant. "Majesty" is reserved to God
alone and "the throne" is the throne of the Heavens and Earth'.33 Yet it was
Abd al-Aziz who took to himself and to his family royal titles and his son
Faysal enhanced them.34 Indeed, regulations instituted by the Saudi civil
service during Faysal's reign demand that all the direct descendants of King
Abd al-Aziz should be referred to as 'His Royal Highness'. Those of his
brothers and some of his uncles should be referred to as 'His Highness', and
members of other recognized branches of the Sauds as 'His Excellency', a title
they share with cabinet ministers, non-royal district amirs and other senior
officials.35
All in all it is estimated that 4,000-7,000 members of Al Saud are considered
today to be part of the royal family, and of these about 700 are direct
descendants of Ibn Saud.36 This substantial group is unquestionably the most
important component of the Saudi ruling classes. Following an economic and
a political crisis which brought him to power as prime minister in 1958, Crown
Prince Faysal reorganized the kingdom's financial and administrative systems.
He also substantially reduced the stipends allocated to members of the royal
family and removed from the list members of remote branches of the family.
That, inter alia, caused a large part of the aristocracy including, ironically,
the young 'Liberal Princes', to support his dismissal by King Saud at the end
of 1960.
At the end of 1962 Saudi Arabia again faced a major political and financial
crisis as a result of the revolution in Yemen (September 1962); Faysal was
requested to resume the premiership with full powers. Among other things,
Faysal instructed (1963) his uncle and finance minister, Musa'id ibn Abd al-
Rahman, to re-examine the royal list and to determine who among the Sauds
was henceforth entitled to be considered part of the royal family and receive
a stipend. Subsequently Prince Musa'id limited the recognized membership
of the royal family to the offspring of Abd al-Aziz and his brothers and Saud
al-Kabir, Abd al-Rahman's nephew,37 as well as the Jilwis and the less
important Thunayans, Abd al-Aziz's kinsmen and companions since the
beginning of his career and who were also related to him through marriage.38
The royal family (as defined above), the Sudayris39
-
the powerful
bedouin dynasty from northern Najd intermarried with all the branches of
the Sauds
-
and the Al Shaykh thus consist of the upper echelon of the
kingdom's ruling class. This group is estimated at about 20,000 people.
Together with their other non-royal partners in the kingdom's traditional elites
(ulama, umara), they probably number nearly 100,000 people.40
Some scholars are of the opinion that until the rise of Faysal the non-royal
traditional elites also comprised important merchant families and urban
notables.4' Yet, even if such a claim is valid, these groups are not part of the
ruling class. Such differentiation is especially significant for our definition
of 'ruling class' in view of the dramatic rise of the importance of the new elites
in Saudi Arabia since the 1960s. The crucial criteria for membership in the
ruling class, we believe, should be the ability to participate in decision-making
and policy formulation. In short, to be represented in ahl al-hal wal-'aqd.
Wealth, education and key positions in the administration, military or the
economy, proposed by some writers as additional yardsticks for inclusion in
the Saudi ruling class, prove incorrect if examined against the criteria set above
and the history of the new Saudi kingdom since its establishment in 1932.
Wealthy merchants, entrepreneurs or even tribal shaykhs very rarely
participated during the reign of Ibn Saud in royal consultations in which
important decisions were adopted or the kingdom's internal or external policies
were formulated. Indeed, merchants, tribal shaykhs, notables and ulama were
present (and still are) in the daily and weekly majalis of Ibn Saud, his heirs
and those of senior princes. They attended the regional gatherings convened
by the ruler to adopt formally decisions proposed by him.42 Occasionally
individuals were requested to help in various matters and were later hand-
somely rewarded for their help. Moreover, until the 1940s important merchants
were frequently requested, if not coerced, to lend money to Ibn Saud. Their
reward was the prestige which they gained and other advantages which enabled
them, in many cases, to amass their present immense fortunes. But they were
never considered ahl al-hal wal- 'aqd nor members of the king's informal majlis
al-shura. Not only was their influence on decision- and policy-making limited,
but their success was largely dependent on the rulers' goodwill.
NATIONALISM, THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS AND THE SAUD-FAYSAL CONFLICT
In his last years, the enfeebled Abd al-Aziz ruled his country with the help
of a Consultative Council. This body was made up of his eldest sons and other
senior members of the royal and related families as well as a few powerful
tribal amirs, helped by the expatriate Arab advisers who had served Abd al-
Aziz for many years. The ulama, it should be noted, did not participate in
the council's discussions other than to give their blessing to Saud's succession,
nor did the merchants and notables take part in them. Somewhat disappointed
with the capability of his heir Saud (appointed 1933), Abd al-Aziz attempted
to counterbalance the latter's wide authority by establishing a formal Council
of Ministers. Its head was meant to be Prince Faysal, the second in line of
succession and universally considered the more suitable to rule.43 But on his
succession Saud appointed himself temporarily prime minister and although
Faysal assumed the position in the second part of 1954 the Council of Ministers
remained a powerless institution.
The reign of Saud, a sickly, weak, conservative and ambivalent king, is
generally considered a period of regression, economic difficulties and political
fermentation. Saud ignored Faysal, the crown prince and foreign minister,
and allied himself at first with the nationalist camp in the Arab world led by
President Nasser. But at the same time he suppressed the nascent Saudi
nationalist and trade unionist movement." Although he somewhat acceler-
ated the modernization of the kingdom, the conservative Saud abolished some
of the reforms introduced in the last decade of his father's reign, and above
all he reactivated the ulama-controlled 'Committees for Encouraging Virtue
and Preventing Vice' and their 'morality police'. Hence, the power of the
conservatives with the ruling class, whose support the king wished to win
against his rivals, increased in this period.45
Faysal's reappointment as prime minister in 1958 followed a financial and
political crisis caused by Saud's incompetent government
and ambivalent
policy. It signalled a new phase of modernization and development
in the
kingdom. Besides a financial reform Faysal reorganized
and expanded the
government and its services. Young Western-educated Saudis were incor-
porated in key positions in the administration, modern education was more
rapidly developed and many technological innovations were introduced.
Saudi Arabia's foreign policy became more balanced and efforts were made
to repair the kingdom's relations with the Arab nationalist camp which
had dangerously deteriorated since 1957 under Saud. The dramatic success
of pan-Arabism in this period and the struggle for power within the royal
house, however, caused the Saudi oligarchy to split into three camps represen-
ting the differing opinions and interests which existed within the ruling
class.
1. The progressives: mainly a small group of Abd al-Aziz's younger sons
led by Prince Talal, some of their young kinsmen and other liberal members
of the ruling elite. This camp wished to bring about a revolutionary change
in the Saudi government and society (above all a constitutional monarchy)
and were unwilling to await their turn to reach a position of power and
influence according to the seniority system. Naturally they were dissatisfied
with Faysal's conservatism and limited reforms aimed at consolidating the
Sauds' patriarchal regime.
2. The modernists: this camp was composed of many of the senior members
of the royal family and the ruling elite as a whole, led by Crown Prince Faysal.
They wanted to accelerate, through evolutionary means, the hesitant modern-
ization of the Saudi state and society introduced by Abd al-Aziz. They also
wished to reform the archaic character of the Saudi government while
preserving the Sauds' hegemony on power and decision-making and the
alliance between the Sauds and the ulama.
3. The conservatives: the older and less enlightened members of the royal
family and Saud's numerous sons, the tribal amirs and most of the ulama.
All wished to preserve the status quo and above all their privileges and the
puritan character of the Saudi-Wahhabi society. They rejected, therefore, any
aspect of modernization and change. Naturally they opposed Faysal's tendency
for reforms and innovations and wholeheartedly supported the conservative
and xenophobic Saud until 1958 and somewhat less so thereafter.
The flow of oil wealth into Saudi Arabia since 1946 and the impact of
modernization, accelerated by Faysal since 1958, were a turning-point in the
process of social change in the kingdom. A new middle class, composed of
the Western-educated bureaucrats, members of the professions, successful
businessmen, as well as many self-made men with traditional background,
began to emerge in the late 1940s. This process and the rise of the Saudi 'new
men' in its wake, was here a serious influence on developments
in Saudi Arabia
in the coming decades.'
The rise of a new middle class in Saudi Arabia coincided with the emergence
in the kingdom, between 1952 and 1956, of Arab nationalism and socialism
(the latter surfaced in the early 1950s among
Aramco's work-force in the oil-
rich Eastern Province
-
al-Hasa). In addition to the return to Saudi Arabia
of graduates of Arab and Western universities, it was related to the
develop-
ment of the oil industry, the influence of foreign
Arabs
employed
in the
kingdom and the political fermentation in the Middle East as a whole.47 It
was only to be expected that the nascent nationalist movement and new middle
class as a whole would become involved in the struggle for power within the
ruling class which had surfaced in this period.
As support for Faysal waned within the ruling class due to his stringent
financial reforms and modernizing policy (1958-60), the new educated
technocrats, many of whom were appointed and promoted by the crown
prince, paradoxically also turned their back on him. Faysal's evolutionary
approach meant to consolidate the Saud regime was contrary to the hopes of
the young nationalists who, encouraged by Nasser's achievements, were aiming
at a constitutional monarchy or possibly a republican government. Thus, when
Saud seemed to agree to promulgate a new constitution and to accelerate
reforms, they followed the 'Liberal Princes' and joined the king's camp.48
When Saud deposed Faysal at the end of 1960 and formed a 'liberal govern-
ment' it appeared for a short while that a new era would begin and the
composition of the Saudi ruling class would soon change. Indeed, the new
government, in which Prince Talal assumed a key role as Minister of Finance
and National Economy and 'progressives' held five ministerial posts,49
announced on 25 December 1960 that it had approved the election of a
National Council and ordered the draft of a constitution. Three days later,
however, these announcements were denied on the orders of King Saud. After
additional disagreement with the king Prince Talal was coerced in September
1961 to resign from the government.
The struggle for power within the royal family was exacerbated by Saud's
reassumption of power at the end of 1960 and his mishandling of the kingdom's
affairs. The crisis climaxed again in 1962 as a result of the revolution in Yemen
and the Egyptian intervention there, not to mention a renewed financial crisis.
While Saud's refusal to grant the promised constitutional reforms completely
disillusioned his progressive allies, his conservative supporters, disenchanted
by his meddling with the former, became apprehensive of the outcome of
events in Yemen, and many joined the powerful camp of Faysal's supporters.
Under pressure from most of the senior princes, supported by the leading
ulama, Saud agreed in October 1962 to surrender his authority to Faysal as
acting prime minister. Two years later (October 1964), after obtaining afatwa
from 12 leading ulama, ahl al-hal wal-'aqd coerced Saud to abdicate in Faysal's
favour.50
Even earlier the progressive-nationalist camp lost heart when its leaders
were dismissed from the government. A few liberal princes led by Talal and
a number of radical-nationalist commoners found it prudent to leave the
country and seek refuge in Cario. There at the end of 1962 they formed the
Arab National Liberation Front ('Free Saudis Movement'); except for some
air force officers who deserted with their planes to Egypt the ANLF failed
to gain significant support in Saudi Arabia and soon disintergrated. The
repentant 'Free Princes' were pardoned by Faysal in 1964 and 1965 and were
eventually appointed to important-sounding positions devoid of power.
Some nationalist commoners were also pardoned
and returned to the
country. Others established several insignificant radical socialist opposition
organizations in Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad
with a small following
in the
kingdom. Thus, the first bid of the Saudi new elites to challenge
the
monopoly
of power held by the traditional ruling class, failed. The large majority
of still
relatively small Saudi intelligentsia chose anyway to serve in, or co-operate
with, Faysal's modernist government. Those who did not were cruelly
persecuted by Faysal in the 1960s and early 1970s.
NEW ELITES, GOVERNMENT AND RULING CLASS
During his first term as prime minister and after his return to power in 1962,
Faysal courted the new elites. Inasmuch as he wanted their support in his
conflict with Saud and needed their co-operation in his struggle against pan-
Arabism, he could not accept in June 1960 the demands of the liberal princes
and nationalist commoners for constitutional reforms. Yet, at the end of 1962,
facing the Egyptian threat and Saud's intrigues, he was ready, for tactical
reasons, to meet partially their pressure for constitutional reforms and
accelerated development.
In his ten-point programme of November 1962 Faysal promised consti-
tutional reforms 'in accordance with the Koran and within the framework of
the Shari'a'. He also declared his intention to form a national Consultative
Council similar to the one which operated in Hijaz between 1926 and 1953,
to reorganize the local government and create provincial consultative bodies
and to develop the central government.5' Once solidly in power, the promised
reforms were forgotten. In 1963 Faysal declared that Saudi Arabia has its own
style of government, its constitution is the Shari'a and its ruler is the king-
imam. 'Whoever wished to be a slave and imitate others let him become a slave.
Saudi Arabia has no need for foreign systems'.52 By 1964 Faysal was con-
vinced that if permitted to participate in the country's government and
modernization and if enabled to share in its wealth, the new elites will co-
operate with his regime.53
Shortly after assuming full authority at the end of 1962, Faysal began to
reform the government and accelerated the pace of modernization. Because
of the shortage of suitable Saudi manpower he substantially expanded the
education system, promoted schools for women, and rapidly increased the
number of Saudis trained abroad.54 Despite his bitter experience with the
Saudi 'new men' in the 1959-62 period, Faysal appointed Western-educated
technocrats to key positions in his government. In fact every graduate of
foreign and local institutions of higher learning who wished to join the
administration was welcomed irrespective of his previous political opinions.
Thus modern-educated bureaucrats replaced expatriate Arabs and increasingly
eroded the monopoly of the conservatives in the Saudi government service.
After he was officially enthroned (1964), Faysal reorganized his cabinet
and entrusted some of the new ministries which he created and many key
positions in his administration to university-trained commoners. In 1969 he
launched Saudi Arabia's first (1970-75) five-year development plan (with
others to follow) which further necessitated the expertise and involvement of
the new elites. By 1975, the year Faysal was assassinated, about half of
the kingdom's cabinet ministers were university graduates, most of them
commoners."5 The civil service, with the exception of the ulama-controlled
ministries, was also largely dominated by bureaucrats with modern education.
Oil wealth and the rapid development of the kingdom created opportunities
which attracted many educated Saudis to the private sector of the economy.
They could not but succeed in the 1960s and 1970s, a period of continuous
prosperity. Those who turned to the professions also became highly successful
because of the insatiable demand for their services.
As time progressed, it became increasingly evident that the king had no
intention of proclaiming a constitution and of establishing an official
consultative assembly. Inasmuch as he was more than willing to entrust most
ministries (excepting security, foreign policy and religion)56 to teclhnocrats,
and to enable the middle class, and Saudis in general, to participate in the
country's wealth, Faysal adamantly refused to allow the new elites to par-
ticipate in decision-making and policy formulation. Indeed, he ruthlessly
persecuted members of the intelligentsia, the military and workers' activists
who agitated against, or attempted to subvert the regime dominated by the
Sauds.
Regardless of his image as a modernist and administrative reformer,
Faysal was a conservative whose government was extremely centralized and
patriarchal. He hardly delegated authority, constantly supervised the running
of the ministries by the commoner-technocrats and intervened in matters of
minute importance.57 On the whole his reforms in fields that were not
technical were at best minimal and in matters not considered by him of primary
importance to the kingdom's development (such as the status of women and
the control of modern education), he tended to compromise with the ulama.
Notwithstanding unrest related to the civil war in Yemen and two abortive
coups in 1969, the Saudi middle class, intimidated by Faysal's powerfully based
regime and merciless suppression of the opposition, tempted by high govern-
ment posts and by wealth, largely chose to co-operate with the regime. Thus,
without compromising the authority of the traditional ruling class, Faysal
succeeded in stemming the revolutionary potential of the new elites and even
enticed the majority to join the regime's power base.58
The development of the Saudi government, its administration and agencies
and the rapid growth of the kingdom's economy since 1970 increasingly
contributed to the importance of the new elites. Some scholars, impressed by
the expansion of their ranks and the growth of their authority, prestige and
wealth, believed that they had become one of the pillars of power of the Saudi
regime.59 Yet, despite their impressive achievements, the new elites failed to
gain a foothold in the Saudi ruling class. Indeed, on the rare occasions in which
leading technocrats, even cabinet ministers, openly criticized the government's
policy or irresponsible acts of senior princes, they had to resign, were dismissed
or 'exiled', even though they voiced popular sentiments.61
It is claimed that some leading technocrats and the wealthy merchants and
entrepreneurs, of Najdi origin, succeeded recently in penetrating the Saudi
'upper class'. But 'upper class' should not be confused with ruling class. Hence,
although they may have achieved international fame (Zaki Yamani) and
control enormous economic power, the technocrats and the merchant entre-
preneurs are still not members of the Saudi oligarchy. The Saudi nouveaux
riches depend on the goodwill of the rulers and are frequently coerced to take
princes as 'partners' or pay them substantial commissions,61 whereas the
technocrats can be fired at the whim of the ruler.
The modernization and the expansion of the Saudi armed forces since the
1960s made the House of Saud even less dependent on the traditional power
brokers. It also reduced the importance of the National Guard (the bedouin
militia), a source of power for the Saudi conservatives. Yet, despite the
enormous investment in it the Saudi armed forces are still (1985) believed to
be weak and inefficient. Moreover, their officers, unless from the ranks of
the oligarchy, are not 'a component of the ruling class', as some authors claim,
nor can they be considered a 'power group'.62
Younger members of the ruling elites are increasingly encouraged to join
the armed forces, especially the air force; many hold key positions in the
latter.63 This, the regime hopes, will reduce the possibility of the armed forces
becoming a threat. An endemic shortage of manpower, especially of skilled
manpower, makes the Saudi armed forces heavily dependent on a host of
foreign experts and mercenaries.' The pressing need for skilled manpower
to handle the increasingly sophisticated weapon systems acquired by Saudi
Arabia, nevertheless, required the enlistment of educated manpower from
Hijaz and Al-Hasa, rather than the traditional illiterate Najdi-bedouin
volunteers.65 The inhabitants of the former provinces are not known for their
support for the House of Saud and the rise of their numbers among officers
and NCOs of the technical branches of the army and in the air force could
lead eventually to the emergence of 'Young Turks' (as in 1969) in the Saudi
armed forces. Such a likelihood seems at present relatively insignificant in view
of the system of checks and balances instituted in the armed forces, the
substantial benefits enjoyed by officers and ranks and the elaborate security
services established by the regime. Yet the non-royal officers should be
considered another component of the expanding ranks of the new elites.
The new Saudi elites (made up of technocrats, professionals, entrepreneurs,
merchants and officers), despite their substantial personal achievements, are
not in a position to challenge the monopoly in decision-making of the tra-
ditional ruling class. They would be satisfied with the establishment of the
often promised, partly elected, partly appointed, national Consultative Coutncil
(majlis
aI-shura);' but, despite repeated undertakings by all the monarchs,
starting with King Saud, the ruling class still refuses to authorize such a
concession fearing that such an institution would serve as a springboard to
the new elite to advance their demand for participation in decision-making.
At the end of 1984 the Saudi government issued a tender for the construction
of the building for the majlis al-shura in Riyadh. On this occasion King Fahd
announced that preparations were being made for the appointment
and
election of members of this institution in the near future, according to the
recommendations of the royal commission established for this purpose at the
end of 1979.67 The establishment of the planned 'National Council' was
delayed because.it met with the strong opposition of the different components
of the traditional elites fearing an erosion of their power.
The more con-
servative ulama and umara were also apprehensive lest a platform provided
for the Western-educated and liberal new elites might corrupt
the character
of the Wahhabi-Saudi kingdom.
THE 'LOWER CLASS' AND THE SAUDI HUKUMA-DAWLA
The Saudi 'lower class', with the exception of an inconsequential element,68
faithfully support the regime, its policy and the conservative-Wahhabi
character of its kingdom. Their allegiance to the government (hukuma) of the
Sauds goes back to the pre-kingdom era and has been maintained through
a network of traditional socio-political institutions. Even after the establish-
ment of the modern Saudi kingdom in 1932, townspeople, nomads and
agriculturalists, were still governed through their respective hierarchy of
village, town, district and provincial amirs and tribal shaykhs (amirs). The
leadership of the rural population was integrated in the regime's power base
through numerous matrimonial arrangements.69 The Saudi patriarchal
system, moreover, provided for the meagre needs of the largely nomadic rural
society through stipends and employment of many in the National Guard,
the armed forces and the internal security services.
The accelerated development of the kingdom since the 1960s and the first
and second five-years development plans (1970-80), although they sparked
off rapid changes in the rural society, mainly benefited the urban population.
They created, nevertheless, attractive opportunities in the towns and acceler-
ated the urbanization of the bedouins and agriculturalists. This, and the
development of a centralized government, caused an erosion of the traditional
socio-political institutions of the tribal society. Yet, the newly urbanized, on
the whole, maintained their ties with their tribes, villages and amirs.70 The
third five-year plan (1980-85) already gave the highest priority to the rural
population with the aim of equating their standard of living to that of the
townspeople.
The distinction made by the Saudi 'lower class' between hukuma and
dawla, both of which they commonly take to mean government, is quite
significant. To the simple Saudi, dawla is a synonym of the modern central
government and its agencies, largely controlled by Western educated
bureaucrats of urban origin. The development of the central government and
the expansion of its services and rapid urbanization brought the Saudi lower
middle and lower classes, both largely of bedouin origin, into daily contact
with the dawla and made them dependent on services and subsidies provided
by it. Notwithstanding, the new townspeople usually dislike the bureaucrats
whom they consider inferior and crafty and who despise them. On the other
hand the Sauds' paternalistic hukuma, which retains personal contact with
them, they believe, respects them, understands their problems and, as befits
a (paternalistic) government, provides all their requirements whenever the need
arises.7'
The 'personal relationship' between the royal family and the tribal rural
and newly urbanized population is maintained through the different levels of
amirs and other traditional institutions. Most important
are the majalis
(singular,
majlis)
held by the king, all the senior princes and their offspring,
the leaders of the aristocratic families and the provincial
and district amirs.
The royal family up to the monarch is thus accessible, at least in theory,
to
the lowliest of citizens. He can petition for, and receive,
financial and other
help, or may bring before the ruler for consideration any grievance
or
any
injustice suffered by him. Individuals and groups, moreover, also use the
majalis to lobby 'worthy' public causes.72
Some authors espousing radical ideologies73 lament the fact that the Saudi
'lower class' is not really a lower class per se because the poorer Saudis have
already elevated themselves to the middle class, or are in the process of doing
so, and hence are not proper 'revolutionary material'. The rapid expansion
of modern education among the rural and recently urbanized Saudis and the
rise in their standard of living may eventually bridge the differences between
the Saudi 'lower class' and the new elite. But at present the new elites, mainly
of urban middle-class origin, can expect little sympathy or support from the
lower middle and lower-class Saudis in their bid to penetrate or overthrow
the Saudi ruling class.
As Crown Prince, King Fahd began to reinforce and reorganize the
provincial administration; young, educated and active princes replaced many
of the ineffective provincial governors of the older generation. They were given
additional responsibilities and their authority was soon to be expanded by law.
Substantial funds were also allocated for the development of the rural areas
and the umara were made responsible for the co-ordination of such projects
in their respective provinces. The Saudi king believes, it seems, that the
modernized patriarchal provincial government may offset the increasing
influence of the constantly growing new elites derived from the power of the
central government.
CONCLUSION
Following in the footsteps of their father the great Abd al-Aziz, the Saudi
monarchs carefully adhere to the golden principle of shura and
ijma'.
Until
today, however, they apply this principle exclusively to the royal family and
its traditional partners in the ruling class. Yet, the monarch's 'absolutism' is
tempered by the fact that he consults with the informal majlis al-shura
representing ahl al-hal wal-'aqd on every important issue and whenever policy
decisions are required. In the case of a major crisis, moreover, a larger forum
of ahl al-hal wal- 'aqd is convened. The centralization of the government, the
expansion of the administration and the rapid modernization of the kingdom,
nevertheless, eroded the power of the non-royal traditional elites (tribal umara
and ulama), and, to a lesser degree, that of the important families, such as
the Jilwis, Al al-Shaykh and the Thunayans.
Again, following Ibn Saud, Faysal, Khalid and Fahd adopted a policy aimed
at pre-empting the consolidation in the kingdom of any power centre with a
potential to challenge the Sauds' regime. Hence, they
did and still do their
best to incorporate the new elites in the royal family's power base. Yet,
regardless of their wealth and their impressive achievements the technocrats
are excluded from any position of power
in the cabinet and although
more
authority is delegated to them since Faysal's death, they enjoy only
an executive
power. Furthermore, the entrepreneurs
and merchants, despite
their wealth,
still depend on the goodwill
of the rulers and have been badly hit by the
stagnation since 1982 of the
kingdom's economy
and
government spending74
due to the decline in its oil revenue.
Thus,
after about 20 years
of faithfully
serving the regime the new elites have failed to penetrate the ruling class, and
decision- and policy-making in Saudi Arabia remain exclusively in the hands
of the traditional elites.
Notwithstanding all the above, the ruling class cannot continue to exclude
the new elites from participating in policy-making much longer. The ranks
of the latter are constantly increasing and so is their frustration. The many
new officers of non-royal origin who have joined, and will be joining, the
armed forces add a new dimension to this challenge. Moreover, the rural
population in Saudi Arabia, a major source of support for the regime, has
declined sharply in size in the last decade. In so far as the urbanized masses
increasingly become more educated and sophisticated, their support for the
House of Saud can no longer be taken for granted. This process may gather
momentum if the decline in the oil revenues and the recession in Saudi Arabia
causes hardship to the less affluent Saudis.
The announced decision in principle by King Fahd in 1985 to establish a
largely appointed, but partly elected, Consultative Council (majlis al-shura)
could have been a step towards granting the new elites a measure of partici-
pation in the kingdom's government. As it turned out it was a delaying tactic,
as were similar announcements in the past necessitated by traumatic develop-
ments in Saudi Arabia. If eventually created such a
majlis al-shura could
become a stepping-stone towards fuller participation of the new elites in
decision-making, if not a means, for a complete change in the Saudi govern-
ment. Indeed the conservatives in the ruling class who strongly oppose the
establishment of the 'National Assembly' have the example of the militant
parliament of Kuwait before their eyes and are well aware of such a possibility.
Thus, the likelihood of a change in the monopoly on decision-making by the
old elites in the near future seems remote.
NOTES
The author wishes to thank the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for a fellowship
(1982-83), which facilitated the research for this article.
1. Al meaning family or clan (or tribe). Until recently the Jilwis governed the oil rich Eastern
Province of Saudi Arabia.
2. The most important families associated with Al Saud are: Jilwi, Sudayri, Thunayan and Al
Shaykh (the descendants of Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabiyya).
3. For example with the defeated house of Rashid of Jabal Shammar. The mother of Crown
Prince Abdallah was a Rashid. Amir, a common title in Saudi Arabia, could denote prince,
provincial or district governor, tribal shaykh or village headman.
4. On Abd al-Aziz and the Wahhabi ulama in the first years of the reconquest of Najd, see
B. 0. Kashmeeri, 'Ibn Saud: The Arabian Nation Builder', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Howard
University 1973, p. 168; J. Goldberg, 'Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud and the Wahhabi Doctrine:
Thoughts about a Paradox' (in Hebrew), Hamizrah Hahadash, Vol. 30 (1981), 100-2; R.
Lacey, TheKingdom (London, 1981), pp. 66-7. On Abd al-Rahman's imamship see H. St.
John Philby, Saudi Arabia (Beirut, 1968), p. 240.
5. G. De Gaury, Faisal King of Saudi Arabia (New York/Washington, 1966), p. 18. Of Ibn
Saud destroying his beloved wind-up gramophone see Lacey, p. 144.
6. J.S. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam (Leiden, 1978), p.222; C. Moss Helms, The
Cohesion of Saudi Arabia (London, 1981), pp. 137-8. Also Philby, p.265.
7. Lit. volunteers. Mostly, it seems, of tribal origin.
8. Ibn Saud planned modernization in the fields of administration, communications and military
technology.
9. See Al-Rihani's evidence from 1922 (Lacey, p. 178) on tension between Ibn Saud and the
ulama and the reaction to the titles mentioned above. Also H. Wahba, Arabian Days (London,
1964), pp.127, 129, 131-4. On Ibn Saud's new titles, see Wahba, pp.135-6; G. Rentz, 'The
Saudi Monarchy' in W. A. Beling (ed.), King Faisal and the Modernisation of SaudiA rabia
(London, 1980), pp.27-8. (henceforth Rentz); F. Hamza, Al-bilad al-A rabiyya al-Saudiyya,
(Mecca 1335 A.H., 1937 A.D.), pp.90- 1; A. Bligh, 'The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as
Participant in the Political System of the Kingdom', International Journal of MiddleEastern
Studies, 17, 1 (February 1985), 38.
10. On the Ikhwan rebellion see Habib; Moss Helms; Philby.
11. 0. Al-Rawaf, 'The Concept of the Five Crises in Political Development: Relevance to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Duke University 1981, p.329.
12. M. Abir, 'Saudi Security and Military Endeavor', The Jerusalem Quarterly, 33, Fall 1984, 81.
13. Philby, p.333; Ibn Saud's revenues in 1922 amounted to $780,000: M. E. Faheem, 'Higher
Education and Nation Building. A Case Study of King Abdul Aziz University', unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1982, p.98.
14. A. H. Said, 'Saudi Arabia: The Transition From a Tribal Society to a Nation', unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Missouri 1979, pp. 126, 138; Wahba, p.299.
15. Majlis (audience or reception) - a forum for discussion and for petitions, held by every
Saudi of consequence. Royal majalis are theoretically open to every Saudi but in reality limited
by the size of the room and admittance frequently depends on the rank of the applicant or
his patron.
16. Wahba, pp. 50-2, 170-1; T. Niblock, 'Social Structure and the Development of the Saudi
Arabian Political System', Chapter 5 in T. Niblock (ed.), State, Society and Economy in
SaudiArabia (London, 1982), p.95 (henceforth Niblock); F. A. Shaker, 'Modernization of
the Developing Nations. The Case of Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Purdue
University, 1972, p. 138.
17. See below.
18. Grand Mufti and Chief Qadi. Faysal established instead in 1971 the Council of Grand Ulama
(Majlis Hay'at Kibar al-Ulama): A. Layish, 'Ulama and Politics in Saudi Arabia', in M.
Heper and R. Israeli (eds.), Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East (New York, 1984),
p. 30, and entrusted the Ministry of Pilgrimage and Awqaf to a Hijazi belonging to a merchant
family: W. Rugh, 'Emergence of a New Saudi Middle Class in Saudi Arabia', The Middle
East Journal (1973), 14-15; Also: F. A. S. Al-Farsy, A Case Study in Development (London,
1982), p.68, on non-Shari'a judicial tribunals; F. M. Zedan, 'Political Development of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 1932-1975', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School
1981, pp. 50-53; S. A. Solaim, 'Saudi Arabia's Judicial System', Middle East Journal, 25
(Summer 1971).
19. Women's education, radio and television. Rioting sparked in 1960 by the establishing of
schools for women and in 1965 against the establishment of TV service were suppressed by
the National Guard. Among demonstrators killed in 1965 was Prince Khalid ibn Musa'id,
whose brother Faysal assassinated in 1975 his uncle King Faysal.
20. On the reversal of Faysal's policy by Khalid-Fahd after 1975 see W. Ochsenwald, 'Saudi
Arabia and the Islamic Revival', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 13 (1981),
278; M. Field, Financial Times(London), 24 April 1984, supplement, Saudi Arabia; J. Buchan,
'Secular and Religious Opposition in Saudi Arabia' in Niblock (ed.), p. 108 (henceforth
Buchan).
21. Abd al-Aziz al-Baz, one of the leading Saudi ulama and an arch reactionary was known to
harbour such sympathies before 1979. The Islamic universities in Al-Madinah and Riyadh
were, and possibly still are, centres for neo-Ikhwan activities. D. Holden and R. Johns, The
House of Saud (London, 1982), p.517; Buchan, pp. 122-3; M. Field, 'How the power of Islam
...', Financial Times, 28 September 1982; Al-Rawaf, pp.359, 527; AIMawqif al-A rabi (Beirut),
20 April 1981.
22. For instance, the most distinguished ulama who hold the senior positions
in the religious
establishmeift: The Council of Grand Ulama (Hay'atKibar al-Ulama),
The
Department
of
Legal-Religious Opinion (Dar al-Ifta'...) and the Central Committee for
Encouraging
Virtue
and Preventing Vice. See
Al-Rawaf, pp. 323, 326; Layish, p.30.
23. Representation of al-Shaykh among the ulama declined sharply Bligh, p. 39. Three al-Shaykhs
served as cabinet ministers in 1984. The head of the Saudi general security services is General
Abdallah ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Shaykh. The commander in chief of the army in 1982 was
General Muhammad al-Shaykh - T. R. McHale, 'The Saudi Arabian Political System - its
Origins, Evolution and Current Status', Virteljahresberichte, 89 (September 1982), 203. See
also L. Blandford, Oil Sheikhs (London, 1976), p. 79 on their place in society. On al-Shaykhs
active in the economy: Al-Rawaf, pp. 331-2.
24. Shaker and Al-Farsy
-
'desert democracy'. Wenner (M. Wenner, 'Saudi Arabia: Survival of
Traditional Elites' in F. Tachau (ed.), Political Elites and Political Development in theMiddle
East, New York, 1975 (henceforth Wenner)) - 'modernizing autocracy'. Alyami (A. H.
Alyami, 'The Impact of Modernization on the Stability of the Saudi Monarchy', unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1977
-
'almost absolute autocracy'.
25. Called also Al-lajnah al-'ulyah - The Supreme Committee.
26. The principle of representation, according to the Shari'a can only be selective: only the elite can
represent the people in Islam. Muslim interpreters refer to such an elite as ahl al-hal wal- 'aqd.
Ibn Taymiyya, a forerunner of Wahhabism, limits membership in this body to amirs and the
ulama. Other eminent interpreters of Wahhabism include in it also the notables (wujuh al-nas).
The oath of allegiance (bay'a) of ahl al-hal wal-'aqd confers legitimacy upon the ruler on
condition that he consults them since they are supposed to speak for the people; Georges Assaf,
'A Constitution for Saudi Arabia', Plus (Paris), 1985/1, p. 40. Also Prince Fahd to Al-
Hawadith, 7 September 1973. Of the hundred Sauds, who are ahl al-hal wal-'aqd, fifty are said
to be the descendants of Abd al-Aziz. The document sanctioning the deposition of King Saud
and Faysal's enthronement was signed by 68 princes, of whom 38 were Ibn Saud's sons: Al-
Rawaf, p. 320. Of 12 distinguished ulama who signed this document four were al-Shaykha:
ibid, p. 326; Ochsenwald, p. 274. According to Dawisha (A. I. Dawish, 'Internal Values and
External Threats' Orbis (Spring 1979), 130), the above body is made up of 100 princes and more
than 60 leading ulama. See also D. E. Long, 'Inside the Royal Family' (a short survey), The
Wilson Quarterly (Winter 1979), 66-7.
27. Dawisha, Orbis, 129-30; Ochsenwald, pp. 274, 277; Holden and Johns, pp. 173, 517-8, 522;
Long, 'Inside ...', pp. 66-7; Al-Rawaf, p. 320; M. B. T. Al Saud, 'Permanence and Change:
An Analysis of the Islamic Political Culture of Saudi Arabia With a Special Reference to the
Royal Family', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1982, pp. 161-2. The
last source is of special interest because the author belongs to a cadet (unprivileged) branch of
the Sauds, but has, nevertheless, contacts in the ruling class.
28. Leading tribal amirs participated in the
majlis
al-shura before Abd al-Aziz's death. They were
courted and consulted by Saud. They were consulted in 1979 and they are again courted by King
Fahd (J. Kraft, 'Letter from Saudi Arabia', The New Yorker, 4 July 1983, 51).
29. On provincial and district umara (1930-1950s and 1960s) Said, pp. 107-8; A. N. Abussuud,
'Administrative Development in Saudi Arabia: The Process of Differntiation and Special-
ization', unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University of Maryland 1979, p. 45. On urbanization, rise
of central government and decline of umara and a'yan see ibid, pp. 104-5, 126. Also T. R.
McHale, 'A Prospect of Saudi Arabia', International Affairs (Autumn 1981), 640; Al-Rawaf,
pp. 428, 429, 483, 503.
30. Said, pp. 164-5, 132, 175-8; M.M. Deij, 'Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy 1953-1975', un-
published Ph.D. thesis, University of Idaho 1979, p. 26; A. M. Al-Selfan, 'The Essence of
Tribal Leaders' Participation, Responsibilities and Decisions in Some Local Government
Activities in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study of the Ghamid and Zahran Tribes', unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School 1981, pp. 151, 192. According to Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Planning Employment by Sector, (Riyadh, 1982), farmers make up about 20-25
per cent and nomads about 10 per cent of total population in 1981. Shaker
(p. 186) claims that
they made up 75 per cent in 1970. See also A. A. Shamekh, 'Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settle-
ment in Al-Qasim Region Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
the University
of
Kentucky
1975, p. 149.
31. J. A. Shaw and D. E. Long, SaudiArabian Modernization. The Impact of Change on Stability,
The Washington Papers/89, Vol. X, 1982, pp. 64-5; J. Buchan, Financial Times, 5 May 1981,
supplement, p. V; M. Collins 'Riyadh: The Saud Balance', The Washington Quarterly (Winter
1981) 202-3; N. H. Hisham, 'Saudi Arabia and the Role of the Imarates in
Regional Develop-
ment', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School 1982, pp.537,
543. On
appointment of younger, more vigorous princes to the emirates. On the appointment of
Mohammad, the son of King Fahd acting governor of the oil-rich Eastern Province, see M.
Field, Financial Times, 9 September 1982; and 15 February 1985.
32. See below.
33. Al Saud, p. 129; Faisal Speaks, Ministry of Information, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jeddah
1965, p. 17.
34. Instead of imam and amir Ibn Saud took in 1921 the title 'Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies',
in 1926 the title 'King of Hijaz' and in 1927 'King of Hijaz and Najd and its Dependencies'.
35. Hisham, p. 9.
36. R. Braibanti and F. A. S. Al-Farsy, 'Saudi Arabia: A Development Perspective', The Journal
of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 1 (Fall 1977), 27: 2,000-7,000; Al-Rawaf, p. 319:
3,500-5,000 with the Abd al-Aziz branch alone accounting for 700; Al Saud, p. 131: 4,000-
5,000; Sunday Times (London), 2 December 1984: no fewer than 5,000.
37. Muhammad Saud al-Kabir, the son of Saud, Abd al-Rahman's elder brother who challenged
Ibn Saud's leadership was married to his sister Nura.
38. Al Saud, pp. 136, 146, fn 26; Al-Rawaf, pp. 318-9; Dawisha, Orbis, p. 131; Holden and Johns,
p.461; Lacey, p.432.
39. Ibn Saud's mother was a Sudayri. Of his two Sudayri wives Hassa bint Ahmad al-Sudayri, was
the mother of the 'Sudayri Seven', one of whom is King Fahd.
40. A very different situation from Iran, where the Shah could depend only on his immediate
family.
41. Niblock, pp.94-5 (1926-47); Buchan, pp. 108-9; Merip Reports, (October 1980), 16; Gh.
Salameh, 'Political Power and the Saudi State', Merip Reports (October 1980), 18; Lacey,
p.443.
42. For example the gathering at the oasis of Murat in 1944 before Ibn Saud met with President
Roosevelt: D. Van Der Mullen, The Wells of Ibn Saud (London, 1957), p. 158.
43. Saud was appointed heir apparent in 1933. Holden and Johns, pp. 172-3; M. A. Saati, 'The
Constitutional Development in Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate
School 1982, pp. 106-7; Deij, pp. 15-16.
44. Shaker, pp. 175-7; Buchan, pp. 111-13; Holden and Johns, p. 183; Alyami, pp. 101-2; M.
Cheney, Big OilMan From Arabia (New York, 1958), pp.222-4,227-9; J. Arnold, Golden
Swords and Pots and Pans (New York, 1963), p.205; H. Lackner, A House Built On Sand. A
Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London, 1978), pp. 96-8.
45. The bedouin royal guard regiments were directly under the command of the king. On subsidies
to tribal chiefs, see T. 0. El Farra, 'The Effects of Detribalising the Bedouins on the Internal
Cohesion of an Emerging State: the Case of Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Pittsburgh, 1973, pp. 172-3. On the 'morality police' and Saud's relations with
the conservatives, see Buchan, p. 108; Shaker, pp. 170-1.
46. Rugh, 'Emergence'. The term 'new men' usually refers to technocrats whose achievements
were due to their abilities and Western education rather than to social and familial affiliations
no longer satisfied with the government of the traditional elites. Their rise in the Middle East
was normally associated with anti-Western nationalism. On 'new men' see S. E. Ibrahim, The
NewArab Social Order. A Study of the Social Impact of Oil Wealth (Westview Press, 1982),
p. 149; S. Duguid, 'A Biographical Approach to the Study of Social Change in the Middle East:
Abdullah Tariki as a New Man', International Journal of Middle East Studies, I, 3 (1970)
(henceforth Duguid), 195-220; Wenner, pp. 172-7; M. Halpern, The Politics of Social
Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, 1965), pp. 51-6.
47. Any kind of organization was, and is, prohibited in Saudi Arabia. G. M. Baroody, 'The
Practice of Law in Saudi Arabia', in Beling (ed.), pp. 121-2. (henceforth Baroody); Shaker,
pp. 170-7 (on the rise of nationalism); Rugh, 'Emergence'; Duguid; Lackner, pp. 94-8; De
Gaury, pp. 90-3. On strikes in the oil fields (1953-1956) see Shaker, pp. 175-7; Cheney, pp.
222-4; Holden and Johns, p. 183; Alyami, pp. 101-2.
48. Duguid; Lackner, pp. 62-4, 96-8; Shaker, pp. 179-80; De Gaury, pp. 98-100. On the impact
of Faysal's austerity programme, see also A.
Lateef, 'King
Faisal: From Obscurity to Inter-
national Status', Pakistan Horizon, 28,
4
(1975), 120.
49. Wenner, p. 177; Al-Rawaf, p. 365.
50. Some leaders of the ulama, mainly of the Al al-Shaykh, participated in the final discussions
which led to Saud's dethronement. Though an extreme step, Saud's removal from office
was not contradictory to tribal and Muslim customs. Faysal wished, nevertheless, to legalize
the procedure by afatwa from the ulama: Zedan, p. 24; McHale, 'Political System', p. 201;
A. Assah, Miracle of the Desert Kingdom (London, 1969), p. 133. Layish (p. 30) identifies the
12 leading ulama who signed thefatwa as being part of the Saudi religious hierarchy. See also:
Lateef, p. 120; De Gaury, pp. 130-5. For text of thefatwa see: W. Khalidi and Y. Ibish, Arab
Political Documents, Beirut 1964, p.441.
51. Full text of ten points in De Gaury, Appendix I, according to Al-Madinah (Saudi Arabia),
November 1964, p. 1. Also De Gaury, p. 148; Said, pp. 91-2; M. Khadduri, Arab Con-
temporaries, the Role of Personalities in Politics (Baltimore, 1973), p. 97; Lackner, pp. 65-6,
94; Lateef, p. 121; Shaker, pp. 306-7, 314.
52. Faisal Speaks, p. 12.
53. Shaker, p.314; Lackner, p.66.
54. Especially in the United States. In 1983 the number of Saudi students in the United States alone
was estimated at more than 15,000. Middle East Business Exchange (June 1980), 49;
Washington Post, 22 July 1980 claims 13,000 students.
55. Salameh, Merip Reports 1980, pp. 19-20; Dawisha, Orbis, 1979, 131-2; Al-Farsy, pp.73-7;
Lacey, pp. 435, 439; Al-Rawaf, pp. 365-6.
56. Faysal frequently reiterated that the Koran was Saudi Arabia's constitution, see N. 0. Madani,
'The Islamic Content of the Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia. King Faisal's Call for Islamic
Solidarity 1965-1975', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, the American University, 1977, p.57;
Shaker, pp. 308, 311.
57. Shaker, pp. 312-3; Lackner, p. 73; Al Saud, p. 146, ibid, fn 23; Holden and Johns, p. 459.
58. On submissiveness of the new elites to the regime after the 1969 abortive coups, see Shaker, pp.
3 12-4. See also Al Saud, p. 116 (1980). On the 1969 coups see Shaker, pp. 306-9; Alyami, pp.
201, 523; Buchan, p. 115; Holden and Johns, p. 271. About 2,000 people are said to have been
arrested. Many were ieleased by Crown Prince Fahd in 1975.
59. See Wenner, pp. 166-7; Braibanti-Farsy, p. 38; Al Saud, pp. 106-7; A. McDermot, Financial
Times, 20 March 1978. According to Al Saud (p. 115) the number of Saudi bureaucrats (?!) in
1980 was 173,290. About 10,800 students graduated from Saudi universities in 1982: Faheem,
pp. 114-15.
60. Abdul Aziz al-Quraishi, head of Saudi Arabia's Monetary Agency (SAMA) resigned in April
1983 after disagreement over the 1983-84 budget. Minister of Information, Muhhamad Abdu
Yamani, was dismissed and, it is claimed, arrested in 1983 when he angered some leading
princes. Dr Ghazi al-Gosaibi, Minister of Health and former Minister of Commerce and
Industry, considered the doyen of Saudi intellectuals (leftists, recruited by Faysal), was dis-
missed in 1984 after indirectly accusing Prince Sultan, the Minister of Defence, of corruption,
and King Fahd of not backing him. He was later appointed ambassador to Bahrain.
61. 'Only the heads of a few of the most distinguished merchant families can meet the senior princes
in private ...'. M. Field, Financial Times, 12 August 1982; M. Field, The Merchants (London,
1984), pp.40, 97-120; Buchan, p. 109. Also Rugh, 'Emergence', p. 19; Shaw and Long, pp.
79-80.
62. Al-Farsy, p. 70; Wenner, p. 174; R. Kavoussi, A. R. Sheikoleslami, Political Economy ofSaudi
Arabia, University of Washington 1973 (mimeographed), p. 3; despite coup attempts by air
force officers in 1969 and 1977, the modernization progressed.
63. The Saudi ambassador to the USA, Prince Bandar ibn Sultan was an air force officer. Other
sons of Sultan and his Sudayri brothers are also serving in the air force and other elite units. Of
different princes beginning their career in the air force in the late 1970s: Holden and Johns, p.
463. The director of air force operations is Colonel Fahd ibn Abdallah whose father was Ibn
Saud's paternal uncle. All 20-25 colonels of the Saudi air force are princes: Contemporary
Mideast Background, Media Analysis Center, Jerusalem,
171
(2
October
1983).
See also
Salameh, Merip Reports 1980, 10; McHale,
'Political
System', p. 203.
64. Abir, pp. 87-91.
65. On the above see: Abir. The Shi'is of Al-Hasa, 7-10 per cent of the kingdom's total citizens,
are excluded from service in the armed forces.
66. Similar to the situation of the parliament in Kuwait and to a lesser degree
in Bahrain.
67. MiddleEastEconomicDigest (MEED), 28 September 1984, 32; Sunday Times (London),
2
December 1984.
68. This minor element in the lower class, together with similar elements in the lower middle class
largely supports ultra-fundamentalist ideologies.
69. The most important are considered ahl al-hal wal-'aqd and occasionally participate in the
consultations of the informal royal Consultative Council.
70. Said, p. 103; M. Field, Financial Times, 10 September 1982; Al Saud, p. 114; F. M. Al-Nassar,
'Saudi Arabian Educational Mission to the US', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Oklahoma (Norman) 1982, p. 60.
71. On the attitude of the population to the bureaucracy see: A.D. Al-Mizjaji, 'The Public
Attitudes Towards the Bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, the Florida
State University 1982, pp.V, 73-80; Also: Said, pp. 153, 165-6; Al Saud, p. 138; Holden
and Johns, pp. 460-1; M. Field, Financial Times, 10 September 1982; Lacey, p.94.
72. According to a royal decree issued by King Abd al-Aziz in 1952 'every subject has the right
of access to his ruler, whether the ruler is a tribal sheikh, a governor or the monarch, to
present petitions or complaints or pleas for help' - Al-Rawaf, p. 363. Also ibid, p. 361. Al
Saud (pp. 135, 155) claims that the stipends provided by Ibn Saud to members of the royal
family (in the wider sense) were meant to help them exercise their role in grassroot politics.
On King Fahd's Majalis: ibid, p. 137; M. Field, Financial Times, 12 August 1982, supplement,
'The Balancing Act ...'; ibid, 23 May 1984, 'Saudi Arabia ... The Pressure For Change';
Niblock, pp. 82, 89; McHale, 'Political System', 204; McHale, 'A Prospect of Saudi Arabia',
639. On King Khalid's majlis: Lacey, pp. 510-20; Lackner, p. 174. See also above, note 15.
73. Kavoussi, pp.32-5, 54-5; Lackner, p.211. Fred Halliday's (Arabia Without Sultans
(Manchester, 1974), p. 69) explanation for the failure of the 1969 coups is most enlightening
in relation to the attitude of the masses to the Saud hukuma.
74. From a high of 91.3 billion dollars for 1982-83, the Saudi budget declined to about 40 billion
in 1985-86. Revenue from oil in that year was less than 30 billion dollars.

The Consolidation of The Ruling Class

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The Consolidation of the Ruling Class and the New Elites in Saudi Arabia

Author(s): Mordechai Abir

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