1

Cayetano vs Monsod

201 SCRA 210, 1991
FACTS
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on
April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess
the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsods
nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having
practiced law for the last ten years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
HELD:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered
to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business
of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while
so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license
fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
BGen. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, as Justice of the Sandiganbayan; 4TH DIVISION,
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facts: Petitioner, Retired BGen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), signed several deeds
of sale for the acquisition of parcels of land for the development of housing projects and for
other concerns. However, it appears that the landowners from whom the AFP-RSBS acquired
the lots executed unilateral deeds of sale providing for a lesser consideration apparently to
evade the payment of correct taxes. Hence, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an
extensive investigation in 1998 on the alleged anomaly.
It concluded that there were irregularities committed by the officials of the AFP-RSBS and
recommended the prosecution of those responsible, including petitioner, who had signed the
unregistered deeds of sale as AFP-RSBS President. Fourteen (14) informations were filed with
the Sandiganbayan against petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents as defined under paragraph 4 of Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
On July 27, 2003, junior officers and enlisted men from elite units of the AFP took over the
Oakwood Premier Apartments at Ayala Center in Makati City to air their grievances about graft
and corruption in the military. In response to the incident, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
created a Fact-Finding Commission (Feliciano Commission) wherein respondents wife,
Professor Carolina G. Hernandez, was appointed as one of the Commissioners.
Feliciano Commission submitted its Report recommending, the prosecution of petitioner.
President Arroyo then issued Executive Order No. 255 on December 5, 2003, creating the
Office of a Presidential Adviser under the Office of the President to implement the
recommendations of the Feliciano Commission. Professor Carolina G. Hernandez was
appointed as Presidential Adviser in the newly created office. Shortly thereafter, respondent
Justice Hernandez was appointed as Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan and assigned to
its Fourth Division.
Then so, petitioner argued that it was erroneous for Justice Hernandez to deny the motions to
inhibit himself under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,
when in fact the basis for his disqualification was the latters spousal relationship with
Professor Hernandez, which situation was governed by the first paragraph of the said section.
According to petitioner, while Professor Hernandez was not directly "pecuniarily interested" in
the case, she was more than so interested in them because as an appointee of President
Arroyo, she was receiving emoluments to monitor the progress of the cases and to see to it
that the recommendations of the Feliciano Commission are fulfilled.
Issue: Did Justice Hernandez commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in not inhibiting himself from the cases against petitioner pending before the
Sandiganbayan?
Held: The petition wherefore denied. The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is
laid down in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided
in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first
paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and
impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary
inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for
other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.
An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the
"just or valid reasons" contemplated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court for which a judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare
allegations of the judges partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role
of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. Verily,
for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges,
mere suspicion is not enough.
And even if we were to assume that petitioner indeed invoked the first paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 137 in his motions to inhibit, we should stress that marital relationship by itself is not a
ground to disqualify a judge from hearing a case. Under the first paragraph of the rule on
inhibition, "No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise...." The relationship mentioned
therein becomes relevant only when such spouse or child of the judge is "pecuniarily
interested" as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to
show that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these
2
cases before the Sandiganbayan to justify the inhibition of Justice Hernandez under the first
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137.


KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION and BANTAY
KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, as
represented by JOVITO R. SALONGA,
Petitioners,


- versus -


LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR., PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 264, PASIG CITY;
GREGORY S. ONG, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE,
SANDIGANBAYAN; and THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF SAN JUAN, METRO
MANILA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 180543

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 18, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong (Ong), following the promulgation of
the Courts Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,
[1]
filed a petition
[2]
under Rule 108 of
the Rules Court for the amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of the entry
on citizenship in his Certificate of Birth, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 11767-SJ and raffled to
Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City over which public respondent
Leoncio Janolo, Jr. presided.

Via the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition, petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation
and Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four Orders and the Decision emanating from the
proceedings in the RTC case.

As Ongs petition was set for hearing by the RTC on August 7, 14, 21 and 28,
2007,
[3]
petitioners-therein oppositors
[4]
filed on August 6, 2007 a motion for voluntary
inhibition, which the RTC denied by Order of August 7, 2007, a day after it was filed and prior
to the hearing on the motion.
[5]
Despite the pendency of petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the RTC proceeded to hear Ongs petition on August 14 and 21, 2007. It was
only by Order of September 17, 2007
[6]
that the motion for reconsideration was resolved, a
copy of which was received by petitioners on October 4, 2007.

Meanwhile, by Order of August 21, 2007,
[7]
the RTC declared petitioners in
default. Petitioners motion to vacate the order of default was likewise denied by Order
of October 4, 2007,
[8]
a copy of which was received by petitioners on October 17,
2007. Subsequently, the RTC granted Ongs petition and recognized him as a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, by Decision of October 24, 2007.
[9]


In the present petition filed on December 3, 2007, petitioners assert that public
respondent erred and committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) [i]n not voluntarily inhibiting
himself from presiding over the case; (b) [i]n declaring herein [p]etitioners as having
defaulted; and (c) in granting the Petition of [r]espondent Gregory S. Ong.
[10]


The Court, by Resolution of February 19, 2008, required respondents to comment on
the petition, with which Ong and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) complied on March
14, 2008 and June 5, 2008, respectively. Petitioners submitted their Consolidated Reply
on December 10, 2008.

The Court shall first resolve the preliminary objections raised by respondents. Both Ong
and the OSG claim that petitioners availed themselves of an improper remedy and disregarded
the hierarchy of courts. Ong adds that the defective verification renders the petition as
unsigned pleading, and the lack of service of the petition on all adverse parties violates basic
rules.

The question on the propriety of the remedy availed of by petitioners is resolved
in Cerezo v. Tuazon,
[11]
where the Court discussed the various remedies available to a party
declared in default, including a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by
default if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly
declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. A party
declared in default may thus alternatively file a petition for certiorari assailing both the order of
default and the judgment of default.
[12]
On the choice of remedy, the Court finds petitioners
recourse procedurally allowable. The same, however, cannot be said as to the choice of
court forum.

The hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs.
[13]
The rule on hierarchy of courts is not absolute,
and the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with
it. A direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are
special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
[14]


The present petition is bereft of even a single allegation of exceptional and
compelling circumstance to warrant an exception to the rule. In fact, this valid objection
elicited no response from petitioners, who glossed over all procedural issues in their
Consolidated Reply. If petitioners themselves do not provide the Court some basis for the
direct recourse, the Court is not minded to search for one.

Further, the petition carries a defective verification since it was verified without stating
the basis thereof. In the Verification/ Certification of the Petition, the affiant states that he
has read the same and all the facts contained therein are true and correct.
[15]
The Rules
clearly state that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records, and a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall
be treated as an unsigned pleading.
[16]
Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless
formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer
caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are
true and correct and not merely speculative.
[17]

3

Moreover, this Court observes that the affiant failed to present competent evidence
of his identity before the notary public, as required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
[18]
The Court cannot assume that affiant, being a public figure, is personally known to
the notary public, for the jurat does not contain astatement to that effect.

Records also show that petitioners failed to furnish public respondent with a copy of the
petition. The Rules require that the petition should be filed with proof of service on all adverse
parties, and that the failure to comply with the requirement shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
[19]


On procedural grounds alone then, the petition is susceptible to dismissal. The Court
deems it best, however, to resolve the substantial issues in the interest of justice.

In their motion for voluntary inhibition, petitioners cite that Ong, his counsel, and public
respondent are members of the San Beda Law Alumni Association which, along with the
schools Benedictine community, publicly endorsed and supported Ongs petition through
newspaper advertisements. Moreover, from the account of the proceedings, petitioners point
out that issuing the order of default without resolving the motion for reconsideration of the
order denying the motion for inhibition exhibits blatant bias for being unduly precipitate and
wholly unwarranted.

The rule on compulsory disqualification and voluntary inhibition of judges is provided
under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:

No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above. (underscoring supplied)


In keeping with the tenet that judges should not only act with fairness, independence,
impartiality and honesty but should also be perceived to be the embodiment of such qualities,
the Court added the rule on voluntary inhibition in 1964. In outlining the genesis of the
provision, the Court narrated:

In Umale v. Villaluz, the Court traced the history of the second
paragraph of the above-quoted provision, which had been added only as
an amendment to the Rules of Court in 1964. Prior to that year, the
question on whether to take cognizance of the case did not depend upon
the discretion of the judges not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. If
those concerned were not disqualified, it was their official duty to proceed
with the case or else risk being called upon to account for their
dereliction. They could not voluntarily inhibit themselves on grounds of
prejudice or bias, extreme delicacy, or even if they themselves took great
interest and an active part in the filing of the case. Gutierrez v.
Santos and Del Castillo v. Javelona paved the way for the recognition of
other circumstances for disqualification those that depended upon the
exercise of discretion of the judges concerned.
[20]



While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for
inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just or
valid reasons. The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision
on whether to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge based on his
rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before
him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest,
relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be
other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for
inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences and
predilections are many and varied.
[21]


In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the
inhibition of judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar
circumstances.

The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing
tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and
whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that they
are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly
deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.
[22]


Impartiality being a state of mind, there is thus a need for some kind of manifestation of
its reality, in order to provide good, sound or ethical grounds or just and valid reasons for
inhibition.
[23]
Bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to
dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor.
[24]
In Gochan v.
Gochan,
[25]
the Court elucidated further:

Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not
give judges the unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from
hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The
mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to
inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be
shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before
it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.

In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and
prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of
judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare
allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed,
especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates,
requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably both to the poor
and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-
connected.
[26]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

4

The Court applied the same precept in Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning,
Inc.
[27]
where the judges right to inhibit was weighed against his duty to decide the case
without fear of repression. Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition
would open the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to
shop for a judge more sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical to the speedy
and fair administration of justice.
[28]


A judge must decide based on a rational and logical assessment of the circumstances
prevailing in a case brought before him.
[29]
In the present case, petitioners cite public
respondents affiliation with an alumni association as the sole ground to which they anchor their
motion for the voluntary inhibition of public respondent.

Before the trial court, petitioners alleged that the law school ties among public
respondent, Ong and his counsel, they having graduated from San Beda College of Law, albeit
years apart, spell partiality.

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears
before the judge as counsel for one of the parties, however.
[30]
In one case,
[31]
the Court ruled
that organizational affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition.

Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a
ground to disqualify an investigator, prosecutor or judge from acting on the
case of a respondent who happens to be a member of the same
fraternity. A trial Judge, appellate Justice, or member of this Court who is
or was a member of a college fraternity, a university alumni association, a
socio-civic association like Jaycees or Rotary, a religion-oriented
organization like Knights of Columbus or Methodist Men, and various other
fraternal organizations is not expected to automatically inhibit himself or
herself from acting whenever a case involving a member of his or her
group happens to come before him or her for action.

A member in good standing of any reputable organization is
expected all the more to maintain the highest standards of probity,
integrity, and honor and to faithfully comply with the ethics of the legal
profession.
[32]
(underscoring supplied)


The added fact that the law schools alumni association published statements in
support of Ongs application cannot lend credence to the imputation of bias on the part of pubic
respondent. No clear and convincing evidence was shown to indicate that public respondent
actively sponsored and participated in the adoption and publication of the alumni associations
stand. It is inconceivable to suppose that the alumni associations statement obliged all its
members to earnestly embrace the manifesto as a matter of creed.

Arbitrariness cannot be inferred either from the fact that public respondent resolved
the motion for voluntary inhibition one day after it was filed. Since the personal process of
careful self-examination
[33]
is essentially a matter of conscience, the judge may decide as
soon as the factual basis of the motions has been clearly laid before the court because from
there on the resolution of the motion enters the subjective phase.

That public respondent, Ong and his counsel former Senator Rene Saguisag are all
graduates of San Beda College of Law was clearly and early on established. Hence,
this sole ground relied upon by petitioners in their motion, it bears repeating, no longer
required a hearing or called for the submission of a comment or opposition, and the absence
thereof did not prejudice petitioners.

In one case,
[34]
it was held that the Rules of Court does not direct the court to order
the filing of comments or oppositions to the motion before the motion is resolved. The parties
may orally argue and ventilate their positions and, thereafter, the court may rule on the
motion.

The Court notes that when petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion (for reconsideration
and deferment) which basically reiterated their previous arguments, they no longer set the
motion for hearing and simply submitted their motion ex parte without further arguments,
thereby recognizing the non-litigious nature of their allegations.

Even assuming that Ong interposed no objection to the motion, it was still up to
public respondent to discern, for a qualified judge cannot be ousted from sitting in a case by
sheer agreement of the parties.

Petitioners further complain that public respondent proceeded to hear the case and
declared them in default without first resolving their pending motion. Records show that
petitioners filed on August 13, 2007 an Omnibus Motion
[35]
for reconsideration of the August 7,
2007 Order and for deferment of the hearings set on August 14, 21 and 28, 2007. Petitioners,
thereafter, did not appear in the various settings, they alleging that the question of voluntary
inhibition, which they deem to be an overriding consideration partaking of a highly
prejudicial matter, had yet to be resolved by the trial court.
[36]


While there is no specific rule providing for a definite period of time within which to
resolve a motion for reconsideration of an order denying inhibition, judges must endeavor to
act promptly on it within the mandatory 90-day period so as not to interrupt the course of
trial.
[37]


The trial court narrated what transpired on August 14, 2007 as confirmed by the entry
of the nunc pro tunc Order of September 17, 2007 making on record the denial of the Omnibus
Motion.


During the hearing on August 14, 2007, the Court, after
considering the arguments and counter-arguments from petitioner [Ong]
and the Office of the Solicitor General, and finding no cogent reasons to
reconsider its earlier position, denied in open court the motion seeking a
reconsideration of the Order dated August 7, 2007 which denied movants
Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of Presiding Judge. Corollarily, for lack of
merit, the motion to defer the proceedings in the instant case was similarly
denied. (see TSN, August 14, 2007, pp. 13). (citation in the original)
[38]



The cited record of the proceedings validates the disposition made by the trial court on
the given date, during which time petitioners failed to appear. After hearing the arguments,
the trial court ruled as follows, quoted verbatim:


COURT: Thats right, so theres no basis to overturn our previous Order
denying the motion to voluntary inhibition filed by Atty.
5
Capulong Now, theres another matter being raised here,
counsel could not have a valid argument here to delay the
proceedings What the Supreme Court wanted is to have an
Order summary of the proceeding because Kilos Bayan did
sought at their level. Supreme Court was expecting that
they will do so again in our level, but in since theres
seems to be no good idea waiting for the adversary
arguments, so, it will, when it reaches the Supreme Court, it
will repeat the purpose to which they were directed to
litigate. Theyre supposed to litigate because if they believe
theyre for the denial of the petition, unless the
application for declaration of natural born citizen, they
should do so without any delay, so, use Bayan as a very
an active group and Bantay Katarungan, they should be a
party to expeditious resolution of cases, not to a
delay. How many are we here from government. We are
here to litigate. So, the Motion for Reconsideration is
denied, and Motion to Defer Further Proceedings is also
denied. The settings for August were all placed in the
Order which was published in the newspaper of general
circulation. We have previously agreed that we will proceed
to cross of petitioner and witnesses. Are you ready or
would you agree to the suggestion by the Court that we
conduct pre-trial?
[39]
(underscoring supplied)


The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order is recognized where an order actually
rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered of record as rendered.
[40]
The
phrase nunc pro tunc signifies now for then, or that a thing is done now that shall have the
same legal force and effect as if done at the time it ought to have been done.
[41]
The purpose
of an order nunc pro tunc is to make a present record of an order that the court made in a
previous term, but which was not then recorded. It can only be made when the thing ordered
has previously been made, but, by inadvertence, has not been entered.
[42]


In the case at bar, the trial court actually took judicial action which was, however,
by mistake or inadvertence, not placed in proper form on record. In any event, petitioners
neither seriously contest the veracity of the transcript used as basis for such confirmatory
order nor claim any unwarranted prejudice from the fact of its resolution during their non-
appearance in the scheduled hearing.

The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness
and partiality of the trial court.
[43]
For one, the grant of such is not a matter of right for it is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
[44]
Parties have absolutely no right to assume
that their motion for deferment would be granted, hence, they should prepare for the hearing,
lest they pass the blame to no one but themselves.

Further, in considering such motions, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason
for the postponement and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.
[45]
In this case, the
requested postponement was premised on the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration. The Omnibus Motion was, however, submittedex parte and without further
arguments from Oppositors,
[46]
drawing public respondent to promptly resolve it by denying
it.

As to the merits of the case of petitioners, the trial court was left with nothing to
assess since they did not file any Opposition to Ongs Petition despite the grant to them of
extension of time for the purpose and their various submissions to the trial court all related to
peripheral issues.

No trace of bias can be found at that juncture when the court proceeded to declare
petitioners in default after resolving the pending incidents. It is an equally important doctrine
that bias and prejudice must be shown to have resulted in an opinion on the merits on the
basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned from participating in the
case. As long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the
evidence presented and the conduct observed by the magistrate, such opinion even if later
found to be erroneous will not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the
judge. While palpable error may be inferred from the decision or the order itself, extrinsic
evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.
[47]


Divergence of opinion as to applicable laws and jurisprudence between counsel and the
judge is not a proper ground for disqualification. Opinions framed in the course of judicial
proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and
conduct observed by the judge, do not prove bias or prejudice. Repeated rulings against a
litigant no matter how erroneous are not bases for disqualification.
[48]


As for the allegation of undue haste, the Court cannot appreciate it, considering that the
trial court even granted petitioners additional period within which to file an Opposition and in
view of the nature of the case, which empowers the trial court to make orders expediting
proceedings.
[49]


In the absence then of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge, a ruling
not to inhibit oneself cannot just be overturned.
[50]
In this case, petitioners failed to
demonstrate such acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice as to thaw the
attributes of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Unjustified assumptions and mere
misgivings that the hand of prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness moves the judge in the
performance of his functions are patently weak to parry the presumption that a judge shall
decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.

In fine, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when public respondent did not
inhibit himself from hearing the case.

On the second issue, petitioners assail the Orders of August 21, 2007 and October 4,
2007 declaring them in default and denying their motion to vacate order, respectively.

Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.
[51]
Section 5, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court provides that [t]he civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto. Records show that the notice was last published on July 26, 2007.
[52]


The trial court pointed out that petitioners filed their entry of appearance
[53]
without
any attached Opposition to Ongs petition and that, despite the grant to them of additional five
days from August 7, 2007, they still failed to make a submission. Petitioners do not contest the
trial courts earlier observation that at theAugust 7, 2007 hearing, petitioners counsel
6
undertook to submit the Opposition within the extended period and to appear at the next
hearing,
[54]
where eventually both their pleading and presence turned up unforthcoming.

Petitioners thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Vacate the August 21, 2007
Order, insisting that the Omnibus Motion presented a prejudicial issue that should have been
resolved first before the trial court proceeded with the case. Notably, in both the Motion to
Vacate Order and the Memorandum and/or Submission, petitioners relied only on this ground
and impliedly waived other defenses or grounds for the lifting of the default order.

For a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
(1) it must be made by motion under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must
be shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of meritorious
defense.
[55]


As the trial court observed, the motion to vacate or set aside the order of default
failed to comply with paragraph (b), Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
[56]
it noting, inter
alia, that the motion was not under oath, it failed to explain or justify why movants have not
filed any opposition to the petition, and it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit.
[57]


Indeed, a trial court has no authority to consider a motion to lift the order of default
where such motion was not made under oath.
[58]
Moreover, a motion to lift an order of default
must allege with particularity the facts constituting the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect which caused the failure to answer.
[59]


In this case, petitioners unverified motion does not contain any justifiable reason for
their failure to file an appropriate responsive pleading. Petitioners persistent stance on the
pendency of their Omnibus Motion deserves scant consideration in view of the recognition of
the nunc pro tunc order confirming theAugust 14, 2007 denial of such motion.

Moreover, the filing of a motion for inhibition could not toll the running of the
reglementary period to file a responsive pleading, for where a period is to be suspended by the
filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such a suspension.
[60]
Despite the
grant of an extension of time, petitioners did not file an Opposition to Ongs Petition, even
one ex abundante ad cautelam that would have sufficiently dealt with their concern over the
alleged pending incident.

Further, petitioners failed to allege, much less demonstrate, a meritorious defense or
any argument to protect whatever interest they may have under the entry which they resist to
be corrected, either embodied in a separate affidavit of merit or embedded in the verified
motion itself.
[61]
Petitioners would later admit that they are not real adversarial litigants in the
juridical sense as they are acting as judicial monitors and observers.
[62]


Velayo-Fong v. Velayo
[63]
discusses the meaning of meritorious defense:

Moreover, when a party files a motion to lift order of default, she
must also show that she has a meritorious defense or that something
would be gained by having the order of default set aside. The term
meritorious defense implies that the applicant has the burden of proving
such a defense in order to have the judgment set aside. The cases usually
do not require such a strong showing. The test employed appears to be
essentially the same as used in considering summary judgment, that
is, whether there is enough evidence to present an issue for
submission to the trier of fact, or a showing that on the undisputed
facts it is not clear that the judgment is warranted as a matter of law. The
defendant must show that she has a meritorious defense otherwise the
grant of her motion will prove to be a useless exercise. Thus, her motion
must be accompanied by a statement of the evidence which she
intends to present if the motion is granted and which is such as to
warrant a reasonable belief that the result of the case would
probably be otherwise if a new trial is granted.
[64]
(emphasis in the
original)


Conjunctively, the glaring deficiencies negate the posture that petitioners had no
intention to delay the case and that their defenses, if any, deserve to see the light of day in
court. David v. Gutierrez-Fruelda
[65]
did not countenance the failure to comply with the basic
requirements of a motion to lift an order of default. Accordingly, public respondent did not
arbitrarily declare them in default and deny their motion to lift the order of default.

Respecting the trial courts Decision of October 24, 2007, petitioners recapitulate their
arguments against the inhibition and default orders to conclude that the assailed decision is
insupportable.
[66]
As lone ground, petitioners posit that the special proceedings under Rule
108 do not fall under the juridical concept of adversarial proceedings in the absence of effective
adversaries since the Office of the Civil Registrar is a formal party while the Office of the
Solicitor General sided with Ongs legal position. Petitioners admit that they, while being
parties in interest in their capacity as judicial monitors and observers, are not real adversarial
litigants in the juridical sense.
[67]


The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,
[68]
stated that substantial corrections to
the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry are effected through a
petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Jurisprudence has settled that such
proceedings are adversarial in nature or [o]ne having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application, one which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
[69]
In this case,
impleaded as defendants were the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other
person having or claiming an interest under the entry sought to be corrected. The interest of
the State was amply represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, while petitioners
interest was deemed waived when they failed to appear and file a responsive pleading.

Petitioners raise no additional ground to substantiate their imputation of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondent insofar as the issuance of the October 24,
2007 Decision is concerned. Since no further issues were raised, the Court is precluded from
making a definitive pronouncement on thesubstantial aspect of the assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.








7
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL G.R. No. 171137
INTERNATIONAL BANK,
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

SPOUSES WILSON DY HONG
PI and LOLITA DY and Promulgated:
SPOUSES PRIMO CHUYACO,
JR. and LILIA CHUYACO,
Respondents. June 5, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, C.J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision
[1]
dated
July 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP. No. 85282, and its Resolution
[2]
dated
January 10, 2006, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Spouses Damian and Tessie Amadeo are indebted to petitioner Philippine
Commercial International Bank, a domestic uni-banking corporation, as sureties for Streamline
Cotton Development Corporation. The promissory notes became due and demandable, but the
Amadeo spouses failed to pay their outstanding obligations despite repeated demands. As of
February 15, 1994, these obligations stood at Ten Million, Six Hundred Seventy-One
Thousand, Seven Hundred Twenty-Six Pesos and Sixty-One Centavos (P10,671,726.61).

Petitioner subsequently discovered that roughly a month before the due date of the
promissory notes, the Amadeo spouses (i) sold three (3) or nearly all of their real properties to
respondents, Spouses Wilson and Lolita Dy and Spouses Primo and Lilia Chuyaco, and (ii)
immediately caused the transfer of the titles covering the parcels of land in favor of the latter.
The consideration for these sales was further alleged to have been grossly insufficient or
inadequate.

Believing that the transfers were done in fraud of creditors, petitioner instituted an
action for rescission and damages on April 22, 1994. In its Complaint
[3]
in Civil Case No. 94-
1585 against Spouses Amadeo, Dy and Chuyaco, petitioner asked
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the following reliefs:
1. Annulling the Deeds of Absolute Sale both dated September
16, 1993 and thereafter, direct the Registries of Deeds of Sultan Kudarat
and Davao City to cancel the Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. (sic) T-
27628, T-202868, and T-202869 issued in the name of Wilson Dy Hong Pi
and Lolita G. Dy AND Primo Chuyaco, Jr. and Lilia O. Chuyaco,
respectively, and in lieu thereof, issue new ones under the name of
Damian and Tessie Amadeo.

2. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff moral damages
in the sum of P200,000.00; exemplary damages in the sum
of P200,000.00; and P100,000.00 as[,] and for[,] attorneys fees.
[4]


The case was then raffled to Branch 133, presided over by Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan.


Upon service of summons on the Amadeo spouses, the latter filed a Motion to
Dismiss
[5]
on the ground that the Complaint violated the explicit terms of Supreme Court
Circular No. 04-94, as the Verification was executed by petitioners legal
counsel.
[6]
Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,
[7]
where it argued that
(i) the rule cited by the Amadeo spouses should not be applied literally, and (ii) at any rate,
petitioners legal counsel was authorized by petitioner to institute the Complaint.
[8]
On
February 4, 1995, the trial court issued an Order
[9]
denying the Motion to Dismiss.

The Amadeo spouses subsequently filed an Answer
[10]
where they alleged that
petitioner failed to release the loans to Streamline Cotton Development Corporation on the
agreed date, thereby constraining them to incur loans from third parties at high interest rates
to keep the company afloat. These loans were covered by postdated checks which had to be
funded once the obligations fell due, lest the Amadeo spouses face criminal prosecution. In
order to pay the said loans, they thus had to sell the properties subject of this case. The
Amadeo spouses further claimed that the purchase price for the three (3) parcels of land was
the fair market value, and that they had other personal and real properties which may be
availed of to answer for their obligations. In their Counterclaim, they prayed for moral
damages of P200,000.00, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.

Petitioner filed its Reply and Answer to Counterclaim
[11]
on March 8, 1995.

On September 13, 1995, petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve
Summons by Publication
[12]
on Spouses Dy and Chuyaco. However, this was denied in an
Order
[13]
dated September 14, 1995 on the ground that summons by publication cannot be
availed of in an action in personam.

Accordingly, on March 4, 1996, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint
[14]
to include
allegations in support of, and a prayer for, a writ of preliminary attachment. Petitioner then
presented evidence in relation thereto, and on February 25, 1997, the trial court issued an
Order
[15]
for the issuance of the writ. Upon petitioners ex-parte motion, the trial court likewise
directed the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to designate a Special
Sheriff to implement the writ of preliminary attachment.
[16]


In Orders
[17]
dated January 12, 1998 and February 20, 1998, respectively, petitioner
was directed to inform the court whether it still intended to pursue the case. This appears to
have been motivated by the fact that no property of the defendants had been attached as of
yet. Petitioner did not comply with the said Orders; consequently, the case was dismissed
without prejudice on June 26, 1998 for failure to prosecute.
[18]
By this time, petitioner had
already caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the titles of the
properties subject of this case (i.e., TCT Nos. T-27628, T-202868, and T-202869).

On August 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 26, 1998
Order, alleging that its failure to notify the trial court of its intention to pursue the case was
prompted solely by the difficulty of locating properties against which the writ of attachment
could be enforced. In the interest of justice, the trial court granted the motion.
[19]


8
Defendant Spouses Amadeo, Dy and Chuyaco then filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
and to Annul All the Proceedings Taken Against the Defendants
[20]
on December 11, 1998, in
which motion they questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over their persons. Petitioner
filed its Opposition
[21]
thereto on February 15, 1999. Defendants filed their Reply
[22]
on March
10, 1999, while petitioner filed its Rejoinder
[23]
on June 9, 1999. Said motion, however, was
merely noted without action in an August 2, 2001 Order
[24]
since its notice of hearing was
addressed only to the Clerk of Court, viz.:
It appears from the Motion that its Notice of Hearing is not
addressed to any of the parties concerned as otherwise required by Rule
15[,] Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such being the case,
the Motion is deemed a mere scrap of paper as held in Provident
International Resources Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 510.

In any event, the record shows that defendants Sps. Amadeo
have been duly served with summons as early as November 11, 1994 per
Sheriffs Return of Service dated November 14, 1994, and they are
therefore within the jurisdiction of the Court. However, defendants
Spouses Dy and Chuyaco have not been served with summons as
evidenced by Officers Return dated May 24, 1994 and Return of Service
dated June 10, 1994, respectively, and so the Court has not yet acquired
jurisdiction over them. Since aforesaid Motion is deemed a scrap of paper,
it cannot be construed to manifest a (sic) voluntary appearance on their
part.

Wherefore, the Omnibus Motion is noted without action. Let alias
summons be issued to defendants-spouses Dy and Chuyaco. For plaintiffs
guidance, it may avail itself of Rule 14[,] Section 14 on summons by
publication if it so desires, upon proper motion.

SO ORDERED. (underscoring in the original)

Spouses Dy and Chuyaco subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of
Jurisdiction)
[25]
on February 18, 2002, in which motion they essentially accused petitioner of
not causing summons to be served upon them and losing interest in the case. Petitioner filed
its Opposition
[26]
thereto, and in an April 23, 2002 Order,
[27]
the trial court denied the Motion to
Dismiss on account of (i) petitioners Compliance and Manifestation
[28]
that it had not lost
interest in pursuing the case, and (ii) the Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by
Publication that petitioner filed simultaneously with its Opposition. On April 24, 2002, the
Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication was submitted for resolution.
[29]


Respondent Spouses Dy and Chuyaco next filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute
[30]
on June 17, 2003. The significant portions of the motion state:
2. That based on the order of this Honorable Court dated April
23, 2003 (sic), the Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by
Publication was submitted for resolution, but the movants-defendants
would like to remind the Honorable Court that a Motion of the same
nature was already filed on September 13, 1995 and was DENIED on
September 14, 1995. xxx;

3. That therefore, the order dated August 21, 2001 of this
Honorable Court which advised the complainant to avail of Rule 14
Section 14 of the Rules is contrary to its order dated September 14, 1995;

4. That up to this date, the complainant has not lifted a finger
to pursue this case against movants-defendants, hence, this Motion to
Dismiss.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed that this case be dismissed against the movants-defendants and to
order the deletion of the Notice of Lis Pendens at the back of the subject
title (sic).

This was opposed by petitioner, arguing that it had already filed a motion for the service of
summons by publication, but the trial court had yet to act on it.
[31]
On July 25, 2003, this
Motion was submitted for resolution.
[32]


On November 4, 2003, Spouses Dy and Chuyaco personally, and not through their
counsel, filed a Motion for Inhibition without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court,
[33]
the relevant portions of which state:
1. That since 1998, the defendants-movants have been moving
for the dismissal of this case as far as the movants are concerned and to
nullify the proceedings taken against them since the Honorable Court has
not yet acquired jurisdiction over their persons when the plaintiff
presented its evidence against defendants (sic) Sps. Damian and Tessie
Amadeo and even thereafter;

2. That, however only on (sic) August 2, 2001 or after more than
three (3) years, that this Honorable Court denied the said Motion to
Dismiss due to technicality (sic) and merely require (sic) the plaintiff to
serve the summons either personally or thru publication;

3. That, however in the order of this Honorable Court dated
September 14, 1995, it already denied the Ex-Parte Motion for Leave to
Serve Summons by Publication considering that the action herein is in
personam, hence, this order is contrary to its latest order dated August
2, 2001;

4. That another Motion to Dismiss was filed last June 11,
2003
[34]
on the ground of lack of interest to pursue the case but up to this
date, the Honorable Court has done nothing that delays (sic) the
proceedings to the prejudice of the defendants-movants;

5. That this continuous delay in the proceedings shows that the
Honorable Court may not be competent enough to further hear this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed for the inhibition of this Honorable Court (sic) from further hearing
this case.

This was submitted for resolution on November 13, 2003.

The motion for inhibition was adopted by their counsel on record, Clarissa Castro,
through a Motion to Adopt Motion for Inhibition and Manifestation, which was filed on
February 11, 2004
[35]
and noted by the trial court in a February 20, 2004 Order.
[36]
On June
23, 2004, however, the trial court (i) denied the motion for inhibition for lack of merit, (ii)
ruled that Spouses Dy and Chuyaco have voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
9
of the trial court, and (iii) gave them fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order within which
to file their respective answers, as follows:
Acting on the Motion for Inhibition, the Court hereby denies the
same for lack of legal basis.

In any event, the fact that defendants Wilson Dy and Primo
Chuyaco, Jr. signed said Motion themselves and in behalf of their
respective spouses undoubtedly indicates their voluntary appearance in
this case and their submission to the jurisdiction of this Court. The phrase
without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
in the heading of said Motion can not qualify the clear import of Rule 14
section 20 which states:

Voluntary appearance. The defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent
to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not
be deemed a voluntary appearance. (23a)

It may be noted that subject Motion for Inhibition is not a
Motion to Dismiss.

Wherefore, defendants-spouses Dy and Chuyaco are given
fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof within which to file their respective
answers.

All pending incidents are deemed resolved.
[37]


Unsatisfied with the Order, respondent Spouses Dy and Chuyaco filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65
[38]
before the CA, alleging that the public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion when he considered the Motion to Inhibit (without submitting to the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court) which they had filed to question his impartiality and
competence due to the delay in resolving the Motion to Dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction,
as voluntary appearance, and wherein he required the respondents to file their Answer within
the required period. The CA granted the petition in this wise:
The old provision under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised
Rules of Court provided that:

Section 23. What is equivalent to service.
The defendants voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service.

Under Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the provision now reads as follows:

Sec. 20. Voluntary Appearance. The
defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in
a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

What remains the same, carry (sic) over from the old doctrine,
is that the issue of jurisdiction must be raised seasonably.

But everything else changed.

What changed is that: if a motion is filed, whatever kind it is, it
need no longer be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court because the motion may raise myriad issues in
that one motion of special appearance as long as the objection to the
jurisdiction of the court is included. xxx

What necessarily changed also is that the medium of special
appearance is no longer restricted to a motion to dismiss because one
could now file any type of motion provided you included the issue of lack
of jurisdiction due to defective service of summons.

Thus, in this case at bar, the two motions to dismiss and the
motion to inhibit may be treated as special appearance since they all
included the issue of lack of jurisdiction due to non-service of summons.
They did not constitute as submitting the movant to the jurisdiction of the
court.

xxx xxx xxx

There being no proper service of summons on petitioners and
there being no voluntary appearance by petitioners, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, the herein
petitioners. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court against them
would consequently be null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed June 23, 2004
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, is hereby
DECLARED NULL AND VOID as against herein petitioners. The April 22,
1994 complaint filed by Philippine Commercial International Bank is
hereby DISMISSED as against herein petitioners DY and CHUYACO only,
no jurisdiction over their persons having been acquired.

SO ORDERED.
[39]


Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court.
[40]


Hence this appeal, where petitioner argues that:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE JUNE 23, 2004
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT NULL AND VOID AND IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AS AGAINST RESPONDENTS DY AND CHUYACO AND
RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN A WAY
THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE FACTS AND APPLICABLE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE, WHICH HOLD THAT BY THEIR SUCCESSIVE FILING OF
MOTIONS WITH THE CONVENIENT CAVEAT THAT THEY ARE NOT
SUBMITTING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO, THEY HAVE
VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURTS JURISDICTION.
10

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED
THE CASE AS AGAINST DY AND CHUYACO.

B. THE SPOUSES DY AND CHUYACO HAVE LOST THEIR RIGHT TO
QUESTION THE TRIAL COURTS JURISDICTION OVER THEM WHEN
THEY DID NOT RAISE THE DENIAL OF THEIR APRIL 22, 2002
MOTION TO DISMISS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.

C. THE SPOUSES DY AND CHUYACO HAVE MISERABLY FAILED TO
SHOW BASIS IN SEEKING THE TRIAL COURTS JURISDICTION.

D. THE SPOUSES DY AND CHUYACO HAVE VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED
THEMSELVES TO THE TRIAL COURTS JURISDICTION.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN A WAY THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE IN NOT DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE DY AND
CHUYACO SPOUSES FAILED TO SHOW THAT THERE IS NO APPEAL, OR
ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY
COURSE OF LAW AVAILABLE TO THEM.
[41]


Simply stated, the issues are: (1) Was the petition for certiorari prematurely filed?
(2) Has there been voluntary appearance on the part of respondent Spouses Dy and Chuyaco
as to confer the trial court with jurisdiction over their persons? and (3) Did the trial court
correctly deny the motion for inhibition?

We shall discuss these issues in seriatim.

First Issue: Propriety of Certiorari

Petitioner contends that respondents subverted the settled rule that a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 is available only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
[42]
It asserts that respondents failure to move
for reconsideration of the June 23, 2004 Order of the trial court, denying the latters motion
for inhibition, provides sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the instant petition.

We disagree.

Petitioner is correct that a motion for reconsideration, as a general rule, must have
first been filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is
sought.
[43]
This is intended to afford the latter an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied
error attributed to it.
[44]
However, there are several exceptions where the special civil action
for certiorari will lie even without the filing of a motion for reconsideration, namely:

a. where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
b. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court;
c. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the government
or the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
d. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would
be useless;
e. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief;
f. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
g. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;
h. where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.
[45]


Otherwise stated, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with only if there are
concrete, compelling, and valid reasons for doing so.
[46]


We find that respondents non-filing of a motion for reconsideration is justifiable
under the circumstances of this case. It is not disputed that the trial court, rightly or wrongly,
considered them to have voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction by virtue of their motion for
inhibition. Thus, respondents apprehension that the motion for reconsideration might be
construed as further manifesting their voluntary appearance is certainly well-grounded. They
may not, therefore, be faulted for having resorted immediately to a special civil action for
certiorari.

Second Issue: Voluntary Appearance

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the
coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in
court.
[47]
As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
[48]
It is by reason of this rule that we have had
occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction.
[49]
This,
however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes
a special appearance to challenge, among others, the courts jurisdiction over his person
cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
[50]


Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner;
and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is
filed and submitted to the court for resolution.

Measured against these standards, it is readily apparent that respondents have
acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the trial court as early as June 17, 2003, when they filed their
11
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. Significantly, the motion did not categorically and
expressly raise the jurisdiction of the court over their persons as an issue. It merely (i)
reminded the court of its purportedly conflicting Orders in respect of summons by
publication, (ii) alleged that because petitioner has not lifted a finger to pursue this case
against movants-defendants, the case may be dismissed for failure to prosecute, and (iii)
prayed additionally for the deletion of the Notice of Lis Pendens indicated at the back of the
transfer certificates of title covering the subject properties. We note, furthermore, that the
motion failed to qualify the capacity in which respondents were appearing and seeking
recourse.
[51]
It is in this light that the Courts pronouncement in Busuego v. Court of
Appeals
[52]
finds cogent application:
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal
notice. An appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the formal method of
entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to
the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the
person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a
formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of appearance is
not necessary. He may appear without such formal appearance and thus
submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by
presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he
specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his
assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
[53]
(emphasis
supplied)

Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance dissipate when
the respondents motion for inhibition is considered. This motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition
of Judge Napoleon Inoturan from further hearing the case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative
relief other than dismissal of the case, respondents manifested their voluntary submission to
the courts jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the courts
jurisdiction.
[54]


To be sure, the convenient caveat in the title of the motion for inhibition
(i.e., without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court) does not
detract from this conclusion. It would suffice to say that the allegations in a pleading or
motion are determinative of its nature; the designation or caption thereof is not
controlling.
[55]
Furthermore, no amount of caveat can change the fact that respondents
tellingly signed the motion to inhibit in their own behalf and not through counsel, let alone
through a counsel making a special appearance.

Third Issue: Inhibition

Respondents argue that the trial courts so-called continuous delay in the proceedings
is indicative of the fact that it is incompetent to continue hearing the case. Respondents
therefore assert that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied their motion to inhibit and required them to file their
Answer.

We are not convinced.

Under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, a judge or
judicial officer shall be mandatorily disqualified to sit in any case in which:

(a) he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise; or
(b) he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity,
or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil
law; or
(c) he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel; or
(d) he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
[56]


Paragraph two of the same provision meanwhile provides for the rule on voluntary
inhibition and states: [a] judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
That discretion is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to the judges sense of
fairness and justice.
[57]
We have elucidated on this point in Pimentel v. Salanga,
[58]
as
follows:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation.
But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in
favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of
circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing
party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge
had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion
on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether
remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should,
therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to
act in or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He
could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by
another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to
others involved therein. On the result of his decision to sit or not to sit
may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to
voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness
might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving
meaning and substances to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.
He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.

The present case not being covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition, the issue
thus turns on whether Judge Napoleon Inoturan should have voluntarily inhibited himself.

At the outset, we underscore that while a party has the right to seek the inhibition
or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent in handling the case, this right must be weighed with the duty of a judge to
decide cases without fear of repression.
[59]
Respondents consequently have no vested right to
the issuance of an Order granting the motion to inhibit, given its discretionary nature.
[60]


12
However, the second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1 does not give judges
unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case.
[61]
The inhibition must
be for just and valid causes, and in this regard, we have noted that the mere imputation of
bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without
basis.
[62]
This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.
[63]
Moreover, extrinsic
evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to
palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.
[64]
The only exception to
the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad
faith or malice.
[65]


We do not find any abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying respondents
motion to inhibit. Our pronouncement in Webb, et al. v. People of thePhilippines, et
al.
[66]
is apropos:
A perusal of the records will reveal that petitioners failed to
adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that respondent judge was
motivated by malice or bad faith in issuing the assailed rulings. Petitioners
simply lean on the alleged series of adverse rulings of the respondent
judge which they characterized as palpable errors. This is not enough. We
note that respondent judge's rulings resolving the various motions filed by
petitioners were all made after considering the arguments raised by all the
parties. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

We hasten to stress that a party aggrieved by erroneous
interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is not without remedy. The
range of remedy is provided in our Rules of Court and we need not make
an elongated discourse on the subject. But certainly, the remedy for
erroneous rulings, absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, is
not the outright disqualification of the judge. For there is yet to come a
judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always infallible. The
courts will close shop if we disqualify judges who err for we all err.
(emphasis supplied)

Truth be told, respondents are not entirely blameless for any perceived delay in the
resolution of the various incidents of the case. For instance, they make much of the fact that
close to three years passed before their Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and to Annul All the
Proceedings Taken Against the Defendants, filed on December 11, 1998, was noted by the
trial court. But the fact remains that the said motion, not having a notice of hearing
addressed to the adverse party, is legally a mere scrap of paper.
[67]
It presents no question
which merits the attention and consideration of the court, and is not entitled to judicial
cognizance.
[68]


Considering the foregoing, we rule that respondents accusations of delay,
incompetence, and bias on the part of the trial court are unfounded. Hence, they are not
entitled to the inhibition of Judge Inoturan as a relief.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18,
2005 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated January 10, 2006 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another in their stead is hereby rendered ORDERING respondent Spouses
Dy and Chuyaco to answer the Complaint in Civil Case No. 94-1585 within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this Decision.

The trial court is directed to proceed hearing the case, and to resolve the same with
dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.



IN RE PACTOLIN

In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455 (Pactolin vs Sandiganbayan), affirmed
the conviction of Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
(Falsification by a Private Individual). It was duly proved that Pactolin falsified a letter, and
presented said letter as evidence in a court of law, in order to make it appear that his fellow
councilor acting as OIC-Mayor illegally caused the disbursement of public funds. In said
decisions, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
appropriate administrative actions against Pactolin.
ISSUE: What administrative sanctions can be imposed upon Atty. Pactolin considering his
conviction?
HELD: Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime of falsification of
public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves
moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most
severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in
clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and a member of the bar. But it has always been held that it is appropriate
to disbar a lawyer if he is convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Further, Pactolins situation is aggravated by the fact that although his conviction has been
affirmed, he has not served his sentence yet.



A.M. No. 2490 FULGENCIO A. NGAYAN, TOMASA K. NGAYAN and BELLA AURORA
NGAYAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FAUSTINO F. TUGADE, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
, J.:
p
This case refers to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the herein complainants Fulgencio A.
Ngayan, Tomasa K. Ngayan and Bella Aurora Ngayan in a letter-complaint dated November
16, 1982 against respondent lawyer for violation of sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines.
It appears that respondent lawyer was formerly a counsel for complainants either as defense
counsel or private prosecutor in the following cases:
(a) People v. Fulgencio A. Ngayan, City Court of Manila, Branch Criminal Case No. 053773-CR
for light threat;
13
(b) People v. Tomasa Ngayan and Bella Aurora Ngayan, City Court of Manila, Branch VIII,
Criminal Case No. 053594-CR, for unjust vexation;
(c) People v. Bella Aurora Ngayan, City Court of Manila, Branch II, Criminal Case No. 053599-
CR, for grave threats;
(d) People v. Roberto Leonido, City Court of Manila, Branch XIV, Criminal Case No. 053649-CR,
for trespass to dwelling; and People v. Nestor Campo, Branch XIV, Criminal Case No. 053650-
CR, for threats;
(e) Fulgencio A. Ngayan and Tomasa K. Ngayan v. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido for
grave threats and trespass; Fulgencio A. Ngayan and Tomasa K. Ngayan v. Rowena Soriano,
for grave defamation, Office of the City Fiscal of Manila before Assistant City Fiscal Elmer K.
Calledo, I.S. No. 82-8564. (pp. 1-2, Rollo)
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
Complainants alleged that they asked respondent to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis
for a complaint to be filed against Mrs. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido as a consequence
of the latter's unauthorized entry into complainants' dwelling. Without thoroughly reading the
same, Mrs. Tomasa A. Ngayan allegedly signed it because she was rushed to do the same.
After signing, Mrs. Ngayan noted a paragraph which did not mention that Robert Leonido was
with Rowena Soriano when both suddenly barged into complainants' residence. Mrs. Ngayan
allegedly told respondent about his omission and in front of her, respondent crossed out the
paragraph she complained about and promised to make another affidavit. In the meantime,
complainants filed motions to discharge the respondent as their counsel.
Complainants allegedly made a follow up after discharging respondent and found that the
name of Robert Leonido was not included in the charge. Since the omission was remedied by
their new counsel and the case was subsequently filed in court, the adverse parties filed a
motion for reinvestigation and attached thereto the first affidavit of complainants which was
crossed out. Complainants averred that the motion was filed by Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, a
former classmate of respondent. They further said that respondent was also a lawyer of the
brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance company. Complainants further alleged that the
motion for reinvestigation was set for hearing before Assistant City Fiscal Milagros F. Garcia-
Beza where respondent himself executed and submitted an affidavit as exhibit for Robert
Leonido and Rowena Soriano controverting the affidavit of complainants notwithstanding the
fact that he prepared the latter's affidavit when he was still their counsel.
They further alleged that before he executed and submitted his affidavit, respondent sent a
personal letter to Fiscal Beza denouncing complainants and stating that he is filing criminal
and civil cases against them.
Complainants charged respondent for violation of paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule
138, Rules of Court, which provide:
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets
of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except
from him or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witnesses, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged;
Complainants claim that paragraph (e) above was violated by respondent when the affidavit
he prepared for complainants but subsequently crossed-out was submitted as evidence against
complainants in the motion for reinvestigation. As to paragraph (f), complainants averred that
respondent violated it when he sent a letter to the fiscal saying that his name was being
adversely affected by the false affidavits of complainants and for that reason, respondent was
contemplating to file a criminal and civil action for damages against them.
In a resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated January 19, 1983, respondent was
required to answer the complaint against him but respondent failed. Thus, on May 25, 1983,
for failure of the respondent to file an answer, this Court resolved to refer this case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereupon, the Solicitor
General set the complaint for hearing on September 26, 1983, October 17 and 18,1983 and
November 24,1983, all of which dates, respondent was duly notified. However, respondent
never appeared on any date. Accordingly, the Solicitor General made findings of facts based
on the aforesaid claims of complainants and said:
Consistent with respondent's failure to file an answer to the complaint herein filed against him,
he also did not appear, despite due notice on the four occasions when the hearing of the
present complaint was set at the Office of the Solicitor General. Neither has respondent shown
concern or interest about the status of the complaint filed against him. The inaction of
respondent to the resolutions of this Honorable Court requiring him to file his Answer to the
Complaint filed against him and his subsequent failure to attend the hearings on the said
complaint indicate that respondent has not obeyed the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities and he has not conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients (Sec. 3,
Rule 138, Rules of Court). Further, lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders
and processes. They should stand foremost in complying with the court's directives or
instructions being themselves officers of the court (p. 75, Legal Ethics, Ruben Agpalo, 2nd
Ed.). This lack of concern shown by respondent regarding the matter that involved the very
foundation of his right to engage in the practice of law would show how much less he would
regard the interest of Ms clients. 1
He thus recommended that the respondent lawyer be disbarred and his name dropped from
attorney's roll. In this report, he averred that the conduct of respondent as above-shown
constitutes unprofessional conduct and an outright violation of the provisions of Section 3 and
paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof (Santos v. Dichoso, Adm. Case No. 1825, August 22,
1978, 84 SCRA 622).
In the case at bar, complainants claim that respondent furnished the adverse parties in a
certain criminal case with a copy of their discarded affidavit, thus enabling them to use it as
evidence against complainants. This actuation constitutes betrayal of trust and confidence of
his former clients in violation of paragraph (e), Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Inasmuch as respondent failed to answer the complaint filed against him and despite due
notice on four occasions, he consistently did not appear on the scheduled hearing set by the
Office of the Solicitor General, this claim remained uncontroverted. Besides, We tend to
believe the said claim of complainants when it is taken together with their other claim that
respondent's actuations from the beginning tend to show that he was partial to the adverse
parties as he even tried to dissuade complainants from filing charges against Robert Leonido.
This partiality could be explained by the fact that respondent is the former classmate of Atty.
Apolo P. Gaminda, the adverse parties' counsel and the fact that respondent is the lawyer of
the brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance company.
Respondent's act of executing and submitting an affidavit as exhibit for Robert Leonido and
Rowena Soriano advancing facts prejudicial to the case of his former clients such as the fact
that the crime charged in complainants' affidavit had prescribed and that he was asked to
prepare an affidavit to make the offense more grave so as to prevent the offense from
prescribing demonstrates clearly an act of offensive personality against complainants, violative
of the first part of paragraph (f), Section 20, Rule 138, Rules of Court. Likewise, respondent's
act of joining the adverse parties in celebrating their victory over the dismissal of the case
against them shows not only his bias against the complainants but also constitutes a
degrading act on the part of a lawyer. It was meant only to titillate the anger of complainants.
Additionally, respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear
at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of
Court.
14
We have fully scrutinized and evaluated the records of this case and We cannot but find that
strong and unassailable reasons exist to render it Our irremissible duty to impose a disciplinary
sanction on respondent. But We feel that disbarment is too harsh considering the
circumstances of the case. We hold that suspension from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year should be imposed on respondent for the aforestated misconduct.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Faustino F. Tugade is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year, effective from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 188051 : November 22, 2010
ASIA UNITED BANK, Petitioner, v. GOODLAND COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner assails the February 16, 2009 Decisioncralaw
1
and the May 18, 2009
Resolutioncralaw
2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103304, annulling the
August 23, 2007cralaw
3
and February 15, 2008cralaw
4
Orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 150, which in turn denied due course to respondent Goodland
Company, Inc.'s (GOODLAND) notice of appeal for invalid substitution of counsel.
The antecedents:
An Ex-Parte Application/Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possessioncralaw
5
was filed by Asia
United Bank (AUB) over a 5,801-square- meter lot located in Makati City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 223120 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati in AUB's
name. The property was previously registered in the name of GOODLAND under TCT No.
192674 (114645).
The petition alleged that, on February 20, 2000, GOODLAND executed a Third Party Real
Estate Mortgage on the property in favor of AUB to secure the P202 million credit
accommodation extended by the latter to Radiomarine Network (Smartnet) Inc.
(Radiomarine).
When Radiomarine defaulted in the payment of its obligation, AUB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings against the real estate mortgage. At the public auction sale held on
December 4, 2006, AUB was declared the highest bidder. On the same date, a Certificate of
Sale was issued in its name and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
With the expiration of the redemption period, AUB proceeded to execute an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, through its First Vice-President, Florante del Mundo. AUB
thereafter secured a Certificate Authorizing Registration from the Bureau of Internal Revenue
to facilitate the transfer of the title.
On December 8, 2006, TCT No. 192674 (114645) was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No.
223120 was issued in the name of AUB.
GOODLAND, through its counsel, Atty. Antonio Bautista (Atty. Bautista), opposed the petition,
denying that it executed the real estate mortgage. GOODLAND further averred that the
signature of the notary public appearing on the deed was a forgery, and that no technical
description of the property supposedly mortgaged was indicated therein. Concluding that
AUB's title was derived from the foreclosure of a fake mortgage, GOODLAND prayed for the
petition's denial.cralaw
6

On March 1, 2007, the RTC issued the writ of possession sought by AUB. It ratiocinated that,
as the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale and as the new title holder thereof,
AUB's right of possession and enjoyment of the same had become absolute.cralaw
7

GOODLAND, through its counsel on record, Atty. Bautista, filed a motion for
reconsiderationcralaw
8
and a supplemental motion for reconsideration,cralaw
9
but both were
denied in the Ordercralaw
10
dated April 25, 2007, which was received by Atty. Bautista on
June 15, 2007.cralaw
11

Relentless, GOODLAND sought recourse with the CA by initially filing a Notice of
Appealcralaw
12
with the RTC, through a certain Atty. Lito Mondragon (Atty. Mondragon) of the
Mondragon & Montoya Law Offices. On August 23, 2007, the RTC issued an
Ordercralaw
13
denying due course to GOODLAND's notice of appeal for being legally inutile
due to Atty. Mondragon's failure to properly effect the substitution of former counsel on
record, Atty. Bautista. GOODLAND moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in the
Order dated February 15, 2008.cralaw
14

GOODLAND elevated the incident to the CA by way of a special civil acton for certiorari. In its
February 16, 2009 Decision, the CA granted the petition and directed the RTC to give due
course to the notice of appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated August 23, 2007
and February 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City are ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The trial court is DIRECTED to give due course to petitioner's Notice of Appeal.
SO ORDERED.cralaw
15

Aggrieved, AUB moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution
dated May 18, 2009. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, cralaw
16
praying for
the reinstatement of the RTC Order.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, for a substitution of attorney to be effectual,
the following essential requisites must concur: (1) there must be a written application for
substitution; (2) it must be filed with the written consent of the client; (3) it must be with the
written consent of the attorney substituted; and (4) in case the consent of the attorney to be
substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof of notice that the motion for
substitution was served on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. cralaw
17

The courts a quo were uniform and correct in finding that Atty. Mondragon failed to observe
the prescribed procedure and, thus, no valid substitution of counsel was actualized. However,
they took divergent postures as to the repercussion of such non-compliance, thereby igniting
the herein controversy.
The RTC strictly imposed the rule on substitution of counsel and held that the notice of appeal
filed by Atty. Mondragon was a mere scrap of paper.
However, relying on our pronouncement in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan
Development Co.,cralaw
18
the CA brushed aside the procedural lapse and took a liberal stance
on considerations of substantial justice, viz.:
It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse
and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false
impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice. Thus, substantial justice would be better served by giving due course to
petitioner's notice of appeal.cralaw
19

AUB argues that the liberality applied by the Court in Land Bank is incompatible with the
herein controversy, and that Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. De Dios
Transportation Co., Inc., cralaw
20
which espouses the same view adopted by the RTC,ismore
appropriate.
GOODLAND, on the other hand, insists that the CA committed no reversible error in ordering
that the notice of appeal be allowed in order not to frustrate the ends of substantial justice.
We agree with AUB. A revisit of our pronouncements in Land Bank and Pioneer is in order.
In Land Bank, we held that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board gravely
abused its discretion when it denied due course to the Notice of Appeal and Notice of Entry of
Appearance filed by petitioner's new counsel for failure to effect a valid substitution of the
former counsel on record.
15
We clarified that the new counsel never intended to replace the counsel of record because,
although not so specified in the notice, they entered their appearance as collaborating
counsel. Absent a formal notice of substitution, all lawyers who appear before the court or file
pleadings in behalf of a client are considered counsel of the latter. We pursued a liberal
application of the rule in order not to frustrate the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of the controversy.
In Pioneer, we adopted a strict posture and declared the notice of withdrawal of appeal filed
by appellant's new counsel as a mere scrap of paper for his failure to file beforehand a motion
for the substitution of the counsel on record.
Provoking such deportment was the absence of a special power of attorney authorizing the
withdrawal of the appeal in addition to the lack of a proper substitution of counsel. More
importantly, we found that the withdrawal of the appeal was calculated to frustrate the
satisfaction of the judgment debt rendered against appellant, thereby necessitating a rigid
application of the rules in order to deter appellant from benefiting from its own deleterious
manipulation thereof.
The emerging trend of jurisprudence is more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of
the Rules of Court. However, we have not been remiss in reminding the bench and the bar
that zealous compliance with the rules is still the general course of action. Rules of procedure
are in place to ensure the orderly, just, and speedy dispensation of cases;cralaw
21
to this end,
inflexibility or liberality must be weighed. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or
the exemption of a case from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when
the purpose of justice requires it.cralaw
22

As early as 1998, in Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona,cralaw
23
we expounded on these guiding
principles:
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since
they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of
delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The requirement is in
pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that 'all persons
shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial
and administrative bodies.' The adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined
to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. There have been some instances
wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was
'never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.' A
liberal interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
In Sebastian v. Hon. Morales, cralaw
24
we straightened out the misconception that the
enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it would prejudice the
substantive rights of litigants:
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is
the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not mean, however,
that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.
Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure
the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a
mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other,
or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it
would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.
x x x. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. x x x.
Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful observance of the Rules of Court, and their relaxation
or suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.cralaw
25
Further, a bare invocation of 'the interest of
substantial justice' will not suffice to override a stringent implementation of the rules.cralaw
26

A reading of the CA's Decision readily shows that the leniency it granted GOODLAND was
merely anchored on substantial justice. The CA overlooked GOODLAND's failure to advance
meritorious reasons to support its plea for the relaxation of Rule 138, Section 26. The fact that
GOODLAND stands to lose a valuable property is inadequate to dispense with the exacting
imposition of a rather basic rule.
More importantly, the CA failed to realize that the ultimate consequences that will come about
should GOODLAND's appeal proceed would in fact contravene substantial justice. The CA and,
eventually, this Court will just re-litigate an otherwise non-litigious matter and thereby
compound the delay GOODLAND attempts to perpetrate in order to prevent AUB from
rightfully taking possession of the property.
It is a time-honored legal precept that after the consolidation of titles in the buyer's name, for
failure of the mortgagor to redeem, entitlement to a writ of possession becomes a matter of
right.cralaw
27
As the confirmed owner, the purchaser's right to possession becomes
absolute.cralaw
28
There is even no need for him to post a bond,cralaw
29
and it is the
ministerial duty of the courts to issue the same upon proper application and proof of
title.cralaw
30
To accentuate the writ's ministerial character, the Court has consistently
disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance despite a pending action for annulment of
mortgage or the foreclosure itself.cralaw
31

The nature of an ex parte petition for issuance of the possessory writ under Act No. 3135 has
been described as a non-litigious proceeding and summary in nature.cralaw
32
As an ex
parte proceeding, it is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to or
consent by any person adversely interested.cralaw
33

Subsequent proceedings in the appellate courts would merely involve a reiteration of the
foregoing settled doctrines. The issue involved in the assailed RTC issuances is conclusively
determined by the above cited legal dictum, and it would be unnecessarily vexatious and
unjust to allow the present controversy to undergo protracted litigation.
AUB's right of possession is founded on its right of ownership over the property which it
purchased at the auction sale. Upon expiration of the redemption period and consolidation of
the title to the property, its possessory rights over the same became absolute. We quote with
approval the pronouncement of the RTC, viz.:
As the purchaser of the property in the foreclosure sale to which new title has already been
issued, petitioner's right over the property has become absolute, vesting upon it the right of
possession and enjoyment of the property which this Court must aid in effecting its delivery.
Under the circumstances, and following established doctrine, the issuance of a writ of
possession is a ministerial function whereby the court exercises neither discretion nor
judgment x x x. Said writ of possession must be enforced without delay x x x.cralaw
34

The law does not require that a petition for a writ of possession be granted only after
documentary and testimonial evidence shall have been offered to and admitted by the
court.cralaw
35
As long as a verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle petitioner to the
relief requested, the court shall issue the writ prayed for.cralaw
36

Given the foregoing, we are bound to deny a liberal application of the rules on substitution of
counsel and resolve definitively that GOODLAND's notice of appeal merits a denial, for the
failure of Atty. Mondragon to effect a valid substitution of the counsel on record. Substantial
justice would be better served if the notice of appeal is disallowed. In the same way that the
appellant in Pioneer was not permitted to profit from its own manipulation of the rules on
substitution of counsel, so too can GOODLAND be not tolerated to foster vexatious delay by
allowing its notice of appeal to carry on.
16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The February 16, 2009
Decision and the May 18, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the August 23, 2007 and February 15, 2008 Orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150, are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.



JUVY P. CIOCON-REER, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ
ANGELINA P. CIOCON,
MARIVIT P. CIOCON- Present:
HERNANDEZ, and
REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR., CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Complainants, BRION,
PERALTA,
*

SERENO, and
- versus - REYES, JJ.


JUDGE ANTONIO C. LUBAO,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
General Santos City, Promulgated:
Respondent. June 20, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, Angelina P. Ciocon, Marivit P. Ciocon-Hernandez, and Remberto C.
Karaan, Sr. (complainants) filed an administrative complaint against Judge Antonio C. Lubao
(Judge Lubao) of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22, for gross
ignorance of the law, rules or procedures; gross incompetence and inefficiency; violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019; violations of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code; violations of pertinent provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, The New Code of
Judicial Conduct per A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, and Canons of Judicial Ethics; and dishonesty and
grave misconduct.

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7819 (Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al. v.
Gaspar Mayo, et al.) for Unlawful Detainer, Damages, Injunction, etc., an appealed case from
the Municipal Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 3. Complainants alleged that on 12
September 2008, Judge Lubao issued an Order directing the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within 30 days from receipt of the order. Complainants further alleged that on 30
September 2008, a copy of the order was sent by registered mail to the defendants, which
they should have received within one week or on 7 October 2008. Complainants alleged that
the 30-day period within which to submit memoranda expired on 6 November 2008. Since the
defendants failed to submit their memorandum on 6 November 2008, complainants alleged
that they should be deemed to have waived their right to adduce evidence and Judge Lubao
should have decided the case. Yet, four months passed from 6 November 2008 and Judge
Lubao still failed to make his decision.

In his Comment, Judge Lubao explained that the parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda on 12 September 2008. The Order was sent to the parties through
registered mail on 30 September 2008. Judge Lubao alleged that the plaintiffs submitted their
memorandum on 10 November 2008 but the court did not receive the registry
return card on the notice to the defendants. On 10 December 2008, the branch clerk of court
sent a letter-request to the Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to
when the Order of 12 September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by
the defendants. However, the court did not receive any reply from the Post Office.

Judge Lubao further explained that on 20 May 2009, for the greater interest of
substantial justice, the defendants were given their last chance to submit their memorandum
within 30 days from receipt of the order. In the same order, he directed the plaintiffs to
coordinate with the branch sheriff for personal delivery of the order to the defendants.
However, the plaintiffs failed to coordinate with the branch sheriff and the order was sent to
the defendants, again by registered mail, only on 17 June 2009.

Judge Lubao informed the Court that complainant Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (Karaan) is
engaging in the practice of law even though he is not a lawyer. Judge Lubao asked this Court
to require Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for unauthorized
practice of law.

Karaan filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Judge Lubaos failure to submit his
comment on time to complainants administrative complaint is a violation of the existing rules
and procedure and amounts to gross ignorance of the law. As regards his alleged
unauthorized practice of law, Karaan alleged that Judge Lubao was merely trying to evade the
issues at hand.

The Findings of the OCA

In its Memorandum dated 13 April 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
reported that a verification from the Docket and Clearance Division of its Office revealed that
Karaan also filed numerous administrative complaints
[1]
against judges from different courts,
all of which were dismissed by this Court.

In its evaluation of the case, the OCA found that there was no evidence to show that
the orders issued by Judge Lubao were tainted with fraud, dishonesty or bad faith. The OCA
stated that the matters raised by complainants could only be questioned through judicial
remedies under the Rules of Court and not by way of an administrative complaint. The OCA
stated that Karaan could not simply assume that the order of 12 September 2008 had been
received by the defendants without the registry return card which was not returned to the trial
court.

The OCA found that based on the pleadings attached to the records, it would appear
that Karaan was engaged in the practice of law. The OCA also noted the numerous frivolous
and administrative complaints filed by Karaan against several judges which tend to mock the
judicial system.

The OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Lubao for lack of
merit. The OCA further recommended that Karaan be required to show cause why he should
17
not be cited for contempt of court for violation of Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

In its Resolution dated 24 November 2010, this Court dismissed the complaint against
Judge Lubao for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit. This Court likewise directed
Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for violating Section 3(e), Rule
71 of the Revised Rules of Court.


Karaan filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint against Judge
Lubao. Karaan denied that he had been assuming to be an attorney or an officer of the court
and acting as such without authority. He alleged that he did not indicate any PTR, Attorneys
Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number in his documents. He further stated that A.M. No. 07-1674
filed against Judge Lindo was not actually dismissed as reported by the OCA.

Karaan thereafter filed Supplemental Arguments to the motion for reconsideration and
compliance to the show cause order. Karaan reiterated that he never represented himself to
anyone as a lawyer or officer of the court and that his paralegal services, rendered free of
charge, were all for the public good. He stated that he assists organizations which represent
the interests of senior citizens, the indigents, and members of the community with limited
means.

In a Memorandum dated 8 November 2011, the OCA found no merit in the motion for
reconsideration. The OCA noted Judge Lubaos explanation that the case was summarily
dismissed by the municipal trial court without service of summons on the defendants. Thus,
Judge Lubao deemed it proper to issue the order requiring all parties to submit their
memorandum to give all concerned the opportunity to be heard. The OCA stated that the
remedy against Judge Lubaos action was judicial in nature. The OCA found that the claim of
Karaan that he could prove the receipt of the order by one Mr. Mayo is immaterial because it
was not in the records of the case where Judge Karaan based his order.

The OCA noted that Karaan, through the use of intemperate and slanderous language,
continually attributed all sorts of malicious motives and nefarious schemes to Judge Lubao
regarding the conduct of his official function but failed to substantiate his allegations. The OCA
further noted that this case is just one of the many cases Karaan filed against various judges
in other courts where the same pattern of accusations could be observed.

The OCA found Karaans explanation on the show cause order unsatisfactory. The OCA
noted Karaans modus operandi of offering free paralegal advice and then making the parties
execute a special power of attorney that would make him an agent of the litigants and would
allow him to file suits, pleadings and motions with himself as one of the plaintiffs acting on
behalf of his clients. The OCA noted that Karaans services, on behalf of the underprivileged
he claimed to be helping, fall within the practice of law. The OCA recommended that Karaan
be declared liable for indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment
for 10 days at the Manila City Jail and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a warning that a
repetition of any of the offenses, or any similar or other offense, against the courts, judges or
court employees will merit more serious sanctions.

The Ruling of this Court

We agree with the OCAs recommendation that the motion for reconsideration of the
Courts 24 November 2010 Resolution dismissing the complaint against Judge Lubao has no
merit.

Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a corresponding penalty. In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action.
[2]
We agree with the OCA that the remedy of the complainants in
this case is judicial in nature. Hence, the denial of their motion for reconsideration of this
Courts 24 November 2010 Resolution dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao
is in order. As the OCA stated, Karaan could not make assumptions as to when the defendants
received the copy of Judge Lubaos order without the registry return receipt. While Karaan
claimed that he knew when one of the parties received a copy of the order, this claim was
unsupported by evidence and was not in the records of the case when Judge Lubao issued his
20 May 2009 Order giving the defendants their last chance to submit their memorandum. The
records would also show that Judge Lubao had been very careful in his actions on the case, as
his branch clerk of court even wrote the Post Office of General Santos City asking for
certification as to when the Order of 12 September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt No. 690,
was received by the defendants. There was no evidence that Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily
or in bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao could not be faulted for trying to give all the parties an
opportunity to be heard considering that the records of the case would show that the court a
quo summarily dismissed the case without issuing summons to the defendants.

We likewise agree with the OCA that Karaan was engaged in unauthorized practice of
law.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,
[3]
the Court ruled that practice of law means any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed
by members of the legal profession.
[4]
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
[5]
Here, the OCA was able to
establish the pattern in Karaans unauthorized practice of law. He would require the parties to
execute a special power of attorney in his favor to allow him to join them as one of the
plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint and other
pleadings acting for and in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative of
the parties. The fact that Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings that he was a member of
the Bar, or any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number does not detract from the
fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the practice of law.

Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person [a]ssuming
to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority, is liable for
indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7 of the same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of
indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months, or both. If a respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt committed
against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both.

Following the ruling of this Court in In re: Joaquin T. Borromeo,
[6]
the OCA
recommended that Karaan be cited for indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve an
imprisonment of ten days at the Manila City Jail, and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a warning
that a repetition of any of the offenses, or any similar or other offense against the courts,
judges or court employees will merit further and more serious sanctions. The OCA further
recommended that a memorandum be issued to all courts of the land to notify the judges and
court employees of Karaans unauthorized practice of law and to report to the OCA any further
appearance to be made by Karaan. However, the records would show that Karaan is already
71 years old. In consideration of his old age and his state of health, we deem it proper to
18
remove the penalty of imprisonment as recommended by the OCA and instead increase the
recommended fine to P10,000.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration of the Courts Resolution
dated 24 November 2010 dismissing the complaint against Judge Antonio C. Lubao for being
judicial in nature. We find REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR. GUILTY of indirect contempt
under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and impose on him a Fine of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land for their guidance and
information. The courts and court employees are further directed to report to the Office of the
Court Administrator any further appearance by Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. before their sala.

SO ORDERED.


People v Castaneda
Facts:
Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document. The
complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of
Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a deed of sale the house and lot belonging to the
conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, making it appear that his spouse gave
her marital consent to said sale.

At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to
disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution stated that it is a
"criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other." Notwithstanding such
opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria.

Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may be considered as a
criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an
exception to the rule on marital disqualification.

Held:
No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN AN OFFENSE
DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT
COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.

In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of
the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife,
no crime could have been charged against said husband. It is the husband's breach of his
wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust
which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint.

With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime
and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person
but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally
lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in
connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from
testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife
underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-
husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, identity of interests disappears
and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such
a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be
nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.



A.C. No. 9608 November 27, 2012
MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of
the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times
subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose
conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.
1

Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint
2
for Disbarment or
Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly immoral conduct."
In her complaint, complainant alleged that
2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn
Statement dated 19 April 2002 and a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002
stating therein that the crime of RAPE was committed against her person sometime
in December, 2001 and on 19 March 2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years
of age by herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years
old, married to Teresita B. Samson, Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San
Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines.
3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted
that sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA
VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself.
4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002
dismissing the charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the
crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on 04 July 2002.
5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
dated 26 August 2002 which was denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October
2002 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur.
6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to the
Department of Justice, by way of a PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending
resolution by the Department of Justice.
x x x x
8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against
the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated
clearly constitute "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
19
Rules of Court of the Philippines which provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or
SUSPENSION of an Attorney by the SUPREME COURT."
Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement
3
that sometime in December 2001, at around
midnight, she was sleeping in the maids room at respondents house when respondent
entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her panty. She
stated that another incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondents poultry farm in
Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He
brought her to an old shanty where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her
five hundred pesos and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her
and her mother.
In her Supplemental-Complaint,
4
complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in
his house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan
National High School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she was
awakened when respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted,
but respondent covered her mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the house.
Complainant also claimed that on March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent
forced her to ride a multi-cab. When they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent
dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.
Respondent alleged in his Answer
5
that
2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect
that Maria Victoria Ventura filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial
Prosecutors Office with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed.
Respondent, however, has no knowledge or information as to the truth of the
allegation that she was 13 years.
x x x x
5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the
complaint to the effect that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in
having sex with complainant was done with mutual agreement after respondent
gave money to complainant. Respondent respectfully submits that his act of having
sex with complainant once does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.
There is no human law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with
mutual agreement and complainant accepts compensation therefore. Having sex
with complainant once with just compensation does not amount to immoral
conduct.
x x x x
6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law
Office of respondent herein. The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a
grudge against the herein respondent who terminated her services due to
misunderstanding.
7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative
Case is a well orchestrated and planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance
against respondent as a result of her separation from the employment in the Law
Office of the respondent. This claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad
Ruluna, the former Office Clerk at the Law Office of respondent.
8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at respondent, she demanded
from respondent to settle with her and demanded the payment of the amount of
P2,000,000.00; otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for
disbarment. Respondent did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made
good her threats and filed the criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case for rape
did not prosper because the Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura
sent word to respondent that she is amenable for the amount of P400,000.00. In
effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so that she can get even
with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;
9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the
Affidavit of Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And
Corazon Ventura can afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in
putting down the respondent herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her
biological daughter and she knows before hand that her ward has a questionable
reputation. The fact that Corazon Ventura is not the biological mother of Maria
Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case No. 5414.
x x x x
Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully
submits that his having sex with complainant with just compensation once does not amount to
immoral conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation when a woman shall invite
him for sex?
Attached to respondents Answer is his Counter-Affidavit
6
which he submitted to the Provincial
Prosecutor. He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night with her male
friends when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard rumors that
complainant had sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March 19,
2002, he saw complainant with some of her classmates near their rented house. Complainant
told him that they wanted to go out to swim but they did not have money. When she asked if
he could spare some amount, he gave her money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see
her that afternoon and go to a place where they could be alone, and he was surprised when
she agreed. He just thought that for complainant, sex is a common thing despite her age. At
around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her house. She casually walked towards the car
and boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging house because people might
recognize him. Upon reaching his poultry farm, respondent met his farm worker and asked
him if he could use the latters hut. The farm worker agreed and they went straight to the hut.
Inside the farm workers hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent
did not notice any involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He asserted that they
had sexual intercourse based on their mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant
dressed up and walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He told her not to tell
anyone about what had happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay motug-an"
meaning, shes not crazy as to tell anyone. He alleged that she accepted the money he gave
because she needed to buy some things but her mother did not give her any allowance.
Respondent insisted that what happened between them was the first and the last incident. He
claimed that he was able to confirm that complainant is no longer a virgin.
It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for
respondent to stand trial for qualified seduction.
7
The charge of rape, however, was dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Agusan del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with the dismissal of the
rape charge, filed a motion for reconsideration. When said motion was denied, complainant
filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained
the findings of the prosecutor.
Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public
prosecutor and executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance.
8
Complainant stated that
what happened between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual
understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before
the RTC as well as the one she filed before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly,
the criminal case against respondent was dismissed.
9

In its Report and Recommendation
10
dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one year from the
practice of law for immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or similar act will
merit a more severe penalty.
20
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-
237, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering that respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is a minor,
respondent and his wife was victims guardians and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S.
Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning
that repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
11

Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty
imposed by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. She
contends that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to have
sexual intercourse with a young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took advantage
of his moral ascendancy over complainant considering that she was then staying at
respondents residence. Moreover, there was a betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity
considering that respondent was a married man. She insists that this detestable behavior
renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and privilege which his license confers
upon him.Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be imposed.
12

Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration
13
of the IBP Resolution. He
asserts that complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. Likewise, during the
sexual encounter, complainant was not under their custody. He contends that complainants
mother even testified that her daughter stayed at respondents house only until February
2002. He further stresses that because of his admission and remorse, and since this is the first
time he has been found administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the penalty to
one year suspension from the practice of law.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
x x x x
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
x x x x
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,
14
the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar.
15
Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public or
private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community.
16
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.
17

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent
himself, we find that respondents act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of
his former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent
not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse
whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he
even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his
wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow
of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with
money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person
and the ethics of his profession.
In Cordova v. Cordova,
18
we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-
year-old minor,
19
who for a time was under respondents care. Whether the sexual encounter
between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latters consent is of no
moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly
reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality required of the
legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others,
any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court,
membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers
lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers.
20

Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting
21
that a lawyer may be disbarred for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya,
22
the Court pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the
rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of
no moment. Complainants Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the
instant proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the
nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or
disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but
is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to
protect the public and the courts.1wphi1 A disbarment case is not an investigation into the
acts of respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as
a member of the Bar.
23

Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite
suspension, depending on the circumstances.
24
In this case, respondents gross misbehavior
and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference
to sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these
could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration
of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
25

The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should never be decreed.
26
However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate
penalty.
27

21
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral
Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let
copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.



A.C. No. 6760 January 30, 2013
ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for the forum shopping he allegedly committed.
In his complaint,
1
Anastacio N. Teodoro Ill related that Atty. Gonzales acted as counsel of
Araceli Teodoro-Marcial in two civil cases that the latter filed against him. The first ccise,
Special Proceeding No. 99-95587,
2
involved the settlement of the intestate estate of Manuela
Teodoro. While the settlement proceeding was pending, Atty. Gonzales assisted
Teodord-Marcial in filing Civil Case No. 00-99207,
3
for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance
and Damages, without indicating the special proceeding earlier tiled. The tiling of the civil
cases, according to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum shopping that warrants the
disbarment of Atty. Gonzales.
Atty. Gonzales admitted that he assisted Teodoro-Marcial in tiling the two cases. He asserted,
however,, that he did not violate the forum shopping rule as the cases were not identical in
terms of parties, subject matter and remedies. Atty. Gonzales also opined that the complainant
only filed the disbarment case to harass him.
4

The Investigating Commissioners Findings
In our Resolution
5
dated March 13, 2006, we referred the disbarment complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation
6
dated July 5, 2010,
Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found Atty. Gonzales administratively liable for forum shopping.
According to Commissioner Dulay, both Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No.
00-99207 hinged on the same substantial issue, i.e., on whether Manuela held the Malate
property in trust for Carmen Teodoro-Reyes, Donato T. Teodoro, Jorge I. Teodoro and
Teodoro-Marcial.
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, Carmen, Donato, Jorge I. Teodoro, Jorge T. Teodoro and
Teodoro-Marcial claimed that they are the heirs of Manuela. During her lifetime, Manuela was
the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate, Manila. According to the heirs,
Manuela held the lot in trust for them, but she sold it to Anastacio and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the
heirs prayed for the issuance of letters of administration so that Manuelas properties could be
inventoried and settled in accordance with law.
In Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela claimed to be the beneficiaries of a trust held
by Manuela over the same parcel of land contested in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587. They
alleged that during her lifetime, Manuela sold a portion of this land to Anastacio. They asked
the trial court to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Manuela; to cancel the resulting
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Anastacio; and to issue a new one in their names.
The commissioner found that a ruling in either case would result in res judicata over the other.
Thus, Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he instituted Civil Case No. 00-99207
without indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending. In committing
forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales disregarded the Supreme Court Circular prohibiting forum
shopping and thus violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Dulay recommended that Atty. Gonzales be suspended for one month from the
practice of law, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense would merit a more severe
penalty.
The Board of Governors of the IBP reversed the commissioners recommendation. In a
resolution
7
dated December 10, 2011, the Board of Governors dismissed the case against Atty.
Gonzales for lack of merit.
The Issue
The case directly poses to us the question of whether Atty. Gonzales committed forum
shopping and thereby violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings of the commissioner and accordingly reverse the resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors, but we modify the commissioners recommended penalty to censure
and a warning that another violation would merit a more severe penalty.
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation
thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal
or certiorari.
8

There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions, (b)
identity of rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of relief sought.
9

Under this test, we find that Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed Civil
Case No. 00-99207 while Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending.
Identity of Parties
An identity of parties exists in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No. 00-99207.
In both cases, the initiating parties are the same, to wit: Carmen, Donato, Teodoro-Marcial,
Jorge I. Teodoro, Rowena Teodoro, Abigail Teodoro and Jorge T. Teodoro. They represented
the same interest in both cases. All claimed to be the legitimate heirs of Manuela and co-
owners of the land that she held in trust for them.
Meanwhile, Anastacio, the oppositor in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, is also the sole
defendant in Civil Case No. 00-99207. In both cases, he espoused the same interest, as
transferee-owner of the lot allegedly held in trust by Manuela.
Identity of causes of action
The test of identity of causes of action does not depend on the form of an action taken, but on
whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of
action.
10
The heirs of Manuela cannot avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying
the form of their action or by adopting a different method of presenting it.
11

In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the trial court held that it had no jurisdiction over the
case, as Manuela left no properties at the time of her death. The lot in Malate, Manila, which
was the sole property that the heirs of Manuela claim should be included in her estate, has
been sold to Rogelio and Anastacio when Manuela was still alive. The trial court did not give
credence to their claim that Manuela held the property in trust for them.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the trial court issued an order granting Anastacios
Motion for Demurrer to Evidence. It held that the heirs of Manuela had been unable to prove
their claim that Manuela held the lot in trust for their benefit. Neither were they able to prove
that the sale of a portion of the lot to Anastacio was void.
In both cases, the issue of whether Manuela held the lot in Malate, Manila in trust had to be
decided by the trial court. The initiating parties claim in the two cases depended on the
22
existence of the trust Manuela allegedly held in their favor. Thus, the evidence necessary to
prove their claim was the same.
Identity of relief sought
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the heirs of Manuela prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration, the liquidation of Manuelas estate, and its distribution among her legal heirs.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela asked for the annulment of the
deed of absolute sale Manuela executed in favor of Anastacio. They likewise asked the court to
cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of the latter, and to issue a new
one in their names.
While the reliefs prayed for in the initiatory pleadings of the two cases are different in form, a
ruling in one case would have resolved the other, and vice versa. To illustrate, had the lot
been declared as part of the estate of Manuela in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, there
would have been no need for a decision annulling the sale in Civil Case No. 00-99207.
Conversely, had the sale in Civil Case No. 00-99207 been annulled, then the property would go
back to the hands of the heirs of Manuela. Placing the property under administration, as
prayed for in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, would have been unnecessary.
Thus, the relief prayed for, the facts upon which it is based, and the parties are substantially
similar in the two cases. Since the elements of litis pendentia and res judicata are present,
Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-99207 without
indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending.
As Commissioner Dulay observed:
Respondent was fully aware, since he was the counsel for both cases, that he raised the issue
of trust with respect to the Malate property in the 1999 Letters of Administration case and that
he was raising the same similar issue of trust in the 2000 annulment case xxx
To advise his client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum shopping for the second
case (annulment case) and state that there is no pending case involving the same or similar
issue would constitute misconduct which should be subject to disciplinary action. It was his
duty to advise his client properly, and his failure to do so, in fact his deliberate assertion that
there was no falsity in the affidavit is indicative of a predisposition to take lightly his duty as a
lawyer to promote respect and obedience to the law.
12

"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes this obligation."
13

The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the
practice clogs the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings.
14
Willful and deliberate
forum shopping has been made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court in SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994.
15

In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice,
16
and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing
court processes.
17

To our mind, however, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh in light of all
the circumstances of this case. Neither is the commissioners recommended penalty of
suspension consistent with prior rulings of the Court.
In Guanzon, Vda. de, etc. v. Judge Yrad, Jr., etc., et al.
18
we severely censured Renecio
Espiritu, the counsel who filed a petition in the Court of Appeals thirty-three days after a
similar petition had been filed with the Supreme Court. We also found him guilty of direct
contempt.
The present case finds favorable comparison with Guanzon. Like Espiritu, Atty. Gonzales
misused court processes in contravention of the express rule against forum shopping. We held
then that Espiritu should be penalized and we imposed the penalty of censure the penalty
usually imposed for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature.
19

Lawyers are also censured for minor infractions against the lawyers duty to the Court or the
client.
20
As earlier stated, Atty. Gonzales act of forum shopping disregarded his duty to obey
and promote respect for the law and legal processes, as well as the prohibition against unduly
delaying a case by misusing court processes.
21
It also violated his duty as an officer of the
court to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
22

WHEREFORE, we find the basis for the complaint meritorious and accordingly CENSURE Atty.
Romeo S. Gonzales for resorting to forum shopping. He is WARNED that any future violation of
his duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. A copy of this reprimand should be
attached to Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales personal file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9387 June 20, 2012
(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)
EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
SERENO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty.
Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged
negligence in the handling of her case.
The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment
case filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
In a Decision
1
dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge
Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be
cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorneys
fees and moral damages.
Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court
of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants Brief. They chose respondent to
represent them in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an
Appellants Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the
Motion in a Resolution
2
dated 16 December 2003.
No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the
couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with
"deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law."
3
Complainant and her husband failed
to file an appeal, because respondent never informed them of the adverse decision.
Complainant further claims that she asked respondent "several times" about the status of the
appeal, but "despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response [sic]," to the damage and
prejudice of the spouses.
4

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was informed of
the Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and
informed her of the Resolution.
On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint
5
with the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent
on the following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for
moral damages in the amount of P 350,000.
Through an Order
6
dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan
ordered respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-
Affidavit/Answer,
7
respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint.
23
Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior to the
mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had never met complainant,
because it was her husband who had personally transacted with him. According to respondent,
the husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because
according to him the period given by the CA was to lapse within two or three days."
8
Thus,
respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that
"it is this pleading which was required."
9

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainants husband to settle the case.
The latter allegedly "gestured approval of the advice."
10

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw
or heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled
the case. When respondent received an Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on
the Motion to Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez
thru available means of communication, but to no avail."
11
Thus, when complainants husband
went to the office of respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed
complainant of the CAs Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised. The
lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."
12

In his 5 January 2009 Report,
13
IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found
that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the
Code). He recommended that respondent be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6
months.
The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August 2010.
Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six
months.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
14
He prayed for the relaxation of the
application of the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of governors
passed Resolution No. XX-2012-17
15
partly granting his Motion and reducing the penalty
imposed to one-month suspension from the practice of law.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B.
Funa, through a letter
16
addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted the
documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against respondent.
We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however,
disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the
six-month suspension the Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.
Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory conference set
for the disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a perusal of the Memorandum of
Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that he had signed as counsel for the defendant-
appellants therein, including complainant and her husband.
17
The pleading starts with the
following sentence: "DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court
submit the Memorandum and further allege that: x x x."
18
Nowhere does the document say
that it was filed only on behalf of complainants husband.
It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainants
husband cannot be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz:
It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for a fee.
Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a client entrusted to a
lawyer handling and prosecution of his case that calls for the strict application of the Code; x x
x
19

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he also
alleges that complainants husband never contacted him after the filing of the Memorandum of
Appeal. According to respondent, this behavior was "very unusual if he really believed that he
engaged" the formers services.
20

Complainant pointed out in her Reply
21
that respondent was her lawyer, because he accepted
her case and an acceptance fee in the amount of P 7,000.
According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the complainants claim that he
charged P 7,000 as acceptance fee," "the fee was only for the preparation of the pleading
which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal: x x x."
22

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to
the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.
23
Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that
lawyers duty to serve the client with competence and diligence.
24
Respondent has failed to
fulfill this duty.
According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainants husband asked
from him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because he
"honestly believed" that this was the pleading required, based on what complainants husband
said.
The IBP Investigating Commissioners observation on this matter, in the 5 January 2009
Report, is correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be
necessary, it was respondents duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from
RTC decisions, viz:
Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should have
known that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal
under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such cases, Rule
44 of the said Rules applies.
25

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal.
Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellants brief be filed after the records of
the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this
procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been expounded in
Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz,
26
to wit:
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in
the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to
be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge
competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.
In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason for his
failure to file the proper pleading was that he "did not have enough time to acquaint himself
thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case." The IBP reconsidered and thereafter
significantly reduced the penalty originally imposed.
Respondents plea for leniency should not have been granted.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case
does not excuse his negligence.
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainants lawyer from the
trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study
a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent
matters involved, as he was approached by complainants husband only two days before the
expiration of the period for filing the Appellants Brief, respondent should have filed a motion
24
for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come
up with, just to "beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals."
27

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the
wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by
the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CAs Order. He claims that he was under the
presumption that complainant and her husband had already settled the case, because he had
not heard from the husband since the filing of the latters Memorandum of Appeal.
This explanation does not excuse respondents actions.
First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of, from
the moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment
Complaint filed against him. But because of his negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do
nothing.
Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case.
His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:
18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could
have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He
could have thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband
in the case and informed the court that he could no longer contact them.
28
His failure to take
this measure proves his negligence.
Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigans Motion
to Dismiss is negligence on his part.1wphi1 Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for
negligence in handling the clients case, viz:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in
fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.
29

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to
his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held
accountable.
30

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03,
18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member
of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their information and
guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.









A.C. No. 6732 October 22, 2013
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN
PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE,
ANTIQUE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the
gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty.
Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in
existent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique
(RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional
Office, represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written
communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The
letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O.
Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.
1

On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request
for a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.
2

Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings
Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It
was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein
Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had
decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,
3
Mr. Hunt sent a letter
dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.
4

After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the
October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to
apprise him of the situation.
5

The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the
situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.
6

In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,
2005,
7
wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the
falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the
respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in
an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.
8

The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,
9
but he invoked his constitutional right to
remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the
latter appeared and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for
Visayas the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be
prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal
25
Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).
10
The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that
disbarment proceedings be commenced against the respondent.
11
Then Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation
to the Office of the Bar Confidant.
12

Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,
13
whereby
he denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his
opinion on Shirleys petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on
the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in
June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court
decision;
14
that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the
decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an
investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to
people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that
he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of
Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator
Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband,
Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy
Quioyo.
15

Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution
16
treating the respondents counter-affidavit as his
comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,
17
Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations
of the Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had
forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings
No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley
Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for
declaration of presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the
petitioner;
18
and that the respondent had received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified
decision. She rationalized her conclusions thusly:
Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel
Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn
statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the
first place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim
reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch except for the names
and dates? Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI
investigation and merely invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true,
he should have made this known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been
a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary
Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident.
19

In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,
20
the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
709
21
denying the respondents motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-
2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance
with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B
22
of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents comment/opposition as
his appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainants reply as his comment on
the petition for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainants
comment within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records
of the case within 15 days from notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.
The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that
he had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the
handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in
Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that
Dy Quioyo had a history of employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation
of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical declaration on the
respondents personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive
evidence, was not overcome by the respondents blanket denial, which by nature was negative
evidence.
23

Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not
command credence.1wphi1It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-
affidavit only after the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required
him to comment.
24
The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing
more than an after thought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that
declared that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged
decision. But such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was
rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the
sworn statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately
exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the
authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for
having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions
can justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
25
Specifically, the
deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of
justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do
nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional
fidelity and integrity.
26
The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those
among them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorneys
Oath for them to:
x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct
26
themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always
a privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or
deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons
of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for
dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected
with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the
principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him.
27
Verily, no lawyer is immune
from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and
punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity.
28
The test is
whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an
officer of the Court.
29
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of
this decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated
against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.



A.C. No. 1900 June 13, 2012
RODRIGO A. MOLINA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CEFERINO R. MAGAT, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is the undated Resolution
1
of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines(IBP) finding Atty. Ceferino R. Magat (Atty. Magat) liable for unethical conduct
and recommending that he be reprimanded.
The Facts:
The case stemmed from a complaint for disbarment
2
filed by Rodrigo A.
Molina (complainant) against Atty. Magat before the Court on May 5, 1978. The complaint
alleged, among others, that complainant filed cases of Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority and Breach of the Peace and Resisting Arrest against one Pascual de Leon (de
Leon) before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila; that the counsel of record for accused
de Leon in both cases was Atty. Magat; that a case for slight physical injuries was filed against
him (Molina) by de Leon as a counter-charge and Atty. Magat was also the private prosecutor;
that Atty. Magat subsequently filed a motion to quash the information on Assault upon an
Agent of a Person in Authority on the sole ground of double jeopardy claiming that a similar
case for slight physical injuries was filed in court by a certain Pat. Molina (Molina); that based
on the record, no case of slight physical injuries was filed by Molina against de Leon; that Atty.
Magat was very much aware of such fact as he was the counsel and private prosecutor on
record of de Leon from the very start of the case way back on May 24, 1974; that Atty.
Magats act of filing the Motion to Quash was a malicious act done in bad faith to mislead the
court, thus, a betrayal of the confidence of the court of which he is an officer; and that Atty.
Magat likewise committed willful disobedience of the court order when he appeared as counsel
for de Leon on two (2) occasions despite the fact that he was suspended from the practice of
law.
In his Answer,
3
Atty. Magat averred that in so far as the filing of the motion to quash was
concerned, he was really under the impression that a criminal case in lieu of the two (2)
charges was indeed filed and that the said motion was opposed by the other party and was
denied by the court. He admitted his appearances in court while under suspension. He
explained that his appearance in the December 21, 1977 hearing was to inform the court that
the accused was sick and to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused.
In the January 9, 1978 hearing, he appeared because the accused had no money and pleaded
that his testimony be finished. Atty. Magat begged for the indulgence of the court and
conveyed his repentance and apology and promised that the same would not happen again.
The complaint was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
4
Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records of the case to the
IBP for proper disposition.
In his Report and Recommendation
5
dated March 20, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline found merit in the complaint and recommended that Atty. Magat be reprimanded
and fined P50,000.00. It stated that:
This Commission finds it hard to believe that respondent would have mistakenly been under
the impression that a case for physical injuries was filed against his client when there was no
such case filed. Respondent was either negligently reckless or he had mischievous intentions
to deceive the trial court. In any case, he committed a transgression for which he should be
punished.
However, the graver sin of respondent is, and this he admits, that he appeared as counsel
before a trial court on at least two (2) occasions notwithstanding the fact that he had been
suspended by the Supreme Court from the practice of law. Despite professing his contrition in
his Answer, this Commission is not convinced. Otherwise, respondent should have had, at the
onset of the proceedings, admitted to his misdeeds and put his fate squarely with the
disciplinary body. Yet, he proceeded to fight the charges against him.
Moreover, if respondent was indeed moved by altruistic intentions when he made those
appearances before the trial court despite having been suspended, he could have so informed
the Presiding Judge of his plight and explained why the party he was representing could not
attend. Yet, what he proceeded to do was to enter his appearance as counsel. Indeed, it is
beyond doubt he trifled with the suspension order handed by the Supreme Court.
If there is one thing going for respondent, it is that the passage of time with which this case
remains pending makes it difficult to impose a penalty of suspension on him. Under normal
circumstances, this Commission would not have thought twice of suspending respondent.
However, the acts committed by respondent occurred over TWENTY (20) YEARS ago. It would
not be fair to now impose a suspension on respondent, more so considering that he is, in all
likelihood, in the twilight of his career.
On the other hand, there is still a need to discipline respondent if only to set an example to
other lawyers that suspension orders of the Supreme Court cannot simply be ignored. Thus, it
is the recommendation of the undersigned that respondent be meted a fine of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P 50,000.00) and that he be heavily reprimanded for his actions, the
passage of time notwithstanding.
6

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed its Resolution
7
adopting the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner. It, however, deleted the imposition of fine.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but not with respect to the penalty.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possess and continue
to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times
a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
27
They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
8

Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, the Court agrees with the observation of the IBP that there was a deliberate
intent on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the
criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and
untruthful statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight
physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do was to secure a certification
from that court that, indeed, a case was filed.
Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly admitted appearing in court on two occasions despite
having been suspended from the practice of law by the Court. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an
attorney for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court and/or for corruptly
or wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so.1wphi1 It provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. [Underlining supplied]
As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved by altruistic intentions when he appeared before the
trial court despite having been suspended, he could have informed the Presiding Judge of his
plight and explained why the party he was representing could not attend. On the contrary,
Atty. Magat kept his silence and proceeded to represent his client as counsel.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ceferino R. Magat is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar
offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.




Non suspension from practice of law for using intemperate languages in pleadings
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court,
San Mateo, Rizal vs. ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES
[A.C. No. 8954. November 13, 2013.]
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
Facts:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal. Respondent Atty. Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant. He
filed his Pre-Trial Brief without proof of MCLE compliance hence; it was expunged
from the records without prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing
the required MCLE compliance. The preliminary conference was reset several times
for failure of respondent to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon
his MCLE compliance. The court a quo gave respondent last chance to submit his
Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered a waiver
on his part. Respondent later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which
was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance.
During the preliminary conference, respondent manifested that he will submit proof
of compliance of his MCLE on the following day. The Investigating Judge found
Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to obey court
orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his
pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended
from the practice of law for one year.
Issue:
Whether respondent should be suspended from practice of law for using
intemperate language in his pleadings
Held:
NO. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court's order to submit proof of
his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. Atty. Flores also
employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is
expected to be circumspect in his language.
However, the court found the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with
the infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction
committed by respondent. Also, the court is not prepared to impose on the respondent the
penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this
Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a century. Thus, he is already in his
twilight years. Considering the foregoing, the court deem it proper to fine respondent and to
remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court processes.


SAMSON vs. ERA

Ferdinand A. Samson brought complaint for disbarment charging respondent Atty. Edgardo O.
Era with violation of trust and confidence of a client by representing the interest of Emilia C.
Sison, his present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his interest.

Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam
perpetrated by ICS Exports led by Sison and other officers.
Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the criminal
prosecution of Sison and her group.
After an amicable settlement and several negotiations with Sison and her cohorts, Atty. Era
expressed that he already accomplished his professional responsibility towards Samson. They
also later found out that they could not liquidate the property subject to the amicable
settlement.

During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group.
They found out that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for
Sison in her other criminal cases involving the same pyramiding scam.


iSSUE:
Is atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests of his clients?
Is there a formal termination of the lawyer-client relationship with Samson?
RULING:
28
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found
Atty. Era guilty.
It is recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act would merit a more
severe penalty.
SC affirmed the findings of the IBP.
The lawyer-client relationship did not terminate, for the fact remained that he still needed to
oversee the implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases
until they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court.

In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests of his clients.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: A lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of
violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of the
decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.



DHALIWAL VS. DUMAGUING

Emilia Dhaliwal was having some legal issues in purchasing a parcel of land from Fil-Estate
Development, Inc. Their case reached the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
She then engaged the services of Atty. Abelardo Dumaguing in the year 2000. Atty.
Dumaguing was given P342,000.00 for him to consign with the HLURB. With the consignment,
he filed a petition with the HLURB to compel Fil-Estate to deliver the title to Dhaliwal.
However, a week later, Atty. Dumaguing withdrew from the HLURB the amount of
P311,819.94.
In 2003, Dhaliwal terminated the services of Atty. Dumaguing. In the same year, Dhaliwal lost
in the HLURB case. She then demanded Atty. Dumaguing to return her the P311,819.94 he
earlier withdrew. Atty. Dumaguing refused to return said amount. Dhaliwal filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Dumaguing.
In his defense, Atty. Dumaguing said that the reason why he deemed it not proper to return
the said amount to Dhaliwal is that he filed a motion for reconsideration with the HLURB but
the latter had not yet acted on it. Atty. Dumaguing attached a copy of the said motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dumaguing should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. It was established that the attached motion for reconsideration was a mere
fabrication because it did not contain proof that the same was filed with the HLURB nor was
there proof that the other party was notified.
Atty. Dumaguing is in violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states, among others, that: A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held
by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment. Atty. Dumaguing was suspended for 6 months.


A.C. No. 9091 December 11, 2013
CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS,
SOLEDAD A. FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A. FERNANDEZ, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN B. BAEZ, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
SERENO, CJ.:
Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land located in Dinalupihan, Bataan.
1
n 4
September 2002, they entered into an agreement, they stood to be paid P35,000.000 for all
the lots that would be sold in the subdivision.
2
For that purpose, they executed a Pecial Power
of Attorney authorizing Fevidal to enter into all agreements concerning the parcels of land and
to sign those agreements on their behalf.
3

Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and failed to
accout for the titles to the subdivided land.
4
Complainants also found that he had sold a
number of parcels to third parties, but that he did not turn the proceeds over to them. Neither
were complainants invited to the ceremonial opening of the subdivision project.
5

Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had previously
executed in his favor.
6

Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal for the amount of P10,000,000, but
the latter again failed to pay them.
7

Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of assisting
them in the preparation of a settlement agreement.
8

Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute actions
against Fevidal in order to recover their properties. Complainants then signed a contract of
legal services,
9
in which it was agreed that they would not pay acceptance and appearance
fees to respondent, but that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the
contract, complainants would pay respondent 50% of whatever would be recovered of the
properties. In preparation for the filing of an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared and
notarized an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to annotate the claim of complainants to at
least 195 titles in the possession of Fevidal.
10

A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to submit the Affidavit of Adverse Claim
to the Register of Deeds of Bataan.
11

The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were paid by respondent. Unknown to him,
the adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got wind of it and convinced
complainants to agree to another settlement.
12

Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending Fevidal a demand letter dated 10
July 2006, respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and revalidation of titles,
and damages against Fevidal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan on 13 October
2006.
13

Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they terminated the
services of respondent on 8 June 2007, withdrew their complaint against Fevidal on 9 June
2007, and finalized their amicable settlement with him on 5 July 2007.
14

Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition
15
dated 20 July 2007 before the RTC, alleging
that the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint had been done with the
intent of defrauding counsel. On the same date, he filed a Motion for Recording of Attorneys
Charging Lien in the Records of the Above-Captioned Cases.
16

When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the complaint,
17
he filed a Manifestation and Motion
for Reconsideration.
18

After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter denying the
formers allegation of collusion,
19
complainants sought the suspension/disbarment of
respondent through a Complaint
20
filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
29
14 November 2007. Complainants alleged that they were uneducated and underprivileged, and
could not taste the fruits of their properties because the disposition thereof was "now clothed
with legal problems" brought about by respondent.
21

In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons
1.01,
22
1.03,
23
1.04,
24
12.02,
25
15.05,
26
18.04,
27
and 20.04
28
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On 14 August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation
29
of the investigating commissioner. It suspended
respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year for entering into a champertous
agreement.
30

On 26 June 2011, it denied his motion for reconsideration. On 26 November 2012, this Court
noted the Indorsement of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as well as respondents
second motion for reconsideration. We find that respondent did not violate any of the canons
cited by complainants. In fact, we have reason to believe that complainants only filed the
instant complaint against him at the prodding of Fevidal.
Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against Fevidal to
recover their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of P10,000,000 a measly
amount compared to that in the original agreement, under which Fevidal undertook to pay
complainants the amount of P35,000,000. Lawyers have a sworn duty and responsibility to
protect the interest of any prospective client and pursue the ends of justice.
31

Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal under the
circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint against a lawyer only
because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath. The claim of complainants that
they were not informed of the status of the case is more appropriately laid at their door rather
than at that of respondent. He was never informed that they had held in abeyance the filing of
the adverse claim. Neither was he informed of the brewing amicable settlement between
complainants and Fevidal. We also find it very hard to believe that while complainants received
various amounts as loans from respondent from August 2006 to June 2007,
32
they could not
spare even a few minutes to ask about the status of the case. We shall discuss this more
below. As regards the claim that respondent refused to "patch up" with Fevidal despite the
pleas of complainants, we note the latters Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 24 September 2007, in
which they admitted that they could not convince Fevidal to meet with respondent to agree to
a settlement.
33

Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the recording of his
attorneys charging lien as the "legal problem" preventing them from enjoying the fruits of
their property. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a
case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the
discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of
money rendered in a case in which his services have been retained by the client. We recently
upheld the right of counsel to intervene in proceedings for the recording of their charging lien.
In Malvar v. KFPI,
34
we granted counsels motion to intervene in the case after petitioner
therein terminated his services without justifiable cause. Furthermore, after finding that
petitioner and respondent had colluded in order to deprive counsel of his fees, we ordered the
parties to jointly and severally pay counsel the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the
determination of whether respondent is entitled to the charging lien is based on the discretion
of the court before which the lien is presented. The compensation of lawyers for professional
services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not only to guarantee that the fees
they charge remain reasonable and commensurate with the services they have actually
rendered, but to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession as well.
35

In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his services.
36

That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate venue does not make him liable for
disciplinary action. Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not without fault. Indeed, we
find that the contract for legal services he has executed with complainants is in the nature of a
champertous contract an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of
the proceedings to enforce the clients rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of
the thing in dispute.
37

Such contracts are contrary to public policy
38
and are thus void or inexistent.
39

They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states
that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. A reading of
the contract for legal services
40
shows that respondent agreed to pay for at least half of the
expense for the docket fees. He also paid for the whole amount needed for the recording of
complainants adverse claim. While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal
matter they are handling in order to safeguard their clients rights, it is imperative that the
advances be subject to reimbrusement.
41
The purpose is to avoid a situation in which a lawyer
acquires a personal stake in the clients cause. Regrettably, nowhere in the contract for legal
services is it stated that the expenses of litigation advanced by respondents shall be subject to
reimbursement by complainants.
In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and
transportation allowance to them for the duration of their attorney-client relationship. In fact,
he admits that the cash advances were in the nature of personal loans that he extended to
complainants.
42

Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the clients interests
with the ethical standards of his profession. Considering the surrounding circumstances in this
case, an admonition shall suffice to remind him that however dire the needs of the clients, a
lawyer must always avoid any appearance of impropriety to preserve the integrity of the
profession.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Baez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing the litigation
expenses in a legal matter her handled for a client without providing for terms of
reimbursement and lending money to his client, in violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He us sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severly.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Baez, Jr.
SO ORDERED.



Mercado vs. Vitriolo

Facts: Rosa Mercado is seeking for the disbarment of Atty. Julito Vitriolo as he allegedly
maliciously filed a criminal case for falsification of public documents against her thereby
violating the attoyrney client privilege. It appears that Vitriolo filed a case against complainant
as she apparently made false entries in the certificate of live birth of her children. More
specifically she allegedly indicated that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when
in fact her real husband is Ruben Mercado. Mercado claims that by filing the complaint the
attorney client privilege has been violated. Mercado filed a case for Vitriolos disbarment.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between
attorney-client when he filed the criminal case for falsification

Held: No. The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants allegations. Complainant
did not even specify the alleged communication disclosed by the respondents. All her claims
were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. Indeed the complaint failed to attend
the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific
confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it would be
difficult if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication. Such information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on
30
privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the
attorney client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the
party asserting the privilege.




A.C. No. 9532 October 8, 2013
MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court s resolution is an administrative complaint
1
filed by Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui
Pitcher (complainant) against Atty. Rustico B. Gagate (respondent), . charging him for gross
ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law.
The facts
Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David),
2
a British national who
passed away on June 18, 2004.
3
Prior to his death, David was engaged in business in the
Philippines and owned, among others, 40% of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge,
Inc.
4
(Consulting Edge), a domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her deceased
husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent.
5

On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with Katherine Moscoso Bantegui
Bantegui),
6
a major stockholder of Consulting Edge,
7
in order to discuss the settlement of
Davids interest in the company.
8
They agreed to another meeting which was, however,
postponed by Bantegui. Suspecting that the latter was merely stalling for time in order to hide
something, respondent insisted that the appointment proceed as scheduled.
9

Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company premises on June 28, 2004. However,
prior to the scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by respondent to put a paper
seal on the door of the said premises, assuring her that the same was legal.
10

On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of
complainant and respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for the court to
settle. She then asked them to leave, locked the office and refused to give them a duplicate
key.
11

Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, caused the change in
the lock of the Consulting Edge office door,
12
which prevented the employees thereof from
entering and carrying on the operations of the company. This prompted Bantegui to file before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati (Prosecutors Office) a complaint for grave coercion
against complainant and respondent.
13
In turn, respondent advised complainant that criminal
and civil cases should be initiated against Bantegui for the recovery of David's personal
records/business interests in Consulting Edge.
14
Thus, on January 17, 2005, the two entered in
Memorandum of Agreement,
15
whereby respondent undertook the filing of the cases against
Bantegui, for which complainant paid the amount of P150,000.00 as acceptance fee and
committed herself to pay respondentP1,000.00 for every court hearing.
16

On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutors Office issued a Resolution
17
dated October 13, 2004,
finding probable cause to charge complainant and respondent for grave coercion. The
corresponding Information was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
63, docketed as Criminal Case No. 337985 (grave coercion case), and, as a matter of course,
warrants of arrest were issued against them.
18
Due to the foregoing, respondent advised
complainant to go into hiding until he had filed the necessary motions in court. Eventually,
however, respondent abandoned the grave coercion case and stopped communicating with
complainant.
19
Failing to reach respondent despite diligent efforts,
20
complainant filed the
instant administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1689.
Despite a directive
21
from the IBP-CBD, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint.
The case was set for mandatory conference on November 24, 2006,
22
which was reset
twice,
23
on January 12, 2007 and February 2, 2007, due to the absence of respondent. The
last notice sent to respondent, however, was returned unserved for the reason "moved
out."
24
In view thereof, Investigating Commissioner Tranquil S. Salvador III declared the
mandatory conference terminated and required the parties to submit their position papers,
supporting documents, and affidavits.
25

The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On March 18, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner
Magpayo) issued a Report and Recommendation,
26
observing that respondent failed to
safeguard complainant's legitimate interest and abandoned her in the grave coercion case.
Commissioner Magpayo pointed out that Bantegui is not legally obliged to honor complainant
as subrogee of David because complainant has yet to establish her kinship with David and,
consequently, her interest in Consulting Edge.
27
Hence, the actions taken by respondent, such
as the placing of paper seal on the door of the company premises and the changing of its lock,
were all uncalled for. Worse, when faced with the counter legal measures to his actions, he
abandoned his client's cause.
28
Commissioner Magpayo found that respondents acts evinced a
lack of adequate preparation and mastery of the applicable laws on his part, in violation of
Canon 5
29
of the Code of Professional Responsibity (Code), warranting his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six months.
30

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforementioned Report and
Recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-261 dated November 19, 2011 (November 19,
2011 Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules.
31

In a Resolution
32
dated October 8, 2012, the Court noted the Notice of the IBPs November 19,
2011 Resolution, and referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
33

The OBC's Report and Recommendation
On February 11, 2013, the OBC submitted a Report and Recommendation
34
dated February 6,
2013, concluding that respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client and failed to
safeguard the latter's rights and interests in wanton disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
35
It
deemed that the six-month suspension from the practice of law as suggested by the IBP was
an insufficient penalty and, in lieu thereof, recommended that respondent be suspended for
three years.
36
Likewise, it ordered respondent to return the P150,000.00 he received from
complainant as acceptance fee.
37

The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and
conclusions of the OBC.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that
lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of
diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
38
To this
end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives.
39
These
principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of
the Code which respectively state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
x x x x
31
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
x x x x
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
x x x x
Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the
required diligence in handling complainants cause since he: first, failed to represent her
competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the proper
bounds of law; and, second, abandoned his clients cause while the grave coercion case
against them was pending.
Anent the first infraction, it bears emphasis that complainant's right over the properties of her
deceased husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established. As such, the high-handed
action taken by respondent to enforce complainant's claim of ownership over the latters
interest in Consulting Edge i.e., causing the change of the office door lock which thereby
prevented the free ingress and egress of the employees of the said company was highly
improper. Verily, a person cannot take the law into his own hands, regardless of the merits of
his theory. In the same light, respondent's act of advising complainant to go into hiding in
order to evade arrest in the criminal case can hardly be maintained as proper legal advice
since the same constitutes transgression of the ordinary processes of law. By virtue of the
foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty to his client to use peaceful and lawful methods
in seeking justice,
40
in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code as above-quoted. To note
further, since such courses of action were not only improper but also erroneous, respondent
equally failed to serve his client with competence and diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the
Code. In the same regard, he also remained unmindful of his clients trust in him in
particular, her trust that respondent would only provide her with the proper legal advice in
pursuing her interests thereby violating Canon 17 of the Code.
With respect to the second infraction, records definitively bear out that respondent completely
abandoned complainant during the pendency of the grave coercion case against them; this
notwithstanding petitioners efforts to reach him as well as his receipt of the P150,000.00
acceptance fee. It is hornbook principle that a lawyers duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but
also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending
scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting
the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without
prodding from the client or the court.
41
Hence, considering respondents gross and inexcusable
neglect by leaving his client totally unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be doubted that
he violated Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code.
In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint
despite due notice.1wphi1This demonstrates not only his lack of responsibility but also his
lack of interest in clearing his name, which, as case law directs, is constitutive of an implied
admission of the charges leveled against him.
42
In fine, respondent should be held
administratively liable for his infractions as herein discussed. That said, the Court now
proceeds to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed against respondent.
Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions
similar to those committed by respondent were suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two years. In Jinon v. Jiz,
43
a lawyer who neglected his client's case, misappropriated
the client's funds and disobeyed the IBPs directives to submit his pleadings and attend the
hearings was suspended from the practice of law for two years. In Small v. Banares,
44
the
Court meted a similar penalty against a lawyer who failed to render any legal service even
after receiving money from the complainant; to return the money and documents he received
despite demand; to update his client on the status of her case and respond to her requests for
information; and to file an answer and attend the mandatory conference before the IBP. Also,
in Villanueva v. Gonzales,
45
a lawyer who neglected complainants cause; refused to
immediately account for his clients money and to return the documents received; failed to
update his client on the status of her case and to respond to her requests for information; and
failed to submit his answer and to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP was
suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, the Court observes that, in the
present case, complainant was subjected to a graver injury as she was prosecuted for the
crime of grave coercion largely due to the improper and erroneous advice of respondent. Were
it not for respondents imprudent counseling, not to mention his act of abandoning his client
during the proceedings, complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a criminal
prosecution. Thus, considering the superior degree of the prejudice caused to complainant,
the Court finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three years as recommended by the OBC.
In the same light, the Court sustains the OBCs recommendation for the return of
the P150,000.00 acceptance fee received by respondent from complainant since the same is
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. While the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-
lawyers administrative and not his civil liability,
46
it must be clarified that this rule remains
applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature for instance, when the
claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and
distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement (such as the acceptance fee
in this case). Hence, considering further that the fact of respondents receipt of
the P150,000.00 acceptance fee from complainant remains undisputed,
47
the Court finds the
return of the said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to be in order.
WHEREFORE respondent Atty. Rustico B. Gagate is found guilty of violating Canon 17 Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three 3) years,
effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher
the P150,000.00 acceptance fee he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the
finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.



A.C. No. 4945 October 8, 2013
MA. JENNIFER TRIA-SAMONTE, Complainant,
vs.
EPIFANIA "FANNY" OBIAS, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint-affidavit
1
filed by Ma. Jennifer Tria-
Samonte (complainant) against Epifania "Fanny"Obias (respondent) charging her for grave
misconduct and/or gross malpractice.
The facts
In 1997, spouses Prudencio and Loreta Jeremias (Sps. Jeremias),through respondent, offered
for sale a parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 597 (subject
property) to the late Nestor Tria (Nestor) and Pura S. Tria (Sps. Tria), for a consideration
32
of P2,800,000.00 and payable in installments.
2
Respondent, who was to receive the payment
from Sps. Tria and transmit the same to Sps. Jeremias, undertook to deliver the deed of sale
and owners copy of the title to her clients (Sps. Tria) upon full payment of the purchase
price.
3
She further undertook to cause the conversion of the subject property from agricultural
to residential, and the transfer of the title to the names of Sps. Tria as part of the package
agreement.
4
Respondent received all the installment payments made by Sps. Tria and issued
receipts therefor.
5
After full payment of the purchase price on July 11, 1997,
6
and after giving
an additional P115,000.00for capital gains tax and other expenses,
7
Sps. Tria requested from
respondent the delivery of the deed of sale and the owners copy of the title to them but
respondent failed to comply explaining that the Department of Agrarian Reform clearance for
conversion of the subject property from agricultural to residential was taking time.
8
Despite
several subsequent demands, respondent still failed to fulfill her undertakings under the
package agreement.
9

On May 22, 1998, Nestor was fatally shot and died.
10
Thereafter, complainant, daughter of
Sps. Tria, again demanded from respondent and Sps. Jeremias the delivery of the deed of sale
and the certificate of title of the subject property to them, but to no avail. For their part, Sps.
Jeremias informed complainant that they had received the consideration of P2,200,000.00 and
they had executed and turned-over the sale documents to respondent.
11

Complainant later discovered that a deed of sale over the subject property was executed by
Sps. Jeremias and notarized by respondent favor of someone else, a certain Dennis Tan, on
May 26, 1998 for a consideration ofP200,000.00.
12

In defense, respondent, in her Comment,
13
claimed that Nestor instructed her in November
1997 not to proceed with the processing of the deed of sale and, instead, to just look for
another buyer.
14
She further averred that Nestor also demanded from her the return of the
purchase price, and that she complied with the said demand and returned the P2,800,000.00
in cash to Nestor sometime during the latter part of January 1998.
15
However, she did not ask
for a written receipt therefor. In fact, Nestor told her not to return the P115,000.00 intended
for capital gains taxes and other expenses, and to just apply the said sum as attorneys fees
for the other legal services that she rendered for him.
16

In the Courts Resolution
17
dated August 30, 1999, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. After numerous
postponements, mostly at the instance of respondent,
18
only the complainant and her
witnesses testified before the IBP. Eventually, respondents right to present evidence was
considered waived.
19

The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On September 25, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes
(Investigating Commissioner), issued his Report and Recommendation,
20
finding respondent to
have violated her oath as a lawyer due to her participation in the second sale of the subject
property despite the lack of any lawful termination of the prior sale of the same property to
Sps.Tria. The Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent received, and admitted to
have received, from Sps. Tria the P2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount
ofP115,000.00 for expenses. He further found the second sale of the same property to Dennis
Tan as a clear indication that respondent: (a) employed serious deceit or fraud against Sps.
Tria and their family; (b) violated their proprietary rights; and (c) violated the trust and
confidence reposed in her.
21
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not give
credence to respondents defense that she returned the P2,800,000.00 purchase price given
by Sps. Tria and that the latter caused the cancellation of the sale of the subject property in
their favor, absent any receipt or documentation to prove the same.
22
As counsel for Sps. Tria,
respondent failed in her obligation to observe honesty and diligence in their transaction and,
as such, she was found guilty of grave misconduct and gross malpractice in violation of
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
23
Accordingly, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of five years.
24

Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the
Code, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners
Report and Recommendation in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-185
25
dated October 19,2007 but
reduced the suspension of respondent from the practice of law from five years to one year.
Both complainant and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration
26
which
were, however, denied in the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XX-2012-109 dated
March 10, 2012.
27

The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should beheld administratively
liable for violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the IBP. Indeed, respondent, in her
Comment, already admitted that she rendered legal services to Sps. Tria,
28
which necessarily
gave rise to a lawyer-client relationship between them. The complete turnaround made by
respondent in her motion for reconsideration from the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No.
XX-2012-109, where she contended that there was no lawyer-client relationship between her
and Sps. Tria,
29
cannot thus be given any credence.
Since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she also donned the
hat of a real estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to the legal
profession. In this regard, the legal advice and/or legal documentation that she offered and/or
rendered regarding the real estate transaction subject of this case should not be deemed
removed from the category of legal services.
30
Case law instructs that if a person, in respect to
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation,
then the professional employment is established.
31
Thus, in view of the fact that Sps. Tria
knew respondent to be, and transacted with her as, a lawyer, her belated and unilateral
classification of her own acts as being limited to those of a real estate broker cannot be
upheld. In any case, the lawyer-client relationship between Sps. Tria and respondent was
confirmed by the latters admission that she rendered legal services to the former. With this
relationship having been established, the Court proceeds to apply the ethical principles
pertinent to this case.
It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
32
They are duty-bound to observe
candor, fairness, and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their
clients.
33
Irrefragably, the legal profession demands of attorneys an absolute abdication of
every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interests of
their clients.
34
As enshrined in Canons 17 and 18 of the Code:
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.1wphi1
In the present case, respondent clearly transgressed the above-mentioned rules as her actions
were evidently prejudicial to her clients interests. Records disclose that instead of delivering
the deed of sale covering the subject property to her clients, she willfully notarized a deed of
sale over the same property in favor of another person. Accordingly, far removed from
protecting the interest of her clients, Sps. Tria, who had, in fact, already fully paid the
purchase price of the subject property, respondent participated and was even instrumental in
bringing about the defeat of their rights over the said property. Hence, respondent grossly
violated the trust and confidence reposed in her by her clients, in contravention of Canons
17and 18 of the Code. To add, by turning against her own clients, respondent also violated
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Lest it be forgotten, lawyers are bound to
33
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing.
35
These unyielding standards respondent evidently failed to adhere to.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, records bear out that the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was decreased from a
period of five years to just one year by the IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XVIII-
2007-185. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of any explanation
showing the bases for such modification in contravention of Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court which mandates that "the decision of the Board upon such review shall be in
writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based."
Verily, the Court frowns on the unexplained change made by the IBP Board of Governors in
the recommended penalty. Be that as it may, the Court proceeds to correct the same.
Jurisprudence reveals that in similar cases where lawyers abused the trust and confidence
reposed in them by their clients as well as committed unlawful, dishonest, and immoral or
deceitful conduct, as in this case, the Court found them guilty of gross misconduct and
disbarred them. In Chuav. Mesina, Jr.,
36
the Court disbarred the lawyer who, upon his
misrepresentations, breached his promise to his clients to transfer to them the property
subject of that case, but instead, offered the same for sale to the public. Also, in Tabang v.
Gacott,
37
the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who, among others,
actively sought to sell the properties subject of that case contrary to the interests of his own
clients. As the infractions in the foregoing cases are akin to those committed by respondent in
the case at bar, the Court deems that the same penalty of disbarment be imposed against her.
Clearly, as herein discussed, respondent committed deliberate violations of the Code as she
dishonestly dealt with her own clients and advanced the interests of another against them
resulting to their loss. For such violations, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of
disbarment consistent with existing jurisprudence.
As a final point, it bears to note that the foregoing resolution does not-as it should not -include
an order for the return of the P2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of P115,000.00
for expenses allegedly received by respondent, albeit the Investigating Commissioner's
findings on the same. In Roa v. Moreno,
38
it has been held that disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-lawyer is still
fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar and that the only concern is his
administrative liability.
39
Thus, the Court's findings during administrative-disciplinary
proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties involved which are purely civil in
nature -meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional
engagement
40
as the same should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature.
WHEREFORE, respondent Epifania "Fanny" Obias is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
accordingly DISBARRED.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.




Adm. Case No. 6475 January 30, 2013
FE A. YLAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint
1
tiled by Fe A. Ylaya (complainant)
against Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott (respondent) who allegedly deceived the complainant and
her late husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a "preparatory" Deed of Sale that the
respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.
After the submission of the respondent's comment to the complaint, the Court referred the
complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, evaluation and recommendation.
The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two (2)
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title ( TCT) Nos. 162632 and 162633 located
at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. Prior to the acquisition of these properties,
TCT No. 162632 (property) was already the subject of expropriation proceedings filed by the
City Government of Puerto Princesa (City Government) on May 23, 1996 against its former
registered owner, Cirilo Arellano. The expropriation case was filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Palawan and Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2902.
The RTC already fixed the price and issued an order for the City Government to
deposit P6,000,000.00 as just compensation for the property.
2

The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the expropriation
case as intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property. The complainant
alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale
of the property, but he left blank the space for the name of the buyer and for the amount of
consideration. The respondent further alleged that the deed would be used in the sale to the
City Government when the RTC issues the order to transfer the titles.
3
The respondent then
fraudulently without their knowledge and consent, and contrary to their understanding
converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4,
2001,
4
selling the subject property to Reynold So and Sylvia Carlos So for P200,000.00.
5

The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid the P200,000.00 purchase price or
that they would sell the property "for such a measly sum" when they stood to get at
least P6,000,000.00 as just compensation.
6

The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 4, 2001 even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mothers sister) are his uncle and his aunt,
respectively.
7

The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint.
8

The respondent argued that the complainants greed to get the just Compensation
9
caused her
to file this "baseless, unfounded and malicious" disbarment case.
10
He claimed that the sale
was their voluntary transaction and that he "simply ratified the document."
11
He also claimed
that Reynold and Laurentino had originally jointly purchased the properties from Cirilo Arellano
on July 10, 2000; that they were co-owners for some time; and that Laurentino subsequently
sold his share to Reynold under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001.
12

The respondent specifically denied asking the complainant and her late husband to execute
any "preparatory deed of sale" in favor of the City Government.
13
He also denied that the
Deed of Absolute Sale contained blanks when they signed it.
14
That he filed for the spouses
Ylaya and Reynold an opposition to the just compensation the RTC fixed proved that there
was no agreement to use the document for the expropriation case.
15
He also argued that it
was clear from the document that the intended buyer was a natural person, not a juridical
person, because there were spaces for the buyers legal age, marital status, and
citizenship,
16
and he was even constrained to file a subsequent Motion to Intervene on behalf
of Reynold because the complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs to the subject properties
after borrowing them from his office.
17
Lastly, he denied violating the Rules on Notarial
Practice.
18

On September 4, 2006, the respondent filed a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated
August 24, 2006 praying for the early resolution of the complaint.
19

On December 5, 2006, the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified
Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006.
20

On February 28, 2008, the complainant executed an Affidavit
21
affirming and confirming the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6,
34
2000;
22
the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated April 19, 2000;
23
and the Deed of
Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.
24
The respondent submitted this Affidavit to the IBP as an
attachment to his Motion for Reconsideration of April 21, 2008.
25

The IBPs Findings
In her Report and Recommendation dated November 19, 2007, IBP Commissioner Anna
Caridad Sazon-Dupaya found the respondent administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule
1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and
Canon 16 ("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).
26
She recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
27

In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302
28
dated December 14, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted the IBP Commissioners finding, but increased the penalty imposed to two (2) years
suspension and a warning:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner [in] the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering respondents violations of Canon 1, [Rule] 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule IV, Sec. 39(c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice), Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott is hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for
two (2) years with a Warning that commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely. [emphases supplied]
On May 8, 2008, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 21, 2008,
attaching, among others, a copy of the complainants Affidavit dated February 27, 2008,
admitting the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Cirilo and Laurentino; the MOA between Laurentino and Reynold; the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Laurentino and Reynold; and the Compromise Agreement between Reynold and the
complainant dated November 14, 2006 for the expropriation case.
29

On September 4, 2008, the respondent filed a Manifestation with the Supreme Court,
requesting that the IBP be directed to resolve his Motion for Reconsideration.
30

By Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,
31
the IBP Board of Governors denied
the respondents Motion for Reconsideration for failing to raise any new substantial matter or
any cogent reason to warrant a reversal or even a modification of its Resolution No. XVIII-
2007-302.
32

On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed a Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the IBPs
findings, as follows:
33

a) In conveniently concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was pre-signed and
fraudulently notarized without requiring Fe Ylaya to adduce evidence in a formal
hearing thus, violated the respondents right to due process as he was not able to
cross-examine her. This is not to mention that the complainant failed to offer
corroborative proof to prove her bare allegations;
b) In sweepingly and arbitrarily disregarded/skirted (sic) the public documents (MOA
and 2 other DOAS) duly executed by the parties therein and notarized by the
respondent;
c) In totally ignoring the complainants Affidavit admitting the genuineness and due
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in issue;
d) In arbitrarily concluding the absence of co-ownership by Reynold So and Fe Ylaya
of the subject lots despite the existence of a notarized MOA clearly showing the co-
ownership of Ylaya and So; and
e) In finding the respondent/appellants act of notarizing the DOAS as contrary to
the notarial rules.
The Issues
From the assigned errors, the complainant poses the following issues:
(1) whether the IBP violated the respondents right to due process; and
(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
The Courts Ruling
We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of the IBP
Board of Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section
3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
34

We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his clients properties. We
likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting
interests without the written consent of the represented parties, thus, violating the rule on
conflict of interests; and (2) Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to
him.
a. Due process violation
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process means the
total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have ones day in court. As a rule, no denial of due
process takes place where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present
his case;
35
what is prohibited is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
The respondent claims that the IBP violated his right to due process because he was not given
the "amplest opportunity to defend himself, to cross examine the witness complainant, to
object to the admissibility of documents or present controverting evidence"
36
when the IBP
rendered its conclusion without requiring the complainant to adduce evidence in a formal
hearing and despite the absence of corroborative proof. He insists that these defects rendered
the complainants allegations as hearsay, and the IBPs report, recommendation or resolution
null and void.
Although the respondent failed to have a face-to-face confrontation with the complainant
when she failed to appear at the required mandatory conference on October 6, 2005,
37
the
records reveal that the respondent fully participated during the entire proceedings and
submitted numerous pleadings, including evidence, before the IBP. He was even allowed to
file a motion for reconsideration supported by his submitted evidence, which motion the IBP
considered and ruled upon in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010.
38

In Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma,
39
we held that due process, as
applied to administrative proceedings, is the opportunity to explain ones side. In Samalio v.
Court of Appeals,
40
due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where the opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or through pleadings, is accorded, no denial of procedural due process
takes place. The requirements of due process are satisfied where the parties are afforded a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
Similarly, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President,
41
we held that "due process, as
a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding.
Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda
or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals
allows a certain degree of latitude[, provided that] fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not
legally objectionable for being violative of due process, for an administrative agency to resolve
a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the
parties."
42

In this case, the respondents failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a sufficient
ground to support the claim that he had not been afforded due process. The respondent was
heard through his pleadings, his submission of alleged controverting evidence, and his oral
testimony during the October 6, 2005 mandatory conference. These pleadings, evidence and
35
testimony were received and considered by the IBP Commissioner when she arrived at her
findings and recommendation, and were the bases for the IBP Boards Resolution.
Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration. A denia of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party
who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. Undoubtedly in
this case, the requirement of the law was afforded to the respondent."
43

We also note that the respondent, on a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August
24, 2006, submitted his case to the IBP for its resolution without any further hearings. The
motion, filed almost one year after the mandatory conference on October 6, 2005, significantly
did not contain any statement regarding a denial of due process. In effect, the respondent
himself waived his cross-examination of the complainant when he asked the IBP Board of
Governors to resolve the case based on the pleadings and the evidence on record. To quote
his own submission:
1. On June 30, 2004, a complaint was filed in this case;
2. On October 19, 2004, the respondent filed his comment with all its attachments
denying all the allegations in the complaint;
3. On June 23, 2005, the respondent filed his position paper. On April 28, 2006, the
respondent also filed his supplemental position paper. By contrast, up to this date,
the complainant/petitioner has not filed her verified position paper thus, waived her
right to file the same;
4. There being no other genuine issues to be heard in this case as all the defenses
and counter-arguments are supported by documentary evidence, it is most
respectfully prayed that the instant case be resolved on its merits or be ordered
dismissed for lack of merit without further hearing;
5. Further, considering that there is an on-going case in Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan in Civil Case No. 2902 for Expropriation involving the same
property, and such fact was deliberately omitted by the complainant in her Verified
Complaint as shown in the certification of non-forum shopping, the outright
dismissal of this case is warranted, hence, this motion; and
6. This is meant to expedite the termination of this case.
44
(underscore ours; italics
supplied)
Finally, we note Section 11, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that:
No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigators Report
shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole
record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which
event the
Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation
of the entire proceedings.
In this case, the IBP Commissioners findings were twice reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors the first review resulted in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302
45
dated December 14,
2007, affirming the IBP Commissioners findings, but modifying the penalty; the second review
resulted in Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,
46
denying the respondents
motion for reconsideration. In both instances, the IBP Board of Governors found no defect or
miscarriage of justice warranting a remedial action or the invalidation of the proceedings.
We emphasize that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that they are
neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers,
47
not the trial of an action or a suit.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in
no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. [emphases deleted]
The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
48
Flowing from its sui generis character, it is
not mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant must adduce evidence.
From all these, we find it clear that the complainant is not indispensable to the disciplinary
proceedings and her failure to appear for cross-examination or to provide corroborative
evidence of her allegations is of no merit. What is important is whether, upon due
investigation, the IBP
Board of Governors finds sufficient evidence of the respondents misconduct to warrant the
exercise of its disciplinary powers.
b. Merits of the Complaint
"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge."
49
Preponderance of evidence
means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief compared to the presented contrary evidence.
Under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in determining whether preponderance of
evidence exists, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of
the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, and the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest
or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately
appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
50
By law, a lawyer enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proven, and
that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with
his oath.
51

The IBP Commissioner set out her findings as follows:
The undersigned, after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, finds
that the charges of the complainant against the respondent are worthy of belief based on the
following:
First, the allegation of the respondent that Reynold So was actually co-owner of spouses
Ylanas (sic) in the properties subject of the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and Spouses
Ylanas (sic) is hard to believe despite the presentation of the Memorandum of Agreement.
It is elementary in Rules of Evidence that when the contents of a written document are put in
issue, the best evidence would be the document itself. In the Deed of Sale between Felix
Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic), the buyer of the subject properties is only Laurentino L.
Ylaya married to Fe A. Ylaya. The document does not state that Reynold So was likewise a
buyer together with Laurentino Ylaya, or that the former paid half of the purchase price.
Also, it is hard for this Commission to believe that Reynold So, assisted by a lawyer at that and
who allegedly paid half of the purchase price, would not insist for the inclusion of his name in
the Deed of Sale as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title subsequently issued.
The Memorandum of Agreement between the spouses Ylaya and Reynold So produced by the
respondent cannot overturn the belief of this Commission considering that the Memorandum
of Agreement was executed more than a month AFTER the Deed of Sale between Felix
Arellano and the Ylayas was notarized. This is not to mention the fact that the complainant
denied ever having executed the Memorandum of Agreement. A close examination of the
36
signatories in the said Memorandum of Agreement would reveal that indeed, the alleged
signatures of the complainant and her husband are not the same with their signatures in other
documents.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Memorandum of Agreement is valid, thereby
making Laurentino Ylaya and co-owner Reynold So co-owners of the subject properties (Please
see Annex "B" of respondents Comment), this Commission finds it hard to believe Laurentino
Ylaya would sell it to Reynold So for P200,000 x x x when his minimum expenses for the
purchase thereof is already P225,000.00 and he was expecting to receiveP7,000,000.00, more
or less. That would mean that if Reynold So and the complainant were co-owners,
theP7,000,000.00 would then be equally divided among them at P3,500,000.00 each, far
above the P200,000.00 selling price reflected in the pre-signed Deed of Sale.
As to the second issue, this Commission believes that the respondent committed serious error
in notarizing the Deed of Sale and the Memorandum of Agreement between his uncle Reynold
So and Laurentino Ylaya based on Rule IV, Section 3 (c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC which
provides as follows:
"Sec. 3. Disqualifications a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
(a) x x x.
(b) x x x.
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree."
The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the aforementioned Rule
becausehis uncle Reynold So, the buyer is not the principal in the Subject Deed of Sale but the
seller Laurentino Ylaya (please see page 3 of the respondents Supplemental Position Paper) is
misplaced. Clearly, both the buyer and the seller in the instant case are considered principals
in the contract entered into.
Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent that his uncle was not a
principal so as to apply the afore-quoted provision of the Rules, the respondent still violated
the Rules when he notarized the subject Memorandum of Agreement between Laurentino
Ylaya and his uncle Reynold So. Clearly, both complainant and Reynold So were principal
parties in the said Memorandum of Agreement.
52

The respondent argues that the IBP Commissioners findings are contrary to the presented
evidence, specifically to the MOA executed by Laurentino and Reynold acknowledging the
existence of a co-ownership;
53
to the complainants Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified
Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006 where she stated that the
parties have entered into a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 2902, and that the
disbarment complaint arose from a misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper
appreciation of facts;
54
to her Affidavit dated February 27, 2008
55
affirming and confirming the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6,
2000;
56
and to the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.
57

In all, the respondent claims that these cited pieces of evidence prove that this administrative
complaint against him is fabricated, false and untrue. He also points to Atty. Robert Peneyra,
the complainants counsel in this administrative case, as the hand behind the
complaint.
58
According to the respondent, Atty. Peneyra harbors ill-will against him and his
family after his father filed several administrative cases against Atty. Peneyra, one of which
resulted in the imposition of a warning and a reprimand on Atty. Peneyra.
59

Reynold, in his Affidavit dated October 11, 2004, confirms that there was a co-ownership
between him and Laurentino; that Laurentino decided to sell his half of the property to
Reynold because he (Laurentino) had been sickly and in dire need of money to pay for his
medical bills; that Laurentino agreed to the price of P200,000.00 as this was almost the same
value of his investment when he and Reynold jointly acquired the property; and that the sale
to Reynold was with the agreement and consent of the complainant who voluntarily signed the
Deed of Sale.
60

After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with the respondent and find the
evidence insufficient to prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1)
the evidence against the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he
has taken to mislead the complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of
sale" and the conversion into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold;
and (2) no prohibition exists against the notarization of a document in which any of the parties
interested is the notarys relative within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at
that time the respondent notarized the documents.
In her Report and Recommendation,
61
the IBP Commissioner concluded that the respondent is
liable for deceit and fraud because he failed to prove the existence of a co-ownership between
Laurentino and Reynold; in her opinion, the signatures of the complainant and of her husband
on the MOA "are not the same with their signatures in other documents."
62

We do not agree with this finding. While the facts of this case may raise some questions
regarding the respondents legal practice, we nevertheless found nothing constituting clear
evidence of the respondents specific acts of fraud and deceit. His failure to prove the
existence of a co-ownership does not lead us to the conclusion that the MOA and the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 are spurious and that the respondent was responsible for
creating these spurious documents. We are further persuaded, after noting that in
disregarding the MOA, the IBP Commissioner failed to specify what differences she observed
in the spouses Ylayas signatures in the MOA and what documents were used in comparison.
Apart from her allegations, the complainants pieces of evidence consist of TCT Nos. 162632
and 162633;
63
her Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. 2902 dated May 17,
2000;
64
the RTC order in Civil Case No. 2902 dated November 6, 2000 fixing the price of just
compensation;
65
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001;
66
the spouses Ylayas Verified
Manifestation dated September 2, 2002, filed with the RTC in Civil Case No. 2902, assailing the
Motion to Deposit Just Compensation filed by the respondent on behalf of Reynold and
manifesting the sale between Laurentino and Reynold;
67
the Provincial Prosecutors Subpoena
to the complainant in connection with the respondents complaint for libel;
68
the respondents
complaint for libel against the complainant dated August 27, 2003;
69
the complainants
Counter Affidavit dated March 26, 2004 against the charge of libel;
70
and the respondents
letter to the Provincial Attorney of Palawan dated April 5, 2004, requesting for "official
information regarding the actual attendance of Atty. ROBERT Y. PENEYRA" at an MCLE
seminar.
71

We do not see these documentary pieces of evidence as proof of specific acts constituting
deceit or fraud on the respondents part. The documents by themselves are neutral and, at the
most, show the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship between the respondent and the
complainant. It is one thing to allege deceit and misconduct, and it is another to demonstrate
by evidence the specific acts constituting these allegations.
72

We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the complainant; the
Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes her case by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence.
73
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other
party. When the pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on
the preponderance of evidence, the equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the
party carrying the burden of proof.
74

In this case, we find that the complainants evidence and the records of the case do not show
the respondents deliberate fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such proof, the
complaint for fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility must perforce be dismissed.
We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his relationship with
Reynold, whom the complainant alleges to be the respondents uncle because Reynold is
married to the respondents maternal aunt.
75
However, this is of no moment as the respondent
37
cannot be held liable for violating Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001
76
and the MOA dated April 19, 2000
77
were
notarized by the respondent prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC on July 6, 2004.
The notarial law in force in the years 2000 - 2001 was Chapter 11 of Act No. 2711 (the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917) which did not contain the present prohibition against
notarizing documents where the parties are related to the notary public within the 4th civil
degree, by affinity or consanguinity. Thus, we must likewise dismiss the charge for violation of
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
c. Liability under Canons 15, 16 and 18 We find the respondent liable under Canon 15, Rule
15.03 for representing conflicting interests without the written consent of all concerned,
particularly the complainant; under Canon 16 for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust
his clients properties; and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted
to him.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 states:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. [emphasis ours]
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest
level of trust and confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be so. Part of the
lawyers duty to his client is to avoid representing conflicting interests. He is duty bound to
decline professional employment, no matter how attractive the fee offered may be, if its
acceptance involves a violation of the proscription against conflict of interest, or any of the
rules of professional conduct. Thus, a lawyer may not accept a retainer from a defendant after
he has given professional advice to the plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept
employment from another in a matter adversely affecting any interest of his former client. It is
his duty to decline employment in any of these and similar circumstances in view of the rule
prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.
78

The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies "even if the lawyer would
not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other,
or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to
the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated."
79
The sole exception is
provided in Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility if there is a
written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
Based on the records, we find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for violating
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The facts of this case show
that the respondent retained clients who had close dealings with each other. The respondent
admits to acting as legal counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the spouses Ylaya and Reynold at one
point during the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2902.
80
Subsequently, he represented only
Reynold in the same proceedings,
81
asserting Reynolds ownership over the property against
all other claims, including that of the spouses Ylaya.
82

We find no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved and we cannot give
the respondent the benefit of the doubt in this regard. We find it clear from the facts of this
case that the respondent retained Reynold as his client and actively opposed the interests of
his former client, the complainant. He thus violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
We affirm the IBP Commissioners finding that the respondent violated Canon 16. The
respondent admits to losing certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his care by
Reynold.
83
According to the respondent, the complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs over
the properties sold by Laurentino to Reynold after she borrowed them from his
office.
84
Reynold confirms that the TCTs were taken by the complainant from the respondents
law office.
85

The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to "hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession." Allowing a party to take the
original TCTs of properties owned by another an act that could result in damage should
merit a finding of legal malpractice. While we note that it was his legal staff who allowed the
complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or
present when the complainant borrowed the TCTs,
86
we nevertheless hold the respondent
liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence
in caring for his clients properties that were in his custody.
We likewise find the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal
matter entrusted to him. Despite the respondents admission that he represented the
complainant and her late husband in Civil Case No. 2902 and that he purportedly filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene in their behalf, the records show that he never filed such a
motion for the spouses Ylaya. The complainant herself states that she and her late husband
were forced to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on their own behalf. The records of the
case, which include the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by the spouses Ylaya, support this
conclusion.
87

Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable." What amounts to
carelessness or negligence in a lawyers discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an
exact formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to
perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.
88

In Canoy v. Ortiz,
89
we held that a lawyers failure to file a position paper was per se a
violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the
respondent clearly failed in this case in his duty to his client when, without any explanation, he
failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Under the
circumstances, we find that there was want of diligence; without sufficient justification, this is
sufficient to hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
d. The Complainants Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the
Case and her Affidavit
We are aware of the complainants Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To
Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006
90
and her Affidavit
91
affirming and confirming the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6,
2000.
92
The complainant explains that the parties have entered into a compromise agreement
in Civil Case No. 2902, and that this disbarment complaint was filed because of a
"misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper appreciation of facts";
93
she erroneously
accused the respondent of ill motives and bad intentions, but after being enlightened, she is
convinced that he has no personal or pecuniary interests over the properties in Civil Case No.
2902; that such misunderstanding was due to her unfamiliarity with the transactions of her
late husband during his lifetime.
94
The complainant now pleads for the respondents
forgiveness, stating that he has been her and her late husbands lawyer for over a decade and
affirms her trust and confidence in him.
95
We take note that under their Compromise
Agreement dated November 14, 2006 for the expropriation case,
96
the complainant and
Reynold equally share the just compensation, which have since increased to P10,000,000.00.
While the submitted Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the
Case and the Affidavit appear to exonerate the respondent, complete exoneration is not the
necessary legal effect as the submitted motion and affidavit are immaterial for purposes of the
present proceedings. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, "No investigation
shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."
In Angalan v. Delante,
97
despite the Affidavit of Desistance, we disbarred the respondent
therein for taking advantage of his clients and for transferring the title of their property to his
name. In Bautista v. Bernabe,
98
we revoked the lawyers notarial commission, disqualified him
from reappointment as a notary public for two years, and suspended him from the practice of
law for one year for notarizing a document without requiring the affiant to personally appear
before him. In this cited case, we said:
38
Complainants desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put
an end to the administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding
for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.
99

In sum, in administrative proceedings against lawyers, the complainants desistance or
withdrawal does not terminate the proceedings. This is particularly true in the present case
where pecuniary consideration has been given to the complainant as a consideration for her
desistance. We note in this regard that she would receiveP5,000,000.00, or half of the just
compensation under the Compromise Agreement,
100
and thus agreed to withdraw all charges
against the respondent.
101
From this perspective, we consider the complainants desistance to
be suspect; it is not grounded on the fact that the respondent did not commit any actual
misconduct; rather, because of the consideration, the complainant is now amenable to the
position of the respondent and/or Reynold.
e. Procedural aspect
We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors are merely
recommendatory and do not attain finality without a final action from this Court. Section 12,
Rule 139-B is clear on this point that:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
x x x x
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action.1wphi1
The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.
102
It
exercises such disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form
its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, and the IBPs recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law or disbarment are always subject to this Courts review and approval.
The Penalty
In Solidon v. Macalalad,
103
we imposed the penalty of suspension of six ( 6) months from the
practice of law on the respondent therein for his violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and Canon
16, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Josefina M. Anion v. Atty.
Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr.,
104
we suspended the respondent therein from the practice of law for
one (1) year, for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Under the circumstances, we find a one (1) year suspension to be a sufficient and appropriate
sanction against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we set aside Resolution No. XVIII-.2007-302 dated
December 14, 2007 and Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010 of the IBP Board
of Governors, and find respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As a penalty, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.


IPI No. 12205CAJ, December 10, 2013
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF TOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E.
VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R.
SP No. 119461.

[A.C. No. 10300]

RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12205CAJ AGAINST
ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.
R E S O L U T I O N
BRION, J.:
On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution
1
dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas
S. Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same
Resolution, we also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegias counsel, to show cause why
he should not be cited for contempt.

After considering Atty. Adazas explanation,
2
we find his account insufficient, and
find him guilty of indirect contempt.

According to Atty. Adaza, he should not be punished for indirect contempt as he was merely
performing his duty as Merdegias counsel when he assisted him in preparing the
administrative complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his
client observed Justice Velosos partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of
immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file
a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso
refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated his request to file an administrative complaint
against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he
should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially when he also believes in the merits of
his clients case.

Atty. Adazas explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to
convince us of his innocence from the contempt charge.

As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice
Veloso refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion
for inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso
during the oral arguments of Merdegias case. The resolution dismissing the motion for
inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Velosos bias. While we do not
discount the fact that it was Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for
inhibition, we note that he was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals.
3
Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this resolution, the
proper remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order
denying the motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that administrative complaints
against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies
against an assailed decision or ruling.
4


While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds
provided by law.
5
He is also dutybound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal
action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal
processes.
6

39

A reading of Merdegias administrative complaint
7
shows an apparent failure to understand
that cases are not always decided in ones favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem
from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in
the case.
8
In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his
client the features of our adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect
for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an
officer of the Court demand of him in acting for his client before our courts.

To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task. We have
to strike a balance between the need for accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the
one hand, with the need to protect the independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from
vindictive and enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should not be made to bow down to
the wiles of litigants who bully judges into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their
favor, but neither should we shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt
practices of people who decide the outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly
injured by malicious and corrupt acts of erring judges and officials should not be punished for
filing administrative cases against them; neither should these litigants be unjustly deterred
from doing so by a wrong signal from this Court that they would be made to explain why they
should not be cited for contempt when the complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient
cause.

What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of the
case that, when read together with the administrative complaint he prepared, shows that his
complaint is merely an attempt to malign the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adazas
penchant for filing motions for inhibition throughout the case: first, against Judge Ma.
Theresa Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order
unfavorable to his client; andsecond, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division
hearing his appeal, for alleged bias during the oral arguments on his case. These indicators,
taken together with the baseless administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he
penned an order adverse to Atty. Adazas client, disclose that there was more to the
administrative complaint than the report of legitimate grievances against members of the
Judiciary.

In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc.,
9
we cited a litigant in indirect
contempt of court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints
against members of the Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the judicial office,
interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes
indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty.
Adazas acts constitute an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of
justice, and is thus punishable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court.

As a final note, Atty. Adazas contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary
sanction as a member of the bar.
10
If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to
discipline him, we are prevented from doing so by our concern for his due process rights. Our
Resolution of October 8, 2013 only asked him to show cause why he should not be cited in
contempt, and not why he should not be administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a
disciplinary sanction against Atty. Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic
tenets of due process as a disciplinary action is independent and separate from a proceeding
for contempt. A person charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal
proceeding, must be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and given ample
opportunity to explain his side.
11
cralawred

While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other,
12
a contempt
proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers,
13
and vice versa.
There can be no substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt proceedings against
lawyers, as officers of the Court, are different in nature and purpose from the discipline of
lawyers as legal professionals. The two proceedings spring from two different powers of the
Court.

The Court, in exercising its power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power
granted to courts in general.
14
Its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings; to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and,
consequently, in the administration of justice;
15
thus, it may be instituted against any person
guilty of acts that constitute contempt of court.
16
Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt
proceeding as penal and summary in nature; hence, legal principles applicable to criminal
proceedings also apply to contempt proceedings. A judgment dismissing the charge of
contempt, for instance, may no longer be appealed in the same manner that the prohibition
against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an accuseds acquittal.
17


In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is
neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding
is not intended to inflict punishment, but to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be
allowed the privilege of practicing law. It involves an investigation by the Court of the conduct
of its officers, and has, for its primary objective, public interest.
18
Thus, unlike a contempt
proceeding, the acquittal of the lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested
party from seeking reconsideration of the ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for
contempt operate as res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct.
19


Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures.
Contempt of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139
thereof.
20


IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E.
Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the
promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that
further similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the institution of disciplinary
proceedings against him.

SO ORDERED.













40
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2198
*
January 18, 2011
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO L. LEONIDA, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH
27, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case at bench stemmed from a judicial audit and inventory of pending
cases conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in Branch 27, Regional Trial
Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (Branch 27, Sta. Cruz), and in Branch 74, Regional Trial Court,
Malabon City (Branch 74, Malabon).
The audits were conducted because respondent Judge Leonardo L. Leonida (Judge
Leonida) applied for Optional Retirement effective July 5, 2008. Judge Leonida was the
presiding judge of Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, from October 1997 until his retirement and was
detailed as assisting judge of Branch 74, Malabon.
On May 21, 2009, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez issued a Memorandum
1
on the audit
teams findings, among which are:
1) As of audit date, March 5 and 6, 2009, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz had a total caseload
of 507 cases consisting of 280 criminal cases and 227 civil cases based on the
records actually presented to, and examined by, the audit team.
2) Out of the total number of pending criminal cases, no further action was taken
after varying considerable periods of time in 14 cases.
2

3) Pending incidents and motions filed by parties in 8 criminal cases
3
were left
unresolved for more than one (1) year in 3 cases, and three months in 2 cases.
4) Twenty-nine (29) criminal cases
4
submitted for decision, the earliest in 2001,
were undecided.
5) Of the 227 civil cases lodged in the court, no setting for hearing and no further
action was taken on 46 cases.
5

6) Twenty-four (24) civil cases
6
have pending motions/incidents awaiting resolution,
the earliest since 2002.
7) Fifty-seven (57) civil cases
7
submitted for decision from 2000 to 2009 were
undecided at the time of the audit.
8) In the course of the audit in Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, several records of criminal
cases were found to be incomplete. The records were not paginated. Certificates of
arraignment, minutes of hearings and notices of hearing were missing from the files.
9) The record of one case, Criminal Case No. 12178,
8
an appealed case submitted
for resolution, is missing and is in the possession of Judge Leonida as per
certification issued by Atty. Bernadette Platon, the Branch Clerk of Court.
9

Regarding Branch 74, Malabon City, the OCA also looked into the Monthly Report of Cases
submitted by said branch for August-October 2008 and January-March 2008 and noted that 95
criminal cases and 18 civil cases were submitted for decision.
10
Considering that Judge Leonida
applied for Optional Retirement effective July 5, 2008, he should have decided 91 of the 95
submitted criminal cases and 16 of the 18 submitted civil cases.
In sum, Judge Leonida failed to decide 102 criminal cases and 43 civil cases both in Branch 27
and Branch 74, and failed to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases in Branch 27.
The same report bears the recommendations of the OCA that were eventually adopted by the
Court in a Resolution dated July 29, 2009,
11
to wit:
(1) RE-DOCKET the judicial audit report as an administrative complaint against
former Judge Leonardo L. Leonida for gross incompetence and inefficiency;
(2) REQUIRE Judge Leonida to MANIFEST whether he is willing to submit the
case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted,
within ten (10) days from notice;
(3) DIRECT:
(a) Hon. Jaime C. Blancaflor, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 27, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna to:
(1) TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on Criminal Case Nos. xxx
which are without further action for a considerable length of
time;
(2) RESOLVE with dispatch the pending incidents/motions in
Criminal Case Nos. xxx and furnish the Court, through the OCA,
a copy of the resolution/order within ten (10) days from
issuance/resolution thereof; and
(3) DECIDE with dispatch Criminal Case Nos. xxx
and Furnish the Court, through the OCA, a copy of the decision
within ten (10) days from its promulgation; and
(b) Atty. Bernadette Platon, Branch Clerk of Court, to:
(1) APPRISE the Acting Presiding Judge, from time to time, of
cases submitted for resolution/decision and those cases that
require immediate action;
(2) ORDER the stitching of all orders issued, minutes taken,
notices of hearing issued, certificates of arraignment in all
appropriate case folders especially those jointly tried, including
their chronological arrangement and pagination as well as the
proofreading of all orders and notices; and
(3) SUBMIT report of compliance therewith to this Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice.
On October 4, 2009, Judge Leonida filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File
Manifest and Memorandum.
12
He cited the short period compounded by the typhoons and
floods which ravaged Manila as his reason for requesting an additional period of twenty (20)
days within which to file the same. In its October 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court noted Judge
Leonidas motion.
On October 22, 2009, Judge Leonida filed a Manifest and Memorandum
13
expressing his
willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings. He explained that he failed
to finalize and promulgate cases pending in his sala because of the severely clogged docket of
Branch 74. With an overwhelming number of more than 1,000 cases, he calendared an
average of 30 cases daily in order to "keep all the cases moving." According to Judge Leonida,
"the court sessions together with the preparation/correction/review of the orders in the cases
set for hearing almost ate up" his time as a judge. The fact that Branch 74, a commercial
court, was still included in the raffle of regular cases exacerbated the situation. Voluminous
pleadings requiring extensive dissection and research, and cases involving numerous
intervenors who raised different and complex issues, made matters much more difficult that
he even had to conduct hearings on applications for search and seizures until nighttime. Judge
Leonida further claimed that his work encroached upon the time he had to devote to his wife
and eight children. Finally, the reconstruction and review of case records submerged in flood
waters added up to his struggle to expedite the disposition of cases assigned to his court.
Anent the missing record in Branch 27, Judge Leonida alleged that the case was raffled to said
branch long after he assumed the position of Assisting Judge of Branch 74; that he neither
saw nor had possession of the said record; and that there was no reason for him to take the
record anywhere. He pleaded for compassion and leniency from the Court, invoking his
unblemished record in government service for twenty-three (23) years. He likewise offered his
sincere apologies to those who were prejudiced.
In its evaluation of the charges against Judge Leonida, the OCA recommended that for his
failure to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases; decide eleven (11) criminal cases, and
twenty-seven (27) civil cases in Branch 27, and to decide ninety-one (91) criminal cases and
sixteen (16) civil cases in Branch 74, he be found guilty of gross incompetency and
41
inefficiency, and fined the amount of P50,000.00 pesos to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
The recommendations of the OCA are well-taken.
Precedents have shown that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary
period warrants administrative sanction. The Court treats such cases with utmost rigor for any
delay in the administration of justice; no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a
speedy disposition of his case.
14
Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice; it
undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings
it to disrepute.
15

No less than Section 15 (1), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that all cases or
matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within three (3) months from
the date of submission. The prescribed period is a firm mandatory rule for the efficient
administration of justice and not merely one for indulgent tweaking.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or
certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and for the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very
nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.
16
In the same vein, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct is emphatic in enjoining judges to administer justice without delay by
disposing of the courts business promptly and deciding cases within the period prescribed by
law.
Corollary to this, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, requires all judges
to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, because
failure to comply therewith violates the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition
of the cases.
17
Only in certain meritorious cases, that is, those involving difficult questions of
law or complex issues, may a longer period to decide the case be allowed but only upon
proper application for extension of the period has been made by the concerned judge.
18

Judge Leonida was clearly remiss in his duties as a judge for he did not take the above
constitutional command to heart. Neither did he observe the above rules which have
encapsulated the Courts strict message: "the need and the imperative" for judges to promptly
and expeditiously decide cases including all incidents therein.
19
In this case, the findings of the
OCA showed that Judge Leonida failed to decide a considerable number of cases: (102)
criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases. Judge Leonida openly admitted his culpability in
the delay of disposition of cases.
His proffered explanation is unacceptable given the ample period that he had. He cannot take
refuge behind the common excuse of heavy caseload to justify his failure to decide and
resolve cases promptly. He could have asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to
dipose of the cases but did not.
Due to his inefficiency, the constitutional right of parties to a speedy trial was violated out of
neglect. Instead of justice wrought by efficient and competent handling of judicial business,
the lower courts handled and assisted by Judge Leonida produced unnecessary financial strain,
not to mention physical and emotional anxiety, to litigants. Delay derails the administration of
justice. It postpones the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly prosecuted.
It crowds the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to
take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of those cases in which
all parties are diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall
of disorganization and insolubility. More than these, possibilities for error in fact-finding
multiply rapidly between the original fact and its judicial determination as time elapses. If the
facts are not fully and accurately determined, even the wisest judge cannot distinguish
between merit and demerit. If courts do not get the facts right, there is little chance for their
judgment to be right.
20

The Court has always considered a judges delay in deciding cases within the prescribed period
of three months as gross
inefficiency.
21
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/am_03-7-170-mctc_2009.html
- fntUndue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court dockets is
still the bane of the judiciary. The raison d' etre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing
justice but also in being able to do so seasonably.
22

Aside from the delay in deciding the reported cases, the audit findings likewise show that the
case records/rollo in Branch 27 were not chronologically arranged. Certificates of arraignment,
minutes of hearings and notices of hearing were unsigned by the accused and his/her counsel,
or worse, missing from the files. Judge Leonida was asked to explain the whereabouts of the
case records of Criminal Case No. 12178. His bare denial however, does not overcome the fair
conclusion that Section 14 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court
23
was not observed. The
expectation directed at judges to exercise utmost diligence and care in handling the records of
cases was certainly not met, or at least approximated.
The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be able to comply
fully and faithfully with the task set before them.
24
As frontline officials of the judiciary, judges
should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity. They are duty-bound not only to be
faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence
must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and
confidence which the public reposed on them and the institution they represent.
25

Therefore, as recommended by the OCA after a thorough judicial audit and considering the
unrebutted audit reports on record, proper sanctions must be imposed. The penalty imposed
for undue delay in deciding cases varies in each case: from fine, suspension, suspension and
fine, and even dismissal, depending mainly on the number of cases left undecided within the
reglementary period, and other factors, such as the damage suffered by the parties as a result
of the delay, the health and the age of the judge.
26

The Court agrees with the OCA that the total number of cases which Judge Leonida failed to
timely decide or act on warrants a fine higher than that prescribed by the rules. In Lugares v.
Judge Gutierrez-Torres,
27
the defaulting judge who was found guilty of gross inefficiency for
her undue delay in resolving cases submitted for decision for a number of years was dismissed
from the service.
In view of Judge Leonidas retirement on July 5, 2008, the only penalty that the Court can
impose against him is a fine, pursuant to the rule that the retirement of a judge does not
release him from liability incurred while in the active service.lavvphil
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Leonardo Leonida, former Presiding Judge of
Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and Assisting Judge in Branch 74, Regional
Trial Court, Malabon City,GUILTY of gross incompetence and gross inefficiency for failure to
decide one hundred two (102) criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases for which he
is FINED P50,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits.
Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and
Atty. Bernadette Platon, Branch Clerk of Court, are hereby ordered to report on their
respective compliance with the orders of the Court contained in its July 29, 2009 Order, within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof. The Court notes that, in its February 10, 2010 Resolution,
Judge Blancaflor was granted a non-extendible period of sixty (60) to comply with its July 29,
2009 Order.
Judge Blancaflor is hereby ordered to cause the reconstitution of Criminal Case No. 12178
within three (3) months from receipt hereof and to report his compliance thereon within ten
(10) days from completion.
Atty. Bernadette Platon is hereby ordered to include the status of said case in her Monthly
Report of Cases.
SO ORDERED.




42
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189 January 18, 2011
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2837-RTJ)
VICTORIANO SY, Complainant,
vs.
Judge OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
We resolve in this Decision the Verified Complaint, dated March 11, 2008,
1
filed by Victoriano
Sy against Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Koronadal
City, South Cotabato, for Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary and for Gross
Ignorance of the Law, in relation to Civil Case No. 1403-24, entitled Sps. Victoriano Sy and
Loreta Sy v. Metrobank, for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate
Mortgage, and Misc. Case No. 1440-24, entitled Metrobank v. Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., for
Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
The Antecedents Facts
The facts are set out in the memorandum/report, dated May 25, 2009,
2
of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), and are summarized below.
The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) was the mortgagee in good faith and
for value of twenty-three (23) parcels of land all located in Koronadal City. The mortgagors
were Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. and/or Sps.
Victoriano Sy and Loreta Cabaies-Sy and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas.
Metrobank foreclosed the mortgage for violation of the terms and conditions of the mortgage
agreement. At the public auction on August 31, 1998, the mortgaged parcels of land were sold
to Metrobank as the highest bidder. Metrobank was issued a certificate of sale which was
registered on September 18, 1998 with the Register of Deeds of South Cotabato. The
mortgagors failed to redeem the 23 parcels of land within the redemption period.
Thereafter, Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc.
filed with the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided over by Judge Dinopol, a complaint
against Metrobank for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage,
Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings and Certificate of Sale, with Damages and Attorneys
Fees and with prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 1403-24.
On April 16, 2004, Judge Dinopol inhibited himself from further acting on the case
3
on the
ground that he received a call, on April 12, 2004, from a ranking officer of the Philippine
Judicial Academy, interceding in behalf of the defendant bank and an earlier call (July 2003)
from a ranking personnel of the OCA, appealing in behalf of the plaintiffs. He claimed he
wanted to avoid being charged with partiality either way he acted on the case.
On September 15, 2005, Metrobank filed with the RTC, South Cotabato, a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the parcels of land subject of the foreclosed mortgage
against Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc., and/or Sps.
Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas, docketed as Misc. Case
No. 1440-24,
4
and assigned to the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided by Judge Dinopol.
On July 13, 2006, Judge Dinopol issued an Order granting the petition,
5
and issued the writ of
possession on July 21, 2006.
6

Meanwhile, or on May 22, 2006, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. filed with the
RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, a petition, entitled In the Matter of: Petition for the Declaration of
State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan, docketed as
Corp. Case No. 1585-06.
7

On June 26, 2006, the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, issued an Order
8
staying the enforcement
of all claims against the debtor, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable with the debtor.
The same court subsequently approved the rehabilitation plan.
In the meantime, Sheriff Conrado B. Dapulang, Jr. proceeded to implement the writ of
possession issued by Judge Dinopol, but it was returned unsatisfied in view of the stay order
issued by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, in Corp. Case No. 1585-06.
9

Consequently, the respondents in Misc. Case No. 1440-24 filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings due to the issuance of the stay order and the approval of the rehabilitation plan
by the Rehabilitation Court, and a motion for inhibition on grounds of bias and partiality on the
part of Judge Dinopol. Judge Dinopol denied the motions in an Order dated February 11,
2008, and directed Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Publico to re-implement the writ of execution of
July 31, 2006.
10

Shortly thereafter, Sy filed the present administrative complaint
11
charging Judge Dinopol of
gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Sy alleged in his complaint that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 (in which he and his wife sought
the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure proceedings against Metrobank) was pending
before Judge Dinopols sala, the judge inhibited himself from acting on the case. This
notwithstanding, and to Sys surprise, Judge Dinopol still handled Misc. Case No. 1440-24, a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by Metrobank, a matter closely
intertwined with Civil Case No. 1403-24. Judge Dinopol then issued an order granting
Metrobank the right to possess the foreclosed properties.
12

Sy further alleged that despite the issuance by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, of a stay
order
13
and the approval of the rehabilitation plan, as well as the pendency of Metrobanks
petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) Twenty-Third Division in Cagayan De Oro City (CA
G.R. SP No. 01824) assailing the validity of the stay order, Judge Dinopol ordered that the writ
of possession be implemented.
14

Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
Sy claimed in relation with his charge that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 was pending in Judge
Dinopols sala, the judge asked him for commodity loans in the form of construction materials
to be used in the construction of the judges house. The transaction was evidenced by delivery
receipt no. 15178 (March 8, 2005),
15
and charge invoices no. 9817 (March 8, 2005)
for P16,000.00,
16
no. 9826 (March 9, 2005) for P850.00,
17
and no. 9838 (March 10, 2005)
for P780.00.
18

Sy further claimed that aside from the commodity loans, Judge Dinopol obtained cash loans
from him on various occasions between December 2, 2005 to July 14, 2006, in the total
amount of P121,000.00, and Judge Dinopol borrowed from him his Suzuki Multi-cab and
returned it after the judge was suspended in September 2007. Sy presented disbursement
vouchers, official receipts and an acknowledgement to prove his claim.
19

Judge Dinopols Comment
In a 1st indorsement dated March 18, 2008,
20
the OCA required Judge Dinopol to comment on
the complaint, which he did on April 21, 2008.
21

Judge Dinopol denied Sys accusations. He stressed that he inhibited himself from Civil Case
No. 1403-24 on April 16, 2004 and had not acted on the case since then; nobody intervened
and pleaded in behalf of Metrobank after Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed. He was not aware
nor had he been given notice that Metrobank filed a petition before the CA (CA G.R. SP No.
01824), nor did he receive any order from the appellate tribunal enjoining him to desist from
performing or acting on the incidents pending in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
Judge Dinopol denied that he committed any breach of procedural rules that could be
characterized as gross ignorance of the basic rules of civil procedures. He maintained that Sy
did not allege any specific actuations of deceit, malice or intent to cause injury to Sy, and that
he had acted fairly and objectively. He added that he observed the requirements of the Code
of Professional Responsibility as a lawyer, relative to his handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
With respect to the alleged accommodations he received from Sy at the time his house was
under construction, Judge Dinopol claimed that when he obtained the commodity loans from
Sy in March 2005, he had already inhibited himself from handling Civil Case No. 1403-24; he
43
did so on April 16, 2004. He explained that Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed only on
September 15, 2005, and was assigned to his sala on September 22, 2005. He denied that he
received from Sy cash loans in the amount of P121,000.00. He also denied borrowing Sys
Suzuki Multi-cab and claimed that it was Rogelio Villanueva who borrowed it.
Judge Dinopol countered that it was Sy who acted with sinister design and employed deceit
and cunning to frustrate the administration of justice in the cases he handled.
In a Resolution dated July 15, 2009, the Court resolved to: (1) note Sys complaint and Judge
Dinopols answer/comment; (2) re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative matter;
and (3) require the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the matter for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings. The Court also noted the OCA Report dated May 25,
2009,
22
which found no basis for the charge of ignorance of the law on the part of Judge
Dinopol, but found him liable for conduct unbecoming a judge.
The Courts Ruling
The OCA evaluation is well-founded. Judge Dinopol cannot be disciplined for ignorance of the
law and of procedure in his handling of Civil Case No. 1403-24 (for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage) filed by Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy against
Metrobank, as he inhibited himself from the case, nor in his handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-
24 (Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession) filed by Metrobank against Sps.
Victoriano Sy, et al., because of the essential nature of the proceeding itself.
In issuing the writ of possession and in directing its re-implementation when it was returned
unsatisfied the first time it was enforced, Judge Dinopol acted in accordance with the rules
and jurisprudence on the matter.
As the Court held in Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera, Inc.,
23
the proceeding in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary in nature. It is
brought for the benefit of one party only and may be granted even without notice to the
mortgagor, in this case, complainant Sy. Moreover, the duty of the court to grant a writ of
possession is a ministerial function. The court does not exercise its official discretion or
judgment.
24
Judge Dinopol, before whom the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
was filed, had no discretion on whether to issue the writ of possession or not. It cannot be
said, therefore, that Judge Dinopol exposed himself or exhibited bias in favor of Metrobank
when he issued the writ of possession.
Further, regardless of whether there is a pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage or
the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of
course to the eventual outcome of the annulment case. Once the writ of possession is issued,
the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay.
25

From another perspective, a stay order only affects claims filed against the assets and
properties belonging to a debtor. Properties that have already been foreclosed, and those
whose titles have already passed on to the winning bidder are no longer considered properties
of the debtor.
26
In such case, it is a ministerial duty on the part of the trial court to grant a
possessory writ over the foreclosed properties.
27

Clearly, Judge Dinopol was well within his authority and committed no impropriety in directing
the re-implementation of the writ of execution in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
On the other hand, we cannot say the same thing with regard to Sys charge of conduct
unbecoming against Judge Dinopol. The latters denial of having committed the acts
complained of flies in the face of indications in the records and documentary evidence that he
obtained commodity loans from Sy in the form of building materials for the construction of his
house in Koronadal City. There was also Sys claim of cash loans to Judge Dinopol on various
occasions, between December 2, 2005 and July 14, 2006, amounting to P121,000.00, as well
as the loan of Sys Suzuki Multi-cab to the Judge.
The commodity loans were evidenced by receipts
28
indicating delivery of construction materials
to Judge Dinopols residence. The cash loans appear to have been covered by disbursement
vouchers,
29
and the borrowed multicab is the subject of an "acknowledgement"
30
from Judge
Dinopols driver Rogelio Villanueva.
There is substantial evidence showing that Judge Dinopol obtained the commodity loans from
Sy. The judge himself admitted that he wrote Sy, on March 4, 2005, regarding the purchase of
materials for his house which was then under construction, although he claimed that it was his
wife who transacted with Sy and it was Sy himself who offered to deliver the materials to his
residence.
31
Judge Dinopol pleaded innocence regarding the commodity loans or even the cash
loans saying that the transaction with Sy regarding the construction materials occurred when
there was no case pending in his sala where Sy was a party.
The above disclaimer notwithstanding, we find Judge Dinopol to have committed a serious
impropriety in his or his familys financial or business dealings with Sy.
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to a judges impartiality provides, inter
alia, as follows:
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of
the judge and the judiciary.
Sec. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the
occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding
cases.
Judge Dinopol violated the above provisions when he received accommodations from Sy for
the building materials he needed for the construction of his house. He compromised his
position as a judge. Although at the time he and his family had business dealings with Sy
there was no pending case involving the businessman, he should have been more circumspect
in securing the construction materials. The sphere of Sys business operations was within his
territorial jurisdiction. As the OCA aptly noted, "it is neither impossible nor remote that a case
might be filed in his court with complainant as a party. In such a case, his (respondent)
business and financial dealings with complainant would create a doubt about his fairness and
impartiality in deciding the case and would tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the
court."
32

In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol also violated Section 1 of Canon 1, Canon 2 and Canon
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 1 of Canon 1 highlights the independence of a judge in performing his official duties,
thus:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free
of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason.
Canon 2 requires a judge to promote integrity in the discharge of his official functions:
Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of
the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Moreover, Canon 4 mandates a judge to observe and maintain proper decorum and its
appearance in his public office:
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
By his own admissions, Judge Dinopol failed to observe these ethical standards. In his
Answer/Comment, Judge Dinopol admitted that he talked with Sy on several occasions to
discuss Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
33
Judge Dinopol also admitted that Sy, in at least two
instances, requested him to delay the resolution of the writ of possession.
34
Judge Dinopols
actions no doubt created the inference that at some point, he acceded to Sys requests to
44
delay the proceedings. This conclusion, is in fact, bolstered by Judge Dinopols knowledge that
the counsel for Metrobank was instructed to immediately secure the order for the issuance of
the writ of possession.
35
Regardless of the representations allegedly made to him by Sy, Judge
Dinopol should have immediately issued the writ of possession in Metrobanks favor.
From these inappropriate actions, we find that Judge Dinopol compromised not only his
impartiality in handling Misc. Case No. 1440-24 but also his independence and integrity as a
judge. His actions no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge.
His actions gave the public the impression and the appearance that he can be influenced by
extraneous factors - other than the legal arguments and the court evidence in discharging
his judicial functions.
In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol committed impropriety in talking with litigants outside
court proceedings. His improper conduct was further aggravated by the fact that these
conversations took place in the absence of the opposing litigants and/or the opposing counsel.
In Agustin v. Mercado,
36
we declared that employees of the court have no business meeting
with litigants or their representatives under any circumstance. In Re: Affidavit of Frankie N.
Calabines,
37
the Court minced no words in explaining that such unethical conduct constitutes
"a brazen and outrageous betrayal of public trust."
38
The Court further declared in the said
case:
x x x The Court cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all
those who are in the service of the judiciary. x x x
The image of a court as a bastion of justice depends to a large extent on the personal and
official conduct of its employees. Thus, from the judge to the lowest clerk, judicial personnel
have the sacred duty to maintain the good name of the Judiciary.
All employees in the judiciary should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency.
As officers of the court and agents of the law, they must discharge their duties with due care
and utmost diligence. Any conduct they exhibit tending to diminish the faith of the people in
the judiciary will not be condoned.
39

Certainly, these responsibilities become more exacting when one occupies the position of a
judge. Time and again, we have emphasized that judges are expected to conduct themselves
in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial
system.
40
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid
any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the
Judiciary.
41
These standards apply not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by
which the decision is made.
42

Without a doubt, Judge Dinopol is liable for gross misconduct in office and deserves to be
sanctioned under the above findings. His track record as a judge, in this regard, is far from
exemplary.1wphi1 He is a repeat offender, as demonstrated by the following cases where
we penalized him for questionable conduct:
First, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969 decided on June 15, 2006, Judge Dinopol was found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and was fined P20,000.00.
43

Second, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2020 decided on September 20, 2006, he was found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority, and was fined P20,000.00.
44

Third, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2003 decided on August 23, 2007, he was found liable for undue
delay in rendering a decision or order and for violating the clear provisions of A.M. No. 01-1-
07-SC, and was fined P11,000.00.
45

Fourth, in A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2173-RTJ decided on August 28, 2006, he was strongly
admonished, even as the complainant desisted from pursuing the complaint against the judge
for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and discretion.
46

And more recently, in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2052 decided on March 30, 2009, Judge Dinopol had
been reminded and warned against entertaining litigants outside court premises.
47

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct constituting a violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious charge. Under Section 11 of the same Rule, the
respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be meted any of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to any
public office;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
months but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering his repeated infractions and numerous breaches of the standard ethical conduct
demanded of judges, we find Judge Dinopol unfit to discharge the functions of a judge. We
impose upon him the severest penalty of dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement
or reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
48

Lastly, as we sanction Judge Dinopol, we remind the members of the bench that:
[a]lthough every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the [J]udiciary.
A magistrate of the law must compose himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct,
official and otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him
as the epitome of integrity and justice.
49

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
Koronadal City, is declared GUILTY OF GROSS MISCONDUCT and is hereby DISMISSED
from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, with
prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.




A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734 January 19, 2011
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-1933-MTJ]
FLORENDA V. TOBIAS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by complainant Florenda V. Tobias
against respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.
Complainant charged respondent with corruption for allegedly offering "package deals" to
litigants who plan to file cases in his court.
In her verified Complaint
1
dated June 6, 2007, complainant alleged that respondent Judge
Limsiaco, Jr. offers "package deals" for cases filed in the court where he presides. She stated
that sometime in June 2006, she requested her sister, Lorna V. Vollmer, to inquire from the
Fourth MCTC of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental about the requirements
needed in filing an ejectment case. Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero
2
allegedly proposed
to Vollmer that for the sum of P30,000.00, respondent would provide the lawyer, prepare the
necessary pleadings, and ensure a favorable decision in the ejectment case which they
contemplated to file against the spouses Raymundo and Francisca Batalla. Fegidero allegedly
required them to pay the initial amount of P10,000.00 and the remaining balance would be
45
paid in the course of the proceedings. It was made clear that they would not get any judicial
relief from their squatter problem unless they accepted the package deal.
Further, complainant alleged that on June 23, 2006, Lorna Vollmer, accompanied by Salvacion
Fegidero, delivered the amount of P10,000.00 to respondent at his residence. Subsequently,
an ejectment case was filed in respondents court, entitled Reynold V. Tobias, represented by
his Attorneyin-fact Lorna V. Vollmer v. Spouses Raymundo Batalla and Francisca Batalla,
docketed as Civil Case No. 06-007-V.
3
Respondent allegedly assigned a certain Atty. Robert G.
Juanillo to represent the complainant in the ejectment case. Complainant stated that
respondent, however, immediately demanded for an additional payment of P10,000.00. She
allegedly refused to give the additional amount and earned the ire of respondent. She asked
her sister, Lorna Vollmer, to request Atty. Robert Juanillo to voluntarily withdraw as
counsel,
4
which he did on April 16, 2007. Complainant also asked Vollmer to withdraw the
case.
5
Respondent granted the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on April 23, 2007 and the
Motion to Withdraw Case on May 3, 2007.
6

In his Comment,
7
respondent denounced the allegation that he offers "package deals" to
prospective litigants as malicious, baseless and a lie. He denied that he demanded from
complainant the additional payment ofP10,000.00. He alleged that he does not know
complainant and she is a total stranger to him.
Respondent attached to his Comment the Affidavit
8
dated September 29, 2007 of Atty. Robert
G. Juanillo, who stated therein that he received as counsel of the complainant in the ejectment
case the sum of P10,000.00 from complainants sister, Lorna Vollmer. From the P10,000.00,
he paid filing fees and miscellaneous fees in the amount of P3,707.00, while the remaining
balance of P6,293.00 was paid to him for his services, consisting of the preparation and filing
of the complaint for ejectment, including acceptance fee.
Respondent also attached to his Comment the Affidavit
9
dated September 29, 2007 of Court
Stenographer Salvacion B. Fegidero, denying the allegation that she offered a "package deal"
to complainants sister, Lorna Vollmer. She declared that the allegations of complainant were
malicious and unfair, and that complainant and her sister could have been misled by some
people who lost cases in the said court.
Meanwhile, the ejectment case was assigned to Judge Herminigildo S. Octaviano, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Negros Occidental, in view of respondents inhibition on July
30, 2007.
10

On February 20, 2008, the Court issued a Resolution,
11
which noted the Report of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) on the complaint against respondent. Due to the conflicting
allegations of the parties, the OCA opined that a formal investigation was necessary to afford
the parties opportunity to substantiate their respective claims and to determine the alleged
participation of court employee Salvacion Fegidero. Upon recommendation of the OCA, the
Court referred the complaint to Executive Judge Frances V. Guanzon, Regional Trial Court,
Bago City, Negros Occidental for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days
from receipt thereof.
On May 20, 2008, the parties were summoned for a formal investigation before Investigating
Judge Frances V. Guanzon. Those who appeared before the Investigating Judge were
complainant Florenda V. Tobias, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., Court
Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero and respondents witness, Atty. Robert Juanillo.
Complainants witness, Lorna Vollmer, did not attend the investigation, because per
information of complainant, Vollmer was in Germany and she was expected to be back in the
country in December 2008.
In his Report dated June 2, 2008, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that complainant
testified that it was her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who informed her about the alleged "package
deal" through long distance telephone call. Complainant testified that she met Salvacion
Fegidero only after the filing of the instant administrative complaint and that she did not talk
with her even once.
12
Complainant further claimed that she had no personal dealings with
respondent or with Salvacion Fegidero, and that she met respondent only after the filing of the
ejectment case.
13

Moreover, complainant testified that respondent neither personally received from her the initial
payment ofP10,000.00 for the alleged package deal nor personally asked from her for an
additional payment ofP10,000.00.
14
It was her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who told her through
telephone about the demand for an additional P10,000.00, but she (complainant) did not send
the money.
15

Complainant testified that she was the one who went to the house of Atty. Robert Juanillo,
bringing with her the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel prepared by respondent for Atty. Juanillo
to sign.
16

Respondent and Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero categorically denied the accusation
that they had a package deal with Lorna Vollmer. Respondent testified that he met and talked
with Vollmer when she went to his court to inquire about the filing of an ejectment case
against the spouses Raymundo and Francisca Batalla. Respondent advised Vollmer that since
there was no lawyer in Valladolid, Negros Occidental, she had to choose the nearest town
lawyer as it would lessen expenses in transportation and appearance fee, and respondent
mentioned the name of Atty. Robert Juanillo.
17
Moreover, respondent testified that Vollmer,
together with her husband and Salvacion Fegidero, went to his house once to ask him for the
direction to the house of Atty. Robert Juanillo. Respondent denied that he received the
amount of P10,000.00 from Vollmer.
18

Further, respondent testified that he met with complainant after the ejectment case was filed,
when she went to his court and told him that she was withdrawing the services of Atty. Robert
Juanillo. Respondent admitted that he prepared the motion for the withdrawal of appearance
of Atty. Juanillo, since respondent wanted to help complainant as she said it was urgent, but
respondent did not charge her.
19

Atty. Robert Juanillo testified that he received the amount of P10,000.00 from Lorna Vollmer
at the Municipal Court of Valladolid, Negros Occidental. From the amount, he paid filing fees
amounting to P3,707.00 to the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Court of Valladolid-
Pulupandan and San Enrique, which payment was evidenced by five official receipts. Atty.
Juanillo testified that the balance of P6,293.00 was payment for his legal services.
Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero denied that she was involved in the alleged package
deal complained of by Florenda Tobias. She testified that she met Lorna Vollmer for the first
time when Vollmer went to the court in Villadolid and asked if there was a lawyer in Valladolid,
because she was intending to file an ejectment suit. She referred Vollmer to respondent Judge
Limsiaco, since there was no lawyer in the Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental. The
courtroom of Valladolid, Negros Occidental consists only of one room where everybody holds
office, including respondent. She saw respondent talk with Vollmer for 15 minutes, but she did
not hear what they were talking about.
20

Investigating Judge Guanzon found that the complainant did not have personal knowledge of
the alleged "package deals" to litigants who file cases in the court of respondent. The
allegations in the Complaint were all based on the information relayed to complainant though
telephone by her sister, Lorna Vollmer. During the investigation, complainant admitted that
respondent did not personally receive from her the amount of P10,000.00 as payment for the
alleged package deal, and respondent did not ask from her an additional P10,000.00.
According to Investigating Judge Guanzon, the only person who could have shed light on the
alleged offer of package deals to litigants was Lorna Vollmer, complainants sister.
Unfortunately, Vollmer was not present during the investigation. Per manifestation of
complainant, Vollmer was then in Germany and she was expected to return to the Philippines
in December 2008. Hence, the complaint of corruption was unsubstantiated.
Nevertheless, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that although the alleged offer of package
deals by respondent to litigants was unsubstantiated, it was improper for respondent to talk to
prospective litigants in his court and to recommend lawyers to handle cases. Likewise, Judge
46
Guanzon found respondents act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty.
Robert Juanillo to be improper and unethical.
Investigating Judge Guanzon recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint
against respondent as regards the alleged offer of package deals to litigants who plan to file
cases in his court. However, Judge Guanzon recommended that respondent be reprimanded
for talking to a prospective litigant in his court, recommending the counsel to handle the case,
and preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which pleading was
filed in respondents court and was acted upon by him.
In a Resolution dated August 4, 2008, the Court referred the Report of Investigating Judge
Guanzon to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation within 30 days from notice.
The OCA found respondents acts, consisting of (1) advising Lorna Vollmer about the
ejectment case she was about to file before his court; (2) recommending Atty. Robert Juanillo
as counsel of the complainant in the ejectment case; and (3) helping complainant to prepare
the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, to be violative of the rules on
integrity,
21
impartiality,
22
and propriety
23
contained in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct constituting
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and be fined in the amount of P20,000.00.
In a Resolution dated February 25, 2009, the Court required the parties to manifest whether
they were willing to submit the case for decision, on the basis of the pleadings/records already
filed and submitted, within 10 days from notice.
On August 18, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution resolving to inform the parties that they
are deemed to have submitted the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records
already filed and submitted, considering that they have not submitted their respective
manifestations required in the Resolution dated February 25, 2009, despite receipt thereof on
April 1, 2010.
The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Judge Guanzon that complainant failed to
prove by substantial evidence her allegation that respondent offers "package deals" to
prospective litigants in his court.
However, the investigation revealed that respondent committed acts unbecoming of a judge,
in particular, talking to a prospective litigant in his court, recommending a lawyer to the
litigant, and preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which
pleading was filed in his court and was acted upon by him. The conduct of a judge should be
beyond reproach and reflective of the integrity of his office. Indeed, as stated by the OCA, the
said acts of respondent violate Section 1 of Canon 2 (Integrity), Section 2 of Canon 3
(Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary,
24
thus:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
x x x x
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
x x x x
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of
the judge and of the judiciary.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of
the judicial office.
The aforementioned acts of respondent constitute gross misconduct. "Misconduct" means a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or
wrong behavior.
25
"Gross" has been defined as "out of all measure, beyond allowance;
flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."
26
Respondents act of preparing the
Motion to Withdraw the Appearance of Atty. Juanillo as counsel of complainant is inexcusable.
In so doing, respondent exhibited improper conduct that tarnished the integrity and
impartiality of his court, considering that the said motion was filed in his own sala and was
acted upon by him.1avvphi1
Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious charge
under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
27
Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, the sanctions against a respondent guilty of a serious charge may be any of the
following:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided,
however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In imposing the proper sanction against respondent, the Court takes note that respondent had
been found guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. MTJ-03-1509
28
and was fined P20,000.00,
with a warning against repetition of the same or similar act. Moreover, per verification from
court records, respondent compulsorily retired from the service on May 17, 2009.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., former Presiding Judge of the Fourth
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, is found
GUILTY of gross misconduct for which he is FINED in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00). The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to deduct the fine
of P25,000.00 from the retirement benefits due to Judge Limsiaco, Jr.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.












47
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139 August 9, 2010
MICHAEL B. BELEN, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, Branch
36, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a
judge filed by Michael B. Belen against Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch 36.
The Facts
Complainant Michael B. Belen filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court, charging Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
with grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. According to
complainant,
1
sometime in March 2004, respondent judge filed a case for Estafa against
complainants father, Nezer D. Belen, but the same was dismissed for lack of probable cause
by Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman in a Resolution dated 28 July 2004.
Respondent judge filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration and Disqualif[ication]) before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City, alleging, inter alia, that Sunega-Lagman
was always absent during the hearings in the preliminary investigation in the estafa case.
Respondent judge likewise filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Sunega-Lagman
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline, docketed as CBD
Case No. 06-1700. To refute the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman,
complainant executed an Affidavit dated 19 May 2006, which was submitted by Sunega-
Lagman as evidence in the CBD case. Complainants Affidavit stated that the allegations of
respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman were "false"; that Sunega-Lagman was present
during the preliminary investigation hearings dated 14, 21 and 29 April 2004, and that she was
absent only once, on 6 May 2004, when she was already on maternity leave; and that it was
respondent judge who was absent during the hearings.
2

Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the
filing of several cases against the latter. On 11 January 2007, at 10:00 in the morning,
complainant received a mobile phone text message from the caretaker of his piggery,
informing him that respondent judge arrived and was taking pictures of the piggery.
Complainant rushed to the area and saw respondent judge, accompanied by the Municipal
Agriculturist and Sanitary Inspector and the Barangay Chairman, inspecting complainants
piggery.
Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government authorities
and employees, requesting information on complainants piggery and poultry business;
advising them of the alleged violations by the complainant of the National Building Code and
certain environmental laws; and reminding the local government authorities of their duty to
forestall the issuance of municipal clearance and license to complainants business
establishment. We enumerate these letters below.
3

1. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of Alaminos,
Laguna, requesting confirmation of the issuance by said office of construction,
building and occupancy permits to "Michael B. Belens Piggery and Poultry in Brgy.
IV and House in Sta. Rosa," and stating that non-compliance with, or violation of the
National Building Code is a criminal offense;
4

2. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of
Alaminos, Laguna, referring to respondent judges previous letter dated 15 January
2007; citing provisions of the National Building Code on Building Use Affecting
Health and Safety (Sec. 1.01.05), Building Permits (Sec. 1.02.03), and Inspection
and Certificates of Occupancy (Sec. 1.02.05); and stating: "These statutory
provisions are mandatory and any violation thereof is subject to appropriate legal
sanctions. Thus, in accordance with the National Building Code and Code of Conduct
of Public Officers that mandates action and reply to any complaint within 15 days
from receipt, may I know your official action and reply on the matter";
5

3. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos,
Laguna, expressing his appreciation of the "immediate action" taken by the mayor in
relation to the inspection of the piggery and poultry business establishment of
complainant; enumerating the environmental laws violated by the complainant, i.e.,
Sec. 8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 984, Section 3 of PD 953, Section 48 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9003, Section 49 of PD 1152, and Section 27 of Resolution
No. 33, Series of 1996; stating that "With the violations of the owner and his farm
workers, appropriate criminal actions shall be instituted against them;" and
reminding the mayor that municipal officers are mandated by environmental laws
not to issue municipal clearance and permits, and to close business enterprises
within its jurisdiction, specifically complainants piggery and poultry, violating
environmental laws;
6

4. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel Bueser of
Alaminos, Laguna, inquiring on the official action taken by the mayor in relation to
respondent judges earlier letters and complainants alleged violation of
environmental laws, and emphasizing the responsibility of the mayor to withhold
clearances and permits from business establishments violating environmental laws;
7

5. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to Ms. Gladys D. Apostol, the Municipal
Agriculturist of Alaminos, Laguna, requesting a copy of the Inspection report dated
11 January 2007;
8
and
6. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of Alaminos,
Laguna, requesting for prompt action on respondent judges previous letters dated
15 and 23 January 2007, with a warning that the failure of the said office to reply to
respondent judges inquiries will compel the latter to file administrative and criminal
complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Section 5 of RA 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees.
9

All of the letters enumerated above bore a letterhead indicating respondent judges official
government position,viz:
From the Chamber of:
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 36
4th Judicial region, Calamba City
Respondent judge also filed a criminal case against complainant for violations of Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 953, docketed as I.S. No.
07-246/07-247, before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna.
10

In his Comment,
11
respondent judge alleged that he never neglected his duties as a judge;
that as a landowner and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, he had the right to file
criminal complaints against violators of environmental laws to protect the environment; and
that he had the right, under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6173, to secure public
information from government offices, especially about the complainant who was violating
numerous laws. Respondent judge also claimed that he did not use the courts official
stationery or letterhead in his correspondence with government authorities and employees of
Alaminos, Laguna. He emphasized that the courts official letterhead should appear as:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
4TH JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 36
CALAMBA CITY
48
Respondent judge claimed that he used his personal stationery or letterhead, and signed the
same in his private, not judicial, capacity.
The OCAs Report and Recommendation
On 11 March 2008, the OCA submitted its Report
12
finding respondent judge guilty of violating
Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA
stated that while respondent judge did not actually use the courts official letterhead but his
own personal stationery, his letters indicated that he is the presiding judge of an RTC in
Calamba City, and even stated that his letters were "from the chambers of" the presiding
judge. It is apparent from the acts of respondent judge that he intended to use the prestige of
his judicial position to promote his personal interest.
The OCA recommended that (a) the administrative case against respondent judge be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) that respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B.
Belen be fined in the amount of P11,000 for violation of Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
13

In a Resolution dated 13 August 2008, the Supreme Court resolved, among others, to re-
docket the administrative complaint against respondent judge as a regular administrative
matter.
14
Subsequently, the OCA, in compliance with the Courts Resolution,
15
designated
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia as the investigating justice of the
administrative case.
The Findings and Recommendation
of the Investigating Justice
Investigating Justice Ramon R. Garcia found respondent judge to have violated Section 4 of
Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary when he used a letterhead indicating his position as the Presiding Judge of the RTC
of Calamba City, Branch 36. According to Justice Garcia, while the computer-printed letterhead
of respondent judge is not the official letterhead of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, the
use of the same reflects respondent judges designation and position in the judiciary, and
indicates that the letters came from the "chambers" of the presiding judge of Branch 36.
Undoubtedly, respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his judicial office for his own
personal interest.
Justice Garcia agreed with the OCA in recommending the imposition of the administrative
penalty of fine in the amount of P11,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
The Courts Ruling
The findings and recommendations of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA are well-
taken.
Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public
information regarding complainants piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the
laws allegedly being violated by complainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as
government officials or employees and warn them of the possible legal effects of neglect of
public duties. In writing these letters, respondent judges use of his personal stationery with
letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and
stating that the letter was "from [his] chambers," clearly manifests that respondent judge was
trying to use the prestige of his office to influence said government officials and employees,
and to achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for which those letters were written. In
other words, respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his personal interest. This is
violative of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. We quote these sections below:
CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE
x x x
SECTION. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are
in a special position to influence the judge.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
x x x
In Oktubre v. Velasco,
16
this Court held that respondent judges act of sending several letters
bearing his salas letterhead, in connection with an apparent dispute in the administration of
the estates of his relatives, clearly showed the judges intent to use the prestige of his judicial
office, and hence, violative of Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
17
The Court
considered respondent Judge Velascos excuse for using his salas letterhead, i.e., that he
wanted to protect the interest of his maternal co-heirs in the subject properties, as flimsy, and
emphasized that respondent judge had no business using his salas letterhead for private
matters, as the same should be used only for official correspondence.
18

Similarly, in Rosauro v. Kallos,
19
it was held that respondent judges use of his salas official
stationery in his private correspondence with complainant and his counsel constitutes violation
of Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court concluded that: "By using his salas
stationery other than for official purposes, respondent Judge evidently used the prestige of his
office to benefit Guerrero (and himself) in violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code."
20
1avvphi1
In Ladignon v. Garong,
21
respondent judges act of using the official letterhead of his court and
signing the same using the word "judge" in his letter-complaint to the First United Methodist
Church in Michigan, USA, was held to be violative of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics and
Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court held, thus:
We agree with the Report that what is involved here is the rule that "Judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities". (Canon 4, Section 1,
New Code of Judicial Conduct) Indeed, members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach
and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the
discharge of their official duties as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life. No
position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness on the individual
than a seat in the Judiciary. x x x
x x x
x x x As the Report stated, [repondent judges] use of the letterhead and his designation as a
Judge in a situation of potential dispute gave "the appearance that there is an implied or
assured consent of the court to his cause." This circumstance, to our mind, was what marked
the respondent Judges use of his letterhead and title as improper. In other words, the
respondent Judges transgression was not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being
very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his
letterhead and his title. x x x
x x x the use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding
circumstances of the use - the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of
"impropriety" or "appearance of impropriety". In the present case, the respondent Judge
crossed the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint involving an
alleged violation of church rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with
the letter addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the
impression of official recognition or notice of the reported violation.
The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title of "Judge" or
"Justice" in the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary. While the use of the title is an
official designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a line still has to be
49
drawn based on the circumstances of the use of the appellation. While the title can be used
for social and other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use the
prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal, family or other pecuniary
interests. Nor can the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the judge. (Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct)
To do any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.
22

In view of the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1
and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC,
23
provides that violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a less-serious charge
punishable by any of the following sanctions:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating justice and the OCA that respondent
judge, for his transgression, be meted a penalty of fine amounting to P11,000, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba City, Branch 36, GUILTY of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1
of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
and FINE him P11,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.



A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J April 12, 2011
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-
RODRIGUEZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA,
SANDIGANBAYAN,Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
We resolve: (a) the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 filed by
respondents Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong) and Associate
Justice Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Honorable Courts Decision Dated 1 September) dated September 15, 2010 of the
complainant.
Both motions seek the reconsideration of the Decision rendered on August 24, 2010, albeit on
different grounds.
Through the Decision, we found and held Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez liable for simple
misconduct, and disposed against them and Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice
Ponferrada), as follows:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of 15,000.00,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely;
2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and
3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be more cautious
about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.
1

A brief account of the factual antecedents is first given.
The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, filed an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 charging Justice Ong, Justice
Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan with: (a) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service (grounded on their failing to hear cases as a
collegial body during the scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division held in Davao City on April
24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by himself and Justice Hernandez and Justice
Ponferrada hearing other cases together; and on their having unreasonably flexed their judicial
muscle when she objected to the procedure); (b) falsification of public documents (grounded
on their issuance of orders relative to the hearings in Davao City, signed by all three of them,
that made it appear as if all of them had been present during the particular hearing acting as
a collegial body, when in truth they were not); (c) improprieties in the hearing of cases that
amounted to gross abuse of judicial authority and grave misconduct (grounded on Justice Ong
and Justice Hernandezs making the following intemperate and discriminatory utterances
during the hearings of their Division in Cebu City sometime in September 2006), to wit:
(a) We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is
already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that
time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.
2
;
(b) You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are
you here to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor who
is doing nothing.
3
;
(c) Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacaang, you are
acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of their (sic)
mother
4
; and
(d) Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated,
and frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had
studied and from which he had graduated was better than his (Justice Ongs) own
alma mater.
and (d) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law (grounded on the fact that Criminal
Case No. 25801, entitled People v. Puno, was dismissed upon a demurrer to evidence filed by
the accused upon a finding that the assailed contracts subject of the criminal case had never
been perfected contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution, the dismissal order being signed
by all three respondents).
In the Decision of August 24, 2010, we explained as follows:
A.
Respondents Violation of the Provisions of PD 1606 and
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
x x x x x x x x x
We find that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in
blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules
of the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the
benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the affected
litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings
open to serious challenge on the ground that a hearing before a duly constituted Division of
the Sandiganbayan was of the very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process of law.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets. They are
expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
rules. For this reason alone, respondent Justices adoption of the irregular procedure cannot
be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but
should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross
misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The respondent Justices were not liable for gross
misconduct defined as the transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more
50
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of the
law or disregard of well-known legal rules considering that the explanations they have
offered herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to maintain
their collegiality by holding their separate hearings within sight and hearing distance of one
another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of the law, which must be based on
reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by
an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules; on the
contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the respondent Justices have
convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate
any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to
thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces.
Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their proceedings
accorded with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their insistence that they adopted the
procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to
entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the
procedure. They could have seen that their procedure was flawed, and that the flaw would
prevent, not promote, the expeditious disposition of the cases by precluding their valid
adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the irregularity. They knew as well that the need to
expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the chief objective of judicial trials. As the
Court has reminded judges in State Prosecutors v. Muro, viz:
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be
borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate
consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial. A
genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration before ruling on
important questions, and a zealous regard for the just administration of law are some of the
qualities of a good trial judge, which are more important than a reputation for hasty disposal
of cases.
x x x x x x x x x
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean
that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and
explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values
and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He
is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is
to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment,
to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of
order in the social life."
Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices signing of the orders issued during the
flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty, in that they thereby made it
appear that they had all been physically present when the truth was different. Such act merely
ensued from the flawed proceedings and cannot be treated as a separate offense.
B.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
The Court approves the Court Administrators finding and recommendation that no evidence
supported the complainants charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had uttered the
improper and intemperate statements attributed to them.
A review of the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in which the offensive
statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed to substantiate the complainants
charge. In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the Court must accept such
transcripts as the faithful and true record of the proceedings, because they bear the
certification of correctness executed by the stenographers who had prepared them.
Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing
before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the
hearings in casual conversation about their respective law schools. They thereby publicized
their professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of
public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We view their acts as
bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no judge worthy of the
judicial robes should avoid especially during their performance of judicial functions. They
should not exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings
(no matter how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe).
Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all who
appear before their court.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
clearly enjoins that:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and
graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on
the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their
conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably
give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations
with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial
duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or
group on irrelevant grounds. It is very essential that they should live up to the high standards
their noble position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and measured,
lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial
duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers,
court staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial
to the proper performance of such duties.
In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming
conduct, which is defined as improper performance. Unbecoming conduct "applies to a
broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or
logical procedure or prescribed method."
C.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to evidence
of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court
upheld the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have "failed to sufficiently show
that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction."
In their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez make it clear that
they:
[A]ccept with all humility, and therefore, will no longer contest the Honorable Courts finding
that the proceedings they had adopted in their provincial hearings fell short of what the
provisions of the law and rules require. For such shortcoming, respondents Ong and
Hernandez can only express their regret and apology.
Nonetheless, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pray for exoneration, contending that they
are not liable for simple misconduct despite the irregularity of their conduct for the simple
51
reason that, as the Decision has indicated, they "have not been ill-motivated or inspired by an
intention to violate any law or legal rules in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been
seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces;" their actions
were not willful in character or motivated by a "premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose;" or even if their actions might be "irregular, wrongful, or improper," such could not
be characterized as simple misconduct necessitating administrative sanction.
Also, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez posit that they cannot be made accountable for
unbecoming conduct because they admittedly posed questions on the law schools of origin of
the counsel appearing before them; that their propounding the queries, per se, did not justify
a finding of unbecoming conduct on their part considering that they thereby never derided any
law school or belittled the capabilities of lawyers on the basis of their school affiliations, nor
exhibited bias for or against any lawyer based on their alma mater.1avvphi1
In the alternative, Justice Ong prays that the sanction imposed upon him be made equal to
that meted on Justice Hernandez. He "implores the Honorable Court to re-examine the
propriety of imposing a different and heavier penalty against him and take into due
consideration its own pronouncement in its decision that the Sandiganbayan is a collegial
court, and in a collegial court, the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule."
For her part, the complainant insists that respondent Justices be found guilty of all
administrative charges made against them; and that the penalties or chastisement be
increased to be commensurate to their infractions.
Ruling
Finding the arguments of the complainant to be matters that the Court fully dealt with and
discussed in the Decision, and there being no other substantial matters raised by her, we deny
her Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts Decision Dated 1 September).
We deny the plea of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez for complete exoneration, considering
what we held in the Decision, which we reiterate hereunder, as follows:
Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit together
as members of the Fourth Division "in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned
thereto." The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any
decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available
to each and every one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and
full participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not
enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and
communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in
hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session.
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became impossible
when not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The internal rules of
the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings on oral motions
made or objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings are be made by
the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be complied with because Justice
Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the other
respondents. Neither could the other respondents properly and promptly contribute to the
rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before him.
Moreover, the respondents non-observance of collegiality contravened the very purpose of
trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three Justices.
Although there are criminal cases involving public officials and employees triable before single-
judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always required a Division of three Justices (not one
or two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in
such cases holding higher rank or office than those charged in the former cases. The three
Justices of a Division, rather than a single judge, are naturally expected to exert keener
judiciousness and to apply broader circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The
tighter standard is due in part to the fact that the review of convictions is elevated to the
Supreme Court generally via the discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, Rules of Court, which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for
the former kind of cases (whereby the convictions still undergo intermediate review before
ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all).
In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., the Court delved on the nature of a
collegial body, and how the act of a single member, though he may be its head, done without
the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the collegial body itself. There,
the question presented was whether Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, as chairman of the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), could alone act in behalf of and bind the
NTC, given that the NTC had two other commissioners as members. The Court ruled:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of
the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any
incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in
this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote
coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a
majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or
decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He
alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man
body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every
deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the
jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved
into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the
NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars
negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only
one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the
time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of respondent Justices
as members of the Fourth Division. It is of no consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt
motive impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible
judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of collegiality to
the valid conduct of their trial proceedings.
As to the argument of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez against this Courts finding of
unbecoming conduct on their part, the matter has been fully addressed in the Decision of
August 24, 2010.
We hold to be not well taken the urging of Justice Ong that the penalty imposed upon him be
similar to that meted upon Justice Hernandez.
The variance in the responsibilities of respondent Justices as Members of their Division compel
the differentiation of their individual liabilities. Justice Ong, as the Chairperson, was the head
of the Division under the Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, being the most senior Member,
and, as such, he possessed and wielded powers of supervision, direction, and control over the
conduct of the proceedings of the Division. This circumstance alone provided sufficient
justification to treat Justice Ong differently from the other respondents.
Moreover, we have noted in the Decision that in the exercise of his powers as Chairman of the
Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an
unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the complainant, and steered
his Division into the path of procedural irregularity; and wittingly failed to guarantee that
proceedings of the Division that he chaired came within the bounds of substantive and
procedural rules. To be sure, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada did not direct and
control how the proceedings of the Division were to be conducted. Their not being responsible
for the direction and control of the running of the Division and their having relied without
malice on the Justice Ongs direction and control should not be reproved as much as Justice
52
Ongs misconduct. Hence, their responsibility and liability as Members of the Division were
properly diminished.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts Decision Dated 1
September) dated September 15, 2010 of complainant Assistant Special Prosecutor III
Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez; and the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated September
14, 2010 of Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez are
denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.




A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC February 8, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, seek
reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated October 12, 2010 that dismissed their
charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano
Del Castillo in connection with the decision he wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled
Vinuya v. Romulo.
1

Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or approved of the
commission of plagiarism in the Philippines. This claim is absurd. The Court, like everyone
else, condemns plagiarism as the world in general understands and uses the term.
Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common definition. To plagiarize,
says Webster, is "to steal and pass off as ones own" the ideas or words of another. Stealing
implies malicious taking. Blacks Law Dictionary, the worlds leading English law dictionary
quoted by the Court in its decision, defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing
presentation of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as ones own."
2
The
presentation of another persons ideas as ones own must be deliberate or premeditateda
taking with ill intent.
There is no commonly-used dictionary in the world that embraces in the meaning of plagiarism
errors in attribution by mere accident or in good faith.
Certain educational institutions of course assume different norms in its application. For
instance, the Loyola Schools Code of Academic Integrity ordains that "plagiarism is identified
not through intent but through the act itself. The objective act of falsely attributing to ones
self what is not ones work, whether intentional or out of neglect, is sufficient to conclude that
plagiarism has occurred. Students who plead ignorance or appeal to lack of malice are not
excused."
3

But the Courts decision in the present case does not set aside such norm. The decision makes
this clear, thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is based on the
originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis,
which encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their
decisions. The judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The
strength of a decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and
long held legal opinions it draws from.
4

Original scholarship is highly valued in the academe and rightly so. A college thesis, for
instance, should contain dissertations embodying results of original research, substantiating a
specific view.
5
This must be so since the writing is intended to earn for the student an
academic degree, honor, or distinction. He earns no credit nor deserves it who takes the
research of others, copies their dissertations, and proclaims these as his own. There should be
no question that a cheat deserves neither reward nor sympathy.
But the policy adopted by schools of disregarding the element of malicious intent found in
dictionaries is evidently more in the nature of establishing what evidence is sufficient to prove
the commission of such dishonest conduct than in rewriting the meaning of plagiarism. Since it
would be easy enough for a student to plead ignorance or lack of malice even as he has
copied the work of others, certain schools have adopted the policy of treating the mere
presence of such copied work in his paper sufficient objective evidence of plagiarism. Surely,
however, if on its face the students work shows as a whole that he has but committed an
obvious mistake or a clerical error in one of hundreds of citations in his thesis, the school will
not be so unreasonable as to cancel his diploma.
In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an original
piece of work or art. Deciding disputes is a service rendered by the government for the public
good. Judges issue decisions to resolve everyday conflicts involving people of flesh and blood
who ache for speedy justice or juridical beings which have rights and obligations in law that
need to be protected. The interest of society in written decisions is not that they are originally
crafted but that they are fair and correct in the context of the particular disputes involved.
Justice, not originality, form, and style, is the object of every decision of a court of law.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the
Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws involved in
the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are written. But laws include,
under the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial interpretations of such laws as are applied to
specific situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are "to stand by precedent and not to disturb
settled point." Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state
of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties or property are the same."
6

And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite often
entangled in apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting experts in the law
to build up regarding such matters a large body of commentaries or annotations that, in
themselves, often become part of legal writings upon which lawyers and judges draw
materials for their theories or solutions in particular cases. And, because of the need to be
precise and correct, judges and practitioners alike, by practice and tradition, usually lift
passages from such precedents and writings, at times omitting, without malicious intent,
attributions to the originators.
Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International Bar Association puts it
succinctly. When practicing lawyers (which include judges) write about the law, they
effectively place their ideas, their language, and their work in the public domain, to be
affirmed, adopted, criticized, or rejected. Being in the public domain, other lawyers can thus
freely use these without fear of committing some wrong or incurring some liability. Thus:
The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of words is everything. Legal
disputes often centre round the way in which obligations have been expressed in legal
documents and how the facts of the real world fit the meaning of the words in which the
obligation is contained. This, in conjunction with the risk-aversion of lawyers means that
refuge will often be sought in articulations that have been tried and tested. In a sense
therefore the community of lawyers have together contributed to this body of knowledge,
language, and expression which is common property and may be utilized, developed and
bettered by anyone.
7

The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the public domain
is not unique to the Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno cites
in her dissenting opinion, observed in her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of
plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published
in a legal periodical or language from a partys brief are used without giving attribution. Thus
53
judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before
them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide
cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the
purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not
subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.
8

If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from the
time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has not
on occasion acknowledged the originators of passages and views found in its decisions. These
omissions are true for many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned
daily by magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals,
the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first
level courts. Never in the judiciarys more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution
been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.
This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere copycats. They are not. Their
decisions analyze the often conflicting facts of each case and sort out the relevant from the
irrelevant. They identify and formulate the issue or issues that need to be resolved and
evaluate each of the laws, rulings, principles, or authorities that the parties to the case invoke.
The decisions then draw their apt conclusions regarding whether or not such laws, rulings,
principles, or authorities apply to the particular cases before the Court. These efforts, reduced
in writing, are the product of the judges creativity. It is hereactually the substance of their
decisionsthat their genius, originality, and honest labor can be found, of which they should
be proud.
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by the opposing
sides in a way that no one has ever done. He identified and formulated the core of the issues
that the parties raised. And when he had done this, he discussed the state of the law relevant
to their resolution. It was here that he drew materials from various sources, including the
three foreign authors cited in the charges against him. He compared the divergent views these
present as they developed in history. He then explained why the Court must reject some views
in light of the peculiar facts of the case and applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew
from his discussions of the facts and the law the right solution to the dispute in the case. On
the whole, his work was original. He had but done an honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and
elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or
expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the petitioners, like all
lawyers handling cases before courts and administrative tribunals, cannot object to this.
Although as a rule they receive compensation for every pleading or paper they file in court or
for every opinion they render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in
their writings. They should not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long
as they do not depart, as officers of the court, from the objective of assisting the Court in the
administration of justice.
As Duncan Webb said:
In presenting legal argument most lawyers will have recourse to either previous decisions of
the courts, frequently lifting whole sections of a judges words to lend weight to a particular
point either with or without attribution. The words of scholars are also sometimes given
weight, depending on reputation. Some encyclopaedic works are given particular authority. In
England this place is given to Halsburys Laws of England which is widely considered
authoritative. A lawyer can do little better than to frame an argument or claim to fit with the
articulation of the law in Halsburys. While in many cases the very purpose of the citation is to
claim the authority of the author, this is not always the case. Frequently commentary or dicta
of lesser standing will be adopted by legal authors, largely without attribution.
x x x x
The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with skepticism. It is only the
arrogant fool or the truly gifted who will depart entirely from the established template and
reformulate an existing idea in the belief that in doing so they will improve it. While over time
incremental changes occur, the wholesale abandonment of established expression is generally
considered foolhardy.
9

The Court probably should not have entertained at all the charges of plagiarism against Justice
Del Castillo, coming from the losing party. But it is a case of first impression and petitioners,
joined by some faculty members of the University of the Philippines school of law, have
unfairly maligned him with the charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross
neglect for failing to attribute lifted passages from three foreign authors. These charges as
already stated are false, applying the meaning of plagiarism as the world in general knows it.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that he lifted from
their works and used in writing the decision for the Court in the Vinuya case. But, as the Court
said, the evidence as found by its Ethics Committee shows that the attribution to these
authors appeared in the beginning drafts of the decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by a
highly qualified and experienced court-employed researcher, she accidentally deleted the same
at the time she was cleaning up the final draft. The Court believed her since, among other
reasons, she had no motive for omitting the attribution. The foreign authors concerned, like
the dozens of other sources she cited in her research, had high reputations in international
law.1awphi1
Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the controversial passages found in their
works to earlier writings by others. The authors concerned were not themselves the
originators. As it happened, although the ponencia of Justice Del Castillo accidentally deleted
the attribution to them, there remained in the final draft of the decision attributions of the
same passages to the earlier writings from which those authors borrowed their ideas in the
first place. In short, with the remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-up, the passages
as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed on their face that the lifted ideas did
not belong to Justice Del Castillo but to others. He did not pass them off as his own.
With our ruling, the Court need not dwell long on petitioners allegations that Justice Del
Castillo had also committed plagiarism in writing for the Court his decision in another case,
Ang Ladlad v. Commission on Elections.
10
Petitioners are nit-picking. Upon close examination
and as Justice Del Castillo amply demonstrated in his comment to the motion for
reconsideration, he in fact made attributions to passages in such decision that he borrowed
from his sources although they at times suffered in formatting lapses.
Considering its above ruling, the Court sees no point in further passing upon the motion of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for leave to file and admit motion for reconsideration-in-
intervention dated January 5, 2011 and Dr. Peter Payoyos claim of other instances of alleged
plagiarism in the Vinuya decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.



A.C. No. 6258 August 24, 2010
LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
For consideration is the disbarment complaint filed by Luzviminda R. Lustestica (complainant)
against Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe (respondent) for notarizing a falsified or forged Deed of
Donation of real property despite the non-appearance of the donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica
54
(complainants father) and his first wife, Cornelia P. Rivero, both of whom were already dead
at the time of execution of the said document.
In his Answer,
1
the respondent admitted the fact of death of Benvenuto H. Lustestica and
Cornelia P. Rivero, considering their death certificates attached to the complaint. The
respondent claimed, however, that he had no knowledge that the real Benvenuto H. Lustestica
and Cornelia P. Rivero were already dead at the time he notarized the Deed of Donation.
2
He
also claimed that he exerted efforts to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared
before him and represented themselves as the donors under the Deed of Donation.
3

After the submission of the respondents Answer to the complaint, the Court referred the
matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline) for investigation, evaluation and recommendation. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline made the following findings:
The core issue is whether or not Respondent committed a falsehood in violation of his oath as
a lawyer and his duties as Notary Public when he notarized the Deed of Donation purportedly
executed by Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero as the donors and Cecilio R.
Lustestica and Juliana Lustestica as the donees on 5 August 1994.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2013, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, explicitly provides:
x x x The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person
who executed it acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. x x x.
As correctly observed by Complainant, Respondents Acknowledgment is the best evidence
that NO RESIDENCE CERTIFICATES were presented by the alleged donors and the donees.
Had the parties presented their residence certificates to Respondent, it was his duty and
responsibility under the Notarial Law to enter, as part of his certification, the number, place of
issue and date of each residence certificate presented by the parties to the Deed of Donation.
Respondent, however, failed to make the required entries. Respondents claim that the
persons who allegedly appeared before him and represented themselves to be the parties to
the Deed of Donation showed their residence certificates and that he instructed his secretary
to indicate the details of the residence certificates of the parties is self-serving and not
supported by the evidence on record.
x x x x
The fact that Respondent notarized a forged/falsified document is also undisputed not only by
[the] strength of Complainants documentary evidence but more importantly, by Respondents
own judicial admission. x x x. In view of Respondents judicial admission that the alleged
donors, BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA and his first wife, CORNELIA P. RIVERO, died on 7
September 1987 and 24 September 1984, respectively, it is beyond reasonable doubt that said
donors could not have personally appeared before him on 5 August 1994 to [acknowledge] to
him that they freely and voluntary executed the Deed of Donation. Moreover, x x x quasi-
judicial notice of the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court finding accused CECILIO
LUSTESTICA and JULIANA LUSTESTICA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principals
of the crime of falsification of public document.
4

In his Report dated August 15, 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found the
respondent grossly negligent in the performance of his duties as notary public and
recommended that the respondents notarial commission be suspended for a period of one (1)
year. The IBP Commissioner also recommended that a penalty ranging from reprimand to
suspension be imposed against the respondent, with a warning that a similar conduct in the
future will warrant an imposition of a more severe penalty.
5

By Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the Report of the IBP Commissioner. The
pertinent portion of this Resolution reads:
[C]onsidering Respondents gross negligence in the performance of his duties as Notary Public,
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary
Public for two (2) years with a notification that this suspension of one year must be served in
succession to the initial recommendation of the IBP Board of Suspension of one year in CBD
Case No. 04-1371.
6

From these undisputed facts, supervening events occurred that must be taken into
consideration of the present case.
First, CBD Case No. 04-1371, entitled Victorina Bautista, complainant, v. Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe, respondent, which was the case referred to in Resolution No. XVII-2005-116, was
docketed as A.C. No. 6963
7
before the Court. In a decision dated February 9, 2006, the Court
revoked the respondents notarial commission and disqualified him from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two (2) years, for his failure to properly perform his duties as
notary public when he notarized a document in the absence of one of the affiants. In addition,
the Court suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Second, on January 6, 2006, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution
No. XVII-2005-116 before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The respondent moved to
reconsider the IBP Resolution, claiming that the penalty imposed for the infraction committed
was too harsh. The motion was denied in Resolution No. XVII-2006-81, dated January 28,
2006,
8
for lack of jurisdiction of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, since the administrative
matter had then been endorsed to the Court.
Third, on January 4, 2006, a motion for reconsideration (the same as the one filed with the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline) was filed by the respondent before the Court. In a Minute
Resolution dated March 22, 2006, the Court noted the findings and recommendations in
Resolution No. XVII-2005-116 and required the complainant to file her Comment to the
respondents motion for reconsideration. On April 28, 2006, the complainant filed her
Comment praying for the denial of the motion.
On July 5, 2006, the Court issued a Minute Resolution noting the denial of the respondents
motion for reconsideration, by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, and the complainants
Comment to the respondents motion before the Court.
Subsequently, on January 26, 2009, the Court declared the case closed and terminated after
considering that no motion for reconsideration or petition for review, assailing both IBP
resolutions, had been filed by the respondent.
9

On October 8, 2009, the respondent, through a letter addressed to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, requested that he be given clearance to resume the practice of law and to allow
him to be commissioned as a notary public. In his letter, the respondent alleged that he has
already served the penalties imposed against him in A.C. No. 6963 and the present case. He
claimed that after the receipt of the IBP Resolutions in both cases, he did not practice his
profession and had not been appointed or commissioned as a notary public.
The Office of the Bar Confidant
Acting on the respondents letter, the Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a Report and
Recommendation, which states:
1. The EFFECTIVITY of the respondents suspension and disqualification should have
been COMMENCED on the date of receipt of the Decision of the Court and not from
the date of receipt of the Resolution of the IBP recommending the respondents
suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public, it being recommendatory in nature;
2. The prayer of the respondent to resume his practice of law in Adm. Case No.
6963 be denied;
3. The respondent be REQUIRED to submit certification from competent courts and
IBP that he has fully served the entire period of suspension and disqualification in
Adm. Case No. 6963;
4. The Court may now FINALLY RESOLVE the findings and recommendation of the
IBP in its Resolution No. XVII-2005-16, dated October 2005, in Adm. Case No. 6258,
for final disposition of the case and for proper determination whether the order of
55
suspension and disqualification in Adm. Case No. 6963 should be lifted after the
respondent has satisfactorily shown that he has fully served the suspension and
disqualification.
10

The Courts Ruling
The findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline are well-
taken. We cannot overemphasize the important role a notary public performs. In Gonzales v.
Ramos,
11
we stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one
invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity.
12
A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face.
13
It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the
integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
14

The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the respondent in discharging
his duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him and
failed to comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do, i.e., to require the
parties presentation of their residence certificates or any other document to prove their
identities. Given the respondents admission in his pleading that the donors were already dead
when he notarized the Deed of Donation, we have no doubt that he failed in his duty to
ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him as donors in the Deed of
Donation.
Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only as a
notary public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103),
but also Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 (Old Notarial Law)
15
states:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where
the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that
the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if
not, his certificate shall so state.
In turn, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes." At the same time, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this regard, a reading of the respondents Acknowledgment in the Deed of Donation shows
how these provisions were violated by the respondent:
BEFORE ME, Notary Public for and in Bulacan this AUG 05 1994 day of August,
1994, personally appeared:
BENVENUTO H. LUSTESTICA: C.T.C. # _______:________:________
CORNELIA RIVERO : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
CECILIO LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
JULIANA LUSTESTICA : C.T.C. # ________:________:________
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing
instrument and acknowledged to me that the same are their free act and voluntary deed.
16

The respondent engaged in dishonest conduct because he falsely represented in his
Acknowledgment that the persons who appeared before him were "known to him" to be the
same persons who executed the Deed of Donation, despite the fact that he did not know them
and did not ascertain their identities as he attested.
17

Moreover, the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct when he did not observe the
requirements under Section 1 of the Old Notarial Law that requires notaries public to certify
that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented, before the notaries public,
the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter the
residence certificates number, place, and date of issue as part of the certification.
18
The
unfilled spaces in the Acknowledgment where the residence certificate numbers should have
been clearly established that the respondent did not perform this legal duty.
With these considerations, we find that the imposition of administrative sanctions for the
above infractions committed is in order.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the penalty of suspension, for a period of
one (1) year, from the practice of law and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public
for a period of two (2) years. Considering that this is already Atty. Bernabes second infraction,
we find the IBPs recommendation to be very light; it is not commensurate with his
demonstrated predisposition to undertake the duties of a notary public and a lawyer lightly.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting,
19
we disbarred a lawyer for failing to subscribe to the sacred duties
imposed upon a notary public. In imposing the penalty of disbarment, the Court considered
the lawyers prior misconduct where he was suspended for a period of six (6) months and
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
20

In Flores v. Chua,
21
we disbarred the lawyer after finding that he deliberately made false
representations that the vendor appeared before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale.
We took into account that he was previously found administratively liable for violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (for bribing a judge) and sternly warned that a
repetition of similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the future would be dealt with
more severely.
22

In Traya v. Villamor,
23
we found the respondent notary public guilty of gross misconduct in his
notarial practice for failing to observe the proper procedure in determining that the person
appearing before him is the same person who executed the document presented for
notarization. Taking into account that it was his second offense, he was perpetually
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public.
24

In Social Security Commission v. Coral,
25
we suspended indefinitely the notarial commission of
the respondent lawyer who was found to have prepared, notarized and filed two complaints
that were allegedly executed and verified by people who have long been dead. We also
directed him to show cause why he should not be disbarred.
26

Considering these established rulings, read in light of the circumstances in the present case,
we find that Atty. Bernabe should be disbarred from the practice of law and perpetually
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public. We emphasize that this is
respondents second offense and while he does not appear to have any participation in the
falsification of the Deed of Donation, his contribution was his gross negligence for failing to
ascertain the identity of the persons who appeared before him as the donors. This is
highlighted by his admission
27
in his Answer that he did not personally know the parties and
was not acquainted with them. The blank spaces in the Acknowledgment indicate that he did
not even require these parties to produce documents that would prove that they are the same
persons they claim to be. As we emphasized in Maligsa:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar
should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A
lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain
from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.
28

In light of the above findings and penalties, the respondents request to be given clearance to
resume the practice of law and to apply for a notarial commission, after serving the
administrative sanctions in A.C. No. 6963, is now moot and academic. We, accordingly, deny
the request for clearance to practice law and to apply for notarial commission.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) NOTE the letter dated October 8, 2009 of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe to
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
56
(2) ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline with MODIFICATION on the administrative penalty imposed.
(3) DECLARE respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe liable for gross negligence, in the
performance of his duties as notary public, and for his deceitful and dishonest
attestation, in the course of administering the oath taken before him. Respondent
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.
(4) DENY the request for clearance to practice law and to apply for notarial
commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Sergio E. Bernabes record, as a member of the
bar, and copies furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts.
In view of the notarization of a falsified deed whose purported parties were already dead at
the time of notarization, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Prosecutor
General, Department of Justice for whatever action, within its jurisdiction, it may deem
appropriate to bring against Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe.
SO ORDERED.




A.C. No. 9385 November 11, 2013
MARIANO AGADAN, EDEN MOLLEJON, ARSENIO IGME, JOSE NUMBAR, CECILIA
LANGAWAN, PABLO PALMA, JOSELITO CLAVERIA, MIGUEL FLORES, and ALBERT
GAYDOWEN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RICHARD BALTAZAR KILAAN, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On September 12, 2005, complainants Mariano Agadan, Eden Mollejon, Arsenio Igme, Jose
Numbar, Cecilia Langawan, Pablo Palma, Joselito Claveria, Miguel Flores and Albert Gaydowen
filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Baguio Benguet Chapter (IBP-Baguio-
Benguet Chapter) a Complaint
1
against respondent Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan (Atty. Kilaan)
for falsification of documents, dishonesty and deceit. They alleged that Atty. Kilaan
intercalated certain entries in the application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC) to operate public utility jeepney filed before the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board Cordillera Administrative Region (LTFRB-CAR) and docketed as Case No.
2003-CAR-688 by substituting the name of the applicant from Gary Adasing (Adasing)
2
to that
of Joseph Batingwed (Batingwed);
3
that Atty. Kilaan submitted false and/or insufficient
documentary requirements in support of Batingwed s application for CPC; that Atty. Kilaan
prepared a Decision based on the Resolution of the LTFRB Central Office which dismissed the
Opposition filed by the complainants; and that the said Decision granted the application of
Batingwed which was adopted by the LTFRB-CAR.
On February 27, 2006, the IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter formally endorsed the Complaint to
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) for appropriate action.
4
Acting on the Complaint,
the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Kilaan to submit his Answer.
5

In his Answer
6
dated April 8, 2006, Atty. Kilaan denied violating the Lawyer s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He disclaimed any pat1icipation in the preparation of the
Decision with respect to the application of Batingwed for CPC. He explained that it is the
Regional Director of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)-CAR who
approves the application and who drafts the Decision after the LTFRB-CAR signifies its
favorable recommendation. He denied exercising any influence over the DOTC-CAR or the
LTFRB. He claimed that Batingwed had decided to abandon his application hence he no longer
submitted the necessary requirements therefor. He also disavowed any knowledge that
Batingwed s application had been forwarded to the LTFRB Central Office for approval. Atty.
Kilaan claimed that he knew about the favorable Decision only when Batingwed showed him
the same. He narratted that considering the incomplete documents, the LTFRB mistakenly
approved Batingwed s application. Thus, when it discovered its error, the LTFRB immediately
revoked the grant of CPC to Batingwed.
He denied intercalating the entries in the application for CPC of Batingwed. He averred that
once an application has been filed, the application and all accompanying records remain with
the LTFRB and could no longer be retrieved by the applicant or his counsel; as such, it is
highly improbable for him to intercalate the entries therein. Atty. Kilaan further explained that
it was Adasing who paid the filing fee in behalf of Batingwed but the cashier erroneously
indicated Adasing instead of Batingwed as payor. Atty. Kilaan lamented that Adasing who is
not in the Philippines could not corroborate his explanation. Finaliy, Atty. Kilaan noted that
complainants filed the instant suit in retaliation for the dismissal of their Opposition to the
application for CPCs which he filed on behalf of his other clients.
The case was set for mandatory conference
7
after which the parties submitted their respective
Position Papers.
8
In their Position Paper, complainants further alleged that the Verification in
Batingwed's application for CPC was notarized by Atty. Kilaan as Doc. No: 253, Page No. 51,
Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon verification of Atty. Kilaan's Notarial Registry
submitted to the Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court in Baguio City, the said notarial entry
actually refers to a Deed of Sale and not the Verification of Batingwed's application. Also,
complainants belied Atty. Kilaan's allegation that Adasing is 'presently abroad by presenting
the Affidavit of Adasing claiming that he never left the country.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner
9
found complainants to
have miserably failed to prove that Atty. Kilaan intercalated the entries in the application for
CPC of Batingwed. Their allegation was based on mere suspicion devoid of any credible proof,
viz:
At the onset, it is very difficult to prove that it was respondent himself who was responsible for
any intercalation, particularly the substitution of Joseph Batingwed's application folder in lieu
of Gary Odasing's. Indeed, that is a grave charge, and based on the evidence presented by
complainants, all that they can muster is a suspicion that cannot be confirmed. Of course, this
has to be pointed out - anyone who had access to the case folder could have possibly been
responsible for whatever intercalation that may have occurred. That being said, this Office is
not prepared to make that leap into conjecture and conclude that it was respondent's doing.
Besides, the Certification of the Receiving Clerk of the DOTC CAR dated 18 October 2006 -
which notably was submitted by complainants -stated that the application of Gary Odasing
was continued by Joseph Batingwed. Complainants have not alleged that the same constitutes
a violation of the rules and procedures of LTFRB. Thus, it may be presumed to have been
done in the regular course of business.
10

However, the Investigating Commissioner did not totally absolve Atty. Kilaan as he found him
liable for violating the Notarial Law considering that the Verification of Batingwed's application
which he notarized and denominated as Doc. No. 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of
2003 was actually recorded as a Deed of Sale in his Notarial Register. In addition, the
Investigating Commissioner noted that Atty. Kilaan lied under oath when he alleged that
Adasing was abroad as this was squarely belied by Adasing in his Affidavit. The Investigating
Commissioner held thus:
Respondent must be punished for making it appear that he notarized a document the
Verification-when in truth and in fact, the entry in his Notatial Registry shows a different
document. Thus, it is but proper to suspend respondent s privilege of being commissioned as
a Notary Public.
Not only that. Despite knowing that the Verification was not properly notarized, respondent, as
counsel for the applicant, proceeded to file the defectively verified Petition with the LTFRB-
57
Baguio City. Clearly, there was falsehood committed by him, as there can be no other
conclusion except that respondent antedated the Verification.
x x x x
Lastly, this cannot end without this being said. Respondent made matters worse by alleging in
his Answer to the instant administrative complaint that Gary Odasing was abroad -which
seemingly was drawn up more out of convenience than for truth. Now, that allegation had
been completely rebuffed and found to be untrue by the execution of an Affidavit by Gary
Odasing himself. x x x It is therefore an affront to this Office that respondent would attempt to
defend himself by pleading allegations, which were seemingly made deliberately, and which
were later found to be untrue. Clearly, respondent tried, albeit vainly, to deceive even this
Office.
11

The Investigating Commissioner recommended, viz:
WHEREFORE, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that respondent s notarial
commission, if still existing, be REVOKED immediately and that he be further PROHIBITED
from being commissioned as a notary public for TWO (2) YEARS.
Moreover, it is likewise recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of TWO (2) MONTHS.
12

In its September 19, 2007 Resolution No. XVIII-2007-82, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification that Atty. Kilaans Notarial Commission be revoked and that he be disqualified
from being appointed as Notary Public for two years, thereby deleting the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law. Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied
by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XX-2012-41 dated January 15, 2012.
After a careful review of the records, we find that Atty. Kilaan committed the following
infractions: 1) violation of the Notarial Law; 2) violation of the Lawyer s Oath; and 3) violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his Motion for Reconsideration tiled before the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Kilaan passed
on the blame to his secretary for the inaccuracies in the entries in his Notarial Register. He
asserted that being a private practitioner, he is burdened with cases thus he delegated to his
secretary the job of recording the documents which he notarized in his Notarial Register. He
argued that the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification for two years is too
harsh. a penalty considering that he is a first-time offender; he prayed for leniency considering
that his family depended on his income for their collective needs.
It is settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable for the accuracy of the
entries in his Notarial Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondent s explanation that
he is burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of his notarial
acts in his Notarial Register to his secretary. In tact, this argument has already been rebuffed
by this Court in Lingan v. Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga,
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viz:
Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:
SEC. 245. Notarial Register.--Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the
notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall
supply a ce1tified copy of such record, or any part thereof: to any person applying for it and
paying the legal fees therefore. (emphasis supplied)
x x x x x x x x x
SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him, the person executing, swearing to or acknowledging the instrument, the
witnesses, if any to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the
instrument, the fees collected by him for his services as notary in connection therewith, and,
when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a connect copy thereof as part of his records,
and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof and shall
give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year.
The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the
page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left
between entries.
x x x x x x x x x
In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:
SEC. 249. Grounds fix revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the
part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient
ground for the revocation of his commission:
x x x x x x x x x
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notatial acts in the manner required by law.
x x x x x x x x x
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally
accountable for all entries in his notarial register. Respondents cannot be relieved of
responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by passing the buck to their
secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our open condemnation.
Respondents. especially Calubaquib. a self-proclaimed "prominent legal practitioner should
have known better than to give us such a simple-minded excuse.
We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary
act but one invested with substantive public interest such that only those who are qualified or
authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily
requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from inflicting
themselves upon the public the courts and the administrative offices in general.
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Notaries public must therefore
observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements of their duties.
In Gemina v. Atty. Madamba,
14
we have also ruled that
x x x The inaccuracies in his Notarial Register entitles and his failure to enter the documents
that he admittedly notarized constitute dereliction of duty as a notary public. He cannot
escape liability by putting the blame on his secretary. The lawyer himself, not merely his
secretary, should be held accountable for these misdeeds.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are
the acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of
these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal
affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public
instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its
genuineness and due execution.1wphi1 Thus, notarization should not be treated as an
empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary public exercises duties calling for caretl1lness
and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most
importantly, they should not take pmt or allow themselves to be pmt of illegal transactions.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a duly
commissioned notary public to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain
from committing any dereliction or any act which may serve as cause for the revocation of his
commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondent s failure to make the proper entry
or entries in his Notarial Register of his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a
principal at the time of the notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal on the basis of
personal knowledge by competent evidence are grounds for the revocation of a lawyer s
commission as a notary public.
Indeed, Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary public
to keep and maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his every notarial act. His
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failure to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts is
a ground for revocation of his notarial commission.
15
As mentioned, respondent failed to make
the proper entries in his Notarial Register; as such, his notarial commission may be properly
revoked.
Aside from violating the Notarial Law, respondent also violated his Lawyers Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility by committing falsehood in the pleadings he submitted before
the IBP. His claim that Adasing was abroad hence could not corroborate the explanation made
by Batingwed was proved to be untruthful when complainants submitted the Affidavit of
Adasing insisting that he never left the country. Canon 10,
Rule 10.0 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides that a lawyer shall not
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice. In the same vein, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 mandates that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent
failed to observe these Rules and hence must be sanctioned.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Kilaan s suspension from the practice of law for three
(3) months and the revocation and disqualification of his notarial commission for a period of
one (1) year appropriate.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, if still existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a
period of one (1) year. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months
effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt
with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Resolution to
enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of
the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.