1

2
Acknowledgements
I wish, first of all, to acknowledge my debt to Alhaji Junaidu, the Waziri
of Sokoto. Fifteen years ago, when 1 was the Resident of Sokoto Province,
he sed to accom!any me on tor and so I have had the good fortne to
visit with him almost every corner of the Sltanate which once constitted
the core of the Flani "m!ire. It was then that 1 first began to collect
historical information and in this task he gave me invalable hel!. #nyone
who has ever sat down in #frica and tried to com!ile a coherent and
accrate narrative ot of the dis$ointed and discrsive reminiscences of
the old gentlemen who act as the re!ositories of local lore and legend will
know that the well, at the bottom of which the trth is said to lie, can be
many fathoms dee!. %ime and again in or sessions #lha$i &naid, with a
timely word, was able to banish error, resolve contradictions, or fill ga!s
from his own com!endios historical and genealogical knowledge. 'ore
recently he has been good enogh to go throgh the whole book in
manscri!t in order to correct mistakes and clear ! !oints that were still
in dobt.
(e)t I wish to record my a!!reciation of the ! that I have received from
'r. Mervyn Hiskett, who was once my colleage in (orthern (igeria and
who is now on the academic staff of the School of *riental and #frican
Stdies. +e is the leading ,ritish athority on the #rabic manscri!ts of
the Flani and the footnotes in this book will testify how fre-ently I have
drawn !on his wide learning. +e too has been good enogh to read the
manscri!t of most of the first half of the book and his many constrctive
sggestions have hel!ed me to remove blemishes and im!rove the
general balance and !ers!ective.
#mong others who have assisted me, directly or indirectly, I wish to
mention !articlarly the Emir of Yauri, the oral historians of the
Kebbi ruling family, the a!iri of Kano, Mallam "agwamatse,
Mallam Muhammadu #ida, 'r. $% J% Moore, and 'r. &hili' Mason.
%rning now from the te)t to the illstrations, I am obliged to .r. J% (%
(hartres for !ermission to re!rodce here !hotogra!h (o. II, dating from
1/01, which was taken by his father, the late 2t.34ol. ". #. 4hartres,
F.R.4.S.I. For the rest of the !hotogra!hs, a!art 1/56 from (os. I 7a8, 1
7a8, and 1 7b8 which I took myself, I am indebted to the (orthern (igerian
'inistry of Information.
%o all those whom I have mentioned, as well as to others whom I have no
s!ace to name, I am most sincerely gratefl.
H% A% $% J.
3
(ha'ter )ne
Hausaland and the Hausas
%he seat of the "m!ire which the Flani created in the nineteenth centry
was +asaland. %o nderstand their achievement it is therefore first
necessary to srvey the geogra!hy of that contry and to review briefly
the origins and history of its inhabitants.
+asaland forms !art of the belt of savannah which stretches right across
#frica from the #tlantic to the Red Sea. %his belt is sandwiched between
the desert in the north and the e-atorial forests in the soth. ,y the
#rabs it was called the ,eled es3Sdan, the land of the blacks, and the
Sdan is the generic name by which it is still known. Within it, +asaland
occ!ies the greater !art of the sector between 2ake 4had in the cast and
the 'iddle (iger in the west.
+asaland is ths !art of a !lain that stretches away for fifteen hndred
miles to the west and two thosand to the east. It contains no montains
and !ossesses no natral frontiers. "ssentially it is a gently ndlating
landsca!e with fertile valleys, !o!los and cltivated, lying between
watersheds and !latea) that are often barren or waterless and therefore
em!ty and clothed in bsh. With minor variations this theme re!eats itself
over hndreds of miles and only occasionally does a chain of reddish hills,
a wide shallow river, or a town of flat3roofed hoses a!!ear to give variety
to the scene.
4limatically the year falls into two distinct !arts, %he rainy season starts in
'ay or &ne and lasts ntil Se!tember or *ctober. For the rest of the
year, a!art from a little irrigated farming, there is not mch to be done on
the land. %he long dry season from (ovember to 'ay has therefore always
been a time of o!!ortnity when the !eo!le have been free to trn their
hands to other !rsits3to their crafts, to trade, to learning, and of corse
to war.
%he geogra!hical !osition of +asaland has also !roved to be historically
significant. %here, at the base of the Sahara, it became the meeting !lace
of two distinct ethnic and lingistic strains, the indigenos Sdanic strain
and the +amitic strain 1 from (orth #frica which, from time to time,
flowed across the desert and mingled with it.
%o nderstand the origins of the +asa !eo!le it is first necessary to
review the history of (orth #frica. In the latter !art of the Roman era the
'editerranean littoral was !o!los and civilized. Its !eace and !ros!erity
de!ended !on two conditions, the athority of Rome and the fact that its
long sothern frontier was !rotected by the desert. "arly in the first
millennim, however, this secrity was ndermined by the introdction of
the camel into the Sahara and the a!!earance soon afterwards of
!redatory, camel3riding nomads. For a time thereafter the legions were
still strong enogh to kee! the nomads at bay, bt as the !ower of Rome
waned, nity and order began to give way to fragmentation and chaos. In
the si)th centry, it is tre, the contry was recon-ered for the "astern
"m!erors, bt revolts soon followed and in any case the athority of
4
,yzantim never matched the de!arted strength of Rome. ,y the seventh
centry, therefore, the half3Roman cities of the littoral and the !etty
,erber !rinci!alities of the interior were en$oying a !recarios freedom
that made them vlnerable to recon-est 9.
It was not long before new con-erors a!!eared. In the middle of the
seventh centry the #rabs, fired by the new faith of Islam, began their
westward march from "gy!t and, in the s!ace of a generation, overran
the whole of (orth #frica. %he indigenos !eo!le were nable to withstand
the onslaght and had to sbmit. ,t at this !eriod the #rabs were not
sfficiently nmeros to do more than im!ose themselves as a rling
aristocracy. %hey settled in the towns, bt made no attem!t to colonize
the contryside where the ,erbers remained !re!onderant 1.
For the ne)t for centries the two !eo!les ran neasily in this doble
harness. %he #rabs recrited ,erbers into their service and with their hel!
con-ered S!ain and threatened France. %hey also Pt !ressre on them
to ado!t the 'oslem religion and the #rabic tonge. ,y degrees they
scceeded in these ob$ectives, bt their sb$ects resented being treated
as inferiors and so the !rocess of assimilation was e)tremely slow.
#ccording to Ibn :haldn, the ,erbers fell into a!ostasy no fewer than
twelve times ; and certainly they were constantly in revolt against #rab
domination <.
"ven thogh the ,erbers were not at this stage de!rived of their land, it is
!robable that their inferior stats, the !enalties sffered by those of them
who did not ado!t Islam, and the constant trmoil of wars and rebellions
indced some of them to emigrate to the soth and west. Sch a
movement was !erfectly feasible, for by this time the !rinci!al caravan
rotes of the Sahara had already been established and were largely nder
the control of the %aregs who were themselves a ,erber tribe 5.
In the middle of the eleventh centry, for centries after the #rabs had
first a!!eared in (orth #frica, there came the second #rab invasion. %his
time it was not $st an army bt two whole ,edoin tribes that were
involved. %he im!act was therefore com!letely different becase the
invaders were in search of land, !articlarly land for !astre, and not $st
con-est or domination. %he first of the two tribes settled for a time in
2ibya, bt the second, the ,eni +ilal, overran what is now %nisia and
thence s!read westward ntil in de corse they reached the #tlantic 6.
%he ,edoin of the +ilalian invasion had little in common with the #rabs of
the original con-est. %hey did not settle in the cities bt took !ossession
of the contryside in a way that their !redecessors had never done.
'oreover, being !astoral nomads, they had no interest in settled
agricltre and so they either destroyed the irrigation systems
that had been !reserved from Roman times or else allowed them to fall
into disse =. %he ,erbers, for their !art, did not sbmit tamely to being
driven from their homes and their land, and the strggle between the two
!eo!les cased frther devastation. Indeed, according to Ibn :haldn, it
gradally redced the contry3side to tter rin with the debris of
monments and bildings bearing witness to the !laces where towns and
5
villages had once stood /.
%he !heavals that accom!anied this invasion cased ma$or changes in
the distribtion of !o!lation in the 'aghreb. %hose ,erbers who were not
killed or enslaved were forced to withdraw from the fertile !lains and
either to fall back on the montains, where the ma$ority of their
descendants are still to be fond, or else to retreat sothwards towards
the desert 10. %his !oint is !roved beyond dobt by the fact that their
langage, which yielded everywhere else to #rabic, has srvived in
corners of the #tlas 'ontains and in oases like %at and >hadames 11.
%hose who fell back on the montains were hemmed in by the #rabs and
had to defend and maintain themselves as best they cold ntil at length
they were more or less assimilated. ,t, for those who had retreated to
the confines of the desert, the Saharan caravan rotes !rovided an otlet.
#s the !ressre of the #rabs on them, and of their !o!lation on the land,
grew greater, so more and more of them mst have been tem!ted to take
this means of esca!e.
#bot +asaland, on the other side of the Sahara, we do not know very
mch. %he tribes inhabiting it at this !eriod !robably belonged to the
Sdanic or 4hadic gro!s and recent discoveries sggest that they were
not nearly as !rimitive as was at one time believed. %hey had been
smelting and working iron, for instance, for at least five hndred years
and !erha!s more 19. ,y the eleventh centry they seem to have been
living in settled commnities and the fact that some of these were
governed by -eens 11 and !robably observed matriarchy, a cstom more
common among ,erbers than Sdanic (egroes, sggests that they had
already been inflenced by !revios waves of ,erber immigration.
%here is no dobt that at some !eriod a considerable nmber of ,erbers
crossed the Sahara, settled among these !eo!le, and intermarried with
them. We do not know e)actly how and when this movement took !lace?
nevertheless, thogh the evidence is scanty, there are certain inferences
to be drawn from it. First, for !hysical reasons, the migrations cold
hardly have occrred before the camel had a!!eared in sfficient nmbers
to o!en ! the caravan rotes of the desert. Secondly, if they had taken
!lace later than the fifteenth centry the migrants wold have been
'oslems,1; which they seem not to have been, and the events wold
srely have been recorded in the historical docments that were then
beginning to be com!iled in the Sdan instead of only srviving as a myth
in the folk memory. %hirdly, the migrants seem to have consisted not of
tribes or clans, which !reserved their racial characteristics and were
strong enogh to fight for the land or !astre that they needed, bt of
small gro!s, mainly of men, who were glad to marry local women and
settle down !eaceably. %his sggests that they were refgees who had
lost not only their homes bt very often their families as well.
%his evidence indicates that the migrations cannot have occrred mch
earlier than #... <00 nor later than #... 1<00 and increases the
!robability of their having been cased, or at any rate greatly stimlated,
by the !heavals that accom!anied the two #rab invasions of (orth #frica
6
and by the long !eriod of nrest and s!oradic warfare that came between
them. If this theory is correct it means that most of the movement took
!lace between #... 5<0 and 1100. It is conceivable that it was s!read
more or less evenly over the whole of this !eriod, bt if that had in fact
been the case its im!act at any one time wold have been negligible and
it wold have been most nlikely to have given rise to any historical
legend. From the fact that there is sch a legend, and a very strong one
at that, it can be arged that there mst have been a !oint of time when
the momentm of the migrations reached a !eak and that the im!ression
it made was great enogh to !rodce the legend. From a (orth #frican
stand!oint we shold e)!ect that !oint of time to coincide with the +ilalian
invasion of the eleventh centry which did more than any other single
event to disr!t the life and economy of the 'aghreb. %his date, as we
shall see, dovetails neatly into the !robable date of the +asa legend.
Indirect thogh all this evidence is, there seems to be a strong !robability
that the crcial !eriod of ethnic alchemy which was to !rodce the +asa
!eo!le and the +asa langage came between #... 10<0 and 1100.
%he legend that the +asas cherish abot their origins cold well be a
sim!lified myth based on sch a chain of events. It tells how #byazid,
1< a !rince of ,aghdad, made his way to .ara, slew the monstros
snake that lived in the well and terrorized the towns!eo!le, and was
rewarded by being made the consort of the @een. %heir children and
grandchildren sbse-ently became the fonders *f the seven +asa
states. It seems !robable that this legend crystallized the folk memory of
the nion between the ,erber migrants and the indigenos !eo!les of
+asaland who were !erha!s already !artly ,erber in blood and cstom.
It also sggests that the newcomers broght a higher civilization with
them and that the nion came abot !eaceflly throgh intermarriage and
assimilation.
+ow long the !rocess of fsion took we do not e)actly know, bt if, as
seems likely, there was early intermarriage and no fighting, it is
reasonable to s!!ose that it was com!leted more -ickly than the
contem!orary fsion of (orman and Sa)on in "ngland. *ne of the first
!rodcts of the nion was !robably the +asa langage3which certainly
goes back to this !eriod and which is now classified as belonging to the
4hado3+amitic 15 or 4hadic 16 gro!. %hogh basically sim!le, it is
nevertheless a fle)ible medim, with a sr!risingly rich vocablary, and
with Swahili it is now one of the two most im!ortant langages of black
#frica.
While the langage was evolving, the +asa city3states began to emerge
as se!arate !owers. %he original seven, which are known as +asa
,akwai, were .ara, :ano, :ano, :atsina, Aazza, >obir, and >arn
>abas 1=. %ogether they cover an area which is abot two hndred miles
s-are and, thogh +asaland has sbse-ently widened its frontiers, this
region still forms its core.
#t a later stage the +asas e)tended their inflence over neighboring
!eo!les who in some cases ado!ted their s!eech and in others merely
7
s!oke +asa as a second langage and followed a similar way of life. %his
gro!, known as the ,anza ,akwai, which can be loosely translated as the
,ogs Seven, is a heterogeneos one and com!rises some !eo!les who
are now indistingishable from the original +asas and others who have
little in common with them. In this secondary gro! the States of Aamfara
and :ebbi and to a lesser e)tent Bari, became most closely identified
with and assimilated to the +asas.
For or knowledge of early history in +asaland we rely !artly on the lists
of 4hiefs that have been !reserved in most of the States, !artly on oral
myths and traditions which have been handed down from one generation
to another, and !artly on the chronicles in which those myths and
traditions have, at some indeterminate time in the !ast, been recorded.
In the seven athentic +asa States, with the notable e)ce!tion of >obir,
the lists of 4hiefs begin with the a!!ro!riate son or grandson of #byazid
and are thereby linked to the .ara 2egend. %hey sometimes give the
nmber of years that each 4hief reigned and ths make it !ossible to
calclate the dates when the dynasties were fonded. 4om!arisons
between these lists natrally reveal serios discre!ancies, !articlarly in
the !eriod before the year 1<00. %he :ano chronology, for e)am!le, gives
#... /// as the year when ,agada, the grandson of #byazid, became
4hief 1/, whereas in :atsina the date assigned to his brother :mayo falls
a hndred years later 90. %his is not altogether sr!rising, however, and
what is !erha!s more significant is that there is a measre of conformity
to a common !attern. In :ano the nmber of 4hiefs in the +asa era is
given as ;1, 91 in :atsina as 1=, 99 in Aazza as 50, 91 in .ara as ;=,
9; and in :ano as ;0 9<. #mong the ,anza ,akwai, Aamfara is said to
have had ;9 +asa 4hiefs 95 and Bari, which was !robably a yonger
fondation, 9/ 96
*f the early written records, mch the fllest and most im!ortant is %he
:ano 4hronicle 9=. It is written in #rabic and !r!orts to give the history
of :ano from the tenth centry right down to the early twentieth centry.
#lthogh several co!ies of it have come to light, the archety!e has never
been traced and is !robably no longer in e)istence 9/. For this reason it is
difficlt to estimate when the 4hronicle was first com!iled, bt internal
evidence sggests that the date !robably falls in the eighteenth centry
10. From then on the 4hronicle was no dobt a more or less contem!orary
record which was !robably broght ! to date each time a 4hief died, if
not more often. So far as the !receding !eriod is concerned, however,
thogh the 4hronicle may well have embodied earlier written fragments, it
mst be regarded in the main sim!ly as the first re!ository of :anoCs oral
traditions. 'oreover, even if earlier fragments were in fact embodied, they
are nlikely to have been written before the end of the fifteenth centry
when "l3'aghili, a divine and $rist whom we shall soon meet again,
visited +asaland and fonded the tradition of #rabic letters 11. It can
therefore be asserted with some assrance that before the year 1;6< %he
:ano 4hronicle had to de!end entirely on memorized traditions, that
between 1;6< and its com!ilation in the eighteenth centry it !robably
8
relied !artly on memorized traditions and !artly on e)isting written
fragments, and that only after the nknown date of its com!ilation did it
become a contem!orary written record. %hese considerations, while
obliging s to a!!roach the older history with great cation, do not mean
that the early !assages need be dismissed as worthless. *n the contrary,
there is inde!endent evidence to show that the +asas are ca!able of
memorizing and transmitting historical facts with a very fair degree of
accracy over several hndred years 19.
2ike many other ancient records, %he :ano 4hronicle is often lacking in
continity and historical !ers!ective, so that on some occasions the
narratives that it begins are left nfinished, while on others ma$or events
are !assed over in silence bt trivial e!isodes are set down in nnecessary
detail. (evertheless, for all its falts, it does give s a general !ictre of
how the civilization of +asaland develo!ed. We see, for e)am!le, how
:ano grew from a settlement to a town, from a town to a city, and from a
city to a city3state. We are shown the ste!s by which neighboring towns
like >aya and :araye, which were !erha!s e-ally ancient bt ha!!ened
to be less !o!los, were drawn into :anoCs orbit. We watch the stages by
which the contryside was !o!lated, first by the volntary movement of
free men from the city to newly fonded towns and villages and later by
the !lantation of slaves and de!endents in rral settlements. We learn of
an e)ods of !agans in the forteenth centry and we detect in it the
tensions that !receded the establishment of Islam. Finally, when :ano has
already otstri!!ed all its rivals, we see smaller city3states like Rano and
:d being gradally swallowed and digested.
,y reading between the lines we are also able to learn from the chronicles
the natre of the society which develo!ed in +asaland. %he States were
rled by 4hiefs from the earliest times bt these 4hiefs, thogh they
wielded the !owers of life and death, were far from being nfettered
atocrats. *n the contrary, they stood at the a!e) of an elaborate
breacracy of titled officials and of a se!arate hierarchy of territorial
magnates whose !osition had mch in common with that of the
fedatories of medieval "ro!e in that they were bond, when called !on
to do so, to render military service with a sti!lated nmber of armed
followers at their backs 11. So long as a 4hief retained control of this
!olitical and military machine he wielded great !ower. If once he lost the
confidence of the cortiers and grandees, however, he cold easily be
de!osed and many 4hiefs in fact sffered this fate 1;.
With each State dis!osing of its own fedal army, and with a cam!aigning
season of seven months in every year, wars were, of corse, fre-ent.
%he fighting was sally confined to the fedal armies and !robably
affected the life of the common !eo!le no more than did the wars of
medieval "ro!e. %he !rizes for the victors were booty and !risoners who
cold either be ransomed or enslavedD 4onversely, the !enalties for the
van-ished were the loss of their lives, liberties, and !ossessions. #s a
!rotection against the hazards of war, towns and villages took to fortifying
themselves, the towns with massive walls bilt of sn3baked clay and the
9
villages with wooden stockades.
#lthogh there was no coinage, cowry shells were introdced in the early
eighteenth centry and thereafter served as crrency 1<. %a)ation was
also levied from a very early date. In :ano, for e)am!le, a land3ta) was
im!osed as far back as the thirteenth centry and a cattle3ta) from abot
the year 15;0 onwards 15.
,y the forteenth centry the !attern of the ftre had already begn to
emerge. %hen, as now, the States of :ano and :atsina formed the core of
+asaland, the one famos for its trade and the other for its learning. %o
the north, occ!ying the semi3desert contry that is now called #ir, was
>obir, noted for its warriors. %o the soth was Aazza, the main s!!lier
of slaves. %o the west was Aamfara, originally one of the ,anza ,akwai
bt now well within the !ale of +asaland. %hese were the five leading
States. In the second rank came .ara, Bari, and Rano, the last already
overshadowed by :ano and abot to be absorbed. *f the original seven,
only >arn >abas had failed to grow at all and had remained an obscre
village. %he tally of the ftre was not -ite com!lete, however, for in the
west :ebbi was still only a !rovince and had not yet been forged into a
kingdom, while in the north3west the area which was later to become
>obir was also waiting for an aristocracy and a !aramont chief.
%he forteenth and fifteenth centries were !eriods of s!ecial im!ortance
in the history of +asaland becase, thanks to the o!ening of new
commnications with the otside world, religion, learning, and commerce
received a new im!ets. %he rling classes of ,oron in the east and 'ali in
the west had been converted to Islam generations before and the fact that
the +asa States remained !agan for so mch longer shows how far
removed they still were from #rab inflences. %he first mention of Islam in
%he :ano 4hronicle occrs in the region of Ba$i 7#... 11;/3=<8 when
Wangarawa or 'andingoes were said to have introdced the new faith
from 'ali and !ersaded the 4hief to ado!t it 16. It is dobtfl, however,
whether he was a very firm convert, for neither he nor his brother who
scceeded him took 'oslem names and later his son :ana$e$i 7#... 11/03
1;108 reverted to !aganism 1=. It was, therefore, only with the accession
of the forteenth 4hief, Emar 7#... 1;103918, that Islam can be said to
have been firmly established 1/.
#mong the other States of +asaland, :atsina was converted at abot the
same time as :ano and there the first 'oslem 4hief is identified as
'hammad :ora who reigned from abot 11=0 to 1;10 ;0. Aazza,
however, seems to have remained !agan mch longer, for no 'oslem
name a!!ears in the list of 4hiefs ntil the early si)teenth centry when
the eighteenth 4hief, #b, who in any case was !robably installed by the
invading Songhai army, scceeded to the throne ;1. For Aamfara we have
no date, bt the first 4hief to bear a 'oslem name was the twenty3forth,
#liy ;9, and it is therefore !ossible, indeed likely, that this was a forcible
conversion dictated by Songhai. So too, !robably, was the conversion of
>obir whose thirtieth 4hief, 'hammad, seems to have been the first to
embrace Islam ;1. Bari, on the other hand, which esca!ed the Songhai
10
invasion, remained !agan ntil the accession of the eleventh 4hief,
>imba, in 1<6= ;;.
It is clear from the !ages of %he :ano 4hronicle that for several
generations a strggle went on between the new religion and the old
!agan beliefs. %he final consolidation of Islam, directly in :ano and
:atsina and indirectly in the other States, was the work of the (orth
#frican divine and $rist, "l3'aghili, who came to +asaland towards the
end of the fifteenth centry. +is visit ha!!ened to coincide with the reign
of 'hammad Rmfa who was the greatest and most enlightened of all
the +asa 4hiefs of :ano. "l3'aghili evidently fond him an a!t !!il and
wrote for him a treatise on the res!onsibilities of rlers ;<. %he contrast
between the brtality and callosness which characterize the early oral
literatre of the +asas and the high3minded !rinci!les laid down by "l3
'aghili show how im!ortant a !art Islam !layed in advancing the
civilization of +asaland.
It was no coincidence that a great e)!ansion of trade occrred dring the
same !eriod as the establishment of Islam. ,oth can be attribted to a
series of im!rovements in commnications which took !lace at this time
and which had the effect of converting +asaland from a backwater to a
centre of commerce and indstry. %he first of these develo!ments came in
the forteenth centry, when a new caravan rote linking :ano with >hat,
in the northern Sahara, was o!ened, with the reslt that trade with (orth
#frica cold flow direct instead of having to go rond by 2ake 4had or the
(iger ,end ;5. %he second develo!ment, which took !lace relatively soon
afterwards, was that the .arb el3#rbaCin, the old caravan rote that had
linked "gy!t to the gold3bearing areas of #shanti by way of the lower (ile,
4had, and +asaIand, was reo!ened after having been closed for the
!revios three centries by the hostility of the 4hristian kingdom of (bia
;6. %he third was that with the decay of the northern rote between "gy!t
and the (iger 7initially becase of the de!redations of the Syrte #rabs and
later !erha!s becase of the chaos which followed the colla!se of the
Songhai "m!ire8 the sothern rote throgh +asaland became the main
artery between east and west ;=. %hese changes mst have had the effect
of transforming :ano from a !lace of !rely local significance first into a
ma$or entre!Ft of the trans3Saharan commerce and then into one of the
!rinci!al meeting !laces for north3soth and east3west trade. %hey
thereby set the city on the road to becoming the greatest commercial and
indstrial centre of the Sdan and laid the fondations for the sbse-ent
growth in the !ros!erity and im!ortance of the whole of +asaland.
#s the +asas are a virile !eo!le, it is sr!rising to find that they were
almost always nder the domination of some other !ower. %he case of
this !arado) seems to have been that, as the leading States were of
roghly e-al size and strength, none of them ever scceeded in
establishing its !redominance over the others. #nother reason is !erha!s
to be fond in the natre of the !eo!le who, thogh !hysically togh, are
generally good3natred and easy3going. %hey can fight if they mst bt
they are not ambitios for !ower and their interests lie mch more in
11
trade than war.
*f the five ma$or em!ires of the Sdan, >hana and 'ali lay too far to the
west for their athority ever to have reached +asaland. #t one time or
another, however, the other three G Songhai, :anem3,orn, and Sokoto
G all foght for and en$oyed the szerainty of the +asa States. %he first
of the three to im!ose its athority was :anem3,orn and the date was
almost certainly the first half of the fifteenth centry ;/. #s the +asa
States were becoming !o!los and wealthy, however, they made a rich
!rize which ,orn was not for long allowed to en$oy in !eace.
%he first challenge came from Songhai in the early si)teenth centry. In
the western Sdan, as the athority of 'ali had declined, so the !ower of
Songhai had grown ntil at length the new em!ire had com!letely
swallowed ! the old. With its ca!ital at >ao, on the middle (iger,
SonghaiCs centre of gravity lay mch farther to the east than that of 'ali.
It was not sr!rising, therefore, that sooner or later the eyes of its rlers
shold have trned towards the +asa States on their eastern borders.
In the year 1<11 #skia 'hammad, having consolidated his !ossessions in
the west, marched into +asaland at the head of a !owerfl army. %hanks
to the famos traveller, 2eo #fricans, who visited +asaland very soon
afterwards, we have an inde!endent accont of this invasion and its
se-el. #ccording to him the +asa States resisted, bt failed to combine
and were destroyed one by one. %he 4hiefs of >obir, :atsina, and Aazza
were killed in the fighting. %he 4hief of :ano was ca!tred when the city
fell, bt was restored to his throne on condition that he !aid a third of his
revene to Songhai as tribte. %he other States also became tribtaries
and before his de!artre #skia installed Residents in each of them who
Hmightily o!!ressed and im!overished the !eo!le that were before richI
<0. ,orn, the nominal szerain, seems to have done nothing to defend
its vassals, bt this is not altogether sr!rising becase, as we shall see
later it was !reocc!ied at the time with trobles of its own.
In his descri!tion of +asaland 2eo mentioned the abndance of corn,
rice, and cotton, the large herds of cattle, the wide range of crafts, the
wealth of the merchants the thriving commerce with other nations, and
the civility of the !eo!le <1. If he is to be believed, it is clear that the
+asas of the early si)teenth centry had already achieved a high
measre of civilization.
#!art from the shadowy #mina, a daghter of the 4hief of Aazza to
whom all kinds of legendary achievements are attribted <9, the only
+asa in history to dis!lay im!erial ambitions was 'hammad :anta
who began his career as one of #skiaCs lietenants. +is !aternal forbears
are said to have come from the east and to have settled in :atsina a few
generations earlier. +is father held the title of 'aga$i and seems to have
been a Jillage +ead. +is mother was a :atsina woman, some say the
daghter of the 4hief of the day. :anta himself was a trblent yoth and
when his father died he was !assed over and his brother was a!!ointed to
the family title and office. 'ortified by this slight, :anta went ot into the
world to seek his fortne. +e collected rond him a following of kindred
12
s!irits and with them he seems to have fonded a commnity of his own
in the 2ower Rima Jalley, which at that time was a marcher !rovince on
the western fringe of +asaland <1. When #skiaCs army a!!eared he
threw in his lot with the invaders. It is safe to assme that he took an
active !art in the sb$gation of the +asa States and that his !rowess
won him recognition. #t any rate he seems to have been a!!ointed
governor of his ado!ted !rovince <;.
%wo years after con-ering +asaland, #skia led his army against the
desert centre of #sben which he anne)ed after defeating and e)!elling its
%areg inhabitants. :anta was dissatisfied with the share of the booty
assigned to him and therefore threw off his allegiance and !roclaimed
himself 4hief of :ebbi <<. It was an act of e)traordinary daring as Songhai
was now at the height of its !ower and controlled almost the whole Sdan
between the #tlantic and 2ake 4had. #skiaCs res!onse to :antaCs revolt
was to send an e)!edition against him, bt :anta met and defeated it <5.
.ring the ne)t thirty years :anta not only resisted all the attem!ts that
first Songhai and then ,orn made to s!!ress him bt went on to carve
ot for himself, at their e)!ense, a not inconsiderable em!ire. #t its height
it stretched from the Sahara to the (iger <6, bt it was a !ersonal
creation and disintegrated very soon after his death. (evertheless, :ebbi
srvived as one of the leading States of +asaland and the tribtary
!rovinces of #rewa and Aaberma remained loyal.
#s the !ower of :ebbi began to decline in the second half of the si)teenth
centry, so that of :wararafa increased. %he sdden rise and almost
e-ally sdden fall of the riverain kingdoms of the &kns are among the
strangest featres of the history of the Sdan. For a hndred years, from
abot 1500 to 1600, they were s!reme on the 'iddle and 2ower ,ene
and dominated all their northern neighbors. .ring this !eriod their
armies ca!tred the city of :ano, came very near to taking :atsina, and
even threatened ,oron <=. ,t by the beginning of the eighteenth centry
they were a s!ent force.
It was only after the decline of the &kn !ower that ,oron was able to
reassert its szerainty over +asaland. In 161; the 'ai, or Sltan,
marched westward with a large army and a!!arently scceeded in
overawing his former vassals withot the necessity of fighting. :ano and
Aazza certainly agreed to resme the !ayment of tribte and we know
that in Aazza a Resident was left behind to collect and transmit it </. (o
dobt the same !ractice was ado!ted in the other States as well.
#bot two generations earlier, an event had taken !lace in the north
which was to have im!ortant re!ercssions all over +asaland. %his was
the e)!lsion of the >obirawa from #ir 50. #s has already been
mentioned, the +asas consider >obir as being one of the original States
and as having a common ancestry with themselves whereas the >obirawa,
or at any rate their rling classes, re!diate both the .ara legend and
the idea of a common ancestor. #lmost certainly the e)!lanation of this
a!!arent !arado) is that the origins of the rling classes and the common
!eo!le are altogether different 51. #t this time the common !eo!le were
13
!robably ordinary +asas who lived in a marcher !rovince and who, like
the :ebbawa before the rise of :anta, ha!!ened to have no !aramont
chief of their own. %he rling classes, on the other hand, were !robably
migrants from the cast who arrived in +asaland mch later than the
,erbers. %hey themselves claim to have come from #rabia by way of
,ilma and to have settled in #Kr 59, bt Sltan ,ello was told that they
were descendants of the 4o!ts and had come to #ir from "gy!t 51. ,e
that as it may, in #Kr they were living in the territory of the %aregs and
when at length they -arrelled with their hosts they were driven ot. %hey
there!on moved soth to the region which lies $st north of the bend of
the Rima River and there they were a!!arently acce!ted by the
inhabitants as a rling aristocracy. %hey were ths assimilated into
+asaland and their leader, whatever his !revios stats, became 4hief of
>obir.
%he >obirawa soon !roved themselves to be trblent neighbors. For
generations they had been accstomed to the lawlessness of the desert
and even if they had wanted to take ! a sedentary life, which was
dobtfl, the rainfall of their new home was hardly sfficient to s!!ort
them. Internecine warfare was not new to the +asas and indeed the
!ages of %he :ano 4hronicle are fll of acconts of it.
,t the >obirawa seem to have broght a new aggressiveness to the
fighting and in the !eriod which ela!sed between their migration and the
middle of the eighteenth centry they were sccessively engaged against
:ebbi, Aaberma, >rma, #Kr, :atsina, and finally :ano. %heir armies
ranged far afield from the borders of ,orn to the great bend of the (iger.
In these battles they were generally victorios and no dobt ca!tred
many slaves and mch booty. ,t the wars were in no way decisive and
when they were over life went on mch as before 5;.
#bot the middle of the eighteenth centry, however, >obir, nder its
4hief, ,abari, embarked on a war which was to take a very different trn.
Aamfara, which straddled the fertile !!er basins of the Rima, Sokoto,
and Aamfara Rivers, was a rich !rize which the >obirawa had !robably
been eyeing for some time. #t all events they went to war with Aamfara.
and this time they did not content themselves, as they had in the !ast,
with slaves and booty. In abot 16<< or 1650 they broght the strggle to
a sccessfl end by sacking the ca!ital, ,irnin Aamfara. #fter that they
!roceeded to occ!y the whole of northern Aamfara and to bild
themselves a new ca!ital at #lkalawa which was more or less in the centre
of their greatly enlarged territory 5<.
#fter its defeat, Aamfara ceased to be a coherent entity. In the
nocc!ied !arts of the contry, it is tre, individal towns !reserved
some measre of inde!endence, those in the cast leaning on :atsina,
which was now hostile to >obir 55, while those in the soth relied for
immnity on their remoteness. ,t the State as sch had been shattered
beyond re!air.
In 161; >obir, in common with the other +asa States, had allowed ,orn
to reassert its szerainty, bt ,orn had sbse-ently made no attem!t
14
to crb >obirCs aggressiveness or to save Aamfara from e)tinction. %his
inactivity was inter!reted as weakness and, later in the centry, >obir
threw off its allegiance 56. In this move it was certainly followed by
:atsina 5= and !robably by some of the other +asa States as well.
#s the end of the eighteenth centry a!!roached >obir was again at war
with :atsina. %his time the case of the hostility was 'aroki, the fgitive
4hief of Aamfara, who had sht himself ! in the fortified town of :iyawa
near the :atsina border. While the >obirawa besieged the !lace, 'aroki
called on the 4hief of :atsina for hel!.
# :atsina army was sent to relieve him and at the battle of .tsin Wake it
inflicted a severe defeat on the >obir forces 5/. (evertheless, the strggle
for :iyawa went on and it was not ntil 1=01, when >obir sffered another
defeat and 4hief Bakba was killed, that the siege was finally abandoned
60.
%hese events G the failre of the +asa States to cohere, their
internecine rivalry and warfare, the decline of ,orn, the dismemberment
of Aamfara, the general hostility arosed by >obirCs aggressions, and the
reverses sffered by >obir at the hands of :atsina and the Aamfara
diehards G were all to !lay a significant !art in !re!aring the way for the
rise of the Flani and the establishment of their em!ire.
(otes
1. %hese traditional classifications are no longer generally acce!ted, bt they are familiar
and well nderstood and they will serve for the !resent !r!ose.
9. ". W. ,ovill, %he >olden %rade of the 'oors, 2ondon, 1/51, !. ;13;/.
1. Ibn :haldn. See &. S. %rimingham, # +istory of Islam in West #frica, *)ford, 1/59, !.
1=.
;. %rimingham, o!. cit. !. 1=
<. ,ovill, o!. cit. !!. <63<=.
5. Ibid. !!. <3<;.
6 %rimingham, o!. cit. !, 1/.
=. ,ovill, o!. cit. !. <=.
/. %rimingham, c!. cit. !. 1/.
10. Ibid.
11. R. 'any, %ablea >Logra!hi-e de lC*est #fricain a 'oyen #ge, .akar, 1/51, !.
;59.
19. 'any, o!. cit. !. 115.
11. S. &. +ogben and #. +. '. :irk3>reene, %he "mirates of (orthern (igeria, 2ondon,
1/55, !. 1;6.
1;. 'any asserts that by this time the assimilation of the ,erbers to the #rab way of
life, and therefore to Islam, was com!lete 7o!. cit. !!. ;51398.
1<. %he name has several variations and is sometime given as ,aya$ida.
15. .. Westermann and '. #. ,ryan. %he 2angages of West #frica, 2ondon, 1/<9, !!.
1603;
16. &. +. >reenberg, 2angages of #frica, %he +age, 1/51, !. ;5.
1=. %he name of the seventh state is sometimes given as ,iram, bt this is in fact the
name of the first legendary rler and >amn >abas, which is what the village is still
called, is !referable as the !lace3name.
1/ %he :ano 4hronicle 7henceforward : 4h in footnotes8. For an "nglish translation see
+. R. Palmer, Sdanese 'emoirs, 2agos, 1/9=, vol. III, !!. /93119.
90 F. de F. .aniel, # +istory of :atsina 7bond cyclostyled co!ies !blished in (igeria8,
!. 9=.
91. : 4h 7Palmer, !!. //31968.
15
99. .aniel, o!. cit. !!. 9=315.
91. 'allam +assan and 'allam ShCaib, # 4hronicle of #b$a, translated and edited by
Frank +eath, Ibadan, 1/<9, !!. 15316. %he 4hronicle 7henceforward 4h #8 was written in
abot 1/;< to record the oral legends and traditions that had been !reserved in #b$a.
9;. Palmer, o!. cit. vol, III, !!. 1;931.
9<. :ano .istrict (otebooks 7henceforward .(,s8, +istory of :ano.
95. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of #nka. #nother list !blished by +ogben and :irk3>reene
7o!. cit. !. ;1<8 gives ;; 4hiefs in the +asa era.
96. >azetteer of :ontagora Province, 1/90, !. 90.
9=. In addition to PalmerCs "nglish translation there is a +asa translation in vol. II of
2abarn +asawa do 'agwabtans 72+d'8, !blished by the 4.'.S. ,ooksho!, 2agos,
1/11, !!. 9936;.
9/. #!art from the risks of destrction by fire or white ants, which are ever !resent in
+asaland, the climate renders !a!er so brittle that after fifty years it begins to
disintegrate.
10. See (ote 1 in #!!endi) I.
11 #. .. +. ,ivar and '. +iskett, H%he #rabic 2iteratre of (igeria to 1/0;I, ,lletin of
the School of *riental and #frican Stdies, vol. MMJ, 1, 1/59, !. 105. %his $dgement is
in broad accord with that of the e)!lorer ,arth who, -oting the Imam #hmed, asserted
7%ravels, vol. II, !!. 9<<358 that the earliest written historical records in ,orn dated
from the first half of the si)teenth centry.
19 '. +iskett, H%he Song of ,agadaI, ,S*#S, vols. MMJII, 1, and MMJII, 1 and 9. %he
Song covers the same historical grond as %he :ano 4hronicle. It was not recorded ntil
abot 1/903< bt it is com!letely accrate both in names and dates back to 1=06.
,eyond that, althogh dates go astray, it contines to agree with %he :ano 4hronicle on
names, with only one discre!ancy, as far back as 15<1.
11. '. >. Smith, >overnment in Aazza, 2ondon, 1/50, !!. 1;369.
1;. : 4h.
1<. : 4h 7Palmer, !. 1918.
15. Ibid. !!. 101 and 11/.
16 : 4h, !!. 10;3<.
1= Ibid. !!. 1063=.
1/. Ibid. !!. 10=3/. H%he Song of ,agadaI also identifies Emar as the first 'oslem
4hief. See +iskett, o!. cit. !. 15/.
;0. .aniel, o!. cit. !. 9/.
;1. 4h #, !. 15.
;9. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of #nka. In the slightly longer list -oted by +ogben and :irk3
>reene, #liy a!!ears as the thirtieth 4hief.
;1. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, 1/90, !. 19. In the mch longer list given by +ogben
and :irk3>reme 7o!. cit. !. ;158 #bdllah, the fifty3forth 4hief, has the first 'oslem
name.
;;. >azetteer of :ontagora Province, !. 1/.
;<. %he *bligations of Princes, translated and edited by %. +. ,aldwin, ,eyroth, 1/19.
;5. 'any, o!. cit. !!. ;9/316.
;6. 'any, o!. cit. 'any !ts this event in the forteenth centry, bt %he :ano
4hronicle 7Palmer, !. 10/8 states that it was only in the reign of #bdllahi ,r$a 71;1=3
<98 that the ,orn3#shanti section of the rote was o!ened.
;=. Ibid.
;/. See (ote 9 in #!!endi) I.
<0. 2eo #fricans, %he +istory and .escri!tion of #frica, translated into "nglish by &ohn
Pory, 1500, 2ondon, 1=/5, !!. =9=311. 2eo was a 'oor whose family had been e)!elled
from S!ain and who was himself ca!tred by the 4hristians in the 'editerranean and
carried off to Rome where he wrote his book. For an assessment of the credibility of his
statements on the Songhai invasion of +asaland see (ote 1 in #!!endi) I.
<1. Ibid.
<9. See (ote ; in #!!endi) I.
<1. 2+d', Jol. I, !!. 15316.
16
<;. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. 91=.
<<. Ibid. !!. 91=3/.
<5. 2+d', vol. I, !. 16.
<6. For !articlars of :antaCs "m!ire, see (ote < in #!!endi) I.
<=. : 4h 7Palmer, !!. 1153998 and .aniel, o!. cit. !!. 10311.
</. >azetteer of :ano Province, 1/91, !. /, and 4h #, !. <. ,oth athorities agree on the
date.
50. For an estimate of the date see (ote 5 in #!!endi) I.
51. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. 15=. C
59. Ibid.
51. Sltan 'hammad ,ello, InfakCl 'aisri 7Inf '8, translated or !ara!hrased and
edited by ". &. #rnett in %he Rise of the Sokoto Flani, :ano, 1/19, !. 19.
5;. 2+d', vol. I, !!. 531;.
5<. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !!. 10311.
55. .aniel, o!. cit. !. 11.
56. 2+d', vol. 1, !. 1;.
5=. .aniel, o!. cit. !. /.
5/. .aniel, o!. cit. !!. 1131;.
60. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !!. 11319.
17
(ha'ter *wo
*he +ulani ,
,arth, who was !robably the most intelligent of all the #frican e)!lorers,
described the Flani as the most intelligent of all the #frican tribes. %hey
are certainly one of #fricaCs great enigmas. %hey have been living in the
Sdan for well over a thosand years, bt their !hysical characteristics
are so different from those of other Sdanic !eo!les that there can be
little dobt that they originated elsewhere.
Physically, e)ce!t where miscegenation over several generations has
blrred the image, they rn remarkably tre to ty!e. It is !ossible, for
e)am!le, to !ick Flani ot of a gro! of other #fricans with mch greater
certainty than, say, Scandinavians ot of a gro! of "ro!eans. %y!ical
Flani a!!ro)imate closely to their own !hysical ideals of light co!!er3
colored skin, straight hair, narrow nose, thin li!s, and a slight bt wiry
frame.
%hese !hysical characteristics and their ndobted talents have given rise
to all kinds of notions abot their origins. %he most romantic bt least
!robable theories are that they are either one of the lost tribes of Israel or
that they are descendants of i Roman 2egion which missed its way and
was englfed in ,lack #frica. 'ore seriosly it has been sggested that
they may be descended from the Phoenicians or from the ancient
"gy!tians, whose cstom of wearing chin3tfts they still follow. *ther
theories have soght to link them with the ,erbers of (orth #frica, the
"thio!ians, and even with +inds and 'alayo3Polynesians 9.
In the task of tracing ethnic origins, the best cles are sally !rovided by
langage. %o follow this line of dedction with the Flani, however, is
merely to come ! against a new enigma. If Flflde, as their langage is
called, belonged to what are variosly defined as the +amitic or #fro3
#siatic >ro!s, it wold be easy to believe that ethnically, like the +asas,
they were the !rodcts of intermarriage between (orth #frican and (egro
stocks. #s it is, however, modern athorities agree that there is virtally
no connection between Flflde and any of the langages in these gro!s,
bt that on the contrary it n-estionably belongs to the Sdanic or
(iger34ongo >ro!s 1. It follows, therefore, that the Flani either
originated in the most westerly corner of the Sdan or else that, in the
corse of a long so$orn there, they abandoned an earlier langage in
favor of the one that they now s!eak. #s they are !rone to change their
langage ;, and as their !hysical characteristics are so markedly different
from those of their lingistic neighbors, the second alternative is mch
the more likely.
%he most widely acce!ted theory is that the Flani came originally from
the 'iddle "ast or (orth #frica and gradally worked their way rond the
blge of the continent to the region of Senegambia. %here they are
believed to have made a lengthy so$orn and ado!ted the langage which
they now s!eak. Some of them are still there, bt in historical times the
18
ma$ority have been drifting slowly eastward along the great corridor of the
Sdan.
2ike most #frican !eo!les, the Flani cherish a myth or legend abot their
origins which has srvived in a nmber of similar, thogh not identical,
forms. *ne version describes the marriage of a 'oslem #rab, who is
sally identified as Ekba, to a woman of the Sdan called ,a$$o 'ang.
*ne day the mother goes to the well and leaves her yongest child in the
care of one of its brothers. *n her retrn she overhears the brother
comforting the child in a strange langage. She tells her hsband who
!redicts that this is a sign that the child will be the fonder of a new
!eo!le who will not s!eak #rabic bt will nevertheless be the saviors of
Islam <.
In his history of the Flani, #lha$i &naid, the Waziri of Sokoto, gives a
different version of this story. +e says that the %oronkawa, the branch of
the Flani !eo!le to which the Sltans of Sokoto belong, are of the seed of
#braham, Isaac, and "sa. %hey s!oke a langage called Wakr 5, and
after leaving Palestine they traversed (orth #frica ntil they came to Fta
%oro in Senegambia, the !lace from which they have taken their name.
%here they rested and mlti!lied. 2ater they were !eaceflly converted to
Islam by Ekbat, who married ,a$$o 'ang, a daghter of their rler. ,y
her Ekbat, became the father of for sons. .eita, Woya, Roroba, and
(asi. %hese boys were the first to s!eak Flflde, which the %oronkawa
also ado!ted, and they became the ancestors of all the Flani tribes. %heir
descendants grew so nmeros, however, that they had to move to Falgo
and there they sli!!ed back into !aganism. %his broght enmity between
them and their %oronkawa cosins who had contined in the ways of
Islam. In the fighting which followed many of the Flani were dis!ersed,
bt those who remained in Senegambia, after being chastised and broght
back to their faith, were finally reconciled with the %oronkawa with whom
they thenceforward lived in amity 6.
*ne of the interesting featres of this legend is the identification of the
%oronkawa with the descendants of "sa. %hey too, it will be will be
remembered, were wandering !astoralistsD
#nd "sa took his wives, and his sons, and his daghters, and all the
!ersons of his hose, and his cattle, and all his beasts, and all his
sbstance, which he had got in the land of 4anaan? and went into the
contry from the face of his brother &acob. For their riches were more
than that they might dwell together? and the land wherein they were
strangers cold not bear them becase of their cattle =.
%he Falgo of this tradition may well be Fta &allon, where the Flani are
known to have established a State in abot the tenth centry. %he
assertion, however, that in the dis!tes between the backsliding Flani
and faithfl %oronkawa it was the %oronkawa who !revailed is not borne
ot by other evidence, for both Fta &allon and Fta %oro remained !agan
States ntil the eighteenth centry /. What seems more !robable is that it
was the 'oslems among both the %oronkawa and the Flani who were
defeated and forced to emigrate.
19
%he Ekba who a!!ears in most versions of these Flani and %oronkawa
legends is E-ba b. (afi, who led the #rab invasion of (orth #frica in the
middle of the seventh centry and fonded the famos city of :airwan 10.
%he retention of his name in the folk memory sggests that the Flani
were somehow caght ! in the trmoil which this invasion cased. *n
the other hand, the ancestress who married Ekba is sally described as
coming from Palestine and this s!!orts the view that the Flani, thogh
the #rab invasion may have caght them in (orth #frica and dis!laced
them from there, actally had their origins somewhere in the 'iddle "ast.
So mch for tradition and myth. %hogh we cannot be sre abot where
the Flani originally came from, there is no dobt that a thosand years
ago they were concentrated in the western Sdan not far from the #tlantic
seaboard. In the tenth centry, as already noted, they fonded the !agan
State of Fta &allon 11. .elafosse considers that the dis!ersal from
Senegambia began in the eleventh centry. We do not know what the
case was bt it may well have been the religios wars between 'oslems
and !agans which seem to have broken ot at this time. *n the other
hand, as the !eriod coincides with the second #rab invasion of (orth
#frica, it is !ossible that this !heaval broght a new infl) of dis!laced
tribes to Senegambia, as it did to +asaland, and that the ensing
confsion and com!etition for land and grazing cased the %oronkawa and
many of the Flani to set off again on their travels.
%oday the Flani nmber well over si) million and are to be fond in all
!arts of the Sdan between the #tlantic and the (ile. ,y far the greatest
concentration is in northern (igeria, where over half of them are to be
fond. *ther !laces where they abond are Senegambia and Fta &allon,
the 'iddle (iger, the 4had region, and the 4ameroon !lands 19. # few of
the more adventros have even !assed beyond 4had to ,aghirmi,
Wadai, and the Re!blic of the Sdan.
%hey have been ke!t within these latitdes by the desert to the north and
the !resence of tse3tse fly, which is fatal to their cattle, to the so th.
%hey have therefore had no choice bt to settle somewhere or contine to
make their way down the corridor of savannah and this is what they have
been doing for the last nine hndred years. Stenning has termed their
slow advance a migratory drift. %o nderstand its tre natre we mst
first distingish between different ty!es of Flani.
In the !ast it has been sal to divide them into two gro!s, the settled
Flani and the nomadic !astoralists. It has been shown, however, that this
is an over3sim!lification and that there are at least for different gro!s
11. First there are the tre nomads whom the Flani call ,ororoCen. %hey
shn settled commnities as mch as !ossible and like to lose themselves
and their herds in large tracts of bsh. Physically, as they have never
intermarried with other !eo!les, they are all cast in the tre Flani mold.
%hey are brave, togh, hardy, and inde!endent. #t the same time they
are nso!histicated, shy, and ss!icios of the world and its ways. %heir
whole life revolves rond their herds and they have few thoghts for
anything else, even religion. %hey are a srvival from the !ast and today
20
they have become a dwindling minority.
(e)t there are the semi3sedentary !astoralists who are known as +ul#e
na-i. %heir way of life has many variants, bt its essential featre is that
the family is no longer com!letely footloose bt has ac-ired a base of
some kind and engages in farming as well as raising stock. ,t, as most of
the cattle of the Sdan have to be taken in search of water and grazing
dring the long dry seasons, it becomes necessary to s!li1;.
%he third gro! are the %oroo,e or the Flani who belong to the rling
and !rofessional classes. %hey may of corse own a few cattle, bt only as
a side3line, and their real interests lie in administration, law, religion, and
edcation 1<.
%he forth gro! are the Fl,e siire. %hese are erstwhile !astoralists who,
having lost all their cattle throgh disease or !oor hsbandry, %he Flani
"m!ire of Sokoto have been com!elled to settle among the local
!easantry and ado!t their way of life 15.
While the Flani were drifting across (orth #frica towards the #tlantic
seaboard it seems !robable that they all led a nomadic e)istence similar
to that of the bororoCen of today. *nce they had reached Senegambia,
however, they mst have trned more and more to the other modes of
life, some throgh choice and others throgh force of circmstance. 2ater,
when they were !rooted from Senegambia, they had, of necessity, to
take once more to a nomadic e)istence bt, having once lived a sedentary
or semi3sedentary life, they were !robably more ready than before to try
it again. %hose who fond !laces where their cattle thrived and they
themselves felt at home, in the 'iddle (iger for e)am!le, no dobt settled
there. If their cattle sickened, however, or if they themselves were
!ersected or ta)ed too highly, then they wold have no com!nction in
!lling ! the roots which they had begn to !t down and moving on.
%he characteristics of this migratory drift were that it was com!letely
ncoordinated and almost im!erce!tibly gradal.
(ot the least im!ortant of the for gro!s were the men of learning. %he
Flani and their %oronkawa cosins are a highly intelligent !eo!le and
they seem always to have had a reverence for knowledge and wisdom,
es!ecially the 'oslems among them. It is noteworthy, for e)am!le, that in
the religios wars between the %oronkawa and the Flani, the 'oslem
%oronkawa were led not by 4hiefs bt by 'allams or men of learning 16.
It was not ntil the eighteenth centry that the Flani created any Islamic
States of their own, bt long before then individal Flani who were
learned in religion and law were making their inflence felt in many
different !arts of the Sdan.
Religion, law, and #rabic letters were the sb$ects in which the Flani
tended to s!ecialize. Some, no dobt, !ossessed little learning otside
these fields, bt there were others who were sr!risingly well informed on
other to!ics. In 1=<9, for e)am!le, when the e)!lorer ,arth was in
,aghirmi, he met a Flani called Sambo, elderly and com!letely blind,
whose family had been settled in Wadai for many generations. +e himself
had once held a !rominent !osition at 4ort, bt with a change of Sltan
21
he had fallen from favor and been banished. +ere is ,arthCs descri!tion
of him.
I cold scarcely have e)!ected to find in this ot3of3the3way !lace a man
not only versed in all branches of #rabic literatre, bt who had even read
7nay, !ossessed a manscri!t of8 those !ortions of #ristotle and Plato
which had been translated into, or rather 'ohammedanised in #rabic, and
who !ossessed the most intimate knowledge of the contries which he
had visited.... When he was a yong man, his father, who himself
!ossessed a good deal of learning, and who had written a work on +asa,
had sent him to "gy!t, where he had stdied many years in the mos-e
of "l #zhar. It had been his intention to go to the town of Aebid in Bemen,
which is famos amongst the #rabs on accont of the science of
logarithms, or el hesab? bt when he had reached >nfda, the war which
was raging between the %rks and the Wahabiye had thwarted his
!ro$ects, and he had retrned to .ar Fr.... +aving then retrned to
Waday, he had !layed a considerable !art as cortier in that contry,
es!ecially dring the reign of #bd el C#ziz, till the !resent king,
'ohammad eC Sherif, on accont of his intimate relations with the !rince
$st mentioned, had driven him from his cort and banished him from the
contry.
#fter having made the ac-aintance of this man, I sed to visit him daily?
and he was always delighted to see, or rather to hear me for he had
nobody with whom he cold talk abot the s!lendor and achievements of
the :halifat, from ,aghdad to #ndalos NS!ainO G!articlarly of the latter
contry, with the history of whose towns, kings, and literary men he was
intimately ac-ainted. +e listened with delight when I once mentioned the
astrolabe or se)tant? and he informed me with !ride that his father had
been in !ossession of sch an instrment, bt that for the last twenty
years he had not met a single !erson who knew what sort of thing an
astrolabe was.
+e was a very enlightened man and in his inmost sol a Wahabi.... I shall
never forget the hors I !assed in cheerfl and instrctive conversation
with this man.... 1=
%his evidence, even thogh it came two generations later, serves to show
that the best of the men of learning among the Flani were very far from
being narrow3minded schoolmen.
It mst be remembered that in Islam there is no established hierarchy like
that of the 4hristian 4hrch. 4onse-ently the manifold dties,
ecclesiastical and lay, which in medieval "ro!e were !erformed by the
clergy, tended in 'oslem contries to fall to men who established a
re!tation for !iety and learning. %hey officiated at weddings, fnerals,
and naming ceremonies. %hey settled dis!tes by e)!onding the
!rinci!les of Islamic law. %hey taght the yong in :oranic schools and
gave instrction to the old in 'oslem dogma, rital, history, and tradition.
For these services they were rewarded by fees which, to the 'oslem
donor, had the -ality of alms.
%hese learned men sally belonged to one of the great sects or
22
brotherhoods of Islam of which the two most im!ortant in the Sdan were
the Kadiriyya, fonded in the twelfth centry by Abd el.Kadir el.Jilani
of #aghdad, and the *ijaniyya, fonded in the early nineteenth
century by Ahmad *ijjani of +e!. %he geninely !ios among them led
lives of devotion and asterity, sometimes as anchorites, and strove to
ac-ire the -ality of sanctity and the s!ernatral !owers which were
thoght to go with it. %he more worldly, on the other hand, e)!loited the
s!erstitions of the !eo!le and made their livings by fashioning charms
and amlets, foretelling the ftre throgh !atterns traced in the sand, or
cring illnesses by means of concoctions made from the ink in which holy
te)ts had been written. # few of the more nscr!los even stdied and
!ractised the black arts. Pios or cynical, they were a force to be reckoned
with.
In the eighteenth centry the Flani, who ntil then had remained divided
between Islam and !aganism, seem to have received a !owerfl new
im!lse towards Islam. 'any of those who had not !reviosly been
converted now abandoned their !agan beliefs and those who were already
'oslems became more strict and aggressive. Whatever the case of this
s!irital change, it was to have very im!ortant !olitical reslts. Its first
manifestation came in 169< when 'oslem Flani began a long strggle
against the !agan dynasty 7P8 of Fta &allon, the !lands where the
Senegal and >ambia Rivers rise. It was not ntil 1665 that this movement
scceeded and a 'oslem rLgime was established, bt in the same year,
after a mch shorter tssle, the 'oslem Flani of Fta %oro overthrew
their !agan kinsmen and set ! a second Islamic State in the same region
1/. %hese develo!ments in the western Sdan !robably had an indirect
bearing on the events that followed in the central Sdan a generation
later, the establishment by the 'oslem Flani of +asaland of the "m!ire
which is the sb$ect of this book. %his in trn inflenced the creation by
the Flani of the E!!er (iger of two more 'oslem States, Sek #hmadCs
kingdom of +amdallahi and the short3lived em!ire of +a$ Emar that
s!erseded it 90.
It is not known for certain when the first Flani reached +asalandD it may
have been as early as #... 1100 91 and was certainly not later than the
middle of the following centry 99. %he conditions obviosly sited them
and, as more and more of them arrived from the west, they halted and
decided to go no farther. In this way, slowly and almost im!erce!tibly,
their nmbers mst have grown ntil by the middle of the eighteenth
centry they had become an im!ortant minority. We have no knowledge
of how large a !ro!ortion of the !o!lation they then formed, bt as in
modern times the ratio between them and the +asas is abot 1D 1 or 1D
; it is reasonable to s!!ose that they were not less than a fifth or si)th
of the whole.
%he day3to3day relationshi! between the !astoral Flani and the +asa
farmers at the end of the eighteenth centry was no dobt mch the
same as it is now. %here was, first of all, the continos e)change of dairy
!rodcts for grain and other goods. With individals there were
23
arrangements for kraaling cattle on farms so that the land got the benefit
of the manre. With villages there were agreements abot cattle tracks,
grazing gronds, rainy3season laagering, and dry season access to water.
With the athorities there was bargaining over $angali, the official cattle3
ta), which was levied from at least as early as the first half of the
seventeenth centry 91, and over the nofficial tribte that all Jillage
+eads e)!ected to receive as one of their !er-isites 9;.
In many different ways, therefore, the semi3sedentary !astoralists were
drawn into the life of the settled commnities among whom they lived. For
the Flani who belonged to the !rofessional classes or the stockless
!easantry the contacts were of corse even closer. %here was not, it is
tre, mch intermarriage between the two races, bt Flani of the !!er
classes did not s!rn concbines taken from the +asa commnity and
those who had lost their cattle may well have had to seek their wives in
the same -arter. In towns and villages the two societies !robably
occ!ied se!arate wards or -arters, as they sometimes do even today.
In almost every other res!ect, however, their lives seem to have been
fairly closely integrated. In langage, for e)am!le, all the !astoral Flani,
save some of the bororoCen, cold dobtless s!eak and nderstand +asa,
indeed many of them were !robably bilingal, while among the two
settled gro!s there mst already have been large nmbers, !articlarly
of stockless !easants, who had begn to lose their facility in Flflde as
the ma$ority of their descendants long since have.
(evertheless, even thogh many of the Flani families in +asaland had
been living there for ten or fifteen generations, they did not always en$oy
the same !rivileges as the +asas. %raditions have srvived, for e)am!le,
that in >obir their right to own slaves was crtailed and that later, when
there was tension between them and the 4hief, they were even forbidden
to carry arms 9<. Sch discrimination mst have been a common
e)!erience for them in their centries of wandering and was !erha!s an
indirect tribte to the awe in which their hosts held them.
In character the Flani are very different !eo!le from the +asas. Where
the +asas are sally tolerant and easy3going, the Flani tend to be
!assionate and intense. %his basic dissimilarity of tem!erament is
reflected in many differences of otlook. %he Flani take life more
seriosly than the +asas and are less ready to lagh at themselves. %hey
have a greater reverence for learning. %hey have more highly develo!ed
!owers of leadershi!. %hey throw themselves with more singleness of
!r!ose into the cases which they ado!t. %hey have a s!erior faith in
their own destiny. In short, thogh not necessarily abler or more
intelligent, they have more fire in their bellies than the genial worldly
+asas.
#t the beginning of the nineteenth centry the time had arrived when
these -alities wold be !t to the test.
(otes
1. %he Flani go nder many names. For frther information on nomenclatre see (ote 6
in #!!endi) I.
24
9. .. &. Stenning, Savannah (omads, 2ondon, 1/</, !!. 1=31/.
1. Westermann and ,ryan, o!, cit. !!. 1.=31/ and 9;310, and &. +. >reenberg, o!. cit.
!!. 6 and ;1.
;. See (ote = in #!!endi) I.
<. Stenning, o!. cit. !. 1/.
5. %he e)!lorer ,arth identified this with the langage of the Wangarawa or 'andingoes
of the western Sdan. See %ravels and .iscoveries in (orth and 4entral #frica, 2ondon,
1=<6, vol. IJ, !!. 1;;3<.
6. #lha$i &naid, %arihin Flani, Aaria. 1/<6, !. 1.
=. >enesis )))vi, 536.
/. Stenning, o!. cit. !. 1;.
10. #hdallah ibn 'hammad, %azyin al3Wara-at 7%W8, translated and edited by '.
+iskett, Ibadan, 1/51, !. /6.
11. Stenning, o!. cit. !. 11.
19 Ibid. !. 1 and ma! o!!osite !. 9;.
11. 4. ". +o!en, %he Pastoral Fl,e Family in >wand, 2ondon, 1/<=, !!. 131.
1;. +o!en, o!. cit. !!. 131.
1<. Ibid.
15. +o!en, o!. cit. !!. 131.
16. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !!. 139.
1=. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. III, !!. 1613<
1/. %rimingham, o!. cit. !!. 15139.
90. See (ote 15 in #!!endi) I.
91. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. ;9/.
99. : 4h 7Palmer, !. III8.
91. : 4h 7Palmer, !. 11/8.
9;. Stenning, o!. cit. !!. ;3/.
9<. +o!en, o!. cit. !!. 11311.
25
(ha'ter *hree
$hehu /suman dan +odiyo
*ne of the Flani who emigrated from Senegambia becase of the
trobled times was a member of the %oronkawa called 'sa &akollo. +e
made his way eastward and in de corse arrived in +asaland. *n a
calclation of known generations the date of his arrival there can be !t at
abot 1;<0 1.
It is known that Musa Jakollo settled in ,irnin :onni, a town in the
!rovince of #dar, and that his family stayed there for the ne)t eleven
generations 9. %he Flani con-erors are sometimes thoght of as being
she!herd kings, that is to say nomads who entered a settled commnity
and soon afterwards seized !ower. (othing cold be frther from the
trth. 'sa &akolloCs descendants, for e)am!le, may have been &ullo na-i
when they reached +asaland, bt once they had settled in :onni they
seem to have become %oroo,e, still owning cattle, no dobt, bt devoting
themselves in the main to religion, law, and learning 1. %hey were already
there when #skiaCs armies sbded western +asaland, they saw the rise
and fall of 'hammad :antaCs brief em!ire, they heard the news that
the &kns were at the gates of :atsina, and they witnessed the
destrction of Aamfara.
What was !erha!s most im!ortant of all, however, was that they had been
in ,irnin :onni for generations before the >obirawa moved down from #Kr
to the neighboring contry which is now called >obir. %his movement, as
already noted, !robably did not take !lace ntil the late seventeenth
centry. ,y the middle of the eighteenth centry, therefore, the nomadic
days of the %oronkawa lay three centries behind them and it was the
>obirawa rather than they who were the newcomers to the district.
*o this family there was born, in the year ,011, a boy whose name
was /suman dan +odiyo bt who is sally known to history as $hehu,
the +asa form of the #rabic word Sheikh. #t the time of his birth
messianic !ro!hecies are said to have been made abot him and he
himself seems to have been conscios from an early age that a great
destiny awaited him.
$hehuCs father, Muhammadu +odiyo, was a man of !iety and learning.
2ike most of the 'oslems of (orth #frica and the Sdan, he was a Snni
and had been broght ! in the 'aliki School of $ris!rdence. +e also
belonged to the :adiriyya fraternity which was the oldest and most
wides!read of the Islamic orders ;. +e saw to it that his sons, $hehu and
a yonger boy called #bdllahi, received the best schooling that was to be
had. In those days edcation in the Sdan was based !on the stdy of
#rabic and Islamic theology in mch the same way that edcation in
medieval "ro!e had been based on 2atin and 4hristian theology. In the
'oslem world, of corse, theology embraced law as well as religion.
"lementary instrction in the basic sb$ects was to be had in the mos-es
26
and :oranic schools. %here were no established centres of advanced
learning, however, mch less any Eniversities, and so those who wished
to !rse their stdies had to seek ot the recognized 'asters, wherever
they might be fond, and enrol themselves as their !!ils <. %he flame
that El.Maghili had lit brnt low, it is tre, in the 4orts of the +asa
4hiefs, bt among the !ios and learned there were still many to tend it
and kee! it brning brightly.
#s with all 'oslem boys, $hehuCs edcation began with the stdy of the
:oran which was taght to him by his father. Synta) and grammar he
learned from #bdr Rabman dan +amada, !oetry and other sb$ects from
Esman ,indawo ,akebbi. +e then s!ent two years with an ncle,
Esman ,ibndw, who !layed a leading !art in molding his character.
#fter that he went to #gades, in the sothern Sahara, and s!ent another
year as a !!il of Mallam Jibrilu 5 who was then recognized as the most
learned man in the central Sdan. Retrning to +asaland he ne)t stdied
e)egesis nder Hashimu #a!amfare and another ncle, Ahmadu dan
Muhammadu Amino, and finally the 'oslem %raditions nder yet
another ncle, Muhammadu dan 2aji 6.
$hehu was an a!t !!il, with an insatiable thirst for knowledge, and he
absorbed all that his instrctors were able to teach him. We do not know
e)actly when he himself received the ijaza, or license to teach, bt it was
certainly conferred on him before he reached the age of twenty3five
becase by then he had become the instrctor of his yonger brother =.
$hehu grew ! in a !eriod when the >obirawa were at the height of their
!ower. %heir victory over the Aamfarawa and their anne)ation of northern
Aamfara took !lace soon after he was born. %he constrction of their new
ca!ital at #lkalawa went forward while he was a child. %heir aggressive
attacks on neighboring States contined dring his boyhood. Finally,
when he was a yong man, they renonced their allegiance to ,orn.
In 1666, when $hehu was twenty3two, #awa scceeded as 4hief of
>obir. +e was a son of Sarkin >obir ,abari, who had defeated Aamfara,
and his nickname, H&an >warzoI, showed that he was a man of nsal
energy and drive. ,y the Flani, however, he was considered a tyrant
becase of the severity with which he ordered jangali, the ta) on cattle,
to be assessed and collected. %hose who tried to evade it, as to a greater
or lesser e)tent the !astoral Flani have always tried to do, had their
cattle seized /. #s a reslt, there was friction and animosity. Some of the
Flani conceived sch a strong sense of grievance that they reacted in
their traditional manner, that is to say they !lled ! their roots and
de!arted 10. #s for the +asa rlers, they were !robably left with the
feeling that the Flani were contmacios aliens who refsed to acce!t the
established cstoms of the contry. %hs were the first seeds of serios
discord sown.
If the tension between the Flani and the +asas was something new, the
-arrel between strict 'oslems and their la)er brethren had !ersisted for
generations. Islam, as we have already seen, had been introdced
centries earlier and the +asa 4hiefs and rling classes were all
27
nominally 'oslems. In fact, however, the im!ets which El.Maghili had
given to Islam at the end of the fifteenth centry had soon s!ent itself.
"arly in the si)teenth centry the memory of the devot and god3fearing
Muhammadu 2umfa had been ecli!sed in +asaland by the s!ectaclar
sccesses of the rmbstios and worldly :anta. In the seventeenth
centry worse had followed when the 'oslem +asas had been re!eatedly
and hmiliatingly defeated by the !agan &kns. We know from %he :ano
4hronicle that the early +asas tended to vale religions according to
their efficacy in worldly affairs 11 and we may srmise that these were
among the factors that cased the zeal engendered by "l3'aghili to
eva!orate dring the scceeding generations.
%he decay of Islam dring this !eriod did not !ass altogether nheeded, it
is tre, and the commentary 19 of at least one reformer has srvived, bt
he was !robably a :anri, not a +asa, and in any case his strictres were
mted and seem to have made little im!act. %hey do, however, serve to
confirm that in the allegedly 'oslem society of the central Sdan
ignorance was rife and observance la).
It has often been said that Islam is not merely a religion bt a whole way
of life, at once !ervasive and demanding. >enerally s!eaking, therefore,
the !eo!le of #frica have fond it easier to embrace this faith than to live
! to its often e)acting standards and observe its manifold and sometimes
novel in$nctions. &st as in "ro!e certain !agan rites were !er!etated
in the 4hristian era in covert or transmted form, so in the Sdan many
ancient cstoms srvived the establishment of Islam even when they were
in direct conflict with its commands.
In +asaland it was all the more natral that this shold have been so
becase among the !easantry, who of corse formed the blk of the
!o!lation, the !ro!ortion that !rofessed to be 'oslem was !robably less
than half 11 and even among them ignorance and s!erstition were still
!revalent. For a man fired with religios zeal there were therefore two
ma$or tasks to be !erformedD the conversion of the heathen among the
!easantry and the eradication of abses among the nominally 'oslem
rling classes.
$hehu himself, his brother Abdullahi, and his son Muhammadu #ello
were all 'rolific writers 1;. %hanks to the books and !a!ers that they
left we have a clear idea of the natre of the abses that $hehu later set
ot to reform.
First, in a work entitled Nasa'ih al-Ummat al-Muhammadiya, which was
!robably written in the !eriod !receding the otbreak of the jihad 1<,
$hehu toched, among other things, on the re!rehensible cstoms of the
common !eo!le. +ere he made s!ecial mention of the mi)ing of the se)es
at social gatherings, the !ractice of allowing women to go to market while
the men sat at home, the moral la)ity at bridal festivals where women in
their finery danced before men, the cstom of saltation by !rostration,
and varios abses and aberrations in the administration of the law of
inheritance 15. +is strictres were not very severe, however, and he was
concerned to admonish rather than to e)!ose or denonce.
28
,t in the Kitab al-Farq, a book which was !robably written as a
$stification for the jihad when the war had already begn, bt which has
for its sb$ect the +asa scene in the !eriod leading ! to it, $hehu
trned on the rlers with mch greater severity and gave a cataloge of
over twenty charges that he made against them. %hese can be classified
into for ne-al gro!s nder the general headings of D
o!!ression
corr!tion
self3indlgence
technical offences against the Islamic code 16.
%he first gro!, the charges of o!!ression, is the largest and embraces
nearly half the total. It incldes accsations that the rling classes
im!osed ta)es not sanctioned by the Shari'a, or sacred law, abdcted the
women they wanted withot offering marriage, misa!!ro!riated the
!ossessions of women who were wards of cort, made forced levies of
goods and money in the markets, commandeered !ack animals withot
!aying for them, se-estrated the goods of strangers who died in their
territory, levied tolls on merchants and travellers, and conscri!ted men to
their armies, allowing those who wished to by themselves ot to do so
1=.
*ne of the three ta)es that $hehu singled ot here for condemnation was
jangali, the cattle3ta) which had been collected in +asaland for
generations !ast and which in recent years had become a bone of
contention between the rlers of >obir and the !astoral Flani. +e !ointed
ot that it was not one of the seven forms of ta)ation recognized by
Islamic law and he therefore challenged its legality. If the +asa
athorities trobled to $stify their actions, they !robably arged that, as
the ma$ority of the !astoral Flani were not 'oslems, the ta) was a form
of jizya, the levy that an Islamic State is entitled to im!ose on non3
'oslem sb$ects 1/. %o this $hehu might well have retorted that jizya
was s!!osed to be a !oll3ta), not a cattle3ta), and that in any case there
were no gronds for im!osing it on 'oslems, as more and more of the
!astoral Flani were now becoming. Whatever corse the argment took,
the s!!ort of a scholar and $rist of $hehuCs standing mst have had the
effect of reinforcing the !astoral Flani in their recalcitrance. #t any rate,
the dis!te smoldered on and in the end had significant historical
conse-ences.
%he second gro! of charges in the Kitab al-Farq, those dealing with
corr!tion, is mch shorter. It incldes accsations that the +asa rlers
cold only be a!!roached throgh intermediaries who had been softened
with !resents, that in the e)ercise of their administrative fnctions they
e)!ected sweeteners 90 to be made to them, and that in the corts they
sold $stice to the highest bidder 91.
%he third gro!, also a small one, com!rises the sins of self3indlgence
and frivolity. It incldes charges that the rlers lived in ornate and
29
l)rios !alaces, indlged e)cessively in concbinage, sometimes
kee!ing as many as a thosand women, and !ermitted msic, drmming,
and abandoned dancing 99.
%he forth and last gro! is another large one and embraces a variety of
offences against the Islamic code. Some of these, which relate to 'oslem
in$nctions and !rohibitions on food, drink, and clothes, a!!ear at first
sight to be of minor moment, bt in those days no dobt carried more
significance. *thers, however, clearly had great !olitical and social as well
as religios im!ortance. *ne sch was the charge that the +asa rlers
e)ercised their !ower arbitrarily withot regard to the law. #nother was
that they im!osed illegal ta)es over and above those !ermitted by the
law. # third was that they often set aside the obligatory !nishments
!rescribed by the law, sch as death for certain classes of mrderers,
mtilation for thieves, and stoning or flogging for adlterers, and
commted them for the se-estration of goods 91.
%o devot 'oslems these charges were of corse all the more heinos in
that the law which the +asa rlers were accsed of floting was no mere
man3made code bt the >od3given and immtable Shari'a.
In the Wathiqat Ahl al-Sudan, a manifesto which he almost certainly wrote
himself and !robably !blished on the eve of the war, $hehu drew
distinctions between different ty!es of offenders. First of all there were the
backsliders and, a stage worse, the a!ostates. %hese cold dobtless be
fond among all classes of society. (e)t there were the o!!ressors. %hey
obviosly belonged to the rling classes and were gilty of the kind of
abses of !ower that had been described in the Kitab al-Farq. %hen there
were the warmongers and troblemakers. %hey are more difficlt to
identify, bt were !robably all those o!!onents of the movement who had
recorse to force in order to s!!ress it or !ersecte its adherents 9;.
In addition there was a class of learned men whom the reformers
stigmatized nder the name of ulama al-su'i and whom we may call the
com!romisers or e-ivocators. %hey were the men of learning who
betrayed their cloth, stilled their consciences, and s!!orted the rling
classes in their transgressions of the law, thereby !roviding them with a
mantle of false res!ectability. %hogh often mch less learned than they
!rofessed to be, it was throgh self interest rather than ignorance that
they acted as they did. %hey were clearly a more or less !ermanent
featre of society in the Sdan for "l3'aghili had denonced them in his
day and when $hehu a!!eared, three hndred years later, they were still
there to !lage him 9<.
#mong $hehuCs teachers there were two who seem to have e)erted a
very s!ecial inflence over him. *ne was his ncle, /suman #ibnuduwu,
with whom he had s!ent nearly two years of his adolescence and who was
evidently a man of high !rinci!le and strong conscience. We are told that
he was renowned for righteosness and for the fearless manner in which
he forbade the wrong and !held the right. We know, too, that his !!il
took him as a model 95 and it is !robable that he !layed an im!ortant
!art in setting $hehuCs feet on the !ath of militant reform.
30
%he other teacher who made a ma$or contribtion to $hehuCs evoltion as
a religios reformer was Mallam Jibrilu dan /maru. +e was generally
recognized as the otstanding figre among the learned men of his
generation in the central Sdan, bt he seems to have worn his learning
lightly, becase he is described as being so genial that one wold have
thoght all men were his friends 96. %here was another side to his
character, however, and he was also the most rigid o!!onent of any form
of com!romise on religios -estions 9=.
*ne of the religios isses which had been s!oradically debated in the
Sdan for generations and which was now active again was whether
disobedience, or in other words sin or backsliding, was sfficient reason
for anathematizing a 'oslem and casting him ot altogether from the
brotherhood of Islam. %he !roblem was to determine when backsliding
became a!ostasy and when disobedience became so blatant that it had to
be treated as nbelief. %hese selfsame -estions had been !t to "l3
'aghili in Songhai at the beginning of the si)teenth centry and the
corres!ondence on the sb$ect that followed between him and #skia
'hammad revealed the e)istence then of forms of o!!ression and
corr!tion strikingly similar to those that were now trobling the
reformers in +asaland G the same o!!ressive rlers, venal $rists,
e-ivocating scholars, and backsliding masses 9/. El.MaghiliCs verdict
had been ncom!romising. %hose who claimed to be 'oslems bt
contined to !ractice !aganism he had condemned as !olytheists and
infidels. %he e-ivocators and venal $rists he had described as being
more harmfl to Islam than all the mischief3makers. #nd of the !redatory
rlers he had said that, while no 'oslem shold be anathematized merely
becase of sin, condct sch as im!osing illegal ta)es, levying tolls, and
seizing the !ro!erty of deceased travellers indicated not mere
disobedience bt rank nbelief 10.
In $hehuCs day Mallam Jibrilu was ready to go even frther and
maintain that those who were gilty of sch acts of disobedience as
having more than for wives, allowing women to mi) with men or go
nveiled, or de!riving or!hans of their rights oght to be anathematized
nconditionally 11. $hehu was sbse-ently to refte this !articlar
doctrine and show that he himself !held a more orthodo) view 19.
(evertheless, &ibrilCs forthright assertion of these e)treme views mst
have hel!ed to !re!are !blic o!inion for $hehuCs slightly more moderate
bt still advanced teaching. Frthermore, there is no dobt whatever that
the later reformers, even if they were not !re!ared to go -ite as far as
&ibril, were !rofondly inflenced by him. Abdullahi wrote a !anegyric in
his honor 11. ,ello described him as a lam! that had dis!ersed the
darkness and revived religion in the land 1;. #nd $hehu himself
acknowledged his debt in the following lines D
Q %hen, by >od, I know not, shold we have been gided to the !ath of
the Snna, and to the abandoning of these blameworthy cstoms, had it
not been for this blessed SheikhP R 1<
31
#nother Islamic doctrine that mst have inflenced $hehuCs evoltion as
a religios leader was the Messianic *radition which taght that in
every centry >od wold send a reformer who wold drive in$stice from
the land and renew the faith 15. %his belief was common throghot Islam
and wold in any case have been known to $hehu. #gain, however, it was
s!ecifically mentioned by El.Maghili in his corres!ondence with #skia
'hammad.
Q #nd, accordingly, it is related that at the beginning of every centry >od
will send a learned man to the !eo!le to renew their faith, and the
characteristics of this learned man in every centry mst be that he
commands what is right and forbids what is disa!!roved of, and reforms
the affairs of the !eo!le and $dges $stly between them, and assists the
trth against vanity, and the o!!ressed against the o!!ressor, in contrast
to the characteristics of the 7other8 learned men of his age 16. R
%here is no dobt whatever that $hehu was familiar with this
corres!ondence, becase he actally embodied it in one of his own works,
the Siraj al-Ikhan 1=. 'oreover, what mst have given these old
!recedents a mch greater significance in his eyes was the fact that they
had been laid down at the time when #skia, !roclaiming himself to be the
cham!ion of Islam, had seized !ower from the sons of his la) and
backsliding !redecessor, $onni Ali. %he civil war that had accom!anied
this co! had been recognized by "l3'aghili as a legitimate $ihad and
declared to be not only $stified bt meritorios 1/.
#ll these were matters on which $hehu, at the trn of the centry, mst
often have !ondered.
(otes
1. +iskett, Introdction to %W, !. <.
9. For the Family %ree see %able I in #!!endi) II.
1. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
;. %he devotion of $hehuCs followers to this brotherhood can be gaged from the fact
that to this day town criers in all the towns and villages of Sokoto address the Peo!le as
HBa :adirawaI.
<. +iskett, Introdction to %W, !. 5.
5. 'allam is the title conferred in +asaland on any man of learning.
6. #bdllah ibn 'hammad, Ida al3(skh 7I(8, edited and translated by '. +iskett,
,S*#S, vol. MIM 71/<68 1, !!. <513;. See also #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !!. /310.
=. #bdllah, I(, !. <51.
/. +o!en, o!. cit. !. 10.
10. +o!en, o!. cit. !. 10.
11. : 4h 7Palmer, !!. 1063=8.
19 'hammad b. #bdr RahmanCs Shrb al3Alal, !robably written at the end of the
seventeenth centry. See ,ivar and +iskett, o!, cit. !!. 11=31/.
11. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 9 18.
1;. :ensdale has listed the following D
#thor Works
$hehu =<
32
#bdllahi 6<
,ello /1
and there are known to be more. See HField (otes on the #rabic 2iteratre of the
Western SdanI in the &ornal of the Royal #siatic Society, 1/<<, 1/<5, and 1/<=.
1<. &ihad means, in the 'oslem sense, a holy war.
15. '. +iskett, H#n Islamic %radition of Reform in the Western Sdan from the Si)teenth
to the "ighteen 4entryI 7#I%R8, ,S*#S, vol. MMJ 71/598 1, !!. <=536.
16. :itab al3Far- 7:F8, edited and translated by '. +iskett, ,S*#S, vol. MMIII 71/508 1,
!!. <<=36/.
1=. :F, o!. cit. !!. <<=36/.
1/. %he :ano 4hronicle describes $angali as $izya 7Palmer, !. 11/8. See also +iskettCs
4omments on :F, loc. cit. !!. <6;3<.
90. In +asa !aisua.
91. $hehu, :F 7+iskett, !!. <563/8.
99. $hehu, :F 7+iskett, !!. <56398.
91. Ibid.
9;. Wathi-at #hl al3Sdan 7W#S8, edited and translated by #. .. +. ,ivar, &ornal of
#frican +istory, vol. II 71/518 9, !!. 91<3;1.
9<. +iskett, #I%R, !!. <=031.
95. #bdllah, I( 7+iskett, !!. <51 and <6<8, and #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !!. /310.
96. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. 103908.
9=. +iskett, #I%R, !. <=/. #lha$i &naid agrees with the view that 'allam &ibril and
Esman ,ibndw e)erted decisive inflence in sha!ing $hehuCs thoght and
character.
9/. +iskett, #I%R, !!. <6=3=1.
10. +iskett, #I%R, !!. <6=3=1.
11. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
11. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !!. /03/;8.
1;. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 1/8.
1<. +iskett, #I%R, !. </1.
15. +iskett, #I%R, !!. <=13;.
16. Ibid.
1=. +iskett, #I%R, !!. <=13;.
1/. Ibid.
33
(ha'ter +our
*he $tart of the Jihad
$hehu was still a yong man of only twenty when, in the year ,003.1,
he began his ministry 1. %hanks to the e)cellence of his edcation,
however, and to his great natral gifts, he was already an athority in his
own right on theology and the law.
It was !robably at abot the same time that he established himself in the
little town of 4egel where he was to live G or rather to make his
head-arters, becase he was fre-ently on the move G for the ne5t
thirty years. .egel lies in o!en sandy contry $st north of the Rima
Jalley in what was then the !rovince of #dar. *riginally, #dar stems to
have been tribtary to #ir, bt by this time it had either been anne)ed to
>obir or was at any rate com!letely nder >obirCs domination. From .egel
it was in fact only abot si)ty miles to #lkalawa where the >obirawa had
recently com!leted their new ca!ital.
%hogh $hehu made his head-arters in .egel, and was visited there by
increasing nmbers of !!ils and followers, he s!ent mch of his time
teaching in the srronding districts 9. From time to time he also made
larger tors of the neighboring States and, a!art from Aamfara and
:ebbi where he was soon to become well known, we hear of him going as
far afield as Illo in the soth and .ara in the east 1.
%he abses which $hehu observed in +asaland and set himself to reform
have already been described. ")ce!t !erha!s in Aamfara, he seems to
have concentrated more on the reform of the faith of those who had
already acce!ted Islam than on making new converts. %he sb$ects of his
discorses were five in nmber. %he first was the necessity of following,
withot deviation of any kind, the !ath of the Sharia or holy law. %he
second was the im!ortance of observing the Sunna or orthodo) !ractices
of Islam. %he third was the danger of harboring religios dobt. %he
forth was the avoidance and !revention of all evil. In his fifth and last
discorse he e)!onded the Shari'a in detail and encoraged his adience
to become seekers after knowledge and trth ;.
,ello has described the manner in which $hehu sed to deliver his
discorses and sermons. +e was, he says, at once friendly, !atient, and
sym!athetic. When he came ot on to his !latform he sed to smile at his
adience and then greet them three times. #fter that he wold call for
silence and begin to s!eak. +e always started with the wordsD HI give
thanks to >od, the 2ord of 4reation.I +e felt no shyness when s!eaking
and feared no criticism. +is faith gave him strength so that he voiced his
o!inions forthrightly and never com!romised with the trth. #fterwards he
wold stay on and answer the mltitde of -estions which sed to be !t
to him. #ccording to the com!osition of his adience, he s!oke sometimes
in +ulfulde, sometimes in Hausa, and sometimes in Arabic <.
%he main sb$ects of ShehCs sermons, as distinct from his discorses,
were the nity of >od, the fondations of faith, righteosness, sin and
34
!nishment, and !aradise and eternal ha!!iness. +e also gave
instrctions where necessary in sch matters of rital as abltion, !rayer,
fasting, !ilgrimage, !aying tithes, giving alms, making vows, taking oaths,
and contracting marriages 5.
%he first ma$or tor that $hehu made was to :ebbi, which was still one of
the leading States of +asaland thogh of corse it had long since lost the
!re3eminence it had en$oyed in the time of Kanta. We do not know the
e)act date of this $orney, bt it was !robably arond the year 16=0. +e
was accom!anied by his yonger brother #bdllahi, then still in early
adolescence, and was a!!arently very sccessfl in making converts and
winning adherents 6.
+itherto $hehu had neither soght the !atronage of 4hiefs nor had any
dealings with the rling classes. (ews of his sccesses in :ebbi dobtless
reached #lkalawa, however, and when he retrned to .egel word seems
to have been conveyed to him that he oght to !resent himself at 4ort.
$hehu was not one to be overawed, even when confronted by a
formidable character like Sarkin >obir ,awa =, and he is re!orted to have
!ro!onded in forthright terms e)actly what the res!onsibilities of an "mir
in a 'oslem State were. (evertheless, ,awa heard him ot and the
adience seems to have been a sccess. 4ertainly it strengthened ShehCs
hand in his sbse-ent dealings with the common !eo!le, and no dobt
with !etty officials as well, becase henceforward it was assmed that his
teaching en$oyed the favor, or at any rate carried the assent, of the
4ort /.
Soon afterwards, !robably in 16=1, $hehu went to Aamfara. It was a
State in which Islam had made less headway than elsewhere in +asaland
and #bdllahi, who accom!anied his brother, described it as a land where
the great ma$ority of the !eo!le were still !agan and where ignorance was
s!reme. %hese were !robably the very reasons which indced $hehu to
s!end the ne)t five years there 10. *nce again, and !robably to an even
greater e)tent than in :ebbi, he scceeded in bdding ! a large !ersonal
following.
.ring this long absence $hehu seems to have maintained his home in
.egel becase he went back there as soon as his work in Aamfara was
finished. Soon after his retrn, !robably in the year 16==3/, he and all the
other learned men of the contry were smmoned to celebrate one of the
great 'oslem festivals in the com!any of the 4hief. #fter the ceremony
large -antities of alms were offered to the assembled divines and $rists.
#t this Sheh, des!ite the fact that he mst still have been one of the
yongest among them, rose to his feet and told ,awa that he and his
followers needed none of his wealth, bt that he asked instead for the
grant of other indlgences 11. +e demanded that he himself shold have
the right to teach and !reach in >obir, that all shold be free to listen to
him, that 'oslems shold sffer no disabilities, and that the brden of ta)
on the !easantry shold be lightened. ,awa rather sr!risingly granted all
these demands 19.
%his e!isode seems to have marked ShehCs emergence as the leader of
35
the reformers. %henceforward, thogh there were still !lenty of divines
and scholars otside the movement who dis!ted his teaching and denied
his mission 11, there was none within it to challenge his leadershi!.
(atrally, however, his assm!tion of 'allam &ibrilCs mantle marred his
relations with the 4ort at #lkalawa. Entil then he had always been
treated with marked res!ect, so mch so indeed that, on his retrn from
his tor of :ebbi, Sarkin >obir ,awa is said to have !aid him a visit at
.egel and made him a !resent of fifty cattle 1;. 4ertainly, some of the
yong !rinces, inclding Bnfa who was later destined to become his
!rinci!al adversary, seem to have stdied nder him for a time 1<. ,t
from that day the relationshi! began to deteriorate.
In 16/< Sarkin >obir ,awa died and was scceeded by his brother
Bakba. .ring BakbaCs reign, which lasted si) years, $hehu made his
second ma$or tor of :ebbi. +e taght and !reached in all the towns right
down to the (iger 15 and enlarged the nmber of his !ersonal followers.
%hese tors had an im!ortant effect on the corse of sbse-ent events.
First of all they gave Sheh. a standing otside >obir which enabled him
to !hold the rights of 'oslems, even to the !oint of defiance, while at the
same time making it difficlt for the 4hief to treat him as if he was no
more than a contmacios sb$ect. Secondly, the s!!ort which he now
bilt ! in Aamfara and :ebbi enabled him to srvive the critical second
and third ronds of the im!ending strggle, whereas withot it his case
wold almost certainly have fondered.
In 1=01 Sarkin >obir Bakba made a final attem!t to storm the Aamfara
fortress of :iyawa and was killed. +e was scceeded on the throne by his
brother, ,n (afata. It is clear that in the twelve years that had ela!sed
since Sarkin >obir ,awa had made his concessions to $hehu the relations
between the reformers and the rling classes in >obir had greatly
deteriorated. %he case of the animosity lay !artly in ShehCs fearless
e)!osre of corr!tion and o!!ression, bt !erha!s even more in the
a!!rehension with which the 4ort had been watching the growth of his
movement. ,y this time his adherents were known as H%he 4ommnityI
7in +asa Jama-a8 and had become very nmeros. 'oreover, his fame
had s!read throghot the central Sdan so that men came from near and
far to $oin him 16. Seeing this, the +asa rlers natrally took alarm.
H%hey saw the growing nmber of his following and the hold that Islam
had gained. ... 'en rged them on saying SIf yo do not dis!erse this
concorse of !eo!le, yor !ower will be gone ? they will destroy yor
contry by casing all the !eo!le to leave yo and go to them.TI1=
%he concern felt in #lkalawa at these develo!ments e)!lains the severity
of the measres that ,n now introdced. First of all, he forbade any
man from holding religios meetings and !reaching to the !eo!le,
e)ce!ting only Sheh. Secondly, he decreed that Islam might only be
!ractised by those who had inherited the creed from their fathers. %hirdly,
he !rohibited the wearing of trbans by men and veils by women 1/.
%hese edicts were !roclaimed in every market !lace in >obir and the
neighboring !arts of #dar and Aamfara which were nder >obirCs
36
domination. %hey were aimed directly at the 'oslem reformers and the
intention was obviosly to crb their growing strength. 4onsidering that
Sheh, was by now the ndis!ted leader of the movement, it seems
strange that an e)ce!tion shold have been made in his favor. %he only
e)!lanation of this a!!arent anomaly is that the concession was dictated
by fear, not favor, and that the +asa rlers still wished to avoid, or at
any rate !ost!one, an o!en conflict with him. %aken as a whole, these
were !arado)ical measres for any nominally 'oslem 4hief to have
introdced. In fact the toch of des!eration abot them betrayed the
alarm with which ,n and his advisers evidently viewed the strength and
cohesion of the reforming !arty, while their severity gave the reformers a
clear warning of the hostility with which they were now regarded.
#s for Sheh, there is no dobt that ntil then he, too, had been trying to
gain his ends withot !rovoking an o!en conflict. #ccording to #bdllahi
one of his sayings wasD HI will not interfere between any man and his
4hiefD I will not be a case of division.I 90 If the sccessive 4hiefs of
>obir had been willing to !lay the !art of 'hammad Rmfa, he wold
have been content with the role of "l3'aghili. 4ertainly, as his whole life
was to !rove, he was in no sense a seeker after tem!oral !ower and there
is no evidence whatever to sggest that he had !lanned the jihad in
advance and was now engineering a breach in order to bring it abot 91.
*n the contrary, his aim, ntil very late in the day, seems to have been to
enlist the s!!ort of the +asa rling classes either by genine conversion
or, failing that, by moral !ersasion and !ressre 99.
*n the other hand, it is also tre to say of $hehu that, while not seeking
a conflict, he was e-ally not !re!ared to com!romise in any way with his
conscience in order to avoid one. %he fact is that, having once set his
corse, he held to it withot regard for the !robability that sooner or later
it wold bring him into collision with the +asa athorities. #t the start of
his mission he had no dobt been strengthened in his determination by
the knowledge that a few years earlier, as has already been noted, two
'oslem reformers in the western Sdan G Ibrahima Sori in Fta &allon
and Sliman ,al in Fta %oro G had scceeded in defying and
overthrowing !agan governments 91. %he fact that both of them were
Flani, and that one of the two theocratic States which they had
established was in the contry from which his own ancestors had come to
+asaland, mst also have inflenced him. #t any rate, later, when Sarkin
>obir ,nCs re!ressive measres sddenly broght the danger of a
collision mch closer, he did not flinch or hesitate. *n the contrary, his
answer was to !ermit and indeed encorage his followers to frnish
themselves with arms and !re!are for war 9;. +e seems to have had no
-alms abot the $stice of this decision, which was to !rove a
momentos one, and once again he was no dobt fortified by the
knowledge that in similar circmstances #skia 'hammad had declared a
jihad and had been commended by "l3'aghili for having done so.
$arkin 6obir #unu was destined to rle for only two years and when he
died in 1=01 he was scceeded by his son Bnfa, ShehCs former !!il 9<.
37
When Yunfa became 4hief, his attitde to $hehu was ambivalent and
seems to have been determined !artly by the reverence of a !!il for his
master and !artly by the distrst of a rler for an over!owerfl sb$ect. #t
first he was conciliatory, bt later he smmoned $hehu to his !alace and
made an attem't on his life. %he move miscarried 95 however, and
ShehCs esca!e was natrally ascribed by his followers to divine
!rovidence. War was now almost inevitable and an incident occrred soon
afterwards to !reci!itate it.
*ne reslt of the earlier religios !ersection was that a gro! of !ios
'oslems, led by a follower of ShehCs called #bd Salami, decided to
emigrate. %hey therefore abandoned their homes, drove off their herds,
and went and settled in >imbana, a small town in the State of :ebbi.
#ngry at their defection, Bnfa sent a message ordering them to retrn.
%hey refsed. %his so incensed him that, with the concrrence of the 4hief
of :ebbi 96, he dis!atched an e)!edition against them. %his force took
>imbana by storm and ca!tred those of #bd SalamiCs men who had not
fled or been killed in the fighting 9=.
BnfaCs ne)t move was to send a message to $hehu saying that he
intended to do to .egel what he had already done to >imbana, and
advising him to de!art with his family before it was too late. $hehu
retrned a message sayingD
G I will not leave my commnity, bt I will leave yor contry, for >odCs
earth is wide 9/.
#t this Bnfa recanted and sent a second message, rging $hehu to stay,
bt he had shown his hand and the reformers no longer trsted him.
2ike the Pro!het 'hammad, $hehu now took refge in flight. *n 91
Febrary 1=0;, accom!anied by his brother Abdullahi, his son
Muhammadu #ello, and all his followers, he left .egel and withdrew to
the west. With them the fgitives took only their families, their cattle,
their arms, their books, a little food, and a few !ersonal !ossessions.
#s .egel was in the west of >obir, and >obir in the west of +asaland,
ShehCs retreat took him to the e)tremity of the oter marches. %he
contry there was an almost em!ty wilderness of sand, scrb, and stnted
trees. %here were a few oases of fertility, however, and at one of them, a
!lace called >d, the reformers now established themselves. It made as
good a fastness as cold be fond in those o!en !lains.
#t first Bnfa made no move against them. #fter a month or two,
however, when he heard of the nmber of men who were flocking to >d
to $oin Sheh, he !t ot a !roclamation forbidding it. #s a frther
deterrent he also gave orders that the goods of defectors were to be
se-estered 10 and, as a final measre, !osted !atrols to interce!t those
who still tried to get throgh. %hen in 'ay, following another im!lse of
his a!!arently vacillating character, he sddenly changed his tactics and
offered $hehu a reconciliation if he wold only retrn to .egel 11. ,t by
now $hehu was in no mood for com!romise. +e told the envoy that he
wold not retrn nless Bnfa re!ented of his sins, !rified the forms of
his worshi!, restored all the !ro!erty which he had confiscated, and
38
trned to righteosness and the tre faith 19.
When he received ShehCs answer, Bnfa smmoned all his concillors
and learned men and asked them whether he or Sheh was in the right.
%hey told him that $stice was on his side. +e therefore sent back a
message sayingD
G %ell $hehu that I am !re!aring for war, and let him make ready
against or meeting 11.
When this declaration reached them the Flani realized, beyond dobt,
that the die was finally cast. ,ello, ShehCs sons and sccessor, has
described how they received the news.
#t this we gathered together and took stock of or affairs. We decided
that it was not right for men to be leaderless, withot a 4hief, so then and
there we !aid homage to Sheh. We !romised to obey his commands and
to follow him alike in !ros!erity and adversity. +e acce!ted or allegiance
and himself vowed to follow the ,ook and the 2aw. %hese events took
!lace on the evening of the Wednesday. %he first to do homage were his
brother, the Waziri #bdllahi, then I ,ello, then Emar 'ai3#lkamm, and
then the whole concorse of 'oslems 1;.
It was on this day that $hehu was addressed for the first time as
4ommander of the Faithfl. Since then this title, in its +asa form of
Sarkin 'slmi, has always been borne by the Sltans of Sokoto. *n the
following day $hehu raised his standard and the jihad had begn.
%here is no evidence, direct or indirect, to indicate the nmber of men
who rallied rond $hehu at >d. ,y that time his adherents in
+asaland cold certainly be nmbered by thosands and his
sym!athizers !robably by tens of thosands. ,t to acce!t religios
direction or s!!ort demands for $dicial and social reform was one thing ?
to $oin a rebellion was em!hatically another. We can be sre that it was
only the hard core of reformers who at the otset took this e)treme ste!.
It is nlikely that, a!art from the women and children, they nmbered
more than a few thosand. BnfaCs conter3measres wold have sfficed
to hold back the half3hearted and in any case >d cold scarcely have
s!!orted greater nmbers.
%he ventre on which the reformers now embarked was an e)tremely
hazardos one and on any rational calclation it had only the slimmest
chance of scceeding. >obir was still the most !owerfl of the +asa
States and cold !t into the field an army of thosands of horse and tens
of thosands of foot. %o !it against this ShehCs followers had little or
nothing Gno base, no money, no armor, no reserves, not mch food,
and not many wea!ons, in the decisive arm, cavalry, they cold mster
only twenty horses and were weakest where the >obirawa were strongest.
In fact their only assets were moral ones G belief in their case, readiness
to stake their lives !on the otcome, and above all the faith that they
were the instrments of the divine will.
In all that contry there was no natral fortress in which the reformers
cold defend themselves against the army which Sarkin >obir was abot
to send against them. %hey knew, therefore, that before long they wold
39
have to fight a !itched battle. 'oreover, instead of waiting !assively to be
attacked, they now seized the initiative while Sarkin >obir was still
mobilizing his fedal army.
%heir first im!ortant move was against 'atankari, a town whose
horsemen had already been harrying them and whose contined activity
in the west wold threaten their rear as they faced Bnfa in the cast. %hey
therefore sallied forth from >d, foght the first engagements of the war
at >iniga and 'atankari, and won two heartening victories 1<.
%heir ne)t move was against ,irnin :onni, from whence they had also
been harried, and there they first showed their metal. %heir forces, nder
'hammad >ayar, left >d on a Wednesday evening, marched thirty
miles dring the night, invested :onni at dawn on the %hrsday, s!ent the
whole day breaching the great md walls of the town, took the !lace by
storm in the late afternoon, and then, becase of an alarm 7which later
!roved to be false8 that Sarkin >obir had sli!!ed behind them and was
attacking Sheh, made another forced march throgh the night to reach
>d by dawn on the Friday. %his meant that in the s!ace of thirty3si)
hors, in a climate as hot as any in the world, they had covered si)ty
miles on foot and foght and won a !rotracted battle. For a force of
ntried irreglars, who were sb$ect to no disci!line, this was an
astonding feat of arms 15.
G *n this day, said ,ello, we e)erted orselves to the limit of endrance.
It was now early &ne and the first rains had fallen. %hogh the re!ort
that the >obirawa were attacking >d !roved to be an e)aggeration,
their forces were in fact on the move. In the interval since the breach with
the Flani had become com!lete, Bnfa had not only been mstering his
own fedal levies bt had tried to !ersade his neighbors to send
contingents to strengthen his army. #fter the cavalier treatment that they
had received in the !ast, however, his brother 4hiefs in the other +asa
States were in no hrry to go to his assistance. %hey sent !romises of
hel!, bt no troo!s. "ven the con-ered towns of Aamfara, e)ce!t for
>mmi, managed to evade their obligations. #t any rate, a!art from the
%aregs who were always s!oiling for a fight, no reinforcements arrived
16.
With the rains a!!roaching, Bnfa seems to have grown im!atient at the
delay and to have decided that he cold safely take the field withot
allies. #fter all, his cortiers mst have told him, the reformers were only
a band of !oorly armed rebels whom they wold have no difficlty in
annihilating. %he idea that they might be defeated was !robably never
seriosly entertained.
When the >obir army set ot, its march was a leisrely affair, for the
fighting men were encmbered with women, cam! followers, and a
!rovision train 1=. BnfaCs strategy, which showed how confident he was
and which at the time seemed !erfectly sond, was to make his way
rond to the rear of the Flani in order to force them to do battle and
!revent their esca!ing to the west 1/. +e therefore made a wide circit to
the soth, which broght him to the shores of a little lake called *abkin
40
Kwatto abot twenty miles west of >d.
%he Flani had no difficlty in shadowing the >obir army as it made its
encircling movement. If they had wanted to avoid fighting they had !lenty
of time to e)tricate themselves before the enemy cold !enetrate to their
rear. #s it was, they waited at >d till the >obirawa had reached the lake
and then made another night march to challenge them. %his was a shrewd
tactical strike, becase it was the last move that the >obirawa e)!ected
and it gave them the advantage of sr!rise.
*n the morning of 91 &ne 1=0; the army of >obir was encam!ed near
the lake. It is evident from the !oem which #bdllahi afterwards wrote
abot the battle that they were taken nawares.
#nd we came !on them on %hrsday
#t @rdam before midday, in the high !laces?
#nd they had s!itted meats arond the fire,
#nd gathered ready in tents
Fine vestments in a chest,
#nd all kinds of car!ets, with cshions ;0.
#fter their long march the Flani did not attack at once bt made their
way to the lakeside to refresh themselves, !erform their ceremonial
abltions, and water their horses. %his gave the >obirawa a short res!ite
in which to !re!are themselves for the coming battle.
%o the north of *abkin Kwatto are two little hills, set close together, and
as the grond rises from the lake to their bases the bsh thins ot into
fairly o!en grond. It was here that the >obirawa drew ! their line of
battle. #s they had the advantage of nmbers, and needed s!ace in which
to de!loy their heavy cavalry, this was tactically the right move for them
to make ;1. %he Flani, on the other hand, as they !ossessed !ractically
no cavalry and had to rely almost entirely on their bowmen, wold have
been well advised to fight a defensive, battle from !re!ared !ositions.
%hey were in a mood of sober e)altation, however, like the Ironsides
before (aseby, and determined to !t the isse to the test. When they
had refreshed themselves, therefore, they left the cover of the trees rond
the lake and marched ot to the o!en, rising grond where the great host
of >obir was being marshalled into a line of battle.
%hanks to #bdllahi and ,ello we have a good idea of the corse which
the fighting took. It began abot midday with the >obirawa discharging
their mskets which, however, !roved ineffective ;9. #fter that, like
#gincort which it strikingly resembles, the battle develo!ed into a contest
between the shock of heavy cavalry and the attrition of lightly armed bt
highly skilled archers. +ere is ,elloCs characteristically terse descri!tion of
it.
%he enemy made ready and took ! their !ositions. %hey had donned mail
and -ilted armor, and with their shields they formed their line against
s. We too formed or line against them and every man looked s-arely
into the eyes of his foe. %hen we shoted or battle3cry three times, #llah
#kbar, and charged against them. #t this their drms beat lodly and they
too charged against s. When the two lines met their right wing overbore
41
or left wing and !ressed it back !on or centre. %heir left wing also
overbore or right wing and !ressed it back !on or centre. ,t or
centre stood fast and when or right wing and or left wing came !
against it they too stood fast and yielded no more. %hen the two armies
were locked together and the battle raged ;1.
It is evident that at this stage of the battle the little Flani force, having
been com!ressed into a s-are and com!letely envelo!ed by the mch
larger >obir army, was in imminent danger of com!lete annihilation.
Indeed, as they had no !ikes to kee! the enemy cavalry at bay, it is a
marvel that their s-are was not broken and the fragments swe!t from
the field. For Bnfa, victory mst have seemed assred. ,t the s-are
did not break and, $st as at #gincort the "nglish archers hmbled the
chivalry of France, so at %abkin :watto the Flani bowmen gradally
mastered the >obir cavalry.
4haracteristically, and certainly withot cant or affectation, ,ello ascribed
the glory to >od.
%he 2ord broke the army of the godless, so that they fell back, and in their
flight they were scattered.... We followed at their heels and slew them
with great slaghter.... >od alone knows the nmber of those who
!erished.... #ll day we !rsed them and only at dsk did we retrn to
say the evening !rayer and to give thanks to >od, the 2ord of 4reation
;;.
+e went on to describe it as the greatest battle of the jihad and com!ared
it to the victory which the Pro!het had won over the 'eccans at ,adr. %o
$hehu it was !roof that he was the chosen instrment of >od.
(otes
1. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. =<8.
9. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. ;58.
1. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !!. =5 and /58.
; ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. 9;368.
<. Ibid. !!. 9639/.
5. Ibid. !!. 9/3;1.
6. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. =58.
=. Sarki7n8 is the +asa word for a 4hief or "mir.
/. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. =58.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid. !. ==.
19. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 19.
11. #bdllahi -oted by $hehu in "anbikhu'l Ikhan 7%I8, translated by +. R. Palmer,
&ornal of the #frican Society, vol. MIJ, !!. 1=/3/9.
1;. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 91. #lha$i &naid confirms that at this !eriod
$hehu was treated with great deference by ,awa and his 4ort.
1<. Ibid. !. 1/.
15. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. /58, and #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 11.
16. #bdIlah -oted by $hehu in %I 7Palmer, &#S, vol. MIJ, !!. 1=/3/98.
1=. Ibid. !. 1/0.
1/. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. ;=8.
90. Sheh, %I 7cf. Palmer, &#S, vol. MIJ, !!. 1=/3/08.
91. '. R. Waldman, %he Flani &ihadD # Reassessment, &ornal of #frican +istory, vol. JI,
42
1, !!. 1<03<.
99. Ibid.
91. %rimingham, o!. cit. !!. 15139.
9;. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 10<8.
9<. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 1/.
95. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 10=8.
96. ,ello, Sard al-Kalam 7S:8, translated into +asa in 2+d', vol. 1, !!. 1/31<.
9=. Ibid. !!. 1/390
9/. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 10=8.
10. Sheh, %I 7Palmer, &#S, vol. MIJ, !. 1/08.
11. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. <08.
19. Ibid.
11. Ibid. 7cf. #rnett, !. <18.
1;. Ibid. Waziri is the +asa form of Jizier.
1<. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. <98.
15. Ibid. !!. <13<;.
16. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. <;3<<8.
1=. Ibid.
1/. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 10/8.
;0. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 1198.
;1. Ibid.
;9. Ibid.
;1. ,ello, Inf '.
;;. ,ello, Inf '. %he !lace where ,ello and #bdllahi said their !rayers is near the lake
and can be seen in !hotogra!h (o. 1 7b8.
43
(ha'ter +ive
*he Jihad in $okoto
,y their victory at *abkin Kwatto the Flani had saved themselves from
e)tinction, bt a long, hard road still lay in front of them. %heir most
!ressing difficlty was an acte shortage of food, a shortage which had
originated in the hrried flight from their homes and which had afterwards
been aggravated by the interdiction !laced on them by Sarkin >obir. %he
barren scrbland into which they had retreated was s!arsely !o!lated
and did not lend itself to farming. With the onset of the rains $hehu
therefore decided to leave >d and move into an area where his
followers cold s!!ort themselves.
(ews of the defeat of the >obirawa at *abkin Kwatto was nowhere more
welcome than in the towns of Aamfara. (early two generations earlier, as
we have already seen, the old kingdom of Aamfara had disintegrated
nder the onslaght of >obir. %he ca!ital had been sacked and never
rebilt. %he whole of the northern and western !art of the territory had
been incor!orated into >obir and those of the !eo!le who had not fled had
had to recognize Sarkin >obir as their !aramont 4hief. *nly in the cast
and more !articlarly the soth had they retained any measre of
inde!endence. %here, on the edge of the Rma ,sh and on the blrred
frontier between +asaland and the !agan territories which lay beyond, a
nmber of their towns acknowledged the nominal szerainty of >obir
withot in fact having to sbmit to mch control from distant #lkalawa.
%hese towns were elated by the news of the Flani victory at %abkin
:watto and the 4hiefs of two of the largest, ,kwim and %alata 'afara,
immediately sent envoys to $hehu, as did $arkin #urmi of ,akra 1.
%he Flani leaders were rece!tive to these overtres and an alliance was
formed. #s a reslt of it, $hehu and his followers were able to leave their
retreat in &ly 1=0; and move down into the more fertile contry rond
the conflence of the Rima and Sokoto Rivers. In doing so they had to
!art com!any with their Flani and %areg allies in the far north. %o set
against this disadvantage, however, was the gain of being able to $oin
forces with Muhammadu Moyijo, a Flani who had offered his services
to $hehu at the otset and who had sbse-ently established himself in a
strong !osition at Babo 9. %here, in what are now the home districts of
Sokoto, they s!ent the rainy season of 1=0;, recriting their strength for
the strggle which they knew they wold have to renew as soon as the
dry season came rond again.
.ring the lll enforced by the rains $hehu wrote letters to all the 4hiefs
of +asaland to e)!lain why he had raised his banner against Sarkin
>obir. +e was fighting for trth against falsehood, he said, and he called
!on them to $oin him in the strggle. %he other +asa States had little
case to love >obir and at one time it seemed as if :ano and Aazza.
might res!ond. %o a greater or lesser degree, however, they were all
44
ss!icios of $hehuCs movement and so in the end they closed their ranks
and s!rned his overtres.
If the other +asa 4hiefs had res!onded to $hehuCs message, the $ihad
wold have taken on a different character and !robably rn a com!letely
different corse. #s it was, their re$ection of it !rodced a nmber of
im!ortant conse-ences. First of all it meant that, at any rate in the early
years, $hehu was not to find very many active s!!orters among the
+asas with the notable e)ce!tion of the Aamfarawa. #s a reslt the war,
which $hehu himself regarded as a !rely religios one, tended
nevertheless to develo! along ethnic lines and to become, in the main, a
strggle between the Flani and their miscellaneos allies on one side and
the +asa and later :anri rling classes on the other. %his in trn cased
the +asa and :anri 4hiefs, who after all were 'oslems themselves,
even if not very devot ones, to regard $hehuCs movement less as a $ihad
than as a Flani insrrection. %he stern measres they took against the
reformers fell most of all !on the Flani, who formed the backbone of the
movement, and aggravated the tendency of the two sides to divide on
racial rather than religios lines. %hey also had the effect of s!reading the
war, dring the ne)t few years, over the whole of +asaland and western
,orn 1.
%he second event of im!ortance which took !lace dring the rains of 1=0;
was the attem!t to !atch ! !eace between the Flani and >obirawa. %he
intermediary was Sarkin >mmi, the 4hief of a large Aamfara town which
had remained loyal to Sarkin >obir. $hehu and his advisers declared that
they were ready to negotiate, bt they distrsted the 4ort cli-e at
#lkalawa and insisted on dealing with Bnfa himself. Yunfa, however,
declined to meet them and so the move came to nothing ;.
%he failre of these two attem!ts at conciliation at least sim!lified
$hehuCs !roblems. +e and his advisers now knew that they stood alone
and cold e)!ect no hel! or encoragement of any kind from any of the
other +asa States. %hey also knew that with >obir there cold now be no
com!romise and that if their case was to srvive they had to fight it ot
ntil one or other was crshed.
It was in these circmstances that the Flani decided, towards the end of
the rains of 1=0;, to lanch a ma$or attack on #lkalawa, the >obir ca!ital.
%hey mst have been encoraged in their !lans by the arrival at abot
this time of a strong force of their kinsmen who had been driven ot of
:atsina by the +asa 4hief <. Since %abkin :watto they had also had as
allies the fierce bt fickle %aregs of #dar and #ir. Pre!arations for the
cam!aign were therefore !t in hand and the command was entrsted to
$hehuCs yonger brother Abdullahi on whom the title of Waziri or Jizier
had been conferred. %he !lan of cam!aign was sim!ly to sbde the
towns and villages arond #lkalawa and then, at the right moment, to
lanch a decisive attack and take the !lace by storm.
+aving been fonded after >obirCs defeat of Aamfara, the city of #lkalawa
was at that time of com!aratively recent origin. 2ike all the ma$or towns
of +asaland, it was !rotected by a massive wall of sn3baked clay. %he
45
gates which !ierced these walls were strongly fortified. %he walls
themselves were frnished with a !ara!et and the !ara!et with
crenellations to enable the defenders to shoot withot e)!osing
themselves. %he assalting forces, on the other hand, were first of all
faced with a dry moat which was !lanted with a dense and virtally
im!enetrable thorn called sarkakkiya 5. When they had cleared a way
throgh this they still had to negotiate the almost sheer face of the wall,
!erha!s thirty feet in height, which was finished with a smooth md
!laster and which therefore !resented no hold for hand or foot.
#t this date there were very few fire3arms in the central Sdan and little if
any artillery. %he breaching and storming of fortified walls was therefore
normally entrsted to shock troo!s !rotected by -ilted armor or chain
mail. #t a later stage of the war, thanks to the arms and horses which
they ca!tred in their battles, the Flani were as well e-i!!ed as their
enemies. In this first year, however, they still had very few horsemen and
!ractically no armor.
%he first !art of the new cam!aign went according to !lan. In (ovember
1=0; the Flani advanced into >obir and invested the city. %hey fond the
wall in good re!air, however, and very heavily defended. (evertheless
they tried to take the !lace by storm. +ad they scceeded they wold
have saved themselves for years of hard fighting. #s it was they only
$st failed. ,ello, who !layed a leading !art in the fighting, deals very
tersely with this reverse.
SWe foght a hotly3contested battleT, he wrote, Sand were within an ace of
gaining an entry into the city. In the fighting great nmbers of the enemy
were killed and many of or men also fond martyrdomT 6.
%o a case like $hehuCs a re!lse of this natre was bad enogh, bt
worse was to follow. Its first frit was the desertion of the %aregs. #t the
best of times they were fickle allies and now they seem to have conclded
that the reformers were not after all going to !revail. #t any rate, they not
only left the besiegers in the lrch in front of #lkalawa bt, having
retrned to their homes, they also started raiding isolated and defenceless
Flani settlements in the northern marches =.
%he reaction of the Flani to these events was swift, indeed too swift.
$hehu had not accom!anied the e)!edition against #lkalawa, bt he now
set ot to $oin it, taking reinforcements with him. Withot waiting for
these reinforcements to arrive, the a!iri Abdullahi led a !nitive
e)!edition against the %aregs. ,ello, meanwhile, ke!t watch over
#lkalawa, bt his forces were de!leted and he himself was sick. %he
>obirawa, !erceiving that the Flani were dangerosly dis!ersed, now
decided to come ot of the city and fight in the o!en /.
%he ensing battle took !lace at %sntswa, a village $st otside
#lkalawa, and the reslt was a decisive defeat for the Flani. Fortnately
for them, $hehu and his reinforcements arrived in the nick of time to
!revent a disaster. "ven so, they lost two thosand of their best men.
#mong those killed were the 4hief $stice Muhammadu $ambo, the
46
Standard ,earer $a-adu, and two hndred 'allams noted for their !iety
and learning 10.
With the hel! of the reinforcements broght ! by $hehu, the Flani were
able to conter3attack and they eventally scceeded in driving the
>obirawa back and brying their dead. %hey were now too weak to invest
the city, however, and so they had to raise the siege and retire 11.
%he failre to take #lkalawa !t an end to all ho!e of an early end to the
war. It also !t $hehuCs case in $eo!ardy again. %he Flani still had no
territory of their own. %he %aregs, one of their only two allies, had
abandoned them and for the ne)t eighteen months were to be among
their most dangeros enemies. %he >obirawa, on the other hand, were
resrgent and cold e)!ect s!!ort from the other +asa States. Perha!s
most serios of all, the defeat at %sntswa had obliterated the moral
effect of the victory at *abkin Kwatto.
%he $ihad began and ended in what is now the northern !art of Sokoto
Province. ,etween its first and last acts, however, the scene shifted to the
soth and soth3west.
#fter the reverse at %sntswa, $hehuCs forces, which were again !laged
by hnger and lack of s!!lies, retrned to the territory of their Aamfara
allies, which they reached early in 1=0<. %his time they decided to make
their base at Sabongari, a remote !lace in the !!er valley of the >awan
>lbi or .ead River. It was there that #barshi, one of the claimants to the
4hieftaincy of Aamfara, had already made his head-arters 19.
#mong the +asas who had $oined $hehuCs ranks there were a nmber of
:ebbi men. *ne of these was Esman 'asa, a member of the rling
family who had -arrelled with the 4hief, 'hammad +odi, and thrown
off his allegiance. +e now sggested to the Flani leaders that they shold
attack :ebbi 11.
:ebbi was the most westerly of the tre +asa States. >eogra!hically it
occ!ied the lower valley of the Rima and its main links with the rest of
+asaland lay throgh Aamfara. %he destrction of Aamfara by >obir had
tended to weaken these links, however, and now the a!!earance of the
Flani on the >awan >lbi and their alliance with the inde!endent
Aamfara towns had the effect of isolating :ebbi still frther.
%he Flani leaders were no dobt mindfl of the fact that $hehu had
many adherents among the :ebbawa. %hey also realized that :ebbi, if
they cold only gain !ossession of it, was rich and fertile enogh to
!rovide them with the base which they needed if they were to establish
their athority over the rest of +asaland. *n the other hand, althogh
:ebbi was no longer the force it had been in KantaCs time, it was still one
of the ma$or +asa States and the :ebbawa were well known for their
fighting -alities. In the circmstances in which the Flani then fond
themselves, the decision to trn their backs on >obir while they lanched
a ma$or attack on :ebbi was a bold and, as it trned ot, ins!ired stroke
of strategy.
$hehu !t the e)!edition against :ebbi nder the $oint command of the
a!iri Abdullahi and Aliyu Jaidu, who had been a!!ointed $arkin Yaki
47
or 4a!tain3>eneral. %hey set ot in 'arch 1=0<, dring the hot weather
which !recedes the rains, and first marched soth to the Aamfara Jalley
where the town of >mmi, thogh of Aamfara origin, was still loyal to its
new >obir overlords. %o remove the threat which it wold otherwise have
constitted to their rear the Flani now attacked the >mmi forces and
com!elled the 4hief to se for !eace 1;.
+eartened by this early sccess, and no dobt strengthened by volnteers
!icked ! on the march, they then trned westward. ,y the time they
entered :ebbi they had sch a formidable force that most of the enemy
towns o!ened their gates and sbmitted. %hose which offered resistance
were -ickly redced 1<.
Within a short time of setting ot, Abdullahi and Aliyu Jaidu were at the
walls of ,irnin :ebbi. %he ca!ital !t ! a brief resistance bt on 19 #!ril
1=0< they breached the walls and took the !lace by storm. %he booty
which they ca!tred was greater than they had ever taken before or were
ever to take again 15.
When ,irnin :ebbi fell, the 4hief of :ebbi, Muhammadu Hodi, managed
to elde ca!tre and fled to the north. %o the Flani, in the flsh of
victory, his esca!e !robably seemed to be of little moment, bt in fact it
was to have serios conse-ences. In his stead Abdullahi installed
/suman Masa as 4hief of :ebbi. +is being a member of the legitimate
family did not alter the fact that he was a !!!et and that $hehu, by
right of con-est, was now master of the greater !art of one of the ma$or
+asa States.
%he :ebbi cam!aign, which had been boldly conceived, was carried
throgh with s!eed and decision. In the s!ace of two months the
reformers seemed to have restored their fortnes. While they had been
winning their victories in the west, however, fresh troble had been
brewing in the east.
When the army of one !eo!le is -artered in the contry of another there
is bond to be friction between the troo!s and civilians. %his was the
difficlty which now arose between $hehuCs forces, which were com!osed
in the main of Flani, and their Aamfara allies.
%he !rimary case of the troble seems to have been the !erennial
!roblem of finding food. $hehuCs followers were of corse volnteers and
irreglars. %here was no chest from which to !ay them and, a!art from
the s!oils of war, they had to e)ist as best they cold. .ring the rains of
1=0; they !robably grew a little food, bt when that was e)hasted they
had to live on the contry again. %he foraging !arties which they sent ot
were no dobt given orders to res!ect the !ro!erty of allies, bt hngry
men do not troble abot sch niceties. #s a reslt, there were certainly
instances of food being forcibly commandeered, if not of downright
!lndering, and at least one case of re!risals being taken 16.
#nother factor in the breach may well have been the attitde of the !eo!le
of Aamfara themselves. #t the start of the war the Aamfarawa were glad
enogh to have $hehu as an ally. #fter the reverses at #lkalawa and
%sntswa, however, they may well have decided, like the %aregs, that
48
the reformers were not after all ca!able of winning the war and were
therefore no longer worth backing.
Wherever the falt lay, the facts were that while #bdllahi was winning his
cam!aign in :ebbi, relations between the Aamfarawa and the rest of
$hehuCs forces, which had remained behind nder ,ello to watch and
harry the >obirawa, went from bad to worse. ,efore long there was o!en
enmity between them. In describing it, ,ello was remarkably ob$ective.
G #ll Aamfara rose against s, he wrote, becase ... or !eo!le were
o!!ressing them. %hey thoght that by o!!ression they wold gain their
ends bt the Aamfarawa resented it and or case was in$red. 1=
For a short !eriod before the conclsion of the :ebbi cam!aign the Flani
fond themselves in a sitation where one base was beginning to crmble
beneath them while they were still engaged in trying to establish another.
+ad they failed in :ebbi they wold have been in a des!erate !light with
no territory of their own and >obir, Aamfara, and :ebbi all ranged against
them. #s it was, however, #bdllahiCs swift sccess secred a new and
mch better base in the west and enabled them to take the initiative again
in the cast.
#s soon as it was safe to do so ,ello trned his attention to the dissident
Aamfara towns.
HI was ordered by $hehu to lead an e)!edition against Sarkin Aamfara for
we had received news that he was assisting or enemies, the >obirawa
and %aregs. I therefore set ot at the end of the month of Muharram and
after a few days march halted at the gate of >armai.... I soght to !arley
with Sarkin Aamfara bt he refsed. I begged him to hel! s and not to
hel! or enemies. #gain he refsed.I 1/
When the terms which he had offered were re$ected, #ello strck with a
ferocity to which he very seldom had recorse. >armai and fifty other
towns were sacked and the whole contryside laid waste 90.
%he Aamfara towns had !roved to be false friends and were made to !ay a
heavy !rice for their defection. In a cam!aign which lasted throgh the
rains of 1=0< ,ello broke their strength and gave warning to the rest of
the +asas that the Flani were not to be trifled with.
%he defection of the Aamfarawa and the devastation of mch of their
territory made Sabongari an nsitable head-arters. Sothern :ebbi, on
the other hand, now lay docile nder the rle of the new 4hief, /suman
Masa. $hehu therefore decided to move and dring the rainy season of
1=0< he and his followers installed themselves in >wand 91.
While the reformers had been engaged in sbding :ebbi and sothern
Aamfara the >obirawa had not been idle. Seeing the fate of another instils
the fear of >od, says the +asa !roverb, and the rlers of the other
States, who ntil then had remained indifferent or lethargic, were at last
beginning to realize their danger. Where he had !reviosly been
frstrated, therefore, $arkin 6obir now scceeded in creating a coalition
dedicated to the !r!ose of crshing the Flani. %he northern !art of
:ebbi, which had not been sbded by #bdllahi, natrally entered this
alliance, as no dobt did some dissidents from the Aamfara towns which
49
#ello had scorged. %he other +asa States, besides harrying their own
Flani at home, also seem to have sent contingents to >obir and the
%aregs certainly rallied in considerable strength. In the atmn of 1=0<,
when the harvest had been gathered, a great army began to mster in the
north. In *ctober or (ovember, as soon as the floods had receded, this
army set off down the Rima Jalley 99. Its ob$ective was the com!lete
annihilation of $hehuCs forces.
+itherto the intelligence system of the Flani had been good and they had
always had some !revios knowledge of their enemiesC intentions. *n this
occasion, however, they seem either to have been caght n!re!ared or
else to have nderestimated the size of the great host which was now
bearing down !on them. #t any rate, their own forces were scattered and
one detachment, which was laying siege to #gi right in the !ath of the
a!!roaching army, had to beat a hasty retreat on >wand 91.
In their !ast fighting $hehuCs adherents had invariably taken the
offensive, even when heavily otnmbered, and e)ce!t at #lkalawa their
aggressive tactics had always !aid. (ow one faction, led by $arkin Yaki
Aliyu Jaidu, favored going ot to meet the enemy and risking
everything in a !itched battle. ,t another faction, whose leader was
,ello, advocated a defensive strategy. #fter some debate, the hotheads
!revailed and it was decided that the army, $ointly commanded by Aliyu
Jaidu and the a!iri Abdullahi, shold take the field and seek battle 9;.
It is worth noting here that $hehu himself took no !art in this debate.
%hese were mndane affairs and he was content to leave them entirely to
his !olitical and military leaders. +e did intervene, however, when the
dis!te over strategy threatened the nity of his case. +earing that ,ello
had declined to march ot with the rest of the army, $hehu remonstrated
with him and !revailed !on him to follow.
G +e said that I oght to accom!any them, ,ello wrote afterwards, lest if
they were defeated it shold be said that by staying behind I had cased
others to hang back. 9<
In this e!isode we catch a glim!se of serios dissension in the Flani
cam! and hear for the first time an admission that defeat is !ossible.
When #ello $oined the others in the field they held another concil of war.
#bdllahi now s!!orted ,ello in advocating a retirement, bt #liy &aid
was still insistent on taking the offensive. %he disagreements of the
leaders were reflected in the movements of the army which advanced, fell
back, and then advanced again. What was more serios was that the
vacillations of the commanders affected the disci!line and morale of the
troo!s.
%he men who had originally enrolled nder $hehuCs banner were devot
'oslems obeying the smmons of their consciences. 2ater on they were
dobtless $oined by others who had no strong religios feelings bt who
res!onded to the call of blood or race. It is safe to say that, ntil the
battle of *abkin Kwatto, the ma$or !art of $hehuCs s!!orters belonged
to one or the other of these two gro!s. #fterwards, however, when the
!ros!ects of ltimate victory had sddenly become mch brighter, a
50
certain nmber of men of a com!letely different stam! evidently $oined
the ranks. #t best they were o!!ortnists, at worst riff3raff. In +asaland
there have always been !lenty of !eo!le of this kind, ever ready to dro!
their hmdrm !rsits and $oin any case, good or bad, which offers
them the !ros!ects of adventre or gain. #fter their a!!earance, $hehuCs
forces, as their recent condct in Aamfara had shown, had ceased to be
an army of scholars and zealots. (ow, for the first and indeed only time,
they were to get ot of band in the !resence of the enemy 95.
*n the eve of the battle, when the army had advanced to the little town of
:wolda, the troo!s sddenly threw off their disci!line and ransacked the
!lace. +ere is ,elloCs accont of the mtiny.
H(ow this town was not at war with s and indeed half the inhabitants
were or own !eo!le. Bet or warriors attacked them and !lndered them
of all they had. %he a!iri Abdullahi ordered them to Sto! bt they
refsed to obey him. %hen 1 too went into the town to !revent more
!lndering bt I came near to being killed and was forced to withdraw.I
96
%he !lndering of :wolda has always lain heavily on the conscience of the
Flani and many of them have attribted to it the calamities which
immediately followed.
#fter the mtiny #ello and Abdullahi again rged a withdrawal. #liy
&aid and his s!!orters wold not hear of it, however, and so the army
advanced again ntil it made contact with the enemy near the town of
#lwasa 9=.
,y this time the Flani forces were mch better e-i!!ed than they had
ever been before. %hey still relied heavily on their bowmen, it is tre, bt
the s!oils of many victories had given them the horses, arms, mail, and
-ilted armor which they had hitherto lacked. %hey were of corse
otnmbered by the great host which $arkin 6obir had broght against
them, bt the odds were certainly less danting than those they had faced
at %abkin :watto. (evertheless, #lwasa !roved to be a disastros defeat
for them. When the crnch came their left wing crm!led nder the
onslaght of the %aregs and their whole line of battle was rolled !. %he
leaders tried in vain to rally the men, bt there was no holding them and
they fell back in the tmost confsion on >wand with losses which #ello
!t at a thosand men killed 9/. %his was the only battle in the cam!aign
in which the Flani failed to $stify their re!tation as resolte and
stbborn fighters.
.ring the ne)t five days $hehu and his followers faced the great crisis of
the war. %he town of >wand, on which the broken army now fell back,
lay then, as now, in a hollow srronded by low, flatto!!ed hills of bronze
and !r!le laterite. It had no walls or fortifications of any kind 10 and was
soon srronded by the victorios allies. %o make matters worse, the
!eo!le of sothern :ebbi, led by the trncoat /suman Masa, now
renonced their allegiance to $hehu and $oined the enemy 11. For the
reformers, defeated and demoralized as they were, the sitation cold
hardly have been more des!erate.
51
%here is little dobt that if the enemy had been swift in following ! their
victory at #lwasa with a determined attack on >wand they mst have
ca!tred the !lace. %he Flani leaders wold then have had the choice of
dying in battle, ca!itlating, or fleeing, and whichever corse they might
have taken their case wold have been lost. For two days, from the
Satrday to the 'onday, the !rize was there for the taking and for three
more days after that the fate of the movement and the whole ftre of
+asaland still hng in the balance.
#t this moment of s!reme crisis it was not the redobtable #ello nor the
gifted Abdullahi nor the belligerent Aliyu Jaidu who rallied the
demoralized reformers bt the frail, devot, and nworldly $hehu. 7t is
characteristic of him that even now, with his army defeated, his
ca'tains at odds with one another, and his whole cause in
jeo'ardy, he continued to e5ert his authority by 'urely s'iritual
means% 7nstead of taking 'ersonal command, as in the
circumstances almost any other leader would have done, he
sought to restore the morale of his followers through 'rayer and
e5hortation. We have #elloCs testimony for the remarkable sccess he
had in commnicating to them his own nshaken sense of faith and
!r!oseD
H$hehu came ot from the mos-e and !reached to the !eo!le. With
loving3kindness he e)horted them to forsake evil3doing and trn into the
!aths of righteosness. +e !rayed for victory and his words made them
eager to fight againI 19.
%here is no better illstration than this of the e)traordinary inflence
which $hehu e)erted over his contem!oraries.
From the Snday ntil the Wednesday the reformers scceeded in
re!elling the steadily monting scale of attacks which the allies made
!on them. ,y the %hrsday they had recovered sfficiently from their
defeat to nleash a fierce conter3attack 11. While on the defensive, they
had been ham!ered by >wandCs lack of fortifications. #s soon as they
went over to the offensive, however, they were greatly aided by the
natre of the terrain rond the town. *n the stony !latea) and stee!
escar!ments of the srronding hills the >obir heavy cavalry and the
%areg camel cor!s fond movement difficlt and manoevre im!ossible.
%he lightly armed Flani bowmen, on the other hand, were in their
element. In a day of !rolonged and bitter fighting they restored their self3
res!ect, avenged #lwasa, and trned the tide of war.
%he si) days which covered the battles of #lwasa and >wand were
n-estionably the most critical of the whole war. If #lwasa broght
$hehuCs case to the very verge of rin, >wand certainly sealed >obirCs
fate.
#fter the victory at >wand and the flight of the allied army, the Flani
had no difficlty in stam!ing ot the rising of the :ebbawa. %he soth
sbmitted withot mch strggle and in the north the large riverain towns
of >lma, Aazzagawa, and Sawa, which had hitherto !reserved their
inde!endence, were redced or overawed. ,efore the end of the dry
52
season, in fact, all :ebbi, e)ce!t the towns of #gi and #rgng, had been
sbded and the doble3traitor, /suman Masa, had been rn to earth
and killed 1;. #fter their nha!!y e)!erience with him the reformers did
not a!!oint a sccessor or !ersevere with their liberal and conciliatory
!olicy. Instead they themselves now took over the reins of government.
+aving consolidated their base in :ebbi, their ne)t moves were first to
reassert their athority over sothern Aamfara and then to move
northwards into eastern Aamfara. ,y doing so they were driving a wedge
between >obir and :atsina, where the Flani had already risen against the
+asa 4hief, and ths making the first move in the isolation and
encirclement of >obir.
%his northward thrst broght abot the last ma$or battle in the western
theatre of war. In 'arch 1=05 the >obirawa, s!!orted by the %aregs,
the ,rmawa, the :atsinawa of :iyawa, and the dissident Aamfarawa
nder their trncoat 4hief #barshi, !t a large army into the field in the
!!er Rima Jalley near Armi. %he Flani, nder the command of
(amoda, met them at the battle of Fafara and won a crshing victory 1<.
%his battle had two im!ortant reslts, the one immediate and the other
delayed. %he hostile Aamfarawa were finally knocked ot of the war and,
later in the year, the %aregs made a se!arate !eace with the Flani 15.
%hese twin sccesses carried the isolation of >obir two stages frther.
In the atmn of 1=05 the Flani made a second attack on #lkalawa. #liy
&aid was in command, bt he showed himself to be mch more catios
than he had been at #lwasa. In fact, he contented himself with harrying
the >obirawa and laying waste the srronding contry, bt did not
attem!t a direct assalt 16.
%he ne)t develo!ment in the cam!aign was that early in 1=06 the
reformers in :atsina, who bad gradally been gaining the !!er hand, at
length ca!tred the city and soon afterwards made themselves masters of
the whole "mirate. %his sccess com!leted the encirclement of >obir. #s
:ano and Aazza were already hard !ressed, there was now no chance of
Bnfa being saved by his neighbors. $hehuCs forces cold therefore
afford to take their time.
In its last eighteen months the war in the west entered a !hase of
attrition. For the remainder of 1=06 and the first !art of 1=0= the Flani
were again content to contain #lkalawa and wear down the defenders.
'eanwhile they concentrated on com!leting the sb$gation of :ebbi and
the occ!ation of Aamfara 1=. ,y the atmn of 1=0=, however, it was
a!!arent that #lkalawa was ri!e for the !lcking. ,ello, thogh still only
twenty3nine years of age, was already a veteran in e)!erience, and
$hehu decided to entrst the s!reme command to him 1/. +e had often
commanded before, of corse, bt never in an o!eration of sch
im!ortance. Frthermore, this was the first time that he had been
!referred to Abdullahi and Aliyu Jaidu for a command which they both
mst have coveted. #liy &aid evidently agreed to serve nder him, bt
Abdullahi seems to have been nwilling to do so. #t any rate, he was not
!resent dring the final act ;0. "arly in the dry season #ello marched into
53
>obir with three se!arate colmns and -ickly drove the enemy back into
the ca!ital. %he city was then closely invested with the :atsina Flani,
nder their new Emir /maru 4allaji, holding the ring to the soth and
west, the Aamfara Flani nder (amoda to the north, and $hehuCs own
forces nder #liy &aid to the east ;1.
#fter for and a half years of fighting the strength had gone ot of >obir
and the end came -ickly. #ello, as terse in trim!h as in disaster,
described the final victory withot vainglory.
H>od then o!ened #lkalawa to s. In the twinkling of an eye, the 'oslems
hrled themselves on the enemy, killing them and making them ca!tive.
Bnfa was slain and all his followers by his side. %hanks be to >odI ;9.
#ccording to a legend treasred by the Flani, $hehu received
s!ernatral intimation of the victory and knew of it long before ,elloCs
straining messenger cold reach him ;1. For him and his faithfl followers
it was the crowning mercy.
(otes
1. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 598.
9. Ibid.
1. #bdllahi, -oted by $hehu in %I 7Palmer, &#S, vol. MIJ, !. 1/18.
;. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. 5;35<8.
<. Ibid. !. 55.
5. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 568.
6. Ibid.
=. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett !. 568.
/. Ibid. !. 5=.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
19. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of #nka. %he river is so called becase in normal years its flow
is ndergrond and it a!!ears on the srface only in years of heavy rainfall.
11. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 698.
1;. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 11<8.
1<. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. 693618.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid. !!. 6;36<.
1=. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 668.
1/. Ibid. !. 6<.
90. Ibid.
91. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 9<
99. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. =18
91. Ibid.
9;. Ibid. !. =9
9<. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. =98.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
9=. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. =98.
9/. Ibid.
10. %he walls of >wand were not bilt ntiI the following year. See %he >azetteer of
Sokoto Province, !. 96.
11. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. =13=<8.
19. Inf ' 7#rnett, !. =18.
11. Ibid.
54
1;. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. =<3=58.
1<. Ibid. !!. =/3/1.
15. %he >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 96. %he %areg tribes mainly concerned were
the :elgeres of #ir and the Itesen of #dar. See (ote / in #!!endi) I.
16. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. /13/98.
1=. %he >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 96.
1/. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. /;8.
;0. See (ote to in #!!endi) I.
;1. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. /;3/<8.
;9. Ibid. !. /<.
;1. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 91.
55
(ha'ter $i5
*he Jihad in Katsina, Kano, and 8a!!au
Katsina
:atsina, it will be remembered, was one of the original +asa States and
had always been in the first flight. Its ca!ital, with walls nearly eight miles
in circmference, was an im!ortant centre in the trades of both the
Sahara and the Sdan and its !eo!le were renowned throghot
+asaland for their learning.
In earlier times :atsinaCs main rival had been :ano and wars between
them had been fre-ent. ,t in the eighteenth centry the >obirawa,
after their move from #ir, had become the !rinci!al enemy. #s a reslt,
after >obir had defeated Aamfara and occ!ied half its territory, :atsina
had s!!orted the Aamfara diehards and ke!t their resistance alive,
!articlarly in the town of :iyawa. %his had led to intermittent bt long3
drawn3ot hostilities which had weakened both sides and which had not
come to an end ntil the :atsinawa had defeated and killed Sarkin >obir
Bakba in 1=01.
:atsina is good contry for cattle and at the beginning of the nineteenth
centry there were ndobtedly !lenty of Flani among its !eo!le. %here
is no record of $hehu having made any of his tors there, bt he mst at
least have traversed the State when he visited .ara and he was certainly
well known to the local 'oslems, becase some of them had been his
!!ils.
When the jihad began, the +asas of :atsina were !robably not sorry to
see the >obirawa in difficlties. 4ertainly, althogh an a!!eal was made
to them, they sent no hel! to Yunfa before the battle of %abkin :watto.
#fter the battle, however, they seem to have been -ick to !erceive that
$hehu constitted a new force which might threaten them as well as
>obir. Bnfa !ointed the moral in a letter which he wrote at this time to all
his brother 4hiefs. %here had been a small fire in >obir, he wrote, and
becase he had neglected to stam! it ot, it had flared ! and brnt him.
2et them be warned by his e)!erience 1.
BnfaCs letter !robably reached the 4hief of :atsina before the conciliatory
message which $hehu sent at abot the same time. #t any rate, when
$hehuCs letter was broght to him he did not hesitate, as did the 4hiefs of
:ano and Aazza, bt sim!ly tore it !.
G "ven so, #ello wrote afterwards, did >od tear ! his kingdom and his
!ower 9.
In :atsina, as in other +asa States, BnfaCs message gave the signal for
the otlawing of the reformers and the Flani to begin.
G When Sarkin :atsina heard what had ha!!ened to Sarkin >obir he
commanded his 4hiefs to make war !on all who were allied to $hehu.
%hen the :atsina 4hiefs combined to kill and ca!tre them ntil or
56
!eo!le came into the o!en and banded themselves together in large
bodies and set to work to arm themselves 1.
%wo sch bodies foght their way westward in the late rains of 1=0; and
reached $hehu when he was making his way to sothern Aamfara. %hey
were the first im!ortant reinforcements to reach him, and mst have been
dobly welcome ;.
'eanwhile their comrades who had remained behind in :atsina and .ara
had alarmed the +asa 4hiefs sfficiently to case them to try to $oin
forces with the 4hief of :ano, with the ob$ect of crshing the Flani
risings. 4ontingents led by Sarkin :atsina and Sarkin .ara actally set
ot for :ano, bt fond their way barred by strong Flani forces nder
4an *unku, the ftre "mir of :azare, who defeated them and
com!elled them to trn back <.
#mong $hehuCs !ersonal followers was a Flani called /maru 4allaji. +e
seems to have foght at %abkin :watto and the other early battles of the
jihad, bt after the sb$gation of :ebbi and the defection of Aamfara,
that is to say in the middle of 1=0<, he was sent to take charge of
o!erations in his native :atsina. +is arrival fortnately coincided with the
defeat of the +asas by 4an *unku. +e was therefore able to take the
offensive straight away and ca!tre many towns in the sothern !art of
the State.
*ne of the !laces which did not fall to Emar .alla$i was Bandoto, a town
which had long been celebrated as a seat of learning 5. Its 'allams had
never acce!ted $hehuCs teaching and since the start of the $ihad they had
been maintaining that he was in error and gilty of deceiving and
misleading the !eo!le 6. In a war that was being foght on isses of
religios !rinci!le sch a centre of o!!osition was of corse more
dangeros than a hostile army. For the reformers it was therefore
im!erative that this strident voice of dissent shold either be won over or
else stifled. #nd so towards the end of 1=0<, as soon as :ebbi had been
sbded again after the rising that followed the battle of #lwasa, #ello
was dis!atched to :atsina 2aka, the sothern !art of the State, to deal
with Bandoto and to reinforce and direct Emar .alla$iCs o!erations =.
With him #ello took Muhammadu Ashafa, a Flani from this !art of
:atsina / who had himself stdied in Bandoto, bt who had been e)!elled
when he had declared for $hehu. When #ello arrived before the town he
sent 'hammad to the !eo!le with a message saying that he had not
come with the intention of making war on them bt in the ho!e of settling
all differences by discssion. %hey s!rned this overtre, however, and
refsed either to see #ello or to listen to what he had to say. %his rebff
!roved too mch for #elloCs !atience and so, withot frther ado, he
moved ! his forces and took the town 10.
#fter this, still accom!anied by Emar .alla$i and 'hammad #shafa and
now with the s!!ort of another inflential Flani called Muhammadu
dan Alhaji, #ello went on to e)!loit his sccess. +e ca!tred many other
+asa towns and sbded a gro! of local Flani who had been assisting
the +asa r#!im$ 11.
57
When sothern :atsina 7which at this time also inclded the 4hafe3>sa3
:anoma area8 had been secred, #ello decided that the time had come
for him to retrn to $hehu. +e therefore !resented flags to Emar .alla$i
and 'hammad dan #lha$i, as symbols of their athority, and ordered
them to move north, into the centre of the State, and attack #wai and
Ranko 19 while 'hammad #shafa remained in :atsina 2aka to
consolidate the territory that had already been won 11.
Ranko and #wai soon fell. %he +asas, nder the /bandawaki, lanched
a conter3attack against Ranko, bt this was re!lsed and they were
com!elled to fall back on the ca!ital 1;. %he way was now o!en for the
decisive blow.
,t before any attem!t was made to deliver it, another !owerfl ally was
recrited to $hehuCs case, namely /maru 4umyawa, the 4hief of the
$ullubawa in :atsina. %he $ullubawa, like the %oronkawa, were not
!re Flani bt !art +ulani and 'art Mandingo. %hey had come with the
Flani from Senegal, however, and they shared their otlook and way of
life. %hose settled in >obir and :ebbi had already thrown in their lot with
$hehu and now Emar .myawa also took ! arms. #s his !eo!le were
settled in the north of the State, which was still in the hands of the
+asas, his accession to the case was of !articlar im!ortance. +e too
was therefore rewarded with a flag 1<.
In the dry season of 1=0536, while 'hammad #shafa held the soth
and Emar .myawa the north, Emar .alla$i and 'hammad dan
#lha$i closed in on the ca!ital 15. %he siege was a long one and food
became so short in the city that a lizard fetched <0 cowries and a vltre
<00 16. #t one !oint the 4hief sed for terms bt his overtres were
referred to #ello who, ss!ecting treachery, re$ected them 1=.
Soon afterwards 'hammad dan #lha$i died. Emar .alla$i intensified
the !ressre, however, and at last forced the +asas to come ot and
fight in the o!en. In the ensing battle the Flani were com!letely
victorios, the +asa 4hief being killed and his army forced to yield ! the
city and fall back on .ankama in the north 1/.
%he ca!tre of :atsina was a ma$or sccess, bt in neighboring >obir
and Aamfara the war was far from over. Soon afterwards, therefore,
Emar .alla$i went off to hel! (amoda, the leader of the Aamfara Flani,
in the task of containing #lkalawa. It was !robably dring his absence that
the :atsina +asas, nder their new 4hief, 'aga$in +alid, lanched a
sr!rise conter3attack and reca!tred the 4ity 90.
%he +asas, however, lacked the strength to e)!loit this ne)!ected
sccess, or even to hold :atsina, and they fell back to .ankama. %here,
soon afterwards, they were attacked by Emar .alla$i, who had come
hrrying back from #lkalawa accom!anied by the Aamfara Flani nder
(amoda, and by a contingent sent ! from :ano 91. %his combined force
defeated the +asas and took the town. #mong those who were killed was
the new 4hief, who either fell in the fighting or, as some say, committed
sicide by $m!ing down a well 99.
#fter the victory at .ankama $hehu recognized Emar .alla$i as the first
58
Flani "mir 91 of :atsina. %here remained, however, the !roblem of how
to find sitable fiefs for the families of the other two flag3holders. It was
solved by a com!romise which, if it did not satisfy everyone, at least ke!t
the !eace and !revented the "mirate from being broken !. #lha$iCs flag
had been inherited by his son, Mamman 4ikko. +e was now a!!ointed
warden of the western marches and given the title of Yandakka.
Frthermore, thogh he was e)!ected to acce!t the local leadershi! of the
new "mir, he was nevertheless allowed to do homage in Sokoto instead of
:atsina and the a!!ointment of his sccessors was retained in the hands
of the Sltans of Sokoto and not delegated to the "mirs of :atsina. %he
other flag3bearer, Emar .myawa, who was still alive, was given the
title of $arkin $ullubawa and accorded similar !rivileges 9;. %his
soltion had the effect of circmscribing the !ower of the "mirs of :atsina
and conse-ently their rle never became as atocratic as those of some
of the other "mirs.
%he early victory in :atsina !layed an im!ortant !art in the jihad and
!articlarly in the decisive strggle against >obir. First of all it convinced
waverers everywhere that $hehuCs s!!orters were really ca!able of
winning the war. Secondly, as already described, it isolated >obir from the
other +asa States and ct off any !ros!ect of hel! coming from them or
from ,orn. %hirdly, it hel!ed (amoda to com!lete the !acification of
eastern Aamfara. Finally, it released im!ortant forces with the reslt that
both the :atsina contingent nder Emar .alla$i and the Aamfara
contingent nder (amoda were able to take !art in the final siege and
storming of #lkalawa.
*n the +asa side the great mass of the !easantry had !robably taken
little !art in the war and they now acce!ted the new rLgime withot
!rotest. For the rling classes, however, it was a different story. It was
they, with their slaves and fedal levies, who had !ersected the
reformers and then taken the field against them. .ring the war they had
first been driven back into the city and then forced to flee the contry
altogether. #s soon as they had gone, the victors, who were mainly
Flani, were free to take !ossession of their hoses and ste! into the
!blic offices which they had occ!ied. %his !rocess went on all over the
"mirate, in the villages and hamlets as well as the towns, and it e)!lains
why the seizre of !ower was so thorogh and far3reaching.
#s for the +asa diehards, thogh defeated and driven into e)ile, they
were by no means finished. #fter the death of Magajin Halidu they
a!!ointed 4an Kasuwa to be their 4hief 9<. Ender him they had at first
to fall back on the neighboring State of .amagaram, bt they rallied
later and established themselves rond 'aradi in what had !reviosly
been the northern corner of their kingdom. %his foothold they managed to
retain for the rest of the centry and when they had recovered some of
their former strength they became, as we shall see, a most !ainfl thorn
in the side of the Flani.
59
Kano
:ano had always been the richest and most !o!los of the +asa States
and at the end of the eighteenth centry its ca!ital was !robably the
greatest city in the whole Sdan. In a !olitical and military sense,
however, it was not as strong as it a!!eared to be. Its !eo!le, !erha!s
even more than most +asas, were absorbed in their own !rsits,
!articlarly their very e)tensive trade, and had little time or zeal to s!are
for other things. "ven %he :ano 4hronicle, which clearly glosses over
mch that was discreditable or nflattering, cannot altogether conceal the
fact that their record in war was a !oor one.
%he contry, like neighboring :atsina, was well sited to cattle and by
the beginning of the nineteenth centry the Flani had !enetrated the
State in some strength. 'ost of them indeed had been established for so
many generations that they no longer thoght of themselves as members
of the clans to which they had originally belonged bt on the contrary, as
their nomenclatre shows, had formed new gro!s based on the
territories in which they had become settled or semi3settled.
In the city the most im!ortant gro! of Flani were the 'ndbawa. %o
the north3west there were the Bolawa, to the north the .ambazawa, to
the soth3east the .ane$awa 95. In addition there were the Sllbawa
whom we have already encontered in :atsina, !eo!le of mi)ed Flani
and 'andingo origin bt otherwise almost indistingishable from the
Flani !ro!er. In :ano their main strength lay to the west of the city 96.
%he :ano Flani were in toch with $hehu long before his breach with
Yunfa. In fact, at least three !rominent members of their leading families
were stdying nder him at the time of his flight to >d.
Soon afterwards they were sent back to :ano with orders to rally the
faithfl.
When $hehuCs conciliatory letter, written after his victory at %abkin
:watto, was first broght to #lwali, the 4hief of :ano, he was a!!arently
on the !oint of acce!ting it bt something cased him to change his mind
9=. We do not know what this was bt it may either have been BnfaCs
warning message or else the news that the Flani, led by 4an *unku,
had already taken ! arms and defeated the attem!t of the 4hiefs of
:atsina and .ara to $oin their forces to his. Whatever the reason, Alwali
re$ected $hehuCs overtres and the war therefore s!read to :ano.
#fter his early sccess, 4an *unku, went north to .ara, where he
hel!ed the Flani to seize !ower 9/ and he seems to have taken no
frther !art in the $ihad in :ano. %his was dominated by seven men drawn
from the si) territorial gro!s which have already been mentionedD
$ulimanu of the 'ndbawa, one of $hehuCs ablest and most
devoted !!ils
Muhammadu 4abo of the .ambazawa, the second of $hehuCs
!!ils
Muhammadu #akatsine of the &obawa, the third of $hehuCs !!ils
60
Jibirin of the Bolawa
4an 8abuwa of the .ane$awa
Jammo and 7brahim 4abo of the Sllbawa.
Ender these leaders the Flani formed a war cam! in the bsh at a !lace
called :wazazzabo UBar :wando abot thirty miles west of the city. %here
they recrited their strength ntil they were ready to strike 10.
%heir first move, which was !robably made in the dry weather of 1=0;3<,
was to assalt the neighboring town of :araye. %his was the
head-arters of the Wambai, one of the territorial magnates of the +asa
hierarchy, and their ob$ect may well have been to forestall an attack by
him on their own nfortified cam!. Whatever the !r!ose, the assalt was
com!letely sccessfl and :araye, thogh defended by a wall, was
ca!tred 11.
+itherto #lwali seems to have nderrated the danger which the Flani
re!resented, bt the loss of :araye stng him into action. +e collected an
army and led it against the Flani at CBar :wando. #ccording to legend,
the battle lasted two days and, bt for a rse, might have gone against
the Flani. #s it was, they won a heartening victory 19.
%he ma$or battle of the jihad in :ano was foght at .an Bahaya, abot
twenty3five miles north of the city, and !robably took !lace in the dry
season of 1=0536. Sarkin :ano #lwali is said to have !t ten thosand
horsemen into the field as well as thosands of infantry. #lthogh this
figre may well be an e)aggeration there is no dobt that the +asas
en$oyed a great !re!onderance in nmbers. *nce again, however, the skill
and resoltion of the Flani bowmen trned the tide of war. %hey won a
crshing victory and forced #lwali and the remnants of his army to fall
back on the city 11.
%he withdrawal of the +asa forces behind the walls of the ca!ital left the
Flani a free hand in the contry. %hey !t it to good se and soon
eliminated, or at any rate isolated, all !ockets of resistance. +aving
obtained control of the greater !art of the State, they at length trned
their attention to the city. :ano was finally ca!tred in 1=06, !robably in
the last -arter, that is to say abot a year later than :atsina, bt a year
earlier than #lkalawa 1;.
#fter losing his ca!ital Alwali fled to ,rmbrm, a large walled town in
the e)treme soth of his former domains. +ad he been allowed to
establish himself there, he wold dobtless have become the focs of a
+asa resistance movement which might have !laged the new r#!im$ for
the rest of the centry. #s it was, a Flani force led by Mallam Jammo of
the Sllbawa 4lan !rsed him and, after a siege of forty days, stormed
the town. #lwali was killed and with his death a dynasty of forty.three
(hiefs came to an end 1<. +asa resistance in :ano was ths
e)tingished.
%he choice of the first Flani "mir and the division of the s!oils of victory
among the other leaders was to case some dissension. %wo years earlier
$hehu had smmoned them all to meet him in Aamfara so that he cold
61
a!!oint a leader, bt in the event he had been nable to make the
$orney. #ello had therefore re!resented him at this meeting, which had
taken !lace $st before the attack on Bandoto, and acting on $hehuCs
instrctions 15 had selected $ulimanu to take command. %he choice was
not a ha!!y one becase Sliman was an nworldly scholar and
evidently lacked the !ersonality that leadershi! demanded 16.
So long as the enemy was in the field, the reformers had s!!ressed their
rivalries and remained loyal to their a!!ointed leader. #s soon as victory
was won, however, their differences broke ot. When #bdllahi went to
:ano towards the end of 1=06, soon after the ca!tre of the city, he fond
the Flani !reocc!ied with their worldly rivalries, and at odds with one
another 1=. +e had some sccess in settling their dis!tes, bt with his
de!artre they seem to have broken ot afresh.
#t any rate, in 1=0= it was considered necessary to send a de!tation to
$hehu in >wand in order to get the -estion of the leadershi! decided.
Reading between the lines, one cannot esca!e the conclsion that the
!r!ose of this move was to have Sliman de!osed and one of the other
leaders a!!ointed "mir in his !lace. If this was the case, however, the
attem!t failed becase $hehu confirmed #elloCs earlier choice and
invested the nso!histicated and relatively yothfl Sliman with the
insignia of an "mir 1/. %o consolidate his athority still frther he also
gave him a daghter in marriage.
.es!ite these marks of favor Sliman never scceeded in -elling the
rivalries that srronded him or establishing himself firmly on the throne
of :ano. In fact, within a year he had a serios -arrel with one of his
lietenants, Muhammadu 4abo, which again re-ired $hehuCs
intervention ;0.
%he !ersistence of these $ealosies hel!s to e)!lain why in ,9:; the :ano
Flani, nlike their cosins in :atsina and Aamfara, sent no
reinforcements to $hehu for the final battle at #lkalawa. %he trth is that
becase of SlimanCs weakness as a rler the hold which they had
established on :ano, was at first a !recarios one. %his was revealed by
the wides!read +asa revolts which broke ot when Sliman died in
,9,;.
In most of the Flani "mirates when the first rler died the sccession
!assed to his descendants. %hat events in :ano took a different corse
can be attribted to two factors, first, the near3e-ality of the seven
families which had led the jihad and, second, the ineffectiveness of
Sliman as a rler. When he died the -estion of who shold scceed
him was referred to Sokoto. ,y that time $hehu too was dead and #ello
had become Sltan. +is choice fell on 7brahim 4abo, the head of the
Sllbawa, who was dly a!!ointed to be the second "mir and who
fonded the dynasty which was to rle :ano for the rest of the centry ;1.
8a!!au was the most southerly of the original Hausa $tates.
,etween it and the River ,ene lay a belt of contry which differed from
the o!en !lains of the north by being more hilly and having a denser cover
of bsh. %his area contained no im!ortant States, a!art from (!e in the
62
soth3west, and its !o!lation was gro!ed into a nmber of !etty
!rinci!alities and inde!endent !agan tribes. In the seventeenth centry
they were all embodied into the riverain em!ire of :wararafa, while
Aazza itself was threatened and constricted, bt as the &kn !ower
receded again, so a !ower3vacm was created into which Aazza was
able to e)!and.
In the north the e)!ansion of the +asa States had already taken the
form of settlement? !lantation, or con-est followed by assimilation. In
the soth, however, the denser bsh did not a!!eal to +asa settlers and
the more !rimitive tribes were not easy to assimilate. 4onse-ently,
AazzaCs e)!ansion !roceeded by con-est and the im!osition of
szerainty, not by settlement or assimilation, and the !attern which
emerged from it differed from the conventional one. ,y the end of the
eighteenth centry there were, in fact, five !etty 4hiefs on AazzaCs
sothern borders who rled over congeries of >waris, ,assas, and other
small tribes and tribal fragments. #ll these 4hiefs owed allegiance to
Aazza and were sb$ect to loose control by the +asa 4hief. Provided
that they !aid their tribte of slaves, however, they were largely left to
their own devices ;9.
In addition to these vassals, there were other tribes which had never
made sbmission. +aving refsed to !rchase their immnity by doing
homage and !aying tribte, they were regarded by the +asas as fair
game for the slave raids by which Aazza traditionally s!!orted itself and
!rovided for the needs of the rest of +asaland ;1.
In 1=09 Muhamman Makau scceeded as the si)tieth 4hief of Aazza
;;. +e was a devot 'oslem and when, after the jihad had begn,
$hehuCs message was broght to him, he was ready to acce!t it. +is
advisers thoght otherwise, however, and he was com!elled to defer to
their views ;<. #s Aazza had a!!arently not followed >obir and :atsina
in renoncing its allegiance to ,orn, and as the szerainCs inflence
seems to have been stronger there than in the other +asa States ;5, it
may well be that 'aka was coerced in this matter by the :achalla, the
Sltan of ,ornCs Resident at his 4ort, or !erha!s by an alliance between
the :achalla and his own 4oncillors, Whatever the !rocess might have
been, the otcome was that $hehuCs overtres were re$ected and the war
s!read.
%he !rinci!al leader of the jihad in Aazza was a Flani called Mallam
Musa who hailed originally from Mali, in the western Sdan, +e had come
to +asaland some time before and, after stdying nder $hehu, had
established himself in Aazza as a religios teacher. +e is said to have
taken !art in the flight from .egel to >d and he certainly received a
flag from $hehu with a commission to lead the jihad in Aazza ;6.
%he Flani had been established for generations in Aazza, as in the other
+asa States, and 'saCs a!!ointment as leader seems to have cased
some $ealosy among the older families. Prominent among these were
another branch of the Sllbawa, whom we have already met in :atsina
and :ano, and the ,ornawa who, as their name shows, were Flani who
63
had come to Aazza by way of ,orn. 'sa was instrcted by $hehu to
work with their leaders, Abdu $alami and Yamusa, and this he did ;=.
In the month of 'arch, !robably in the year 1=0<, Musa entered Aazza
from the north ;/. (o dobt he had !reviosly arranged a rendezvos
there with $hehuCs known adherents. In addition he received s!!ort
from some of the local +asas <0.
#s soon as he heard of the invasion, Malum sent his cavalry, nder the
'adaki, to interce!t the enemy and bar their way to the city.
'sa either defeated this force or else gave it the sli!, for very soon
afterwards he was able to take the +asas com!letely by sr!rise. It
ha!!ened to be the day of the <esser #airam, festival and the 4hief,
attended by his followers and accom!anied by all the 'oslems of the city,
had ridden forth as sal to the ceremonial !rayer3grond otside the
walls. While there, they were sr!rised by 'saCs cavalry and their retreat
into the city ct off. ,eing narmed they were nable to stand and fight
and so they had no choice bt to fly. %he great city of Aaria, therefore, fell
to the Flani with hardly a blow having been strck <1.
+aving lost his ca!ital Makau made his way soth with abot three
thosand followers. +e went first to :ar, bt the 4hief, who was one of
his vassals, sht the gates of the town against him. +e therefore !assed
on to :a$r where the 4hief admitted him. %he Flani were close on his
heels, however, and besieged him there for si) months. In the end their
!ressre became so great that he was forced to move on again <9
From :a$r, 'aka went on to Aba. %he Flani contined to attack and
harry him for the ne)t fifteen months, bt in the soth the terrain was
more hilly and less o!en than in the north and they failed to kill or ca!tre
him. Finally, in 1=06, he re!lsed them where!on they abandoned the
!rsit and went back to Aaria <1.
When he became a fgitive, Makau fond that some of his sb$ects,
notably the >wari, remained loyal to him bt that most of them threw off
their allegiance. +aving no ca!ital or base of his own, he was forced to
kee! moving abot in the broken contry which lies between the (iger
and the ,ene Rivers near their conflence. In this way he !reserved a
!recarios e)istence for another eighteen years, In 1=9<, however, while
attacking the town of 2a!ai, he met his death <;.
Makau was scceeded by his brother, Abu Ja. It was he who fonded the
town of Abuja and this became the head-arters of the fgitive +asas of
Aazza <<. %hey contined to maintain their inde!endence and, by
e)erting their inflence over the neighboring !agan tribes, gradally bilt
#b$a into a 4hiefdom of some im!ortance. For the rest of the centry
they were to remain a thorn in the side of the Flani, bt they never
develo!ed into sch a serios menace as the diehards of >obir, :atsina,
and :ebbi were soon to become.
'eanwhile, Mallam Musa had been confirmed by $hehu as the first
Flani "mir. +is first task was to consolidate his athority in Aazza
!ro!er and its vassal States. #fter the flight of 'aka there seems to have
been little resistance from the +asas <5. %he fedatories and ma$or
64
office holders fled or ste!!ed down into obscrity. "ither way, the road
was left o!en for the new "mir to install his own s!!orters, the great
ma$ority of whom were Flani.
Musa was not content with consolidation, however, and was determined
to e)tend his dominions sothward. %his he did by indcing the Flani in
the area, who were already fighting the local !agan tribes, to acce!t his
leadershi!. %he Flani of &emaCa seem to have been glad enogh to do so
in retrn for 'saCs !romise of !rotection and s!!ort <6. %hose of :effi,
where Abdu 8anga had already established a town !rotected by a
stockade, were at first ho!efl of obtaining recognition direct from $hehu,
bt 'sa !ersaded them that $hehu had already made him szerain of
all the territory between Aaria and the ,ene River. In the end, therefore,
they were content to acce!t a flag from him and acknowledge him as their
overlord <=. In this way the two small "mirates of &emaCa and :effi came
into being in abot ,9,: as vassals of Aazza. (early a generation later
the !rocess was re!eated when 'akama .ogo, a +asa soldier of fortne
who had carved ot a kingdom for himself in the soth, was recognized as
the vassal "mir of (assarawa </. In this way Aaria, as the "mirate of the
Flani now came to be called, at length reached the ,ene.
When 'sa, the first "mir, died in ,9=, one of his sons e)!ected to
scceed him. In the event, however, the choice of the "lectors fell on
Bamsa, the head of the ,ornawa family, who as the 'adaki had been
'saCs !rinci!al lietenant. Similarly, when Bamsa died in 1=1;, the
throne did not go to any of his sons bt to #bdl :erim, another Flani
who had !layed a !rominent !art in the jihad 50. #fter that, a!art from
one aberration, the sccession rotated irreglarly between the hoses of
these first three "mirs. %his meant that Aaria had three rling families
whereas in all the other "mirates, inclding :ano after the initial change,
there was only one dynasty.
(otes
1. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 10<8.
9. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 518.
1. Ibid. !. 55.
;. Ibid.
<. Ibid. !. 66.
5. Ibid. !. =.
6. Ibid. !. =6.
=. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, P. =68.
/. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of >sa.
10. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. =68. %he !lace is deserted now, bt the site, still marked by
baobab trees, can be seen on the Aaria3>sa road. See also (ote 11 in #!!endi) I.
11. Ibid.
19. Ibid. !. 6=
11. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of >sa.
1;. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 6=8.
1<. +ogben and :irk3>reene, !. cit. !. 15=.
15. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 6=8.
16. .aniel, o!. cit. !. 15.
1=. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett !. 6=8.
1/. Ibid.
65
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid. !!. 6=36/.
99. .aniel, o!. cit. !. 15.
91. %o mark their greater devotion to Islam, the title S"mirT has been reserved in this
book for the Flani rlers while their +asa !redecessors, thogh nominally 'oslem,
have been described as S4hiefsT.
9;. .aniel, o!. cit. !!. 15316.
9<. '. #badie, 2a 4olonie d (iger, Paris, 1/96, !!. 19; and 1=0.
95. #lha$i #bbakar, :ano to .abo 4igari, :ano, 1/</, !!. ;=3;/.
96. >azetteer of :ano Province, !. 11.
9=. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 518.
9/. Ibid. !. 6/.
10. #lha$i #bbakar, o!. cit. !. ;/, and :ano .(,s, +istory of :ir.
11. :ano, .(,s, +istory of :araye.
19. :ano .(,s, +istory of :ano.
11. >azetteer of :ano Province, !. 11, and #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 6/8.
1;. :ano had certainly, bt a!!arently only recently, been taken when #bdllahi reached
it in *ctober or (ovember 1=06. See (ote to in #!!endi) 1.
1<. :ano .(,s, +istory of %dn Wada. %he visitor to ,rmbrm is still shown the
baobab tree nder which #lwali lies bried.
15. Information from #lha$i &naid.
16. +. #. S. &ohnston, # Selection of +asa Stories, *)ford, 1/55, !!. 19139.
1=. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 1918.
1/. #lha$i #bbakar, o!. cit. !. ;/.
;0. :ano .(,s, +istory of .ambarta.
;1. #lha$i #bbakar, o! cit. !!. <93<1. For Ibrahim .aboCs family tree see %able ; in
#!!endi) II.
;9. 4h #, !. 5.
;1. Ibid. !. ;.
;;. 4h #, !. 16.
;<. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 5;8. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
;5. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. 91/.
;6. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !. 11=.
;=. Ibid. !!. 11=3/.
;/. 4h #, !. <. %he date given there is 1=0;, bt this cannot be right becase we know
from #ello that it was not ntil &ly 1=0; that $hehu wrote his letters to the +asa
4hiefs, inclding Aazza, and the $ihad did not really s!read to the other States ntil his
overtres had been re$ected.
<0. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !. 11/.
<1. 4h #, !!. <35. %his disaster is still commemorated dring the 'oslem festivals in
#b$a by the "mirCs bodygard facing to the west while he trns to the east to !ray.
<9. Ibid. !. 6.
<1. Ibid.
<;. Ibid. !. =.
<<. Ibid. !. /.
<5. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !. 1;0.
<6. (otes on (assarawa Province, 1/90, !. 11.
<=. Ibid. !. 5.
</. Ibid. !!. 15316.
50. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !!. 1<039.
66
(ha'ter $even
*he Jihad in #ornu
:anem3,orn has already been mentioned as one of the for great
em!ires of the Sdan which !receded the "m!ire of Sokoto. #s a 'oslem
!ower of long standing, which saw no need for reform, it natrally became
the !rinci!al adversary of the Flani reformers and so it has a !rominent
!art to !lay in this history.
%he acconts of the origins of the Kanuri 7as the !eo!le of ,orn are
called8 and the Kanembu go back to the shadowy !eriod of the first
millennim and are more than ordinarily contradictory and confsing.
%here is no dobt, however, that like the +asas they were the !rodcts
of a mingling of races. %he region rond 2ake 4had which they inhabited
was connected by caravan rotes to both %ri!olitania and the (ile Jalley
from as early as the eighth centry 1 and #rab strains from the east as
well as ,erber strains from the north seem to have entered into their
make!. In fact, there is reason to think that, like the >obirawa, their
rling classes and common !eo!le had different origins, that the
commoners evolved ot of a nion of ,erber immigrants and Sdanic
tribes, and that sbse-ently they absorbed another wave of immigrants,
this time of #rab blood, whom they acce!ted as an aristocracy 9.
Whatever their !recise origins, the :anemb seem to have emerged as a
distinct !eo!le two or three hndred years before the +asas. 4ertainly
:anem was mentioned by the historian Yakubi, writing at the end of the
ninth centry 1, and the !eo!le are said to have embraced Islam as early
as the last decade of the eleventh centry, again two or three centries
sooner than the +asas ;.
It was in the twelfth centry that :anemCs e)!ansion began. Ender a
vigoros rler the :anemb e)tended their inflence sothwards to obtain
better control of the sta!les of the trans3Saharan trade gold, ivory, and of
corse slaves3and northwards to !revent the nomads of the desert from
!lndering their caravans <. In the following centry they !shed their
settlements to the west ntil the whole northern shore of the 2ake was in
their gri! 5. (e)t, dissident members of their rling family, who had
!reviosly broken away to the east and fonded the ,lala .ynasty in the
new kingdom of >aoga, retrned to challenge their athority in :anem. In
the civil war which followed the ,lala were com!letely victorios and in
abot 11/0 6 the legitimate rler and the loyalists were com!elled to
abandon the ca!ital of ($imi and seek refge in the new settlements to
the west of the 2ake. %his shift marked the emergence of ,orn as a State
distinct from :anem and the :anri as a !eo!le distinct from the
:anemb.
.ring the ensing !eriod the Mais, as the Sltans of ,orn were called,
gradally rebilt their strength. In this they were greatly assisted by their
sccess in winning the allegiance of the Shwa #rabs, a fresh wave of
immigrants who had !ored into the central Sdan after the destrction of
67
the 4hristian kingdom of (bia, abot a centry earlier, and settled in
fairly large nmbers in the region soth of the 2ake.
,y abot #... 1;10, little more than a generation after losing :anem to
the ,lala, the 'ais of ,orn were able to establish their hegemony over
the +asa States. #t abot the same time the reo!ening of the caravan
rote from "gy!t to 4had, again as a reslt of the e)tinction of the
4hristian !ower in (bia, and its e)tension to the gold bearing districts of
#shanti, mst have broght new trade and wealth to ,orn =. %his was
reflected in the decision of 'ai #li >ha$i, in abot #... 1;==, to bild a
fine new ca!ital at (gazargam /.
When 7dris scceeded as 'ai in #... 1<01 he felt strong enogh to
attem!t the recon-est of :anem. Soon afterwards, therefore, he led an
army rond the 2ake and a great battle took !lace at >arni :iyala. %he
,lala sr!er was com!letely defeated and forced to retire to the east.
+is sccessor later tried to recover :anem, bt he, too, was defeated and
driven back. %he wheel had now come fll circle and, instead of ,ornCs
being a !rovince in the "m!ire of :anem, :anem. had become a tribtary
State in the "m!ire of ,orn 10. ,t the ,lala, des!ite the loss of all
their western !ossessions, refsed to sbmit and from their original base
in the east they contined to harry the :anri intermittently for the rest of
the centry 11.
'ai Idris was already embroiled in the strggle with the ,lala when the
Songhai army invaded +asaland in 1<11. %his !robably e)!lains why he
allowed his rights as a szerain to be wrested from him by #skia
'hammad and why he and his sccessors sbse-ently made sch a
!oor showing against Muhammadu Kanta of :ebbi.
,orn is sally regarded as having reached the height of its !ower nder
'ai Idris #looma, who reigned from 1<61 to 1501. ,t he too had to
e)!end most of his energy in e)!editions against the ,lala and he did not
attem!t to recon-er the +asa States. In the centry that followed his
death the :anri, no less than the +asas, were on the defensive against
the &kns, and so it was not ntil 161; that they re3established their
sway over +asaland. ,t soon afterwards, nder the weak Mai Ali
Ajimi, their !ower declined again 19, with the reslt that some of the
+asa States, as has already been mentioned, were able to throw off their
allegiance althogh others seem to have remained loyal.
In the organization of ,orn there was a wide measre of
decentralization. %he tribtary States, as we have already seen, were left
to rle themselves with only Residents stationed in their ca!itals to watch
over im!erial interests. (earer home the marches of ,orn !ro!er were
rled by Wardens or 4onstables chosen from the rling family. %heir
fnctions were the !reservation of law and order, the condct of
di!lomacy with neighboring !eo!les, if necessary throgh war or !nitive
e)!editions, and the collection of ta) and tribte. %he Warden of the West,
the 6aladima, had his head-arters at (gr and from there he wielded
his very considerable athority 11.
")actly when the first Flani reached ,orn we do not know, bt it was
68
!robably at abot the same time as the arrival in ,irnin :onni of $hehuCs
ancestor, Musa Jakollo, that is to say in the middle of the fifteenth
centry 1;. "ven if the ma$ority came mch later, there is no dobt that
by the beginning of the nineteenth centry they had been living among
the :anri for generations.
Sch, then, was the setting of the scene in ,orn when the $ihad began in
+asaland.
*he Mai of #ornu, as ruler of the most 'owerful Moslem $tate in
the central $udan, had long been known by the 7slamic title of
>(ommander of the +aithful?. It was natral, therefore, that as soon as
the 'ai of the day, Ahmed ibn Ali, heard that the reformers had
conferred this style !on their leader, he shold have sent a !erem!tory
message to $hehu demanding to know by what right he had acce!ted the
title and taken it on himself to declare a holy war 1<. In his re!ly $hehu
asserted that the +asa 4hiefs were no better than infidels and called on
the 'ai, as he was a good 'oslem, to s!!ort the jihad. #t the same time
he sent an order to the Flani in ,orn to stay their hand and acce!t a
!eacefl settlement if one was offered. ,t the 'ai took offence at
$hehuCs message and instead of offering !eace started !re!aring for war
15.
When the fighting started in +asaland it is nlikely that >obir and
:atsina, having !reviosly renonced their allegiance, a!!ealed to ,orn
for hel!. :ano, and .ara !robably did so, however, for the 'ai seems to
have ordered the >aladima to go to their resce. ,t before he cold
make any effective move he fond that he had his own hands fll 16.
#t that time there were a nmber of small !rinci!alities G#yo, ,edde,
Shira, and %ashenaG lying between ,orn and +asaland. %hey were
nder the $risdiction of the >aladima and it was there that the reformers
now rose against the athority of ,orn. First of all a !astoral Flani called
#bdre, or #bdwa, threw off his allegiance and declared for $hehu.
#lthogh he himself died very soon afterwards, his two sons, Emar and
Sambo, obtained a flag and a commission to sbde the !rinci!ality of
#yo. %his they very soon did. (e)t they took !ossession of the town of
+adei$a, which they enlarged and strengthened, and from there they
!roceeded to e)tend their athority over the intervening and srronding
towns and villages. *ne of these, incidentally, was >arn >abas, the only
one of the original +asa ,akwai which had failed to develo! into even a
!rinci!ality. %his territory became the ncles of the "mirate of +adei$a
1=.
'eanwhile, another Flani, #rdo 2ernima, had also $oined the $ihad. +e
lived near (gr and, before the war, had been the agent a!!ointed by
the >aladima to collect ta) and tribte from the !astoral Flani in the
district. #lthogh the >aladima had given him a daghter in marriage he
declared for $hehu and rged the Flani to rise. In the first clash 2ernima
was defeated, bt later, when he had been reinforced by Sambo of
+adei$a and Ibrahim Aaki of Shira, whom we shall meet again later, he
was com!letely victorios. %he ,orn forces were defeated, (gr sacked,
69
and the >aladima killed 1/. %he destrction of (gr and the
consolidation of +adei$a meant that in the northern sector of ,ornCs
western frontier the reformers had been com!letely sccessfl.
In the central and sothern sectors of the frontier o!erations were in the
hands of three men, all of whom were Flani. %he first, Ibrahim Aaki, was
the son of the Imam of Shira. +is family was inflential in the little
!rinci!ality and he himself had been given a daghter of the 4hief in
marriage 90. %he second, >wani 'ktar, also came of a family which had
been settled in ,orn for many generations. +e himself had stdied nder
$hehu and indeed had been one of his most gifted !!ils 91. %he third,
,ba Bero, came from the 2ower >ongola, where his father had settled
and taken a daghter of the local 4hief in marriage. +e too had stdied
nder $hehu as a yong man and ever afterwards had remained one of
his most devoted and trsted followers. Enlike the other Flani, however,
he had not waited for the $ihad to start before asserting his athority bt
by 16/= had already made himself master of the greater !art of the valley
of the 2ower >ongola. When the war came, therefore, he was already a
force in his own right 99.
(ews of the $ihad and of the 'ai of ,ornCs reaction to it cased Ibrahim
Aaki and >wani 'ktar to renonce their allegiance and declare for
$hehu. %hey were not yet strong enogh to risk a battle, however, and so
at the start they fell back to the soth and $oined forces on the >ongola
with ,ba Bero 91. Fortnately for them, 'ai #hmed was notoriosly
feeble and irresolte. +ad he !ossessed vision and moved with s!eed, he
cold have crshed the local risings of the Flani before they had become
dangeros or had had the chance of coalescing. +e might also have saved
the +asa rlers of :ano, .ara, and Aazza. #s it was, however, he did
nothing to hel! his +asa vassals or reinforce the >aladima. "ven the fall
of (gr did not stir him ot of his lethargy and he tamely !ermitted the
nmerically mch weaker Flani to seize and kee! the initiative.
#fter the destrction of (gr and the ca!tre of +adei$a, the Flani made
their ne)t move against Shira, which Ibrahim Aaki, whose ado!ted
contry it was, invaded and occ!ied in 1=06. %he three leaders then met
near .amatr and agreed !on a concerted !lan of cam!aign 9;. While
Ibrahim Aaki attacked %ashena and ,ba Bero o!erated in soth3western
,orn, >wani 'ktar was to drive ! throgh the centre and try to
ca!tre (gazargam, the ca!ital 9<.
%his !lan was !t into effect in the dry season of 1=063=, nearly a year
after the ca!tre of :atsina and at abot the same time as the final attack
on :ano city. It was a com!lete sccess and, on 19 'arch 1=0=, >wani
'ktar seized the ca!ital of the ,orn "m!ire 95.
(ineteen days !reviosly, 'ai #hmed, who was old and blind, had
abdicated in favor of his son, Muhammad <efiami. %he new 'ai
scceeded in esca!ing from the city and making his way to the east bt,
even so, it looked as if the "m!ire was shattered and as if the kingdom
too might disintegrate. #t that moment, however, a new figre sddenly
a!!eared !on the scene who in his way was hardly less remarkable than
70
the Flani leaders and who made a worthy o!!onent for them. %his was
$heikh Muhammad el.Amin el.Kanemi.
El.Kanemi was the son of $keikh "inga, a well3known scholar and
divine of :anemb origin who had settled in the Fezzan 96. #fter Jisiting
"gy!t and making the !ilgrimage to 'ecca, "l3:anemi had retrned to
:anem and there established a great re!tation for learning and !iety. It
was to him that the fgitive 'ai now trned for hel!. "l3:anemi was
es!ecially inflential with his own :anemb, who had the same re!tation
as !ikemen as the Swiss had en$oyed in "ro!e a few centries earlier,
and with the Shwa #rabs of sothern 4had. ,y mstering these two
elements as a stiffening for the SltanCs own :anri, he was able to trn
the tide of war 9=.
%he easy trim!h which the Flani had en$oyed in occ!ying the whole of
western ,orn and ca!tring the ca!ital seems to have made them over3
confident. 4ertainly, they were n!re!ared for "l3:anemiCs conter3attack
when it was lanched in *ctober 1=0/. #uba Yero and his followers were
in the soth, consolidating their con-ests, while in the west 7brahim
8aki was occ!ied in anne)ing %ashena and merging it with Shira. %he
blow therefore fell on >wani 'ktar, whose forces were inade-ate to
withstand it. +e himself was killed in the fighting and his !eo!le were
driven ot of (gazargam, which the :anri nder "l3:anemi then
reocc!ied 9/.
%hree or for years of indecisive fighting followed. In the dry season of
1=11319 the Flani ca!tred (gazargam for the second time. #fter this
both sides seem to have realized that the sands and swam!s of western
,orn were hardly worth fighting for. %he :anri therefore abandoned
(gazargam for good and fell back on 2ake 4had while the Flani
consolidated their gains in the soth and west 10.
#lthogh the Flani had failed to crsh ,orn, as before the emergence of
"l3:anemi had seemed likely, they had nevertheless made sbstantial
gains at ,oronCs e)!ense. In the north3west $ambo 4igimsa had
established the new "mirate of +adei$a. In the west 7brahim 8aki had
welded Shira and %ashena together to form the new "mirate of :atagm.
In the soth ,ba Bero had carved the new "mirate of >ombe ot of
!agan lands over which ,orn had !reviosly held sway. #ll these leaders
had received flags from $hehu dring the fighting and were now
recognized by him as the rlers of the territory which they controlled.
,y 1=19, among all the Flani who had taken the leading !arts in the war
against ,oron, only the family and followers of 6wani Muktar were still
nrewarded. %hey had striven for the greatest !rize of all, the whole of
western ,orn, and had lost it. When >wani 'ktar had been killed in the
,orn conter3attack of 1=0/, the leadershi! had !assed to his son,
'amman 'anga. For a time he was able to maintain a foothold in
sothern ,orn in the >$ba3.amatr area, bt later he was driven ot
by "l3:anemi. In recognition of what he and his father had done for the
case, however, $hehu conferred the title of Sarkin ,orn !on him and
later #ello, when he became Sltan, ordered the "mir of ,achi to cede
71
to him the town of 'isa together with the contry rond it 11. %he little
kingdom of 'isa, which was ths broght into e)istence, com!leted the
-arter3circle of Flani "mirates that now lay rond the western and
sothern bondaries of ,orn.
#fter eight years of war the :anri were as ready for !eace as the Flani
19. #lthogh the 'ais were still the nominal rlers of ,orn, all effective
!ower had by now !assed to "l3:anemi. It was he who decided to
abandon (gazargam and in the s!ace of three years he first de!osed 'ai
2efiami and then restored him to the throne 11.
In 1=1;, after the withdrawal to the region rond 2ake 4had, "l3:anemi
obtained two concessions from the 'ai which strengthened his !osition
still frther. First he was a!!ointed head of all the :anemb who had
settled to the west of the 2ake and then he was given the land rond
:kawa, or :ka as it later came to be called, for the !r!ose of
establishing an administrative head-arters 1;. #s no new ca!ital was
bilt for the 'ais, who lived at a nmber of different !laces in the
neighborhood, :ka came to be regarded more and more as the ca!ital
of the kingdom and "l3:anemi as its real rler.
So ended the first !hase of the strggle between the new "m!ire and the
old. %he !eace which came in 1=19 was only an armistice, however, not a
genine reconciliation, and thirteen years later the war was to be
resmed.
(otes
1. 'any, o!. cit. !. ;9.
9. Palmer, o!. cit. vol. 1, !!.11319, and (ote 19 in #!!endi) I.
1. Ibid. !. 6.
;. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. 10/.
<. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. II, !. 96/, and Stenning, o!. cit. !!. 9639=.
5. >azetteer of ,orn Province, 1/9/, !. 10.
6. Palmer, o!. cit. vol. I, !. 16.
=. 'any, o!. cit. !!. ;9/316.
/. >azetteer of ,orn Province, !. 11.
10. Palmer, o!. cit. vol. I, !. 16.
11 Ibid. !!. 1=369.
19 +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. 11=.
11. Stenning, o!. cit. !. 9=.
1;. : 4h 7Palmer, !. 1118.
1<. ,elle, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 1008.
15. S tenning, o!. cit. !. 10.
16. Ibid. !!. 10031.
1=. Ibid. !!. 10311.
1/. Stenning, o!. cit. !!. 10311.
90. Ibid.
91. #lha$i #bkar, o!. cit. !. ;/.
99. >azetteer of Jola Province, !!. 19311. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
91. Stenning, o!. cit. !!. 11319.
9;. >azetteer of ,orn Province, !. 1=.
9<. Stenning, o!. cit. !. 19.
95. >azetteer of ,orn Province, !. 1=.
96. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. 190. Frther back "l3:anemi is said to have been
of 'oorish descent. See .enham, >la!!erton, and *dney, (arrative of %ravels and
.iscoveries in (orthern and 4entral #frica, 2ondon, 1=9=, vol. II, !. 16/.
72
9=. >azetteer of ,orn Province, !. 90.
9/. Stenning, o!. cit. !. 19.
10. When .enham visited this area a dozen years later, he fond it almost deserted bt
stdded with the rins of former towns. See %ravels, vol. 1, !. 1;=.
11. >azetteer of :ano Province, !!. 1131;, and +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. P. ;/=.
4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
19. #!art from being e)hasted by the war, the :anri had reason to be a!!rehensive of
the latent enmity of ,aghirmi and Wadai in their rear. %his was soon to lead to war on
their eastern front. See .enham, %ravels, vol. I, P. ;<5 and vol. II, !. 1=9.
11. >azetteer of ,orn Province, !. 91.
1;. Ibid.
73
(ha'ter Eight
*he Jihad in Adamawa and #auchi
%he bondaries of the "m!ire which the Flani created did not sto! short
at the o!en !lains of the Sdan. %o the soth of ,orn and the +asa
States lay a belt of mch closer contry with a higher rainfall and many
more natral featres. In the centre, between the converging (iger and
,ene Rivers, was the ,achi Platea. %o the cast of it were the
montainos ranges which formed the watershed between the #tlantic
and 2ake 4had. %o the west was the area of dense, tsetse3infested bsh
which se!arated the 2ower :adna and 'iddle (iger Rivers. %his contry,
s!arsely !o!lated by small !agan tribes, lay mostly otside the !ale of
+asa and :anri civilization.
%he !eo!les of the Sdan were the heirs of a common cltre and, thogh
often at fed, at least regarded each other as being more or less e-als.
*n the other hand, they were at one in treating their neighbors to the
soth as inferiors. ,ecase of this attitde there had been very little
intercorse between the :anri and +asas on the one side and the
!agans on the other, e)ce!t for a little trading and a good deal of slave3
raiding. With the Flani, however, it was otherwise.
%he first Flani to reach ,orn may have a!!eared as early as #... 1100
1, bt the date when they began to arrive in significant nmbers was
!robably, as has already been noted, the middle of the fifteenth centry.
Entil then, in their migratory drift throgh the Sdan, they had moved
mainly among settled agricltral !eo!les and had encontered few
serios rivals for the !astre and water for which they were always
searching. When they reached 4had, however, their east3bond tide ran
into the west3bond tide of the Shwa #rabs, who were !astoralists like
themselves 9. %his collision, long drawn ot and !eacefl thogh it was,
seems to have had the effect of halting the Shwas, who made no frther
advance towards the west, and of trning the Flani aside. # few Flani, it
is tre, !assed throgh the Shwas and moved on eastward into ,aghirmi
and Wadai 1, bt far greater nmbers either settled in ,orn or were
diverted to the soth.
#s it ha!!ened, the contry lying soth of ,orn was admirably sited to
the FlaniCs needs. %oday it contains one of the greatest concentrations of
Flani that e)ists anywhere in #frica and so we can take it that the
!rocess of infiltration contined over a long !eriod. ,y the end of the
eighteenth centry it had certainly reached an advanced stage. ,t the
great ma$ority of the immigrants were still semi3nomadic !astoralists and
conse-ently, thogh by now nmeros, they were widely scattered
74
among the valleys and !latea) of a region in which commnications were
!oor. Frthermore, a!art from ,ba BeroCs recent con-ests on the 2ower
>ongola, they !ossessed no territory or strongholds of their own bt had
to acce!t the athority of their hosts.
,eing s!erior in cltre and intelligence to the !eo!le among whom they
settled, however, the Flani gradally ac-ired inflence at the 4orts of
the nso!histicated !agan 4hiefs. Sometimes, too, they forged closer links
by acce!ting the daghters of these 4hiefs in marriage. ,t as they
increased in nmbers and inflence, so the role of sbservience, which
they had !reviosly been content to acce!t, became increasingly irksome
to them. In fact, it seems !robable that, even if $hehu had never risen
against Yunfa, the Flani of #damawa and ,achi wold still have
overthrown the !agan rlers, as ,ba Bero had already done, and set !
some kind of State of their own. #s it was, however, these movements all
became !art of the larger jihad.
It is sometimes s!!osed that the creation of the "mirates of #damawa
and ,achi ot of the backward tribes and !etty States which had
!reviosly occ!ied the area was an easier task than the seizre of !ower
in the mch more advanced kingdoms of +asaland. In fact, with the sole
e)ce!tion of >obir, the reverse was tre. In the o!en !lains of the north
the isse was decided by a few !itched battles and sieges. *nce the
+asas had been defeated, the Flani were able to take over the States as
going concerns. %he +asa diehards, it is tre, were later able to harry the
con-erors by raids, bt these, e)ce!t for :ebbiCs, had to be carried ot
from distant bases and never threatened the integrity of the Flani
"mirates. In #damawa and ,achi, on the other hand, the !agans
generally managed to avoid !itched battles and instead retired to
fastnesses in the hills from which it was e)tremely difficlt to dislodge
them. 4onse-ently, the jihad lasted mch longer in the soth than it did
in the north.
#nother difference between the jihad in #damawa and ,achi on the one
hand and in the +asa States on the other lay in the origins of the
!artici!ants. In the +asa States the contest was in the main a
straightforward one between the Flani with their miscellaneos allies and
the +asa rling classes. *tside +asaland, however, where the
adversaries were !agans and where there were rich !rizes to be won,
!lenty of +asas were to be fond among the ranks of the Flani
reformers. In #damawa, for e)am!le, volnteers from :atsina, Aamfara,
:ebbi, and >obir took !art in the fighting ;, while in ,achi the Flani
were reinforced by men from :ano and even ,orn <. Some of these
+asas dobtless shared the reforming zeal of the Flani leaders, bt it
seems likely that the ma$ority were adventrers or yong men bent on
making their fortnes 5.
75
Adamawa
In #damawa, where the Flani were already nmeros, the latent ill3
feeling between them and the ,ata !agans flared ! into fighting in 1=01,
a year before the start of the jihad. #ccording to legend, the case of the
troble was the ,ata 4hiefCs insistence on e)ercising the droit de seigner.
When this right was asked of Ardo Jobdi in res!ect of his daghter, he
not only refsed to concede it bt killed first his daghter and then the
4hief who had demanded her. Fighting followed and the Flani, althogh
they re!elled the attacks of ,ata, were forced to withdraw to the soth of
the ,ene River 6.
7n the following year there returned to his 'eo'le a young +ulani
called Modibbo Adama, who for some time !reviosly had been away
stdying nder the leading teachers of the day. +e had first been taght
by Mallam Kiari of ,orn and had then become a !!il of $hehu at
.egel. When he at length reached home it was to find that his father had
been killed in the fighting with the ,ata in the !revios year =.
#dama was a man of !r!ose and strong character. First he indced the
Flani, who belonged to a nmber of different clans, to band themselves
together and then he enlisted their s!!ort for $hehuCs jihad, which by
this time was nder way in the west. #s one of the clans was already
embroiled with the ,ata, !erha!s the others did not need mch
!ersading. #t any rate, they agreed readily enogh to ally themselves
with $hehu and to seek the sanction of his athority. %o this end they
a!!ointed a de!tation and #dama was of corse inclded in it /.
In 1=0< or 1=05 this de!tation was received by $hehu, !robably in
>wand town, and !resented with a flag. #lthogh he was not the senior
member of the !arty, #dama was recognized to be its stanchest and
most zealos member. It was, therefore, to him that $hehu entrsted the
flag and as he delivered it he s!oke the following words D
Q When yo retrn tell them that this is what $hehu gave yo. Say also
that I acce!t their greetings. ,id them !lace their hands in yors ?
whoever gives his hand to yo, $oins hands with me. %ell them I greet
them. 'ake flags for them like this that I have given yo and give them
the flags with the orders I have laid !on yo. Bo are the envoy ?
whatsoever they desire let them tell it to yo, then do yo come and tell
me 10. R
$hehu then conferred the title of 2amido Fombina or Rler of the Soth
on Adama and allowed him to recrit volnteers from his own forces
before dismissing him. ,y the time the de!tation started for home,
therefore, #dama had emerged as the ndis!ted leader.
,ack in the east, #dama made his head-arters at >rin, the !lace to
which the Flani had retired after their battle with the ,ata in 1=01. It lay
in the angle formed by the ,ene and its tribtary, the Faro, and at that
time was !robably no more than a fortified cam!. Starting from this
narrow base, the Flani set ot to win a kingdom.
76
%he strggle which followed was too !rotracted and intricate to allow of its
being described here in detail. #t the otset the Flani established
themselves in the !lain of the ,ene Jalley and from there they gradally
e)tended the area of their inflence. Sometimes they were able to achieve
their ends by !eacefl means, as they did, for e)am!le, with a branch of
the ,ata tribe, whose 4hief was !ersaded to throw in his lot with them
and who ever after remained a stanch ally 11. Sometimes di!lomacy was
sccessfl as it was with the +olma !agans where the daghter of the
4hief was given in marriage to one of the Flani leaders and the son of
this alliance was later acce!ted by the tribe as their new 4hief.
Sometimes, even when !agans were never wholly sbded in their
fastnesses, a satisfactory trce cold be arranged with them as it was with
the :ilba, who were indced to come and trade at a border market 19.
For the most !art, however, the Flani had to resort to arms to im!ose
their will on the ntamed !agans. %hogh they were sally the victors, it
shold not be s!!osed that these contests were markedly one3sided. *n
the contrary, the !agans, fighting mainly with bows and !oisoned arrows
from behind natral or artificial defences in terrain where the Flani
horsemen fond it difficlt to o!erate, normally en$oyed a tactical
advantage and often inflicted severe casalties on their more
so!histicated enemies. +ow sccessfl the !agans cold be is revealed by
the fact that the ,ata stronghold of ,agale, which was so close to the
Flani ca!ital that the !agans cold actally look down on it from their
hills across the river, was re!eatedly attacked bt never ca!tred ntil
1=<1 when it was at last taken by a rse 11.
(or shold it be thoght that the aggression always came from the Flani
side. *n the contrary, !agans were constantly making forays from the
hills against the villages, the cattle, and the caravans in the !lains. So
!ersistent and damaging were these raids that #dama had to consolidate
all his gains by bilding fortified towns and ot!osts as blwarks against
them 1;.
%he most formidable enemy whom the Flani had to face, however, was
not one of the !agan tribes bt an "mirate very similar to their own. %his
was 'andara, which lay to the north of them, still in the bill contry, and
which was in alliance with the hostile !ower of ,orn. In 1=91 the "mir of
'andara, reinforced by a !owerfl contingent from ,orn and by the
%ri!olitanian #rabs who had accom!anied the *dney3.enham 4la!!erton
e)!edition across the Sahara, attacked the town of 'asfel in the north3
eastern corner of #damaCs domain. 'a$or .enham, who accom!anied the
e)!edition as an observer, watched the battle at very close -arters and
afterwards wrote a vivid descri!tion of it which is the best accont we
have of how contem!orary battles were foght and in !articlar of the
way in which the Flani bowmen dominated their adversariesD
Q We now came to a third town, in a sitation ca!able of being defended
against assailants ten times as nmeros as the besiegersD this town was
called 'sfeia NsicO. It was bilt on a rising grond between two low hills
at the base of others, forming !art of the mass of the 'andara montainsD
77
a dry wadey e)tended along the front? beyond the wadey a swam!?
between this and the wood the road was crossed by a dee! ravine, which
was not !assable for more than two or three horses at a time. %he
Felatahs NFlaniO had carried a very strong fence of !alisades, well
!ointed, and fastened together with thongs of raw hide, si) feet in height,
from one hill to the other, and had !laced their bowmen behind the
!alisades, and on the rising grond, with the wadey before them? their
hone were all nder cover of the hills and the townD this was a strong
!osition. %he #rabs, however, moved on with great gallantry, withot any
s!!ort or co3o!eration from the ,orno or 'andara troo!s, and
notwithstanding the shower of arrows, some !oisoned, which were !ored
on them from behind the !alisades, ,oo3:haloom, with his handfl of
#rabs, carried them in abot half an hor, and dashed on, driving the
Felatahs ! the sides of the hills. %he women were everywhere seen
s!!lying their !rotectors with fresh arrows dring this strggle ? and
when they retreated to the hills, still shooting on their !rsers, the
women assisted by rolling down hge masses of the rock, !reviosly
ndermined for the !r!ose, which killed several of the #rabs, and
wonded others. ,arca >ana, and abot one hndred of the ,orno
s!earmen, now s!!orted ,oo3:haloom, and !ierced throgh and throgh
some fifty nfortnates who were left wonded near the stakes. I rode by
his side as he !shed on -ite into the town, and a very des!erate
skirmish took !lace between ,arca >anaCs !eo!le and a small body of
Felatahs. %hese warriors throw the s!ear with great de)terity ? and three
times I saw the man transfi)ed to the earth who was dismonted for the
!r!ose of firing the town, and as often were those who rshed forward
for that !r!ose sacrificed for their temerity, by the Felatahs. ,arca >ana,
whose msclar arm was almost gigantic, threw eight s!ears, which all
told, some of them at a distance of thirty or thirty3five yards, and one
!articlarly on a Felatah chief, who with his own hand had broght for to
the grond. +ad either the 'andara or the SheikCs troo!s now moved !
boldly, notwithstanding the defence these !eo!le made, and the
reinforcements which showed themselves to the soth3west, they mst
have carried the town with the heights overlooking it, along which the
#rabs were driving the Felatahs by the terror their miserable gns
e)cited ? bt, instead of this, they still ke!t on the other side of the
wadey, ot of reach of the arrows.
%he Felatahs seeing their backwardness, now made an attack in their
trn ? the arrows fell so thick that there was no standing against them,
and the #rabs gave way. %he Felatah horse now came on ? and had not
the little band rond ,arca >ana, and ,oo3:haloom, with a few of his
monted #rabs, given them a very s!irited check, not one of s wold
!robably have lived to see the following day ? as it was, ,arca >ana had
three horses hit nder him, two of which died almost immediately, the
arrows being !oisoned ? and !oor ,oo3:haloomCs horse and himself
received their death3wonds by arrows of the same descri!tion. 'y horse
was badly wonded in the neck, $st above the sholder, and in the hind
78
leg ? an arrow had strck me in the face as it !assed, merely drawing the
blood, and I had two sticking in my bornose. %he #rabs had sffered
terribly ? most of them had two or three wonds, and one dro!!ed near
me with five sticking in his head alone ? two of ,oo3:haloomCs slaves were
killed also, near his !erson.
(o sooner did the 'andara and ,orno troo!s see the defeat of the #rabs,
than they, one and all, took flight in the most dastardly manner.... We
instantly became a flying mass. R 1<
#lthogh this cam!aign reslted in a com!lete victory for the Flani, the
"mir of 'andara later gained his revenge and almost com!letely wi!ed
ot one of the Flani clans. %his reverse !rom!ted #dama to take a hand
in the war himself and soon afterwards he defeated the 'andara army at
>ider and occ!ied the ca!ital. #lthogh not strong enogh to hold the
!lace, his victory nevertheless enabled him to anne) the soth3western
districts of 'andara G 'bi, 'ichika, and Eba G and incor!orate them in
his own domains 15.
.ring the rest of the 1=90s, for the whole of the 1=10s, and in the early
1=;0s #dama was engaged in !shing forward his frontiers 16, sbding
!ockets of resistance within his bondaries, s!!ressing the revolts
against his athority which broke ot from time to time, and consolidating
and assimilating his gains. >rin remained the ca!ital ntil 1=10, when
#dama moved first to Ribad and then to &obolio. Finally, in 1=;1, he
started to bild Bola, the !resent ca!ital 1=.
#s a man, Modibbo Adama was niversally res!ected on accont of his
character as mch as his achievements. +e combined the otlook and
tastes of a scholar with the ambition and drive of a man of action. ,y
natre he was said to be mild to a falt and yet, when the occasion
demanded he cold be both rthless and infle)ibly resolte 1/. +e came
from a hardy generation and all his life he observed the tre Flani
traditions of asterity and !iety. +e never ac-ired any !ersonal wealth
and when he died in 1=;= he had !ractically nothing to be-eath save his
:oran and an "mirate, still not flly consolidated, of abot thirty thosand
s-are miles, which was called after him.
#auchi
In +asa the word ,achi means the land of slaves. *riginally the term
was a!!lied generally to the whole region lying soth of +asaland, bt
later it came to be identified with the central massif which se!arates the
4had basin from the (iger3,ene River systems.
%he core of this massif consists of a high !latea of grassy !lains at an
elevation of 1,0003;,000 feet with rocky !eaks rising to 6,000 feet. From
it the grond falls away in stee! escar!ments to a more e)tensive lower
ste!, which forms an irreglar oter ring to the !latea !ro!er at an
altitde of abot 9,00031,000 feet. +ere the bsh is thick and the contry
is broken by fast3flowing rivers and irreglar ranges of hills.
,efore the jihad this region was inhabited by a large nmber of small
tribes. Some of their langages show affinities with +asa and it is safe to
79
assme that they were the descendants of the indigenos !eo!le who, at
the time of the ,erber migrations, chose to retreat into the hills rather
than stay and intermarry with the strangers from the north.
%hose inhabiting the high !latea and the sothern half of the lower ste!
which srronded it remained as ntoched by the inflences of the
+asas and the :anri as the more remote !agans of #damawa. If they
saw one another at all, it was !robably only as slave3raider and -arry.
%hose living in the northern half of the oter ring, however, were only $st
otside the !ale and were not se!arated from the more advanced
societies of +asaland and ,orn by any !hysical barriers. *n the
contrary, the !lains of the north merged im!erce!tibly into the foothills of
the !latea and so it was inevitable that with the !assage of time the
tribes of the foothills shold begin to absorb some of the civilization of the
!lains. %he slave3raids and !lndering forays did not cease, it is tre, bt
neither did they !revent the growth of legitimate trade and the mingling
of the races in the border markets. Sch evidence as there is sggests
that by the end of the eighteenth centry the !rocess of assimilation, at
any rate among the more advanced and accessible tribes, had already
gone a long way. Some of the !agans had abandoned their vernaclars in
favor of +asa. *thers, while retaining their mother tonges, cold
s!eak +asa as a second langage. *thers again had been converted to
Islam 90.
We do not know e)actly when the Flani first reached this area, bt it was
!robably at abot the same time as their arrival in #damawa, that is to
say in the fifteenth centry, when their migratory drift to the east came
! against the Shwa #rabs in the 4had Region and cased them to trn
aside and seek !astres for their cattle among the hills whose ble
otlines they wold have seen to the soth. %he contry was, in fact, very
well sited to their needs and a movement which may have been born of
necessity was certainly !er!etated by free choice.
,y the end of the eighteenth centry the Flani had !enetrated the whole
of this region e)ce!t the citadel of the high !latea. %he con-est of the
2ower >ongola by ,ba Bero in 16/= shows that in nmbers they were
already strong and that they were less dis!osed than hitherto to acce!t
the rle of the !etty chieftains of the contry. In other words in ,achi, as
in >ombe and #damawa, the jihad came at e)actly the right moment and
fond the Flani ready and indeed eager to assert themselves.
%he man who was to become the creator of ,achi "mirate was the only
leader of the first rank in the jihad who was not himself a Flani. +is name
was Yakubu and he was born into a family of the >erawa tribe, which had
been 'oslem for at least two generations 91. +is father ha!!ened to be a
close friend of a learned Flani called Mallam 7siyaku and when Bakb
was still a boy he was handed over to IsiyakCs gardianshi! to be
broght ! and edcated. 2ater on, Isiyak went to .egel to stdy nder
$hehu. +e took Bakb, now a yong man, with him and so it came
abot that Bakb also became one of $hehuCs !!ils 99.
#t the start of the jihad $hehu !resented a flag to his s!!orters from
80
,achi and bade them go and rally the contry to his case. +itherto, it
has always been s!!osed that the flag was given to Bakb in the first
!lace, bt 'allam IsiyakCs descendants claim that in fact he was the
original reci!ient. #ccording to their version, Isiyak set off for home, bt
before reaching :ano, fell ill and died. %he -estion of who shold scceed
him as leader was referred back to $hehu, whose choice fell on Bakb.
IsikayCs son 2awan was offended at being !assed over and stayed in
:ano, where he took !art in the jihad and afterwards became the fonder
of the town of >waram. Bakb, however, !ressed on 91.
,ack in ,achi he made his head-arters not far from the site of the
!resent city. #lthogh his own !eo!le, the >erawa, did not at first s!!ort
him, he seems to have had no difficlty in !ersading the local Flani to
acce!t his leadershi!. #t any rate, he soon collected a large following,
which was later strengthened by the arrival of +asa and :anri
volnteers and adventrers from :ano and ,orn, and created a firm base
for his ftre o!erations 9;
#s there was no state or tribe of any size to o!!ose him, BakbCs task
was basically similar to that of Modibbo AdamaCs in #damawa. %he area
of his o!erations was smaller, however, the contry less rgged, and the
!eo!le with whom he had to deal less recalcitrant. "ven so, there was no
-ick road to sccess and each tribe had to be sbded or overawed
se!arately. In seven years of fighting he broke the back of the resistance
and made himself master of virtally the whole region between the high
!latea and the E!!er >ongola. In 1=11, !asing from these labors, he
set abot the bilding of his new ca!ital, ,achi 4ity, on its !resent site
9<.
#s Bakb of ,achi and #uba Yero of >ombe had both carved their
"mirates ot of the territory of the !agan tribes there was no formal
bondary between them. 4onse-ently, in the !eriod when they were
both e)tending and consolidating their gains, they came into collision on
the E!!er >ongola. %here was fighting and some Flani blood was shed.
In the end, however, the two leaders were reconciled and agreed that the
river shold be the bondary between the two "mirates 95.
Soon after this, in abot 1=1=, Bakb led his army right rond the
sothern skirts of the high !latea to the town of 2afia ,eriberi. 2afia,
which stands in the !lain between the !latea and the ,ene, was a
recent :anri settlement and its !eo!le, by sbding the srronding
!agans, had in the s!ace of abot fifteen years created a small city state.
Bakb invested the !lace and after a short siege acce!ted its sbmission
96. %he 4hief was offered vassal stats of the same kind as that accorded
by the "mir of Aaria to the rlers of :effi and &emaCa. In this way 2afia, as
a tribtary of ,achi, was absorbed into the "m!ire 9=.
In s!ite of this sccess Bakb, at any rate in his attitde to the more
recalcitrant !agans, seems to have been less ventresome than Modibbo
Adama. +ad #dama been in his !lace, it is difficlt to believe that, having
once sbded ,achi, he wold not have attem!ted to add the high
!latea to his dominions. It was inhabited, it is tre, by warlike !agan
81
tribes, bt the terrain was no more difficlt than !arts of #damawa and
the o!en grasslands and !lentifl water made a rich !rize for a !astoral
!eo!le. Bakb certainly raided the tribes living in the high !latea and its
sothern escar!ments, for we know that he sent e)!editions to ,kr
and Shendam and foght against the 'ontol and Bergm !agans 9/.
%hese were fleeting raids, however, and he seems to have made no
attem!t to sb$gate the tribes and anne) their territories. %he task was
certainly a formidable one and he may well have been right not to have
ndertaken it. #s no other Flani leader attem!ted it, however, the high
!latea was never sbded and remained to the end an ncon-ered
!agan bastion.
Bakb rled his "mirate with $stice and wisdom for forty years. +e
never wavered in his loyalty to Sokoto and in the reign of $ultan #ello,
as we shall see, he was to save the "m!ire.
(otes
1. >azetteer of Bola Province, !. 10.
9. It is significant that, according to %he :ano 4hronicle, #rabs and Flani both a!!eared
for the first time in the reign of the same 4hief 7Palmer, !. 1118.
1. #ccording to ,erth the first Flani reached ,aghirmi in the si)teenth centry. In abot
1=99 their descendants tried, rather belatedly, to e)tend the jihad eastwards, bt their
rising failed and was s!!ressed. See %ravels, vol. 10, !. 11/.
;. >azetteer of Bola Province, !. 1;.
<. 2+d', vol. I, !. ;6.
5. >azetteer of Bola Province, !. 1;.
6. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. ;11.
=. Ibid. 'odibbo is the cortesy title accorded by the Flani to a man of learning, the
Flflde e-ivalent of the +asa 'allam,
/. Ibid.
10. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. ;19.
11. Ibid. !!. ;1139.
19. #. +. '. :irk3>reene, #damawa Past and Present, 2ondon, 1/</, !. 119.
11. Ibid. !!. 11=3/.
1;. >azetteer of Bola Province, !. 1;.
1<. 'a$or .enham, %ravels, vol. I, !!. 111315.
15. >azetteer of Bola Province, !. 15.
16. #t least one e)!edition reached the sea, bt it was really only a long3range raid. See
(ote 16 in #!!endi) I.
1=. :irk3>reene, !. cit. !!. 19/319.
1/. >azetteer of Bola Province, !. 1=.
90. >azetteer of ,achi Province, 1/90, !. 11.
91. +ogben and :irk3>reene, *P. cit. P. ;<;.
99. 2+d', vol. I, !. ;<.
91. :ano .(,s, +istory of >waram. #lha$i &naid agrees that the flag was originally
given to 'allam Isiyak.
9;. 2+d', vol. 1, !. ;6.
9<. 2+d', vol. I, !. ;6.
95. Ibid.
96. (otes on (assarawa Province, !. 11.
9=. '. >. Smith asserts that Aaria had established a !rior claim to the szerainty of
2afia, bt abandoned it to ,achi, either as an act of solidarity or in retrn for the
szerainty of 2ere. See >overnment in Aazza, !. 1;. Jolntary cession seems very
nlikely and if there was a !rior claim BakbCs army is !robably what e)tingished it.
9/. 2+d'. vol. I, !. ;6.
82
(ha'ter "ine
*he (onsolidation of the Em'ire
,y the year 1=10 the first !hase in the creation of the Flani "m!ire was
com!lete. %he former States of >obir, Aamfara, and :ebbi had been
merged into one and had become the metro!olitan Sltanate. In :ano,
:atsina, and Aazza, as we have seen, the +asa 4hiefs had been driven
ot and s!!lanted by Flani "mirs. In western ,orn the new "mirates of
+adei$a and :atagm had been created. Similarly, in the soth3cast the
"mirates of >ombe, #damawa, and ,achi had been forged ot of
formerly !agan lands and were still in the !rocess of enlarging their
territory and inflence.
'eanwhile, other lesser !rizes had also been ac-ired. In .ara, the first
of the +asa States, events had followed a corse similar to those in
:atsina, that is to say the +asa 4hief had been overthrown and had fled
with a few diehards, while a new Flani rLgime had taken over the
government 1.
In the north the "mir of #ir, Muhammadu #akiri, had come to $hehu in
abot 1=10 and done homage. When he had died soon afterwards he had
been scceeded by his brother, 'hammad :amma, who had also come
in !erson to !ay allegiance. .ring this visit a treaty had been negotiated
whereby the new "mir had ndertaken to kee! o!en the desert trade
rotes and to transfer to $hehu the szerainty of certain northern towns
which the %aregs had hitherto controlled. In this way the distant oasis of
#ir and the intervening region of #dar had become !arts of the "m!ire 9.
In the soth the State of Bari, one of the ,anza ,akwai, had also
sbmitted. *n the otbreak of the jihad $hehu had sent an e)!edition
against it which, thogh it had failed to take the ca!ital, ,in Bari, had
scceeded in ca!tring a nmber of other towns and defeating the Bari
army in the field 1. Soon afterwards the 4hief had sed for !eace and, on
doing homage to $hehu, had been allowed to retain his office and title.
Bari had ths become an e)ce!tion to the general rle in that it had been
embodied into the "m!ire withot mch bloodshed and withot the
wholesale sbstittion of Flani for +asa in the fedal hierarchy.
%o the west of Bami, on the other side of the (iger, was the State of
>rma, another of the #an!a #akwai, which resembled Bari in having a
!agan !easantry governed from a few walled towns by a 'oslem rling
class. .ring the heyday of Songhai it had formed !art of that "m!ire and
then later it had fallen nder the domination of :ebbi ;. When :ebbi had
declined, >rma had recovered its inde!endence, bt it had remained
weak and its !eo!le had tended to slide back into !aganism <. In 1=0/
and again in 1=10 $hehu, had dis!atched e)!editions against it nder the
command of Mallam. Abdullahi, who had first occ!ied the !rovinces of
.andi, :amba, and Aaberma, which lay between :ebbi and >rma, and
then crossed the river and sbded >rma itself. In the following year
#ello, had led a third e)!edition to this !art of the contry, con-ered the
83
little !rinci!ality of Illo, and consolidated AbdullahiCs gains 5. %he "m!ire
had ths been e)tended in the soth3west to the (iger and beyond.
%he FlaniCs ne)t move had been made against the >waris, a nmeros
!eo!le who occ!ied a large !ocket of hitherto nsbded contry
between Aamfara and Aaria in the north and (!e in the soth. %he
>waris, althogh sally inclded among the ,anza ,akwai, had, in fact,
made little or no !rogress with the +asa tonge and still s!oke a difficlt
langage of their own. Politically they were organized into a loose
confederation of clans rather than a state and the centre of this
confederation was the walled town of ,irnin >wari. #s they had made no
move to sbmit to the Flani, bt on the contrary had contined to attack
their neighbors, an e)!edition nder #ello had been sent against them
in 1=10. ,irnin >wari had been stormed and sacked and the 4hief, who
called himself Sarkin >wari, thogh his athority was, in fact, more
limited than his grandiose title sggested, had been carried off into
ca!tivity 6. +aving achieved their aim of sb$gation, however, the Flani
had made no attem!t to create a >wari "mirate, bt had sim!ly left the
scattered tribe, which now had neither head nor ca!ital, to be governed
!iecemeal by the srronding "mirs.
#t the close of 1/10 there was still mch consolidation to be done,
!articlarly in #damawa, ,achi, and sothern Aaria, while in the soth
considerable con-ests, notably in (!e and Ilorin, had yet to be made.
,t in the north the war was virtally over.
In most of the "mirates the victors were eager to enter into their new
kingdoms, bt in the metro!olitan Sltanate, $hehu showed no desire to
do so. +e had always concerned himself mch more with s!irital than
tem!oral matters and now, when his aims had been achieved, he
withdrew more than ever from the world and gave himself ! to his
mystical devotions. +e contined, of corse, to discharge his religios
res!onsibilities as 4ommander of the Faithfl, bt his !olitical and military
athority he delegated more and more to Abdullahi and #ello. #t this
stage there was no !recise demarcation of s!heres or allocation of dties,
bt #ello gradally assmed a general res!onsibility for the east and
Abdullahi for the west, while $arkin Yaki Aliyu Jaidu was recognized as
having a s!ecial interest in the north =.
$hehu had always set his face against corts, hierarchies, and titles, all of
which he regarded as earthly vanities /, and so dring his lifetime the
machinery throgh which the Sltanate was administered and the "m!ire
governed remained rdimentary. In fact, a!art from the !ost of a!iri or
Jizier, which had already been assigned $ointly to Abdullahi and #ello,
only si) offices of state were recognized and filled 10, namelyD
Sarkin Baki
4a!tain3
>eneral
#lkalin
#lkalai
4hief &stice
84
Bari 4onstable
SaCi
Standard
,earer
2iman Imam
'aCa$i %reasrer
*f the other titles of +asaland and ,orn, sch as 6aladima and
/bandawaki, he !ositively disa!!roved, and he warned his followers
against the system of government nder which they florished 11.
4onse-ently, at any rate in the metro!olitan Sltanate, it was not ntil
after his death that the +asa hierarchies and titles were ado!ted and a
4ort came into being.
*ne seclar enter!rise to which $hehu did give his consent, however,
was the creation of a new ca!ital. %he !lace that the Flani selected for
this !r!ose was a village called Sokoto, which was sitated on high
grond near the conflence of the Rima and Sokoto Rivers at the !oint
where the >obir3:ebbi and #dar3Aamfara trade rotes intersected. %he
area was already familiar to them becase they had moved into it for a
short time after the battle of %abkin :watto. #ello !robably chose it
becase, thogh rather far from eastern Aamfara, it was reasonably near
the centre of what had now become the metro!olitan area 19.
It was #ello who took the initiative in establishing the new city. +e laid it
ot on a generos scale on the high grond overlooking the rivers and
enclosed it with a wall. #s soon as it was habitable $hehu, who in 1=10
had moved from >wand to Sifawa 11 took ! residence there. #ello,
Atiku, and $hehuCs other sons also bilt themselves hoses, bt
Abdullahi, who had moved to ,odinga while $hehu was at Sifawa, did
not $oin them.
#mong the other leaders of the movement there were several who shared
$hehuCs belief in the corr!ting -alities of worldly !ower. Foremost
among them was Mallam Abdullahi, later to become "mir of >wand
and heir to abot a -arter of the "m!ire. +e had already shown his
distaste for tem!oral ambition 1; and later in life he, too, was to divest
himself as far as !ossible of seclar res!onsibility so as to devote himself
to stdy and scholarshi! 1<. Similarly, in :ano there was the nworldly
Sliman who hesitated for some time before he cold even bring himself
to take !ossession of the !alace, becase he was afraid lest he and his
family shold be corr!ted by the wealth and !ower which it symbolized
15. #lthogh it was in the athentic tradition of the early 4ali!hs, sch
high3mindedness was necessarily rare, however, and for the most !art the
victors were glad enogh to take !ossession of their con-ests.
Who e)actly were these victorsP %he -estion lies at the centre of a
controversy which we mst now !ase and e)amine.
%he general corse that the jihad took is well established and not in
dis!te, bt there have been disagreements abot its real cases and the
85
motives of those who took !art in it. %he orthodo) view is that it was first
and foremost a religios movement, as its leaders claimed, and that,
thogh the Flani !rovided its main driving force, tribal distinctions were
of only secondary significance. ,t another school of thoght has
sggested that it was the religios manifestations that were of only
s!erficial im!ortance and that the real cases were ethnic, in other
words that what !assed as a movement to !rify religion was in fact a
revoltion designed to give the Flani control of the less gifted !eo!le
among whom they had settled 16. 'ore recently a third school has
maintained that too mch em!hasis has been laid on both religios and
ethnic factors and that the movement drew a large !art of its strength
from $hehuCs social teaching and the res!onse of the +asa !easants and
the Flani !astoralists to his attacks on the o!!ression, e)!loitation, and
in$stice which were then rife 1=. #ccording to this theory, the movement
was as mch a !easantsC revolt as a jihad. In seeking the trth among
these divergent views it is necessary to recognize from the otset that
there are two se!arate !roblems to be solvedD
to establish the identities of the reformers, then, in the light of that
knowledge
to ascertain whether their governing motives were religios, racial,
or social, or !erha!s a mi)tre of all three.
%o take first the -estion of establishing identities, there is no dobt that
the Flani !layed a central !art in the jihad, bt it is by no means easy to
determine how large a contribtion was made by the +asas and other
!eo!les. Abdullahi asserted that some of the rling classes forsook their
4hiefs and came to $oin $hehu, bringing their !ossessions with them 1/.
If the roll of !rominent non3Flani adherents is called, however, the
nmbers will be fond sr!risingly small. #mong men of the first rank,
a!art from Yakubu of ,achi who still had to make his way, there were
only the 4hief of Bari, /suman Masa of :ebbi, and the two %areg
leaders, Agale and Abu Hamidu. #mong men of the second rank there
were Abdu $alami of >imbana and a nmber of sbordinate chiefs from
Aamfara :ebbi, and of corse Bari, bt very few, so far as we know, from
the other +asa States 90. #bot the rank and file there is some conflict
of evidence. In one of his !oems abot the victory of %abkin :watto,
Abdullahi s!oke of Hor Flani and or +asa all nited.I 91 *n the other
hand, it is clear from two !assages of #elloCs writings that, when the
reformers moved down to the >awan >lbi a few months later, their only
+asa s!!orters were the Aamfarawa and certain :ebbawa 99.
%he fact is that in the early stages of the jihad in +asaland were strong
moral and material inflences at work which tended to kee! the +asa
!o!lation on the side of their 4hiefs, or at any rate netral, and to drive
the Flani, whether or not they were dee!ly religios, into the cam! of the
reformers. For a +asa, $oining $hehuCs case meant engaging in a
rebellion, losing all his !ro!erty throgh confiscation, and volnteering to
86
fight against his own !eo!le. For a Flani, by contrast, refsing to $oin
$hehuCs case tended to land him in even more troble than $oining,
becase it meant that he incrred the odim of his own kith and kin
withot necessarily gaining the confidence or esca!ing the !ersection of
the +asa athorities. #nd as for !ro!erty, his cattle in the bsh, which
the reformers soon began to dominate, were worth more to him than his
hose and chattels in the town.
From the start of the war in +asaland these !olarizing forces tended to
divide the contestants into the +asas on one side and the Flani and
their miscellaneos allies on the other. +ere and there we catch glim!ses
of them at work and elsewhere we can discern them throgh their effects.
*n the Flani side, for e)am!le, we know that, before ever the war began,
Abdullahi was active in enlisting the s!!ort of those Flani who had not
committed themselves to $hehu and that he was sccessfl in bringing
the ma$ority of them into the fold 91. # minority evidently remained aloof
or hostile, however, becase he later mentions them as serving in the
army that Bnfa broght against the reformers at %abkin :watto 9;. ,t,
according to #ello, even some of these defected at the last moment and
went over to $hehu 9<.
%hanks to these defectors and to $hehuCs victory, the nmber of Flani
who still remained with the >obirawa after the battle seems to have
dwindled to a handfl. "ven so, Abdullahi thoght it worth while to
maintain the !ressre by addressing a !oem of veiled re!roach and
e)hortation to them 95.
"lsewhere in +asaland we hear of a few Flani fighting with the +asa
4hiefs, for e)am!le rond Bandoto in :atsina 2aka 96 and in the
Wamakko district of what was then still :ebbi 9=, bt the instances are so
few and scattered that it is clear that the nmber of Flani who for long
remained hostile to $hehuCs case was negligible. For this the +asa
rlers had !artly themselves to blame. In an effort to ni! the movement in
the bd and forestall an insrrection they had recorse to very severe
measres of re!ression 9/. In theory, no dobt, these measres were
s!!osed to be aimed only at men who were known to sym!athize with
$hehuCs teaching, bt in !ractice they !robably fell with little
discrimination on the Flani commnity generally. 'any who were
indifferent or hesitant, therefore, wold have fond themselves
!ersected and threatened, sometimes even !t in fear of their lives 10,
and wold ths have been driven along with the real zealots into the arms
of the reformers.
*n the other side, the very !re!onderance of the Flani among the
reformers may well have deterred some of the +asas who were attracted
by $hehuCs teaching from actally $oining the case. 4ertainly, the
+asas and the other non3Flani !eo!le who did $oin seem to have fond
something ncongenial or nsettling in the atmos!here of the reformersC
cam!, becase on the whole they !roved mch less constant than the
Flani. %heir fickleness first showed itself in the treachery of Esman 'asa
and his :ebbawa, reached its height with the defections of the %aregs
87
and Aamfarawa, and came to an end after the war, as we shall see, with
the revolt of #bd Salami and the >imbanawa. %hese wides!read
desertions natrally had the effect of shifting the movementCs ethnic
centre of gravity even frther towards the Flani. #s a reslt, the jihad in
+asaland became more than ever a straight contest between the Flani
on one side and the +asa rling classes on the other. In a later !hase,
however, when the war had s!read beyond the old bondaries of
+asaland, this swing was balanced by another swing in the o!!osite
direction. +aving at last freed themselves from their inhibitions, the
+asas then made a significant contribtion to the sccess of the jihad
and the creation of the new em!ire. We have already met their volnteers
in #damawa and ,achi and we shall enconter them again in (!e and
llorin.
+aving traced the com!licated !attern of identities, let s now try to
determine whether the !rivate motives of the reformers were the same as
those they !roclaimed !blicly. +ere again there is an intricate !attern to
be e)!lored. #t the smmit, the generally acce!ted view of $hehu is that
he was a religios reformer, !re and sim!le, bt an northodo) theory
recently !t forward has sggested that, besides being a religios
fndamentalist, he was also a radical social reformer whose cam!aign was
directed $st as mch against crrent abses, sch as frad and
ignorance, as against religios nbelief 11. %here is some trth in this
assertion, becase his teaching ndobtedly had a large social element in
it, bt it cold $st as well be arged that he was a !olitical reformer or a
legal and $dicial reformer, becase these elements were also !resent in
his doctrine. Where this theory becomes misleading is in sggesting, as it
does when it co!les $hehuCs name with that of &ohn Start 'ill 19, that
the reforms which $hehu !reached were inde!endent of, and did not
derive from, his religios beliefs. In fact, if the evidence is dis!assionately
e)amined, it will he fond to lead in e)actly the o!!osite direction. +is
sym!athy with the common !eo!le was genine enogh, bt it is
nevertheless tre that the only abses he condemned were the !ractices
Islam forbade and the only reforms he demanded were those Islam
re-ired. %his !oint is well illstrated by his attitde to ta)ationD what he
criticized was not any e)cessive brden of ta)ation bt the im!osition of
ta)es which the ShariCa did not recognize. *ther !olitical, legal, $dicial,
economic, and social -estions interested him only in so far as they were
as!ects of Islam, and then he $dged them solely from a religios
stand!oint 11. With mal!ractices like slavery and enslavement, !rovided
that they had the sanction of Islam, he did not concern himself. +is aim,
-ite sim!ly, was to establish a theocratic state which he, as >odCs chosen
instrment, wold direct in strict accordance with the sacred law.
4om!ared to $hehu, #ello was mch more seclar in his otlook. %hogh
devot and !erfectly sincere in his faith, he was essentially a man of the
world who nderstood !ower and had no -alms abot e)ercising it.
Abdullahi, on the other hand, had a more com!le) character than either
$hehu or #ello and in these res!ects fell somewhere between the two D
88
he was certainly not devoid of worldly ambitions bt he was !erce!tive
enogh to recognize them for what they were and high3minded enogh to
des!ise himself for harboring them 1;. *f the other early leaders only
Sliman or :ano seems to have been cast in the same mold as $hehu.
%he remainder were mch more like #ello, that is to say they were
geninely religios and had a sincere belief in the $stice of their mission,
bt were nevertheless !ractical men of the world with material as well as
moral aims.
#bot the motives of the rank and file we natrally know less, bt even so
there are certain inferences to be drawn. It seems !robable, for e)am!le,
that when $hehu first raised his standard he was $oined only by the most
devoted or fanatical of his followers. %his view is borne ot by the
references made to the men who fell at the battle of %sntswa in 1=0;D
Abdullahi recalled their noble -alities 1< and #ello asserted that two
hndred of them knew the :oran by heart 15 ,t some at least of the new
recrits who took their !lace mst have been men of an altogether
different stam!, becase within twelve months there followed the
!lndering incidents in Aamfara and the mtiny at :wolda. In one of his
!oems Abdullahi contrasted the !iety and devotion of the men who
foght and died at %sntswa and #lwasa with the cowardice and
degeneracy of those who mtinied at :wolda and then saved themselves
by flight at #lwasa. %hese he castigated as mtineers, cheats, hooligans,
!leasre3seekers, and backsliders 16. When every allowance has been
made for !oetic e)aggeration in the descri!tion of a hmiliating disaster, it
is still clear that the ranks of the reformers now contained more than $st
saints and scholars.
#s the war !rogressed and $hehuCs !ros!ects of winning it im!roved, the
!ro!ortion of reformers with worldly ambitions as well as religios aims
mst have tended to grow. %he call of blood was, of corse, only one of a
whole range of seclar or !rely selfish motives, bt among the Flani,
with their !ride and racial consciosness, it mst have been a !articlarly
!owerfl one. %he horsemen who changed sides $st before the battle of
%abkin :watto, for e)am!le, can hardly have ndergone a sdden
conversion and were !robably res!onding to its call. In sch ways as this
it tended to divide the contestants on ethnic lines and thereby hel!ed to
make the war a racial as well as a religios conflict. ,t one mst beware
of overrating its im!ortance. When, for e)am!le, Abdullahi addressed his
!oem of veiled re!roach to the Flani who had remained with the
>obirawa after the otbreak of war, it was as good 'oslems that he
a!!ealed to them, not as fellow tribesmen 1=. Sch inflence as the ties
of blood had, therefore, seems to have remained on an instinctive or
sbconscios !lane and was not o!enly e)!loited by the leaders of the
movement.
We can now trn to the second of the northodo) theories, namely that
the nderlying forces which !rodced the jihad were not religios bt
social and economic. It is based mainly on the em!hasis !laced by $hehu
and the other Flani leaders on the o!!ression and corr!tion that
89
florished nder the +asa 4hiefs. %o a !eo!le accstomed to higher
standards these abses might !erha!s have acted as a s!r to rebellion,
bt it mst be remembered that the +asas, in s!ite of El.Maghili, had
never known any better government. (or, !erha!s, was it -ite as bad as
it was !ainted. Some of the !ractices that $hehu condemned, sch as the
levying of tolls on merchants and travellers, were then niversal
throghot #frica. *thers, sch as the se-estration by rlers of the
goods of strangers who died in their territory, srvived the jihad and were
not nknown in the Flani era 1/. *thers again, sch as administrative
bribery and $dicial corr!tion, were admittedly alleviated when the Flani
scceeded to !ower, bt were certainly not eradicated by them or even by
the ,ritish after them. %he trth is that, by the standards of the #frica of
that day, o!!ression and corr!tion on this scale were not ot of the
ordinary.
So far as the +asas were concerned, there is no evidence to sggest that
the hardshi!s of the !easantry at this time were any worse than they had
been for generations !ast. It is tre, of corse, that $hehuCs teaching
drew attention to them, and !erha!s hel!ed to crystallize crrent
discontent, bt it is nlikely that it did more than this becase the +asas
as a !eo!le are not given to !easantsC revolts and seem to be hard to
rose on sch isses. In their time they have followed adventrers like
Koran of :atsina ;0 and Kanta of :ebbi, and occasionally they have been
willing to s!!ort self3styled 'ahdis ;1, bt so far as we know they have
never thrown ! or foght for a Robert :ett or a &ohn ,all. %his may be
one of the reasons why so few of $hehuCs +asa s!!orters were ready
to take ! arms in his case. #nother reason is !robably to be fond in
the natre of the im!act that $hehuCs astere and radical teaching made
!on the tolerant and easy3going +asas. When, for e)am!le, he
denonced the !ractice whereby the athorities made forced levies on
!rodce and goods dis!layed for sale in the markets ;9, the common
!eo!le dobtless a!!laded him, bt when he also condemned the social
mi)ing of the se)es and the cstom of allowing women to dance before
men at bridal feasts, there mst have been many who demrred ;1.
Similarly, when he said that the rle of law shold a!!ly to the 4hiefs, as
well as to their sb$ects, the !eo!le wold have s!!orted him, bt when
they realized that this meant the fll rigor of the ShariCa might be a!!lied
to them, withot benefit of the com!romises by which the +asa 4hiefs
and $dges had habitally softened it, there mst have been many who
-estioned whether the change wold really sit them.
,t the Flani !astoralists were made of altogether different mettle. First
of all, being Flani, they were more !assionate and intense than the
+asa !easants and less willing to com!romise or sbmit. Secondly, as
has already been described, they seem to have had a ma$or grievance, at
any rate in >obir, abot the severity with which the +asa athorities now
assessed and collected jangali, the ta) on their cattle. It is easy to
imagine, therefore, that $hehuCs dennciation of this ta) as an illegal
im!osition mst have won him strong s!!ort and at the same time have
90
heightened the discontent and !rovided it with a focs. It is conceivable
that it did more than this and that, as he was himself a Flani, his
teaching may somehow have harnessed these resentments to
sbconscios racial as!irations and, withot his intending it, have sown in
the minds of his Flani adiences the idea that the time had at last come
to !t an end to the in$stices that went with their sbordinate stats. If
social and economic grievances did, in fact, !lay on racial as!irations in
this way, they cold easily have Prodced an e)!losive mi)tre, and their
interaction may indeed e)!lain why the !astoral Flani rallied to $hehuCs
standard in far greater nmbers than the +asa !easants.
Reviewing all this evidence we can only conclde that the trth abot the
origin and natre of the jihad lies somewhere between the e)tremities of
the three theories. It was certainly not a !rely religios conflict. ,t nor,
for that matter, were its !rimary cases either racial or social. $ocial and
economic forces may well have had some effect in rousing the
+ulani 'astoralists, but they seem to have obtained little 'urchase
on the Hausa 'easants and on balance they were only a secondary
factor% More im'ortant were the ethnic ties that bound the +ulani
together and the vague as'irations that they may have harboured
of asserting themselves as a 'eo'le. %hese !robably constitted a
ma$or factor. "evertheless, the movement was fundamentally a
religious one. (othing illstrates this trth so clearly or !roves it so
conclsively as the fact that from first to last, without challenge or
@uestion, the leadershi' remained in the hands of an unworldly
mystic.
(otes
1. >azetteer of :ano Province, !. 9/, and +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. 1<1.
9. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. /<3/6 and 190318. #ello im!lies that 'hammad ,akiri
died a natral death, bt according to ,arth he was killed by some of his own !eo!le, the
:elgeres. %he !ecliar relationshi! between the "mir and the %areg tribes is described
in (ote / of #!!endi) I.
1. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. =68.
;. See (ote < in #!!endi) I.
<. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 1968.
5. Ibid. !!. 1963/.
6. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. /=3//8.
=. #ello, S: 72+d', vol. I, !!. 9639=8.
/. $hehu, :F 7+iskett, !!. <5/3608.
10. Information !rovided by #lha$i &naid.
11. $hehu, :F 7+iskett, !. <5/8.
19. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Sokoto 4ity. #ccording to tradition, $hehu a!!roved of the
site becase he thoght that corr!ting wealth wold never come to sch a bare and
stony !latea.
11. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 1968.
1;. See (ote so in #!!endi) I.
1<. +iskett, Introdction to %W, !. 99.
15. #lha$i #bbakar, o!. cit. !. ;=.
16. See, for e)am!le, 4. :. 'eek, %he (orthern %ribes of (igeria, 2ondon, 1/9<, Jol. I,
!. 100.
1=. .. #. *lderogge, Fedalism in the Western Sdan from the Si)teenth to the
(ineteenth 4entries, Sovietskaya "tnografia, no. ;, 1/<6, and %homas +odgkin,
91
SEthman dan FodioT, in the magazine (igeria, *ctober 1/50.
1/. #bdllah -oted by $hehu in %I 7Palmer, &#S, vol. MIJ, !. 1=/8.
90. See (ote 1< in #!!endi) I.
91. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !.1108.
99. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 698. See also #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 91.
91. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !!. /=31018.
9;. Ibid. !. 10/.
9<. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. <<8.
95. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 1118.
96. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. =68.
9=. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Wamakko.
9/. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 11;8.
10. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !!. 66 and 6/8.
11. +odgkin, o!, cit.
19. Ibid.
11. See +iskett, #I%R, !!. <=53/5.
1;. See #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !!. 190318, and (ote 10 in #!!endi) I.
1<. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. 11;8.
15. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 5=8.
16. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !!. 11=31/8.
1=. #bdllah %W 7+iskett, !. 1118.
1/. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. IJ, !. 10;.
;0. .aniel, o!. cit. !. 1.
;1. See, for e)am!le, +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. ;6/, and &ohnston, o!. cit. !!.
15136. $hehuCs movement, of corse, had no connections with or leanings towards
'ahdism. #ello, it is tre, once s!oke as if the advent of the 'ahdi was near, bt this
seems to have been an isolated reference and later he stated e)!licitly that $hehu was
not to be called the 'ahdi 7#rnett, !!. =6 and 19<8.
;9. $hehu, :F 7+iskett, !. <5=8.
;1. $hehu, (E' 7+iskett, #I%R, !. <=68.
92
(ha'ter *en
*he 2eligious (ontroversy with El.Kanemi
and the 4eath of $hehu
%he theology of $hehu and his adherents, like that of El.Maghili and the
%imbctoo divines whom they broadly followed, was rooted in Maliki
orthodo)y and the overwhelming ma$ority of the athorities that they
-oted belonged to this school 1. (evertheless, there was abot their
doctrines a strong flavor not merely of reform bt of radical or
fndamental reform. %he -estion therefore arises whether there were
any direct links between them and the other Islamic reformers of the day,
!articlarly the Wahhabis with whom, at any rate at first sight, they
seemed to have mch in common.
%he Wahhabis, it will be remembered, were the followers of a reformer
called Muhammad b% Abdul ahhab, who florished in central #rabia in
the second half of the eighteenth centry. #mong his converts was SaCd,
the fonder of the royal family of Sadi #rabia, and nder his dynamic
leadershi! the Wahhabis first of all made themselves masters of the
interior of the !eninsla and then, in 1=013;, ca!tred the +oly !laces of
'ecca and 'edina, which they held ntil 1=19 9.
,y conviction the Wahhabis were not merely !ritans bt fndamentalists
who soght to rid Islam of false doctrines and degenerate !ractices. %hey
favored a literal inter!retation of the :oran, banned tobacco, and
frowned on silks and $ewellery. Wherever they gained !ower they
introdced theocratic r#!im$s of the most astere severity 1.
In the works of Mallam Abdullahi there are three references to Ibn al-
%ayyini al-&anbali, whose writings had an im!ortant inflence on Al-
Wahhab, and this !roves beyond dobt that the Flani reformers were
ac-ainted with the sorces on which Wahhabism drew ;. It is also
!ossible that the seeds of the movement itself were broght back to
+asaland by retrning !ilgrims. 4ertainly, among those who made the
!ilgrimage dring this !eriod were two men who had great inflence on
$hehu, namely his ttor, 'allam &ibril, and his !aternal ncle,
Muhammadu dan 2aji. Mallam Jibrilu seems to have come back from
the !ilgrimage, which may have been his second, abot 16=1 < and
'hammad dan Ra$i in 16/; 5. %his means that they were in the +e$az
well before it was occ!ied by the Wahhabis, bt even so, as they both
s!ent some time there 6, they mst have heard abot the reformers, who
were already masters of the neighboring !rovinces, and have known
what their aims and doctrines were. It may also be significant that 'allam
&ibrilCs doctrine that disobedience involved nbelief was characteristic of
Walahabism =. 4ertainly, there were marked resemblances between the
fndamentalism of the Wahhabis and the radicalism of the Flani and
between the two brands of !ritanism which flowed from these doctrines.
*ne !oint which $hehu em!hasized in his writings, for e)am!le, was the
93
im!ortance of stdying the lives of the early 4ali!hs /, and his !ersonal
!redilection for a system of government as starkly sim!le as theirs has
already been noted. Similarly, many of the reforms which he advocated
were identical to those that the Wahhabis had already introdced.
%o sggest that $hehu may have been inflenced by Wahhabism,
however, is not to say that the Flani reformation was !art of the Wahhabi
movement 10. In fact, there were im!ortant differences. %hogh $hehu,
himself tended to look back to the early days of the 4ali!hate as offering
the ideal system of Islamic government, even he relied mch more on the
$rists of the #bbasid 4ali!hate than on the earlier athorities, while the
administrative machine that #ello, and Abdullahi set ! to govern the
"m!ire was nothing like the sim!le society of 'edina bt a com!le)
hierarchy akin to that of the #bbasids 11.
In theological doctrine, too, there were im!ortant differences of otlook.
$hehu, as we have already noted, did not acce!t 'allam. &ibrilCs view,
shared with the Wahhabis, that disobedience involved nbelief and,
indeed, felt called !on to refte it 19. 4onversely, the Flani reformers
acce!ted the miracles of the walis, or saints, whereas it was one of the
central tenets of the Wahhabis to re$ect them 11. 'ost im!ortant of all,
the WahhabisC denial of the athority of the for orthodo) $rists of Islam
1; fond no !lace in the beliefs of the Flani. *n balance, therefore, the
most that can be said is that, while the reforming movement in +asaland
was !erha!s inflenced by Wahhabism, it was certainly not ins!ired by the
Wahhabis and it was always se!arated from them by im!ortant
differences of dogma and !ractice 1<.
Whatever the !recise natre of this relationshi! may have been, there was
certainly a conne)ion between $hehu and Seko #hmad, who led a
similar movement in the western Sdan. #hmad, who was also a Flani,
studied under $hehu in his youth and then returned to his native
'assina 1<b brning with his masterCs reforming zeal. #fter declaring a
jihad he first of all freed 'assina from its ancient ttelage to the ,ambara
kingdom of Seg and then e)tended his con-ests over a very large area
stretching from %imbctoo in the north to the ,lack Jolta in the soth.
#lthogh at the otset he had sent two of his brothers 1<b to obtain
$hehuCs blessing for his enter!rise, he sbse-ently ke!t his kingdom
-ite distinct and never acknowledged $hehuCs !olitical or even religios
athority. Indeed, he too styled himself 4ommander of the Faithfl 15.
(evertheless, his original ins!iration had been derived from $hehu and
his movement develo!ed along !arallel lines.
#t the beginning of the nineteenth centry, therefore, there were !owerfl
inflences at work in the 'oslem world to !rify the faith and eradicate
abses. Since then it has often been asked whether the reformers were, in
fact, $stified in resorting to war to gain their ends. Was the faith so
sllied and were the abses so dee!ly ingrained that blood had to be shed
to !rify themP Was there no other method of achieving the same endsP
In the central Sdan these -estions were asked at the time by none
other than $heikh El.Kanemi, the man who had saved ,orn, and the
94
best way of answering them is to follow the great religios controversy
which they !rovoked.
It will be recalled that in 1=0=, after the loss of (gazargam, his ca!ital,
the 'ai of ,orn had enlisted the aid of $heikh El.Kanemi, a man of
otstanding ability and distinction, who had scceeded in checking the
disintegration of ,orn and halting the eastward advance of the Flani.
(ow El.Kanemi, like his adversaries, was a scholar and a divine as well
as a soldier and an administrator. ,esides meeting force with force,
therefore, he challenged the Flani in their own theological field. +is first
move, made after his reca!tre of (gazargam in 1=0/, was to address
the following letter to $hehu.
>reetings and friendshi!. %he case of my writing to yo is that when >od
broght me to ,orn, I fond that the fire of discord had broken ot
between yor followers and the !eo!le of this contry. When I in-ired
why, some said that the reason lay in religion, others that it was to be
fond in tyranny.
,eing still !er!le)ed, I wrote to yor kinsmen who live amongst s and
asked them to e)!lain their !rete)t for making war on ,orn. In re!ly I
received a !oor sort of $stification sch as wold not come from a wise
man, mch less a learned one, and least of all from a religios reformer.
%hey referred me to certain books and said that in these books they had
learnt of the necessity of waging war. (ow we on or side have e)amined
these books and we do not find in them what they have fond. %hs we
remain in or !er!le)ity. (ow that there is a trce in the war we think it
best to write to yo ... for we believe that a wise man, when he meets an
honest -estion, will give a trthfl answer. Will yo therefore tell me
yor reasons for going to war and enslaving or !eo!leP
Shold yo say that it is on accont of or heathenism, let me tell yo
that we are no heathens and that infidelity is far from or thresholds. If
!rayer and the giving of tithes and fasting in Ramadan and the restoration
of mos-es amont to heathenism, then what, I mst ask, is IslamP
I have been told that the gronds on which yo accse s of being infidels
are as followsD becase or chiefs are re!ted to make idolatros
sacrifices, becase or women go nveiled, and becase or $dges are
said to be corr!t and o!!ressive. ,t these things do not make it lawfl
for yo to wage war on s. %hey are, it is tre, very great evils, and it is
of corse or dty to !revent their being committed, bt it is not right to
say that those who are gilty of them are heathens.... It were better to
command them to mend their ways than to make war on them as yo are
doing.
%he only reslt of yor !olicy is to bring triblation and sffering on yor
fellow 'oslems, for yor followers have been killing or men and
ca!tring or women and children. We are astonished that yo shold
!ermit sch things when yo claim to be reforming or religion and we
!erceive that yor tre ob$ect is the !ower to rle over others. %hogh
yo may conceal this aim, even in yor own hearts, it is, we believe, yor
95
real ambition.
We have heard mch of the character of $hehu /suman 4an +odiyo
and we have orselves read his books.... :now therefore that if $hehu is
for the trth, then we are for $hehu bt if $hehu de!arts from the trth,
then we shall leave him and follow the trth 16.
In this letter El.Kanemi had raised the controversial -estions of whether
disobedience was tantamont to nbelief and when backsliding became
a!ostasy. "l3'aghili, as we have seen, had condemned com!arable
deviations in Sonni #li as nbelief and had !rononced #skia 'hammadCs
jihad to be $stified and indeed meritorios 1=. *n the other hand, when
'allam &ibril had arged that disobedience involved nbelief and
therefore $stified anathematization it was $hehu himself who had
refted him and asserted that the orthodo) athorities !held the
o!!osite view 1/. 4learly, El.Kanemi had toched the weakest s!ot in
the argment of the reformers. ,ello admitted as mch afterwards when
he said that in the whole corse of the jihad nothing had cased the Flani
leaders as mch an)ios heart3searching as El.KanemiCs -estioning of
their claims. %his is not sr!rising for from the very otset their case had
been established on religios fondations. It was the belief that $hehu
was >odCs chosen instrment and that he was destined not only to !rify
religion bt to introdce a new order into worldly affairs that had been the
sorce of the faith and e)altation which had carried the Flani to victory
and had seemed to $stify their swee!ing aside the hereditary athority of
the +asa 4hiefs. %he !olitical strctre of the whole "m!ire in fact rested
!on these basic assm!tions. (ow El.Kanemi, a man of admitted
learning and eminence, after !robing and testing the fondations, had
!blicly !rononced them to be nsond.
,oth #ello and Abdullahi wrote to El.Kanemi to refte his charges.
,elloCs letter, which was dobtless ins!ired by $hehu, or at any rate
a!!roved by him, was long and forthright. #fter taking El.Kanemi to task
for reaching his conclsions on false or im!erfect information, he went
back to describe the cases which had led to the jihad
Frthermore, El.Kanemi, so that yo may nderstand the origin of this
affair, let me say that we did not begin the war for the reasons that yo
heard. In fact or reason for fighting was sim!ly to re!el the attacks
which were being made on or lives, or families and or faith.... ,efore
that we had merely been following the trth which $hehu had revealed to
s bt for this they began to harry and !ersecte s. %hey drove s from
or homes. %hey confiscated or !ro!erty. %hey robbed s on the roads
90.
,ello then went on to describe at some length the measres which Sarkin
>obir (afata had taken to crb the s!read of Islam, BnfaCs overt hostility,
the n!rovoked attack on >imbana, BnfaCs ltimatm, $hehuCs flight to
>d, the battle of %abkin :watto, and the manner in which the jihad had
s!read to the other +asa States. So far as ,orn was concerned, he
admitted that the 'ai had sent them a message, bt contended that the
96
res!onsibility for the fighting which had afterwards broken ot was
nevertheless his 91.
$hehu ordered me to write to him. I e)!lained to him all the reasons for
or actions. I told him abot the +asa 4hiefs and their heathen !ractices.
I added that whoever went to their aid wold be no better than they. #t
the same time I wrote to the Flani in ,orn and commanded them to
kee! the !eace. (ot long afterwards, however, I heard that the 'ai had
had the messenger whom we had sent to him !t to death 99.
,ello then ridicled the idea that $hehuCs s!!orters regarded the !eo!le
of ,orn as !agan merely becase they made sacrifices in high !laces,
took bribes, gave n$st $dgements, sr!ed the !atrimony of or!hans,
and allowed their women to go nveiled. %hese abses did not constitte
heathenism. In fact, ,ello admitted, they were common enogh among
his own !eo!le. +e was only sr!rised that El.Kanemi, while
acknowledging the learning of the Flani leaders, shold have believed
them ca!able of sch ignorance. It sggested that he was moved by
malice and hatred. %he +asa 4hiefs, who were in the habit of making
sacrifices to sticks and stones and !ersecting 'oslems, were no better
than heathens. %hat was the reason why the Flani had gone to war with
them 91.
In a second letter to El.Kanemi ,ello came back to this themeD
%he first case of or fighting against yor !eo!le is that they are hel!ing
the heathen +asas against s. Bo mst in trth know that whoever
hel!s infidels is no better than they. %he second reason is that yor !eo!le
are !ersecting or !eo!le and driving them from their homes.... (one of
yor !rayers and tithes, yor fasting and yor fonding of mos-es, will
hel! yo nor sto! s from fighting yo, in this world or the ne)t, so long
as yo s!!ort the nbelievers against s.... :now yo, El.Kanemi, that
all that yo have charged s with is false. >od is or hel! against yo 9;.
In the scceeding years ,ello wrote frther letters to El.Kanemi,
a!!arently in a more conciliatory vein, bt these seem to have gone
astray and in any case he did not record their te)t. #t last, however, a
letter from 6idado, who was later to become a!iri of Sokoto, reached
El.Kanemi and elicited from him a re!ly which was also conciliatory and
which mentioned the desirability of making !eace. Enfortnately, before
this reconciliation cold develo!, the Flani received an earlier letter from
El.Kanemi, his third in the series, which they considered contentios and
!rovocative. In re!lying to it ,ello for the first time accsed the :anri as
well as the +asas of heathen and idolatros !ractices 9<
... %he reason why we gave or !eo!le in ,orn athority to go to war
was the fll information which reached s abot the character of yor
!eo!le. We have been told by those who have lived in the contry and
mst know, that they make sacrifices to rocks and trees, that they
!ractice certain observances in the river similar to those of the "gy!tians
on the banks of the (ile, and that there are great hoses with gardians
a!!ointed over them in which these rites are carried ot.
97
%o s, whoever makes sacrifices to sticks and stones is a heathen and that
is why we call the !eo!le of ,orn heathens... 95
(evertheless, ,ello conceded that if it was tre, as El.Kanemi had
a!!arently said in his letter, that the :anri had mended their ways, then
it was the dty of the Flani to sto! fighting them. +e went on to say that
'allam >idado was being sent to the cast to assemble the Flani leaders
and sggested that El.Kanemi shold dis!atch an envoy to meet him and
discss calling a trce 96.
2ater, at the time of Mallam 6idadoCs mission to the east, $hehu and
,ello both wrote letters which were fairly conciliatory in tone 9=. In his
re!ly, El.Kanemi first of all set ot to refte the charges of !ersection
and o!!ression which had been made earlier and then to !rove that it was
the Flani and not the :anri who had been the aggressors.
H... %hey have raided or villages and !lndered or !ro!erty. %hey have
killed or menfolk and enslaved or children. %hey have set fire to or
hoses. #ll we have done is to rise ! and re!el them. We have only
retaken from them what they had first taken from s.... It was never I
who began any -arrel with them. . . . I 9/
El.Kanemi also told $hehu blntly that his followers did not always live
! to his own high standards.
G Bo know that yor kinsmen who live among s are ignorant !eo!le.
%heir ambition is to con-er and rle this contry.... +ad they been as yo
are, then we wold not have foght them. ,t . . . in trth they are not
men of high character. Whenever I e)tingish a fire which they have lit,
they immediately light another 10.
(evertheless, he ended on a note of conciliation.
G I will show no enmity to any Flani, he wrote, e)ce!t to him who comes
against me in war 11.
In another letter to #ello, which seems to have been written at the same
time, he said that there was no treating with the ,orn Flani becase
they were intransigent, bt that it wold be best if the leaders made
!eace 19. In answer to these two letters $hehu and #ello com!osed a
long re!ly in which they reca!itlated all their argments 11. With that
the corres!ondence came to an inconclsive end. (one of these letters are
dated and so we cannot relate them e)actly to events in the jihad, bt the
corres!ondence !robably began in 1=10, and went on ntil 1=19 1;. ,y
that time the war in ,orn had drifted into stalemate. It is dobtfl,
therefore, whether these e)changes did anything to shorten it.
%hogh neither side can be said to have emerged as the victors from the
theological debate, the whole corres!ondence is nevertheless of absorbing
interest. It shows that, althogh the !rize ha!!ened to be a great
territorial em!ire, the contest itself was basically one of ideas and that, as
these letters reveal, it was foght ot by men of considerable attainments.
7n ,9,A, after this controversy had sbsided, $hehu fell ill and in the
following year he died. +is death immediately !reci!itated a sccession
98
crisis between #ello and his followers on the one hand and Abdullahi and
his s!!orters on the other. %here were two -estions to be decided.
First, was the "m!ire to be divided and, if so, howP Secondly, who was to
assme the title of Sarkin 'slmi with the s!irital leadershi! that went
with itP
#t this time Abdullahi was $st over fifty years of age and #ello a little
nder forty. %heir claims to scceed were so even that it was difficlt to
decide between them. Abdullahi had been the first to swear allegiance to
$hehu at >d and had commanded the Flani forces both at %abkin
:watto and at the ca!tre of ,irnin :ebbi. #ello, on the other hand, had
knocked Aamfara ot of the war and held the s!reme command when
#lkalawa had been taken. ,oth were men of e)em!lary character, high
religios !rinci!les, great learning, and strong !ersonality.
#t the time of his death $hehu was living in the new city of Sokoto. #ello
was there with him, bt Abdullahi was at ,odinga, fifteen miles away 1<.
#s soon as Abdullahi heard that $hehu was dead he collected his
followers and rode to the city. +e was too late, however, for by the time
he arrived #ello, in accordance with his fatherCs known wishes, had
already been !roclaimed Sarkin 'slmi 15.
%here was a good reason why the election had been held in sch haste.
%he Flani leaders felt that if Abdullahi were !resent it wold be difficlt
for them to a!!oint anyone e)ce!t him, bt that if he became Sltan his
descendants rather than $hehuCs might sbse-ently scceed and that
therein lay the seeds of ftre civil war 16. %o avert this danger and
com!ly with $hehuCs wishes they therefore elected #ello before
Abdullahi cold stake his claim.
Soon afterwards, when Abdullahi and his !arty reached the city, they
fond the great gates sht and barred against them. (o dobt this was a
wise !recation on the !art of #elloCs s!!orters, for if the two factions
had been allowed to mingle, fighting might easily have flared ! between
them. (evertheless, to Abdullahi the manner of his re$ection mst have
come as a crel blow. 4ertainly, he took it hard becase he at once
withdrew to >wand and for several years thereafter he and #ello were
estranged.
When #ello scceeded as $arkin Musulmi he ac@uiesced in
Abdullahi-s retaining the territories which, during the latter 'art of
$hehu-s lifetime, he had been mainly res'onsible for
administering. %he core of the "m!ire was therefore divided into two
ne-al !arts and Kebbi became AbdullahiCs Emirate of 6wandu.
Abdullahi was also acknowledged to be the rler of D
o #rewa
o .andi
o :amba
o Aaberma
99
which were former !rovinces of :ebbi.
In addition it was recognized that D
o Bari
o >rma
which had already been broght within the "m!ire
o (!e
o Ilorin
which had not yet been won bt in which the Flani were already
active
shold fall within the s!here of inflence of 6wandu, not of $okoto.
%he reslt of these dis!ositions was that, while Abdullahi was endowed
with rank and !ossessions which made him almost the e-al of his
ne!hew, at any rate in theory, and which certainly raised him to a higher
level than any of the other "mirs, the lion-s share of the Em'ire still
fell to #ello. #s his Sltanate, #ello had the former territories of D
o >obir
o Aamfara
and he became the acknowledged szerain ofD
o :ano
o :atsina
o Aaria
o ,achi
o #damawa .ara
o +adei$a
o #ir
o >wari 1=
What was no less im!ortant was that, with the title of $arkin Musulmi,
he also inherited $hehuCs immense s!irital athority.
$hehu /suman dan +odiyo, the creator of the "m!ire which was now
being divided between his son and his brother, was buried in his new
ca'ital of $okoto. &dged by any standards he was a most remarkable
leader.
%hogh a man of !eace, he sstained a lengthy war.
%hogh an nworldly mystic, he created a great territorial em!ire.
+e fond Islam in the central Sdan corr!t and !ersected? he left
it !rified and s!reme.
+e fond the Flani landless and insecre? he left them a rling
aristocracy.
*ne of the greatest of his many gifts was his s'iritual magnetism. From
the time when he was still -ite a yong man,he had the !ower to draw
others to him. 'oreover, once they had become his !!ils or followers,
they remained devoted to him for life. #nother characteristic was the
moral courage with which he stood on his 'rinci'les. +e showed this
100
trait at >d, immediately after he had raised his standard against Yunfa,
when some of his followers got ot of hand and withot !rovocation
attacked the +asa !eo!le living in the district. In circmstances as
des!erate as his, even the most !right and high3minded of leaders might
well have trned a blind eye or at any rate have waited ntil after the
im!ending battle before asserting his athority. ,t not $hehu.
H*n the %hrsday or !eo!le fell !on the +asas who were in the district
and slew and !lndered and enslaved them. ,t on the Friday $hehu rose
! and !reached to them and commanded them to release those whom
they had ca!tred and to restore that which they had taken. #t this they
set free their !risoners and gave back their bootyI 1/.
#nother characteristic which distingished $hehu was his faith in his
own destiny. So intensely did it brn that it fired all those who came into
contact with him. %here is no better illstration of its !ower than the effect
it had at the s!reme crisis of the jihad, when his defeated and half3
mtinos army was srronded in the nwalled town of >wand. +is
intervention then not only rallied his demoralized followers bt ins!ired
them to win a victory which !roved to be decisive.
%he last and in many ways most characteristic of $hehuCs traits was his
unworldliness. Enlike the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmed, no breath of
scandal ever touched him. Frthermore, $hehu was never da!!led by
success and remained as uns'oilt in trium'h as he had been
unshaken in disaster. %o the very end, in fact, he led a life of 'ious
and ascetic sim'licity and the most significant featre of his whole
career is that no sooner had he achieved all his worldly aims than
he virtually renounced the world.
*n his achievements alone he deserves to be ranked among the
greatest men whom Africa has 'roduced. If his character and
achievements are taken together, however, his 'lace is uni@ue.
(otes
1. +iskett, #I%R, !!. </139.
9. .. S. 'argolioth, 'ohammedanism, 2ondon, 1/11, !!. 1663/.
1. Ibid. !. 165.
;. +iskett, #I%R, !. </1.
<. #bdllah, %W 7+iskett, !. /08.
5. Ibid. !!. /;3/< and !. 1 of Introdction. Abdullahi described him as having remained
long in 'edina.
6. Ibid. !. /<, and the +asa 4hronicle !blished in &. #. ,rdonCs +istorical (otes on
certain "mirates and %ribes, 2ondon, 1/0/, !. /1.
=. +iskett, #I%R, !. </5.
/. $hehu, :F 7+iskett, !. <618.
10. #lha$i &naid does not even acce!t that .an Ra$i and 'allam &ibril may have
broght back the seeds of Wahhabism with them.
11. +iskett, #I%R, !. </9.
19. Ibid. !. <=/.
11. Ibid. !. </;.
1;. 'argolioth, o!. cit. !. 165.
1<. +iskett, #I%R, !!. </135.
1<b. %hese two statements are erroneos. %hey are to be corrected as followsD
101
o Seko #hmado never travelled otside his native 'aasina ? he did his schooling
and com!leted all his scholarshi! there.
o %wo disci!les, not brothers, of Seko #hmado were dis!atched to Sokoto to seek
E. dan FodiyoCs blessings.
For an inde!th and reliable biogra!hy of Seko #hmado, see #. +. ,V W &.
.agetCs 2Cem!ire !el d 'acina. N%.S. ,ah G webPlaakO
15. ,ovill, o!. cit. !. 99=.
16. #ello, Inf ' 7cf. #rnett, !!, 109318.
1=. +iskett, #I%R, !!. <6=3=5.
1/. Ibid. !!. <==3/.
90. #ello, Inf ' 7cf. #rnett, !. 10;8.
91. Ibid. !!. 10<35.
99. Ibid. !. 105.
91. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 1068.
9;. Ibid. !!. 10=3/.
9<. Ibid. !!. 10=3/.
95. Ibid. !!. 110311.
96. #ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. 1118.
9=. Ibid. !!. 11131;.
9/. Ibid. !. 11;.
10. Ibid.!. 11<.
11. Ibid. !. 11<.
19. Ibid. !. 115.
11. Ibid. !!. 115390.
1;. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !!. 9=39/.
1<. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 16.
15. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 9<.
16. +iskett, Introdction to %W, !. 90. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
1=. #t this time certain yonger "mirates, namely 'isa, :azare, &amaCare, (assarawa,
'ri, and :ontagora, had not yet come into being.
1/. #ello, Inf ' 7cf. #rnett, !. <98.
102
(ha'ter Eleven
$ultan #ello B the +irst *en Years
*n $hehuCs death in 1=16 the "m!ire, which for some time had, in effect,
been divided into two !arts and governed se!arately by #ello and
Abdullahi, was formally !artitioned between Sokoto, and >wand. In
Sokoto, therefore, #ello scceeded as the second $arkin Musulmi and
the first Sltan.
%he acconts of #ello that have srvived give s a fair idea of his
a!!earance and bearing. %he e)!lorer (la''erton, when he met him
eight years later, described him as a noble3looking man, forty3for years
of age althogh mch yonger in a!!earance, five feet ten inches high,
!ortly in !erson, with a short crling beard, a small moth, a >recian
nose, and large black eyes 1. #nother eye3witness, who was !robably
s!eaking of him in a later !eriod of life, said that, thogh beginning to go
bald, he had a thick beard and a rddy com!le)ion and that when he
a!!eared in !blic he was always veiled, in the %areg manner, with a
fold of his trban drawn across the lower !art of his face 9.
%o the office of Waziri, or chief minister, #ello a!!ointed /suman
6idado, a man a!!reciably older than himself who had become his
brother3in3law when $hehuCs daghter "ana, who incidentally was the
outstanding woman of her day, had been given to him in marriage.
6idado also belonged to the %oronkawa 4lan and from the start had been
one of $hehuCs most devoted adherents. %he !ictre of him which
emerged from 4la!!ertonCs $ornal is of a civilized and kindly man with
whom the e)!lorer was able to strike ! a real friendshi!. +is wisdom and
matre $dgement certainly formed the !erfect foil for #elloCs zest and
vigor and together they made a formidable combination.
%he heritage into which #ello now entered was a trobled one. First of all
there was the difficlty of his estrangement from his ncle Abdullahi who
retired in hrt silence to >wand. Shortly after this there came news that
many of the Aamfara, and ,rmi towns, on hearing of $hehuCs death, had
renonced their allegiance 1. #nd finally, most distrbing of all, there
were soon to be signs of disloyalty, !erha!s even treason, among some of
his own closest followers.
It will be recalled that the e!isode which !reci!itated the jihad was BnfaCs
attack on Abdu $alami and his followers in the town of >imbana. Abdu
$alami, as has already been mentioned, was one of the few men among
the more !rominent of $hehuCs original s!!orters who was not himself a
Flani. +is !aternal forebears had, in fact, been #rabs who had settled
among the #rewa !eo!le and he himself was therefore of mi)ed blood ;.
When $hehu had fled to >d and raised his standard, Abdu $alami had
gone with him and his followers had !layed a significant !art in the
sbse-ent fighting. When victory was won he had been rewarded for his
services by being given the fief of :warre, a town of some size and
im!ortance fifteen miles north of Sokoto, and he had there!on taken !
103
residence there as its fedal lord <.
%hogh the fief of :warre was far from negligible, Abdu $alami was
dissatisfied with it and felt that it was not commensrate either with his
!revios standing or with the services which he had rendered in the jihad.
G #nd I, Abdu $alami, he wrote to ,elle, where then is my !ortionP It
seems to me that what I rle now is no greater than what I rled before,
that is to say a !lace to farm and a !lace to be bried in 5.
+is dissatisfaction led him into intrige and mischief3making and even
while $hehu was still alive he was gilty of disloyalty, if not worse. For
this he was smmoned to Sokoto and admonished 6.
It was only after $hehuCs death, however, that the resentment which he
felt against the Flani leaders showed itself in o!en insbordination. When
#ello became Sltan, he alone among the great fedatories failed to go to
Sokoto to do homage. Ignoring the inslt, #ello sent him a conciliatory
message inviting him to come and re!air his omission which he eventally
did. # brsh was ths averted, at any rate for the time being, bt his
hostility !ersisted =.
%his -arrel wold have been mch less serios if it had not been for
wides!read revolts in the east of the Sltanate where dissident
Aamfarawa, :atsinawa, and ,rmawa, nder the leadershi! of ,anaga
dan ,atre, had risen against the Flani /. .es!ite warnings from Sokoto,
Abdu $alami !ersisted in trading and having other dealings with the
rebels. #ello contined to show him great forbearance, bt it was all in
vain. %he recent division of the "m!ire between Sokoto and >wand
!robably led him to believe that it was going to break ! and encoraged
him to think that he cold assert his inde!endence. %his at any rate is
what he now tried to do 10.
#ello wrote frther letters to him in the ho!e of bringing him back to his
dty, bt these were ignored. It was then discovered that he was in
treasonable corres!ondence with the Aamfara rebels and so #ello at last
decided that he wold have to se force. :warre was invested and early in
the year 1=1=, after a siege of five months, taken by storm. Abdu $alami
scceeded in esca!ing, bt he had been wonded in the fighting and he
died of his wonds soon afterwards 11.
+aving dis!osed of Abdu $alami, #ello ne)t trned on his ally, ,anaga
dan ,atre, who in the meantime had sacked >sa and other towns in
the eastern !art of the Sltanate. First, #anagaCs own town of 'orai, near
%alata 'afara, was ca!tred? then the :atsinawa of :anoma were
overcome and their hill3fortress occ!ied? finally, ,anaga himself was
defeated and killed near ,ngd 19.
#fter Abdu $alamiCs death some of his followers dis!ersed, bt the hard
core, nder the leadershi! of his son ,hari, migrated to the soth where,
after a !eriod of wandering, they took !ossession of the fortified town of
:alembaina in >wand. #s Abdullahi was nable to dislodge them from
there, he a!!ealed to his ne!hew for hel!. #ello res!onded at once and
himself led a colmn against the rebels. +e $oined forces with Abdullahi
104
in front of :alembaina and together they stormed the !lace 11.
#lthogh, as we shall see, #ello and Abdullahi disagreed abot the
natre of the offence which Abdu $alami and his followers had
committed, the $oint action at :alembaina was the occasion of their formal
reconciliation. When they met otside the town, #ello as the yonger
man !re!ared to dismont and go over to greet his ncle, bt Abdullahi
motioned to him to remain in the saddle and himself leant forward and
greeted his ne!hew as $arkin Musulmi 1;. %his magnanimity was
characteristic of both men and it healed the breach which had o!ened
between them after $hehuCs death.
While these events were taking !lace in the central Sdan, arrangements
were being made in "ro!e that were to reslt in the first breach being
made in the !hysical barriers which had hitherto !revented any direct
intercorse.
In the history of geogra!hy there has always been a tendency to
concentrate on one !roblem at a time. In the latter !art of the eighteenth
centry, 4ookCs voyage to the Soth Seas had cleared ! the mystery of
#stralia and the interest of the civilized world had then switched to
#frica. %o !romote the e)!loration of the interior of the continent, abot
which little or nothing was known, the #frican #ssociation was formed in
2ondon and a series of e)!editions were lanched.
#ttention at this time was focsed not on the (ile, whose sorce ,rce
was thoght to have discovered, bt on the more mysterios (iger. %he
first two e)!editions ended in failre and the death of the e)!lorers. In
the third e)!edition a resolte yong Scotsman called 'ngo Park
reached the E!!er (iger and established the fact, which had !reviosly
been in dobt, that it flowed from west to cast. ,t when Park went back
early in the nineteenth centry, to try to sail down the river to its moth,
he too !erished.
#fter the end of the (a!oleonic wars the #frican #ssociation resmed its
attem!ts to e)!lore West #frica and solve the riddle of where the (iger
flowed into the sea. In this task it received the encoragement of the
,ritish >overnment, which was concerned to find new otlets for trade
generally and !articlarly for the manfactred goods which, thanks to
the indstrial revoltion, >reat ,ritain was now !rodcing in ever3
increasing -antities. #fter frther failres, an e)!edition set ot from
%ri!olitania in 1=99, which was to be at least !artially sccessfl. It was
led by a naval srgeon called *dney and its members were two other
half3!ay officers, 4la!!erton and .enham, and a shi!wright named
+illman, who was s!!osed to bild a boat when the !arty reached its
destination.
%his e)!edition, escorted by a force of #rabs !rovided by the Pasha of
%ri!oli, crossed the Sahara and reached ,orn in safety. %here they s!lit
! and *dney, accom!anied by 4la!!erton, set off for +asaland.
*dney died on the way, bt 4la!!erton !shed on alone and at length,
on 15 'arch 1=9;, reached the city of Sokoto. +e was the first "ro!ean
ever to do so and a great mltitde trned ot to see him.
105
+gh 4la!!erton, the son of a good family from the Scottish border, was a
born adventrer. #t the age of thirteen he had gone to sea in a
merchantman and soon afterwards had transferred to the Royal (avy.
.ring the (a!oleonic wars he had served in three different theatres and
at one time or another had been wonded in S!ain, almost ca!tred by
the #mericans on the 4anadian 2akes, and very nearly drowned in the
#tlantic. +e was now in the !rime of life, togh, daring, and remarkably
handsome. #s an e)!lorer he may have lacked ,arthCs in-iring mind and
tireless attention to detail, bt he !ossessed other -alities, namely an
observant eye, a sardonic sense of hmor, and a ready !en.
4la!!erton was lodged in the hose of 6idado, the Waziri, and on the
following day he was taken to the !alace for his first adience with the
Sltan. #ello made 4la!!erton heartily welcome and the two men took to
one another from the start.
*n this first visit 4la!!erton s!ent seven weeks in Sokoto and in all was
received in adience thirteen times. %he main bsiness discssed at these
meetings was how to o!en a channel of commnication to +asaland and,
arising ot of that, the !ossibility of a ,ritish 4onsl and a "ro!ean
!hysician being stationed in Sokoto. %he Sltan came back to the sb$ect
over and over again and it is clear that his desire to establish links with
the otside world was both strong and !erfectly genine 1<.
%he record of these interviews shows that #ello was a man of great
intellectal criosity and, considering how com!letely the central Sdan
was then sealed off by desert and forest from the western world, that he
was also very well informed on a sr!risingly wide range of sb$ects. +e
confonded 4la!!erton, for e)am!le, by in-iring whether the ,ritish
were (estorians or Socinians and then went on to ask sch !robing
-estions on other theological sb$ects that the honest e)!lorer had to
confess that he was ot of his de!th. Similarly, among the !resents which
4la!!erton broght it was the telesco!e and com!ass that arosed his
greatest interest and later he asked for a s!ecial demonstration of how a
se)tant worked. In the corse of this he showed that he knew many of the
stars by their #rabic names and some of the constellations as well. #t
another adience he asked abot the ancient >reeks and later ta)ed
4la!!erton with the fact that the ,ritish had con-ered India and recently
been at war with #lgiers. +e had heard abot "ro!ean news!a!ers and
made 4la!!erton bring one which he had in his baggage so that he cold
read e)tracts from it 15.
From 4la!!ertonCs narrative we catch a few glim!ses of life at the SltanCs
cort and it is evident that it still retained mch of the sim!licity of
$hehuCs day. #ello himself was !lainly dressed in a ble cotton gown and
white mslim trban. %he !alace was only lightly garded and on one
occasion the sher who condcted 4la!!erton to the SltanCs inner
a!artment was no cortier bt an old slave3woman. %he a!artment itself,
which consisted of a s-are room with a valted ceiling s!!orted on eight
ornamental arches, was handsome bt far from l)rios. #s for the
Waziri >idado, his interest seemed to be mainly centred !on his family
106
and the new mos-e that he was bilding 16.
When 4la!!erton and .enham retrned to "ngland in 1=9<, the accont
of their discoveries cased something of a sensation. %hroghot the
seventeenth and eighteenth centries the ,ritish had been more heavily
engaged in the maritime slave3trade than any other nation. #t the trn of
the nineteenth centry, however, they had ndergone a change of heart
and were by this time as active in trying to !revent the traffic as they had
been earlier in !romoting it.
When the ,ritish >overnment stdied the re!orts of 4la!!erton and
.enham, they thoght they saw a golden o!!ortnity of !rsing in the
central Sdan their now thoroghly res!ectable !olicy of s!!ressing the
slave3trade and re!lacing it by legitimate commerce. For once, therefore,
they moved with nsal s!eed and decision. # new e)!edition, with
4la!!erton as its leader, was -ickly fitted ot and dis!atched. #mong its
members were the 4onsl and the !hysician for whom #ello had
s!ecifically asked.
4la!!ertonCs second e)!edition followed a different rote from the first
and, after landing in the ,ight of ,enin, they !lanned to march north to
+asaland. Within three months, however, five of the seven "ro!eans,
inclding the 4onsl and the !hysician, had sccmbed to the climate.
*nly 4la!!erton and his servant, a yong 4ornishman called Richard
2ander, strggled throgh to Sokoto, which they reached towards the end
of 1=95.
#t the time of 4la!!ertonCs earlier visit, relations between ,orn and
Sokoto had been good and #ello, in conversation, had gone ot of his
way to refer to El.Kanemi as his friend 1=. In 1=9<, however, war had
broken ot again and by the time that 4la!!erton retrned to +asaland
the whole !olitical climate had changed. It was now El.Kanemi who had
become the aggressor and it was the trn of the Flani to await in some
tre!idation the invasion that he was known to be !re!aring 1/.
"arly in the year 1=96 El.Kanemi, at the head of a great army, at length
crossed the border and began advancing on :ano. :atagm, the first of
the Flani "mirates to be invaded, was nable to offer any effective
resistance. %he common !eo!le no dobt fled from the !ath of the
invaders and the men who cold bear arms !robably fell back on :ano. In
:ano "mirate an attem!t was made to stem the invasion, bt the forces
which had been collected for the !r!ose did not make a very determined
stand and were easily brshed aside. If El.Kanemi had now !ressed on
with s!eed and determination he might well have ca!tred the city before
the "mir of :ano had had time to make another stand. #s it was,
however, he may have been conscios of the fact that by advancing to the
west he was creating a long sothern flank and e)!osing it to conter3
attack from ,achi and #damawa. #t any rate, instead of advancing
ra!idly he seems to have dallied in the .tse area of eastern :ano.
*n the other side the Flani had no illsions abot the magnitde of the
threat which faced them. When the news of El.KanemiCs advance into
:ano reached Sokoto, the Sltan showed the greatest concern and
107
immediately ordered the Waziri to go to the front and take s!reme
command. What the Flani !articlarly feared was that the invasion wold
bring the %aregs ot against them and that the +asa !o!lation wold
rise and $oin the diehards who were already in o!en rebellion 90. %he
crisis was easily the greatest that they had had to face since the end of
the jihad and in Sokoto the ne)t three weeks were a time of the most
acte an)iety.
#ello had already sent letters to all the "mirs in the east ordering them to
mobilize their forces and o!!ose El.KanemiCs advance. When this
message reached Yakubu, "mir of ,achi, he ha!!ened to have an army
in the field against the !agans. #lthogh he cold mster no more than
9,<00 horsemen, far less than the great host of ,orn, he immediately led
his forces north to interce!t El.Kanemi in :ano 91.
When Bakb made contact with the ,orn army, the Waziri of Sokoto
had not yet arrived in the east to coordinate and take command of the
Flani forces. Bakb therefore had to decide for himself whether to risk a
battle or to wait with the ob$ect of $oining ! with contingents from other
"mirates. +e conslted his chief advisers, bt they wold not commit
themselves. BakbCs inclination, however, was obviosly to attack.
G I know not how to defeat El.Kanemi, he said, Sneither do I know how
to slay him, bt one thing I do know. I know that he has no !ower to raise
the dead? that he has no !ower, if rain be lacking, to make it fall? that he
has no !ower, if the grass does not s!ring !, to case it to grow.
%o this BakbCs followers re!lied by saying that these were things which
only >od cold do.
G #s yo know this, said Bakb, we shall take corage and fight with El.
Kanemi and we shall defeat him and kill him, for all !ower resides in >od
99.
%he ensing battle took !lace in the second week of Febrary 1=96, and
was foght at Fake in eastern :ano. #lthogh the ,achi army was
greatly inferior in cavalry, it was very strong in archers. %he archers,
moreover, had a secret !oison for !tting on their arrowheads which was
so !otent that it was known as :are .angi, a name that im!lied that it did
not $st kill individals bt destroyed whole families. #s at %abkin :watto,
therefore, the battle resolved itself into a strggle between heavy cavalry
and lightly armed archers.
In the first clash the ,orn cavalry had the better of it and the 'adaki
+assan, who had been in o!erational command, was killed. %he :anri
believed that they had killed Bakb himself and were elated at their
sccess while the Flani were e-ally dismayed. When Bakb heard this
he determined to take command himself and so, srronded by his
bodygard, he hrled himself into the fight 91.
%he battle was foght in the middle of the dry season and all acconts of
it s!eak of the great clod of dst which rose ! and envelo!ed the
combatants. Bakb was -ick to see that it gave his archers a tactical
advantage and his e)!loitation of this o!!ortnity !roved decisive.
108
When the two armies met, nothing cold be heard bt the clash of arms.
%he battle grew fierce and the dst rose ! so high that none cold see
his neighbor. %he day wa)ed dark. #t this Bakb gave orders to his
bowmen, saying
G Shoot into the mrkX Shoot into the mrk.
So the Flani ke!t shooting into the mrk ntil the enemy gave way 9;.
Seeing the day beginning to go against him, El.Kanemi ordered a
retirement. +is ob$ect was !robably to e)tricate his troo!s from an
nfavorable !osition and then retrn to the attack. %he retirement trned
into a retreat, however, and the retreat soon became a rot. %he Flani
were not only left in !ossession of the field bt ca!tred the enemy cam!
and with it a mass of booty. %he :anri lost over two hndred horses, all
their baggage, and even their flag and drms 9<. So severe was the
defeat at Fake that El.Kanemi marched back to ,orn and abandoned his
!lan of recovering the lost !rovinces of +asaland.
It was 4la!!ertonCs misfortne that his second e)!edition became
embroiled in these events. When he retrned to Sokoto in the atmn of
1=95 he fond the Flani leaders !reocc!ied with the ,orn war and
worried by the attacks of the >obir and :ebbi diehards which the war had
!rovoked. #t first his relations with #ello were as cordial as ever, bt as
soon as #ello heard that he intended to go on from Sokoto and visit
,orn a shadow came over them. %he Sltan said that sch a visit wold
give aid and comfort to his enemies and absoltely refsed to !ermit it.
%he e)!lorer, on the other hand, insisted that he mst !ay the visit
becase he had been commissioned to do so and refsed to acknowledge
that the Sltan had any right to sto! him. ,oth !arties remained adamant
and the differences between them, which their #rab intermediaries may
well have fomented, -ickly develo!ed into a serios -arrel 95.
%he trth is that there was right on both sides. 4la!!erton, whose health
was ra!idly deteriorating, felt that as he had only retrned to Sokoto on
#elloCs own !ressing invitation, he was the victim of a breach of faith in
not being allowed to flfil his commission. +e refsed to acce!t #elloCs
assessment of the effect that it wold have on !blic o!inion if he were to
leave Sokoto at sch a critical !hase of the war and make his way to
,orn. #s for #ello, althogh he may have allowed the #rabs to !lay too
mch on his fears, he was obviosly !erfectly sincere in believing that to
allow 4la!!erton to go to ,orn might hel! the enemy and $eo!ardize the
Flani case 96.
While the war lasted neither #ello nor 4la!!erton wold bdge and
relations between them became very strained. BakbCs victory at Fake,
however, and the colla!se of El.KanemiCs invasion, immediately !rodced
a change for the better. 4la!!ertonCs $ornal records the intense relief
with which the news was greeted in Sokoto 9=. Some of the s!oils of war
were !t on show in the city, inclding a co!!er vessel which had
belonged to El.Kanemi himself, and the celebrations lasted right throgh
the night. In this new atmos!here #ello and 4la!!erton were reconciled.
Enha!!ily, however, 4la!!erton colla!sed on the very ne)t day and a
109
month later he was dead 9/.
In "ro!e, if not in #frica, the death of 4la!!erton has cast a shadow on
the estimation in which #ello has hitherto been held. %his is less than
$st, for #ello never detained 4la!!erton, as has sometimes been
s!!osed, bt always made it clear that he was free to go home by any
other rote !rovided that he abandoned the idea of visiting ,orn 10. In
the face of a s!reme crisis in the affairs of the "m!ire this condition was
not nreasonable and #ello can be ac-itted of blame for im!osing it.
(otes
1. 4la!!erton, %ravels, vol. II, !!. 11931.
9. +a$$i Said, #n #rab +istory of Sokoto translated by 4. ". &. Whitting, &ornal of the
Royal #frican Society, no. 1==. %he term Srddy com!le)ionT !robably mean the reddish
co!!er color which is common among the Flani.
1. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 95.
;. >wand .(,s, +istory of &ega.
<. #ello, S: 72+d', vol. I, !. 918.
5. Ibid. !. 9=.
6. Ibid. !. 90.
=. Ibid. !. 99.
/. Sokoto .(,s, +istories of ,akra, 'am, and >sa.
10. #ello, S: 72+d', vol. I, !!. 993918.
11. Ibid. !!. 9131<.
19. Sokoto .(,s, +istories of 'am and >sa. 'hammad .adi, a Flani who !layed a
!rominent !art in these events, was rewarded with the title of ,anaga
11. +iskett, Introdction to %W, !!. 1=390.
1;. +iskett, Introdction to %W, !!. 1=390.
1<. 4la!!erton, %ravels, vol. II, !!. 110365.
15. %ravels, vol. II, 4la!!erton, !!. 110365.
16. Ibid.
1=. 4la!!erton, %ravels, vol. II, !. 1<1.
1/. *n 9= 'arch 1=9; the ,orn army won a crshing victory at (gala and so !t an end
to the war with ,aghirmi, which had been going on since abot 1=16. With the removal
of this threat to his rear, El.Kanemi seems to have decided to take the offensive against
the Flani with the ob$ect of recovering the szerainty of +asaland. 4ertainly, he told
.enham a few months later that he e)!ected his inflence in +asaland to increase
shortly and e)tend to (!e. See .enham, %ravels, vol. II, !!. 1631/ and =<.
90. 4la!!erton, &ornal of a Second ")!edition into the Interior of #frica, 2ondon, 1=9/,
!. 9;1.
91. En!blished 'anscri!t abot the "mirs of ,achi written by 'allam 'stafa who
was ttor to BakbCs sons.
99. Ibid.
91. #lha$i 'ahmd, # 2ight for 2earners and a 2am! for the ,lind, an n!blished
'anscri!t, written abot 1/<0 and based on older material.
9;. #lha$i 'ahmd, o!. cit.
9<. Ibid.
95. 4la!!erton, &ornal, !!. 1/939<9.
96. 4la!!erton, &ornal, !!. 1/939<9.
9=. Ibid. !. 9<9.
9/. Ibid. !!. 9<9365.
10. Ibid. !!. 1/939<9.
110
(ha'ter *welve
$ultan #ello B *he $econd *en Years
It will be remembered that when the Flani overran the State of :ebbi
dring the jihad they allowed the 4hief, Muhammadu Hodi, to sli!
throgh their fingers. %hey seem to have thoght that he no longer had
any !olitical significance, for they made little or no effort to !rse and
ca!tre him. +e and his followers were therefore able to withdraw to the
soth of the Aamfara River and establish themselves in the town of >indi
1, where for the ne)t fifteen years they lay low and gave no troble.
'eanwhile, in abot 1=90, the followers of Abdu $alami, having made
their sbmission to the Flani after their defeat at :alembaina, had been
allowed to retrn to the Aamfara Jalley where their !revios settlement of
>imbana had been. %here they !roceeded to fond the new town of &ega
which soon began to grow in size and commercial im!ortance. #mong
their former adversaries, Abdullahi had all along taken a more lenient
view of their defection than either $hehu or #ello and had maintained,
contrary to the views of the others, that by s!!orting infidels in
disobedience, as distinct from s!!orting them in nbelief, they had not
themselves become infidels 9. For this reason, !erha!s, he scceeded in
winning their loyalty where $hehu and #ello had failed.
#s >indi and &ega face each other across the Aamfara Jalley, it was not
long before hostilities broke ot between the reclaimed followers of Abdu
$alami on the north bank and the still rebellios :ebbawa on the soth
bank. %he :ebbawa sffered an early reverse when they lost their base at
>indi, bt they recovered !rom!tly by occ!ying the neighboring town of
:imba 1. #fter that the fighting became indecisive. (evertheless, in 1=9;
it was still sfficiently serios for #ello to have told 4la!!erton that an
army was ravaging the contry throgh which the direct road between
Sokoto and Bari ran and that, conse-ently, it wold be im!ossible for
him to take it ;.
In the following year, when ,orn again declared war on the "m!ire and
El.Kanemi lanched his invasion, the Flani leaders were nervos that
the +asas might rise against them in sym!athetic rebellion. %his an)iety
no dobt broght home to them how dangeros it was to allow a man like
'hammad +odi, who still styled himself Sarkin :ebbi, to go on living on
the very frontier of the "m!ire.
In the dry season of 1=9536, therefore, a combined force drawn from
>wand, &ega, and Sokoto besieged +odi in :imba. %hogh the assalt
failed, the attackers managed to fire the town by shooting flaming arrows
into the thatch of the hoses. 2ater the inhabitants, fearing for their lives
and !ro!erty if there shold be a second assalt, trned +odi and his
followers ot of the town. Soon afterwards he was rn down by the Flani
and killed <. If Esman 'asa is conted as the first 7thogh in fact the
:ebbawa have never recognized him as a legitimate 4hief8, +odi ths
became the second of five sccessive 4hiefs of :ebbi to fall in battle.
111
"ven then, however, the resistance of the :ebbawa was not e)tingished.
# year or two after +odiCs death, his yonger brother :arari was
!roclaimed Sarkin :ebbi in #rgng and was s!!orted not only by the
neighboring towns of :ebbi bt also by the #rewa and Aabermawa in the
west 5. %hree times he was called !on to sbmit, bt each time he
retrned a defiant answer.
%he Flani, recognizing that they had a serios rebellion on their hands, at
last bestirred themselves. In 1=11 #ello mstered an army in Sokoto and
himself led it down the Rima Jalley to s!!ort the >wand force which
was already in the field. *ne by one the Flani redced the :ebbi towns
on the east bank ntil only #rgng remained. For a time :arari
scceeded in holding ot bt, as at :imba, the Flani at length managed
to set fire to the hoses and at this the inhabitants, led by the women,
insisted on ca!itlation. %he gates were thrown o!en and so to avoid
ca!tre :arari and his followers had to flee 6.
#fter this sccess #ello retrned to Sokoto and left it to the >wand
forces to stam! ot the last embers of the rebellion. 'eanwhile, after
esca!ing from #rgng, :arari had crossed the river and taken refge in
the town of Aazzagawa =. ,efore long he was again closely invested.
.es!airing of withstanding another siege, he and his son Bakb (abame
now decided to make a dash for safety in the ho!e of esca!ing to the west
beyond the reach of their enemies. %hey were s!otted, however, and the
hnt was !.
:arari was no longer a yong man and when he saw that he cold not
esca!e he commanded Bakb to save himself in order to !reserve their
!osterity. +e himself then dismonted and seated himself on his shield in
the !ostre of !rayer to await his !rsers. ,y sacrificing himself in this
way he enabled his son to esca!e /.
For a year or two Bakb (abame remained in hiding in the west among
the faithfl #rewa who concealed him from his enemies. In the end,
however, he decided to throw himself on the mercy of the >wand Flani.
#fter some debate they agreed to s!are his life, bt, fearing that he might
again lead the :abbawa into rebellion, they banished him to Sokoto 10.
%here we shall meet him again.
In the latter !art of this cam!aign the >wand forces were led by the new
"mir 'hamman 11, for the great Abdullahi had died in 1=9=. In age,
Abdullahi stood half3way between $hehu and #ello. In character and
otlook, no less than in years, he also occ!ied a !osition between them.
+e shared with $hehu a distrst of worldly affairs and a bent towards
mysticism. "-ally, however, when the occasion demanded it, he cold
show talents as a soldier and administrator which did not fall far short of
#elloCs. If $hehu and #ello were the com!lements of one another, then
Abdullahi was s!!lementary to both of them. 'oreover, being a !oet
and a $rist as well as a mystic and a man of action, he was the most
versatile of the three and incidentally the most com!le) in character 19.
%he ma$or events in AbdullahiCs career, sch as his victory at %abkin
:watto and his ca!tre of ,irnin :ebbi, are so familiar that they hardly
112
need reca!itlating. It may be, however, that the greatest service which
he rendered to the Flani case was his ns!ectaclar bt !ainstaking
work as a $rist. +is three main legal works 11 became standard
te)tbooks for later generations on the condct of the state and the dties
of the rler. If $hehu ins!ired the jihad, and #ello became the architect
of the "m!ire, AbdullahiCs great thogh less s!ectaclar contribtion was
to bild ! the body of theoretical knowledge necessary for the condct of
government based on !rinci!le and !rece!t 1;. Possessing as he did a
marked strain of hmility and self3abnegation, this is the tribte which he
himself wold !robably have a!!reciated more than any other as his
e!ita!h.
While Abdullahi was still alive, his great !ersonal athority and Prestige
hel!ed to balance the !re!onderance of Sokoto over >wand and
!reserve the conce!tion of a dal "m!ire. #fter his death, however, even
thogh his sccessors were very active in (!e and llorin, as we shall see
in the ne)t cha!ter, the !rimacy of Sokoto became more marked,
!articlarly as #ello still had nine years of life ahead of him.
%hogh #ello was a sccessfl general and a !rolific athor, his fame
rests mainly on his ability as an administrator. $hehu, as we have seen,
had as!ired to create a theocratic commnity and had always been dee!ly
mistrstfl of worldly !ower, its essential breacratic framework hardly
less than its !om! and tra!!ings. It had therefore been left to #ello to
create the machinery for administering the Sltanate and governing the
"m!ire. %o do so he had to abandon $hehuCs ideal of sim!licity.
#s we shall see in a later cha!ter, the Flani in other !arts of +asaland
were able to take over a fedal system that was already in e)istence and
ada!t it, withot many changes, to their own needs. For #ello, however,
the task was more com!licated becase the metro!olitan Sltanate was
made ! not of a single state bt of two >obir and Aamfara G with !art of
a third G the 4hafe3>sa3:anoma area of :atsina G added on to them.
>eogra!hically, moreover, the task was rendered more difficlt by the fact
that the almost waterless >ndmi ,sh, in the !assage of which
4la!!erton and afterwards ,arth sffered so mch, tended to divide the
eastern and western !arts of the Sltanate from one another. (or was this
all. While $hehu had still been alive, his athority and !restige had been
so great that there had been little or no dis!osition on the !art of the
con-ered +asas to rebel, while the Flani and their allies, in their
dis!tes among themselves, had been ready to acce!t his $dgements.
With $hehuCs death, however, as the revolt of ,anaga dan ,atre, the
defection of Abdu $alami, and the rising of the :ebbawa had shown, this
com!laisance had disa!!eared. For most of his reign, therefore, #ello had
to carry ot his difficlt administrative reforms with only one hand, as it
were, in order to kee! the other one free for military action.
+e began straight away in the ca!ital. +aving first made 6idado his
Waziri, he went on to create other !osts and, in s!ite of what $hehu had
said to the contrary, to dignify them with titles. %he most im!ortant of the
new offices, in their order of !recedence 1<, were those of D
113
'aga$in >ari
>aladima
'aga$in Rafi
Ebandoma
#t the same time, with the death of the second of the two 4hief $stices
a!!ointed by $hehu, this office also fell vacant and #ello was therefore
able to make a fresh a!!ointment 15.
#ll the men chosen to fill these !osts were Flani. *ne of them,
'hammad #li, who now became the Ebandoma, was the son of
$hehuCs elder brother, #li, and therefore #elloCs first cosin 16. %he
others were not related by blood bt were all connected to #ello or
6idado by marriage. #lthogh they !ossessed fiefs in the home districts,
they habitally lived in the ca!ital and indeed wards of the city grew !
rond their town hoses. %hey were never formally a!!ointed as
4oncillors bt, as they were always on hand to advise the Sltan or
receive his instrctions, they gradally came to constitte the 4oncil of
both the Sltanate and the "m!ire 1=.
%he only non3Flani who occ!ied a ma$or !ost in Sokoto at this time was
Sarkin #dar #hamat. +e seems to have been the yonger brother of the
#gale, whom we have already met, and was certainly the leader of the
only gro! of %aregs who had remained stanch throghot the jihad.
%hey were already semi3sedentary and, as a reward for their loyalty, they
had been allowed to settle in Sokoto where they had !o!lated the
northern -arter of the city. ,y virte of this backgrond, Sarkin #dar
seems to have been admitted to the SltanCs confidence, thogh not to
the innermost 4oncil 1/.
.ring $hehuCs lifetime there had been no 4ort, bt now, with these
4oncillors as its ncles, a 4ort came into being. 'ost of the Flani,
coming as they did from very different backgronds, were nschooled in
these matters and ignorant of how they shold com!ort themselves. ,t
one of them, the new >aladima 'hammad .eshir, had in his earlier
days attended the >obir 4ort at #lkalawa. +e therefore became a kind of
4ort 4hamberlain and gave his less so!histicated colleages instrction
in !rotocol and !nctilio 90.
In the districts of the Sltanate, #elloCs first !roblem, as Abdu $alamiCs
defection had revealed, was to win and hold the loyalty of the great
fedatories. +is second task was to establish between them and the
ca!ital an efficient channel of commnication which wold bring to him the
information and revene that he re-ired and take to them the s!ecific
orders or general instrctions that he wold need to give. %he
achievement of the first end de!ended in the last analysis on the SltanCs
!ersonality, !restige, and wisdom. #ello was strong in all these -alities,
bt he nevertheless deemed it !rdent to reinforce the ties that bond the
great territorial magnates to him by conferring honors !on them. %he
titles were often, thogh by no means always, taken from the van-ished
+asas. 'hammad 'oyi$o, for e)am!le, whose early con-ests rond
114
Babo had !rovided $hehu with his first base when hnger had com!elled
him to abandon >d, was honored with the style of Sarkin :ebbi 91.
Similarly, althogh (amoda himself had been killed in 1=10 while
besieging the stbborn fortress of :iyawa, #ello now conferred the titles
of Sarkin Aamfara on the senior branch of his family and of Sarkin :iyawa
on his brother 'amd, who had finally scceeded in ca!tring the !lace
99. Within a short time of #elloCs accession, therefore, titles had become
as common among the Flani as they had !reviosly been among the
+asas.
%he second !roblem, that of maintaining an effective channel of
commnications between the centre and the !eri!hery, #ello solved by
ado!ting the kofa system which had !robably been evolved in earlier
times. %he word in +asa means SgatewayT and the S:ofasT were the
intermediaries at 4ort throgh whom the Sltan dealt with his vassals3in3
chief. %heir role was !art3!olitical, !art3administrative. %hey were
res!onsible for kee!ing themselves informed abot the affairs of the fiefs
concerned and for advising the Sltan on them. %he SltanCs orders and
instrctions were transmitted by them and conversely any favors that
the vassals wished to beg or re!resentations that they thoght to make
had to !ass throgh the :ofa. *ne of their main dties was to collect and
check the tribte from the fiefs for which they were res!onsible and they
were rewarded by being given a share of the revene.
Ender this system the Ebandoma in Sokoto served as the :ofa for two of
the great fedatories mentioned earlier, namely Sarkin Aamfara of Armi
and Sarkin :iyawa of :ara (amoda, while the >aladima was res!onsible,
among others, for >sa and 4hafe 91. %he system had its drawbacks,
!articlarly the case with which it cold be absed, bt it !ossessed
certain solid advantages. In the districts it gave the vassal a friend at
4ort whom he cold conslt and on whose inflence he cold rely. #t
head-arters it !rovided the Sltan with a sorce of information and
advice on each of his fiefs and an officer of state to whom all matters of
rotine cold safely be delegated. In a land where distances were great
and commnications !oor, it was !robably as effective a link as cold then
have been devised. 4ertainly, it worked satisfactorily and indeed, as we
shall see in a later cha!ter, it was soon e)tended to cover the "mirates of
the "m!ire as well as the fiefs of the Sltanate.
In the Sltanate and "m!ire alike, #ello !roved himself to be a strong
rler. (ear home, his s!!ression of the local revolts of Abdu $alami,
,anaga dan ,atre, and :arari have already been described. Frther
afield, when the "mir of :ano Sliman had died in 1=1/, he had not
hesitated to change the dynasty by recognizing Ibrahim .abo as his
sccessor. 2ikewise, in Aaria, first in 1=91 and again in 1=1;, he !assed
over the sons of the "mirs who had died and a!!ointed men withot
hereditary claims. #gain, in order that the family of the con-eror of
(gazargam shold not remain nrewarded, he insisted in 1=11 on the
"mirs of ,achi and :atagm srrendering in favor of >wani 'ktarCs
son, 'amman 'anga, their conflicting claims to a town and its
115
srronding districts 9;. In this way he created the new "mirate of 'isa.
Similarly, in 1=1<, in order to reward a Flani called Sambolei who had
distingished himself in battle, he broght the new "mirate of &amaCare
into being 9.< From his "mirs, in short, he e)!ected and indeed received
n-estioning obedience. It will be remembered, for e)am!le, that at the
time of El.KanemiCs invasion he sent the a!iri 6idado to take s!reme
command over all their heads. 2ater, as we shall see, when he needed
their s!!ort for another ma$or enter!rise, he did not hesitate to call them
and their fedal armies ot again.
In every sector bt one #elloCs statesmanshi!, which was com!onded of
firmness, !atience, and magnanimity, !roved sccessfl. "ven the
:ebbawa were -iescent and the "m!ire as a whole en$oyed a !eriod of
tran-illity and good government. In s!ite of all his efforts, however,
which inclded some liberal and imaginative measres, #ello achieved no
lasting sccess with the +asa diehards in the north.
It will be recalled that, after the defeat of :atsina and >obir in the jihad,
the great blk of the common !eo!le had sbmitted bt that many of the
rling classes had fled north to the borders of the desert. Since then these
irreconcilables had been maintaining a !recarios e)istence rond 'aradi,
their new ca!ital, bt as the rainfall was s!arse and the soil sandy, it was
hardly !ossible for them to s!!ort themselves there. (ecessity as well as
inclination therefore !rom!ted them to live by raiding across the borders
of the "m!ire.
#elloCs !olicy was to contain these raids and !revent them from reaching
the !o!los !arts of the Sltanate. %o !rotect the home districts of
Sokoto he first set ! the war3cam! of 'agariya, which 4la!!erton often
mentioned, and then in abot 1=9= re!laced it by the fortified town of
Wrno, which he fonded in the same !art of the Rima Jalley 95. 2ater,
by bilding >andi in the neighboring valley of the Sokoto River and
installing his brother #tik with a garrison in the ,rmi town of ,akra, he
created a chain of fortresses facing north3east 96.
In the east he !rsed the same !olicy and, to !rotect Aamfara, fonded
the town of 2a$inge in the Jalley of the E!!er Rims. %he command of this
fortress he gave to a yong man called Fodiyo, his own son by a woman
of the >obir rling family called :atambale, who had become his
concbine after the ca!tre of #lkalawa 9=. If Fodiyo had not trned ot
to be a libertine 9/ this imaginative move, with its strong hint of
conciliation, might have been more sccessfl.
#s for the >obirawa who had remained within the borders of the
Sltanate, #ello soght by another liberal gestre to reconcile them too.
#li, a member of the old rling family, was a!!ointed to be their 4hief.
'oreover, he was made directly sbordinate to the Sltan, !aying his
allegiance in Sokoto, and was !ermitted to retain the title of Sarkin >obir
10.
For ten or fifteen years #elloCs e)!eriment in Indirect Rle worked
satisfactorily. Sarkin >obir #li remained loyal and the sbmissive
>obirawa acted as a bffer between the Flani and their nreconciled
116
cosins over the border. #li, however, was nder constant !ressre from
the diehards to throw off the yoke of Sokoto. For a time he ignored their
threats and tants, bt in 1=1< they at last scceeded in goading him into
rebellion by sending him, it is said, a set of btcherCs knives to signify that
he was no better than a Flani slave 11. 4ertainly, in that year he
renonced his allegiance and $oined a coalition which had been formed by
his kinsmen in e)ile with the %aregs and the diehard :atsinawa.
#fter eight years of com!arative !eace #ello now sddenly fond himself
facing another dangeros crisis. +e reacted with all his old vigor. First he
sent messages to his "mirs, calling on them to $oin him in a military
e)!edition, and then he collected his own forces and led them to the
rendezvos which he had a!!ointed. %he ma$ority of the "mirs also
commanded their contingents in !erson and the host which gathered at
Isa was !robably the greatest that the Flani ever assembled for any
cam!aign 19. 'oreover, before setting ot, they all swore a solemn oath
to con-er or die 11.
#ello now marched this army northward in search of the enemy. %hey left
the Rima Jalley at the to! of its great bend and entered the featreless
semi3desert which lay beyond. +ere, before long, they were !ainflly
afflicted by thirst, and the shortage of water was so great that it seemed
dobtfl whether they cold go on. >o on they did, however, ntil they
reached a !lace called ,lechi. #fter staying there for two days they
!ressed on with a doble forced3march. While they were resting between
these marches, #ello forbade the kindling of cam!3fires, becase he
wanted to take the enemy by sr!rise 1; and in this he seems to have
been com!letely sccessfl.
%he reslt of the battle which now took !lace at >awakke 1< was an
overwhelming victory for the Flani. Ibra, the %areg chieftain, made his
esca!e, bt the leaders of the two diehard factions, Sarkin :atsina Rada
and the trncoat Sarkin >obir #li, were both killed with thosands of their
followers. #ello was sally generos in victory, bt on this occasion he
had no mercy and, while women and children were s!ared, abot a
thosand combatant !risoners were !t to death 15. In its com!leteness,
as well as in its se-el, >awaklte was a 4romwellian victory.
#fter this disastros defeat those of the >obir diehards who had srvived
fell back to the north3east on the 'aradi area where the :atsina diehards
were already concentrated. %here they fonded a new town, %sibiri, which
was to be their head-arters for the rest of the centry 16. When he
heard of this, #ello decided to lead another $oint e)!edition against both
!laces with the ob$ect of finally sb$gating the diehards and !acifying his
northern frontier. +ad he had time to carry this !lan into effect he wold
have crowned his life3work and be-eathed to his sccessors a realm that
was nited within and nchallenged withot. ,efore he cold do so,
however, he sddenly fell mortally ill.
.ring his last illness #ello sent for his eldest son #ky and warned him
not to attem!t to make himself Sltan by nconstittional means. 2ater
the Waziri invited him to nominate his sccessor by sayingD
117
G In whose hands do yo leave s P
,t #ello refsed to make any choice.
G I leave yo, he said, in the hands of >od 1=.
*n the following day he died. ,y his own wish he was bried in the town
of Wrno, which he himself had fonded and made his ca!ital.
%he natre of #elloCs -alities and achievements have already been
described. +e was e)ce!tionally well endowed with a wide variety of
talents3a good brain, a strong !ersonality, and a sond and ncom!licated
character. %hese assets were fostered by the kindly inflence of his father
and ncle and at the same time fortified by his rigoros edcation and
astere !bringing. %he jihad gave him his o!!ortnity and, thogh he
was not $hehuCs eldest son, he soon came to the forefront. #t the start
he was a yong man fighting hand3to3hand nder the walls of #lkalawa.
#t the end he was in s!reme command of the combined forces that took
the !lace and so broght the war to an end.
#s a soldier, #ello took !art in forty3seven battles and sieges 1/. #s a
writer, he !rodced over eighty works in !rose and verse ;0 and, thogh
he lacked AbdullahiCs sense of style, he wrote in InfakCl 'aisri the best
accont we have of the jihad. #s a religios leader, he made a worthy
sccessor to his father. Finally, as a seclar rler, he was easily the
greatest of all the Sltans of Sokoto.
%here was only one other man of this generation in the central Sdan
whose statre and attainments a!!roached those of #ello. %hat was El.
Kanemi. In intellect, learning, ability, and strength of character these two
towered over the rest of their contem!oraries. %hey were born at abot
the same time, they died within a year or two of one another, and dring
mch of their lives they were destined to be in conflict.
#ello, thogh devot, had none of $hehuCs mysticism and never
e)!erienced AbdullahiCs revlsion from the world and its ways. *n the
contrary, he obviosly had a taste for !ower and en$oyed wielding it.
(evertheless, he never allowed it to clod his vision or tarnish his
standards. %hat for twenty years he was the most !owerfl man in the
whole Sdan, and yet remained com!letely ncorr!ted, mst be conted
among the greatest of all his achievements.
#s a man, he cold sometimes be infle)ible, as he was with 4la!!erton,
and occasionally rthless. %hese were bt the defects of his virtes,
however, for the hall3mark of his character was magnanimity. In his
career we enconter this magnanimity again and again G in the
ob$ectivity of his historical works, in his forbearance nder Abdu $alamiCs
!rovocation, in his reconciliation with Abdullahi, in his avoidance of
bigotry ;1, in the great swee! of his own achievements, and in the sense
of !ersonal hmility before >od which, in the moment of his greatest
trim!h at the taking of #lkalawa no less than on his death3bed, never
deserted him. It is well illstrated in the words which he himself wrote at
the height of the theological conflict with El.KanemiD
'ay >od be gracios to s in or end and to El.Kanemi in his end. 'ay
+e kee! s both !on the straight way and show s mercy.
118
In com!any with his father $hehu, thogh in a wholly different way, he
!roved himself to be one of the most remarkable men whom #frica has
ever !rodced. #s a Sltan, Sokoto was not to look !on his like again.
(otes
1. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of :ebbe.
9. +iskett, Introdction to %W, !!. 11390.
1. >wand .(,s, +istory of &ega.
;. 4la!!erton, %ravels, vol. II, !. 1;9.
<. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 15, and Sokoto .(,s, +istory of :ebbe. For his share
in this e)!loit ,hari clan, Abdu $alami was given the title Sarkin :ebbi, which the
4hiefs of &ega still bear.
5. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 16. For the family tree, see %able 5 in #!!endi) II.
6. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 16.
=. %his was the town which 'hammad :anta had fonded three hndred years earlier
as a settlement for !risoners ca!tred in his wars with Aazza.
/. &ohnston, o!. cit. !!. 1963=. In the 'oslem tradition his gestre signified that to
refsed to srrender bt was ready to die.
10. &ohnston, o!. cit. !!. 19=3/.
11. For the family tree, see %able 1 in #!!endi) II.
19 See (ote 10 in #!!endi) I.
11. .iyaCal3+kkam, .iyaCal3Sltan, and .iyaCal3Siyasat. See +iskett, Introdction and
#!!endices to %W, !!. 99 and 11;.
1;. +iskett, Introdction and #!!endices to %W, !!. 99 and 11;.
1<. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of .rbawa.
15. Sokoto .(,s, +istorical (ote on the 4hief #lkalis.
16. 'ore than thirty years later he was to receive with great kindness the e)!lorer ,arth,
who described him as a cheerfl old man of abot seventy3five with !re featres and a
noble demeanor 7%ravels, vol. IJ, !!. 1613;8. +e mst therefore have been abot forty
when first a!!ointed.
1=. Sokoto .(,s, +istories of +ammaCali and .rbawa .istricts and of Sokoto 4ity.
1/. Ibid. +istories of .ndaye .istrict and Sokoto 4ity.
90. Ibid. +istory of .rbawa.
91. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Babo.
99. Ibid. +istories of Armi and :ara (amoda.
91. Ibid. +istories of +ammaCali and .rbawa.
9;. >azetteer of :ano Province, !. 11.
9<. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !!. ;/931.
95. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Wrno.
96. Ibid. +istories of >andi and ,akra.
9= Ibid. +istories of Sabon ,irni and Isa. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
9/. +a$$i Said, loc. cit.
10. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Sabon ,irni.
11. Ibid. %he Flani, being devoted to their cattle, always left btchering to their slaves.
19. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 9=.
11. Ibid.
1;. Ibid. !. 9/.
1<. "arlier historians often confsed it, -ite wrongly, with the village of the same name
near Sokoto.
15. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 9/. In 1/01 a ,ritish officer was shown a mond abot
twenty feet high and was told that it contained the remains of the 90,000 men who had
fallen in this battle. %he figre is !robably an e)aggeration, bt the size of the mond
shows that the casalties mst have been e)tremely heavy. 'a$or3>eneral 4. +. Folkes,
article in the Royal "ngineersC &ornal, vol. 2MMIII, no. ;, 1/</, !!. ;9/316.
16. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Sabon ,irni.
1=. +a$$i Said, loc. cit.
119
1/. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 10.
;0. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. 1/6.
;1. # com!arison of .enhamCs accont of life in :ka and 4la!!ertonCs accont of life in
Sokoto sggests that El.KanemiCs rle was stricter, and his !nishments more ,evere,
than #elloCs.
120
(ha'ter *hirteen
*he Jihad in "u'e and 7lorin
In the +asa States, as we have already seen, the Flani were able to
establish their athority by ra!idly overthrowing the old rling classes and
then taking over from them the established machinery of government.
#mong the !agan tribes of #damawa and ,achi they faced a different
!roblem which took a longer time to solve. In (!e and llorin the
!roblems were different again and their soltion even more !rotracted.
%he ac-isition of these areas, which fell in the !eriod following the death
of $hehu, therefore re!resented the third !hase in the e)!ansion of the
"m!ire. It was one, moreover, which was associated mch more closely
with >wand than with Sokoto.
"u'e
%he (!es are -ite distinct from the +asas and it is not clear why they
were ever gro!ed among the #an!a #akwai. %hey s!eak a langage of
their own 1 and have never been mch !enetrated by emigration from
+asaland. %heir links with the +asa States in fact consisted in little
more than !ro)imity and a similar system of government by a 4hief and
aristocracy.
So far as is known the (!es have always lived arond the conflence of
the (iger and :adna Rivers. ,efore the fifteenth centry, however, they
had no state of their own bt were vassals of the Igalas, who were
themselves sb$ect to ,enin and whose ca!ital, Idah, was a hndred and
fifty miles farther down the (iger. 2ike the +asas, they have !reserved a
legend which attribtes the creation of their kingdom to a half3mythical,
half3historical fonder or cltre3hero 9.
#ccording to this legend a son of the Atta or 4hief of Igala went on a
hnting e)!edition to the contry of the (!es. %here he fell in love with
the daghter of a local chieftain and lived with her for a time. She was
!regnant when he left her to retrn to Idah and he !resented her with a
charm and a ring to give to their child when it was born. %he child !roved
to be a boy and was called *soede or, in the +asa version, Edegi. When
he grew ! he was sent to Igala as a slave, !art of the tribte which the
(!es had to !ay every year, and there, becase of his ring, he was
recognized by his father who in the meantime had himself become #tta 1.
%he #tta, the legend goes on, took %soede into his hosehold and showed
him the same favor as his other sons. %his evoked the $ealosy of his
Igala half3brothers. #t length, when the #tta had grown old and felt the
a!!roach of death, he bestowed the chieftaincy of (!e on %soede and
!resented him with all the insignia of office. When his half3brothers got
wind of this, they !rsed him, meaning to kill him, bt he elded them
and reached home in safety. %here he assmed the title of "ts (!e and
121
in abot 1<10, having sbded the whole contry and re!diated his
allegiance to Idah, he became the fonder of an inde!endent dynasty.
2ater he bilt the town of >bara, on the :adna River, which was to
remain the ca!ital ntil the advent of the Flani three centries later ;.
While the legend has !robably been embellished with the !assage of time,
as sch myths sally are, the e)ternal evidence shows that there is
nothing inherently im!robable in it. %here was certainly contact between
(!e and lgala, and it is significant that the legend of %soede has srvived
in lgala as well as in (!e. #s for the date, there is a good measre of
agreement between different genealogies on the early si)teenth centry.
In any case, whatever its content of historical trth, the legend was of
social significance becase it was treasred by the (!e !eo!le and the
general knowledge and acce!tance of it was one of the fondations of the
!olitical and cltral nity which they gradally evolved <.
%here is some ncertainty abot when Islam first became established in
(!e. *ne tradition is that the fifteenth "ts, &ibirin, who lived in the
eighteenth centry, was the first 'oslem of his line 5. #gainst this,
however, is the fact that a nmber of &ibirinCs !redecessors bore 'oslem
names 6. *n balance it seems !robable that, even if it did not at first gain
mch grond, Islam took root at some time dring the seventeenth
centry.
%he date when the Flani first reached (!e is also nknown. #s the
contry !rovides good grazing in the dry season bt is nhealthy for cattle
dring the rains becase of the !revalence at that season of the tsetse fly,
the !robability is that semi3nomadic !astoralists made their a!!earance at
a very early stage, bt that settlement did not take !lace till mch later
and then only on a small scale. "ven by the time of the jihad,one estimate
!ts the total nmber of Flani as low as 1,00031,<00 =.
%owards the end of the eighteenth centry there a!!eared on the scene a
Flani called Mallam 4endo. +e was a member of the %oronkawa 4lan
and ntil then his home had been in :ebbi. +e was a scholar, not a
!astoralist, and he seems to have gone to (!e as a !reacher and
missionary of Islam and to have established himself, even before the
$ihad, as a man of inflence.
It so ha!!ened that at this time the (!es were divided into two cam!s
by a dis!te abot the sccession. *ne !retender, &imada, rled the
eastern !art of the kingdom from the old ca!ital at >bara on the :adna
River, while the other, 'a$iya, rled the west from the new town of Raba
which he had bilt for himself on the (iger. %his schism gave the Flani,
des!ite their small nmbers, an o!!ortnity of !laying a decisive !art /.
#t the start, !robably arond the trn of the centry and before the
otbreak of the jihad, Mallam 4endo and his s!!orters allied
themselves to 'a$iya in Raba. With the hel! of his Flani allies 'a$iya
defeated and killed &imada and soon afterwards made himself master of
all (!e 10.
With 'a$iyaCs trim!h Mallam 4endo became more inflential than ever
and a fresh wave of Flani came to Raba to enter his service. #fter a time,
122
however, 'a$iya seems to have grown $ealos of Mallam 4endoCs
growing athority. #t any rate there was a serios -arrel and all the
Flani were forced to flee 11.
#fter being driven ot of Raba, Mallam 4endo crossed the (iger and
took refge with another Flani, Mallam Alimi, who had become
inflential in Ilorin. From there he es!osed the case of the (!e faction
which he had earlier hel!ed to defeat. Its leader was now Idiris, the son
of 'a$iyaCs dead rival &imada. 'a$iya reacted to this move by taking an
army against Mallam 4endo and 7dirisu, bt in the ensing battle,
which took !lace near florin, he was decisively defeated, and com!elled to
fall back !on Raba 19.
%here is little dobt that Mallam 4endo now soght and received
reinforcements from $hehu. We know, at any rate, that in 1=10, when
the war with >obir was over and the city of Sokoto was being bilt, an
e)!edition was sent to (!e nder #liy &aid and that it ca!tred many
towns 11. %his force seems to have hel!ed Mallam 4endo to drive 'a$iya
ot of Raba and install himself there as $arkin +illani.
From then ntil his death Mallam 4endo, thogh not an "mir or even the
acknowledged rler of a nified state, was the most !owerfl man in
(!e. +is new ally 7dirisa assmed the title of "ts (!e, it is tre, bt
contined to live on the soth bank of the (iger and was, in fact, no more
than a !!!et rler. #s for 'a$iya, he had to retire into banishment in the
north. From Raba, Mallam 4endo was able to !lay them off against one
another and so dominate them both 1;.
%his balance of !ower lasted for twenty years, bt in the end, in abot
1=10, Idiris tired of his im!otence and rebelled against Mallam 4endoCs
athority. +e was defeated and killed, however, and Mallam 4endo then
made 'a$iya the !!!et rler of (!e in his !lace while retaining the real
!ower in his own hands 1<.
,efore he died Mallam 4endo is said to have advised his sons to follow in
his own footste!s and to be content with the reality of !ower withot
hankering after its tra!!ings. *n his death in 1=11 he was scceeded as
Sarkin Fillani by his son /suman 8aki, whose mother had been a Flani
and who therefore had no (!e blood in him. Soon afterwards Majiya
also died and was similarly scceeded by his son *sado. %wo years later
%sado rose against the Flani, bt was defeated and forced to flee 15.
#fter this victory Esman Aaki, oblivios of his fatherCs advice, took over
the regalia of the kingdom and himself assmed the title of "ts (!e.
%hese events, which took !lace in 1=15, marked the e)tinction of the old
(!e dynasty and the birth of a new "mirate in the Flani "m!ire.
%o rle his "mirate, Esman Aaki introdced the Ajele system and tried
to govern the (!es throgh Flani and +asa de!ties. %his alien regime
!roved so n!o!lar, however, that it soon !rovoked a new revolt and at
the same time introdced a fresh com!lication into the already tangled
skein of (!e affairs 16.
#mong Esman AakiCs brothers there was one, 'asaba, who had a (!e
mother. 'asaba had -arrelled with Esman Aaki soon after their fatherCs
123
death and had left the ca!ital for the contryside. %here he had begn to
intrige against his brother and to !ro!agate the idea that, as he himself
was half (!e by birth and frthermore had been broght ! as a (!e,
he was the one who shold be "mir rather than the alien Esman Aaki 1=.
'asaba and %sado, the de!osed !!!et, were com!anions in mischief and
natral allies. 'oreover, the n!o!larity of Esman AakiCs de!ties and
the nrest that they !rovoked gave them the which they had been looking
for. In abot 1=;0, therefore, they organized a rising of the (!e
!o!lation against the #$eles. %his revolt was so sccessfl that Esman
AakiCs !ower colla!sed com!letely and he and his cortiers were
com!elled to abandon their ca!ital, Raba, and flee to #gaie in the
northeast 1/.
It will be remembered that Mallam 4endo had originally come from
:ebbi and that, when the "m!ire had been divided on the death of
$hehu, (!e had been inclded in #bdllahiCs s!here of inflence. ,y this
time +alil, #bdllahiCs second son, had scceeded as "mir of >wand,
and the news of the revolt broght him hrrying down to (!e with a
large force behind him. +e soon restored !eace and his first inclination
was to !t Esman Aaki back on the throne. In the end, however, he
listened to the !leas of his (!e sb$ects, who assred him that the !eace
wold not last nless 'asaba became their rler. +e therefore installed
'asaba as "mir and carried Esman Aaki off into banishment in >wand
90. #t first this move seemed to achieve its ob$ect, bt in the long term it
meant that the "mirate was to be torn by the -arrels of two Flani
factions as well as two (!e factions.
.ring the 1=;0s the new "mir 'asaba greatly enlarged the bondaries of
the "mirate. +e con-ered the :amk tribe in the north, the riverain
:akandas in the soth, and !art of the >wari !eo!le in the east.
'oreover, thogh he retained Raba as his ca!ital, he established his
!ower firmly along the soth bank of the (iger 91. In the early 1=<0s the
e)!lorer ,arth heard re!orts in +asaland abot the great warlike
kingdom of (!e which lay to the soth.
In abot 1=<; (!e was once again rent by civil war when /mar
#ahaushe, a mercenary ca!tain who had been em!loyed by the Flani,
revolted against them. For a time he carried everything before him, drove
'asaba ot of Raba, and made himself master of the "mirate. +e failed to
gain the s!!ort of the (!e !o!lation, however, and scceeded only in
niting the two Flani factions against him. With the hel! of
reinforcements from >wand, therefore, he was at length defeated in
1=<6 and drowned in a river while trying to esca!e 99.
#fter the s!!ression of EmarCs rebellion the "mir of >wand restored
Esman Aaki to the !osition of "mir and told him to make his ca!ital at
,ida which was nearer the centre of the "mirate than Raba. %wo or three
years later, however, in abot 1=50, Esman Aaki died. +e was again
scceeded by 'asaba, who rled (!e ntil he too died in 1=61 91.
,t for their internal dissensions it is dobtfl whether the (!e !eo!le
wold ever have been broght within the Flani "m!ire.
124
%he Flani living among them were certainly too few to seize !ower as
they had been able to do in the +asa States while forces dis!atched from
the north, which wold have had to fight in conditions nsited to Flani
methods, wold !robably have been no more sccessfl than those sent
against ,org if they had met an e-ally nited and resolte o!!osition.
#s it was, however, the (!es by their feds and rivalries first allowed the
far less nmeros Flani to dominate their affairs and then to seize and
retain !ower.
In the +asa States the jihad had the virte that it led to a clean3ct
victory and reslted, for the most !art, in the ra!id restoration of !eace.
In #damawa and ,achi, religios considerations a!art, it cold be
$stified as a ste! in the !rocess of taming the wild and !redatory tribes
who inhabited the hills. ,t in (!e the war broght neither of these
benefits. *n the contrary, what had been a sim!le schism between two
(!e Pretenders became a com!le) !attern of intrige and shifting
alliances between two (!e and two Flani factions. %he reslt was two
generations of trblence and fratricidal strife.
It was not ntil these feds had worked themselves ot that (!e was
able to take its !ro!er !lace as one of the richer and more !owerfl States
in the "m!ire. From the time of 'asabaCs sccession its new regime,
re!resented by an "mir who had a (!e mother and who called himself by
a (!e title, took on a character of its own which was recognizably
different from that of the other vassals. In its devotion to Islam, however,
and its loyalty to >wand, and throgh >wand to Sokoto, (!e was no
different from any of the other "mirates.
Ilorin
%here are many similarities between the !rocesses by which the Flani
established their !ower in (!e and those which led to the creation of the
Ilorin "mirate. %he only im!ortant difference is that the (!es, being
mch less nmeros than the Borbas, were com!letely absorbed into the
"m!ire, whereas in llorin the Flani scceeded in detaching and
assimilating only one of the many States of Borbaland.
%he Borbas, like the (!es and indeed the +asas, look back to a
mythical fonder or cltre3hero. %his is )duduwa, who is s!!osed to
have been the son of the rler of 'ecca, in !re3Islamic days, and to have
migrated to the west becase of a -arrel with his father. #fter many
wanderings he is said to have reached Borbaland and settled down at Ife.
2ater, his descendants s!read ot and fonded the other Borba city3
states. In the meantime, according to this legend, two of his brothers,
who had left #rabia at the same time, had become the rlers of the :anri
and >obirawa 9;.
%here is a marked resemblance between this tradition and the .ara
legend, bt the histories of ,orn and >obir !rovide even closer !arallels.
%hey, too, !reserve the tradition of an origin in #rabia, as has already
been mentioned, and they also recognize a cosinly relationshi! between
the three !eo!les. #s in ,orn and >obir the strangers from the east were
125
a!!arently sfficiently nmeros to have been acce!ted as an aristocracy
by the !eo!le of Borbaland among whom they settled. 'oreover, the arts
and skills that they broght with them !robably made a significant
contribtion to the advanced cltre and com!le) strctre of society that
the Borbas were later to develo!. *n the other hand, the immigrants do
not seem to have been nmeros enogh to have left any significant
ethnic traces behind them becase !hysically the #rabs and Borbas are
very different ty!es. 4ertainly lingistically they made no mark at all, for
the evidence shows Borba to be a !rely #frican langage 9<. Whatever
the !recise corse of these early events may have been, the Borbas
ndobtedly mlti!lied and develo!ed so that in historical times they
emerged as a !ower to be reckoned with.
*r knowledge of Borbaland before the eighteenth centry derives more
from legend than history. It is generally agreed, however, that *yo, which
was to become the more !owerfl of the Borba States, had come into
e)istence by the year 1;00 and that its first ca!ital, *ld *yo, was fonded
at abot that time. %he 4hief held the title of Alafin and the dynasty
claimed that the fonder of their line was the grandson of the mythical
*ddwa.
*yo gradally grew in strength and athority ntil it had e)tended its
sway over the whole of Borbaland and had become the szerain of the
!etty States which srronded it. ,y 1600, when it had $st con-ered the
neighboring kingdom of .ahomey, its !ower was at its zenith and, with
the formerly !owerfl kingdom of ,enin already in decline, it now
dominated the whole region soth and west of the 2ower (iger.
In the eighteenth centry, however, *yo began to show signs of waning.
Its military !ower was based on its cavalry and its !ros!erity on the
overland trade with the +asa States. With the growth of maritime
commerce, the overland trade declined in im!ortance while with the
im!ortation of firearms the hitherto dominant role of cavalry began to
diminish. %he reslt of these changes was that the States on the seaboard
grew in statre while in *ld *yo, sitated in the savannah contry of the
north3east and far removed from the #tlantic, the #lafins fond it
increasingly difficlt to control them. It was therefore a sign of the times
when, towards the end of the centry, .ahomey refsed to !ay its tribte
and "gba, another vassal State, threw off its allegiance altogether.
%he Borbas at this time still adhered to a com!le) religion of their own
and, althogh 'oslem teachers and missionaries had already a!!eared
among them, Islam had as yet taken no real root. Frthermore, becase
the !revalence of the tsetse fly had ke!t the !astoralists at a distance, the
Flani had not !enetrated into the contry in any significant nmbers. If
the way had not been o!ened to them, therefore, it is inconceivable that
the Flani cold ever have established themselves as the dominant !ower
in any !art of Borbaland. #s it was, however, the dissensions of the
Borbas among themselves was to enable them to do $st this.
%o the soth3east of *ld *yo lay the city and district of florin, an
im!ortant bastion which was governed by a military commander called
126
Afonja. It will be remembered that when Mallam 4endo, the leader of
the jihad in (!e, had been driven ot of Raba it was in Ilorin that he had
taken refge, !robably becase Afonja by this time had already come
nder the inflence of another Flani teacher, Mallam Alimi. ,e that as it
may, the insight that Afonja then gained into the fighting -alities of the
Flani seems to have given him the idea of sing them himself to frther
the designs which he was already harboring.
From his close association with Mallam Alimi we can assme that by this
time Afonja had already become a convert to Islam 95. %his in itself
wold be enogh to weaken his loyalty to the #lafin of *yo who still
worshi!!ed other gods. In addition he was an ambitios man who chafed
at his vassal stats and was eager to become a 4hief in his own right. We
know at any rate that, soon after Afonja had hel!ed the (!e Flani to
re!el their !rsers, he made a com!act with Mallam Alimi for the
recritment from the north of Flani and +asa volnteers 96. +e no
dobt !ersaded Mallam Alimi to believe that his aims were to declare a
jihad and establish a 'oslem "mirate in Ilorin which wold owe allegiance
to >wand and Sokoto, bt it seems likely that he was in fact !laying a
dee!er game.
Whether Mallam Alimi had any dobts abot AfonjaCs real motives we
do not know, bt there was no -estion abot the sccess of his
recriting, for he attracted to Ilorin large nmbers of Flani and +asa
volnteers. ,y 1=16, the year of $hehuCs death, Afonja felt himself to be
ready. +e therefore threw off his allegiance to the #lafin and declared
Ilorin to be inde!endent of *yo. %he #lafin immediately reacted by
sending a !nitive e)!edition against him, bt, with the hel! of his
'oslem allies, Afonja defeated it and drove it back 9=.
%he rebellion of Afonja in Ilorin was the signal for other vassals to throw
off their allegiance and the rickety "m!ire of *yo began to break !. ,y
1=91 the #lafin had lost most of his tem!oral athority otside
metro!olitan *yo and was no longer strong enogh to bring Ilorin or the
other rebels to heel. In Borba history this was a develo!ment of the
greatest significance, for the removal of *yoCs athority was to lead to
seventy years of civil war.
In Ilorin Afonja ke!t on good terms with his Flani and +asa allies for
$st as long as *yo remained a szerain to be feared. When *yoCs !ower
colla!sed, however, and the threat of con-est was removed, he soon fell
ot with them. %here are two conflicting versions of how this came abot.
#ccording to the first, the Flani and +asas recrited by 'allam #limi,
who were known as the $amaCa as the early reformers had been, got ot
of hand after their victory and started !lndering friendly towns and
villages 9/. ,t according to the second, the falt lay on the other side
and it was the Borbas who, as soon as the threat from *yo had been
removed, tried to deny their allies the frits of victory and drive them ot
of the kingdom which they had hel!ed to create 10.
%here is !robably trth in both these acconts. #mong the Flani and
+asa volnteers there mst have been many adventrers and soldiers of
127
fortne and it wold not be sr!rising if they were gilty of some looting
and !illage. *n the other hand, AfonjaCs rling motive seems to have
been !ersonal ambition rather than devotion to Islam and it wold have
been in character if, when the Flani and +asas had served their
!r!ose, he had tried to get rid of them.
Mallam Alimi himself was a soldier and teacher whose aims were
religios rather than !olitical. While he lived he did his best to kee! his
followers nder control and his restraining inflence on them, combined
with the modesty of his !ersonal aims, seems to have !revented an o!en
breach. When he died in 1=11, however, he was scceeded as leader of
the 'oslem gro! by his son, Abdu $alami dan #limi, who was a man of
mch greater worldly ambition 11.
%he sccession of Abdu $alami at once !reci!itated the crisis which had
long been develo!ing in Ilorin. Afonja no dobt knew what sort of a man
he wold now have to deal with and made ! his mind to attack the Flani
and +asa immigrants and drive them ot of the kingdom altogether. %o
that end he secretly enlisted the s!!ort of neighboring Borba towns.
%hey failed to !rovide the hel! on which he was conting, however, and
the reslt was that, when he strck, Abdu $alami was able to trn the
tables on him. Afonja was killed in the fighting which followed and the
Borba case colla!sed 19.
,y this victory Abdu $alami made himself master of Ilorin. 2ike his father
before him, he had always looked to >wand for leadershi! and
!rotection. In retrn he was now !resented with a flag and invested with
the rank and regalia of an "mir. %he "mirate of florin ths came into being
in 1=11 as !art of the .al "m!ire.
Abdu $alami did not rest content with the modest domain which he had
wrested from Afonja bt at once set abot enlarging it by making war on
his neighbors. +e was generally sccessfl and, thogh nable to hold all
his gains, won many notable victories against the crmbling !ower of *yo
and its warring satellites 11.
%he reverses which he sffered at Abdu $alamiCs hands at length stirred
the #lafin to action and he determined to make a s!reme effort to crsh
what he still regarded as the rebellion in Ilorin. %o this end he not only
smmoned to arms his sb$ects and sch vassals as were still loyal bt
also enlisted the aid of the neighboring !eo!le of ,org, who had shown
in the !ast that they were ca!able of withstanding the Flani. In Ilorin,
Abdu $alami got wind of these moves and a!!ealed to >wand for hel!.
+alil, who in 1=1< had scceeded his brother as "mir, res!onded by
obtaining reinforcements from Sokoto and dis!atching a strong combined
force to Abdu $alamiCs assistance 1;.
In the strggle which followed, the Borbas and their ,org allies won
some early sccesses. %hey were gradally forced back, however, and the
decisive battle took !lace near the ca!ital, *ld *yo, in 1=16. Its reslt was
an overwhelming victory for the Flani. %he city was ca!tred, the #lafin
killed, and the allied armies roted. %he ,orgawa fared no better than the
Borbas and lost their commander as well as the 4hiefs of :aiama and
128
Wawa 1<.
With this defeat the ancient kingdom of *yo, which had already lost its
"m!ire, more or less disintegrated. %he old ca!ital was never rebilt nor
did the #lafins ever recover their !aramontcy. %hereafter, *yo was
hardly more than one of the city3states into which Borbaland now broke
!.
+ad the Flani of the day been as bold and aggressive as those of a
!revios generation they wold !robably have gone on to sbde these
city3states !iecemeal and add them to the "m!ire. ,y this time, however,
their ambitions were largely satisfied and the tide of their e)!ansion was
almost s!ent. %he year 1=16, moreover, was the one in which Sltan ,ello
died. %hey were therefore content to consolidate their !ower in Ilorin and
did not attem!t to e)!loit their victory by making frther con-ests.
*ne of the reslts of the defeat of *yo and the flight of the Borbas from
the old ca!ital was the fonding of Ibadan. %he city grew very ra!idly in
size and im!ortance and for mch of the rest of the centry it was to be at
war with Ilorin, barring the way to any frther advance by the Flani and
conter3attacking them whenever the o!!ortnity offered.
4onsidering what a small minority the Flani were, the sr!rising fact was
not so mch that they let !ass the o!!ortnity of anne)ing the rest of
Borbaland to the "m!ire bt that they managed to establish themselves
in even a corner of it. (o less sr!rising was the fact that they were
afterwards able to maintain their !osition among a !redominantly Borba
!o!lation when they were all the time being sb$ected to heavy !ressre
from the great mass of the Borba !eo!le beyond their borders. %his,
however, is what they scceeded in doing. In the !rocess they, too,
ac-ired certain characteristics which distingished them from their
kinsmen in other !arts of the "m!ire. ,t, as with the (!e Flani, their
local coloring did not diminish either their devotion to Islam or their
loyalty to >wand and throgh >wand to Sokoto.
(otes
1. >reenberg classifies it with Ibo and Borba in a section of the (iger34ongo gro! of
his 4ongo3:ordofanian family 7o!. cit. !. =8.
9. S. F. (adel, # ,lack ,yzantim, 2ondon, 1/;9, !!. 6936;.
1. Ibid.
;. (adel, o!. cit.
<. Ibid. !!. 6<365.
5. Ibid. !. 65.
6. >azetteer of (!e Province, 1/90, !. =.
=. (adel, o!. cit. !. 66.
/. (adel, o!. cit. !. 66.
10. Ibid. !!, 66361.
11. Ibid. !. 6=.
19. Ibid. !!. 6=36/
11. ,ello, Inf ' 7#rnett, !. //8.
1;. (adel, o!, cit. !. 618.
1<. Ibid.
15. Ibid. !. =0.
16. >azetteer of (!e Province, !. 11.
1=. (adel, o!. cit. !. =0.
129
1/. >azetteer of (!e Province, !. 11.
90. Ibid. !. 19.
91. (adel, o!. cit. !. =0.
99. Ibid. !!. =03=9.
91. >azetteer of (!e Province, !!. 1;316.
9;. Samel &ohnson, +istory of the Borbas, 2ondon, 1/91, !!. 13;.
9<. >reenberg classifies it in the same section of the (iger34ongo gro! as (!e. 7o!.
cit. !. =.8
95. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
96. >azetteer of Ilorin Province, 1/91, !. 1<.
9=. >azetteer of Ilorin Province, !. 15.
9/. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. 9=6.
10. >azetteer of Ilorin Province, !. 15.
11. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !!. 9=63=.
19. Ibid. !. 9=/.
11. >azetteer of Ilorin Province, !. 15.
1;. Ibid. !!. 1=31/.
1<. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. 9/1.
130
(ha'ter +ourteen
*he Middle Years
,y the time that #ello died it had come to be recognized that any
legitimate male descendant of $hehu was eligible to scceed as Sltan of
Sokoto and 4ommander of the Faithfl. Frthermore, to reglate the
sccession and to make the final choice between those who !t
themselves forward as candidates, an "lectoral 4ollege had been evolved.
It was !resided over by the Waziri >idado, who was to live for another
forteen years, and one of its most !rominent members was Sarkin Baki
#liy &aid, who was also still alive and active. %he 4hief $stice was of
corse a member too, as were the for 4oncillors whom we have already
met G the 'aga$in >ari, the >aladima, the 'aga$in Rafi, and the
Ebandoma. %he remaining members, who may not have been admitted to
the college ntil a later date, were Sarkin :ebbi of Babo and three other
territorial magnates from the home districts. While all were Flani, none
belonged to the rling family.
When #ello died there were three serios contenders for the sccession.
%he first two were his yonger brothers G Abubakr Atiku and
Muhammadu #uhari G and the third was his eldest son, Aliyu #abba.
#mong them Atiku, who was then abot fifty3three, was the most senior.
+e was a fll brother of #ello 1, which shold have been an advantage to
his candidatre, bt against this was the fact that neither $hehu nor
#ello had ever confided to him an im!ortant command or a ma$or !ost. It
mst have been known to many that #ello had distrsted him 9 and it
was rmored that he had a streak of avarice and crelty. Indeed, there
were some who !ro!hesied that, if ever he became Sltan, heads wold
roll 1. In the event, as we shall see, the !ro!hecy was flfilled not in him
bt in his son, #bdr Rahman.
,hari, by contrast, was a strong candidate. (ot only was he highly
res!ected bt !ossession of the great fief of %ambawal in the soth3west
of the Sltanate gave him a firm base ;. #nother factor that mst have
weighed in his favor was his fine record as a commander. %en years
!reviosly he had led the Sokoto contingent in the s!!ression of the
rising of Sarkin :ebbi 'hammad +odi, whom he had finally rn down
and killed <. 'ore im!ortant !erha!s, becase mch more recent, he had
again commanded the Sokoto forces in the war in ,org and Borbaland
that had led to the destrction of *ld *yo and the consolidation of Ilorin
as an "mirate in the .al "m!ire, albeit nder >wandCs szerainty 5.
+owever, strong thogh his claims ndobtedly were, the awkward fact
remained that he cold only be a!!ointed if Atiku were first !assed over.
%he genial #liy ,abba was !robably the most !o!lar of the three
candidates and when the Waziri >idado had asked the dying #ello to
designate his sccessor he may well have been ho!ing that #liy wold be
nominated. ,t #elloCs refsal to do so dobtless reminded the "lectors
that at thirty #liy was still com!aratively yong and ine)!erienced. In
131
effect, therefore, the field was narrowed to Atiku and ,hari. #fter seven
daysC deliberation the "lectors at length chose Atiku, who was there!on
!roclaimed as the new Sltan and 4ommander of the Faithfl.
In a!!earance, Atiku was small of statre and slight of bild. +is face was
fll, his com!le)ion reddish, and his voice soft. +e sed to kee! his eyes
lowered and, even in conversation, did not look his com!anion in the eye.
*ne of his eccentricities was always to go abot armed and he was seldom
seen withot a sword at his hi! or a s!ear or a bow in his hand 6.
*n becoming Sltan, Atiku immediately started making changes. +e
began by abandoning Wrno, which dring the last ten years of #elloCs
reign had virtally become the ca!ital, and retrning to Sokoto. In Sokoto,
moreover, he did not install himself in the hose that #ello, had bilt for
himself, which was of corse regarded as the SltanCs Palace, bt
!referred to convert his own town3hose into a new Palace =. #t the same
time he recalled his eldest son Ahmadu 8aruku, whom #ello had sent to
,akra as commander of one of the fortresses in the defensive chain set
! against the >obirawa, and restored to him, nder the im!ortant title of
$arkin 8amfara, the office of >overnor of the 4ity which he had
!reviosly en$oyed /.
Atiku was mch narrower in his otlook than #ello and had in his
character a toch of !ritanism and bigotry. +e ne)t set himself to stam!
ot the msic, drmming, and dancing which #ello had tolerated bt
which he regarded as vicios and immoral. +e did this by having a
drmmer arbitrarily !t to death in the middle of his !erformance 10. %he
ca!ricios rthlessness of this action seems to have been characteristic
and hel!s to e)!lain the dobts that had !reviosly been entertained
abot his sitability to be Sltan.
In reversing so many of ,elleCs measres Atiku was not only giving
e)!ression to a different character and otlook bt !robably also trying to
assert himself against the weight of his brotherCs memory. ,t in fact his
changes were less momentos than they may have seemed at the time
and only affected matters of secondary im!ortance. *n the ma$or isses
he had no choice bt to contine to !rse #elloCs !olicies. %he !roblems,
after all, were nchanged and the stand!oint from which he $dged them,
that of a devot 'oslem and of a Flani who intended to !reserve his
heritage, was e)actly the same as #elloCs. In any case, radical changes
wold not have been easy to institte becase the 4oncil was by this
time firmly established and among those whom #ello had originally
a!!ointed, a!art from the Waziri and Sarkin Baki, the >aladima
'hammad .eshir and the Ebandoma 'hammad were still alive and
now had twenty years of athority behind them 11.
AtikuCs first military e)!edition was against a leage of Aamfara and
,rmi rebels who were defying him from ,irnin .antri on the !!er
>awan >lbi 19. +aving sbded them, he ne)t trned his attention to
the resrgent >obir and :atsina diehards. 2ike #ello, he realized that to
break their !ower it wold be necessary to strike a decisive blow against
their twin ca!itals in the north, %sibiri and 'aradi.
132
In abot 1=;0 he therefore smmoned the eastern "mirs to assist him in
another e)!edition. %he diehards got wind of what was afoot, however,
and called on the hel! of .amagaram, a kingdom which was tribtary to
,orn, and of those %aregs who had not thrown in their lot with the
Flani. When Atiku marched north at the head of his army, therefore, he
fond himself o!!osed by strong forces. # battle was foght near %sibiri,
bt it was indecisive, and the Flani had to fall back withot ca!tring
either of their ob$ectives 11.
#fter re!lsing the Flani, the >obirawa seem to have conterattacked.
4ertainly, at abot this date they drove #elloCs son Fodiyo ot of the
fortress of 2a$inge and again made themselves masters of the
northernmost segment of the bend of the Rima Jalley. Fodiyo was
com!elled to fall back to another fortress on a site near the !resent town
of Isa 1;. +is death soon afterwards marked the final failre of the
attem!ts that the Flani made between abot 1=90 and 1=;0 to conciliate
the >obirawa by giving them a measre of atonomy.
In the dry season of 1=;139 Atiku again smmoned his "mirs and
monted another e)!edition against %sibiri. ,t the Flani had now been
fighting for nearly forty years and the zest for battle had gone ot of
them. #lready in 4la!!ertonCs day an #rab had said that their leaders no
longer foght with the same disregard of danger and death as they had
dis!layed in the $ihad 1<. #t >awakke, it is tre, #ello had scceeded in
rosing them to one last s!reme effort, bt Atiku was nable to kindle
the same s!ark. When he realized that his army had no stomach for the
fight, he abandoned the enter!rise and trned his face towards home. +e
fell ill on the way, however, and died at :atr, in Aamfara, in the year
1=;9 15.
#s a man, Atiku lacked the -alities of intellect and !ersonality that had
distingished #ello. +e had character, certainly, bt its fondations were
narrow and it had obvios flaws. %he most charitable verdict, !assed by
+a$i Said some time after his death, was that he was a stanch !holder
of the right 16. #s a Sltan, his reign of five years was really too short for
him to be $dged either a sccess or a failre. %he most that can be said
is that, thogh he was clear3headed enogh to !erceive what his !roblems
were and incisive enogh to tackle them, yet he lacked the !owers of
organization and the s!ark of leadershi! to achieve any real sccess.
#s Muhammadu #uhari had died dring AtikuCs reign, #liy ,abba was
left as the only candidate from the !revios election still alive. +e had no
serios rivals and the "lectoral 4ollege seems to have had little difficlty
in deciding in his favor. +e was now abot thirty3five, of medim height,
stot in bild, dark in com!le)ion, and having good featres and a fine
black beard which, nlike his father , he did not conceal with a veil 1=.
#s a man, #liy was intelligent and very well informed abot crrent
affairs. In religios matters he was so learned and elo-ent that no one
cold match him in argment and dis!tation 1/. ,t with all this he was
genial, good3natred, and fond of laghter. +e treated all men alike, from
the greatest to the lowest, and had a ha!!y gift of remembering the
133
names of those whom he had !reviosly met.
#s a rler, too, #liy had many good !oints. +e did not allow criticism to
deflect him from the right corse and he ignored those who denigrated
him. +e was devoid of malice and he remained ncorr!ted by !ower. +e
did not stand on ceremony and he was always accessible to his sb$ects.
In a violent age he was nsally ready to show mercy. #s an e)am!le of
his aversion to violence it is related that, when a renegade Flani who had
been fighting with the >obirawa was ca!tred, he overrled his advisers
and s!ared the manCs life 90. (evertheless, his love of $stice was
stronger than his im!lse to be mercifl and on another occasion, when a
slave had allowed some of the yong !rinces to commit acts of in$stice
and o!!ression in the market, he had the man e)ected on the s!ot 91.
,ecase of #liyCs rare !ersonal -alities Flani historians have dealt
kindly with his memory. %he trth is, however, that as a Sltan he was
not a sccess. +e rled the "m!ire for seventeen years and in that time
he might have com!leted all the tasks that his father and his ncle had
left nfinished. Instead, becase of some want of steel in his character, he
allowed the gri! of the Flani on their trblent sb$ects to weaken and
sli!.
In the early years of his reign, #liy was faced with a nmber of scattered
revolts, mainly in Aamfara. %hese were no more than bshfires, however,
and he e)tingished them withot mch difficlty. +e then led an
e)!edition against the >obir ca!ital of %sibiri, bt was nable to take the
!lace or achieve any decisive sccess 99.
#liyCs first great mistake was his failre to a!!reciate that the !resence
of the nsbded diehards on his northern frontier, who ke!t ! an
incessant gerilla war on Aamfara and :atsina, was the case of most of
the internal and e)ternal trobles that he afterwards encontered. +e
shold have retrned to the fray, mobilized all his forces, inclding those
of the "astern "mirates, and crshed them as #ello and Atiku had both
!lanned to do. Instead, after the first failre, he feebly abandoned the
task. %his mst have been inter!reted as a sign of weakness. #t any rate,
it !t heart into his enemies, who grew mch more daring, and
encoraged some of the Aamfara towns to side with them. ,y abot 1=<9
his athority in Aamfara had become so diminished that even the !agan
villages of :otorkoshi revolted against him 91.
In the following year the e)!lorer ,arth made the $orney to Sokoto and
followed more or less the same road that 4la!!erton had sed almost a
generation earlier. ,y com!aring their narratives it is !ossible to gage
the e)tent to which the s!remacy of the Flani had declined dring the
interval. In 4la!!ertonCs day the danger that they had had to gard
against was no more than an ambsh or a ti!3and3rn raid in which a
caravan might have become dis!ersed and sffered some casalties 9;.
,t a generation later the !erils of the road had obviosly grown mch
more menacing. *n leaving :atsina, for e)am!le, ,arthCs caravan, for the
first !art of its $orney, was escorted by the "mir in !erson and, instead of
heading west on the direct road, was first obliged to make a detor to the
134
soth. What the >obirawa now had in the field was not $st a few !arties
of raiders bt a force ca!able of holding ! even the most im!ortant and
well3garded convoys.
%he hostile army of the >obirawa being in this neighborhood, the danger
of the road frther on was very considerable? and the :anawa and
Aazzawa, of whom the latter carried 9,000,000 shells, <00 tobes 9<, and
10 horses as tribte, were too mch afraid of their !ro!erty to accom!any
s 95.
It is, in fact, clear from ,arthCs narrative that the whole of the eastern
!art of the Sltanate was in a state of trmoil.
Armi is an im!ortant town even at !resent bt, being nder the dominion
of the Flani, it is only ca!able of !reserving its e)istence by a constant
strggle with >obir and 'aradi.... It is difficlt to know which towns are
still de!endent !on the dominion of Sokoto, and which adhere to their
enemies the >obirawa 96.
%he contryside was no longer safe in this !art of the Sltanate and the
!o!lation had been com!elled by the constant raids to seek the
!rotection of walled towns.
%hs we reached, a little !ast noon, the town Sansanin Isa 9= which was
originally a mere fortified encam!ment or $ansani. ,t its advanced and
in some res!ects isolated !osition, as an ot3lying !ost against the
>obirawa and 'aradiyawa, rendered it essential that it shold be strong
enogh by its own resorces to offer a long resistance? and it has in
conse-ence become a walled town of considerable im!ortance 9/.
,arthCs accont shows that eighteen years after >awakke all the
advantages of #elloCs great victory had been lost and that the Flani were
on the defensive again.
In 1=<1 #liy did, it is tre, s!!ress the revolt in :otorkoshi. +e has
been remembered for the sb$gation of its ninety villages, bt it was a
hollow victory, for their inhabitants were no more than refractory !agans.
With the real enemy, the >obirawa, he did not again try conclsions.
,arth !t his finger on this failre when he wroteD
#s long as the Flani do not defeat the host of the >obirawa, who take the
field every year and offer them battle, the state of this em!ire will become
daily worse and worse.
#nother comment of ,arthCs shows how demoralized the Flani had now
become.
In scarcely any !lace in (egroland, he wrote, did I observe so little tre
military s!irit as in Wrno? and almost all the leading men seem to be
imbed with the melancholy conviction that their rle in these -arters is
drawing to an end 10.
.isinclination to get to gri!s with his enemies in the north was #liyCs first
great failing. %he second, which was to have e-ally serios
conse-ences, mst be attribted to his easy3going natre. %he srrender
of Yakubu "abame, the Pretender to the throne of :ebbi, and the reason
why it was thoght necessary to banish him to Sokoto, have already been
related. Since 1=19 Bakb had been living at the SltanCs 4ort as a
135
!rince in e)ile and :ebbi had en$oyed fifteen years of !eace. ,t in 1=;6,
in circmstances which will be described in a later cha!ter, #liy relented
and gave Bakb !ermission to retrn to his native land.
%his act of clemency was to have disastros conse-ences, becase two
years later Bakb renonced his allegiance and raised :ebbi and
Aaberma against the Flani. #liy now did his best to e)tingish the fire
that he had !ermitted Bakb to kindle, bt he was no more sccessfl
against the :ebbi rebels than he had been !reviosly against the >obir
diehards. %he reslt of his generos bt misgided gestre was that for
the whole of the second half of the centry, e)ce!t for one !eriod of trce,
the Sokoto Flani had to contend with a gerrilla war on their western as
well as on their northern frontier.
%he inability of the Sltan to master the enemies at his own gates
inevitably ndermined his !restige in the "m!ire. Frthermore, the
disr!tion of his commnications with the north and east ham!ered him in
his attem!ts to deal with other trobles which arose. In +adei$a, for
e)am!le, as will be described later, the de!osed "mir ,hari sr!ed the
throne in 1=<1, !rovoked a civil war, and afterwards cased havoc in the
whole north3cast of the "m!ire by raiding the neighboring "mirates of
:atagm and :ano. In #ir a similar !alace revoltion took !lace at abot
the same time. In this the "mir #bdl :adir, a!!arently withot SokotoCs
consent, was driven ot and s!!lanted by Ahmadu 2ufa-i 11. %hese two
e!isodes reveal the e)tent to which the SltanCs gri! on the "m!ire was
sli!!ing.
2ike #ello, #liy !referred Wrno to Sokoto and dring his long reign
Wrno again became the ca!ital of the "m!ire. +e died there in 1=</, his
trobles still thick abot him, and was bried near his father.
%he key to #liyCs character lies !erha!s in the fact that his mother was a
+asa concbines 19 and that in certain im!ortant res!ects he seems to
have taken after her rather than after his father. +e !ossessed many
virtes and in times of !eace, or in almost any other walk of life, he wold
have earned sccess as well as res!ect. Enfortnately, however, his easy3
going amiability did not befit him to carry the very heavy brdens which
he had inherited. #s a Sltan, thogh not as a man, he mst be conted a
failre.
*n AliyuCs death, Ahmadu 8aruku, the son of Atiku, was elected
Sltan. %his a!!ointment established a !attern becase, with one
e)ce!tion, all sbse-ent Sltans were selected from the hoses of #ello
and Atiku. %he e)ce!tion was Ahmadu 2ufa-i who, as we shall see, was
made Sltan in the Csi)ties when he had become the elder of $hehuCs only
two srviving sons.
#lthogh in his yonger days he had governed Sokoto city for nearly
twenty3five years 11, #hmad seems to have had no love for the !lace
becase when he became Sltan he removed the 4ort to a town called
4himmola, which was sitated in the Rima Jalley a few miles west of
Wrno. .ring his reign, therefore, 4himmola became the seat of
government $st as Wrno had been dring the latter !art of #elloCs reign
136
and the whole of #liy ,abbaCs.
#hmadCs original intention in making this move was !robably to establish
an advanced head-arters from which he cold watch the >obirawa. In
the early Csi)ties, however, there was a develo!ment which greatly
redced the menace from this -arter. $arkin 6obir #awa na 6wanki,
who was recognized as their 4hief by all the diehard >obirawa living
beyond the frontier of the "m!ire, accsed one of his kinsmen, the 4an
6aladima 4an Halima, of trying to encom!ass his death by deliberately
leaving him in the lrch in battle. Finding himself banished, .an +alima
made his !eace with the Flani. #hmad for his !art was glad to give him
!ermission to fond a new town, Sabon ,irni, near the rins of #lkalawa
and to recognize him as the 4hief of all the >obirawa in that !art of the
Sltanate 1;. %he arrangement that had been destroyed in 1=1< by the
treachery of Sarkin >obir #li was ths restored, and a bffer State of
>obirawa loyal to the Sltan was again inter!osed between the Sltanate
and the diehards of %sibiri. From then on, thogh the diehards contined
to harry the soth and east, their raiding of the western districts of the
Sltanate virtally ceased.
%his res!ite enabled the new Sltan to concentrate his attention on a
different ob$ective altogether. #t that time the sandy !lains that stretched
away northward from the Rima Jalley rond Wrno and 4himmola to
,irnin :onni were only s!arsely inhabited. Ahmadu 8aruku realized that
they were ca!able of s!!orting a large !o!lation and set abot !eo!ling
them. %his he did by encoraging +asas from the soth in search of land
and #darawa from the north in search of rainfall to settle there 1<. In this
way he laid the fondations of >wadabawa which, a generation later, was
to rival Armi and %ambawal as one of the great fiefs of the Sltanate and
to !rovide the backing of wealth and men that was to hel! two of his sons
to scceed as Sltan.
#!art from the !artial settlement that he achieved with the >obirawa,
Ahmadu 8aruku did not attem!t to tackle the ma$or !roblems of the
"m!ire. In the west he was content to try to contain the :ebbawa and in
the east he sim!ly waited for death to remove the rebellios ,hari from
+adei$a. Within his limitations, however, he was a good Sltan and his
reign is remembered as a !eriod when roads and markets were safe for
travellers and trade florished 15.
When #hmad died in 1=55, the electors went back to the hose of #ello
and a!!ointed #liy :arami, the yonger brother of #liy ,abba. +e gave
!romise of develo!ing into a $st and mercifl Sltan, bt in the following
year he fell ill and died.
%he sccession had now alternated for times between the hoses of
#ello and Atiku, and, if the !attern was to be maintained, it had again
become the trn of the #tikawa. ,t among them the ne)t in line was
Abdur 2ahman, generally called Abdu, who at this time was only thirty3
eight years of age. +ad he been a man of otstanding !ersonality this
wold have been no bar, for both #ello and Aliyu #abba had been
yonger when a!!ointed. #s it was, however, the electors were rightly
137
dbios abot #bdCs sitability for the highest res!onsibilities. %here was,
therefore, a strong movement in favor of breaking the tradition of
alternation and of a!!ointing Abubakr na 2abah, the yonger brother of
the two #liys, who was a more matre man of fifty3one and an eminently
sitable choice. ,t the Atiku faction, natrally enogh, were o!!osed to
this move and tried to block #bbakrCs a!!ointment. %o resolve this
difficlty the electors trned to $hehuCs srviving sons and chose the
senior of the two, Ahmadu 2ufa-i, to be the new Sltan 16.
#s a man, Ahmadu 2ufa-i resembled his father $hehu. +e was modest,
soft3s!oken, accessible to !eo!le, sym!athetic to their trobles, and
generos to rich and !oor alike. If he lacked the administrative gifts and
strength of !ersonality that the office of Sltan demanded, he was at least
a man of com!assion, hmility, and good sense 1=. +e seems to have
realized that it was not in him to lead the "m!ire to victory over the
:ebbawa, who were now the worst thorn in the sides of the Flani, and so
he did the ne)t best thing and made !eace with them.
%hanks to this !eace, which lasted till after his death, the reign of
Ahmadu 2ufa-i was !robably the golden age of the Flani era. %he
inherited trobles of the !ast had at last been largely overcome. Within
the bondaries of the "m!ire the +asas were now reconciled to Flani
rle and no longer broke ot in s!oradic revolts as from the time of
#elloCs accession they had been inclined to do. In the north, thanks to
Ahmadu 8arukuCs settlement, the >obir and :atsina diehards were less
troblesome than they had been. In the west the :ebbawa were observing
the terms of the trce. In the east, +adei$a had been broght back into
the fold. In the soth even (!e was at last en$oying !eace. #t home the
Sltanate was tran-il and relations with >wand were close and friendly.
In the world beyond +asaland, moreover, the inflences which were to
!resent the "m!ire with a new set of !roblems in the last two decades of
its e)istence had not yet taken sha!e. Rabeh was a name which was still
nknown and the Royal (iger 4om!any had not yet been formed. In
"ro!e the !owers were !reocc!ied with the Franco3Prssian War and
had not begn to concern themselves with #frica.
In this !eriod, then, when the great con-ests of the early years had at
last been assimilated and before the !ressre of e)ternal events had
become acte, the "m!ire of the Flani reached its zenith.
(otes
1. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. ;01. For the family tree, see %able 9 in #!!endi)
II.
9. 4la!!erton, on his first visit to Sokoto, had been advised by the Waziri >idado to avoid
calling on Atiku dring #elloCs absence from the city lest his visit shold be
misconstred. See %ravels, vol. II, !!. 1<<36.
1. 4la!!erton, %ravels, vol. II, !!. 1<<36.
; .%his fief was sbse-ently s!lit ! into the .istricts of %ambawal, .ogonda$i, and
Sifawa.
<. +iskett, Introdction to %W, !!. 90391.
5. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !!. 1=31/.
6. +a$$i Said, loc. cit.
=. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Sokoto 4ity.
138
/. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Sokoto 4ity.
10. +a$$i Said, loc. cit.
11. Sokoto .(,s, +istories of .rbawa and +ammaCali.
19. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 11.
11. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 19.
1;. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Isa.
1<. 4la!!erton, %ravels, vol. II, !. 91/.
15. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 19.
16. +a$i Said, loc. cit.
1=. Ibid.
1/. +a$$i Said, o!. cit.
90. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. J, !. 1;0.
91. Ibid.
99. #lha$$i &naid, o!. cit. !!. 1031<.
91. #lha$i &naido, o!. cit. !. 10. See also ,arth, o!. cit. vol. IJ, !!. 1=13;.
9;. 4la!!erton, %ravels, vol. II, !!. 19;36.
9<. >owns.
95. ,arth, o!. cit., vol. IJ, !!. 115316.
96. Ibid. !!. 19031.
9=. %his town is now known sim!ly as Isa.
9/. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. IJ, !!. 19=3/.
10. Ibid. !. 159.
11. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. IJ, !!. 1=<35.
19. ,arth fond #bdl :adir living in Wrno and ho!ing that the Sltan wold restore
him.
11. Ibid. !. 1<;.
1;. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Sokoto 4ity.
1<. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Sabon ,irni.
15. Ibid. +istories of >wadabawa and >ada.
16. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. << and >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 1<.
1=. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of >andi, and verbal information given to the athor by 'allam
SaCid b. +ayat.
1=. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !!. <53<6.
139
(ha'ter +ifteen
*rade and the Economy
%hanks to the in-iring mind and observant eye of the e)!lorer #arth we
have a very clear !ictre of the "m!ire in the middle of the centry.
,etween the beginning of 1=<1 and the end of 1=<; he s!ent many
months within its borders, and in the corse of his travels visited #ir,
:atsina, :ano, #damawa, Sokoto, and >wand. %hogh an emissary of
the ,ritish >overnment, he was a >erman by birth and training and he
recorded all that he saw with e)traordinary fidelity and attention to detail.
Some of the scenes of rban and rral life which #arth de!icted are not
nlike those of today. +ere is his descri!tion of a corner of :ano cityD
In another !art were to be seen all the necessaries of life, the wealthy
bying the most !alatable things for his table, the !oor sto!!ing and
looking greedily at a handfl of grain? here a rich governor dressed in silk
and gady clothes, monted !on a s!irited and richly ca!arisoned horse,
and followed by a host of idle, insolent slaves, there a !oor blind man
gro!ing his way throgh the mltitde, and fearing at every ste! to be
trodden down? here a yard neatly fenced with mats of reed, and !rovided
with all the comforts which the contry affords G a clean, sng3looking
cottage, the clay walls nicely !olished, a shtter of reeds !laced against
the low, well3ronded door, and forbidding intrsion on the !rivacy of life,
a cool shed for the daily hosehold work3a fine s!reading allelba G tree
offering a !leasant shade dring the hottest hors of the day ... the
matron in a clean black cotton gown wond rond her waist ... bsy
!re!aring the meal for her absent hsband, or s!inning cotton, and at the
same time rging the female slaves to !ond the corn, the children naked
and merry, !laying abot in the sand ... or chasing a strggling stbborn
goat? earthenware !ots and wooden bowls, all cleanly washed, standing in
order .... 1
$lavery 7which, it mst be remembered, had still not been abolished in
the Enited States 8 was acce!ted everywhere as a !erfectly natral
!henomenon and slaves formed a high !ro!ortion of the !o!lation of the
"mirates. In :ano city ,arth fond that, while the wealthy owned many
slaves, the !oor had few or none. +is conclsion, on balance, was that in
nmbers the slaves might e-al bt certainly did not e)ceed the free men.
%aking the "mirate of :ano as a whole, he reckoned that the nmbers of
bond and free were also abot e-al 9.
What the !ro!ortions in other "mirates were we do not know. :atsina,
however, being basically similar to :ano, !robably had a com!arable ratio.
In Aaria, ,achi, and #damawa the !ro!ortion of slaves may well have
been even higher. In #damawa, for e)am!le, ,arth heard of many
wealthy men who were said to own 1,000 or more 1, while in Aaria the
Emir Mamman $ani, when he died in 1=50, was re!ted to have left
;,:::, to be divided with his estate ;. #s for Sokoto and >wand, since
140
they received tribte from all the others, mch of which was !aid in
slaves, they were nlikely to have had fewer slaves, relatively or
absoltely, than their vassals.
In what he described as the -iet corse of domestic slavery, ,arth saw
very little to offend or distress him. %he Flani and +asa owners he fond
to be mch more hmane than the #rabs. Slaves were seldom
overworked, bt on the contrary were sally well treated and often
acce!ted almost as members of the family. In #damawa, for e)am!le,
,arth saw slave girls on their way to work on their masterCs farm who
were neatly dressed in white a!rons and adorned with strings of glass
beads.
%he !o!lation of :ano city was estimated by ,arth to be C:,::: and
that of the "mirate at 1::,:::. #ll the towns, he said, were !rotected by
md walls, !ierced by narrow fortified gates, and the larger villages by
wooden stockades. En!rotected villages were sally sited within easy
reach of walled towns so that the inhabitants cold take refge whenever
danger threatened. %he villagers earned their right to sanctary by
hel!ing the towns folk in the ardos task of bilding and maintaining
these immense walls.
*o accommodate such refugees, and to enclose farmland which
could be cultivated in the event of a long siege, the town walls
normally enclosed an area two or three times as large as the town
itself and, conse@uently, were often five or seven miles in
circumference. %he walls of :ano, the greatest of them all, had a
!erimeter of eleven miles with thirteen gates <. %o !rotect farmers
working in the fields otside the walls some towns also had an oter
earthwork known as a tara mahara encircling the whole cltivated area.
%hese oter defences were not intended to kee! raiders ot altogether bt
sim!ly to delay them enogh to give the farmers time to rn to safety.
Similarly, the !r!ose of the tall silk3cotton trees which ,arth noticed
growing near every town gate was to !rovide a look3ot !oint from which
the watch cold give the alarm as soon as raiders a!!eared !on the
scene 5.
In :ano, ,arth fond that in the richer -arters the ma$ority of the
houses were bilt in the (bian or (orth #frican style, being flat3roofed,
laid ot rond a cortyard, and entirely constrcted of sn3baked clay. +e
described them as being inferior to those of #gades and %imbctoo in that
their cortyards were very cram!ed and !rivacy, rather than light and air,
seemed to be the !rime consideration. *n the other hand, the architectre
of the "mirCs !alace im!ressed him very favorably. %he adience
chamber, also bilt of sn3baked clay and reinforced internally with the
termite3resistant timber of the fan3!alm, had a very high ceiling s!!orted
on two lofty and neatly ornamented arches 6.
,arth fond the Flani "m!ire a land of !lenty com!ared with most of the
other contries throgh which he travelled. Indeed, water was scarce
141
more often than food. Wells, for e)am!le, were often forty fathoms dee!
and in Wrno, thogh the wells were shallow, water was so hard to get
that it fetched five cowries a !ot. *nly in >wand, where the war with
:ebbi had made it im!ossible for the !eo!le to !lant their cro!s, was
there any real shortage of food. #lmost everywhere else ,arth fond a
thriving agriculture and a good variety of all kinds of !rodce. >inea3
corn and millet he saw everywhere, rice wherever conditions !ermitted of
its being grown, and milk and meat in !lenty e)ce!t in certain !arts of
#damawa.
#mong vegetables and tbers, onions seem to have been the chea!est
and most !lentifl, bt beans, grond3nts, sweet3!otatoes cassava,
yams, and coco3yarns were also fairly common. Irrigation was !ractised in
the dry season, the water being raised by shadoofs, and in this way a little
wheat was grown, thogh the main cro! was onions. Sgar3cane was also
cltivated and ,arth was informed that the owner of a farm he saw near
Sokoto knew how to make $aggery, or coarse sgar =.
>arden frits were less !lentifl than vegetables, bt then, as now,
!aw!aw trees were to be seen in many com!onds. .ates and bananas
were also grown where the conditions sited them. In addition trees sch
as the locst3bean and the shea3btter tree were !rized for their frits.
+oney, too, was collected wherever fond /.
%he main cash cro!s were cotton and indigo. %hey mst have been grown
in sbstantial -antities, for they not only sfficed for most local needs
bt also, as we shall see, s!!orted a !rofitable trade in dyed cloth.
%obacco, too, was widely cltivated for sale as well as consm!tion.
%he crafts of the contry ,arth fond very nevenly distribted. %he most
im!ortant of them were s!inning, weaving, dyeing, tailoring, smithing,
!ottery, and leather3working. %he women did the s!inning and some of
the !ottery, bt the rest of the work was !erformed by the men.
%he cloth trade, which was mainly centred !on :ano bt whose
ramifications s!read far and wide, was very highly develo!ed. 2ocally
woven materials, !articlarly when dyed and embroidered, were in great
demand all over the central and western Sdan, the Sahara, and even
!arts of (orth #frica. Indeed, the skill of the :ano, craftsmen was so
highly !rized that a re3e)!ort trade develo!ed, coarse "ro!ean cloth
being im!orted across the Sahara and then, after being !re!ared for the
#frican market, sent on to new destinations 10.
%he smiths were also skilled craftsmen and worked silver, co!!er, and
alloys, as well as iron. #!art from agricltral im!lements, there was a
brisk demand all over the Sdan for wea!ons, bits, stirr!s, and womenCs
ornaments.
For smelting there was !lenty of iron3bearing rock to be fond in
+asaland, bt the -ality varied a!!reciably. ,arth re!orted, for
e)am!le, that the iron smelted rond :ano was mch inferior to that of
Sokoto. (o dobt that is why many sword blades were im!orted from
"ro!e. "ven so, the :ano blacksmiths retained a share in the trade, for
142
they set the blades and re3e)!orted them at a !rofit 11.
*n the other hand, there were no de!osits of co!!er and metal had to be
im!orted from .arfr 19. #s for tin, thogh (orthern (igeria is now one of
the leading !rodcers in the world, there seems to have been little trade
in it dring the nineteenth centry, !robably becase the Platea where it
is fond was then still dominated by ss!icios and intractable !agan
tribes.
*f the other towns in the "m!ire, only ,ida in (!e cold rival :ano for
the skill of its craftsmen. In the cloth trade, thogh the ,ida weavers
cold not e-al the glossy navy trbans !rodced in :ano, their menCs
gowns and womenCs wra!s were held in e-al esteem and were indeed
e)!orted throgh :ano, :atsina, and &ega to the other great markets of
the Sdan 11. In addition to cloth, ,ida was famos for its silver, brass,
glass, and beads 1;.
%he main !rodcts of the brass and silver smiths of ,ida were sword and
dagger hilts, horse tra!!ings, bowls, $gs, dishes, ladles, anklets, bangles,
necklaces, and rings. #rtistic decoration, as well as s!erior workmanshi!,
hel!ed to give these articles their s!ecial vale. For the manfactre of
some of them a form of cire !erde casting was em!loyed which was
!robably introdced from ,enin 1<.
%he glass3workers of ,ida, who always seem to have been a self3
contained gro!, cherish a tradition that they came originally from "gy!t.
%hey !assed throgh many cities in the corse of their travels, bt did not
sto! ntil they fond a s!ot where the soil was sitable for the !rsit of
their craft. %he !lace, they say, was (!e and the time the reign of the
first 4hief %soede 15. Whatever their origins, they broght to ,ida a craft
which was !ractised nowhere else in the central Sdan. %heir main
!rodcts, bangles and beads, were conse-ently in great demand.
Sokoto, the ca!ital of the "m!ire, was a centre of religious learning
rather than crafts. #!art from its s!erior iron, it was noted only for its
leather3work. In this, however, it was !re3eminent. %he red goats of
Sokoto yield a soft leather which has no s!erior anywhere and for which
there has long e)isted a world3wide demand. "ven in medieval times it
was e)!orted to (orth #frica and from thence, nder the name of 'orocco
leather, mch of it went on to "ro!e.
,arth described it as being soft and beatiflly dressed and noted that the
!rinci!al goods dis!layed for sale were cshions, bags, and the
ornamental horse tra!!ings which were famos throghot +asaland 16.
*f the other centres of the "m!ire, >wand was renowned for nothing bt
its cloth. %his, thogh only indifferently dyed, nevertheless commanded a
market e)tending far to the west. Bola, on the other hand, relied so
heavily on the trade in slaves that it had no legitimate crafts at all 1=.
%he !attern of continental, as distinct from regional, trade was of corse
determined more by the basic facts of geogra!hy and the gradal
im!rovement of commnications than by any combination of local factors.
Entil the Portgese had !ioneered the sea3rote rond #frica in the
fifteenth and si)teenth centries, the Sdan had had no other links with
143
the oter world than the caravan rotes which crossed or skirted the
Sahara. ,y the fifteenth centry these had therefore been bilt ! into a
fairly close network which served not only the Sdan bt the rest of West
#frica as well. %he o!ening of the sea rotes in the si)teenth and
seventeenth centries had revoltionized the e)ternal commnications of
the whole coastal belt, bt had not yet had very mch effect on the
hinterland. In the first half of the nineteenth centry, therefore, as the
e)!eriences of (la''erton and <ander showed, the desert !assage was
still a safer and easier rote to the Flani "mirates than the a!!roach
from the coast. %he only e)ce!tions to this rle were (!e and Ilorin
which, with the develo!ment of navigation on the (iger, were being
broght within the ambit of maritime trade. ,t all the other "mirates still
faced towards the north and had their backs firmly trned on the sea.
In the Sahara, however, a significant change in the relative im!ortance of
the main caravan rotes took !lace dring the first half of the nineteenth
centry. %he oldest rote from (orth #frica to the central Sdan was the
one which ran from %ri!olitania throgh the Fezzan to 2ake 4had. For
centries it had retained its !rimacy and as late as the 1=90s it was the
one !referred by the )udney.(la''erton.4enham e)!edition. ,t in
the following decades it became increasingly nsafe for caravans, with the
reslt that by the middle of the centry it had been ecli!sed by the more
westerly rote that ran throgh >hadames, >hat, and Ainder to :ano 1/.
%his change !robably reflected the waning of the athority of ,orn, which
was no longer ca!able of controlling the desert tribes along its rote and
the corres!onding rise in the !ower of the +asa States now that they had
been welded together by the Flani. Whatever the case, the change
certainly had the effect of enhancing the !ros!erity of +asaland, and
!articlarly that of :ano, now n-estionably the commerciaI and
indstrial centre of the "m!ire, at the e)!ense of ,ornCs.
From :ano a web of trade rotes s!read ot in all directions. %o the north
the caravan trail to #gades led on, by varios branches, to 'orocco,
#lgeria, %nisia, %ri!olitania, and 4yrenaica. %o the cast another rote,
which had been closed dring the two ,orn wars bt which was now
o!en again, led to ,orn and thence to Wadai, .arfr, the (ile, and finally
"gy!t. %o the soth3cast a third rote led to ,achi and #damawa, the
two main sorces of slaves. %o the soth a forth rote led to ,ida, Ilorin,
and Borbaland. %o the soth3west a fifth rote led to #shanti. %o the
north3west a si)th rote led to >ao and %imbctoo. Im!ortant as they
ndobtedly were, however, it mst not be imagined that these trade
rotes were in any sense highways. *n the contrary, ,arth observed with
some sr!rise that the one which led from :ano to ,orn was little more
than a !ath leading from one town to another 90.
#t this time the main im!orts from "ro!e and (orth #frica were cottons
and calicoes from 2ancashire, cottons and sgar3loaves from France, red
cloth from Sa)ony, beads from Jenice, needles, mirrors, and !a!er from
(remberg, sword3blades from Solingen, razors from Styria, fine silks
from 2yons, coarse silks from %rieste and %ri!oli, red fezzes from 2eghorn,
144
and all kinds of #rab dress from (orth #frica 91.
*ther vital im!orts from the north and north3east were salt and natron.
%hese did not have to be broght from so far, however, as they were
fond in am!le -antities in the Sahara at ,ilma, north of 2ake 4had 99.
,arth actally arrived in +asaland in the com!any of the salt caravan
from ,ilma which he estimated as consisting of three thosand camel
loads. %he annal im!orts of natron he !t at not less than 90,000 loads.
'ch of this went on to ,ida where it was sed in the !rocess of glass3
making 91.
From the soth3east, ,achi and #damawa, came slaves and a little ivory.
Sch were the workings of the law of s!!ly and demand and the
difficlties of trans!ort that the material for for womenCs gowns, which in
:ano was worth no more than for dollars in all, wold sffice in Bola to
!rchase either a slave or for ele!hantCs tsks of tolerable size 9;.
From the soth there came to :ano, !artly for local se and !artly for
distribtion throgh :anoCs s!erior mercantile network, the manfactres
of ,ida3cottons, brass vessels, silver ornaments, and glass bangles and
beads.
From the soth3west, along the very im!ortant #shanti3:ano caravan trail
which featres in many +asa folk tales and !roverbs, came two most
im!ortant commodities, gold and cola3nts. 'ch of the gold went on,
throgh ,orn and Wadai, to the (ile Jalley and 4airo, bt ,arth re!orted
that it was always on sale in :ano market and that one hndred mith-als
cold easily he boght at any time. #s for colas, the demand for them
seems to have been even keener than it is today and ,arth re!orted that,
while an onion or a needle cold often be boght for as little as one cowry,
a cola3nt from the new seasonCs cro! had been known to fetch as mch
as 190 cowries 9<.
%he main commodities which the "m!ire e)!orted to balance its trade
with the otside world were cottons, goatskins, leather goods, and
slaves. %here was also a small trade in ivory, bt it was of mch less
im!ortance.
%he heavy cotton cloth that was woven and dyed in the +asa States was
e)!orted along all the trade rotes radiating from :ano. It went to ,orn
in the east, to Igbirra and Iboland in the soth, to %imbctoo and Senegal
in the west, and in the north to all the oases of the Sahara and even as far
as the 'editerranean seaboard. In ,arthCs day the demand was so great
in the west that, even thogh the direct rote was closed by the revolt of
:ebbi, :ano cloth was carried as far north as >hat and >hadames so that
it cold be switched back from there to %imbctoo 95.
#fter his visit to %imbctoo, ,arth !ointed ot that the blk of the fine
cotton cloth which earlier e)!lorers had noticed and !raised was not
manfactred locally bt im!orted from :ano. %he same !oint might well
have been made abot the so3called 'orocco leather. #s already
mentioned, most of it originated not in 'orocco bt in +asaland, from
where it was e)!orted by way of #gades and %at to Fez and the
'oroccan !orts.
145
Finally, there was the slave.trade. ,arth estimated that the nmber of
slaves e)!orted annally from :ano did not e)ceed 1,::: and he
reckoned that the vale of this traffic was slightly less than that derived
from the cloth trade 96.
%hroghot the greater !art of the "m!ire the main crrency for all
commercial transactions was cowry shells 7'y(r)$a m)n$ta8. %hese are
fond in the Indian *cean and for many centries they served the !eo!le
of the Sdan as a coinage. In ,arthCs day the rate of e)change was 9,<00
cowries to the S!anish or #strian silver dollar and 19,<00 to the "nglish
gold sovereign 9=.
%he vale of all money, inclding the !ond sterling, has changed so
mch in the interval that it is difficlt to translate these vales into
modem terms. %he sim!lest and most realistic way of illstrating the
!rchasing !ower of cowries in the middle of the nineteenth centry,
therefore, is to -ote some of the !rices which ,arth mentions in his
narrative.
1 needle 1 cowry
1 small
onion
1 cowry
1 good razor 1,000 cowries
1 sword
blade
1,000 cowry
1 bll 6,000 cowries
1 !ack3o) /,000 cowries
1 !ony
10,000
cowries
1 slave3lad
11,000
cowries
#s a crrency, cowries had the disadvantage that they were blky and
only 100,000 of them went to the load of a normal camel. 4onse-ently,
they were ill3sited to ma$or transactions and 'ayments for big deals
were usually made in slaves rather than in shells. %his was a sorce
of strength as well as weakness, however, for it meant that there was
little !rofit to be made from im!orting them. *ver the centries, it is tre,
their vale gradally declined in relation to gold, bt the !rocess was sch
a gradal one that it can have cased no dislocation and on the whole
they !rovided the Sdan with a remarkably stable crrency 9/.
In :ano, ,arth re!orted that, while cowries were the normal crrency,
most tradesmen were ready to acce!t 'ayment in dollars. In Wrno, on
the other hand, he was gratefl for the !resent of 100,000 cowries from
the Sltan becase he fond the !eo!le nwilling to take dollars. In !arts
of #damawa neither cowries nor dollars were acce!ted and woven stri's
of cloth served as the medium of e5change 10.
In the big towns the merchants were !ros!eros and the se of credit was
well nderstood. %he Islamic ban on sry was circmvented by the
146
e)!edient of bargains which sti!lated that the amont to be re!aid
shold be mch greater than the amont to be advanced. Indeed,
according to ,arth the normal !rofit on sch transactions was too !er cent
11, a rate so high that it not only indicates the hazards of the times bt
also sggests that there was a chronic shortage of ca!ital and credit.
Markets have always been a greater featre of life in West #frica than in
other !arts of the continent. In the mid3nineteenth centry, des!ite the
trobled times, it is clear from ,arthCs narrative what an im!ortant !art
they !layed in !romoting the trade and wealth of the contry. #ccording
to his estimate, for e)am!le, the market of ,adarawa, a Aamfara town of
no !articlar im!ortance, was attended by 10,000 !eo!le even thogh the
>obir moss3troo!ers were known to be in the field. Similarly, in >mel,
near the :ano3,orn border, he conted abot 100 stalls and saw at least
1,000 loads of natron 19.
%he market of Sokoto was in decline at this time, not only becase of the
>obir and :ebbi wars bt e-ally becase the Sltan #liy had removed
the 4ort to Wrno. (evertheless, when ,arth visited it he saw dis!layed
for sale 10 horses, 100 cattle, <0 !ack3o)en, a good many slaves, and a
great -antity of ironware and leather goods, inclding over 100 bridles.
"vidently this was nothing ot of the ordinary, for he described the market
as being only tolerably well attended and s!!lied 11.
%he !attern of trade nder the Flani was mch the same as it had been
nder the +asa dynasties. %he two ,orn wars had, of corse, ct
commnications between :ano and 2ake 4had. For a time this interr!tion
no dobt !shed ! the !rice of salt, natron, and the manfactred goods
of (orth #frica, bt before long the merchants !robably fond alternative
rotes for their caravans. %he trobles in (!e, on the other hand, seem
to have cased little interr!tion in the trade between ,ida and the
northern "mirates 1;.
%he most radical change which took !lace in the nineteenth centry was
the decline of :atsina as a trading centre. :atsina had certain natral
advantages 1< and in 16;0 the #rab merchants, frightened off by high
ta)ation, had actally abandoned :ano, and moved to :atsina. It had
seemed then that :atsina might one day ecli!se :ano. "arly in the Flani
era, however, the advantage had swng right back to :ano. %he reason
was that :atsina, lying farther to the north, was mch more e)!osed to
the raids of the +asa e)iles. %hese raids sometimes reached :ano
"mirate, it is tre, bt they never threatened :ano city. :atsina, on the
other hand, was so menaced that the "mir at one time contem!lated
abandoning it and bilding a new ca!ital farther to the soth. %he Sltan
!revented him from doing so, bt the danger remained and :atsina never
recovered its former commercial im!ortance.
#fter the revolt of :ebbi, Sokoto and >wand sffered the same kind of
commercial ecli!se as :atsina. %he #rabs, for e)am!le, whom 4la!!erton
had fond living in Sokoto, had all de!arted by the time that ,arth arrived
a generation later 15.
,y and large, however, des!ite the many trobles which beset it, the
147
Flani "m!ire, !articlarly the former +asa States, was bsy and
!ros!eros com!ared with the rest of the Sdan. %here is no mistaking
the relief which ,arth felt when he retrned to the well stocked markets of
+asaland and fond himself once more among its friendly, tolerant
!eo!le 16.
(otes
1. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. II, !!. 10=3/.
9. Ibid. vol. II, !!. 19;3< and 1;13;.
1. Ibid. vol. II, !!. <0931.
;. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !. 1<=.
<. #nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311, !lan o!!osite !. 15<.
5. Information confirmed by #lha$i &naid.
6. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. II, !. 10<.
=. *ral tradition in Sokoto, endorsed by #lha$i &naid, asserts that sgar3cane was first
introdced by Sltan ,ello,
/. ,arth, o!. cit.
10. Ibid. vol. II, !. 115.
11. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. II, !!, 11=3/.
19 Ibid. vol. II, !. 1;1.
11. Ibid. vol. II, !. 19=.
1;. (adel, o!. cit. !!. 95/3=<.
1<. Ibid. !. 961.
15. Ibid. !. 96;.
16. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. II, !. 1=0.
1=. Ibid. vol. II, !. <01.
1/. Ibid. vol. IJ, !. 6/.
90. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. II, !!. 1=931.
91. Ibid. !. 11<.
99. 'any, o!. cit. !. 199.
91. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. II, !. 119.
9;. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. II, !. <09.
9<. Ibid. vol. IJ, !. 159.
95. Ibid. vol. II, !!. 19536.
96. ,arth, o!. cit., vol. II, !!. 11139.
9=. Ibid, vol. II, !!. 9= and 1;931.
9/. See (ote 11 in #!!endi) I.
10. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. II, !. ;;5.
11. Ibid. vol. J, !!. 1563=.
19. Ibid. vol. II, !. //.
11. See, for e)am!le, ,arth, vol. IJ, !. //.
1;. Ibid, vol. %J, !!. 16/3=0.
1<. See (ote 1; in #!!endi) I.
15. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. IJ, !. 16;.
16. Ibid. vol. J, !. 9=0.
148
(ha'ter $i5teen
*he Machinery of 6overnment
In the jihad in +asaland it had been the Hausa ruling classes rather
than the Hausa 'eo'le who had suffered defeat. Some of them had
fled with their 4hiefs and become the diehards of D
'aradi
%sibiri
#rgng
#b$a
*thers, withot going into e)ile, had moved away and begn new lives
elsewhere. *thers again had stayed in their towns and villages and sim!ly
retired into !rivate life. ")ce!t for those who had adhered to $hehuCs
case, therefore, and otside Aamfara they were a small and nim!ortant
minority, the fedal rlers of the +asa States, when they had lost the
war, had also abandoned or forfeited all their titles and offices.
*he +ulani leaders had fought the war to 'urify religion, not to
reform the social or economic structure of society% hen they
emerged as the victors, therefore, they did little to change the
feudal system which they had inherited from the de'arted Hausa
rulers. %hey sim!ly took it over. %hose who had distingished themselves
in the war obtained for themselves and their families the s!oils of victory
in the sha!e of the !osts which the defeated +asas had vacated and the
!rivileges which went with them.
It is not easy to describe in smmary form the fedal system which the
Flani inherited from the +asas and themselves elaborated, firstly,
becase it varied from "mirate to "mirate and, secondly, becase it did
not stand still bt develo!ed as the centry wore on. If de allowance is
made for these difficlties, however, a descri!tion in broad and general
terms can be attem!ted.
%he first !oint to be em!hasized is that the society which the Flani rled
was a com'le5 one, not only becase the !eo!le who made it ! were
se!arated by differences of race, religion, and langage bt e-ally
becase the "mirates which com!rised the "m!ire were diverse in size
and heterogeneos in strctre and com!osition. "ven the "mirates that
had !reviosly been +asa States normally embodied older chiefdoms and
!rinci!alities, swallowed at an earlier date bt still only half3digested, and
to these the jihad often added fresh con-ests.
%he "mirate of Aaria !rovides a good e)am!le of this diversity. In +asa
times it already contained the !etty !rinci!alities of :a$r, :ar, and
Fatika. %o these the Flani later added :agarko, 2ere, and .rm. In
addition, however, the jihad and the !eriod of e)!ansion that followed it
broght for satellites into AariaCs orbit, namely &emaCa, :effi, (assarawa,
and .oma. ,y the end of the Flani con-ests, therefore, Aaria was made
149
! of three se!arate com!onents G the fiefs into which the main body of
the "mirate was sbdivided, its si) minor vassals, and its for larger
satellites 1.
%he relationshi! between the "mir of Aaria and each of the three
com!onents of the "mirate was different. %he for satellites natrally
en$oyed the greatest measre of inde!endence. *riginally, as already
described, the fonders of three of them had intended going to $hehu in
the ho!e of receiving flags direct from him, bt they had been told by
Mallam Musa, the first Flani "mir, that they were too late becase
$hehu had already conferred !on him !ossession of the whole territory
as far soth as the ,ene. %hey had therefore been content to receive
their flags from Aaria instead of from Sokoto. #s for the forth of these
fonding fathers, Makama 4ogo of (assarawa, he had been encoraged
by the "mir of Aaria to carve a new "mirate ot of the decaying Igbirra
kingdom of Panda and there had therefore never been any -estion of his
!aying homage elsewhere than in Aaria.
%hese 4hieftaincies were recognized from the start as being hereditary in
the families of their fonders. "ach had its own "lectoral 4ollege and the
role of the "mir of Aaria at this stage was only to confirm the choices
made by the electors and install the new "mirs. %hese "mirs en$oyed
considerable latitde. %hey had their own administrative hierarchies and
$diciaries. %hey wielded !owers of life and death. %hey im!osed what
ta)es they !leased. #lthogh, of corse, forbidden from fighting among
themselves, they did not re-ire their overlordCs !ermission to make war
on the +asa diehards of #b$a or to raid and harry their !agan
neighbors. %he main symbol of their sbordinate standing was the
annal tribte that they had to !ay to Aaria. %his consisted of ,:: slaves
from each of them together with horses, gowns, corn, salt, locst3beans,
!alm3oil, cola nts, mats, and cowries 9.
%he athority of the si) vassals, as one wold e)!ect, was not as great as
that of the satellites. %re, their dynasties were hereditary, they had their
own administrative hierarchies, and they en$oyed fll discretion in
assessing and collecting ta). *n the other hand, they themselves were
denied !owers of life and death and the $risdiction of their corts was
limited to minor cases. Similarly, in military matters they were not free to
go to war or even to ndertake a raid withot their overlordCs !ermission.
'oreover, the "mir of Aaria had the athority to de!ose as well as to
a!!oint them 1.
"ven more restricted, of corse, were the !owers of the hakimai or fief3
holders in the main body of the "mirate. %heir fiefs were sometimes
hereditary or -asi3hereditary, es!ecially the ma$or ones which might be
vested in some branch of the rling family or in some noble hose whose
fonder had !layed a !rominent !art in the jihad, bt the ma$ority were
not tied to any !articlar family and were freely in the gift of the "mir.
Similarly, while the ma$or fief3holders might have large enogh
res!onsibilities for their !ersonal followers to be organized into a !ro!er
hierarchy, the remainder commanded little more than a set of henchmen
150
who served them, whenever the occasion demanded, as troo!ers,
constables, gaolers, bailiffs, ta)3gatherers, and messengers, in short, as
men3at3arms in war and factotms in !eace.
%hese fief3holders, great and small, thogh their !owers were
circmscribed, nevertheless occ!ied !ositions of basic im!ortance in the
fedal system of the "m!ire. %heir dties were !artly civil, !artly military,
and !artly $dicial, and they were the first of the vital links which
connected the "mirs and their 4orts to the !easants in their villages. In
!eace they were res!onsible for the maintenance of law and order, for the
collection of ta) and tribte, for the e)ection of any orders that the "mir
might from time to time give, and for carrying ot sch local tasks as
clearing tracks, re!airing town walls, and s!ervising markets. In the
$dicial s!here they were re-ired to leave cases covered by the Shari'a to
the corts, bt they were em!owered to deal with Siyasa ; cases if they
were not grave enogh to send to the "mir. 2and dis!tes were also
regarded as coming within their !rview. In addition, of corse, as they
were vassals of a 'oslem Sltan, they were bond to do all in their !ower
to !hold Islam. Finally, as the eyes and cars of their overlords, they were
e)!ected to know all that was going on in their fiefs and to re!ort to the
"mir anything that might endanger the state or the dynasty <.
In retrn for the !osition of !rivilege which these3offices conferred, their
holders were re-ired to render military service when called !on to do so
and to bring with them a recognized nmber of men3at3arms whom they
had to e-i!. In this res!ect the system closely resembled the fedal
strctre of medieval "ro!e. # smmons to serve was natrally
answered with more eagerness if there were chances of ca!tring
!risoners or taking booty bt, however hard the !ros!ect, it cold never
be ignored. %o do so wold be tantamont to rebelling.
Fief3holders had two sorces of remneration, one official and reglated,
the other largely nreglated bt nevertheless officially condoned. %he
official sorce was a share, generally one fifth, of all the ta) and tribte
that the fief3holder collected. #s there was no censs, however, the "mir
had only a general idea, based on his own observation and the yield of
earlier years, of the retrn to e)!ect from any !articlar fief. %his lack of
!recise information gave an nscr!los hakimi some latitde to enrich
himself by nder3declaration or over3collection. %he other sorce of
revene was !er-isites. %he scale on which these cold be e)!loited was
to some e)tent governed by tradition and by the o!eration of !blic
o!inion, bt generally s!eaking fief3holders had a free hand to acce!t
what they considered fair or to demand as mch as they thoght they
cold get.
#lthogh the fief3holders cold and indeed often did abse the system for
their !rivate gain, it wold be wrong to think of them, as a class, sim!ly
as !arasites on society and o!!ressors of the !oor. %heir !ositions in the
hierarchy were only intermediate ones and mch of what they received
from their inferiors as !resents they had to !ass on to their s!eriors.
From what they ke!t, moreover, they had to feed, clothe, hose, arm, and
151
sometimes !ay the staff with which they administered their fiefs.
Some of the great fiefs, sch as >wadabawa in Sokoto or .tse in :ano,
were geogra!hically com!act and not dissimilar to "nglish conties. ,t
this was the e)ce!tion, not the rle, and fiefs generally tended to be
scattered, having at the most a core in one !art of the "mirate and
otlying towns and villages in other !arts. In Sokoto itself this
fragmentation went so far that it took the first ,ritish Resident abot two
years of hard work to trace the ramifications of the fiefs and regro! them
into self3contained districts 5.
#lthogh many hakimai lived in their fiefs and administered them
!ersonally, there were others who did not do so, either becase the towns
and villages entrsted to them were too scattered to make local
administration !ossible or else becase they were concillors or cortiers
and had to live in the ca!ital. In sch cases local administration was
entrsted to Jillage +eads and a confidential messenger, called a jekada,
served as the link between them and their overlord. (atrally, this indirect
form of administration was more o!en to abse than the system whereby
the fief3holder rled his domain !ersonally and was accessible to
com!laints and a!!eals from his !eo!le 6.
&dged by modern standards, this whole system of administration throgh
the fedal hierarchy was rogh and ready. *n the other hand, it was
!robably more advanced than any other system in black #frica at that
time. What was more im!ortant was that it worked and that at its best it
'rovided a benevolent if 'aternalistic form of local government.
# featre of the fedal system of the "m!ire was that athority was first
centralized and then e)tensively delegated. %he role of the "mir was
conse-ently of vital im!ortance, for on him everything trned.
%he general rle, to which Aaria was an e)ce!tion, was that there was
only one rling family althogh within it the choice might lie between
several of its hoses. In theory, any legitimate male descendant of the
fonder was eligible for election, bt in !ractice the candidates were
narrowed down to a small nmber by the elimination of all those who
lacked the re-isite strength of !ersonality, e)!erience of !blic affairs,
and !o!lar s!!ort.
When an election became necessary it was sal for each dynasty or
hose of the rling family to agree !on the candidate which it intended
to back and, conse-ently, elections sometimes became contests between
dynasties or hoses rather than individals. %he desirability of !reserving
a rotation among dynasties or hoses was also taken into accont bt
cold not always be met. %he final choice, as in the metro!olitan
Sltanate, was made by an "lectoral 4ollege consisting of the leading men
of the "mirate who were not members of the rling family and,
conse-ently, not themselves eligible to stand for election.
*nce elected the "mir fond himself in a !osition of great, bt certainly
not nbonded, athority.
152
%he first limit to his !ower lay in the fact that he was a vassal of the
Sltan of Sokoto or "mir of >wand, as the case might be, and had
to retain the confidence of his overlord if he was not to incr the risk
of being de!osed. %he Sltans and "mirs of >wand did not often
take this e)treme ste!, it is tre, bt cases occrred from time to
time. For e)am!le, in 1=;0 the "mir of >wand Halilu de!osed
/suman 8aki of (!e, as has already been related, while the
Sltan Aliyu #abba de!osed $arkin Katsina $idiku in 1=;; =,
and Sarkin +adei$a ,hari in 1=<0 /. It was only in Aaria, however,
that de!ositions became at all common. %here $idi Abdul Kadir
was de!osed in 1=<1, Abdullahi in 1=61 and again in 1==1, and
$ambo in 1=== 10. (evertheless, the knowledge that the !ower
was there and might be sed against them was enogh to Pt a
crb on the condct of all bt the most headstrong "mirs.
%he second limitation to the athority of the "mirs was to be fond
in the working of Islamic 2aw. Ender it, and es!ecially nder the
doctrine of siyasa, they admittedly !ossessed very wide !owers.
%hese were clearly defined, however, and cold not be e)ceeded.
(or was there any conce!tion of droit administratif which conferred
e)em!tion or legal !rivileges on members of the rling classes or
even on the "mirs themselves. Indeed, as the law was considered to
be >od3given and not man3made, the sbordination to it of even the
highest in the land was acce!ted as being !erfectly natral. %he
"m!ire can therefore be said to have en$oyed the rle of law.
'oreover, in every "mirate this was safegarded by gro!s of
divines and $rists who regarded themselves as being the gardians
of the tre faith. *nly men like #uhari of +adei$a, who were
com!letely rthless and cared nothing for !blic o!inion, cold ever
ho!e to intimidate and silence these fearless and ots!oken men.
*rdinary "mirs had to be carefl not to lay themselves o!en to their
strictres.
#nother limiting factor which certainly cold not be ignored, thogh
it was !erha!s less !otent than Islamic 2aw, was local tradition and
convention. It was !articlarly effective in crbing ne!otism and
!reventing "mirs from going too far in dismissing the officials
a!!ointed by their !redecessors and filling their !osts with their own
nominees. %he watchdogs here were the s!!orters of the rival
dynasties or hoses. %he later history of :ano !rovides a good
e)am!le of what "mirs cold and cold not achieve. When
Muhammadu #ello was "mir in the Ceighties he dismissed Bsf,
the son of his !redecessor, from the !ost of >aladima and a!!ointed
his own son %kr instead 11. In doing this he had two aims, first to
strengthen his own r#!im$ by !lacing a man he cold trst in a key
!ost and second to groom *ukur to follow him as "mir. E! to a
!oint his manoevre was sccessfl, for dring his life he en$oyed
his sonCs s!!ort and after his death %kr was nominated by the
Sltan to scceed him. In fact, however, he had overreached
153
himself and by going frther than convention !ermitted had
alienated !blic o!inion and arosed the bitter hostility of the rival
hose of the dynasty. %he se-el, as we shall see, was the :ano
civil war.
#nother very im!ortant conter!oise to the !ower of the "mirs was
the vested interests of the Flani nobility. %hogh there were certain
im!ortant differences, their standing was broadly similar to that of
the nobility of medieval "ro!e, that is to say they en$oyed a
!rivileged !osition and in retrn were obliged to render military
service whenever they might be called !on to do so. %hey not only
filled most of the !osts in which their families had hereditary
interests bt, thanks to the advantages which birth and edcation
gave them, they also secred most of the a!!ointments that were
theoretically o!en to all. In this way they obtained the same gri! of
the machinery of government, and became almost as mch of a
!ower in the land as the aristocracy in eighteenth3centry "ngland.
%his was as tre of the central governments as of the administration
of the contry districts. %he 4oncils of the "mirates, for e)am!le,
were not formally constitted bodies with any fi)ed allocation of
seats. In theory, therefore, the "mirs needed to smmon to them
only their own !ersonal s!!orters 19. In !ractice, however, it was
almost im!ossible for them to e)clde the leading re!resentatives of
the great families sch as the Sllbawa in :atsina or the Bolawa
and .ambazawa in :ano.
#ll these factors, while they combined to !lace real limitations on the
athority of the "mirs, still left them in !ositions of great !otential
strength. In the last analysis, therefore, the amont of !ower that they
wielded de!ended mainly on the force of their !ersonalities, their skill in
!laying the !olitical game, and the length of their reigns. Some, like
Abdullahi who rled :ano from 1=<< to 1==1, became com!lete
atocrats. *thers, like Ahmadu of +adei$a, lacked the !ersonality and
standing to assert themselves and always remained ci!hers.
%he administrations over which the "mirs !resided were !artly
breacratic, !artly fedal, in natre. %o sstain them, therefore, !blic
fnds were re-ired and these, for the most !art, were raised by means
of ta)es. %a)ation, as we have already seen, had been introdced into
+asaland at a very early date. %he system which the Flani took over
and develo!ed was by no means niform bt everywhere it fell into four
broad categories.
First of all there was the haraji, or kr.in kasa, which was a !oll3
ta) or general ta) on the farming commnity.
(e)t there was jangali, the ta) on cattle, which the Flani rather
sr!risingly did not remit when they came to !ower.
%hen there were death3dties which were levied according to
'oslem 2aw.
154
Finally, there was a miscellaneos gro! of im!ositions on crafts and
trade. In addition to all these there was !akka, the e-ivalent of
the tithe of 4hristendom, bt this was not so mch a seclar ta) as
a more or less volntary contribtion to fnds devoted to religios
or charitable !r!oses.
%he method of assessing hara$i varied from "mirate to "mirate. In
:atsina, for e)am!le, the head of every hosehold had to !ay a flat rate
of 9,<00 cowries with an additional <00 cowries for every hosehold slave.
%he total revene from this sorce was estimated by ,arth in the middle
of the centry at 90310 million cowries. In :ano the rate was the same
bt the revene mch higher, !robably abot go million. In Aaria, on the
other hand, instead of a flat rate, free men !aid <00 cowries in res!ect of
every member of the hosehold, slave or free, who was ca!able of
wielding a hoe 11. In 1=50 there was a change to a flat rate of 9,000
cowries !er family and this gradally rose ntil by 1/00 it had become
5,000 cowries 1;.
%here is no dobt that before the jihad this ta) was also levied at
com!arable rates in >obir, :ebbi, and Aamfara. Ender the Flani,
however, the territory of these three States became the metro!olitan
region of the .al "m!ire and therefore the re!ository of the tribte !aid
by all the other "mirates. %his sfficed to kee! the two %reasries
reasonably fll. %he inhabitants of the Sltanate and the "mirate of
>wand were therefore e)csed from the !ayment of haraji 1<. %his
concession was one of the more im!ortant reforms in the +asa system
which the Flani made when they came to !ower.
#mong the miscellaneos im!ositions some, sch as caravan tolls, dated
back to the +asa era and were in any case !ractised all over black #frica.
*thers were innovations introdced by the Flani. ,y the end of the
centry, one way or another, dties were being levied on a wide variety of
ob$ects sch as canoes, market3gardens, date !alms, and dye3vats.
*cc!ational ta)es were also im!osed on sch craftsmen and traders as
blacksmiths, btchers, tanners, leather workers, honey3gatherers, snff3
makers, entertainers, and brokers 15. %he collection of these ta)es was
entrsted to the heads of the craft gilds, almost invariably +asas, who
were recognized by the "mir and given sch titles as Sarkin 'akera and
Sarkin Fawa 16.
7n these hierarchical societies, indeed, titles 'layed a most
'rominent 'art. %he tradition had of corse come down from the +asa
era, bt the Flani, forgetting $hehuCs teaching, !er!etated it with
gsto. "ach "mirate had its own set of titles and among them the styles of
D
>aladima
'adaki
'akama
'aga$in >ari
%raki
155
4hiroma
.an >aladima
were sally to be fond together with others which were !ecliar to the
locality. (or was the !ractice confined to the ca!itals. Satellites and
vassals had their own se!arate hierarchies and even fief3holders and
Jillage +eads often dignified the standing of their henchmen and servitors
by conferring on them, in their hmbler s!here, one of the great titles of
the State.
In Sokoto the metro!olitan Sltanate was administered on mch the same
lines as the "mirates of the "m!ire. #s the States of >obir and Aamfara,
which com!osed the greater !art of it, had been broken ! in the wars,
there was no difficlty in embodying them in the new strctre. +ad their
!eo!le not deserted $hehuCs case dring the jihad, the larger fragments
of Aamfara might indeed have been accorded the same degree of
atonomy as the satellites of Aaria. ,t as it was, #nka, %alata, 'afara,
and >mmi were given a lower stats similar to that of the Aaria vassals,
that is to say the hereditary claims of their dynasties were recognized and
they were allowed a measre of administrative, $dicial, and fiscal control
of their own affairs, bt in all matters of ma$or im!ortance their !owers
were strictly circmscribed. %he ,rmawa of ,akra and %reta were
treated in the same way. So too, when they retrned to the fold, were the
>obirawa of Sabon ,irni.
#mong the vassals of the Sltanate, former +asa 4hiefs were only a
small minority and the vast ma$ority of the fedatories were Flani whose
forbears had distingished themselves in the jihad. So far as the greater
ones were concerned the !ractice of Sokoto differed in an im!ortant
res!ect from that of Aaria. %here, as we have seen, the growth of
hereditary and -asi3heriditary rights was held in check and most of the
ma$or fiefs remained in the "mirCs gift. In Sokoto, however, events were
allowed to develo! in $st the o!!osite way and hereditary sccession
became the general rle.
'ention has already been made of the great fiefs of %ambawal and Armi
which were conferred on #uhari dan $hehu and the heirs of (amoda.
#fter two generations their families were now nassailably established in
!ossession of them. In addition, there were many others of only slightly
less im!ortance in which the hereditary rights of the families concerned
had become $st as secrely entrenched. For e)am!le, the descendants of
Muhammadu Moyijo and Muhammadu Ashafa, whom we have already
met, established similar liens on the fiefs of Babo and >sa 1=. 2ikewise,
the descendants of $hehuCs yongest son 7sa, who had been installed in
:warre after the defeat and flight of Abdu $alami, had soon been
recognized as having hereditary rights to the sccession, while the family
of Muhammadu 4adi, who at abot the same time had hel!ed #ello to
sbde Abdu $alamiCs rebellios ally #anaga dan #ature, had ac-ired
a no less endring stake in the fief of 'ar 1/. %his !rocess, moreover,
was by no means confined to the !eriod of the jihad and its aftermath. In
156
the early Csi)ties, as has already been described, the $ultan Ahmadu
8aruku created the great fief of >wadabawa and sbse-ently his heirs
lost no time in consolidating their title to it. 2ater, thogh by different
methods, the Sltans #liy :arami and #hmad RfaCi sed their inflence
to establish hereditary rights for their families in the fiefs of Isa and
Silame which they had themselves rled before their elevation 90.
%he !roliferation of hereditary rights !robably went frther in the
Sltanate of Sokoto than in any other !art of the "m!ire e)ce!t !erha!s
>wand. 'oreover, it was not limited to the territorial hierarchy and
before long the great offices of the 4oncil and 4ort, inclding that of the
Waziri, had also come to be regarded as hereditary. "ven the dignity of
4hief $stice became a mono!oly and was en$oyed by the family of 'allam
'stafa, whom ,ello had a!!ointed in 1=16, right down to the year 1=/=
91. %his entrenchment of !rivilege carried with it the germs of ftre
decay, bt the !rocess was to be a slow one and in the meantime the
administration of the Sltanate still seemed !erfectly healthy,
#s the government of the "m!ire rested largely in the same hands as the
administration of the Sltanate, it was of corse e)!osed to the same
dangers. *n the srface, however, it too seemed sond enogh. It was
still based on the kofa system that #ello had introdced nearly two
generations earlier. (o 4oncillor had been assigned s!ecial res!onsibility
for im!erial affairs and so the brnt of the work fell on the a!iri who
had in his !ortfolio the "mirates of :ano, Aaria, #damawa, >ombe,
+adei$a, :atagm, 'isa, &amaCare, and #ir 99. %o hel! him sstain this
brden, which involved a good deal of travelling, he was allowed to
a!!oint a de!ty who, needless to say, was drawn from the same family
and given the title of 4an 6aladiman a!iri. Res!onsibility for the
remaining "mirates was shared by some of the other great families.
,achi fell to the Magajin 2afi and :atsina, .ara, and :azare to the
6aladima 91 while 'ri and :ontagora, two of the more recent "mirates
whose creation will be described in the ne)t cha!ter, were assigned
res!ectively to $arkin 2abah and the /bandoma 9;.
,eing the im!erial !ower Sokoto was entitled to collect tribte from its
vassals. %his was levied at the Islamic rate of one3fifth and fell e-ally on
revene collected in !eace and booty taken in war. #s the yield from
booty was very volatile, the amonts remitted tended to vary from
"mirate to "mirate and from year to year. %his e)!lains the large
divergences in the acconts which have come down to s. In 1=<1, for
e)am!le, ,arth was told that there were
10 horses
<00 gowns
9,000,000 cowries
in the caravan bearing AariaCs tribte to Sokoto and that similar
instalments were dis!atched every second month. *n the other hand,
he learned that in the whole of the !revios year :atsina, from which
similar contribtions might have been e)!ected, had been able to scra!e
157
together only =00,000 cowries and a single stallion 9<. %he discre!ancy
between these two sets of figres reflects the difference in the sitation of
the two "mirates at that time, Aaria being free to raid its weaker
neighbors to the soth while :atsina was !reocc!ied in defending itself
from the attacks of the +asa diehards in the north.
Forty years later another "ro!ean traveller was informed that :ano was
the only "mirate rich enogh to !ay its way withot having recorse to
slaves and that its tribte amonted to
100 horses
1<,000 gowns
10,000 trbans
:atsina a!!arently made a mi)ed contribtion of ,:: slaves
su''lemented by horses and currency. ,achi and #damawa, on the
other hand, !aid entirely in slaves, 1:: and =,:::, res!ectively 95.
#ccording to still later sorces, 'riCs tribte at the end of the centry
consisted of ,:: slaves and ,:: horses 96 while :anoCs, after the civil
war, was redced to ,:: horses and ,,::: gowns 9=.
Whatever the !recise amonts may have been, there is no dobt that the
flow of tribte into Sokoto, and to a lesser e)tent >wand, was very
considerable. At the time it was regarded as a source of strength. 7n
the 'ers'ective of history, however, we can see that, like the gold
that 'oured into $'ain from the Americas, it served only to soften
the fibre of the 'eo'le and hasten the decay which soon began to
attack the heart of the Em'ire.
(otes
1. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !!. 613115.
9. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !. 66.
1. Ibid. !!. 6=36/.
;. In 'oslem $ris!rdence there are many offences which do not come within the sco!e
of the ShariCa. (ormally these are not tried in the ordinary corts bt dealt with by the
"mir or, at a lower level, by e)ective officials like .istrict +eads who re!resent him.
<. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !!. 613115.
5. 'onthly and @arterly Re!orts from Sokoto Province, 1/0135, now in the (ational
#rchives, :adna.
6. In >overnment in Aazza, '. >. Smith gives a ma! of the fiefs of Aaria in the
nineteenth centry. %his shows the e)tent of the fragmentation and gives an indication of
the large !ro!ortion of fiefs held by the >aladima, 'adaki, #lkali, Imam, and other high
officials of the "mirate who, in the natre of things, mst have been absentees.
=. .aniel, o!. cit. !. 90.
/. >azetteer of :ano Province, !. 99.
10. >azetteer of Aaria Province, 1/90, !!. 10311.
11. #lha$i #bbakar, o!. cit. !!. </ and 51.
19. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !!. 11=390.
11. ,arth, o!. cit. vol II, !. 1;;.
1;. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !. /;.
1<. See the 'onthly and @arterly Re!orts from Sokoto Province, 1/0135. When ,rden,
the Resident, re!orted to 2gard, the +igh 4ommissioner, that no hara$i had hitherto
been !aid in Sokoto and >wand, he was re!rimanded for allowing the wool to be !lled
over his eyes. (evertheless, he was right and 2gard was wrong.
15. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !!. 1<63= and the >azetteer of Aaria Province, !!. 15316.
158
16. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !!. =<3=5.
1=. Sokoto .(,s, +istories of Babo and >sa.
1/ Ibid. +istory of 'ar.
90 Ibid. +istory of Isa and Silame.
91 Ibid. +istorical (ote on the 4hief #lkalis.
99. Information frnished by #lha$i &naid.
91. Ibid.
9;. Sokoto .(,s, +istories of Rabah and +ammaCali.
9<. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. IJ, !. 196.
95. 4. +. Robinson, +awaland, 2ondon, 1=/5, !. 10<.
96. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of Rabah.
9=. 'onthly and @arterly Re!orts from Sokoto Province, 1/0135.
159
(ha'ter $eventeen
(racks in the Edifice
>iven the circmstances in which $hehuCs s!!orters seized !ower, it was
inevitable that, once their enemies had been overcome, some of them
shold start -arrelling over the s!oils. In the early days there were
strong Sltans to settle these dis!tes and so they did little harm to a
movement that was still vigoros. #s time went by, however, the vigor
eva!orated and the Sltans became less incisive. It was then that the
same inherent weaknesses that had ndermined the other great States of
the Sdan began to make themselves felt and threatened the nity and
cohesion of the "m!ire.
%he first of these weaknesses was the combination of great distances and
bad commnications. From Sokoto city, which lay far to the west of the
geogra!hical centre of the "m!ire, the distance to the remoter !arts of
#damawa was well over a thosand miles. #t the best of times this s!an,
as great as that which se!arated ,ritain from Im!erial Rome, was
ncomfortably long for the e)ercise of a szerainCs athority. What made
the task mch more difficlt in #frica than in "ro!e was the natre of the
climate. %he concentration of all the rainfall into the s!ace of a few
months had the effect, as 4la!!erton and 2ander discovered to their cost
1, of making the roads virtally im!assable dring !art of the year. %his in
trn, by giving !eo!le living near the !eri!hery a sense of isolation from
the centre, sometimes tem!ted them into disloyalty and rebellion.
%he "m!ireCs second great weakness was the want of a standing army. %o
fight his wars the Sltan had to rely on his own fedatories and vassals
and, if the emergency $stified calling them ot, the fedal levies of his
"mirs. In the early days, as we have already seen, #ello and his
sccessors did not hesitate to smmon the "mirs to the ma$or e)!editions
that they monted. #dama, for e)am!le, the first "mir of #damawa, is
said to have made the long $orney to Sokoto on no fewer than eleven
occasions 9. ,t as time went by the Flani grew weary of fighting and it
became more difficlt for Sltans to mobilize their fll strength,
!articlarly when the enemy was not an e)ternal one bt merely a
rebellios vassal.
%he third weakness was moral, not material. It was the corr!tion broght
abot by worldly sccess, the loss of early ideals, the ebb of zeal, the
decay of resoltion, and the general decline in standards of condct. It
wold be an e)aggeration to say that by the second arid third generation
the Flani had become decadent, bt they had n-estionably lost their
early fire.
Frthermore, as the centry wore on, the statre of the scceeding
Sltans tended to diminish and the inherent weaknesses of their !osition
seemed increasingly to inhibit them from dealing vigorosly with the
160
internal crises that arose. #ello, it will be remembered, had -ickly
scotched the first of them, the revolt of #bd Salami and ,anaga dan
,atre. 2ater in his reign, as we shall now look back and see, he showed
e-al firmness in -elling !otentially serios troble in :azare and 'ri.
,t when his sccessors faced similar !roblems in +adei$a and :ontagora,
they flinched from hard decisions and either ac-iesced in the defiance of
their vassals or else took refge in inglorios com!romises.
4an *unku and Ka!aure Emirate
It will be remembered that .an %nk, was the Flani leader who, early in
the jihad, had !revented a coalition between the forces of the +asa
4hiefs of :ano, :atsina, and .ara. For this feat he had received a flag
from $hehu 1. 2ater he had hel!ed to establish a Flani rLgime in .ara,
bt thereafter he had not !layed a !articlarly active !art in the jihad and
had made little contribtion to the victory of the reformers in :ano.
,y the end of the war his !osition in northern :ano was strong bt ill3
defined. #s a flag3bearer he had the right of doing homage direct to
$hehu, and sbse-ently to #ello, bt in s!ite of this it seems to have
been recognized that he was to some e)tent nder the ttelage of :ano.
So long as the nworldly Sliman was "mir of :ano this loose
arrangement a!!arently worked satisfactorily, bt when the mch more
forcefl Ibrahim. .abo scceeded in i gig it broke down. Ibrahim
demanded .an %nkCs allegiance and was refsed. +e there!on
conferred on one of his own vassals, Sarkin ,ai of the .ambazawa family,
a fief embracing all the territories that .an %nkii and his followers had
ac-ired in the jihad. %his move led to o!en hostilities ;.
%he fighting, thogh intermittent, lasted abot five years. #t first .an
%nk. had the best of it and raided right ! to the walls of the city.
>radally, however, :anoCs weight began to tell and he was !ressed back.
(evertheless, he still contined to harry all the northern !art of :ano
"mirate. When 4la!!erton !assed throgh the contry in 1=9; he fond
the "mir Ibrahim in his war3cam!, !re!aring for the annal cam!aign, and
in many rined and deserted villages he saw evidence of .an %nkCs !ast
ravages.
2ater in the same year Ibrahim made a determined attem!t to bring .an
%nk, to heel. +e took an army ! to the :azare hills and occ!ied the
fortified cam! where .an %nk had made his head-arters. Soon
afterwards, however, .an %nk made a sr!rise conter3attack and
drove the :ano forces ot again <.
#s the fighting had ended in stalemate both sides agreed that the dis!te
shold be referred to the arbitration of the Sltan. When the case was
broght to him, #ello fond in favor of .an %nk and reaffirmed his
inde!endence of the "mir of :ano. :azare was thereby recognized to be
a se!arate "mirate and its bondaries were demarcated 5.
%his decision broght the hostilities to an end and after that :ano and
:azare lived together as good neighbors. ,t the fact remained that,
161
even in Sltan #elloCs day, Flani had begn fighting against Flani.
Enfortnately, as the centry advanced, this !henomenon was to become
more common.
6ombe and Muri
It will be recalled that one of the leaders of the jihad in the east had been
#uba Yero, who had made himself master of the area enclosed in the
bend of the >ongola River, !reviosly tribtary to ,orn, and had created
ot of it the new "mirate of >mbe.
.ring the ne)t !hase, after the :anri had broken off the war in western
and sothern ,orn and fallen back on 2ake 4had, #uba Yero had
!roceeded to rond off and consolidate his new ac-isitions. In the
!rocess, he had attem!ted to e)tend his $risdiction beyond the >ongola
to the north and west, bt in doing so had come into shar! collision with
Yakubu of ,achi, who regarded this territory as his own. %here had
therefore been some fighting and Flani blood had been shed on both
sides. In the end, however, ,ba Bero had withdrawn his forces, which in
any case had got the worst of the enconter, and had agreed to acce!t
the river as the bondary between the two "mirates. *n this basis, !eace
between him and Bakb had been !atched !.
While ,ba Bero had been ths occ!ied in the north, he had entrsted to
his brother, Hamman 2uwa, the task of e)tending his bondaries into
the ,ene Jalley in the soth. In this +amman Rwa had been
cons!icosly sccessfl. It is tre that, a!art from some remnants of
&kns, the indigenos !eo!le were backward and were organized only
into small !rinci!alities and tribes. ,t even if they were not very
formidable individally, they were collectively nmeros and the terrain
sited their style of fighting mch better than that which the Flani had
now ado!ted. %heir sb$ection had therefore been a considerable feat of
arms.
#s a reslt of these con-ests, >ombe by 1=9< had become a s!rawling
"mirate like Aaria. 'ri, the territory in the ,ene Jalley, was remote
from the ca!ital, *ld >ombe, which ,ba Bero had recently bilt on the
E!!er >ongola. 'oreover, becase of the hilly contry and still ntamed
tribes that intervened, commnications between them were nsally
difficlt. ,ba Bero therefore recognized his brother as the rler of 'ri
and gave him a free hand. #t first this arrangement worked !erfectly wellD
+amman Rwa contined to acknowledge ,ba Bero as his overlord and
always rode in his train whenever they were smmoned to attend the
4ort or cam! of the Sltan.
#s old age came over him, however, ,ba Bero became obsessed by
ss!icions abot +amman RwaCs loyalty. +e seems to have feared either
that +amman Rwa wold secede and declare himself inde!endent of
>ombe or, worse still, that when he himself died the "lectoral 4ollege
might a!!oint +amman Rwa as "mir and so e)clde his own sons.
Whether he had any $stification for these ss!icions we shall never know.
162
What is certain is that in 1=11 he smmoned +amman Rwa and his
eldest son ,ose to >ombe and then, on the !rete)t that they were
scheming secession, had them both e)ected 6.
%his treacheros and arbitrary act, which was com!letely ot of kee!ing
with the god3fearing character of the first generation of Flani rlers to
which ,ba Bero belonged, cased consternation. +amman RwaCs !eo!le
at once a!!ealed to Sokoto for $stice and #ello was so incensed by what
had ha!!ened that he then and there severed the link between >ombe
and 'ri and !resented +amman RwaCs sons with a flag to mark their
inde!endence =.
%hanks to the SltanCs firm and !rom!t intervention, this conflict had no
damaging re!ercssions. (evertheless, it re!resented an early and gly
crack in the edifice of Flani nity.
#uhari of Hadeija
%he "mirate of +adei$a, it will be remembered, was one of the first to be
created when the jihad s!read eastward to the ,orn marches. $ambo,
the third "mir, had !layed a leading !art in its formation and it was he
who, in the corse of a long reign, had enlarged and consolidated it.
In 1=;<, when he was a!!roaching the age of eighty, Sambo decided to
retire in favor of his sons. %he eldest, 6arko, scceeded as "mir, bt
lived for only two years. +e was followed by the second son, bt after a
short and stormy reign of only seven months he too died.
%he death in ra!id sccession of his two eldest sons broght Sambo back
from retirement and for a short time in 1=;= he resmed !ower, bt then
he too fell mortally ill. +is third son, #uhari, was known to be crel and
nscr!los and Sambo now tried to !rocre the sccession of the forth
son, #hmad. 2ike &acob, however, ,hari is said to have im!ersonated
his brother and in this way to have obtained his fatherCs death3bed
blessing. 4ertainly, when Sambo died it was he who was chosen to
scceed /.
#bot a year after becoming "mir, ,hari began to grow a!!rehensive of
the inflence and !o!larity of his cosin, Sarkin #yo (alara, and to fear
that he might develo! into a dangeros rival for the throne. %o !revent his
ever doing so, ,hari had him assassinated 10.
#liy ,abba was Sltan at this time. (o dobt he already knew that
,hari had a re!tation for rthlessness and so he smmoned him to
Sokoto to answer the charges made against him. ,hari refsed to go.
Aliyu therefore sent Abdul Kadir, who had scceeded his father 6idado
as Waziri, to deal with him 11
%he Waziri #bdl :adir made his way to :atagm, assembled a mi)ed
force drawn from the eastern "mirates, and marched on +adei$a. ,hari,
on this occasion, !t ! little resistance bt gave ! the town and
withdrew to the north. %he Waziri there!on invested as "mir the yonger
brother, #hmad, whom their old father had always !referred to ,hari.
+aving done this he dismissed the troo!s who had been frnished to him
163
and retrned to Sokoto.
,hari, cast ot by his own !eo!le, retired to the north3east and soght
the sccor and alliance of the enemies of the "m!ire. %he 4hief of
'atsena allowed him to make his head-arters in the town of Barimari
and from ,orn, 'atsenaCs szerain, he received hel! in the form of arms
and men. With this hel! he soon became strong again and !ressed on with
his !re!arations for recovering the throne that he had lost 19.
In 1=<1, $st after #arth had !assed throgh that !art of the contry on
his otward $orney, ,hari lanched his attack on +adei$a. #lthogh he
mst have had news of ,hariCs warlike !re!arations, the Sltan had
a!!arently done nothing to strengthen the hand of his nominee Ahmadu.
,hari was therefore able to retake +adei$a withot mch difficlty.
Frthermore, having ca!tred #hmad, he em!hasized the fact that he no
longer acknowledged the SltanCs athority by !tting him to death 11.
%his was the most flagrant act of rebellion that any "mir had yet
committed. Seven years earlier, it is tre, the "mir of :atsina, $idiku,
had gone over to the +asa diehards after the Sltan had de!osed him 1;
bt he had not resisted his de!osition, as ,hari had done, mch less
reca!tred his throne and killed his s!!lanter. %o maintain his athority
and !restige the Sltan now had to take some drastic action. It was
characteristic of #liy, however, that his measres were half3hearted and
inade-ate. Instead of taking the field himself, or at least sending the
Waziri, he at first entrsted the o!erations to the WaziriCs yonger
brother, Ahmadu dan 6idado, who held the relatively minor title of 4an
6aladiman a!iri 1<. 2ater, it is tre, he dis!atched the Waziri to take
over the command, bt the cam!aign never recovered from this false
start.
%he Waziri now again !t himself at the head of the mi)ed force,
assembled by his brother the .an >aladima and drawn mainly from
:atagm and &amaCare "mirates, and marched on +adei$a. %o reach the
town they had to cross the river, whose broad valley was hereabots ct
! by small lakes and covered with a dense growth of thorn trees 15. In
this difficlt terrain ,hari ambshed and roted them. %he Waziri
there!on abandoned the enter!rise and retrned to Sokoto. %he Sltan
also ac-iesced in the defeat and so ,hari was left in ndis!ted
!ossession of +adei$a.
If the damage to the "m!ire had been confined to the loss of one "mirate
it wold not have been felt too badly. Enfortnately, however, ,hari was
not the man to let bygones be bygones and he now embarked on a
deliberate !olicy of harrying his Flani neighbors and enriching himself
by !lndering them. :atagm, &amaCare, and the whole of the
northeastern !art of :ano "mirate had to sffer his de!redations. Sccess
emboldened him and his raids took him as far afield as 'isa, .tse 16,
and even to the vicinity of :ano 1=. When ,arth !assed throgh this area
again in 1=<< he remarked !on the e)traordinary change which, daring
the s!ace of less than for years, ,hari had wroght in what had
!reviosly been a !o!los and florishing contryside.
164
,hari was never sbded and to the day of his death in 1=51 he
remained the scorge of his fellow Flani. When he died +adei$a was, it is
tre, broght back into the "m!ire and reconciled to Sokoto. ,t the
damage that he had done lived on after him. %he solidarity of the "m!ire,
es!ecially in the north3east, was shattered. Worse still, his evil genis had
!roved how easy it was for a determined rler to defy the distant
szerain. Worst of all, he showed the Sltans how to trn a blind eye to
the distress signals of their !eo!le and he taght the !eo!le to dobt the
willingness and ability of the Sltans to !rotect them.
"agwamatse and Kontagora
In /maru "agwamatse the rling family of Sokoto !rodced a man who
had the same combination of adacity, corage, and rthlessness as
#uhari.
(agwamatse was the son of $ultan Atiku and the yonger brother of
$ultan Ahmadu 8aruku 1/. From his yoth he !roved to be rebellios
and trblent. #s a yong man the first res!onsibility assigned to him was
the headshi! of the town of >wamatse, which stands in the Rima Jalley
abot a dayCs march west of Sokoto. #t that time it did not form !art of
any fief bt was in the gift of the Sltan to whom its rler !aid allegiance
direct. It was his early association with this !lace that later cased him to
be called (agwamatse 90.
.ring the reign of Sltan Aliyu #abba, (agwamatse was given
command of the garrison town of :atr in the eastern !art of the
Sltanate. With Isa and Armi, this was one of the fortresses in the !!er
Rima Jalley by means of which the Flani were trying to contain the >obir
and :atsina diehards, who were then ra!idly recovering their strength.
%he res!onsibility was therefore a mch greater one than he had borne in
>wamatse. While he was there (agwamatse attracted a large !ersonal
following with the reslt, a!!arently, that he arosed the $ealosy of his
own elder brother, #hmad Aark, who !erha!s feared that he might be
dis!laced as heir a!!arent when the Sltanate ne)t fell vacant. +e was
therefore relieved of his command and recalled to Sokoto 91.
#fter this (agwamatse was sent to %alata 'afara. %his was a Aamfara
town, the most !o!los and im!ortant in central Sokoto, and
(agwamatseCs role was not to rle it himself bt to act as a Flani
Resident and kee! an eye on the SltanCs vassal, $arkin Mafara
Agwaregi, whose loyalty was ss!ect. ,t the Sltan and #hmad again
became a!!rehensive abot his growing !ower and so, in abot 1=<1, he
was once more recalled 99.
%hese snbs seem to have convinced (agwamatse that there was no
advancement to be had at home, for soon afterwards he shook off the
dst of Sokoto and went ot into the world to seek his fortne. +e made
his way to the soth becase there, on the still flid frontiers of the
"m!ire, the o!!ortnities were greatest for a man of his stam!. It
ha!!ened that Makama 4ogo, who later became first "mir of (assarawa
165
bt who was then still only a soldier of fortne em!loyed by the "mir of
Aaria, was at that time condcting his cam!aign in the 2ower ,ene Jalley
against the Igbirra :ingdom of Panda 91. For a time (agwamatse served
with him as a mercenary ca!tain and hel!ed him to take the im!ortant
town of %oto 9;. #fter abot two years, however, they !arted com!any
and (agwamatse went westward to (!e.
+is arrival there in the year 1=<6 coincided with the s!!ression of Emar
,ahasheCs insrrection. Emar himself was dead, bt most of his defeated
and leaderless troo!s were still at large. (agwamatse enrolled many of
them among his own followers and thereby enhanced his statre as a
mercenary leader. 'oreover, he scceeded in getting on good terms with
both the Flani leaders, /suman 8aki and Masaba, and he s!!orted
them in e)!editions against the !agan >waris 9<.
When Esman Aaki died in 1=</ he was scceeded as "mir of (!e by
'asaba. #lthogh 'asaba was still friendly with (agwamatse, he !robably
regarded him as an ncomfortably !owerfl sb$ect. #t any rate, he
encoraged him to leave (!e and carve ot a new kingdom for himself in
the no3manCs3land to the north, which lay between Bari, Sokoto, Aaria,
and (!e. First he allowed him to set ! a war3cam! at a !lace called
,ogi and later he agreed to give him a free hand north of the River
:rmin :ada 95.
%he territory into which (agwamatse now moved lay otside the borders
of +asaland and had never been effectively sbded or occ!ied by the
Flani. It was very e)tensive, at least ten thosand s-are miles, and
inhabited in the north by the .akkakeri, in the east by the >waris, and
elsewhere by a mi)tre of tribes and tribal fragments. ,eing covered in
thick bsh and heavily infested by tsetse fly, it did not lend itself to the
cavalry warfare which the Flani now favored. (evertheless, to an able
and nscr!los adventrer like (agwamatse, its scattered !agan
!o!lation !romised rich hals of slaves and booty.
(agwamatse began his o!erations in the east against the >waris. %hogh
they received some hel! from the nsbded +asas of #b$a, they were
nable to withstand him and he soon overran the sothern and western
!art of their territory 96. +is o!erations had been ndertaken withot the
sanction of the Sltan or "mir of >wand, however, and they were
therefore regarded with disfavor. Indeed, Sltan #liy ,abba !laced an
interdiction on him 9=, bt died soon afterwards and was scceeded as
Sltan by #hmad Aark, (agwamatseCs elder brother. (agwamatse not
only managed to mollify him bt later, nder the title of $arkin $udan,
obtained recognition as a !aramont rler in his own right 9/.
In 1=51 the >waris rose against (agwamatse, bt after nearly a year of
hard fighting he sbded them again. %he insrrection broght famine in
its train and food became so scarce that a single 4unya or wild !lm
cold be sold for five cowries 10.
+aving secred his !osition in the east, (agwamatse ne)t trned his
attention to the west. %here he fond a sitation which he was -ick to
e)!loit to his advantage. Bari, it will be remembered, was one of the
166
,anza ,akwai and its !o!lation consisted of +asa rling and middle
classes living in the towns, and a mainly !agan !easantry who had not
ado!ted the +asa langage or been assimilated to the +asa way of life.
.ring the jihad the 4hief had made volntary sbmission to $hehu and
had been confirmed in office. Bari had thereby become !art of the
"m!ire and after $hehuCs death had !aid allegiance to >wand.
Since 1=;;, however, Bari had been torn by a dynastic clash, which soon
afterwards had led to civil war. %he two factions were led by Jibrilu
6ajere and Abubakr Jatau. In 1=;= >a$ere, who had !reviosly been
de!osed, retrned and defeated his rival. &ata was killed in the fighting
and >a$ere regained the throne for a year before he in trn was defeated
and killed. +is son, Yakuba dan 6ajere, there!on had himself
!roclaimed "mir. ")ce!t among the :amberawa, however, he en$oyed
little s!!ort and the rest of the Bari !eo!le !referred to follow his cosin
$ulimanu. Ender these two leaders, the civil strife contined 11.
(agwamatse, for reasons of his own, es!osed the case of Bakba dan
>a$ere and soon had him com!letely within his !ower. Ender the !rete)t
of hel!ing him, he e)tended his sway over what had been eastern Bari,
right ! to the 'olendo River, and forced the "mir Sliman back on to
the islands in the (iger and a com!aratively narrow stri! of the mainland
19. Sliman re!eatedly a!!ealed for hel! to his szerain, the "mir of
>wand, bt withot sccess.
%he trth is that the "mir of >wand was in an embarrassing
!redicament. (ot only was he !reocc!ied with the :ebbi war, as we shall
see, bt he mst have been mindfl of the fact that (agwamatse was the
yonger brother as well as the vassal of the Sltan. %he easiest corse
was, therefore, to ignore the a!!eal from Bari and do nothing. In 1=55,
however, Sltan #hmad Aark died and in the following year the Flani
!atched ! a tem!orary !eace with :ebbi. %his freed the "mir of
>wandCs hands and he warned (agwamatse not to encroach frther on
his !reserves 11. ,t the damage had already been done and he had to
recognize that eastern Bari had been lost.
+aving established his athority in both west and east, (agwamatse bilt
himself a ca!ital at :ontagora in the centre of his territory. %here, in
1=65, death at length broght his trblent career to an end. In his favor
it can be said that in the s!ace of seventeen years he created a new
"mirate ot of what had !reviosly been a no3manCs land and added it to
the "m!ire. ,t to his discredit it mst be added that throghot his life
he followed a corse of nscr!los ac-isitiveness that was com!letely
contrary to all that was best in the Flani tradition.
In retros!ect we can see how shar! a difference there was between the
way in which the earlier and the later of these for e!isodes were
handled. #ello showed firmness and wisdom in co!ing with the !roblems
raised by 4an *unku and #uba Yero. Aliyu #abba and Ahmadu
8aruku, in contrast, dis!layed weakness and ne!otism in their dealings
with #uhari and "agwamatse. %he difference was an indication of the
167
e)tent to which the gri! of the Sltans on the "m!ire was beginning to
rela). In the ne)t generation, as we shall see, it was to sli! frther still.
(otes
1. 4la!!erton, &ornal, ch. J.
9. >azetteer of Bola Province, !. 1=.
1. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 10.
;. :azare "mirate (otebook, +istorical (ote.
<. Ibid.
5. Ibid. .an %nk did not live long to en$oy his sccess. Soon afterwards, while
re!airing a flintlock, he accidentally set fire to some loose gn!owder. +e was a man of
the old school, however, and even thogh his clothes and the roof of the bilding caght
fire he refsed to move, saying that he was a Flani and wold show no fear. +e was
dragged ot of the flames, bt died of his brns two months later.
6. >azetteer of 'ri Province, 1/99, !. 16.
=. Ibid.
/. >azetteer of :ano Province, !. 99.
10. Ibid.
11. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !!. 1<315. For the family tree, see %able 6 in #!!endi) II.
19. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. II, !!. 16<35.
11. >azetteer of :ano Province, !. 99.
1;. .aniel, o!. cit. !. 90. In 1=<1 ,arth met Sidik among the +asa diehards.
1<. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 15.
15. #thorCs !ersonal knowledge.
16. :ano .(,s, +istory of .tse.
1=. ,arth, o!. cit. vol. J, !!. 16039.
1/. For his !lace in the family tree, see %able 9 in #!!endi) II.
90. Information confirmed by #lha$i &naid. %he belief that (agwamatse means Sthe
destroyerT, which has srvived to this day, is incorrect.
91. >azetteer of :ontagora Province, !. =.
99. Ibid. !!. =3/. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
91. Panda is the Fndah which Sltan #ello mentioned to 4la!!erton.
9;. 4h #, !. 19.
9<. >azetteer of :ontagora Province, !. /.
95. Ibid. !!. /310.
96. Ibid.
9=. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 11.
9/. >azetteer of :ontagora Province, !. /.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid. !!. 15399.
19. Ibid.
11. >azetteff of :ontagora Province, !. 10.
168
(ha'ter Eighteen
*he Kebbi ars
In the first half of the centry it was the diehards of >obir and :atsina
who cased the Sltans the greatest troble and an)iety, bt in the
second half, with the sbmission of 4an Halima and the fonding of
Sabon ,irni, the !attern changed. %hereafter, as already mentioned, raids
from the north fell increasingly on :atsina, :ano, and Aaria "mirates,
while the !ressre on Aamfara and Sokoto was eased. ,t so far as
Sokoto was concerned, this shift was conterbalanced by the resrgence
of :ebbi. ,y 1=6<, in fact, the :ebbawa and their allies, the #rewa and
Aabermawa, had become a ma$or threat to the strength and stability of
the "m!ire.
In the early days of the $ihad, it will be recalled, the Flani had invaded
:ebbi, sacked the ca!ital, and driven ot the 4hief, 'hammad +odi. In
his !lace they had installed their !!!et, Esman 'asa, bt in the crisis
following the defeat at #lwasa he had !roved false and had trned against
them. #fter the victory of >wand, therefore, they had hnted him down
and killed him.
,efore the defection of /suman Masa the Flani had been dis!osed to
treat the :ebbawa in the same way as the Aamfarawa, assming that
they were friendly nless they showed hostility and rling them throgh
their own 4hiefs. ,etrayal had broght disillsionment, however, and
/suman MasaCs treachery had cased them to reverse this !olicy.
%henceforward :ebbi was no longer regarded as an ally bt treated
instead as a defeated enemy. %he towns that resisted were redced and
the +asa rling classes, if they had not already fled, were de!rived of
their offices and titles and re!laced by Flani whose loyalty to the rLgime
cold be relied !on 1.
%he resistance !t ! by Muhammadu Hodi in the Aamfara Jalley and
then by :arari in #rgng and Aazzagawa has already been described in
an earlier cha!ter. It will be recalled that after KarariCs death his son
Yakubu "abame had thrown himself on the mercy of the Flani, that his
life had been s!ared, and that for si)teen years he had lived as an e)ile at
the 4ort in Sokoto and Wrno. ,ello, magnanimos by natre, accorded
to him the !rivileges that befitted his birth and breeding. With the !assage
of time, moreover, he gradally won the trst of the Flani so that, when
the easy3going and genial Aliyu #abba scceeded as Sltan, he seems to
have been treated almost as if he were a member of the family 9.
It was the s!ecial trst which #liy re!osed in him that led in the end to
the termination of his banishment. In abot the year 1=;6 the >obirawa
diehards raided the town of >ora in central Sokoto. # Flani e)!edition
was -ickly dis!atched to interce!t them and with it the Sltan sent his
eldest son /maru, entrsting him, as he was still yong and
ine)!erienced, to the s!ecial care of Yakubu. In the fighting that followed
Bakb saved EmarCs life and the Sltan, in gratitde, told him to seek
169
whatever favor he !leased. Bakb begged to be allowed to retrn to his
own contry and his wish was granted 1.
*nce back among his own !eo!le Bakb, it seems, began to !onder a
tant that had been hrled at him by the >obirawa at >ora. +e shold be
fighting with them, they had cried, not by the side of his fatherCs
mrderers. %hese words gradally became an obsession with him and at
length drove him to rebellion ;. In 1=;/, like his father before him, he
sddenly renonced his allegiance and !roclaimed himself to be 4hief of
:ebbi. So ended eighteen years of !eace, the longest trce that there was
to be in this war.
Bakb had !re!ared the grond with care and, as soon as he raised his
standard, men from :ebbi, #rewa, and Aaberma thronged to $oin it.
Sokoto and >wand were caght n!re!ared and before their forces cold
be concentrated they had sffered a nmber of shar! reverses. %he worst
blow of all was the sack of the Flani stronghold of Silame, which garded
the western a!!roach to Sokoto <. #s soon as the news reached the
Sltan he gave orders for his army to be mstered.
When the army had assembled Aliyu himself led it down the Rima Jalley.
,y this time Halilu had scceeded Muhamman as "mir of >wand and
he $oined #liy to lay siege to #rgng $st as #ello and 'hamman had
done eighteen years earlier 5. %here the !arallel ended, however, for the
reslts of the two e)!editions were to be very different.
%here is no better e)am!le than this of what an ineffective Sltan #liy
was. ,ecase of the e)cessive trst that he had re!osed in Bakb he had
broght abot a serios rebellion in the west at a time when he was
barely holding his own with the >obir and :atsina diehards in the north. It
was obvios that he mst move heaven and earth to scotch this revolt
before it gained strength and momentm. %o do this he only needed to
storm #rgng and reca!tre Bakb. ,t instead his !atience gave ot
or his resoltion wavered and, after sstaining the siege for some time, he
raised it and marched away 6. In doing so he was ac-iescing in the
revival of the +asa State of :ebbi and making the first im!ortant
srrender of territory that had taken !lace anywhere e)ce!t in ,orn
since the original con-ests. +e was also condemning his sccessors in
Sokoto and >wand to fifty years of hard and n!rofitable fighting.
%he resrgent State of :ebbi now bore the sha!e of a wedge driven into
the flank of the Flani "m!ire. In the west #rewa, .andi, and Aaberma
formed the broad base of this wedge. In the centre it narrowed down to
the for walled towns of #gi, Aazzagawa, >lma, and Sawa. #nd in the
cast its heavily armored ti!, the town of #rgng, was inserted into the
vlnerable $oint between Sokoto and >wand. .ring the five decades of
fighting that was to take !lace along these frontiers each !art of the :ebbi
wedge was to !lay its !art. #rewa and Aaberma were to s!!ly a steady
stream of new recrits. %he walled towns in the centre were to !rovide the
necessary defensive stiffening. #nd #rgng was to serve as the
bridgehead for the raids and forays with which the :ebbawa now started
harrying the Flani.
170
In the corse of one of these raids Bakb. (abame was mortally
wonded and ths became the forth sccessive 4hief of :ebbi to !erish
in this contest. %o the Flani, who remembered only the yong man
s!ared by 'hamman and befriended by ,ello and #liy, he was a rebel
and a doble3dyed traitor. %o the :ebbawa, on the other hand, he was an
heroic figre, like Wallace or ,rce, who sna!!ed the fetters of servitde
and led his !eo!le back to dignity and freedom.
Bakb was scceeded by his brother, Bsf 'ainasara, and the war
went on =. %he main battlefield was the flood !lain of the Rima River,
which hereabot is three or for miles wide. .ring the height of the rains
it becomes a broad sheet of water, bt in the dry season, when the floods
have gone, it dries ot into a flat, treeless e)!anse of clay, clothed in
coarse grass or thorn3scrb and ct ! at intervals by the shifting
channels of the river. %he :ebbi fortresses of #gi, >lma, and Sawa
were all sitated on the edge of this flood3!lain and looked across it to
Flani fortresses on the other side. .ring the cam!aigning season it
became a no3manCs land across which the war was foght.
+ere, in 1=</, the :ebbawa sffered yet another set3back.
'ainassara was in #rgng when a message was broght to him
saying that the Flani had lanched a sr!rise attack on >lma. +e
immediately s!rang to arms and, accom!anied by sch men as he had
been able to collect, set ot to ride across the valley, bt on the way he
and his !arty were ambshed by a s!erior >wand force and he was
killed. +is head was ct off and taken back to >wand town, where it was
fi)ed over the main gate /. +e ths became the last of the five 4hiefs of
:ebbi who fell in this war.
Haliru had recently scceeded his elder brother Halilu as "mir of >wand
and for him this was a great trim!h. In the following year, however, he
was to sffer an identical fate. For a reason which has never been clearly
e)!lained, he then decided to by3!ass the :ebbi towns that stood in the
front line and attack a remote !lace of secondary im!ortance called
:arakara, which lay far to the west. %he :ebbawa, however, seem to have
got wind of this !lan. #t any rate, they had time to !re!are an ambsh
and +alir, falling into their tra!, was srronded and killed. +is head, like
his victimCs, was then ct off and borne back to #rgng 10.
%he new 4hief of :ebbi, Muhammadu are, did not live long to en$oy
his trim!h. *n his early death he was scceeded by Abdullahi *oga,
another son of :arari. #t first this change made little difference, bt in
1=56, when Ahmadu 2ufa-i became Sltan in Sokoto, the !olitical scene
was sddenly transformed.
#hmad RfaCi, who was a son of $hehu, was an elderly man when he
was elected. ,eing !ios and retiring by natre, he had already been
!assed over three times when #liy ,abba, #hmad Aark, and #liy
:arami, who all belonged to the ne)t generation, had been made Sltan
before him. .ring their reigns he had lived at Silame and had only $st
esca!ed when the !lace had been sacked by the :ebbawa. Indeed, if
tradition is to be believed, he had lost members of his family and
171
hosehold dring the fighting 11.
%hese e)!eriences, in other men, might have engendered a thirst for
revenge. In #hmad RfaCi, however, they had the o!!osite effect. #s has
already been mentioned, he had the !erce!tion to see that there were
only two ways of dealing with the rebellion in :ebbiD either to crsh it or
else to acce!t it as a fact. ,eing a man of !eace, he chose the second
corse.
In 1=56, therefore, #hmad RfaCi and #bdllahi %oga made a treaty of
!eace. Ender its terms the Flani recognized the inde!endence of :ebbi
and agreed that all the territory that the :ebbawa had recovered was to
remain in their hands 19. %his treaty, thogh it re!resented an im!ortant
sccess for the :ebbawa, was by no means a trim!h for them. While
confirming them in the !ossession of #rgng and most of the territory
beyond the river, it nevertheless left the Flani as masters of mch more
than half of their erstwhile State.
%he !eace, which is known to history as the Peace of %oga, lasted from
1=56 to 1=6<. It marked the end of another stage in the war and, a!art
from the eighteen years when Bakb (abame was either a fgitive or an
e)ile, was the only !eriod dring the whole centry when there was a real
!ase in this bitter strggle.
%he Peace of %oga came to an end in 1=6< becase the !eo!le of the
:ebbi town of Fanna in the 2ower Rima Jalley, on accont of some now
forgotten -arrel with #rgng, decided to transfer their allegiance to
>wand. %he "mir agreed to their doing so, bt the :ebbawa constred
the action as a breach of the treaty and by way of re!risal seized ten
thosand head of Flani cattle. %his natrally !rovoked retaliation from
the Flani and hostilities began again 11.
In the early stages of its resm!tion the war centred !on the town of
>ir, which stood o!!osite Fanna on the east side of the 2ower Rima
Jalley. $arkin $hiko, its rler, declared for #rgng and defied the "mir
of >wand, now 'stafa, to do his worst. %he FlaniCs first attack failed
and so 'stafa smmoned reinforcements from (!e. When these arrived
>ir was invested and, after a for3month siege, ca!tred 1;.
%he fact that the >wand Flani were nable to take a small town like
>ir withot the hel! of their vassals showed how far their !ower had
already declined. %he trth was that, ever since #bdllahiCs death, the
theory of their stats being e-al to SokotoCs had been little more than a
!olite fiction. %he resrgence of :ebbi e)!osed the limitations to >wandCs
!ower and at the same time drastically redced the base from which it
was e)ercised 1<.
#fter the fall of >ir the focs of the war moved north to the #rgng3
>wand sector. %he :ebbawa lanched a ma$or assalt on #mbrsa, bt
failed to take it and the Flani were no more sccessfl when they
attacked >lma.
In the main, however, it was a war of forays and ambshes rather than
sieges and !itched battles. It threw ! its own cham!ions, sch as the
8arumin Kola of >wand, the 6aladima 4an aje of :ebbi, and the
172
Magaji Jan #orodo, who foght first for one side and then for the other
15. ,eing constantly engaged on a relatively narrow front, the contestants
came to know the methods and tactics of their adversaries and were
always striving to otwit and overreach one another.
It was, in fact, a moss troo!erCs war and it bears many striking
resemblances to the border warfare of the "nglish and Scots. If anything,
however, it was even more bloody and relentless. %he rank and file might
srrender and ho!e to !rchase their lives with their liberty, bt for men
of -ality there was no -estion of -arter or ransom. %hose who were
nhorsed settled themselves on their ots!read shields in the !ostre of
!rayer, as :arari and 'ainasara had done, and with their rosaries in their
hands stoically waited for their enemies to dis!atch them.
%he last !hase of this strggle between the Flani and :ebbawa was
dominated by $ama-ila, the son of Bakb (abame. +e was born in 1=;9
at the time when his father was an e)ile in Sokoto. #s a small boy of
seven or eight he mst have been !resent at the siege of #rgng and he
grew ! in a soldierCs world of !atrols and raids.
In statre SamaCila was not nsally tall, bt his frame, with broad
sholders and dee! chest, was e)ce!tionally lithe and !owerfl. +e took
great !ride in the !rofession of arms and from his yoth he trained
himself in the se of every wea!on, being es!ecially deadly, it is said, with
the $avelin. 'oreover, he stdied to harden himself so that he never
betrayed !ain or fear. #s a soldier, in fact, he matched great natral gifts
with rthlessness and dedication. ,t there was more to him than $st
this. +e also had a strong !ersonality, which was made more formidable
by the fact that he was by natre rather tacitrn and morose, and as he
matred he showed otstanding gifts of leadershi! 16. 'ost im!ortant of
all, he !ossessed a flair for gerilla warfare that amonted almost to
genis.
In Sokoto, in the meantime, the !eace3loving Sltan #hmad RfaCi had
died in 1=61. #ccording to the tradition of alternation, it had still been the
trn of the hose of Atiku to !rovide a sccessor, bt again they had
failed to !rodce a sitable candidate. %he sccession had therefore gone
in trn to two sons of #ello, first to Abubakr na 2abah and then, on his
death in 1=66, to Mu-a!u. When he in trn had died in 1==1, the claims
of the #tikawa had again been !assed over and /maru, the eldest of
,elloCs grandsons, had been a!!ointed Sltan.
%his Emar, now a man of fifty3seven, was the same son of Aliyu #abba
whose life had been saved by Yakubu "abame thirty3three years earlier
in the fight at >ora. +e had not forgotten his debt and when he scceeded
he at once sent an embassy to #rgng, where *oga was still 4hief,
!ro!osing !eace. ,t nfortnately the war !arty, led by the renegade
Flani, Jan #orodo, was in the ascendant there and so the Flani
overtres were re$ected 1=.
+aving failed to make !eace, the new Sltan decided to mont an
e)!edition against #rgng, which was now the recognized ca!ital of
173
:ebbi as well as being its bridgehead on the east bank of the Rima.
4ommand was entrsted to an e)!erienced bt ageing freedman called
$arkin <ifidi <efau 1/. %his time the :ebbawa did not sht themselves
! in the town, as they had on both !revios occasions, bt decided to
risk a battle in the o!en. For the first time command of the whole :ebbi
army was given to SamaCila. It was a great o!!ortnity, which he seized
with both hands. %he Flani forces were interce!ted near #rgng and,
according to tradition, it was a $avelin hrled by SamaCila himself that
broght the Flani commander down and trned the tide of the battle.
4ertainly, 2efa was killed and his army roted 90.
For SamaCila this victory came at a most o!!ortne moment. In the
following year the old 4hief %oga died and he was elected to scceed.
"ndowed now with s!reme military and !olitical !ower, he soon began to
dis!lay his genis for this kind of warfare.
%he remarkable rn of sccesses that SamaCila achieved between 1==1
and 1/01 was based on accrate intelligence and good tactics. In the
collection of intelligence, to which he devoted infinite !ains, he was far
ahead of any of his contem!oraries. In his tactics he relied mainly on
sr!rise and shock. ,y riding ot of #rgng at nightfall he cold get into
!osition by first light on the following day for an attack on almost any
town in northern >wand or sothwestern Sokoto, and this is what he
normally did.
#s SamaCilaCs list of victories grew, so the s!erstitions that clstered
abot him mlti!lied. +is famos bay was said to be no horse bt a $inn
and he himself was re!ted to be able to change himself at will into an
animal so that he cold reconnoitre the towns which he !ro!osed to
attack. #s a shrewd commander he !layed on the fears that his name
ins!ired and often intimidated his enemies into flight or srrender. If a
town o!ened its gates he contented himself with carrying off the booty
and ca!tives that he wanted and forbore from sacking or brning it. If it
resisted, however, he delivered it ! to fire and the sword 91.
In the s!ace of twenty years SamaCila is said to have ca!tred ninety
Flani towns and villages 99. Probably, a ma$ority of these were mall
!laces !rotected only by stockades, bt many mst have been walled
towns and among them there were certainly a few real fortresses sch as
>ande, Shagari, :a$i$i, and #liero 91. #ll the contryside lying within reach
of #rgng was ravaged by him and when the ,ritish arrived in 1/01 they
were a!!alled at the havoc that he had wroght. +ere is the re!ort of
,rdon, the first Resident of Sokoto Province.
%hroghot the whole distance from $hagari to #mbrsa, all rond
>wand and north3east to within twenty miles of Sokoto, I was mch
im!ressed by the devastation wroght by the :ebbawa, mch of it within
the last eight years. %he contry is strewn with the rins of towns 9;.
%here is no dobt that dring the last two decades of the centry the
:ebbawa, nder the ins!ired leadershi! of SamaCila, not only held their
own bt took the war to the Flani. >wand sffered most, bt Sokoto,
too, was distracted and weakened. 'oreover, these events took !lace at
174
the very time when, as we shall see in the ne)t cha!ter, the a!!roach of
2abeh from the east and the ,ritish from the soth made it im!erative
for the Sltans to be strong and vigilant. For this reason, even thogh the
:ebbi wars were foght in a restricted theatre and on a limited scale, they
nevertheless !layed an im!ortant !art in determining the fate of the
"m!ire.
(otes
1. Information confirmed by #lha$i &naid.
9. *ral tradition !reserved in the :ebbi rling family and confirmed by #lha$i &naid.
1. Ibid.
;. Ibid.
<. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
=. For the family tree, see %able 5 in #!!endi) II.
/. *ral tradition !reserved in the :ebbi rling family. For the family tree, see %able 5 in
#!!endi) II.
10. #ccording to a tradition !reserved in the :ebbi rling family, a black magician called
'allam 'hamman encom!assed the deaths of both 'ainassara and +alir. +e first lred
'ainasara to destrction with his s!ells and then, having been bribed by the :ebbawa to
change sides, did the same to +alir. See &ohnston, o!. cit. !!. 11131.
11. *ral tradition !reserved in the :ebbi rling family. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
19. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 16.
11. Ibid. !!. ;13;9.
1;. Ibid. !. ;9.
1<. 4om!are >wand "mirate in 'a!s 9 and 5.
15. *ral traditions !reserved in >wand and :ebbi. See &ohnston, o!. cit. !!. 11;35.
16. *ral tradition !reserved in the :ebbi rling family.
1=. *ral tradition !reserved in the :ebbi rling family. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
1/. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. *ral tradition !reserved in the :ebbi rling family.
99. %his claim is made on his gravestone.
91 Information confirmed by #lha$i &naid.
9;. #nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311, !. 16<.
175
(ha'ter "ineteen
6athering (louds
When the first Flani "m!ire came into e)istence it was largely inslated
from the world by the desert to the north and the rainforests to the soth.
%re, religios and cltral crrents flowed throgh the corridor of the
Sdan and a certain amont of trade crossed the Sahara, bt these
contacts were limited and with the western world there was no direct
commnication at all. Indeed, the only "ro!eans who had even
!enetrated to +asaland were 'ngo Park and his com!anions and they
had only reached its soth3west corner when they had !erished in the
ra!ids near ,ssa. In the early days, therefore, the Flani had known no
e)ternal threat beyond that of their neighbors. #mong them only the
:anri had been strong enogh to challenge their hegemony and they, as
we have already seen, had twice been decisively defeated.
#fter the second defeat in 1=96, the !ower of ,orn had entered a slow
decline. "l3:anemiCs athority, it is tre, had srvived the failre of his
!ro$ected invasion of the "m!ire so that, on his death in 1=1<, his !ower
had !assed to his son Emar. #nd for another decade after that the
government had been condcted in the same way as before, with the 'ai,
or Sltan, acting as the titlar rler and the Sheikh wielding all the real
!ower, bt then there had come a sdden crisis. In 1=;5, while Sheikh
Emar had been away in Ainder, the 'ai of the day, Ibrahim, had tried to
seize !ower. .es!ite the backing of the "mir of Wadai, however, he had
soon been ca!tred and e)ected. +is son, #li .alatmi, had then been
!roclaimed 'ai in his !lace, bt within si) weeks, after being deserted by
his Wadai allies, he too had been defeated by Emar and killed. With him
had been e)tingished a dynasty that had rled ,orn for centries !ast
1.
#fter the death of lbrahim and #li, Sheikh Emar had made himself the
titlar as well as the real rler of ,orn. #!art from a short !eriod in
1=<;, when his yonger brother had scceeded in sr!ing the throne, he
had rled ,orn ntil his death in 1==0, +e had then been scceeded, in
fairly -ick sccession, by his three sons 9.
,t, thogh !eace had been restored there was no dobt that in the
second half of the centry ,ornCs !ower was on the wane.
*he rise of 4amagaram and "ingi
%he Flani did not gain mch res!ite from the decline of ,orn becase it
was matched by the rise of .amagaram. %he "mirate of .amagaram,
which was a vassal State of ,ornCs, was of com!aratively recent origin.
Its fonder was a !ios 'oslem of the .agerra tribe called 'allam.
*riginally, he seems to have come from the 4had region, bt as a boy he
went to stdy in one of the oases of the sothern Sahara. %here he made
176
a name for himself as a scholar and divine and bilt ! a large !ersonal
following. 2ater, the !ressre of the %aregs com!elled him and his !eo!le
to move soth and in 1615 he was !roclaimed "mir of .amagaram 1.
%his new "mirate occ!ied the indeterminate area between #gades in the
north and :ano and :atsina in the soth. It was not -ite desert and yet
its rainfall was for the most !art too light to s!!ort an ordinary
agricltral economy. Its !o!lation was very mi)ed and inclded
%aregs, :anri, +asas, Flani, and dis!laced tribes or tribal fragments
like the .agerra from whom the rling family traced their descent ;.
%he new "mirate seems to have been tribtary to ,orn from the otset,
bt at the time of the $ihad it was still too weak to assist the :anri or
arose the animosity of the Flani. %he war more or less !assed it by,
therefore, and left it sbordinate as before to ,orn. Its ca!ital, Ainder,
was not fonded ntil a decade later and even then was bilt as an
nfortified town <. #t this stage its main im!ortance was that it !rovided a
refge in the north in which the +asa diehards of >obir and :atsina were
able to seek sanctary after their defeat by the Flani.
%he rise of .amagaram dates from the accession of the "mir %anim in
1=;1. #lthogh de!osed two years later, he recovered his throne in 1=<1
and then rled the contry ntil his death in 1==;. +e Was a man of vision
as well as ambition. +e gras!ed the im!ortance of fire3arms mch earlier
than any other 4hief in the central Sdan and by bilding ! an armory
of 5,000 rifles or mskets and ;0 cannon he created a force that came to
be feared even by his more !owerfl neighbors 5.
In the second half of the nineteenth centry .amagaramCs fealty to ,orn
became increasingly !erfnctory bt was never thrown off, .ring this
!eriod the "mirs concentrated mainly on harrying their Flani neighbors
to the soth and in this they were always able to cont on the s!!ort of
the +asa diehards of 'aradi and %sibiri. %he diehards, for their !art,
were stiffened in their intransigence by the knowledge that they now had
a !owerfl ally standing behind them.
In 1=<6 %anim felt strong enogh to mont an e)!edition against :ano.
+e failed in his main ob$ective, which was to take the city, and he lost a
large !art of his cavalry in the attem!t 6. It was a sign of the times,
however, that he cold embark on sch an ambitios enter!rise at all and
the fact that he was able to defeat the :azare forces, kill the "mir, and
sack the town showed that .amagaram had now become a force to be
reckoned with =.
In the scceeding decades :ano and to a less e)tent Aaria fond
themselves nder !ressre from a different -arter, namely from (ingi. In
the first half of the centry the (ingi !eo!le were no more than a tribe
inhabiting an area between :ano, Aaria, and ,achi "mirates that was
sfficiently hilly and inaccessible for them to have !reserved a !recarios
inde!endence from Flani rle. In abot 1=<0, however, some renegade
+asa 'allams, who had fallen fol of the Flani athorities in :ano, took
refge there /. It is said that one of them was an accom!lished con$rer
and that it was throgh his tricks, which the sim!le !agans acce!ted as
177
evidence of magical !owers, that the +asas first established their
ascendancy 10. ,e that as it may, they gradally e)tended their athority
over the (ingawa ntil they had become the rlers of the tribe. *nce
established they began leading raiding e)!editions against the towns in
the !lains which they fond ri!e for !lndering.
#t first the (ingawa condcted their forays at short range and attacked
only the ad$acent districts of :ano 11 and ,achi "mirates. ,t, with the
confidence born of sccess, they gradally grew bolder and in the latter
!art of the centry they were going as far afield as soth3western :ano
and the home districts of Aaria 19.
In 1=5= the "mir #bdllahi of :ano made a determined attem!t to crsh
(ingi by sending a !owerfl force against it. #t Fa$ewa, however, they
sffered a severe defeat in which some of their leading commanders,
inclding the 'adaki Ismail and Sarkin .tse Sliman, were killed 11.
#fter this reverse, :ano fell back on !rely defensive strategy. %he (ingi
raids were fleeting, it is tre, and inflicted no !ermanent damage.
(evertheless, they distracted the attention of the Flani from the more
serios dangers in the north and !rovided frther evidence of the decline
of their fighting !ower.
%owards the close of the centry, as will be related later, .amagaram was
again to declare war and invade the "m!ire. ,t what in the interim was
e-ally im!ortant was the fact that its backing made the +asa diehards
very bold and active. In !articlar, Sarkin :atsina .an ,askore, who rled
the nreconciled :atsinawa from 1=<6 to 1=6/ and who afterwards came
to be regarded as the greatest of their 4hiefs, was a most adacios and
sccessfl leader 1;. From 'aradi he and his sccessors were constantly
swoo!ing down on !laces in :atsina and .ara "mirates and they even
raided as far soth as western :ano 1< and northern Aaria 15.
*he advent of 2abeh
While these events were taking !lace in +asaland, a new figre, Rabeh,
was rising to !ower and !rominence in the eastern Sdan.
Rabeh was a native of .arfr, bt, having been ca!tred and enslaved in
his yoth, his early life had been bond ! with the "gy!tian rlers of the
Sdan. %o nderstand the backgrond of his career, therefore, we mst
go back to Abeir Pasha, the "gy!tian adventrer and slave3trader, who
earlier in the centry had made himself master of the ,ahr al3>hazal
region of the E!!er (ile and then gone on to con-er for the :hedive the
ancient Sltanate of .arfr. Rabeh had first made a name for himself as a
ca!tain in AbeirCs !rivate army and had contined to serve his son
Sliman when the latter had scceeded his father as >overnor of ,ahr al3
>hazal. ,t before long Sliman had defied the >overnment in :hartom
and declared his inde!endence. #t this >ordon, who by this time had
become >overnor3>eneral, had dis!atched an e)!edition against him and
in 1=6=3/, after several battles, this force had broken his strength.
Sliman and AbeirCs other srviving ca!tains had there!on srrendered
178
in the ho!e of obtaining clemency.
,t not so Rabeh. +e had always set his face against ca!itlation and so,
when the others had given themselves !, he had rallied the srvivors of
his com!any, who are said then to have nmbered abot for hndred,
and led them away to the soth and west beyond >ordonCs long reach.
%here, in the very heart of the continent, they had contined to maintain
their inde!endence and to s!!ort themselves by slave3raiding and
!reying !on the neighboring tribes 16.
Five years after RabehCs flight the 'ahdi 'hammad #hmed emerged and
!roceeded to raise the Sdan against the "gy!tians, storm :hartom, kill
>ordon, and establish his own rLgime. +e is said to have invited Rabeh to
enlist nder him, bt Rabeh declined the offer 1=. +is refsal is hardly
sr!rising, for Rabeh was a man of strong will and by this time he had
grown sed to being his own master. (evertheless, he identified himself
to some e)tent with the 'ahdi by $oining the 'ahdiyya sect of Islam and
acce!ting its rital. 'oreover, he also ado!ted for his own troo!s the
!atched tnics that had become the niform of the 'ahdists.
*ver the years Rabeh gradally bilt ! his strength. It was his !ractice
when he was on the move, as he often was, to s!are the towns and
villages that o!ened their gates to him and to content himself with the
e)action of tribte. If the inhabitants fled, he !ermitted looting, and of
corse if they resisted they were !t to fire and the sword.
Rabeh allowed his troo!s to kee! any chattels that they took, bt if they
ca!tred slaves, horses, or cattle they had to yield ! a half share. From
this revene he was able to give them reglar !ay amonting to seven
dollars a month. With the balance he boght the firearms on which he
relied to maintain his s!eriority over the fedal forces which from time to
time challenged him 1/.
RabehCs army was organized into Standards or 4om!anies. %hese were
not of niform size bt de!ended !on the athority and ability of the
4a!tains who commanded them. *f these two3thirds were Frians, like
himself, and the rest #rabs 90. +e ke!t them nder strict control and they
in trn maintained a stern disci!line. 2atterly, the average nmber in each
4om!any seems to have been abot 900. Rabeh maintained his strength
by offering the !risoners whom he took their lives and freedom if they
entered his service. In this way he gradally bilt ! his !ower ntil, at
the clima) of his career, he had <,000 men, 1,000 fire3arms, ;; small
!ieces of artillery, 1,000 horses, and a baggage and ammnition train
com!rising hndreds of camels, mles, and !ack3asses 91. ,y the
standards of contem!orary #frica this was a formidable force.
In the early Cnineties Rabeh at length felt strong enogh to emerge from
the remote fastness in which he had ntil then been content to lrk.
'oving north he came into collision with the warlike !eo!le of Wadai, who
gave as good as they got. #t any rate, he was nable to con-er the
"mirate and therefore trned westward 99. +is eyes already seem to have
been fi)ed on the 4had region, for althogh he defeated the ,aghirmi
forces, he did not sto! there or attem!t to occ!y the contry. *n the
179
contrary, he !ressed on westward and in 1=/1 entered ,orn.
%he Sheikh of ,orn at this time was +ashim, who had never been of a
warlike dis!osition and who was now growing old. When Rabeh invaded
his territory, +ashim nderestimated the danger and merely sent one of
his generals with a force of abot 1,000 men to bar the way. Rabeh
brshed him aside withot difficlty and contined his advance. %wo more
battles were foght, one at (gala and the other in front of :ka, bt each
time the :anri were overwhelmed. +ashim was therefore com!elled to
abandon his ca!ital and fall back to the north3west on the River Bobe 91.
#mong the ,orn rling family there was one who thoght that +ashim
had disgraced his hose and lost his !atrimony throgh his want of
corage and resoltion. %his was 'hammad el3#min, sally known as
:iari, who was a ne!hew of +ashim 9;. Feeling that a des!erate sitation
called for a des!erate remedy, he had his ncle assassinated and himself
!roclaimed Sheikh in his stead. +e then started collecting an army and
annonced that he wold drive Rabeh from ,orn or !erish in the attem!t
9<.
When :iari advanced on :ka to reca!tre it he fond Rabeh barring his
way at .mrwa. In the battle that ensed the :anri seemed at first to
have won a swee!ing victory. %hey rela)ed their vigilance, however, and
this gave Rabeh the chance to rally his forces, conter3attack, and rot
them. :iari was ca!tred alive. %hogh wonded, he refsed to !lead for
his life bt defied Rabeh to do his worst and went bravely to his death 95.
When Rabeh had first occ!ied :ka he had s!ared the !lace. (ow, to
teach the :anri a lesson, he resolved to destroy it. +e therefore let his
troo!s loose and for two days they indlged in an orgy of mrder, ra!ine,
and !illage. *ver three thosand !eo!le are said to have been slaghtered
and the city was so thoroghly devastated that it was never rebilt. In the
districts RabehCs troo!s were given the same license and these acts of
calclated brtality had the effect that Rabeh desired. ,orn was not only
defeated, bt, for the time being, com!letely cowed 96.
+aving made himself master of ,orn, Rabeh retired to .ikwa, soth of
the 2ake, where he bilt himself a new ca!ital and concerned himself with
reorganizing the government of the kingdom that he had won. %his he did
sim!ly by installing his own followers alongside the main :anri
fedatories and delegating to them the res!onsibility for maintaining the
new rLgime and collecting tribte and ta). ,t, becase of the rigid
disci!line which he maintained, RabehCs system was more highly
centralized than the loose fedal organization that it re!laced 9=.
#mong RabehCs 4a!tains there was by now a recent recrit called +ayat,
who was not only a Flani bt also a member of the rling family of
Sokoto. In 1=56, when the Sltan #liy :arami had died and there had
been a movement in favor of electing his yonger brother #bbakr na
Rabah, +ayat had intervened with the sggestion that #hmad RfaCi, as
a srviving son of Sheh, had the better claim. #s a reslt, #hmad RfaCi
had in fact been a!!ointed. When he in trn had died, however, #bbakr
na Rabah had scceeded. %here is no evidence that he had shown +ayat
180
any ill3will for having !reviosly wrecked his ho!es. (evertheless,
+ayatCs own !eo!le had trned against him and driven him ot of his fief
9/
In abot 1=6; +ayat had therefore shaken the dst of Sokoto from his
feet and trned his face to the east. %en years later, when the 'ahdi had
emerged in the Sdan, +ayat had $oined the 'ahdiyya sect. 4ertain
letters that he wrote at this time sggested that he was in direct
corres!ondence with the 'ahdi, for he hinted that when the 'ahdi had
redced :hartom he wold sbde the Flani "m!ire as well and that he
wold then install +ayat as Sltan 10.
+ayatCs e)!ectations of hel! from this -arter were disa!!ointed by the
'ahdiCs early death. We ne)t hear of him in the late Ceighties when he
installed himself in the town of ,alda in eastern #damawa, where he
seems to have bilt ! a large following. 4ertainly, by the early Cnineties
he was strong enogh to defy the "mir and then, when the "mir tried to
bring him to book, to rot him in battle 11.
#s soon as Rabeh a!!eared on the horizon in the 4had region, +ayat
made overtres to him. (o dobt he felt that Rabeh might flfil the ho!es
that the 'ahdi had disa!!ointed. Rabeh for his !art saw in +ayat not
only a valable ally bt a man whose birth might one day make him sefl
if he shold ever mont an enter!rise against the Flani "m!ire 19.
'oreover, the fact that both men !rofessed devotion to the 'ahdiyya sect
made an alliance between them seem a natral move.
When +ayat $oined Rabeh in 1=/1 he broght with him a force of at least
;00 horsemen 11. For Rabeh, abot to ndertake the con-est of ,orn,
this mst have been a sefl accession of strength, bt it hardly e)!lains
the warmth of the welcome that Rabeh gave him. (ot only was he
immediately elevated to the !osition of one of RabehCs !rinci!al
lietenants bt the alliance between them was cemented by Rabeh giving
+ayat his daghter, +awa, in marriage. #s Rabeh was not a man who
ever made sentimental gestres, it is safe to dedce from this move that
he had assigned an im!ortant !art to +ayat in whatever !lans he was
making for the ftre.
When Rabeh had consolidated his hold on ,orn itself he trned his
attention to ,ornCs neighbors. First he moved against 'andara, where
some of the :anri rling family had taken refge 1;. (e)t, in abot
1=/5, he sent an e)!edition nder his son, Fadr #llah, against ,edde. %he
ob$ective this time was to sbde or overawe a 4hief who had !reviosly
been sb$ect to ,orn bt who, since the con-est, had failed to send in
tribte or acknowledge Rabeh as the rightfl overlord. Sch was the terror
that his name now ins!ired that the !eo!le of ,edde, after attem!ting to
resist, !referred flight to sbmission and either dis!ersed into the
srronding bsh or crossed the bondary into +adei$a "mirate 1<. Fadr
#llah refrained from !rsing the refgees and from this we may infer
that Rabeh did not yet feel ready to challenge the Flani "m!ire.
(evertheless, this sdden lnge of RabehCs to the north3west, which was
accom!anied by a similar e)!edition to the sothwest, cased
181
consternation in tile Flani cam!. 2etters !ored into Sokoto and :ano
with news of what had ha!!ened and rmors abot what was said to be
afoot. %he "mir of +adei$a sent a message to inform the "mir of :ano that
Rabeh intended to move west. #ccording to some, he wrote, Rabeh
intended to advance on :ano throgh +adei$a, according to others
throgh :atagm. *thers again said that his intention was to sbde
Ainder first and then descend on :ano 15.
%he "mir of +adei$a wrote in a similar vein to the Waziri of Sokoto, now
,hari, for the information of the Sltan.
Q RabehCs intention is to come west. %his news or s!ies have broght s.
It is tre and I have sent it to yo in order that yo may !ass it rgently
to the Sltan and !ray that the evil of Rabeh may, not enter among s in
the dominions of Esman dan Fodiyo 16. R
%he alliance between Rabeh and +ayat, which of corse was well known
to the Flani, added !oint and weight to these warnings.
What RabehCs !lans actally were will never be known becase he did not
confide them to anyone and the a!!earance soon afterwards of the
s!earheads of the a!!roaching French forces distracted his attention and
!revented him from !rsing them. It was !o!larly believed, however,
that his ambition was to create an "m!ire stretching from :ano in the
west to Wadai in the east 1=. Sch was the awe with which he was now
regarded that none thoght that this !lan was beyond his com!ass.
Mallam Jibrilla
*ne other develo!ment of this !eriod mst be recorded. 4om!ared to the
advent of Rabeh it was of only minor im!ortance, bt it was to have some
inflence in sha!ing the ftre. #!art from this, it was a significant
!ortent showing how the gri! of the Sltans on the "m!ire was
weakening.
In the Ceighties a certain 'allam &ibrilla settled in >ombe "mirate and
fonded the town of ,rmi near the to! of the loo! of the >ongola River.
+e was re!ted to !ossess s!ernatral !owers and he soon collected a
large following. It is not known e)actly when he first became a member of
the 'ahdist sect, bt it seems !robable that it was before 1===. What is
certain is that in that year he sddenly threw off his allegiance to the "mir
of >ombe 1/ and it seems nlikely that he wold have taken so e)treme a
ste! nless he had what he regarded as a good religios reason for his
action.
Whatever the motive, the "mir Aailani was not willing to tolerate
insrrection and monted an e)!edition against ,rmi. +e failed to
ca!tre the !lace, however, and was himself mortally wonded in the
assalt ;0. %his sccess added greatly to &ibrillaCs !restige and made him
mch more dangeros than before.
%he new "mir of >ombe, +assan, was determined to avenge his
!redecessor and !ersaded the neighboring "mirs of ,achi, :atagm,
'isa, and even +adei$a to send contingents to reinforce him. %heir
182
efforts were in vain, however, and by defying them all &ibrilla frther
enhanced his re!tation ;1.
.ring the ne)t few years &ibrilla made himself master of all the northern
!art of >ombe "mirate. +e did not claim to be the 'ahdi himself ;9 bt
merely styled himself ,arden 'ahadi or the 'ahdiCs troo!er ;1. Whether
he ever acknowledged any allegiance to the 'ahdiCs sccessor in
:hartom, the :halifa, we do not know, bt he certainly did not recognize
the Sltan of Sokoto or Rabeh or any other local rler as his overlord ;;.
*n the other hand, he does not seem to have been a bigoted 'ahdist,
becase when the %i$anis from the E!!er (iger a!!eared arond the trn
of the centry, having moved on nder their new leader ,asher after a
few years so$orn in Sokoto, he allowed them to settle in ,rmi. %heir
e)treme views on religios -estions a!!arently commended them to him
and sfficed to !rocre an entry for them.
&ibrilla and the !eo!le of ,rmi seem first and foremost to have been
fanatical 'oslems. %his was the characteristic which led them to create a
society of their own. #s &ibrilIaCs re!tation grew, it dobtless acted as a
magnet and drew to him like3minded men not only from all over the
"m!ire bt also, as in the case of the %i$$ani fgitives, from frther afield.
%his fanaticism, allied to their growing strength, enabled them first to
re!lse the "mirs and ne)t to sbde their neighbors.
,rmi, thogh not of !rime im!ortance, was significant in a nmber of
ways. %he "mir of >ombe showed that he was nable to s!!ress a rebel
and an !start. +is overlord, the Sltan, made no attem!t to hel! him. #s
a reslt this !start rebel was able to defy the military !ower of the one,
s!rn the religios leadershi! of the other, and carve a Province ot of the
body of the "m!ire. %hat sch things were !ossible showed how far the
religios and !olitical athority of the Sltans had now declined.
(otes
1. >azetteer of ,orn Province, !. 1/.
9. For the family tree, see %able < in #!!endi) II.
1. #badie, o!. cit. !. 19<.
;. Ibid. !!. 19<3=.
<. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. #badie, o!. cit.
=. :azare "mirate (otebook, +istorical (ote.
/. >azetteer of ,achi Province, !!. 1<315.
10. #lha$i #bbakar, o!. cit. !. <6.
11. :ano .(,s, +istories of ,irnin :d and Rano.
19. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !. 1=1.
11. :ano .(,s, +istory of .tse.
1;. #badie, o!. cit. !. 1=0.
1<. :ano .(,s, +istory of >warzo.
15. 'ary Smith, ,aba of :aro, 2ondon, 1/<;, !!. ;53;6.
16. ". >entil, 2a 4hte de lC"m!ire de Rabeh, Paris, 1/09.
1=. Ibid.
1/. +erbert #le)ander, ,oyd #le)anderCs 2ast $orney, 2ondon, 1/19, !!. 1=<3/0.
90. >azetteer of ,orn Province, !!. 10=310.
91. Ibid.
183
99. #le)ander, o!. cit. !. 1=5.
91. >azetteer of ,orn Province, !!. 913;.
9;. For the family tree, see %able < in #!!endi) II.
9<. >azetteer of ,orn Province, !!. 9;39<.
95. Ibid. !!. 9<395.
96. >azetteer of ,orn Province, !!. 95396.
9=. >entil, o!. cit.
9/. Information given to the athor by +ayatCs son, 'allam SaCid. 4onfirmed by #lha$i
&naid.
10. Information from #lha$i &naid.
11. +ogben and :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. ;;1.
19. +. F. ,ackwell, %he *cc!ation of +asaland, 1/0030;, 2agos, 1/96, !. /.
11. >azetteer of ,orn Province, !. 10/.
1;. ,ackwell, o!. cit. !. /.
1<. Ibid. 2etter, no. /6.
15. ,ackwell, o!. cit. 2etters, nos. /13//.
16. Ibid. 4f. 2etter, no. /;
1=. #le)ander, o!. cit. o!. 1=/3/0. >entil mentions his desire to revenge himself on
Wadai and the >azetteer of ,orn Province, !. 110, his designs on :ano.
1/. >azetteer of ,achi Province, !!. 1131;. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
;0. Ibid. !. 1;. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
;1. >azetteer of ,achi Province.
;9. %he #nnal Re!ort on (orthern 3(igeria for 1/09 is wrong in asserting that he did.
;1. Information given to the athor by one of &ibrillaCs former followers.
;; 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
184
(ha'ter *wenty
*he 2oyal "iger (om'any
While Rabeh, like a roge ele!hant, was moving slowly westward towards
2ake 4had, another more serios threat to the integrity and inde!endence
of the Flani "m!ire was beginning to bild ! in the soth.
In medieval times West #frica was almost com!letely ct off from "ro!e
by the doble barrier of the Sahara and the 'oslem !owers of (orth #frica
and S!ain. In the fifteenth centry, however, the seamen of Portgal
trned the flank of these obstacles by sailing their shi!s down to the >lf
of >inea.
(e)t, at the end of the eighteenth centry, the geogra!hers, fascinated by
the mysteries of the still nknown continent, sddenly conceived and
im!arted to the !blic a new interest in #frica. %his was soon enlarged by
the hmanitarians who at abot the same time lanched the cam!aign for
the abolition of the slave trade. In accordance with the theory that the
best way of eradicating the traffic in slaves was to s!!lant it by
legitimate trade, this in trn led to a new commercial interest in #frica as
a sorce of raw materials and as a market for manfactred goods.
"ven so, however, becase of the difficlties of geogra!hy and climate,
!rogress was e)tremely slow. #fter the death of 4la!!erton, Richard
2ander retrned to #frica and in 1=10, by sailing down the (iger from
,ssa to the sea, established the fact that the river flowed into the ,ight
of ,enin. %wo years later some 2iver!ool merchants, nder the leadershi!
of 'ac>regor 2aird and with the backing of the ,ritish >overnment,
soght to se this discovery to o!en ! trade with the hinterland. %he two
shi!s which they commissioned scceeded in steaming <00 miles ! the
river, bt the climate killed three3-arters of the "ro!ean com!any and
so the !ro$ect was abandoned,
In 1=;1 the ,ritish >overnment made another attem!t to !enetrate into
the interior. %his time a naval e)!edition was sent ! the river with
instrctions to s!!ress the slave trade, make treaties with friendly
4hiefs, and establish a model farm. *nce again, however, there was very
heavy mortality among the "ro!eans3over a third in the s!ace of two
months3and the scheme was abandoned withot achieving anything
e)ce!t the fonding of the town of 2oko$a.
It was not ntil IS 1=<;, by which time the !ro!hylactic se of -inine as
a safegard against malaria had been introdced, that the ,ritish had any
sccess with their riverain ventres. In that year another e)!edition
organized by 'ac>regor 2aird and led by ,aikie was com!letely
sccessfl. (ot only did all its members srvive bt the trading that they
were able to do !aid all e)!enses and still yielded a !rofit. %his !roved to
be the trning3!oint.
.ring the ne)t few years 'ac>regor 2aird and ,aikie scceeded in
develo!ing the riverain trade. In doing so, however, they arosed the
hostility of the other 2iver!ool merchants and their allies on the coast, the
185
,rassmen, who fond themselves losing the !rofitable entre!Ft trade with
the interior that they had hitherto en$oyed. Indeed, in the late Csi)ties, by
which time 2aird was dead and ,aikie had been com!elled by ill health to
retire, their o!!osition almost strangled the new line of commnications
with the interior. ,t once again the ,ritish >overnment, faithfl to their
belief that fostering legitimate commerce was the best means of stam!ing
ot the slave trade, decided to intervene. In 1=61 they therefore sent an
envoy to the "mir of (!e to enlist his s!!ort and !rotection for the river
traffic against those who were trying to kill it. %he "mir, 'asaba, was
-ick to see the advantages which sch an arrangement wold have for
himself and his !eo!le and so he acce!ted the !ro!osals on condition that
(!e, in retrn for its !rotection, shold become the sole channel for
trade between the ,ritish com!anies and the Flani "m!ire. %he ,ritish,
who were an)ios to withdraw their naval !atrols from the river, acce!ted
this sti!lation 1.
E! to this !oint there had been little or no rivalry in #frica between the
"ro!ean nations. %he criosity shown had been scientific and the interest
either hmanitarian or commercial. %he absence of any atmos!here of
com!etition along national lines was illstrated by the fact that, as late as
the Cfifties, the ,ritish >overnment was em!loying >ermans to ndertake
its e)!loring. In 1=51, it is tre, 2agos was declared a 4olony, bt this
move was made in the interest of s!!ressing the maritime slave trade
and not for the !r!ose of territorial aggrandizement. Indeed, a few years
later a Select 4ommittee of the +ose of 4ommons, reflecting the !olitical
indifference of the day to colonial e)!ansion, recommended not only that
there shold be no more ac-isitions in #frica bt that ,ritain shold
consider freeing itself from some of its commitments.
In the ne)t decade the attitde of the !rinci!al "ro!ean !owers towards
#frica sddenly nderwent a radical change. It was !erha!s inevitable that
the bitter rivalries that divided them at home wold sooner or later affect
their activities abroad. %he indirect case of the change was the Franco3
Prssian War of 1=6031. #fter her defeat France soght to assage her
wonded !ride by a !olicy of e)!ansion overseas. ,efore long >ermany,
fearfl lest France might be stealing a march on her, also entered the race
and soon became the !acemaker. 2ast of all, encoraged by one faction
and restrained by another, now thrstfl, now hesitant, came >reat
,ritain. %he !rinci!al conse-ence of the shar!ening and e)tension of
these rivalries was the so3called SScramble for #fricaT which occ!ied the
"ro!ean Powers dring the last two decades of the centry and several
times broght them to the brink of war,
#t this !oint there a!!eared !on the scene a remarkable man, Sir
>eorge >oldie, whose vision and determination were to be the main
factors in deciding the corse that events were to take in this !art of
#frica. 4oming of a good family and !ossessing a considerable !rivate
fortne, he had had a short and che-ered career in the #rmy before
resigning his commission to take over a small firm in which his family had
an interest. %his firm was engaged in the (iger trade and had recently rn
186
into difficlties. In 1=65 >oldie went to West #frica to find ot for himself
e)actly what was amiss. +aving diagnosed the troble as e)cessive
com!etition between com!anies that were individally weak, he ne)t
!ersaded his com!etitors to agree to a series of mergers which led to the
formation of a single ,ritish gro! called the Enited #frican 4om!any,
later renamed the (ational #frican 4om!any 9. %hen in 1==1, having
emerged as 4hairman and ndis!ted leader of the new 4om!any, he
a!!lied for a Royal 4harter, bt with this re-est he was nsccessfl.
#t this time the !olitical sitation in the ,ight of ,enin was highly
confsed. %he French had established themselves in .ahomey and the
>ermans in the 4ameroons. ,etween them the ,ritish had set ! the
4olony of 2agos and the (iger 4oast Protectorate, bt these were not
contigos and in any case did not cover the hinterland to which all three
!owers were laying conflicting claims.
%o resolve these dis!tes the >ermans called the ,erlin 4onference of
1==;. %his !roved to be >oldieCs great o!!ortnity. First of all he
!ersaded the ,ritish >overnment that they had no chance of getting
their claims to the (iger3,ene hinterland recognized nless they
acce!ted the (ational #frican 4om!any as their chosen instrment and
based their argments on the mono!oly which the 4om!any had
established on the rivers and the nmeros treaties which it had
conclded with neighboring 4hiefs. #t the eleventh hor >oldieCs scheme
was almost !set by the a!!earance of two French firms to challenge his
mono!oly. ,y engaging in a rthless !rice3war, however, he broke them
both $st before the 4onference began. +is !lan was therefore ado!ted by
the ,ritish >overnment and the ,ritish >overnmentCs claims to a s!here of
inflence over the whole area were in trn acce!ted by France and
>ermany 1.
In 1==< >oldie consolidated the !osition of the 4om!any still frther by
engaging the e)!lorer &ose!h %homson and sending him ! to Sokoto to
make treaties with the Sltan and the "mir of >wand ;. # year later the
,ritish >overnment acknowledged the commanding !osition that >oldie
had ths bilt ! by granting the 4harter which they had !reviosly
refsed. In this way the Royal (iger 4om!any came into being <.
%he ambivalent attitde of ,ritain to colonial affairs has already been
mentioned. *n the one side there were men like Rhodes and >oldie, with
their s!!orters at home, who fervently and sincerely believed that the
contry had an im!erial mission to !erform and who were determined to
do everything in their !ower to e)tend ,ritish inflence in the world. *n
the other there were men who, with e-al sincerity and fervor,
-estioned ,ritainCs right to interfere in the affairs of other !eo!le and
de!lored the e)!ense of colonial entanglements. %he ordinary ,ritish
voter, !lled this way and that between the two factions, !robably shared
both the !ride of the im!erialists in the achievements of their contrymen
in distant !arts of the world and the dismay of the 2ittle "nglanders at the
e)!ense that these achievements involved. 4hartered 4om!anies, thogh
they were "lizabethan anachronisms, were therefore resscitated with the
187
idea that they wold resolve this contradiction and, by combining
government and trade, wold enlarge the ,ritish "m!ire withot adding to
the brdens of the ,ritish ")che-er.
When the ,ritish >overnment gave the Royal (iger 4om!any its charter
they conferred !on it the right to govern as well as to trade. #rmed with
the 4harter, the 4om!any immediately began to create the machinery of
government that it needed to discharge these res!onsibilities. %he ,oard
of .irectors became the 4oncil and were invested with s!reme
legislative, e)ective, and $dicial !owers. #s a legislatre they enacted
the laws of the territory, as an e)ective they were the sorce of all !olicy
decisions, and as a $diciary they were the final cort of a!!eal. %he
4hairman, now styled >overnor, was a figre3head and >oldie, as .e!ty
>overnor and Political #dministrator, contined to kee! all the reins of
!ower in his own hands 5.
%he 4oncil now !roceeded to set ! a civil service and a $diciary. For
the most !art this sim!ly meant endowing the 4om!anyCs .istrict #gents
with administrative and $dicial !owers, bt a few new !osts were created
at the to! of the staff !yramid and a nmber of fresh a!!ointments were
made to fill them. %he ma$or innovation, however, was the creation of a
4onstablary. #t first its strength was 1<0 #frican rank and file nder
three "ro!ean officers, bt the nmbers were later increased to nearly
<00. %he name 4onstablary was misleading for it was, in fact, a small
army, e-i!!ed with modern rifles, s!!orted by machine3gns and
artillery, and ke!t concentrated for se as a striking force 6.
%he 4om!anyCs whole commercial and administrative organization was
based !on the river systems of the 2ower (iger and ,ene. Its
administrative head-arters were at #saba, o!!osite *nitsha, and its
de!ots and worksho!s were in the .elta. Its fleet consisted of twenty to
twenty3five river steamers of which, however, only one3third were large
vessels =. %hey were em!loyed as circmstances dictated, for taking trade
goods ! river, evacating the !rodce of the contry, moving staff from
one station to another, or trans!orting the 4onstablary on !nitive
e)!editions. Within its limitations this system of commnication served
the 4om!any fairly well, bt it had two great weaknesses. %he first was
that a series of ra!ids above &ebba !revented navigation mch beyond
that !oint. %he second was that, above the conflence at 2oko$a, the dro!
in the water3level of the (iger and to an even greater e)tent the ,ene
made navigation im!ossible, at any rate for the larger shi!s, dring mch
of the long dry season.
%he 4om!anyCs de!endence on water trans!ort was revealed by the
distribtion of its stations. *f the forty which it had in 1==/, all were
sitated on the river system and over half were on the 2ower (iger below
2oke$a. *n the (iger above 2oko$a there were seven and along the whole
length of the ,ene only ten. In these two sectors the !rinci!al stations
were 2oke$a, "ggan, 2oko, and Ibi /.
In de!loying its administrative and trading stations along the (iger and
,ene, the 4om!any was broght into toch with all the sothern
188
"mirates of the Flani "m!ire and !articlarly with (!e, Ilorin, 'ri, and
#damawa. %hrogh the town of Wase, with which it had troble, it also
made contact with ,achi, whose "mir consented to sign a treaty.
In addition to the "mirates, however, many of the !etty !agan 4hiefdoms
that lay otside the borders of the "m!ire also came within the 4om!anyCs
!rview. #s the two sides were often at war with one another, the
4om!any, which was bond to both sides by treaty, was constantly in
danger of becoming embroiled in their dis!tes. Frthermore, as the main
case of the fighting was the slave3raiding of the "mirs and the re!risals
of the 4hiefs, the difficlties of the 4om!anyCs staff were aggravated by
the fact that, whereas the treaties entered into by the "mits did not bind
them to desist from slave raiding, those of the 4hiefs entitled them to call
!on the !rotection of the 4om!any if they were raided 10. In these
circmstances it was inevitable that the 4om!any was often faced with the
choice between failing one side or coming into collision with the other.
#ll the e)!enses of the administration, 4onstablary, and $diciary had to
be borne on the trading revenes of the 4om!any. %o meet them >oldie
sed the 4om!anyCs legislative !owers first to set ! tariff barriers and
then to !reserve a rigid commercial mono!oly within those barriers. In
this way he managed to !ay his way, bt his actions !rovoked sch bitter
!rotests, inclding some which the >erman >overnment took !,
combined with so many allegations of maladministration and abse of
!ower, that the ,ritish >overnment was com!elled to set ! a commission
of in-iry 11.
%he 4ommissioner, 'a$or 4. '. 'acdonald, com!leted his in-iry in 1==/
and his findings throw an interesting light on the contem!orary scene. It
is clear, for e)am!le that the "mirs who had signed treaties or conclded
agreements with the 4om!any did not consider that they had made over
any of their sovereignty. %he "mir of (assarawa, it is tre, had sold a stri!
of land covering the north bank of the ,ene throghot his territory, bt
had entered into no other commitments. %he "mirs of 'ri and :effi had
signed treaties, bt had conceded no !olitical rights. Indeed, in the 'ri
%reaty, so far from the 4om!anyCs obtaining concessions in retrn for a
garantee of !rotection, it was the "mir who was re-ired to !rotect the
4om!any. In (!e, likewise, the "mir had always considered himself as
the !rotector of the 4om!any and conse-ently, when offered a treaty in
which the roles were to be reversed, he refsed to sign it and wold do no
more than make an ordinary commercial agreement 19.
.ifficlties of langage !robably lay at the root of many of the
misnderstandings that now came to light. (early all the treaties had
been conclded throgh the medim of inter!reters. ,eing men of hmble
!osition, they !erha!s did not themselves flly nderstand the affairs of
state that they were called !on to discss. In any case, they wold have
been an)ios to !lease their em!loyers withot offending the "mirs and so
there was a constant tem!tation to skate over difficlties and leave
misnderstandings nresolved.
*f corse, the treaties between the 4om!any and the vassal "mirates
189
were to some e)tent overridden by, and therefore of mch less
im!ortance than, the treaties between the 4om!any and the two
overlords. %hanks to the e)!lorer %homson, >oldie had secred these as
early as 1==<, even before he had gained his 4harter. %he Sltan at that
time had been Emar and he, no dobt recalling that it had always been
the desire of his grandfather ,ello to make an alliance with >reat ,ritain
and o!en a channel for maritime trade, had signed a treaty, as had the
"mir of >wand, 'aliki, soon afterwards.
Ender the terms of the Sokoto %reaty the Sltan had first of all granted to
the .irectors of the 4om!any Hmy entire rights to the contry on both
sides of the River ,ene and rivers flowing into it throghot my
dominions for sch distance from its and their banks as they may desireI
11. Secondly, he had recognized that Samong foreignersT the 4om!any
shold have the sole right to trade and to e)tract minerals. %hirdly, he
had acknowledged the 4om!any to be the sole channel for all
commnications between him and foreigners Scoming from the riversT.
Forthly, he had agreed that the grant of these rights was irrevocable. In
retrn for these concessions the 4om!any had ndertaken to !ay him an
annal sbsidy of 1,000 bags of cowries, then valed at abot Y1,<00 1;.
%he terms of the treaty with >wand had been similar, e)ce!t that the
cession of land had related to the banks of the (iger and its tribtaries as
well as to the ,ene and had been more definite, s!ecifying a distance of
ten horsC $orney inland, or sch other distance as the 4om!any might
desire, from each bank 1<.
It is regrettable that 'acdonald did not visit Sokoto and >wand and
therefore never had the o!!ortnity of -estioning the Sltan and the
"mir abot their nderstanding of these treaties. We know, however, that
when he revealed to the (!e 4oncil the terms of the >wand %reaty,
and !articlarly the clase abot the cession of land along the banks of
the (iger, they were frankly incredlos and stotly maintained that the
"mir of >wand wold never have signed sch an agreement 15. It is
therefore difficlt to esca!e the conclsion that in these two ma$or
treaties, as in many of the minor ones, the contracting !arties had
different ideas abot what had been agreed !on. It is in any case certain
that, whatever >oldie and later 2gard chose to read into the agreements,
neither the Sltan nor the "mir of >wand s!!osed for a moment that
they had bargained away any of their own sovereignty or their inherited
athority over their vassals.
'acdonaldCs general conclsions were that, while the 4om!any had gone
too far in establishing a mono!oly, the graver charges of abse of office
that had been broght against it were nfonded. ,t on the !olitical side
he had to re!ort that, des!ite its treaties, which in any case were often
ambigos, its !ractical $risdiction was limited, even along the rivers,
and that its writ hardly ran at all beyond their banks 16. %o the ,ritish
>overnment the 4om!anyCs lack of real athority came as distrbing
news, becase in international affairs the im!ortance of effective
occ!ation was now beginning to otweigh the mere !ossession of
190
treaties. Similarly, 'acdonaldCs criticisms of the 4om!anyCs mono!olistic
!ractices !laced them in a dilemma, becase they knew that it was only
by e)!loiting a commercial mono!oly that the 4om!any cold afford to
carry its administrative and military e)!enses.
%he 2iberal >overnment which was then in office was nwilling either to
assme direct res!onsibility for the (iger %erritories or yet to srrender
them to another "ro!ean !ower. It therefore took the line of least
resistance and did nothing.
It is now recognized that >oldie was one of the originators of the system
of colonial administration which later came to be termed Indirect Rle.
From the start he insisted that it was not the 4om!anyCs bsiness to
establish a system of government in the (iger %erritories. %he !olicy
which he laid down, therefore, was that the 4om!any wold interfere as
little as !ossible in the internal affairs of local States or tribes bt wold
leave government to the traditional fedal or tribal athorities 1=. +e held
these views from conviction, .ot ot of necessity, bt the !attern of
events !roved to be a good deal more com!licated than he had e)!ected
and in the end he was com!elled to modify his !olicy.
Indeed, at this !eriod the !olitical sitation along the (iger and ,ene
Rivers was highly nstable. %he fact that some of the States belonged to
the Flani "m!ire and that others did not was only one of the cases of
the trmoil in which they all lived. *ther reasons, a!art from the constant
slave3raiding of the Flani and the !eriodic re!risals of the !agans, were
risings sch as those of the %iv in 1==<35, dynastic dis!tes sch as those
of 'ri "mirate in the Cnineties, land !iracy sch as that of the %akm
renegade :achalla on the ,ene caravans 1/, and, finally, the intriges of
the agents of other "ro!ean !owers sch as +oenigsberg in (!e and
'izon in 'ri and #damawa 90.
It was all very well to say in theory that the 4om!any wold not interfere
in sch matters, bt in !ractice, as >oldie discovered, it was drawn into
them by its treaties and by the need to defend its allies and !hold its
!restige. In any case, if trade was to florish and the 4om!any !ay its
way, it was im!erative to establish a measre of order. Pnitive
e)!editions became fairly common, therefore, and these sometimes
clminated in fighting.
# frther com!lication was that international tension, which had been
relieved by the ,erlin settlement of 1==;, now started to mont again.
%he agreement of 1=/0 between ,ritain and France had fi)ed the northern
bondary of the ,ritish s!here of inflence and that of 1=/1 between
,ritain and >ermany had settled the eastern bondary. ,t only half the
western bondary had been determined and so, as the !rinci!le of
effective occ!ation was coming to be generally acce!ted, the French felt
free to !ress their claims to the (ikki3,ssa3:aiama area which had
hitherto been regarded as !art of the 4om!anyCs territories. %hese moves
cased consternation in 2ondon and >oldie was called on by the
>overnment to forestall the French.
#t the same time, now that the ,ritish Protectorate over the Borba
191
States was becoming more of a reality, the war between llorin and
Ibadan, which had been going on intermittently ever since lbadan had
been fonded after the destrction of *ld *yo, was beginning to case
concern. In 2ondon it was assmed that florin was the aggressor sim!ly
becase the Flani had started the war two generations earlier and
becase they had sbse-ently earned a bad name as slave3raiders. #s
Ilorin fell within the 4om!anyCs s!here of inflence, the ,ritish
>overnment now began to !ress >oldie to bring the "mir to heel, if
necessary by the se of force 91.
>oldie at the time was too !reocc!ied with the 4om!anyCs internal
!roblems, es!ecially (!e, to care mch abot these e)ternal difficlties.
(!e had never made a !olitical treaty with the 4om!any and the
differences between them were now coming to a head. In the Csi)ties the
"mir 'asaba had overrn the small tribes G Bagbas, ,ns, :akandas,
:!as, and "ggas G who inhabited :abba and ever since then the (!es
had regarded :abba as one of their !reserves 99. In recent years,
however, their raids had been carried ot on a scale that had broght
trade to a standstill and threatened to de!o!late the whole contry. "ven
2oke$a, the head-arters of the 4om!anyCs northern region, had been
threatened and so the 4om!any, in defence of its vital interests bt in
contradiction of its avowed !olicy of non3intervention, had been com!elled
to warn the (!es to kee! their distance 91. %his had led to great tension.
%owards the end of 1=/1 >oldie decided to go to ,ida himself in the ho!e
of reaching a settlement. When he met the "mir #bbakr there he assred
him that the 4om!any had no intention of attacking and occ!ying (!e
and he !romised that its servants wold not interfere in the internal
affairs of the "mirate. In retrn he demanded that the (!es shold sto!
raiding for slaves in the 4om!anyCs territories otside the "mirate. If they
!ersisted, he threatened to declare war, blockade them, and divert their
trade to other "mirates. #lthogh the "mir !rofessed himself satisfied with
these terms, >oldie left ,ida with the feeling that war wold not be long
delayed 9;.
In fact, the "mir did not kee! his bargain. ,efore long his men were
o!erating in :abba again and a clash between them and the 4onstablary
became almost inevitable. It came when the (!e forces srronded one
of the 4om!anyCs !atrols and took !risoner two ,ritish officers and forty3
five #frican rank and file. #lthogh they were all sbse-ently released,
this e!isode seems to have convinced >oldie that the time had come for a
showdown with (!e. #s he had already ndertaken to send an e)!edition
against Ilorin, he determined to combine the two o!erations and to mont
them in the forthcoming dry season 9<.
>oldie did not make the mistake of nderrating his o!!onents. +e
determined to command the e)!edition himself and he saw to it that his
troo!s, who nmbered only <00 nder 10 ,ritish officers, were given
every !ossible advantage of modern science and technology. %heir
e-i!ment inclded searchlights and wire to foil night attacks and they
were s!!orted by artillery and si) machine3gns 95.
192
In the (!e cam!aign >oldie e)!loited two weaknesses in the "mirCs
!osition, the !resence of half his army on the soth side of the (iger and
the fact that to recall these troo!s to the defence of his ca!ital he had to
rely on the canoes of the river tribes, who were neither 'oslems nor
!articlarly loyal to the Flani rLgime. While >oldie and the troo!s
marched against the (!e contingent In :abba, Wallace with the river
steamers raised the river !eo!le in revolt against them and so ct their
line of retreat. When they fell back, therefore, they were nable to get
across the water and took no frther !art in the cam!aign.
%he e)!edition, coming ! behind them, was soon ferried across the river
and contined its march on ,ida. %he main (!e army, massed in
considerable strength in front of the ca!ital and nearly all monted, !t !
a stot resistance. *n the first day they charged the colmn with sch
dash and determination that for a time, while the troo!s were forming
s-are, the isse of the battle hng in the balance. %hogh they failed to
break the s-are, they did scceed in forcing >oldie to fall back on his
cam!.
*n the following day the troo!s advanced again, this time in s-are
formation from the start, and the volleys of the riflemen, s!!orted by the
fire of the machine3gns, beat off all the attacks of the (!e cavalry. #
mile and a half from the city they halted while the artillery cleared the
defenders from the walls. #fter this they advanced again ntil they were
within range of the centre of the city. #n artillery bombardment was then
begn, which set the town ablaze and scattered the remaining defenders
96. #nd so, on 96 &anary 1=/6, ,ida fell to the troo!s of the Royal (iger
4om!any and (!e ca!itlated.
#fter a few days rest >oldie retrned to the (iger and, with abot half the
original forces, was trans!orted !stream to &ebba. From there he
marched soth on Ilorin. %he battle for Ilorin was a re!etition of the battle
for ,ida e)ce!t that the o!!osition was less stiff. %he llorin cavalry
charged corageosly against the s-are bt cold make no headway
against the rifle and machine3gn fire. When >oldie called for a srrender
his demand was refsed. %he city was therefore shelled, set on fire, and
finally occ!ied 9=.
In this cam!aign >oldie had em!loyed most of his military resorces and
risked the 4om!anyCs very e)istence. In a military sense he had been
brilliantly sccessfl, bt his victories had left him with !olitical and
administrative !roblems to solve. In llorin his soltion was to rea!!oint
the defeated "mir Sliman, in ,ida to de!ose the "mir #bbakr and
a!!oint another member of the rling family, 'hammad, in his !lace.
,oth "mirs on a!!ointment had to acknowledge the 4om!any as their new
szerain and to agree to conform to sch directions as the re!resentatives
of the 4om!any might from time to time give 9/.
%he handica! from which >oldie now sffered was that, at a time when he
needed the backing of a great nation to e)!loit his sccess and carry ot
his ideas, he cold call only !on the resorces of a medim3sized
193
com!any. %hey were not enogh for the task and the settlement that he
had im!osed by force was soon to crmble away.
(otes
1. &. ". Flint, Sir >eorge >oldie and the 'aking of (igeria, 2ondon, 1/50, !. 9<.
9. Flint, o!. cit. !!. 10311 and ;;3;5.
1. Flint, o!. cit. !!. 59360.
;. Ibid. !!. =/3/0.
<. Ibid. !!. 603=6.
5. Flint, o!. cit. !!. /13/9.
6. Ibid. !!. /1 and 1;9.3;.
=. Ibid. !. 1;9.
/. Flint, o!. cit. !!. 1;;3<.
10. Ibid. !!. 19/3<<.
11. Ibid. !!. /=311/.
19. Flint, o!. cit. !!. 19/3<<.
11. Ibid. !. =/.
1;. For the te)ts of the treaties see %he 'a! of #frica by %reaty by Sir ". +ertslet,
2ondon, 1/0/, vol. I, !!. 1993<5. %he fact that the Sltan agreed to acce!t a sbsidy
does not mean that he regarded himself as in any way de!endent on the 4om!any. *n
the contrary, it is significant that #lha$i &naid 7o!. cit. !. 5/8 ses the word gaimwa to
describe it, a term that denotes either a sweetener or else the gift offered by an inferior
to a s!erior.
1<. Flint, o!. cit. !. =/.
15. Ibid. !!. 1;031.
16. Ibid. !!. 1<139.
1=. Flint, o!. cit. !!. /;3/<.
1/. >azetteer of 'ri Province, !!. 5390.
90. Flint, o!. cit. !!. 1;; ff. and 15= ff.
91. Flint, o! cit. !!. 919 ff.
99. >azetteer of Ilorin Province, !. 1/.
91. Flint, o!. cit. !!. 91;3<.
9;. Flint, o!. cit. !. 91<.
9<. Ibid. !. 9;0.
95. Ibid. !!. 9;1351.
96. Flint, o!. cit. !!. 9<031.
9=. Ibid. !. 9<<.
9/. Ibid. !!. 9<; and 9<5.
194
(ha'ter *wenty.)ne
$ultan Abdu
It will be remembered that, when Ahmadu 2ufa-i had become Sltan in
1=56, his choice had broken the tradition that a!!ointments shold
alternate between the House of #ello and the House of Atiku. *n his
death in 1=61 the sccession had gone back to the +ose of ,ello with the
election of Abubakr na 2abah. When he in trn had died in 1=66 the
+ose of #tik had again been !assed over and he had been scceeded by
his yonger brother Mu-a!u. %hen, when 'Caz had died in 1==1, the
claims of the #tikawa had again been ignored and the choice had fallen on
,elloCs senior grandson, /maru.
.ring most of this !eriod the leading contender from the +ose of #tik,
whose ho!es had been so fre-ently blighted, had been Abdur 2ahman.
#bd, as he was generally called, was a son of Sltan #tik and a yonger
brother of Sltan #hmad Aark. +e was also the elder brother of Emar
(agwamatse of :ontagora, bt this conne)ion was more of a handica!
than an advantage and only served to heighten the ss!icion, which
already e)isted, that he had similar flaws in his character 1.
%hogh belonging to an earlier generation, Abdu was yonger than Sltan
Emar 9 and otlived him. In 1=/1, when Emar died, he was, in fact, in
his early si)ties. +is matrity !robably hel!ed him, becase dring the
second half of the centry the "lectoral 4ollege seemed to be inclining
more and more to the sim!le !rinci!le of seniority. In considering their
decision this time they no dobt also took into consideration the fact that
the +ose of ,ello had !rovided the last three Sltans and that it was
twenty3five years since the +ose of #tik had had its last trn. Ignoring
the !ortents, therefore, they chose #bd to scceed. #t any !eriod their
choice wold have been a bad one. #t this !articlar !oint, however, when
the "m!ire was for the first time being drawn into the main crrent of
world events, it was to !rove absoltely calamitos.
#bdCs reign began inas!iciosly. *n his accession he fond a dis!te
going on between two of his !rinci!al vassals over the little town of ,irnin
%d. +e handled it so ine!tly that one of them, the 4hief of %alata
'afara, went into o!en revolt. %alata 'afara was one of the larger
fragments of the old Aamfara kingdom and its defection cased risings in
some of the other Aamfara towns, notably #nka 1.
%he rebellion was not a very formidable one and had #bd moved with
s!eed and decision he cold -ickly have stam!ed it ot. #s it was,
however, he gave the rebels time to take the initiative. %his they did by
smmoning the >obir and :atsina diehards to their aid and sacking the
loyal town of %reta, which lay abot half3way between %alata 'afara and
Sokoto ;.
#fter this disaster, which was all the more hmiliating becase many of
the women and children of %reta were carried off into slavery <, #bd
bestirred himself, drove the diehards back beyond the frontiers of the
195
"m!ire, and broght the rebels to heel. %he indemnity of ,,::: slaves
that he im!osed on them gave warning of the c!idity and vindictiveness
for which he was later to become notorios 5.
,y the time #bd scceeded as Sltan the war with :ebbi had already
begn to go against the Flani. $ama-ila was now at the height of his
!owers and by his genis for gerrilla fighting was inflicting one !ainfl
reverse after another on Sokoto and >wand. #bd, for all his other
falts, was not wanting in vision or resoltion. +e seems to have realized
at once that the defensive strategy on which the Flani had fallen back left
the initiative with the :ebbawa and that to end the war it wold be
necessary to bring them to a decisive battle. +e therefore resolved at all
costs to ca!tre #rgng, which was not only their ca!ital bt the sally3
!ort for most of their raids, and made a vow that he wold not shave his
head ntil he had done so 6.
%he last two Flani e)!editions against #rgng had both been failres.
#bd did not re!eat the earlier mistake of nderrating the enemy bt,
having decided to mont an offensive, he sent ot a smmons to all his
"mirs ordering them to bring half their total forces to Sokoto for an
e)!edition against :ebbi. %he strategy was n-estionably sond bt,
nfortnately for the Flani, #bd !ossessed none of the -alities of
leadershi! that were needed to see it throgh.
#lthogh he had been Sltan for only a short time he had already
ac-ired a re!tation of being a tyrant. When his smmons reached the
"mirs, therefore, they only obeyed it with relctance. %heir ns!oken
thoghts were that it wold be a mistake to rid sch a man of his e)ternal
enemies, for then he wold be free to do as he !leased within the "m!ire.
For this reason many of those who $oined the e)!edition were secretly
ho!ing that it wold fail =.
%he Flani army mstered slowly in the dry weather of 1=/931. %he "mirs
of :atsina and ,achi came in !erson with their troo!s while the "mir of
:ano and the 2amido of #damawa were re!resented by their sons. %he
Aaria contingent was commanded by the 'adaki /. It was late in the
season when, with #bd at their head, they finally got on the move. Sch
a mighty host were they that, according to tradition, they drank all the
wells dry and raised a dst that hng over them like a clod.
In #rgng, SamaCila had long had wind of their coming. +e had therefore
had time to strengthen the defences of the town and smmon to his aid
his faithfl #rewa and Aaberma vassals. %hogh he mst have realized
that the crisis of his career was a!!roaching, he showed no dismay when
told that #bd had set off from Sokoto bt sim!ly saidD
G 2et him come? ICm waiting for him 10
#s #bd a!!roached #rgng he was $oined by the >wand contingent.
%ogether they im!rovised a fortified cam! for the noncombatants and
baggage and made their final !re!arations for the im!ending strggle.
,ecase the weight of nmbers was so overwhelmingly in their favor
they assmed that SamaCila wold not risk a !itched battle bt wold sht
himself ! in the town as all his !redecessors had done. %his assm!tion,
196
and the overconfidence that lay behind it, was to !rove a fatal blnder.
When #bd ordered the advance on the following day he neglected to
have a !ro!er reconnaissance made and took it for granted that all the
enemyCs forces were in the town. 4onse-ently, when his army reached
#rgng, he did not scent any danger bt allowed the troo!s to dis!erse
rond the walls so that each contingent cold take ! the siege station to
which it had already been assigned.
*n the other side SamaCila had three !ossible corses o!en to him. +e
cold either retire with all his men behind the walls of #rgng in the ho!e
of being able to withstand a siege, or he cold bar the
SltanCs way with all his forces and risk everything on the reslt of a
single !itched battle, or again he cold divide his forces and leave his foot
in #rgng while kee!ing his horse otside as an inde!endent striking
force. >iven the SltanCs great nmerical s!eriority the first alternative
was the safest and the third the most hazardos. SamaCila, who was
highly s!erstitios, first conslted his agrs and then chose the third
11.
+aving taken this decision he sent all his cavalry ot of the town before
the Flani came on the scene and ordered them to conceal themselves in
the bsh beyond the cltivated area. #t the last !ossible moment he too
sli!!ed ot and !t himself at their head. From this vantage !oint the
:ebbawa watched the Flani army arrive and flow rond the walls like an
advancing tide ntil they had com!letely encircled the town. When he saw
them ths dis!ersed and off their gard to the real danger, which lay
behind them, SamaCila knew that his garrible had scceeded.
G %he 2ord be !raised, he cried. I SamaCila give thanks to >od and +is
Pro!het.
#t this his famos bay charger, which was believed by the s!erstitios to
be no horse bt a $inn or familiar s!irit, is said to have whinnied three
times and so convinced every man that victory was assred 19.
When he $dged the moment to be right SamaCila led his cavalry ot of
the bsh and fell like a thnderbolt on the rear of the Flani army, whose
attention was focsed on the town. %he sector where he first strck was
occ!ied by the :ano contingent nder the "mirCs eldest son %kr.
%hogh %kr strove to rally his men, the weight of the :ebbi charge
swe!t them aside. +aving broken the enemy ring SamaCila !roceeded to
roll it !. %he Flani now fond themselves in a ho!eless !osition and
before long their whole army was in flight, !rsed by the trim!hant
:ebbi horse 11.
*n this disastros day it was left to one of the SltanCs ne!hews, the
'arafa 'aitrare, to strike the only effective blow for the Flani and save
their honor. When the :ebbi cavalry gallo!ed off in !rsit of the main
body of the army, they in trn e)!osed themselves. ,y kee!ing his own
contingent of %aregs and #darawa nder firm control, the 'arafa was
therefore able to take them in the flank and rear. ,t the conter3attack,
thogh it e)acted some retribtion, came too late to save the day 1;.
%his victory saved :ebbi from !ossible e)tinction. When every allowance
197
has been made for #bdCs negligence, for the disloyalty to their
commander of many of the Flani, and for the !art !layed by lck, it is
still !ossible to discern a toch of genis abot SamaCilaCs tactics. For him
it was the crowning victory of a brilliant military career.
For #bd, on the other hand, it was only the beginning of a series of
blnders and disasters.
*he Kano (ivil ar
2ater in the year 1//1 the "mir ,ello of :ano, died and with his death
there began a fierce strggle for the sccession between his branch of the
family and the far more nmeros clan of his !redecessor, the "mir
#bdllahi. %he two candidates for the title were the heads of these two
hoses, %kr and Bsf.
In the recent e)!edition against #rgng, %kr had been the only ca!tain
to show any enthsiasm or determination. +is zeal mst have stood ot
when so many others were hanging back and it did not !ass nnoticed by
the Sltan. In fact, tradition has it that #bd then and there !romised him
the sccession to :ano with the wordsD H6oronka Kano in ta fadi.I 1<
#s #bd did not know what the wishes of the !eo!le of :ano were, it was
a rash !romise to have made and it was to case him endless troble. In
fact, BsfCs following, both in the city and in the "mirate, was far
stronger than %krCs and was determined to make him "mir at any cost.
%here was, therefore, a real danger that if he was not constittionally
a!!ointed there wold be civil war.
It so ha!!ened that when the "mir of :ano died the Waziri of Sokoto,
,hari, a grandson of 4la!!ertonCs old friend the Waziri >idado, was
!assing throgh :ano on his way to the cast. *n the death of the rler in
one of the greater "mirates it was traditionally the task of the Waziri to
smmon the "lectors to the choice of a new "mir and to convey their
recommendations to the Sltan for his confirmation. %his ,hari now
!roceeded to do. %he :ano "lectors were nanimos in choosing Bsf
15 and they added a rider saying that if he was not a!!ointed they were
convinced that blood wold flow. %he Waziri accordingly sent a message to
Sokoto, which contained both the recommendation and the warning.
In Sokoto, #bd now fond himself in an awkward !redicament. +e had
gone a long way, both morally and !blicly, to committing himself to
%krCs case, bt now the "lectors of :ano, nanimosly and in the
strongest terms, had re$ected him. With the :ebbawa nsbded in the
west, .amagaram and the +asa diehards still very active in the north,
the ,ritish becoming more assertive in the soth, and Rabeh
contem!lating fresh con-ests in the cast, every canon of statecraft called
ot for !rdence and cation in dealing with sch an obviosly e)!losive
!roblem. ,t #bd was determined not to be thwarted and sent a
message back to the Waziri saying that he did not mind if entrails ran in
:ano, mch less blood, bt that at all costs %kr mst be made "mir 16.
When the news of the SltanCs decision s!read abroad in :ano city there
198
was consternation. #bdllahiCs whole clan, together with their henchmen,
at once congregated at BsfCs hose to take consel with one another.
%hey decided that once %kr had become "mir he wold not rest ntil he
had broken them, !erha!s !t them to death, and that the only safety lay
in flight. #nd so, while the Waziri was investing the new "mir with the
regalia of :ano in an almost em!ty mos-e, Bsf and all his s!!orters
were clattering ot of the (assarawa >ate and trning their faces towards
the east 1=. It was tantamont to a declaration of war.
Bsf now made his head-arters at %akai, a large town abot fifty miles
soth3east of the ca!ital, and at once began soliciting the s!!ort of the
territorial magnates of the "m!ire. Some $oined him? others remained
loyal to %kr. +is ne)t move was to send embassies to the neighboring
"mirates to enlist their hel!. #t first it seemed as if +adei$a wold back
him, bt when the "mir 'hammad met the Waziri of Sokoto, he
realized that to do so wold mean !lain defiance of the Sltan. ,eing
nwilling to reo!en the old breach, which had now healed, the "mir
therefore withdrew his s!!ort 1/.
+adei$aCs neighbor to the north3west was >mel, a small bt warlike
"mirate which owed loose allegiance to .amagaram, and ,orn and had
never formed !art of the Sokoto "m!ire. %he 'angawa of >mel, thogh
they had ado!ted the +asa langage, were kin to the :anri and for the
greater !art of the centry had been engaged in s!oradic fighting with
their Flani neighbors, !articlarly those of +adei$a. For them there was
no clash of loyalties, sim!ly the !ros!ect of some rich !ickings, and so
when BsfCs envoy reached them they willingly !romised their s!!ort
90. ,y calling them in, the insrgents ac-ired a !owerfl ally, bt at the
same time they dealt another blow at the case of Flani nity.
When he felt himself strong enogh, Bsf marched on :ano and
attem!ted to take it by storm. +e had no artillery, however, and the md
walls and heavy ironclad gates gave the defenders an overwhelming
advantage. In s!ite of this the attackers scceeded in breaking in at one
!oint, bt they were at once conter3attacked and thrown ot. With the
failre of this assalt, Bsf withdrew again to %akai, leaving the
!risoners who had been taken in the battle to be e)ected by %kr.
For the ne)t three months the rebels consolidated their strength in the
soth and cast of the "mirate. *ne after another the larger towns that had
not already $oined their case were either intimidated into adherence or
sbded by force of arms. With the ca!tre of >aya, >arko, and :ra, the
PretenderCs forces cre!t forward to within twenty miles of the city and it
was obvios that another assalt on the ca!ital was imminent.
#s the decisive moment a!!roached, however, Bsf sddenly fell
mortally ill and his ne)!ected death !laced his whole movement in
$eo!ardy. (one of his brothers !ossessed the same ascendancy as he and
there was a danger that the case wold be rent by a strggle for the
sccession. Bsf realized this and from his death3bed designated #liy
,abba, one of his yonger brothers, as his sccessor. +e chose #liy for
two reasons, !artly becase he !ossessed the necessary !owers of
199
leadershi! and !artly becase #liy, throgh his mother, was related by
blood to the SltanCs family. Bsf $dged that this tie wold one day
lead to a reconciliation with Sokoto 91. In this he was ltimately to be
!roved right.
%he strangest !art of the interlde between the first and second attacks
on :ano was the inaction of %kr, who left the initiative entirely to his
adversaries. +e sim!ly sht himself ! in the ca!ital and remained !assive
while Bsf and #liy, by !rising away one town after another, gradally
ndermined his athority and !ower. (o dobt he felt too weak to risk a
!itched battle, bt his failre to make even sallies against his enemies, or
to take any re!risals against those who deserted his case, gave men the
im!ression that he was wanting in corage and resoltion. In any case, if
he did not feel strong enogh to tackle the rebels naided, he shold have
a!!ealed for hel! to his overlord. Similarly, in Sokoto the Sltan did
nothing to assist his vassal ntil it was too late. +ad he ordered :atsina,
Aaria, ,achi, and :atagm to reinforce :ano, %kr cold have taken the
field with a !owerfl army and wold in all !robability have crshed the
Pretender. We do not know why #bd remained s!ine when his richest
!rovince was being riven by civil war, bt it seems !robable that he was
inhibited by the memory of that disastros day at #rgng and that he did
not feel sre enogh of the loyalty of his "mirs to call them ot again for
the !r!ose of re!airing the blnder over the sccession which they all
knew to be his.
"arly in 1=/; #liy again advanced on :ano, city. %he "mir, who had
missed all his o!!ortnities of harrying the rebels when they were weak
and vlnerable, now committed another tactical error by leaving his
defences and challenging them in the o!en. (ot sr!risingly, his
otnmbered forces were defeated and driven back behind the walls. %his
reverse seems to have broken the morale of his army, for they offered
little frther resistance. Soon afterwards the rebels made a breach in the
wall and overran the defences. %hen, as #liy made a trim!hant entry
into the city from the soth3east, %kr with a few dis!irited followers
sli!!ed ot of it to the north3west 99.
*nly now, when a manageable fire had become an ngovernable
conflagration, did the Sltan sddenly begin to take all the measres
which he shold have !t in hand months earlier. %he "mir of :atsina was
bidden to give %kr asylm and re!el the :ano forces if they shold
!rse him. %he other "mirs were ordered to !rovide troo!s and the
Waziri was sent to :atsina to take command of the army which was to
restore %kr to his throne 91. ,t it was all in vain. #bdCs orders were
either ignored or at best obeyed with a dilatory relctance that stltified
them. (o troo!s arrived for the Waziri to command and the "mir of
:atsina sht himself ! in his ca!ital on the !rete)t that he had received
news that the +asa diehards were !lanning another raid 9;. %kr was
therefore left in an e)!osed and vlnerable !osition on the :atsina3:ano
bondary. When #liy finally came ! with him at %afashiya he made a
des!erate bt ho!eless last stand and went bravely to his death.
200
So ended the :ano civil war. (o !rinci!les had been at stake and the
strggle had really been nothing more than a dynastic contest for a vacant
throne. (evertheless, it had disr!ted the life of the "mirate for the best
!art of a year. Indirectly, too, it was to have other no less damaging
reslts.
Soon after the end of the civil war :ano again became embroiled with
.amagaram. *stensibly the bone of contention was the szerainty of
>mel, whose traditional fealty to .amagaram had begn to waver from
the time that its s!!ort of the Pretender had drawn it into :anoCs orbit,
bt actally the nderlying case was !robably the o!!ortnism and
c!idity of the "mir of .amagaram. While :anoCs strength had been
sa!!ed by internal strife, his had recently been reinforced by fgitives
from the ,orma army which had been defeated by Rabeh 9<. +o!ing no
dobt to !rofit by these changes of fortne, the "mir #hmad now
mstered an e)!edition and led it sothward.
#dvancing throgh >mel the .amagaram. forces encontered little
o!!osition and soon reached the town of >ezawa, only twenty miles from
the ca!ital, and sacked it. From there the van !shed on and actally
came in sight of the walls of the city. In doing so, however, they over3
e)tended themselves and this gave the :ano force, which was waiting on
the sothern flanks of their march, an o!!ortnity of inter!osing itself
between their van and their rear. 'oreover, when the van fell back, it
failed to take !ro!er military !recations and was lred into an ambsh by
a :ano drmmer imitating its own rallying tattoo. %he reslt was an
ne)!ected victory for :ano and the discomfitre of the .amagaram
army, which retreated northward in disorder 95.
In s!ite of his defeat the "mir of .amagaram retrned in 1=/= with a new
army at his back, this time taking a more westerly rote throgh
.ambarta 96. %he :ano forces marched ot to bar his way and a !itched
battle was foght near %attarawa. In this the cannon and mskets of
.amagaram !roved to be too mch for the :ano cavalry, which fled from
the field. %he "mir #liy was left e)!osed and, to evade ca!tre, was
forced to disgise himself as a %areg. "ven then he barely esca!ed and
indeed lost a nmber of his !ersonal bodygard 9=.
%he .amagaram army now advanced right ! to the walls of :ano,
!illaging and looting as they went. Inside the city, which was thronged
with refgees from the srronding towns and villages 9/ as well as
srvivors from the battle, there was confsion and des!ondency. From the
otside, however, the fortifications mst have looked immensely strong.
'oreover, the assailants knew that, since the days of the &kns, the
!lace had never been taken. %he "mir of .amagaram did not attem!t an
assalt, therefore, bt raised the siege and marched home with his booty
10.
%he .amagaram invasions were not the only banefl conse-ences to flow
from the :ano civil war. +ardly less serios, in its wider conte)t, was the
damage that it did to the !restige and athority of the Sltan. When soon
afterwards #bd allowed himself to be reconciled to #liy and
201
acknowledged him as the lawfl "mir of :ano, he was only bowing to
necessity. (evertheless his action, coming so soon after %krCs death,
destroyed the last vestige of trst that his sb$ects bore him. +enceforth
he was seldom called by his real name or accorded his title of 4ommander
of the Faithfl. Instead he was derisively referred to as Abdu 4anyen
Kasko or #bd the /nbaked &ot.
+oreign Affairs
It will be recalled that in 1==< the Sltan Emar and the Royal (iger
4om!any had signed a treaty, which incidentally had been reaffirmed five
years later and slightly widened in sco!e, and that in 1=/1 >oldie had !aid
a visit to the "mir of (!e in an effort to reach an nderstanding with
him.
#fter >oldieCs visit to ,ida, the "mir evidently referred to his overlord in
>wand the demand that he shold desist from slave3raiding in :abba
and the "mir of >wand mst in trn have conslted the Sltan abot it.
For once #bd seems to have conselled !atience and conciliation, for the
"mir of >wand, in acknowledging his instrctions, wrote to him as
followsD
#fter greetings, I have seen yor letter abot the 4hristians and have sent
to Sarkin (!e telling him to watch his ste!, leave them alone, kee! faith
with them, and bring abot a reconciliation between them and s !rovided
that they do not break their agreement and stir ! strife or show deceit. I
too have written to them in a s!irit of conciliation.
'ay >od hel! s and grant s increase.
%his with !eace. 11
%he ne)t develo!ment was that in 1=/; William, Wallace, one of the
4om!anyCs senior officials, was sent ! to Sokoto by >oldie to negotiate
fresh treaties with the Sltan and the "mir of >wand. %he new te)ts,
while consolidating the earlier versions, were more e)!licit and again
slightly wider in sco!e. %hey declared that the 4om!any had acted
honorably dring the nine years that had ela!sed since the first treaties
had been made and confirmed it in the fll !ossession of all mineral rights
and in its $risdiction over non natives. 'oreover, by a new clase, the
Sltan and the "mir were to acknowledge the 4om!any as the
re!resentative of the ,ritish >overnment and to agree not to recognize
any other white nation 19.
#t first sight it may seem sr!rising that #bd, who later was to !rove so
intractable and trclent, shold even have contem!lated going frther
than his !redecessor in making concessions to the 4om!any. %he reasons,
however, are not far to seek. In the !revios year his e)!edition against
#rgng had been a calamitos failre. In :ano the civil war had only $st
come to an end. %hese in themselves were good reasons for renewing the
treaty, bt the considerations that !robably swayed #bd more than any
others were the emergence in the east of Rabeh and RabehCs alliance with
202
+ayat, who was known to be ambitios to scceed as Sltan. #t that
time the 4om!any, whose main interests seemed to lie in trade, minerals,
and the $risdiction over foreigners, mst have looked mch less
menacing than the new master of ,orn.
If the Sltan had good lterior motives for maintaining the treaty, >oldie
and the 4om!any had even stronger reasons for wishing to e)tend its
sco!e. %hey were not only nder heavy !ressre from the French bt were
being constantly sni!ed at by their critics at home. +ence, of corse, the
inclsion of the new clase which bond the Sltan not to recognize any
other "ro!ean !ower. In the event, however, WallaceCs mission seems to
have been only !artially sccessfl. +e certainly !ersaded the "mir of
>wand to sign the new treaty, bt it is very dobtfl whether he was
e-ally sccessfl with the Sltan 11. ,t if #bd did not enter into a new
agreement neither did he at this stage denonce the %reaty of 1=/0,
which therefore remained in force.
%he fact that both sides were !rimarily concerned to strengthen their
hands vis3Z3vis their rivals rather than to im!rove relations with one
another no dobt e)!lains why these treaties trned ot to he sch
nsatisfactory instrments of di!lomacy. %he most !ressing !roblems of
the day, which were soon to lead to war, were the s!!ression of slave3
raiding, !articlarly the (!e raids in :abba, and the ending of the war
between llorin and Ibadan. ,t they fond no !lace in the treaties and
Wallace does not seem to have raised them either in Sokoto or >wand. It
mst be conceded that the 4om!anyCs failre even to attem!t to settle
these -estions by negotiation when it had the chance to do so largely
stltified the e)!lanations that it gave only two and a half years later for
its attack on (!e and Ilorin.
%o nderstand #bdCs behavior after 1=/; we mst consider the events
of the ne)t few years from his !oint of view. In !reserving the old treaty
with the 4om!any, even if he did not enter into a new one, he no dobt
thoght that he had secred his sothern flank and that if Rabeh attacked
from the east he wold be ready to meet him. In the event, however, it
was not Rabeh who attacked in 1=/6 bt the 4om!any. %here is no dobt
that #bd was taken com!letely by sr!rise. Enderstandably, he regarded
>oldieCs actions against (!e and Ilorin as a breach of faith which !t an
end to the treaties and from then on he refsed to acce!t the 4om!anyCs
annal sbsidy 1;.
Jery soon afterwards, moreover, certain develo!ments in the east
convinced #bd that he no longer had anything to fear from that -arter.
%he French, moving northwards from the 4ongo, a!!eared on the River
Shari in 1=/6 and were welcomed by the "mir of ,aghirmi. Rabeh, who
was -ick to see the danger which they re!resented, at once abandoned
the tentative moves that he had !reviosly made against the Flani
"m!ire and swng rond to meet them. %hereafter he was com!letely
!reocc!ied in defending his kingdom against the growing !ressre of the
French. #lthogh the letters have not been !reserved, it is nevertheless
certain that abot this time Rabeh and #bd were in corres!ondence 1<
203
and it seems !robable that they made a non3aggression !act with one
another so that they cold concentrate on resisting the encroachments of
the French and ,ritish res!ectively. We know at any rate that in 1=/6
#bd wrote to the "mir of #damawa to annonce that he had made an
alliance with Rabeh 15.
%he 4om!anyCs attack on ,ida and Ilorin and his own !act with Rabeh
therefore combined to bring abot a com!lete reversal in #bdCs foreign
!olicy. In the first half of his reign, having been a!!rehensive of Rabeh,
he had been fairly conciliatory towards the ,ritish. ,t in the second half,
once the danger that Rabeh re!resented had been scotched, his attitde
towards the ,ritish changed abr!tly.
# factor that mst have inflenced #bdCs !olicy towards the "ro!ean
!owers was the arrival at abot this time of a large !arty of Flani and
%klor refgees from the E!!er (iger, where their !ower had recently
been broken by the French 16. %hey were led by +a$ EmarCs son, #hmad,
and, with their women and children, nmbered abot 10,000 1=. %he fact
that they were militant %i$anis cannot have commended them to the
Sltan and his advisers, who of corse were still faithfl to the :adiriyya
sect, bt they were nevertheless allowed to settle in the western !art of
the Sltanate. %hey remained there for some years, dring which time
#hmad died, bt so hostile were they to the 4hristian !owers that at the
trn of the centry, when the ,ritish sent troo!s ! the (iger to Illo, and
later to #rgng, they decided to !ll ! their roots and move frther east
where we shall enconter them again.
#s for #bd, he was !robably not altogether sorry to see them go.
(evertheless, the acconts he had heard of their clashes with the French
mst have hardened him in his new resolve to have no trck with the
,ritish. 4ertainly, from then on he became com!letely intransigent.
(otes
1. *ral tradition !reserved in Sokoto.
9. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !!. </ and 60.
1. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of %alata 'afara.
;. Ibid. +istories of %alata 'afara and %reta.
<. Sarkin ,rmi #bdlbaki, #bdlbaki %aniwaddarin %reta, Aaria, 1/<;, vol. I, !!. 136.
5. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 51.
6. P. 2. 'onteil, .e St. 2ois Z %ri!oli !ar le 2ac %chad, Paris, 1=/;.
=. Information given to the athor by a :atsina man who took !art in the e)!edition.
/. *ral tradition !reserved in #rgng and confirmed by #lha$i &naid.
10. *ral tradition !reserved in the :ebbi rling family.
11. Ibid.
19. F. "dgar, %atsniyoyi na +asa. "dinbrgh, 1/11, vol. II, !!. 1163;0. 1
11. *ral tradition !reserved in the :ebbi rling family.
1;. #lha$i &naid, oral tradition.
1<. *ral tradition !reserved in :ano and Sokoto. %he !hrase means HBor reward
Nliterally cola3ntO shall be :ano when it falls.I
15. For the family tree, see %able ; in #!!endi) II.
16. *ral tradition !reserved in :ano and Sokoto.
1=. #lha$i #bbakar, o!, cit. !. 59.
1/ #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !!. 59351.
90. >mel "mirate (otebook, +istorical (ote.
204
91. #lha$i #bbakar, o!. cit. !. 51. #liyCs mother was a daghter of Sltan #liy ,abba.
99. #lha$i #bbakar, o!. cit. !. 5<.
91. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !!. 5635=.
9;. Ibid.
9<. B. Ervoy, +istoire de lC"m!ire de ,orno, Paris, 1/;6, !. 196.
95. 4. >. ,. >idley, 'antanfasG# Stdy in *ral %radition, #frican 2angages Stdies, vol.
JI, 1/5<, !!. 1;31<.
96. %he "mir #hmad a!!arently convinced himself that he owed his defeat entirely to a
:ano astrologer. +aving indced this man to change sides, he lanched his second
attem!t. >idley, loc. cit. !. 1<.
9=. Ibid. !. 15.
9/. >idley, o!. cit. !. 15.
10. Ibid. !. 16. %his time, according to tradition, it was the :ano wizards who !revailed
and, having been ordered to cast a s!ell on #hmad, scceeded in making him ill.
11. ,ackwell, o!. cit. cf. 2etter, no. III.
19. +ertslet, o!. cit.
11. #lha$i &naid asserts that #bd never signed it and this seems to be borne ot by
+ertslet, who -otes the >wand treaty bt makes no mention of any treaty with Sokoto
in 1=/;.
1;. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 5/. *n the other hand, 2gardCs re!orts sggest that the
sbsidy was !aid in 1/00. See #nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311, !. =9.
1<. # letter written in Aaria by the Waziri ,hari to Sltan #bd has srvived saying that
he is sending RabehCs messenger on to Sokoto with an escort. See 2etter, no. // in %he
*cc!ation of +asaland.
15. :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. ;/.
16. See the second !art of (ote 15 in #!!endi) I.
1=. >azetteer of Sokoto Province, !!. 1;31<.
205
(ha'ter *wenty.*wo
A Year of 4isasters
.es!ite the fact that >oldieCs gamble in attacking (!e and florin had
a!!arently been a com!lete sccess, o!inion in 2ondon was hardening
against him. It was at last beginning to be realized that a commercial
com!any, whose first dty was to make !rofits for its shareholders, was
not a sitable instrment for the e)ection of im!erial !olicy, and that in
any case the Royal (iger 4om!any sim!ly did not !ossess the resorces in
men and materials to occ!y a territory of hndreds of thosands of
s-are miles and administer a !o!lation of many millions. Frthermore
>oldie, who was self3willed and secretive, was coming to be regarded by
!oliticians and civil servants alike with growing distrst.
With the %ories back in !ower the ,ritish >overnmentCs attitde to
im!erial res!onsibilities had in any case ndergone a marked change. Its
!olicy was no longer the !rely negative one of kee!ing the French and
>ermans ot of ,ritish s!heres of inflence with the least !ossible
e)!ense to the ")che-er. (ow, with 4hamberlain at the 4olonial *ffice,
there was a new drive towards the effective occ!ation of ,ritish
Protectorates as a necessary !reliminary to the s!!ression of abses like
slave3raiding and the develo!ment of !otential wealth.
%he days of the Royal (iger 4om!any were therefore nmbered. In 1=/6
the ,ritish >overnment, tired of having to rely on the 4om!anyCs
4onstablary to withstand the heavy !ressre of the French in the ,org
area, decided to create the West #frican Frontier Force. In the following
year they went frther and made ! their minds to revoke the 4om!anyCs
4harter and assme direct res!onsibility for the whole of the (iger
%erritories. %hese decisions were dly !t into effect and on 1 &anary
1/00 the Protectorate of (orthern (igeria was broght into being. Sir
Frederick 2gard, who had !reviosly been 4ommandant of the Frontier
Force, was a!!ointed to the new !ost of +igh 4ommissioner.
*n the srface 2gard a!!eared to be a ty!ical !rodct of his class and
age, bt in fact he was a most nsal man. +e had been edcated at a
!blic school and then, after !assing throgh Sandhrst, had gone into
the army. +aving s!ent his childhood in India, he had retrned there as a
yong soldier and had foght in three frontier cam!aigns. Entil he was
thirty, in fact, his career had been com!letely conventional. #t that !oint,
however, a tem!estos love affair with a married woman had driven him
oft this safe corse and, after carrying him dangerosly close to the
shores of insanity, had cast him !, an emotional wreck, on the shores of
#frica 1. %here his first service had been in (yasaland and Eganda. %hen
in 1=/; he had been broght to West #frica to lead the (ikki ")!edition
and three years later had been a!!ointed 4ommissioner and 4ommandant
of the West #frican Frontier Force.
When 2gard became +igh 4ommissioner he was still only forty3two. For
the !ast twelve years he had been trying to obliterate his nha!!y
206
memories by hard work and alleviate his earlier frstration throgh new
achievements. #t this !eriod, therefore, he was a dynamic and ambitios
man and a hard3driving and often ngracios master. (evertheless, even
when he was trying to e)orcize his own !rivate devils, he believed
!assionately in the im!ortance of what he was doing and, at any rate in
his lonely dedication to dty, was a man of the same stam! as 2ivingstone
and >ordon.
%he territory which 2gard took over in 1/00 was a Protectorate only in
name. ")ce!t in the neighborhood of the two great rivers, there was no
effective occ!ation or control. #nd even there (!e had reasserted its
inde!endence when the "mir #bbakr had retrned to his ca!ital and
osted >oldieCs nominee, while in llorin the "mir had resmed his attacks
on the Borbas and was disregarding all !rotests. In the north3west,
Sltan #bd had never asked for !rotection and had now become so
hostile that he cold not be e)!ected either to sbmit or negotiate. In the
north3east, Rabeh was e-ally determined to resist any frther e)tension
of "ro!ean !ower.
# few months after the new Protectorate had been declared, war broke
ot in #shanti. #t this 2gard had to agree to half the Frontier Force,
which now nmbered abot 9,<00, being sent to the >old 4oast as
reinforcements. %heir absence not only com!elled him to hold ! the !lans
that he was matring bt also encoraged the "mirs of (!e and
:ontagora to resme slave3raiding in :abba and >wari. #lthogh, as we
shall see, there was rgent need for ,ritish intervention in ,orn, the
adacity that the two "mirs were now showing convinced 2gard that his
first action mst be against them 9.
#s soon as the troo!s retrned from #shanti, therefore, 2gard gave
orders for an e)!edition to be !re!ared against ,ida and :ontagora.
,efore taking this drastic ste! he made no attem!t to get in toch with
the Sltan or the "mir of >wand to find ot whether they, as the
szerains, were willing or able to restrain their trblent vassals. For this
omission he is o!en to e)actly the same criticism as >oldie in 1=/536.
In :ontagora the first "mir, /maru "agwamatse, had died in 1=65 and
been scceeded first by his eldest son and then, when he in trn had died
in 1==0 by another son called Ibrahim 1. %his Ibrahim, a chi! off the old
block, had !rsed the same !olicy as his father, continally harrying the
!agans, !articlarly the >waris, and always looking for e)cses to
encroach !on the territory of his neighbor
In the Ceighties, when Emar of the ,ello +ose had been Sltan, Ibrahim
had had to kee! his de!redations within bonds, bt when his ncle #bd
had scceeded in Sokoto, he seems to have thrown off all restraint. +e
now divided his time between his ca!ital, :ontagora, and the military
cam! which he had established on the :ano3,ida trade rote. From this
base he levied tribte on !assing caravans and ndertook slave3raids
whenever it !leased him to do so. *ne of his ma$or sccesses was the
sack of ,irnin >wari and by 1=/; he had already devastated the contry
207
for miles arond and so disr!ted and de!o!lated it that even food was
nobtainable ;.
Q In the corse of or march from :ano to ,ida, wrote a "ro!ean
traveller, we !assed towns and villages, literally withot nmber, which
had been recently destroyed and their inhabitants sold as slaves <. R
%his descri!tion shows that nder #bdCs disastros rle !arts of the
"m!ire were sliding towards anarchy and it !erha!s hel!s to e)!lain why
2gard did not troble to seek his hel! before taking military action.
"arly in 1/01 a colmn of the West #frican Frontier Force moved against
:ontagora. Ibrahim barred its !assage in front of his ca!ital, bt he was
easily defeated and forced to flee. #fter his flight 2gard wrote to the
Sltan to e)!lain the action he had seen fit to take and to invite the
Sltan to nominate a sccessor. ,t to this letter he received no re!ly.
From :ontagora the colmn marched on to ,ida. %he "mir #bbakr,
>oldieCs old adversary, offered no resistance bt fled when the ,ritish
a!!roached. %he town was therefore occ!ied with very little fighting.
Withot waiting to conslt Sokoto or >wand abot the sccession,
2gard restored the "mir 'hammad to the throne on which >oldie had
!laced him for years earlier. #t the same time he !resented him with a
letter of a!!ointment setting ot the conditions on which he held his
office.
When 2gard retrned to his ca!ital at 2oko$a he left ,ritish Residents
behind in both ,ida and :ontagora, which ths became the head-arters
of two new Provinces in the Protectorate. %o all intents and !r!oses,
therefore, they had ceased to he !arts of the Flani "m!ire.
#lthogh the !roblems of ,orn still demanded rgent attention, 2gard
now began to think that he mst settle acconts with #damawa before
sending an e)!edition to 4had. In this he was inflenced by the fact that
river trans!ort !rovided easily the best means of reaching Bola and that
Se!tember was the only time of the year when the larger steamers cold
o!erate so far !3stream. 4onse-ently, if he did not catch the flood of
1/01 it wold mean waiting another year.
Relations between the ,ritish and the Flani of #damawa had never been
good. #s early as 1==< a wooden hlk had been towed ! to Bola to serve
as a base for the 4om!anyCs o!erations, bt in the face of o!!osition from
Sanda, who was then "mir, the ventre had withered and been
abandoned. In 1=/0 Sanda had died and been scceeded by Abeir, who
had soon allowed the trading3hlk to retrn to Bola. 'oreover, in 1=/1 he
had entered into a treaty with the 4om!any, agreeing to acce!t a sbsidy,
and for years later this agreement had been reaffirmed and slightly
am!lified 5.
In s!ite of these treaties, however, relations between the 4om!any and
the Flani had not im!roved. %o some e)tent they had been wilflly
damaged by the intriges of the French adventrer 'izon, bt the main
case of the troble had lain in the character of Abeir himself who,
thogh a man of great corage and considerable ability, was !rod,
ss!icios, and bigoted 6.
208
In 1=/6, soon after renewing the treaty with the 4om!any, Abeir had
received letters from the Sltan calling on him to e)!el the 4om!anyCs
agents from #damawa as a re!risal for the attacks on ,ida and Ilorin =.
#lthogh he had not com!lied with the order at the time, Abeir had
afterwards become more ss!icios and intolerant than ever. Faced by
this intransigence, and fortified in his resolve by re!orts abot AbeirCs
raids against his !agan neighbors and his contined dealings in slaves,
2gard came to the conclsion that he mst settle acconts with
#damawa withot frther delay. In reaching this decision he was no dobt
inflenced by the thoght that a hostile and nsbded #damawa wold
constitte a serios threat to the long lines of commnications of any
e)!editions which might be sent against ,orn.
%he Bola ")!edition was fitted ot in the rainy season of 1/01 Wallace of
the (iger 4om!any, who had become 2gardCs .e!ty, sailed with it to
take charge of !olitical negotiations. %he steamers reached Bola in early
Se!tember and, as Abeir refsed to !arley, the troo!s were !t ashore.
%hey occ!ied the town withot mch difficlty, bt were challenged in
front of the "mirCs !alace. %his was !rotected by a high wall and was
defended by AbeirCs !ersonal bodygard, who were reinforced by si)ty
veterans of RabehCs army and s!!orted by the two cannon which 'izon
had !resented to the "mir some years before /. #fter a stiff fight, in which
the ,ritish forces sffered abot ;0 casalties and the Flani 1<0, the
!alace was taken by storm 10.
When Bola fell Abeir scceeded in making his esca!e and fled across the
border to 'ara in the >erman 4ameroons. *n his way there he wrote
this letter to the Sltan.
I write to tell yo of the terrible disaster which has befallen s. %he
4hristians have made war on s. We were warned bt !aid no heed ...
and now we have been broght down by them. %hey have seized Bola bt
have not occ!ied the districts. (or have they taken me becase I made
good my esca!e. I am now three days march from Bola, seeking a dry
!lace in which to rest ntil the rains cease....
I shall not stoo! to doble3dealing between yo and the 4hristians. ,y
>od and the Pro!het, my allegiance is to yo.... "ven if all my towns are
taken from me I shall never sbmit to the Enbelievers. %he Pro!het
declared that he who dwelt with the Enbeliever shold be nmbered
among them... Peace be on him who adheres to the faith. 11
#t abot the same time Abeir sent the following message to the !eo!le
of Bola and two other towns.
I shall retrn and we shall drive ot the Enbelievers. ,t if they !rove too
strong for s yo mst leave Bola and follow me to a new contry. %he
:oran forbids yo to consort with Enbelievers.... %hey wish to take or
contry. +ave no dealings with them 19.
%hese letters show the stern, ncom!romising stff that Abeir was
made of. %he e)hortation to abandon hose and home rather than sbmit
to 4hristian domination is !articlarly interesting and we shall enconter it
again. #mong the blk of the !eo!le of #damawa, however, it evoked no
209
res!onse.
"ven so, Abeir was not yet finished. #cross the border he rosed the
Flani to an attack on the >erman force which had occ!ied >ara. %hey
were heavily defeated, however, and soon afterwards the >ermans
lanched a conterattack on AbeirCs followers in 'ara. %here the Flani
showed that the fanatical corage they had dis!layed in the $ihad was not
by any means dead. %hogh o!!osed by machine gns, some ;00 of
AbeirCs Sikirri, who had vowed to con-er or die, foght to the last man
rond his standard 11.
#fter this disaster Abeir, who had again evaded ca!tre, managed to
!reserve his liberty for another year in the hilly contry along the border
between (orthern (igeria and the 4ameroons. In the end, however, early
in 1/01, he sccmbed to the !oisoned arrows of the !agans whom he
had so long harried 1;.
'eanwhile, in Bola the ,ritish had installed AbeirCs yonger brother,
,obbo #hmad, as the new "mir. #t the same time #damawa had been
!roclaimed a Province in the Protectorate and a Resident had been
a!!ointed to take charge of it. *ne more "mirate had ths been lost to
the "m!ire.
While these events were taking !lace along the (iger and ,ene Rivers,
there had been im!ortant develo!ments in the 4had region.
&st before the end of the centry the French, in !rsit of a grand design
to stake ot claims to the whole of the interior of West #frica, had
lanched three se!arate e)!editions from (orth #frica, the 4ongo, and
Senegal with orders to march on 2ake 4had and $oin forces there. "arly in
1/00 these three colmns had dly made their rendezvos. Soon
afterwards they had broght Rabeh to battle at :sseri, on the River
2ogone, and won a crshing victory in which Rabeh had been killed 1<.
When Rabeh had marched ot to meet the French he had left his son,
Fadr #llah, in charge of .ikwa with +ayat as his second3in3command. ,y
this time +ayat had lost faith in Rabeh and he now !lanned to desert,
bt his wife, +awa, betrayed the !lot to her brother, Fadr #llah. When
+ayat and his followers sli!!ed away, therefore, they were !rsed and
overtaken by Fadr #llah with a s!erior force of cavalry. In the battle that
followed +ayat was soon killed. *nce again, however, the Flani
dis!layed their corage and devotion, for they refsed to abandon the
body of their leader and one hndred of them, foght rond him and
!erished to the last man 15.
#s for Fadr #llah, when Rabeh was defeated and killed at :sseri, he
abandoned .ikwa and led the garrison and the remnants of the army
westward into ,orn. #s he was now in the ,ritish s!here of inflence, the
French were !reclded from following him. (evertheless, to be on the safe
side, he sent a message to 2gard asking to be taken nder ,ritish
!rotection.
%hese events !t 2gard in a dilemma. +e was loath to recognize a man
who had so recently been at war with another "ro!ean nation, bt he
was not sre whether there was anyone else ca!able of rling ,orn.
210
'oreover, he was afraid that if the whole region dissolved into chaos, as it
might easily do, the French wold se the danger of anarchy as an e)cse
for ste!!ing in and occ!ying ,orn themselves 16.
,t 2gard, as we have seen, cold not move into ,orn in 1/00, becase
half the troo!s were in #shanti, nor yet in 1/01 becase of the necessity
of secring his base and sothern flank by first sbding :ontagora,
(!e, and #damawa. .ring the interval Fadr #llah, after recriting his
strength, began to raid and harry the French across the border. %his
!rovoked them into retaliation and, late in 1/01, a French colmn !rsed
him into ,ritish territory and killed him at >$ba.
%he French intervention made the effective occ!ation of ,orn absoltely
im!erative. # strong force had already been assembled at Ibi, on the
,ene, in antici!ation of this need, and early in 1/09 2gard dis!atched it
to 4had with orders to march throgh ,achi and deal with that "mirate
on the way.
In ,achi the "mir Emar had !lanned to fight, bt when he saw the
strength of the ,ritish colmn his discretion overcame his valor and he
took to flight. Wallace, who was re!resenting 2gard, there!on conslted
the "lectors and, on their advice, a!!ointed EmarCs cosin 'hammad
to scceed him 1=. ,t once again there was no consltation with the
Sltan either abot the de!osition of one "mir or the a!!ointment of the
other.
#fter leaving ,achi, WallaceCs colmn crossed the E!!er >ongola and
entered what had !reviosly been the northern !art of >ombe "mirate bt
was now the inde!endent territory of 'allam &ibrilla. (ear %ongo it was
almost ambshed by &ibrillaCs force, which consisted of 100 horse and
abot 500 foot, bt the attack was beaten off and the enemy roted. In
the ensing !rsit &ibrilla, now an elderly man, was ca!tred and sent
down to 2oko$a 1/.
%he "mir of >ombe, Emar, who had already made sbmission to the
,ritish and who was in fact riding with the colmn 90, was then formally
recognized as the rler of the "mirate and had his lost domains, inclding
the town of ,rmi, restored to him. ,ecase &ibrilla had been ca!tred, it
was mistakenly assmed that ,rmi was no longer a danger and so no
frther action was taken against its inhabitants. %his was an omission that
the ,ritish were soon to regret.
+aving dealt with &ibrilla and settled >ombe, the colmn marched on into
,orn. #fter nearly ten years of war the :anri !eo!le were so
im!overished and e)hasted that they welcomed the !ros!ect of secrity
and !eace which the ,ritish broght with them. ,kar >arbai, a great3
grandson of "l3:anemi, was formally installed and acce!ted the conditions
of his a!!ointment withot demr. ,ecase of the accidents of history,
therefore, the ancient kingdom of ,orn, which in other circmstances
might have been e)!ected to resist "ro!ean domination as vigorosly as
Sokoto, now sbmitted itself willingly to the yoke.
It was to be e)!ected that the "mirs who had been osted by the ,ritish
wold sooner or later make their way to Sokoto. Abeir of #damawa
211
wold !robably have done so if he had not been killed, bt (!e and
,achi seem to have taken refge in :ano 91 and to have made no effort
to go any farther. %his was bad enogh, bt :ontagoraCs condct was
!ositively disr!tive.
#fter the loss of his "mirate, Sarkin Sdan Ibrahim established himself
near Fatika in Aaria "mirate. It ha!!ened that at that time the "mir of
Aaria, :wasa, was not only on bad terms with the Sltan, who had not
favored his election in the first !lace 99, bt was also at fed with Sarkin
Aamfara Emar dan 'amd, the rler of the great fief of Armi in
eastern Sokoto. (ow this Emar was an old ally of Sarkin SdanCs in
e)!editions against the >wari 91 and so Sarkin Sdan took his side
against the "mir of Aaria, or at any rate sed his allyCs fed as a licence
for indiscriminate attacks on AariaCs neighboring towns and villages. %he
reslt was that in the latter !art of 1/01 a minor civil war develo!ed in
Aaria "mirate between the forces of the "mir on one side and those of
Sarkin Sdan and Sarkin Aamfara on the other. %he "mir scceeded in
shifting Sarkin Sdan from Fatika to :aya bt failed to drive him ot
altogether 9;. In the meantime his !eo!le were sffering so severely that
early in 1/09 he determined to call for hel!.
In Sokoto, #bd was now in his seventy3third year and nearing the end of
his life. Senility seems to have overtaken him becase, while his "m!ire
was disintegrating arond him, he sat in his ca!ital and concerned himself
chiefly in kee!ing ot local traders, !articlarly Borbas, whom he
imagined to be agents sent by the ,ritish to s!y ot the land 9<. #!art
from some rather ineffective remonstrances, however, he had done
nothing to restrain his ne!hew Ibrahim and Emar dan 'amd from
ravaging northern Aaria. It was therefore natral for the "mir of Aaria to
conclde that there was no hel! to be had from him. Instead he a!!ealed
to 2gard who, having moved his head-arters from 2oko$a to &ebba and
then from &ebba to Anger, was by this time in a mch better !osition
than before to hel! him.
"arly in 1/09, in res!onse to this a!!eal, 2gard sent a com!any of
'onted Infantry against Sarkin Sdan. %hey advanced so ra!idly that
they took him com!letely by sr!rise. #lthogh he was srronded by his
own !eo!le in his war3cam!, he offered little resistance and was haled
off into ca!tivity. #t the same time a garrison was established near Aaria
city and a Resident was a!!ointed to take charge of this new Province of
the Protectorate.
For Sokoto and >wand the !ast twelve months had broght one disaster
after another, each more damaging than the last. First :ontagora and
(!e had been van-ished and their "mirs driven into e)ile. (e)t
#damawa had been occ!ied and the 2amido had become a hnted
fgitive. #fter that ,achi had ca!itlated withot a strggle and had
s!inely acce!ted the new "mir a!!ointed by the +igh 4ommissioner.
%hen, worse still, the "mir of >ombe had allied himself to the ,ritish and
acce!ted at their hands the restoration of the lost !rovinces which, in the
!revios decade, his rightfl szerains had made no effort to recover for
212
him. #nd finally, worst of all, the "mir of Aaria had ignored the Sltan and
volntarily delivered ! his "mirate to the occ!ation of the ,ritish.
When 2gard had sent a message to Sokoto after the ca!tre of
:ontagora and the occ!ation of ,ida, #bd had not deigned to answer.
,t in 'ay 1/09, moved no dobt by the series of disasters for which he
considered the ,ritish res!onsible, he at last broght himself to re!ly 95.
Enlike his other acts of intransigence had a certain defiant granderD
From s to yo. :now that I do not consent to any of yor !eo!le dwelling
among s. I myself shall never be reconciled to yo, nor shall I !ermit any
frther dealings with yo. +enceforth there shall be no e)changes
between s save those between 'oslems and Enbelievers3+oly War as the
#lmighty has en$oined on s. %here is neither athority nor !ower save in
>od on high 96.
(otes
1. 'argery Perham, 2gardD %he Bears of #dventre, 2ondon, 1/<5, !!. </361.
9. #nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311, !. 11.
1. >azetteer of :ontagora Province, !. 11. Ibrahim is often referred to as (agwamatse,
bt this is incorrect as the nickname was his fatherCs, not his.
;. Robinson, o!. cit. !!. 9193;9.
<. Ibid. !. 111.
5. :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. ;/.
6. >azetteer of Bola Province, !!. 90399.
=. :irk3>reene, o!. cit, !. ;/.
/. >azetteer of Bola Province, !!. 91399.
10. :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !!. <63<=.
11. ,ackwell, o!. cit. cf. 2etter, no. 119.
19. 4f. :irk3>reene, o!. cit. !. </.
11. >azetteer of Bola Province, !. 99
1;. Ibid.
1<. >entil, o!. cit.
15. #le)ander, o!. cit. !!. 9013;.
16. #nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311, !!. 5135=.
1=. >azetteer of ,achi Province, !!. 11319.
1/. #nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311, !!. 5<355.
90. >azetteer of ,achi Province, !. 1;.
91. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
99. '. >. Smith, o!. cit. !!. 1/13;.
91. >azetteer of :ontagora Province, !. 11. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid.
9;. "dges, o!. cit. vol. I, !!. 1/13;.
9<. Ibid. vol. II, !art II, no. 1<.
95. #nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311, !!. =9 and 1</.
96. #s the original of this letter has not been !reserved, its athenticity has been called
in -estion. See .. &. '. 'ffett, 4oncerning ,rave 4a!tains, 2ondon, 1/5;, !!. ;93<1.
%his !ossibility and 2gardCs dealings with Sltan #bd and his sccessor are e)amined
more closely in #!!endi) III.
213
(ha'ter *wenty.*hree
*he +all of $okoto
%he events of 1/0139 had !rodced a decisive shift in the balance of
!ower between the Flani and the ,ritish.
*n the Flani side the loss or defection of all the sothern "mirates meant
that the "m!ire had now been redced to little more than Sokoto,
>wand, :ano, :atsina, +adei$a, :atagm, .ara, :azare, and Bari.
>iven strong leadershi! their forces cold still have been welded into a
!owerfl combination. It was the misfortne of the Flani, however, that
at a time when they sorely needed another ,ello to lead them ot of their
difficlties they were saddled instead with an incom!etent and now senile
tyrant.
*n the ,ritish side 2gard, in the smmer of 1/09, was faced with the
most serios decision that he had yet had to take, whether to treat with
the Sltan as before or to force the isse. %he whole !roblem was
bedevilled by the vageness of the treaties. When the Protectorate had
been declared, 2gard had written to #bd saying that the >overnment
had assmed all the 4om!anyCs obligations nder the treaties and wold
honor them. %his letter had never been answered, however, and so it
was not even certain that the Sltan still recognized them 1.
In 1/09 2gard soght the advice of his 4hief &stice on the validity and
sco!e of the treaties. +e was advised that nder the third treaty the
Sltan had srrendered his inde!endence and that, having once done so,
he had also srrendered his !ower to re!diate the treaty which was
therefore still valid and binding 9. #s it was very dobtfl whether #bd
had ever signed the treaty, which in any case made no mention of
sovereignty or its srrender, this advice a!!ears today to be astonishingly
tendentios. 2gard himself seems to have recognized that there was too
mch casistry in the argment and that he cold !lace little reliance on
the treaties in !ersading the Sltan to acce!t ,ritish !rotection and
gidance.
For 2gard the need to reach a satisfactory settlement was becoming
increasingly rgent. First of all there was the awkward fact that an #nglo3
French ,ondary 4ommission was abot to demarcate the international
frontier between the (iger and 2ake 4had? as things were, he cold not
garantee their safety and yet if he asked for the work to be deferred it
wold be a !blic admission that the ,ritish were not in control of the
territory which they had so insistently claimed.
In addition to this, however, there were other considerations that !robably
weighed more heavily with 2gard. +e was a man of !rinci!le and he held
strong views abot the moral obligation of >reat ,ritain to bring !eace,
order, and good government to the Protectorate. ,eing a creative idealist
as well, he was also nderstandably im!atient to settle the !olitical and
military !roblems so that he cold bckle down to the tasks of
reconstrction and develo!ment which interested him most.
214
#ll these factors dobtless !layed their !art in !ersading 2gard that he
wold have to send an e)!editionary force against :ano and Sokoto to
overawe and if necessary sb$gate them. #bdCs defiant letter of 'ay
1/09 seems to have finally convinced him that this was the only !ossible
corse. +e was still dobtfl whether the ,ritish >overnment wold agree
with him, however, and so he !ressed on with his arrangements withot
divlging his intentions to the 4olonial *ffice. (evertheless, by mid3
smmer it was common knowledge among the officers who were closest
to him that in the coming dry season he intended to march against
Sokoto.
#s the year wore on the Flani leaders got !lenty of warning that the
,ritish were !re!aring for a fresh move. %he "mir of :ano, for e)am!le,
received the following letter from a corres!ondent in Aaria.
%he !r!ose of my letter is to inform yo of the coming of the 4hristians.
%hey have increased in nmbers and established themselves more firmly
than before. #s for the others, they have come to :waba and are bsy
collecting stores for war. %hey declare that when they have finished what
they are doing they will go on to :ano. It is to give yo this news that I
am writing 1.
In a second letter he informed #liy that the ,ritish had started work on
im!roving the road, or rather track, from Aaria to :ano and that they
were e)!ecting reinforcements from ,achi ;. In a third and final letter he
wrote with a !lain note of rgency.
%his is to let yo know that the 4hristians who were said to be coming
from ,achi have now arrived.... %hey are mstering here and intend to
go on to :ano. 'ay >od remember and !rotect s. . . <
%he gist of this and similar intelligence reaching the "mir of :ano was
!assed on by him to Sokoto 5. In addition, thogh the letters have not
srvived, it can be taken as certain that the Sltan and the Waziri were
ke!t informed by other corres!ondents of 2gardCs !re!arations.
%here is no dobt, therefore, that by the late smmer or early atmn of
1/09 the Flani leaders were flly aware of the danger that threatened
them. Enfortnately for their case, however, they cold not agree on
how they shold meet it. %o 2gard there seemed to be bt two
alternatives to fight or to negotiate G bt to them there were threeD to
fight, to negotiate, or to emigrate en masse 6.
%o the Flani, who had only ceased to be nomads in com!aratively recent
times, the idea of a mass migration was !erfectly feasible. Indeed, a belief
was crrent that Sheh himself had foretold that one day sch a migration
wold take them to the +e$az and the holy !laces of Islam =. #fter the
defeat at Bola, this was the corse that the "mir had called on his !eo!le
to ado!t. (ow the !olicy fond a new advocate in the "mir of :ano, who
wrote to the Waziri ,hari in the following termsD
I have received yor letter and I nderstand from it that my advice
commends itself to yo. ,oth of s are seeking what will serve or religion
best in the long rn. #s I said in my last letter, I still believe that, as these
dogs have srronded s and now threaten to overwhelm s, the best
215
!lan is for all tre 'oslems to abandon this contry. %hat is my firm
conviction and I !ray that yor eyes too may be o!ened to this reality.
'ay >od hel! s and lighten or brdens /.
%here were others, however, who considered that it wold be calamitos
for the Flani case if the +asa !o!lation ever got an inkling that the
!ossibility of migration was so mch as being considered. 2ater in the,
year, for e)am!le, the 'arafa 'aitrare, the hero of the Flani conter3
attack at the battle of #rgng, wrote to the Sltan in the following termsD
I earnestly beseech yo, in >odCs name, let no3one in this land hear from
yor li!s any hint of or de!artre for this wold mean the rin of or
case. *n hearing sch news the !eo!le wold certainly throw off their
allegiance to s and we shold get none of the hel! which they have
!romised. 2et s therefore wait and see how things trn ot. +el! lies
with >od alone .... 10
In the Flani cam! this debate contined throghot the rest of the year
1/09 and into the early !art of 1/01. It was one of the factors that
broght abot the !aralysis of will which now seemed to afflict them when
their whole ftre was in $eo!ardy.
#s the dry season a!!roached, tension between the Flani and the ,ritish
gradally monted ntil early in *ctober when there were two im!ortant
develo!ments which affected the ftre corse of events.
%he little "mirate of :effi, lying soth3west of the Platea and only fifty
miles from the ,ene, has already been mentioned. It belonged to the
second generation of the Flani family of States and owed allegiance
throgh Aaria to Sokoto. .ring the latter !art of the centry the "mirs of
Aaria had ado!ted the !ractice of maintaining one of their own officials at
the 4ort of :effi to watch their interests 11. %his !ost was now occ!ied
by the 'aga$i .an Bamsa, an intre!id warrior, a redobtable slave3
raider, and a man of dynamic !ersonality. %hogh in theory he was only
the !ower behind the throne, he was in fact more !owerfl than the "mir
himself 19.
:effi, however, was also one of the "mirates that had made treaties with
the Royal (iger 4om!any 11 and on the strength of these treaties, when
the Protectorate came into being, the "mirate was embodied into
(assarawa Province. Frthermore, in &ly 1/09, after the "mir of Aaria,
:wasa, had made sbmission to the +igh 4ommissioner, the
head-arters of the Province were moved to :effi town and the Resident,
4a!tain 'oloney, took ! his !ost there with a detachment of troo!s to
s!!ort him 1;.
#s the 'aga$i was not withdrawn when 'oloney arrived, there were now
in effect two Residents in :effi, one Flani and the other ,ritish. So long
as relations between the +igh 4ommissioner and the "mir of Aaria
remained cordial, all went well. In Se!tember, however, 2gard fond it
necessary to have :wasa !t nder detention and removed from his
ca!ital 1<. When news of this action reached :effi it natrally !rodced
e)treme tension between 'oloney and the 'aga$i.
%hogh he had troo!s on call 'oloney was relctant to se them and tried
216
to assert his athority by !eacefl means withot recorse to force. ,t
he had mis$dged his man and, on 1 *ctober 1/09, he was sddenly set
!on by the 'aga$i and his armed followers in the middle of the town and
killed. +is !olitical agent, Audu *intin, was also hnted down and
dis!atched 15.
#fter committing this deed 7which had little enogh to e)cse it becase
'oloney was narmed at the time and, being lame from an earlier wond,
was nable either to defend himself or esca!e8 the 'aga$i and his
followers fled north. %hey avoided Aaria, where there was now a ,ritish
garrison, and made their way straight to :ano. %here they were well
received by the "mir #liy 15.
When news of 'oloneyCs death reached 2gard it strengthened his resolve
to force the isse with :ano and Sokoto.
If the life of a "ro!ean can be taken with im!nity the !restige of the
>overnment wold be gone, and !restige is another word for self3
!reservation in a contry where millions are rled by a few score. In my
o!inion the >overnment owes it to every ,ritish *fficer called !on to
serve in distant districts among trblent !eo!le to take !rom!t and
effective measres in sch a case or the lives of its servants wold not be
safe.... I felt that I had no o!tion bt to attem!t the arrest of the 'aga$i
to the ttermost limits of the Protectorate .... 16
2gardCs !lans for sending an e)!edition against :ano and Sokoto were
already well advanced and now the death of 'oloney and the sanctary
given to the 'aga$i in :ano had !rovided him with what he had !reviosly
lacked, namely a good !rete)t for resorting to force. &st then, however,
another event of radical im!ortance occrred which o!ened ! the
!ossibility of a !eacefl settlement and which shold therefore have given
him !ase.
*n / *ctober, less than a week after the assassination of 'oloney, Sltan
#bd died in Wrno and three days later his ne!hew, 'hammad
#ttahir, was a!!ointed to scceed him 1=. (ews of the old tyrantCs death
reverberated rond +asaland and mst have reached 2gardCs ears
within a matter of days. %he new Sltan, thogh a devot 'oslem, was a
reasonable and o!en3minded man and it wold in fact have been !ossible
to negotiate with him 1/. 2gard cold not be e)!ected to know this, of
corse, bt e-ally he had no right to assme that #ttahir wold !rove
to be as bigoted and intransigent as #bd. Enfortnately, however, his
mind was now made ! and he was not !re!ared to !ost!one the
!ro$ected e)!edition to see whether negotiation with the new Sltan
wold lead to a !eacefl settlement. For this !reci!itancy he cannot
esca!e the censre of history.
If #bdCs death came too late to deflect 2gard from his !r!ose, it at
least had a saltary effect on the cohesion of the Flani. #lthogh after
the termination of the :ano civil war the old Sltan had accorded formal
recognition to #liy as "mir of :ano, there had nevertheless remained a
legacy of distrst between them. #s a reslt of it, #liy had never made
the $orney to Sokoto, as tradition and cortesy demanded, to !ay
217
homage to his overlord.
When #ttahir scceeded as Sltan, #liy evidently thoght that it was
time to re!air this omission. +e !robably also felt that a visit wold
!rovide him with a good o!!ortnity for im!roving relations between :ano
and Sokoto and for !ressing his view that a mass migration was
!referable either to sbmission or war. #t the beginning of &anary 1/01
he therefore set ot for Sokoto at the head of abot half his fighting men
90. If the ob$ect of this move had been to form a military concentration in
Sokoto, in !re!aration for a decisive battle, the strategy wold have been
sond. #s this was not the !r!ose, however, it was rash to the !oint of
folly, for it divided the :ano forces at a critical moment and left the city,
which after Sokoto itself was the most valable !rize in the "m!ire,
e)!osed and vlnerable.
#lthogh among the Flani and the ,ritish in (igeria it had been common
knowledge for some time that an e)!edition was being !re!ared against
:ano and Sokoto, 2gard had still not broght himself to divlge his !lans
to the 4olonial Secretary. %his omission was not inadvertent bt
n-estionably deliberate. +e knew that in "ngland the bloodshed and
waste of the ,oer War had !rodced a change of mood in the !blic and
becase of it the >overnment were now loath to allow any moves which
might be condemned as fresh colonial adventres.
Fearing that timid !oliticians advised by catios civil servants wold veto
his !lans if he revealed them !rematrely, he resorted to varios
sbterfges to kee! them masked ntil the !oint3of3no3retrn had been
reached and !assed. In this way he scceeded in forcing the hand of the
,ritish >overnment and obtaining a!!roval for a !lan which, if it had been
sbmitted at the right time and in the !ro!er way, wold in all !robability
have been trned down 91.
If the methods which 2gard em!loyed to get his way were -estionable,
his motives, to give him his de, were !rely altristic. +e was im!atient
to stam! ot slave3raiding and other abses. +e wanted a free hand to
introdce the reforms that were later to make him famos. +e was
convinced that he cold transform the lives of the !eo!le for whose
welfare he regarded himself res!onsible. %hese were worthy as!irations
which he was later to flfil in am!le measre. %he fact remains, however,
that by refsing to delay his military o!erations in order to negotiate with
the new Sltan he !reci!itated a war which it might have been !ossible to
avoid.
%he :ano3Sokoto ")!edition set off from Aaria at the end of January
,;:C nder the command of 4olonel 'orland. Its strength was ;0 ,ritish
officers and (.4.*.s and =00 #frican rank and file. #!art from a com!any
of monted infantry and a few gnners, the whole force consisted of
infantry. %hey were s!!orted, however, by for 6<3mm. montain gns,
which cold if necessary be dismantled and trans!orted by !orters, and by
si) machine gns.
%he ma$ority of the troo!s were +asas. %hey were retrning to their own
contry !rely as mercenaries, not becase they had any thoghts of
218
revenging themselves !on the Flani. %hogh mercenaries, they made
fine soldiers and were brave, loyal, stoical, cheerfl, and togh 99.
Frthermore, being veterans of other cam!aigns, they were seasoned and
confident.
%he distance from Aaria to :ano is $st nder a hndred miles. %he troo!s
were o!!osed at only one !lace, ,ebe$i, and covered the grond in five
days. When they reached the city, however, they fond the newly re!aired
walls manned and the massive gates closed against them.
It has been cstomary in the !ast to describe the ca!tre of :ano as if it
was a great feat of arms. %he trth is that, with the "mir and half his
army away in Sokoto, the defenders had a ho!eless task. #s the +asa
!o!lation remained !assive, neither hel!ing nor hindering the Flani,
there were not nearly enogh troo!s to man the eleven miles of
fortifications and defend the thirteen gates. #ll that the ,ritish needed to
do, therefore, was to blow in one of the gates and !t a storming !arty
throgh it before the defence cold rally and conter3attack. %his they
accom!lished with negligible casalties. ,efore long the city was theirs.
In a military sense, :ano was an em!ty shell and its ca!tre a hollow
victory. (evertheless, it was still the greatest city of +asaland and its fall
shook the "m!ire.
2gardCs original orders to his commander were that he shold first take
:ano and then, after sending the Sltan a message to e)!lain his motives
for having done so, march on Sokoto. #fter the fall of :ano, however, he
became convinced that the Sltan wold ca!itlate and so he sent a
message to ,rigadier3>eneral :emball, who had now taken over
command from 4olonel 'orland, cancelling these orders and instrcting
him instead to make :ano im!regnable and the :ano3Aaria line of
commnications absoltely secre. :emball was free to defend himself in
case he was $eo!ardized by s!erior forces bt was to take no
nnecessary offensive action. %he res!onsibility for making any frther
move against Sokoto wold rest solely on him 91.
,y this time 2gard had moved ! to Aaria, where he was $st as well
!laced as :emball in :ano for commnicating with the Sltan. It was
therefore e)traordinary that he, of all !eo!le, shold have delegated the
task of making this decision, which was essentially !olitical, to a soldier. It
was all the more e)traordinary in that he was ot of sym!athy with
:emball and had only relctantly agreed, at the insistence of 2ondon, to
his taking over the command of the e)!edition from 'orland 9;. What
was most e)traordinary of all was that, althogh the letters that he wrote
to his wife at this time show that he was very critical of the action which
:emball decided to take 9<, he made no attem!t to halt him or resme
the athority that he had delegated. Indeed, his condct at this time was
so strange and ncharacteristic that it sggests that he had to some
e)tent lost his nerve and was ensring, in case of failre, that :emball,
whom the Secretary of State had forced on him, shold carry at least !art
of the blame 95. Whatever his motives, his abrogation of his
res!onsibilities dring this critical !eriod had the effect of leaving control
219
in the hands of the soldiers, who were !rimarily concerned with forcing a
-ick military decision, and so materially redced the chance of a !eacefl
settlement with Sokoto.
'eanwhile, in :ano re!orts were beginning to reach :emball and 'orland
that the fgitives from the cityCs defenders had $oined ! in Aamfara with
the :ano army which was retrning from Sokoto. %he move that the
,ritish had most case to fear was the bilding ! of a hostile coalition.
,elieving that this !rocess might be beginning, :emball now decided that
he mst at all costs forestall it. #nd so on 15 Febrary, leaving a small
garrison in :ano, he took the field again.
%he re!orts which had reached the ,ritish in :ano, thogh e)aggerated,
were basically correct. %he "mir of :ano had in fact left Sokoto at abot
the time that the ,ritish had ca!tred his ca!ital. +e was in Aamfara when
the news reached him, broght by fgitives, and he was flabbergasted by
it.
#fter a few daysC indecision he determined that he at any rate wold carry
ot the !lan that he had nsccessflly rged on the Sltan. *ne night,
therefore, accom!anied only by a small !arty of women and slaves, he
sli!!ed away from his cam! G again in disgise G with the intention of
emigrating to #rabia. ,t his road lay throgh the territory of the >obir
diehards, who !enetrated his disgise, took him !risoner, and later
handed him over to the ,ritish 96.
*n the morning after the "mirCs flight, when news of his disa!!earance
s!read abroad, the :ano forces fell into com!lete confsion. Some of the
leaders favored one corse, some another, bt none !ossessed the
statre to im!ose his will on the others. %he army therefore broke ! into
two main gro!s. %he larger body, avoiding :emballCs advancing colmn,
made their way to :ano, where they sbmitted to the ,ritish athorities
and laid down their arms. %heir leader, the Wambai #bbas, having been
chosen by the "lectors, was soon afterwards installed by 2gard as the
new
"mir of :ano.
'eanwhile, the other gro!, which was led by the Waziri #hmad 9=,
contined its eastward march with the intention not of avoiding bt of
seeking battle. It was too far soth to meet the main ,ritish colmn, bt
near :otorkoshi it ran into a half3com!any of 'onted Infantry, which was
reconnoitring and covering the flank of :emballCs advance. %he
engagement that followed was a classic of its kind, a contest between
modern wea!ons and disci!lined stanchness on the one hand and
s!erior nmbers and reckless corage on the other. %he 'onted
Infantry formed a little s-are, which had only eleven men on each face,
and dring the ne)t two hors withstood twelve se!arate charges. ,y the
narrowest of margins the s-are held ot and when the fighting was over
the victors conted si)ty3five bodies scattered rond it. #mong them was
the Waziri #hmad, who ths fond the death which he had deliberately
set ot to seek.
While these events were taking !lace in Aamfara, the Sltan had still not
220
made ! his mind whether to fight or negotiate. "arlier in the month he
had received from 4olonel 'orland a letter written on 2gardCs instrctions
to e)!lain that the ,ritish had moved against :ano becase the "mir had
received the 'aga$i of :effi with honor and had shown that he wanted
war. %he letter went on to say that the ,ritish were now contine to
Sokoto and that they intended to install a Resident and a garrison.
(evertheless, they did not wish for war nless the Flani themselves
soght it and if they were received in !eace the Sltan wold retain his
!osition and no harm wold come to any of his !eo!le. If he wished to
show his friendshi!, however, he mst co3o!erate in bringing the 'aga$i
to $stice.
%he moderate tone of 'orlandCs letter did not disgise the fact that it
contained an ltimatm. What the ,ritish were offering was a straight
choice between !eace on their terms, which were not ngeneros, and
war.
%his message !t #ttahir in a !osition of e)traordinary difficlty. #s he
was 4ommander of the Faithfl as well as Sltan of Sokoto, the !roblem
was as mch religios as !olitical or military. +is own inclination was
towards the soltion of a mass migration 9/, bt as no decision in favor
of this corse had been reached dring the "mir of :anoCs visit, it is safe
to assme that o!!osition to it was still strong and o!inion divided. +aving
been in office for less than si) months, #ttahir was nwilling to take so
fatefl a decision by himself. #s his 4oncillors also seem to have been
ncertain in their views, he made ! his mind to conslt the learned men
of the Sltanate, who in any case regarded themselves as the s!irital
heirs of the $ihad and the kee!ers of the !blic conscience, and to abide
by their decision 10.
While he was waiting for this !arliament of divines to assemble, #ttahir
sent the following letter to 'orland, who by this time had already set ot
from :anoD
Saltations. :now that yor messenger has arrived here and that I
nderstand the !r!ort of yor letter. %o consider it I have smmoned all
my advisers bt, as they will take some time to assemble, I am sending
this message back to yo withot delay. 2ater, when we have agreed
!on or !olicy, I shall write again to inform yo what corse my
consellors have en$oined !on me 11.
When this letter reached 'orland and :emball they !robably assmed
that #ttahir was !laying for time while he mobilized his army. #t any
rate, they did not delay their march bt !ressed on towards Sokoto.
%ime was already rnning ot when the learned men of Sokoto, at length
assembled to consider what the SltanCs decision shold be. %he ma$ority
of them were not !ractical men of affairs bt scholars and $rists.
4onse-ently, they took little accont of the fact that no hel! was to be
e)!ected from the rest of the "m!ire, that the city wall of Sokoto was
crmbling 19, that the SltanCs forces had not yet been concentrated, and
that in any case they !ossessed no answer to the modern arms of the
,ritish. %heir verdict was that it was nthinkable for the 4ommander of
221
the Faithfl to sbmit volntarily to a 4hristian !ower and that he mst
fight and if necessary die. >reatly to his credit, as he disagreed with it,
#ttahir acce!ted their $dgement.
.ring the ne)t few days the Sltan was able to call ! his troo!s from all
the districts of western Sokoto, bt there was no time to bring men in
from Aamfara, or frther afield. (or had any hel! arrived from >wand or
:atsina. For the last decisive battle, therefore, the "m!ire was able to
de!loy only a fraction of what had once been its total strength.
%he ,ritish force a!!roached Sokoto from the soth and a!!eared before
the city at abot noon. #fter !itching cam!, they made a reconnaissance
in force in the afternoon to e)amine the grond over which they wold
have to fight and to stdy the !ositions which the Flani intended to take
!. In the corse of this reconnaissance they were attacked by a few
fanatics, who went bravely to their deaths, bt there was no other fighting
11.
,y daybreak on the following day, $unday, ,1 March ,;:C, the Sokoto
army was drawn ! in three divisions on the common soth of the city. In
the centre was the Sltan himself. +e took ! his !osition at the foot of a
fan3!alm and his flag was set ! beside him. %he right wing, which
covered the #tik >ate, was commanded by the 'arafa 'aitrare, the left
by Sarkin Rabah Ibrahim 1;.
%he ,ritish force marched ot of cam! at si) oCclock in the morning and
abot an hor later reached the ridge from which 'orland had made his
reconnaissance on the !revios evening. ,eing se!arated from the Sokoto
army by only a shallow valley, the infantry now formed a s-are and the
'onted Infantry took ! !ositions on the flanks. When all was ready they
advanced catiosly across the valley. #s soon as they had crossed it the
for machine3gns were set ! in !ositions where, at a range of si) to
eight hndred yards, they covered the serried ranks in which the SltanCs
army was drawn !.
#s for the Flani, $st as they were !re!aring to deliver their cavalry
charge across the o!en grond of the common, they fond themselves
being raked by a merciless fire from the machine3gns. #t the same time
6<3mm. shells from the gns also started dro!!ing among them. Some
who tried to charge the ,ritish !osition fond that their horses wold not
face the racket bt swerved away to left and right 1<. *thers, who
remained in the line of battle waiting for orders which were drowned in
the din of battle, saw great swathes being ct throgh their ranks. %he
trth was that warfare of two different ages of history had come into
collision and there was never any -estion of which of them wold !revail.
#s soon as he realized that there was no ho!e of coming to gri!s with the
,ritish, the 'arafa 'aitrare gallo!ed over from his !osition on the right
to rge the Sltan to abandon the battle.
G ,eware, he said, lest the fire be e)tingished while yo hold it.
,y this he meant that if the Sltan !ersisted in a ho!eless strggle he
might be gilty of destroying the whole heritage and !osterity of the
Flani. ,t the Sltan was made of sterner stff than his brother.
222
G .o yo think, he demanded angrily, that this is my first battleP 15
%he 'arafa, who had already had two horses hit nder him, was now
wonded in the sholder, and the 'a$asirdi, one of the hosehold slaves,
was killed. #t this the Waziri ,hari intervened and told the Sltan that
from then on the blood of all those who fell in the battle wold be on his
head 16
SaCi Emar, the hereditary standard3bearer and the grandson of Ibrahim
'ai3%ta, who had been one of ShehCs standard3bearers, corageosly
!held the flag as a rallying !oint for the Flani forces. %hey became the
target of the machine3gnners, however, and were mown down to the last
man 1=.
#t this the Flani forces began to melt away and the Sltan at last allowed
his horse to be led from the field. It was the end not only of a battle bt
virtally of an e!och. %here remained only the last act in which the
nha!!y #ttahir had to !lay ot the tragic !art that fate had assigned to
him.
(otes
1. #nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311, !. =1.
9. 4olonial *ffice File, no. 4* ;;5[10, !. /.
1. ,ackwell, o!. cit. cf. 2etter, no. 11/.
;. Ibid. 2etter, no. 190.
<. Ibid. cf. 2etter, no. 191.
5. Ibid. 2etter, no. 19;.
6. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 60.
=. 'ffett, o!. cit. !. 1;6.
/. ,ackwell, o!. cit. cf. 2etter, no. 19<.
10 ,ackwell, o!. cit. cf. 2etter, no. 19=.
11. (otes on (assarawa Province, !. 6.
19. 'ffett, o!. cit. !. 5;.
11. Flint, o!. cit. !. 11/.
1;. (otes on (assarawa Province, !. 6.
1<. >azetteer of Aaria Province, !. 1;.
15. 'ffett, o!. cit. !!. 5935=.
16. #nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311, !!. 6<35.
1=. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 60.
1/. 'ffett, o!. cit. !!. 1;13;.
90. #lha$i #bbakar, o!. cit. !. 60.
91. See #!!endi) III.
99. Jandeler, who saw service in both "ast and West #frica, thoght that the +asas
made the best soldiers in #frica. See S. Jandeler, 4am!aigning on the E!!er (ile and
(iger, 2ondon, 1=/=.
91. 'ffett, o!. cit. !. 105.
9;. Perham, 2gardD %he Bears of #thority, 2ondon, 1/50, !. 100.
9<. Perham, 2gardD %he Bears of #thority, !. 190.
95. For a more detailed accont of these events, see #!!endi) Ill.
96. Folkes, loc. cit. !!. ;9/316. %he >eneral, then a sbaltern, rode 16< miles in three
days and two nights in order to collect the "mir from the >obirawa, an e)traordinary feat
of endrance in the Sahara beat.
9=. In :ano the title of Waziri had less im!ortance than in Sokoto and the holder was not
the chief minister. #hmad was actally a yonger brother of the "mir #liy ,abba. See
%able ; in #!!endi) II.
9/. #lha$i &naid, o!. cit. !. 60.
10. *ral tradition !reserved in Sokoto.
223
11. #nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311, #!!endi) I, cf. 2etter, no. 6.
19. 4onfirmed by #lha$i &naid. Fifty years earlier ,arth had described the wall as being
only twelve feet high 7%ravels, vol. IJ, P. 16=8.
11. &ohnston, o!. cit. !!. 1<=3/.
1;. Information given to the athor by srvivors of the battle.
1<. #ccont of the battle given to the athor by a srvivor.
15. Information given to the athor by the 'a$asirdi, a srvivor of the battle and the son
and sccessor of the 'a$asirdi who was killed at the SltanCs side. See &ohnston, o!. cit.
!!. 9</359.
16. Information given to the athor by the 'a$asirdi, 'allam (agwamatse, and others.
1=. Sokoto .(,s, +istory of :ilgori.
224
E'ilogue
#fter the battle of Sokoto the defeated Flani gallo!ed away in small
gro!s heading north and east. ,efore they dis!ersed, the Sltan #ttahir
absolved his 4oncillors and closest followers from their allegiance and left
to each of them the decision whether to accom!any him into e)ile or
retrn and seek the indlgence of the ,ritish 1. %he ma$ority, when they
fond that the con-erors were behaving magnanimosly, went back and
made their !eace. #mong them were the Waziri ,hari, the 'arafa
'aitrare, and most of the Flani aristocracy.
%he Sltan, however, evidently felt that it was im!ossible for him to
sbmit. #ccom!anied by his !ersonal followers he therefore trned
towards the east and, having shaken off the !rsit, which in any case
was only halfhearted, made his way to >andi. #fter slee!ing there he
traversed the >ndmi ,sh and on the third day reached the E!!er Rima
Jalley at Shinkafe 9.
Finding that the ,ritish were !reocc!ied with their own affairs in Sokoto,
:atsina, and Aaria, #ttahir was able to s!end abot three weeks in
Aamfara withot being molested. #t this time his force was re!orted to
nmber several hndred horse and foot and abot two thosand cam!
followers 1. ,t the demonstrations of loyalty which his !resence evoked
in Aamfara came to the ears of the ,ritish and alarmed them sfficiently
to send ot flying colmns from Sokoto and Aaria. ,y this time, however,
he was on the move again and he managed to ot3distance one colmn
and elde the other.
From Aamfara he and his followers headed east again, !assing north of
Aaria and kee!ing well to the soth of :ano. # third colmn nder 4a!tain
Sword, which had been sent ot from :ano, failed to ca!tre them bt
!ressed them very hard and engaged them in a nmber of minor actions
;.
.ring this !eriod, which lasted from mid3'arch to mid3'ay, #ttahir
seems to have had no clear ob$ective. It is !robable that he was receiving
conflicting advice from his adherents and that he himself was still
ndecided abot sbmitting, emigrating, or contining to defy the ,ritish.
With the "ro!eans firmly established rond 2ake 4had, the door to the
east was no longer o!en. #s for the north, the fgitive "mir of :anoCs
recent hmiliating e)!erience mst have discoraged any attem!t to
esca!e in that direction. 4onse-ently, when he reached the north3
eastern bondary of the "m!ire at 'isa and fond the gates of the town
sht against him <, he made no attem!t to break ot bt instead trned
sothward.
Still harried by Sword he crossed the >ongola River near the to! of its
bend and fond himself near 'allam &ibrillaCs town of ,rmi. #lthogh
&ibrilla himself had already been defeated by the ,ritish and carried off
into e)ile, the !lace was still fll of his fanatical followers, who were now
led by a new Imam called 'sa. %hey accorded the former Sltan a
225
res!ectfl greeting 5 and if at that time he had been determined to fight
on at all costs he wold dobtless have $oined them withot frther ado.
#s it was, however, he seems still to have been in two minds for he
!assed on to ,ima +ill.
,ima, a long saddleback, lies east of and !arallel to the >ongola River in
the reach where it trns soth towards the ,ene Jalley. *ver the years
a!ocaly!tic legends had gathered abot it and one of these foretold that
one day the Flani wold rally there before migrating en masse to the holy
cities of the +e$az. It seems to have been these legends that attracted
#ttahir and his followers, for in the middle of 'ay they encam!ed at the
foot of the hill 6.
In the meantime the ,ritish, who at first had nderrated #ttahir and
made little effort to ca!tre him, had now become thoroghly alarmed by
the re!orts that were reaching them. %hese s!oke of the !easantry
deserting their villages in thosands in order to follow the fgitive Sltan.
E! to a !oint these re!orts were tre and there is no dobt that large
nmbers of contry !eo!le, !articlarly Flani, did set ot with this
intention. ,t the ma$ority, finding that the !ace of his retreat before
SwordCs !rsit was too hot for them, were forced to give ! and go
home. In addition there were dobtless many others who abandoned their
villages not with the ob$ect of following him bt sim!ly in order to hide
themselves and their families in the bsh ntil the troble had !assed. In
fact, as #ttahir moved eastward, he seems to have lost as many
adherents as he gained so that the nmber of his s!!orters remained
fairly constant at a few hndred and showed no real tendency to increase.
(ot knowing this, however, and believing that he might ndo their
con-ests by raising a new $ihad against them, the ,ritish decided that he
mst be ca!tred or crshed.
%he im!lementation of this !olicy became the more rgent when, on 11
'ay, 4a!tain Sword tried to force an entry into ,rmi, believing
incorrectly that the Sltan was in the town, and was re!lsed. %his was
the first reverse that ,ritish arms had sffered in (orthern (igeria and the
moral effect was very great. Wallace, who was acting as +igh
4ommissioner dring 2gardCs absence on leave, now realized rather
tardily that he was facing a ma$or crisis and set abot concentrating a
large force to deal with it.
%wo days after SwordCs re!lse at ,rmi, another ,ritish colmn nder
4a!tain +amilton3,rowne located #ttahirCs cam! on ,ima
+ill and delivered a sr!rise attack, which forced the Sltan and his
followers to cross the >ongola again. +aving no other haven to make for,
they fell back once more on ,rmi, which they re3entered on 15 'ay.
It is clear from his sbse-ent actions that, in retrning to ,rmi, #ttahir
had not finally resolved to throw in his lot with the fanatics. *n the
contrary, he seems to have decided on emigration, for a few days later he
wrote to %em!le, the Resident of ,achi Province, saying that he did not
want to fight and asking only for a safe condct to enable him to leave the
contry =. %em!le re!lied saying that if he wished to avoid violent
226
measres being taken against him he mst give himself !. Withot
making any !romises he im!lied that if #ttahir did so his life wold be
s!ared /. >iven the fact that the ,ritish were trying to sbde an
immense contry with e)igos forces and were fearfl of a $ihad, this
demand was not an nreasonable one.
In early &ne #ttahir wrote another letter to %em!le in the same vein as
before 10. ,y this time, however, the military !re!arations of the ,ritish
were well advanced and no re!ly seems to have been retrned to him.
"ven so, he mst have known that he wold have come to no great harm
if he had acce!ted the earlier terms and given himself !. Why then did
he not do so P We shall !robably never know the answer to this -estion,
bt there are two !ossible e)!lanations. %he first is that, when he
retrned to ,rmi, #ttahir became the virtal !risoner of the fanatics
who were determined to fight to the last. %hese inclded not only the
srvivors of 'allam &ibrillaCs forces and the )eno!hobic %i$$anis from the
E!!er (iger bt also diehards from many other !arts of the "m!ire.
Prominent among them were the twice de!osed "mir of (!e #bbakr,
the recently dis!ossessed "mir of 'isa, #hmad, and the notorios
'aga$in :effi .an Bamsa. #ccording to a re!ort which reached the ,ritish
in &ne, #hmad of 'isa had by this time become the real ring3leader
and was !reventing #ttahir from giving himself ! 11.
%he second !ossible e)!lanation of #ttahirCs relctance to acce!t the
terms offered to him lies in his own character. %hogh no fanatic, he was
a man of integrity and !ride who took his res!onsibilities seriosly.
Srronded as he was by men who revered him as 4ommander of the
Faithfl, he may well have felt that to ask for a safe condct was as far as
he cold honorably go and that to srrender to a 4hristian !ower wold
amont to a breach of faith. It is conceivable that both factors were at
work and that #ttahirCs own relctance to give himself ! was fortified by
the knowledge that his diehard followers wold never allow him to do so
19. Whatever the reason, his nwillingness or inability to com!romise
meant that the tragedy had to be !layed ot to the bitter end.
Since the beginning of &ne the ,ritish had had a force watching and
!artly containing ,rmi while they broght ! their reinforcements
together with a !iece of artillery. %he movement of their colmns was
ham!ered by the rains which had now set in, bt by the last week of &ly
they had scceeded in concentrating a formidable striking force. %his
consisted of twenty3one ,ritish officers and (.4.*.s and over <00 #frican
rank and file, inclding 50 monted infantry, s!!orted by for machine3
gns and one 6<3mm. field3gn.
*n 96 &ly 1/01, a little before noon, the ,ritish force a!!eared nder the
walls of ,rmi and the final battle began. It was to !rove easily the
toghest and bloodiest of the whole cam!aign. %he diehards of ,rmi
foght with fanatical corage and devotion against the infinitely s!erior
wea!ons of their enemies. Some deliberately corted death. *thers lashed
themselves together so that they shold not be tem!ted to try to esca!e
bt wold die together 11.
227
When the fighting began #ttahir went to the mos-e. +e remained there
!raying ntil he heard that the gates had been breached and then he
emerged and went down to the walls. +e was on foot, narmed, and his
intention was not to fight bt to go ot to meet his fate 1;. It was a
gestre not less noble than >ordonCs at :hartom. .eath came to him
with mercifl swiftness, for when he was within a stoneCs throw of the
sothern wall he was shot throgh the head 1<. %wo of his sons died by
his side and ninety of his followers, showing the same devotion as the
bodygards of +ayat and the "mir Abeir, chose to !erish with him
rather than save themselves in flight.
When the sn set that day on the smoking rins of ,rmi, with the dead
lying thick in the trenches, on the ram!arts, and among the hoses, the
Flani "m!ire came to an end. #n old !ro!hecy 15 had foretold that it
wold endre for e)actly a centry and so it came to !assD #ttahirCs
death took !lace in the hndredth year after Sheh had first been
!roclaimed Sarkin 'slmi.
In reviewing the history of the Sokoto "m!ire, one mst make de
allowance for the governing facts of geogra!hy and climate. %he State
came into being at a time when the Sdan was still com!letely inslated
by the desert to the north and the forests to the soth from all the main
crrents of the western world. %he only global inflence that !enetrated to
it, therefore, was Islam. From the other forces that were then changing
the corse of history G the discoveries of science, the advance of
technology, and in the hmanitarian field sch movements as that
directed towards the s!!ression of slavery and the slave trade G it
remained almost wholly isolated. 4onse-ently, althogh it florished in
modern times, its setting was more akin to that of "ro!e in the fifteenth
and si)teenth centries, the age of armies and walled cities, and it is by
the standards of those earlier days that it shold be $dged.
When every allowance had been made for these factors, the historian
mst still admit that the "m!ire had fndamental weaknesses. It
de!ended too mch for its !ros!erity on slave3raiding. Its !eace was too
often distrbed by rebellions. Its later rlers fell too far short of the high
ideals of its fonding fathers. Its !eo!le were too divided against
themselves. #t every level there was still too mch o!!ression and
corr!tion. %hese failings have already been described and they mst be
taken into accont when the final reckoning is made. #nd yet they are
dramatically otweighed by the "m!ireCs achievements. %he Flani gave
+asaland a greater measre of !eace than it had ever !reviosly
en$oyed. %o this can be added the fact that their government was based
on !rinci!le and not on mere !ower. (o man, however mighty, was above
the law. (o man, however lowly, was beneath it. "very man had rights
that the law defined and !rotected. In a continent still largely dominated
by war and anarchy, the gift of !eace and $stice was no small thing.
Secondly, it can be said that the strctre of society was well integrated
and not inhmane. #t the base of the !yramid, it is tre, there were the
slaves, bt even they had their rights. In fact, they were generally better
228
treated than slaves in other !arts of the world inclding the Enited States,
and for the most !art they led tolerable lives. (e)t came the !easants. #s
they were free men, en$oying rights in the soil of which no one cold
de!rive them, their standing was higher than that of the serfs who were
still to be fond in many !arts of "ro!e. %hen there were the craftsmen
and traders of the townsD they were sfficiently nmeros and afflent to
constitte the beginnings of that most im!ortant com!onent in any society
G a middle class. Finally, there was the rling caste. Its members, thogh
athoritarian, were generally $st and beneficent. In short, thogh tyranny
and in$stice were not nknown, they were !robably less !revalent than in
many contries of "ro!e and the #mericas which had greater !retensions
to being considered as civilized.
%hirdly, it can be said that the society of the "m!ire was a reasonably
cltivated one. %rade and agricltre florished so that the ma$ority of the
!eo!le were able to en$oy some sim!le l)ries over and above the bare
necessities of life. Similarly, edcation was not the mono!oly of the rling
caste bt was common among the middle class and not nknown among
the !easantry and slaves. #mong all classes, moreover, scholars and
divines were held in the very highest esteem. Finally, there was the all3
!ervading inflence of religion. Its disci!lines were the cement of society,
its teachings gave !r!ose and dignity to life, and its consolations
reconciled men to the in$stices of an im!erfect world.
%he civilization of the Sokoto "m!ire was the !rodct of the nion
between two very different strains, the Flani and the +asa. %he
contribtion of the Flani lay mainly in the arts of government,
scholarshi!, and religion, that of the +asas in the fields of agricltre,
indstry, and trade. %he two !eo!les were com!lementary to one another
and between them they evolved a society which was !robably more
advanced than any other hitherto !rodced in black #frica. #t the trn of
the centry that society was englfed by world forces that were too strong
for it. (ow, fittingly enogh, it has been reborn as the ncles of a new
and !owerfl nation.
(otes
1. SorceD 'allam (agwamatse, confirmed by #lha$i &naid.
9. 'ffert, o!. cit. !. 1<0.
1. Ibid. !. 1<0.
;. Ibid. !!. 151360.
<. 'isa at this time was torn by a dynastic dis!te. In &anary 1/01 the si)th "mir,
#hmad, had accom!anied the "mir of :ano to Sokoto in order to !ay his res!ects to the
new Sltan. .ring his absence his brother #lha$i %afida had seized !ower and been
!roclaimed seventh "mir. #hmad had there!on retrned and laid siege to the town.
When #ttahir a!!eared on the scene #hmad
abandoned the siege and followed him to ,rmi. See 'ffett, o!. cit. !. 15=.
5. 'ffett, o!. cit. !. 9/;.
6. *ral traditions confirmed by #lha$i &naid.
=. 'ffett, o! cit. !. 1=1. #ttahir had !robably made two earlier re-ests of the same
kind.
/. Ibid. !!. 1=139.
10. Ibid. !. 1=<.
11. Ibid.
229
19. #lha$i &naid endorses this view.
11. 'ffett, o!. cit. !. 901
1;. *ral tradition endorsed by #lha$i &naid.
1<. 'ffett, o!. cit. !. 900. It was the irony of fate that the Sltan, who had wished to
avoid the final conflict, was killed whereas the real irreconcilables G #hmad of 'isa,
#bbakr of (!e, and .an Bamsa of :effi G all made good their esca!e. %he ,ritish
4ommanding *fficer, 'a$or 'arsh, also fell in the battle. +e and #ttahir now lie bried a
short distance from one another.
15. W. F. >owers, the com!iler of the >azetteer of :ano Province, recorded that in 1/01
he met an old Flani who told him of this !ro!hecy and attribted its origin to a 'S. of
$ultan #ello.
230
A''endi5 7
,% 4ate of *he Kano (hronicle
%he style of the 4hronicle is nlike that of the Flani historians of the
nineteenth centry and it almost certainly goes back to an earlier !eriod.
*n the other hand, the chronicler, when describing two reigns in the
middle of the seventeenth centry, admits that there is dobt abot how
one 4hief met his death and why the other was de!osed. %hese two cles
!oint to com!ilation at some indeterminate date in the eighteenth
centry.
=% 4ate of #ornu-s $u!erainty over Hausaland
%he :ano 4hronicle 7Palmer, !. 10/8 relates that in the reign of .ada
7#... 1;9131=8 an official from ,orn took ! residence in :ano. It seems
!robable that he was, in fact, a Resident, in the im!erial sense, and that
his advent marked the beginning of ,ornCs szerainty. %here is an old
hose in :ano city known as >idan Shettima and, as Shettima is a ,orn
tide, it is !ossible that this in its day was the Residency.
C% <eo Africanus and the $onghai 7nvasion of Hausaland
2eoCs credibility as a witness is sometimes -estioned becase his accont
of his #frican travels was written many years after the event and becase
his famos mistake abot the direction of the (igerCs flow showed how
dee! into error he cold fall.
For the Songhai anne)ation of #gades there is inde!endent evidence, bt
the s!!osed invasion of +asaland in #... 1<11 rests almost entirely on
his evidence. 'ost historians have acce!ted it, bt some have remained
sce!tical and have !ointed ot that %he :ano 4hronicle makes no mention
of the invasion. %his is !erfectly tre, bt the 4hronicle does state
7Palmer, !. 1198 that the Sltan of ,orn broght an army against the
city in the time of #bdllahi 7#... 1;//31<0/8 who was com!elled to go
ot and hmble himself. #s the slight discre!ancy in dates is within the
tolerance of historical error, this may well be a garbled accont of the
Songhai invasion. *n balance, this e)!lanation certainly seems more
!robable than the alternative theory that 2eoCs accont of the Songhai
invasion, which goes into some detail, was all an invention.
3% Amina of 8a!!au
#mina, or to give her fll name #minat, is described in %he :ano
4hronicle 7Palmer, !. 10/8 as a 4hieftainess who lived in the first half of
the fifteenth centry and !rsed a career of con-est over a !eriod of
thirty3for years. She does not, however, a!!ear in either of the lists of
Aazza 4hiefs that have come down to s 7+eath, #!!endi) I and 2+d',
vol. I, !!. ;13;;. %he #b$a 4hronicle describes her as the daghter of
,akwa %rnk, who was 4hief or 4hieftainess of Aazza a hndred years
later than the date given by %he :ano 4hronicle and who in any case
231
reigned for only three years. %he 2abarn +asawa da 'akwabtans list
does not mention #mina at all and clods the isse by describing the
#b$a 4hronicleCs ,akwa %rnk as ,ako %rnk 7thereby sggesting
that he was a man and not a woman8 and giving him a reign of thirty
years instead of only three. Sltan ,ello follows the #b$a 4hronicle in
describing #mina as the daghter of a 4hieftain and not as a 4hieftainess
in her own right 7#rnett, !. 198.
It is $st conceivable that the #b$a 4hronicle and Sltan ,ello were right
and that #mina was an #mazon of the rling hose who florished abot
#... 1<;0, bt for a nmber of reasons it is very nlikely. First, as already
mentioned, %he :ano 4hronicle !laces her a centry earlier. Secondly, if
she had in fact lived abot i<;o she wold have overla!!ed :anta in time,
whereas we know that some of her re!ted con-ests, sch as (!e and
most !robably Aazza itself, formed !art of his "m!ire. 7See (ote <
below.8 %hirdly, her fame rests !artly on her activities in fortifying towns
with walls, bt %he :ano 4hronicle 7Palmer, !. 1008 gives the early twelfth
centry as the !eriod when walls were first bilt and by 1<;0 the art was
certainly already several hndred years old.
For these reasons it is very difficlt to believe that #mina lived as late as
the si)teenth centry and this dobt is reinforced by the shadowy natre
of her legend. "ven %he :ano 4hronicle may have !laced her too late and,
if wall3bilding is the key to her !eriod, we may gess that it was the
twelfth or thirteenth centry. #lternatively, she may never have e)isted
bt sim!ly be a myth with its roots in an earlier matriarchal era.
1% *he Em'ire of Muhammadu Kanta
:anta is known to have led his army as far east as ,orn and as far west
as Songhai 72+d', vol. 1, !!. 153168, bt at this distance of time it is
difficlt to tell which contries he actally sb$gated and which he merely
raided or marched across. %here is no dobt, however, abot his having
sbded the !rovinces of #rewa and .andi and the !rinci!ality of
AabermaD they remained loyal when the rest of the "m!ire had
disintegrated and were still giving :ebbi active s!!ort when the ,ritish
arrived nearly for centries later. Similarly, it is almost certain that
Aamfara, Aazza, Bari, >rma, (!e, and sothern #ir became
tribtaries 7+ogben and :irk3>reene, !. 9;58. Sltan ,ello says that the
"m!ire also embraced >obir, :atsina, and :ano 7#rnett, !. 118. >obir at
that time was still a !rovince withot a !aramont 4hief 7see (ote 5
below8 and its sb$ection by :anta along with #dar and sothern #ir is
likely enogh. Similarly, it is difficlt to believe that :anta, with his
:atsina origins, did not make a !oint of con-ering or at least overawing
that State. *n a balance of !robability, therefore, this too can be
acce!ted. *n the other hand, %he :ano 4hronicle makes no mention of his
ever challenging :ano, nor of any incident that might be a garbled
accont of an invasion by his army. Indeed, the only mention of :anoCs
involvement comes from the historian of :ebbi -oted in 2abarn
+asawa da 'akwabtans 7vol. I, !. 168, who s!eaks of the :ano forces
232
hel!ing to drive back :antaCs attem!ted invasion of .ara. It therefore
seems nlikely that :ano and .ara ever formed !art of his "m!ire.
A% 4ate of the E5'ulsion of the 6obirawa from Air
,ovill !ts the date of the e)!lsion of the >obirawa from #ir in the early
fifteenth centry 7!. 106, n. 18 bt it almost certainly took !lace mch
later. We know that this move was made in the reign of 4hiroma
7>azetteer of Sokoto Province, !. 198 and that his son 'hammad dan
4hiroma became 4hief in abot 161< 7+ogben and :irk3>reene, P. ;158.
%he correct date therefore seems to be the late seventeenth centry.
0% "omenclature of the +ulani
%he Flani go nder so many different names that nomenclatre !resents
a difficlty. %hey refer to themselves as Fl,e and to their langage as
Flflde. %o the Wolof and many French athors they are Pels, to the
,ambara Fla, to the :anri Felaata, and to the +asas Fillani in the !lral
and ,a3Fillace in the singlar. In (igeria they are generally called Flani,
the anglicized version of the +asa !lral. In this book Flani has been
sed to describe them 7in both the singlar and the !lral8 and Flflde
their langage.
Similarly, the +asa %oronkawa has been !referred to the Flflde
%orodobe.
9% *he +ulani and their <anguage
%oday there are more Flani living in (orthern (igeria and the +asa3
s!eaking areas of the (iger Re!blic than in all the rest of #frica. #mong
them the ma$ority have already abandoned Flflde for +asa and the
remainder, as they already s!eak +asa as a second langage, are likely
to follow sit in the foreseeable ftre. 'oreover, it is not only for +asa
that the Flani have e)changed their own langage? ,arth 7vol. J, !!.
999318 encontered a gro! on the (iger who had abandoned Flflde for
Songhai. *n this evidence, des!ite the dobt of some modern athorities,
it is not difficlt to believe that Flflde is sim!ly a langage that the
Flani !icked ! dring a long so$orn in Senegal and that their original
langage, which wold have given a cle to their real origin, was then
discarded and lost 7PX8. %his theory is s!!orted not only by the FlaniCs
own legends bt also by the fact that in their writings #ello and
Abdullahi sometimes refer to the +asas and other indigenos !eo!le as
Sdanese or (bians 7see, for e)am!le, #rnett, P. <1, and +iskett, !.
10/8, ths im!lying that the Flani belonged to an entirely different
gro!ing. 'ngo Park noted the same habit among the Flani of
Senegambia and remarked that, when s!eaking of different !eo!les, they
always classified themselves as being among the whites.
;% *he *uaregs
%he %aregs were ,erbers by origin and from a very early date they
dominated the whole region of the central Sahara. %hey made their living
!artly by rearing stock, !artly by trade, and !artly by banditry and raiding
233
their more !eaceable neighbors. %heir way of life was semi3nomadic, that
is to say they were loosely anchored to oases like #gades bt roamed far
afield from these bases, either with their flocks in search of !astre or
with their !ack3camels in search of trade or else with their allies in search
of booty. #mong the !eo!les of the Sdan they had the re!tation of
being false friends and !redatory enemies.
%heir organization was tribal and the desert north of Sokoto was
dominated by the :elgeres of #ir and the Itesen of #dar. ,oth owed
nominal allegiance to the "mir of #gades, bt the arrangement was a
crios one becase the "mirs were not %aregs themselves and did not
wield mch athority over the tribes who did not hesitate to de!ose and
even kill those that dis!leased them. 7See cha!ters MJII3MJIII of ,arthCs
%ravels.8 In fact, the stats of these so3called "mirs was hardly higher
than that of the 4ommandant of a military base from which mobile and
very badly disci!lined troo!s were o!erating nder inde!endent command.
%he 4hronicle of the Sltanate of #ir 7Palmer, o!. cit. vol. III, !!. ;=3<08
reveals how very !recarios their tenre of office was.
#mong the %aregs the real !ower resided with the %ambaris or military
leaders. #t the time of the $ihad the :elgeres were led by %ambari
#gmbl and the Itesen by #b +amid. #t the start of the war both
were friendly to the reformers 7,ello, Inf '3#rnett, !!. <1 and 608 bt
later they changed sides and foght with the >obirawa at #lwasa,
>wand, and Fafara 7ibid. !!. =13=< and ==3/18. %he Flani have never
really forgiven their treachery and to this day !assers3by will dishonor
the grave of one of the %areg leaders who fell near >wand by casting a
fresh stone on the great cairn which already covers it.
,:% Abdullahi-s $'iritual (risis
In the %azyin #I3Wara-at, #bdllahi has described the s!irital crisis
which overtook him in *ctober 1=06.
%hen there came to me from >od the sdden thoght to shn the
homelands, and my brothers, and to trn towards the best of >odCs
creation, in order to seek a!!roval, becase of what I had seen of the
changing times, and NmyO brothers, and their inclination towards the
world, and their s-abbling over its !ossession, and its wealth, and its
regard\ I considered flight incmbent !on me and I left the army ... and
faced towards the "ast, towards the 4hosen *ne ... and I entered the
wilderness with five of my com!anions, and we !assed three nights
withot seeing anyone, nor the traces of anything other than the tracks of
many ele!hants in the wilderness ... 7+iskett, !!. 190318.
+aving traversed what was !robably the >ndmi or Rma ,sh,
#bdllahi and his little !arty came at length to :ano. #t the time he
evidently intended to travel on eastwards, !robably with the idea of going
to 'edina, bt in :ano he fond that the reformers, who had recently
driven ot the +asa 4hief and seized !ower, were at odds with one
another in their strggle for !recedence. +e recognized in this worldly
discord the very thing from which he had himself been fleeing and he was
234
!ersaded to sto! in :ano ntil harmony had been restored.
%he qasida that he wrote at the time dis!lays a mood of disillsionment
with the world and of longing to esca!e to a more s!irital life. +e does
not reveal what !rovoked the crisis, bt it may be that $hehu had already
informed him of his decision that ,elle shold be in s!reme command
when the time came to make the final assalt on #lkalawa and so bring
the war to a trim!hant conclsion. From this #bdllahi may have divined
that #ello wold gradally s!!lant him and that he himself wold never
become 4ommander of the Faithfl.
If these were indeed the cases of #bdllahiCs s!irital crisis we shold be
doing him an in$stice if we s!!osed that he sim!ly rode off in ddgeon
when he heard that #ello was to s!ersede him. *n the contrary, it is
clear that disgst with himself and a desire to !rge himself of worldly
ambitions which he was nable to banish were !!ermost in his mind.
G I knew, he wrote, that I was the worst of them.
Whatever the original case of the crisis, #bdllahi seems to have cred
himself by the work he did in :ano. ,t althogh he retrned to his own
!eo!le $st before the final overthrow of >obir, he took no frther !art in
the war bt left ,ello to !lay the leading role 7+iskett, !!. 190318.
,,% #ello and the $ack of Yandoto
In the controversy that arose later between the Flani leaders and Sheikh
"l3:anemi, one of the accsations made by "l3:anemi was that the Flani
had been gilty of destroying religios books 7#rnett, !. 1018. From
,elloCs answer it is clear that he recognized the incident referred to and
that it occrred dring the ca!tre of a town which was almost certainly
Bandoto. %his !lace, incidentally, seems to have had s!ecial ties with
,orn 7ibid. !. =8 which hel!s to accont for its hostility to ShehCs case.
In his re!ly ,ello indignantly rebtted the charge, ascribed the scattering
of the books to the accidents of looting, and reconted how he had himself
labored to recover the !a!ers and identify and !nish the looters 7ibid. !.
1068. %his denial is worth re!eating becase in the !ast some historians
have acce!ted "l3:anemiCs allegation as tre.
,=% )rigins of the Kanuri
%he :anri, or at any rate their rling class, cherish a legend that they are
descended from an #rab called Saif .hi Bazan, an historical !ersonage
who rled the Bemen as the Persian viceroy in the centry before the rise
of the Pro!het 'hammad. *n the other hand, the
historian Bakbi described the :anri as Aaghawa and 2eo #fricans as
2ibyans 7Palmer, !. cit. !. 58D both definitions, if correct, !lace them
among the ,erbers and are in accord with the +asa name for them,
,arebari, which of corse has the same meaning. Enfortnately, the
lingistic evidence does not !rovide a clear lead in the direction of either
of these alternatives, becase the latest classification !laces the :anri
langage not in the #fro3#siatic >ro! with +asa, mch less in the
Semitic >ro! with #rabic, bt in the (ilo3Saharan >ro! 7>reenberg, o!.
cit. !. 1108. %he only s!!osition that fits all these a!!arently conflicting
235
facts and legends is that the :anri at some state in the !ast changed
their langage 7as the Flani almost certainly did G see (ote =8 and that
their rling classes and common !eo!le, like those of the >obirawa, had
different origins. Palmer seems to s!!ort this theory 7o!. cit. vol. I, !!.
113198, and, certainly, the fact that the %ri!oli34had and "gy!t3(ile34had
caravan rotes were o!en from as early as the eighth centry 7'any, o!.
cit. !. ;9/8 makes it inherently !robable that there wold have been
immigration on a significant scale from both (orth #frica and the 'iddle
"ast.
,C% (owry $hells as a (urrency
In the middle of the forteenth centry Ibn ,atta re!orted that the rate
of e)change in the western Sdan was 1,<00 cowries for one mith-al
7a!!ro)imately 1 oz.8 of gold. ,y the end of the si)teenth centry the rate
in %imbctoo had risen to 1,000 cowries 7,ovill, !. 1;1, n. 18, bt in
#shanti in 1=90 it was still no more than 1,<00 cowries 7I. .!is, &ornal
of a Residence in #shantee, 2ondon, 1=9;, vol. II, !. 1;<8. %he change in
the rate of e)change may have been de to the a!!reciation in the vale
of gold, which was getting worked ot, rather than the de!reciation in the
vale of cowries. In any case the !ace of devalation G less than 50 !er
cent in nearly <00 years G was very gradal.
,3% Katsina as a *rading (entre
%he first of :atsinaCs two natral advantages over :ano as a trading
centre was the fact that it lay farther north and was to that e)tent a more
sitable terminal for trans3Saharan trade. %he second was that, whereas
the :ano3,ida trade rote had to cross many rivers, the :atsina3,ida
rote mainly followed the watershed between the (iger and 4had basins.
It cold therefore be negotiated by caravans, !articlarly camel caravans,
dring mch more of the year than the :ano rote. #!art from the fact
that ,ida was a centre of considerable commercial and indstrial
im!ortance in its own right, it also acted as the main entre!Ft between
the canoe3borne trade of the soth and the caravan3borne trade of the
north. %he s!eriority of :atsinaCs link with it was therefore an im!ortant
factor in :atsinaCs commercial rivalry with :ano.
,1% Hausa &artici'ation in the Jihad in Hausaland
.irect evidence of the e)tent to which +asa fedatories and Jillage
+eads $oined ShehCs case in the early stages of the $ihad is scanty.
Where we hear of their doing so, like the Jillage +ead of .rm in Aaria,
for e)am!le, their actions seem to have been the e)ce!tion rather than
the rle and were normally rewarded by their being confirmed in their
!osts 7'. >. Smith, o!. cit. P. 6=8. *n the other hand, where they
remained hostile to the reformers, as did the 4hief of :a$r, for e)am!le,
they normally had to flee, or at any rate ste! down, when the war went
against them and make way for Flani sccessors 7ibid, !. 1508. It is
therefore significant that in +asaland today, e)ce!t in Bari and !arts of
Aamfara, the great ma$ority of Jillage +eads are of Flani descent. When
236
de allowance has been made for sbse-ent changes, this fact confirms
the im!ression that, in the +asa States, not many +asas !layed
!rominent enogh roles in the $ihad to have been rewarded with the
sweets of office.
,A% *he +ulani $tates of the /''er "iger
%he early history of +amdallahi, the first of the two States that the Flani
established in the E!!er (iger, ran closely !arallel to that of the Sokoto
"m!ire. %here was a concentration of Flani in 'assina, a !rovince in the
!agan kingdom of Seg, and in abot is 1=10 Sek #hmad, who was
himself a Flani and who had !reviosly been a !!il of Sheh, scceeded
in raising them in a jihad. So sccessfl was he that, within the s!ace of a
few years, he had carved ot for himself a State that stretched from
%imbctoo to the Jolta. %hogh mch smaller than the Sokoto "m!ire, it
was organized on broadly similar lines. .es!ite its theocratic character,
#hmad was scceeded by his son and in de corse the sccession
became hereditary in his family 7see +ogben and :irk3>reene, !!. 19<35,
and %rimingham, !!. 1663=18.
#ccording to the information given to ,arth, #hmad had received a flag
from Sheh at the start of his $ihad. %he fact that he sbse-ently
terminated this relationshi! by !roclaiming himself 4ommander of the
Faithfl, thereby asserting his e-ality, no dobt acconts for the marked
coolness that ,arth observed between Sokoto and >wand on the one
hand and +amdallahi on the other. #nother case for dissension !ossibly
lay in the fact that, as ,arth also testified, a mch more bigoted and less
tolerant form of Islam was !ractised in +amdallahi DEFG than in the Sokoto
"m!ire 7see ,arth, cha!ters 2JII, 2MJI, and 2MMMII8.
%he fonder of the second Flani State on the E!!er (iger, which was to
crsh and absorb the first, was +a$ Emar. +e was born in Fta %oro
towards the end of the eighteenth centry and as a yong man went on
the !ilgrimage. #fter a long so$orn in the +e$az he retrned by way of
Sokoto towards the end of Sltan ,elloCs reign. Some re!orts say that
,ello gave him a daghter in marriage, bt #lha$i &naid asserts that
there is no record of any sch alliance. From Sokoto he went on throgh
+amdallahi and Seg to Fta &allon where he settled. +e had already
become a member of the %i$aniyya sect and he s!ent the ne)t decade
bilding ! a strong and fanatical following, mainly among the Flani and
the %kolors. In 1=<; he in his trn !roclaimed a jihad. +is first ob$ective
was the con-est of his native Fta %oro, bt this move broght him into
collision with the French. #fter sffering some reverses he withdrew
eastward, and in the early Csi)ties con-ered Seg, +amdallahi, and
*imbuctoo. #t its height, the State that he ths created was considerably
larger than +amdallahi. When he was killed in 1=5;, his son #hmad tried
to hold his con-ests together bt was !laged by tribal rivalries and by
dissension between the two rival sects, the :adiriyya and the %i$aniyya. In
the end the French, who had gradally !enetrated this region between
1=6/ and 1=/1, destroyed the remnants of his !ower and forced him to
flee.
237
%he fact that +a$ Emar and #hmad were militant %i$anis did not
commend them to sccessive Sltans of Sokoto who remained faithfl to
the :adiriyya sect. While they were in !ower, therefore, there seem to
have been no dealings between the two ca!itals. ,t in the Cnineties, after
their defeat by the French, #hmad and a large following a!!eared in
Sokoto as refgees and were allowed to settle 7>azetteer of Sokoto
Province, !!. 1;31<8. 2ater, as 4ha!ter (ineteen and the "!iloge
describe, they moved on to ,rmi.
,0% *he +ulani 4rive to the $ea
%he #damawa Flani made some daring e)!editions and there is no dobt
that at least one of them, nder the command of #mba 7or +ama8 Sambo,
reached the sea. #s the rler of 4hamba, #mba Sambo owed fealty to the
"mir of #damawa, bt his !osition was sch a !owerfl one that in 1=;9
he made a bid, which only narrowly failed, to cast off this allegiance and
!ay homage direct to Sokoto 7+ogben and :irk3>reene, !!. ;15368. # few
years later he won great fame by leading an e)!edition sothwards to the
sea. ,arth, in 1==1, ke!t hearing of this feat and indeed met two men
who had !artici!ated in it. ,oth his informants s!oke of Iboland as having
been their destination bt, while one mentioned it in the conte)t of the
(iger .elta, the other said that the e)!editionCs rote had !assed throgh
,aft in the 4ameroon highlands 7,arth, cha!ters MMM, MMMJI, and M2II8.
#s the men were a!!arently monted, it is difficlt to believe that they
!enetrated into the creeks and e-atorial forests of the (iger .elta and it
seems mch more likely that they followed the high grond down throgh
,aft towards 4alabar and o!erated at the moth of the 4ross River
rather than in the (iger .elta. %here is no dobt, however, that they
reached the sea. %he second of ,arthCs two informants said that his !arty,
which was not the main one, had sailed along a rocky coast and he
convinced ,arth that he had seen an ocean3going vessel.
%he e)!edition was only an isolated raid, of corse, and did nothing to
e)tend the bondaries of the "m!ire. (evertheless, as it involved making
a rond tri! of seven or eight hndred miles throgh broken contry and
o!erating in nfavorable terrain, it was a bold ventre and shows how
hardy and confident the Flani then were.
238
A''endi5 777
$ir +rancis <ugard and the Kano.$okoto
E5'edition of ,;:C
+itherto, it has not been easy to form a $st a!!raisal of the events that
led ! to the :ano3Sokoto ")!edition *f 1/01. (ot only has almost all the
readily available evidence come from the ,ritish side bt most of it can be
traced back to Sir Frederick 2gard, the +igh 4ommissioner. "minent as
he was, he cannot be considered a disinterested witness becase, before
the event, he was trying to convince a sce!tical ,ritish >overnment that it
was necessary while afterwards he was at !ains to !rove that it had been
$stified. Entil recently little accont has been taken of the views of ,ritish
officers who differed from 2gard on this isse and no attem!t has been
made to check his assertions against sch evidence as there is from the
other side. #s a reslt, certain anomalies in the acce!ted version of events
have long remained nchallenged. (ow, however, when fresh facts have
been broght to light on the ,ritish side 1 and more is known of the
reactions of the Flani to the ,ritish threat, the time has come to attem!t
a fresh a!!raisal.
%he first sb$ect for scrtiny is the abortive corres!ondence which was
e)changed between 2gard and Sltan #bd. .escribing the
circmstances afterwards 2gard made the most of a case which looks
less convincing now than it did at the time. +e laid great stress on the two
letters which he actally did write, covered ! the other occasions when
he shold have written bt failed to do so, har!ed on the difficlty of
coming to terms with a !otentate who did not re!ly, and finally bilt !
the SltanCs letter of 'ay 1/09 into a virtal declaration of war. %o see
whether this is a tre !ictre we mst rn over the corse of events
afresh.
In 1/00 2gard had the Proclamation establishing the Protectorate
translated into +asa and sent a co!y of it to Sokoto. It was not well
received by the Sltan, who declined to acknowledge it 9. *n his retrn,
2gardCs messenger re!orted that, when the Sltan had read the
!roclamation, he had trned to his 4ort and, s!eaking in Flflde, a
langage which he wrongly believed the messenger did not nderstand,
had said,
G (o letters ever broght fear like this one. ICll read no more letters from
these white men 1.
It was s!!osed at the time that clmsy translation mst have given
offence where none was intended. %his may well have been a contribtory
factor, bt the SltanCs se of the word SfearT sggests that his reaction
was one of dismay rather than mbrage. (ow the Flani, even in ,elloCs
day, had known all abot the ,ritish con-est of India ; and, more
recently, mst have heard of ,ritish activities on the >old 4oast, in
#shanti, and in Sothern (igeria. %hey certainly knew of the French drive
239
to the E!!er (iger, which had led to the destrction of the Flani :ingdom
created by +a$ Emar <. %his being so, it seems likely that what
disconcerted the Sltan was not so mch the wording of the !roclamation
as the realization that in ftre he wold be dealing not with a mere
trading com!any bt with a world !ower which he knew to have
ac-isitive instincts.
Whatever the case of the SltanCs dis!leasre, he made it !lain to the
messenger, first by telling him that if the "ro!eans came, he was ready
to fight them, and then by having him hastily condcted ot of the town.
From !rivate sorces the messenger sbse-ently gathered that the
nderlying case of this hostility was fear that the ,ritish determination to
s!!ress the slave trade wold rin SokotoCs agricltre 5, which of
corse was nsally de!endent on slave labor.
When the messenger retrned em!ty3handed to 2oke$a and told his story,
it was 2gardCs trn to be angry. %he SltanCs action, he said later, Swas a
deliberate inslt.T 6 From this nha!!y start the relations between the two
men never recovered.
#t the beginning of the following year, 1/01, 2gard was a!!arently still
!i-ed becase, when he dis!atched a colmn against :ontagora and
(!e, he took no ste!s to ac-aint the Sltan beforehand with his reasons
for doing so. *nly in 'arch, when the o!eration was com!lete, did he
write to e)!lain his motives and invite the Sltan to nominate a new "mir
of :ontagora in !lace of Sarkin Sdan Ibrahim, whom he had defeated
and driven ot. #nd even then he went on to inform the Sltan that in
(!e he had de!osed #bbakr and reinstated >oldieCs nominee,
'hammad =. Bet, in making this gestre, 2gard seems to have
believed that he had flfilled all his obligations towards the Sltan.
G %his was a very significant act, he wrote afterwards, and e-ivalent to
a recognition of all his ancient !rerogatives /.
4onse-ently, when this letter too remained nanswered, he again felt
aggrieved. It is evident that, throgh want of imagination, he never
realized that his action in (!e might have s!oken loder than his gestre
in :ontagora and that even in :ontagora the only choice he was offering
was between ca!itlation 7becase acce!tance of his invitation to
nominate a new "mir meant an acknowledgement by the Sltan of the
,ritish right to de!ose his !redecessor8 and defiance.
2gardCs ne)t move was made in the late smmer of 1/01 when the Bola
")!edition was lanched. +e himself was on leave at the time, bt the
action was of corse taken on his instrctions. It led to more fighting and
the flight of another "mir. For the Sltan the fall of #damawa was a more
severe blow than the loss of :ontagora, a mch more recent ac-isition,
or of (!e, which was tribtary to >wand and not to Sokoto. ,t neither
beforehand nor afterwards was any word of e)!lanation vochsafed to
him. (or, a!!arently, did 2gard realize the bitter resentment he had
engendered.
"arly in 1/09, soon after his retrn from leave, 2gard embarked on a
new series of moves. First he lanched the ,achi3,orn ")!edition. (e)t,
240
in res!onse to an a!!eal for hel! from the "mir of Aaria, he dis!atched a
small force against Sarkin Sdan Ibrahim, the fgitive bt still
troblesome "mir of :ontagora, which reslted in his ca!tre and removal
into ca!tivity. Finally, on the !rete)t that by a!!ealing to him for hel! the
"mir of Aaria had acknowledged ,ritish szerainty, he !osted a Resident
to Aaria with a garrison to s!!ort his athority. %o the Sltan he gave no
!rior information abot any of these moves, althogh in 'arch 1/09,
when the first had been initiated and the second com!leted, he did at
length write to e)!lain his actions 10. ,t even then he said nothing of his
third move. (ews of it mst have reached the Sltan at abot the same
time as the letter and rined any chance that there might have been of
2gardCs message being received in a conciliatory s!irit.
%he messenger who took this second letter of 2gardCs to Sokoto was
treated coldly and ke!t waiting for some time for a re!ly, bt he met with
no abse, threats, ill3treatment, or even discortesy 11. "ventally he
was given the following answer from the Sltan to take back to AngerD
%o >overnor 2gard.
,e it known to yo that I did not call on yo to enter on the !acification of
,achi or any other !lace whatever, nor that yo shold enter on the
!acification of towns or territories.
I seek hel! from no one e)ce!t from >od. Bo have yor faith, we have
ors.
>od is or defence and or sre refgeD there is no strength or !ower
e)ce!t in >od on high, the #lmighty.
%his with saltations 19.
In the circmstances the tone of this letter was sr!risingly moderate and
even 2gard, when he saw it, admitted that it was inoffensive.
%he SltanCs re!ly did not reach Anger ntil &ne 1/09. In the !revios
month, however, a!!arently ot of the ble, 2gard had received from
him a mch more hostile and !rovocative letter 7-oted at the end of
4ha!ter %wenty3two8 saying that henceforth there cold be no e)changes
between them save those between 'oslems and Enbelievers war. %his
letter is of considerable historical im!ortance, becase it seems finally to
have convinced 2gard that conciliation wold never scceed and that
:ano and Sokoto wold have to be sbded by force of arms before the
Protectorate became a reality. #t any rate, he said later that it was
tantamont to a dennciation of the %reaties and even referred to it as a
declaration of war 11. In addition, when he had to convince the ,ritish
>overnment that there was no alternative to his !olicy, he made its
im!lacable tone one of the main fondations of his case.
#bot this letter there has always been a slight ara of mystery. It
a!!arently bore no relation to earlier corres!ondence bt seemed, rather
im!robably, to have been written s!ontaneosly by a man who, for the
!revios two years, had remained obstinately silent. 'oreover, des!ite
the crcial significance afterwards attached to it, the Secretary of State
was not even informed of its e)istence ntil eight months after it had been
received. Ss!icions arosed by these crios circmstances have been
241
shar!ened by the disa!!earance of the original, the lack of any evidence
of how it came into ,ritish hands, and the fact that 4a!tain #badie, the
!rinci!al advocate of a military rather than a !eacefl soltion, was the
translator. %hey have even !rom!ted one historian of the !eriod to
sggest that the letter may either have been a mistranslation, !robably
deliberate, of an earlier letter from the Sltan to the Royal (iger 4om!any
or else a fabrication !lanted on 2gard by #badie 1;. %he evidence hardly
s!!orts so swee!ing a conclsion, bt the mysteries remain and deserve
to be re3e)amined.
%he key to the mystery of what evoked the letter seems to lie in the very
first sentence in which the Sltan wroteD
Q :now that I do not consent to any of yor !eo!le dwelling among s. R
Who had made sch a re-estP 4ertainly not 2gard himself. ,t in the
smmer of 1/01, while 2gard was on leave, his .e!ty, Wallace, had
written to the Sltan saying that the ,ritish wished to !lace a Resident in
his ca!ital and rging him to acce!t the a!!ointment 1<. #gainst WallaceCs
better $dgement this letter was sent ! the (iger to the officer in charge
of the detachment at Illo, who was to arrange for its transmission. From
another of WallaceCs letters, however, we know that at the end of *ctober,
either becase the messenger from Illo was trned back or becase the
Sltan refsed to receive his message, the letter had still not been
delivered. In mentioning this delay, Wallace observed testily that, if he
had em!loyed his own channels, he cold have sent a dozen messages
and got answers 15. Soon afterwards, a!!arently assming that the letter
wold never reach its destination, he told 'orland that if 2gard wold
allow him, it was his intention to go to Sokoto himself.
G I think it is only fair, he wrote, that the Sltan shold have the chance
to refse to a white man this >overnmentCs friendly advances 16.
(othing came of this !ro!osal and so we mst assme that, when 2gard
retrned from leave soon afterwards, he vetoed it. (evertheless, it is
!erfectly !ossible that the Illo letter was eventally delivered to the Sltan
or alternatively that, being barred by 2gard from going to Sokoto
himself, Wallace wrote again in the same vein and had the letter conveyed
to the Sltan by a messenger of his own. If sch a message reached
Sokoto in the s!ring of 1/09, which from the date of the re!ly seems the
most !robable time, the coincidence of its arrival with the move against
,achi and the ca!tre of Sarkin Sdan Ibrahim wold accont for the
acerbity of the answer. Significant, too, is the fact that, whereas the
SltanCs ne)t letter was addressed to 2gard by name, this one was not. It
is also noteworthy that in 'ay 1/09, when the SltanCs letter reached the
,ritish, Wallace had $st gone on leaveD in his absence it wold natrally
have fond its way to 2gard.
%he e)!lanation to the second mystery G why 2gard said nothing abot
the letter for eight months G emerges -ite clearly in the light of his
condct dring the rest of the year 1/09. ,riefly, the reason for the delay
was that, while !re!aring a military e)!edition, 2gard was at !ains to
conceal the fact from the ,ritish >overnment. +e therefore chose to hold
242
back this !articlar card ntil he $dged that the right moment had come
to !lay it.
Enless fresh evidence comes to light it is nlikely that the dobts
srronding this famos letter will ever be resolved. #ll we can say now is
that it was !robably neither addressed to 2gard nor written
s!ontaneosly, as has hitherto been s!!osed, bt that, as the te)t
sggests, it was a re!ly to an earlier letter from Wallace rging him to
bow to the inevitable and acce!t a ,ritish Resident. If this was indeed the
case, it is !ossible that the tre facts were not disclosed even to 2gard.
%hey were certainly withheld from the ,ritish >overnment.
Whatever the !recise trth abot the SltanCs letter, it is clear from other
!a!ers which have srvived that, in the s!ring and smmer of 1/09,
2gard was hardening his heart against Sokoto and !aying less and less
attention to conciliators like ,rdon 7who as Resident ,ida was in toch,
throgh the "mir of (!e, with the "mir of >wand8 and listening more
and more to men like #badie who were !ressing for action. We know, for
e)am!le, that in #!ril 1/09 ,rdon wrote a long letter to inform 2gard
that Flani o!inion had been shocked becase the ca!tive "mir of
:ontagora had been sent to 2oko$a in irons and that he ended it by
asserting his conviction that the intransigence of the Sltan was based
less on hostility than on misnderstandings which di!lomacy cold
resolve. %his advice 2gard brs-ely re$ected.
G .i!lomacy ceases, he wrote, when either !arty refses to receive the
agent of the other, to read his letters, or to re!ly 1=.
Similarly, %em!le, the Resident of ,achi Province, whose attitde to the
Flani was mch less conciliatory than ,rdonCs, informed 2gard at abot
the same time that, according to information which had reached him, the
Sltan did not wish to fight 1/. %his advice was also ignored.
*n the other hand 2gard seems to have fallen increasingly nder the
inflence of #badie, whom he described at abot this time as being
e)tremely able and, throgh sch sorces as s!ies and traders, closely in
toch with the #frican world 90. In $dging #badie, we mst first of all
admit that his task in Aaria was !articlarly difficlt in that the "mir had
not been defeated in battle and clearly resented being saddled with a
,ritish Resident. (evertheless, from what we know of #badieCs character,
we can infer that he sim!ly did not !ossess the fnd of sym!athy and
!atience which might have enabled him to get on friendly terms with the
"mir. %he reslt was that in Aaria no effective links were established with
the Flani rling classes and #badie had to rely for all his information on
his agents and !aid informers. (ot sr!risingly, this information was
consistently hostile to the Flani and har!ed constantly on the menace of
:ano. 'ch of it, as we shall see, was either inaccrate or greatly
e)aggerated. (evertheless, it was all !assed on to Anger, where 2gard
seems to have taken it at its face vale.
Whether 2gard and #badie, in acce!ting these tendentios re!orts as
valid, were acting disingenosly, or merely being naive, it is now
im!ossible to tell. #ll that we know for certain is that dring the smmer
243
of 1/09 #badie sent in a series of re!orts alleging that the "mir of Aaria,
:wasa, was the worst kind of Flani rler, that he was still raiding for
slaves, that he was !er!etrating otrages and e)tortions in the name of
the Resident, that he was intriging with :ano, and that he was
contem!lating an attack on the ,ritish force. In Se!tember 2gard at
length res!onded by giving instrctions for the garrison in Aaria to be
dobled 91. Soon afterwards #badie, on his own initiative, arrested the
"mir and took him to Anger on charges of o!!ression and tyranny.
#!art from the earlier accsations, these inclded allegations that nder
his rle !eo!le were mtilated for !etty offences and bried alive for more
serios crimes, that inflential men were being done to death and bried
in the !alace, and that he had even tried to have the Resident !oisoned
99. 2gard acce!ted the charges withot frther in-iry, detained the
"mir in Anger, and athorized #badie to entrst the government of
Aaria to a com!liant concillor, the >aladima.
%he de!osition of the "mir of Aaria, as related in 4ha!ter %wenty3three,
inflamed the hot tem!er of his re!resentative in the tribtary "mirate of
:effi, the 'aga$i .an Bamsa, and !reci!itated a fresh crisis which
clminated in the 'aga$iCs assassinating the ,ritish Resident, (a'tain
Moloney, and seeking refge in :ano. %hese events reinforced 2gard in
the belief that there wold have to be a military confrontation with :ano
and Sokoto and at the same time !resented him with the !erfect cass
belli. ,t, $st when the way ahead seemed !lain and clear, an im!ortant
new develo!ment occrred which introdced fresh ncertainties and
threatened frther delays.
Within a week of 'oloneyCs assassination, Sltan #bd died in Wrno. For
more than a decade he had held the "m!ire in his tyrannical gras! and
determined its !olicy according to his n!redictable whims. +is
disa!!earance from the scene at this $nctre was therefore an event of
ma$or !olitical im!ortance, becase it !resented 2gard with the
o!!ortnity of reo!ening negotiations with a new Sltan who had sffered
none of #bdCs hmiliating reverses and was in no way committed to
resisting the ,ritish rather than coming to terms with them. If 2gardCs
mind had not already been made !, his first action shold have been to
send a conciliatory message to the new Sltan, #ttahir, and his second to
inform the Secretary of State of this im!ortant new develo!ment. In fact,
he did neither of these things. #s a reslt, Attahiru was driven, against
his own better $dgement, to ho!eless resistance while Whitehall
remained ignorant that the chance of a negotiated settlement was sli!!ing
away 91.
*n the ,ritish side there was as shar! a division of o!inion abot the
intentions of the "mir of :ano as there had been abot Sltan #bdCs. In
#!ril 1/09 ,rdon re!orted to 2gard that an emissary of the "mir who
was in ,ida insisted that he wanted !eace and that the "mir of (!e
s!!orted this view 9;. #badie, on the other hand, ke!t re!orting that
there was real and imminent danger of the :ano forces making an
n!rovoked attack on the ,ritish garrison in Aaria. #ny chance that there
244
might have been of 2gardCs believing ,rdon rather than #badie
disa!!eared for good, of corse, when the 'aga$in :effi and his followers,
having elded their !rsers and reached :ano, were warmly received by
the "mir 9<.
Soon after this #badie re!orted to 2gard that, on 9= *ctober, the "mir of
:ano had actally advanced on Aaria with the intention of attacking the
,ritish garrison and had only trned back becase he had been overtaken
by news of Sltan #bdCs death 95. (o historical evidence whatever has
come to light to s!!ort this story or #badieCs earlier re!orts that the "mir
of :ano was !lanning an attack. *n the contrary, we know from his letter
to the Waziri of Sokoto that he had come to the conclsion that resistance
to the ,ritish was ho!eless and that the best corse for the Flani was to
emigrate en masse 96. (evertheless, #badieCs re!orts cased 2gard to
dis!atch more troo!s to Aaria, to have a s!!ly rote cleared, and to send
! reserves of food and ammnition 9=.
%hese activities on the ,ritish side were in trn re!orted to the "mir of
:ano as evidence that an e)!edition was being monted against him.
G %hey declare, wrote one of the "mirCs corres!ondents in Aaria, that
when they have finished what they are doing among s, they will ... come
to yo.
In the atmn of 1/09, therefore, similar re!orts were reaching 2gard
and the "mir of :ano, both affirming that the other was !re!aring to
attack. It is a strange !arado) that on the Flani side, while the re!orts
were basically tre, they failed to stir the "mir into effective action?
whereas on the ,ritish side, while the re!orts were basically false, they
cased 2gard to redoble his efforts.
Since the smmer it had been an o!en secret among the senior ,ritish
officers that the +igh 4ommissioner was soon going to march against
:ano and Sokoto 9/. ,y the atmn it was clear that the move was to be
made dring the forthcoming dry season 7*ctober3#!ril8 and that an
e)!editionary force was being mstered in Aaria. ,t 2gard had still
given the Secretary of State virtally no information abot his !lans or
!re!arations, nor indeed did he do so ntil mch later and then only
becase an e)!lanation was demanded of him. +e did, however, dro!
some hints, !erha!s with the ob$ect of !roviding himself with a defence if
he was afterwards accsed of failing to kee! the ,ritish >overnment
informed of his intentions. For e)am!le, in a dis!atch of 6 *ctober 1/09
abot the International ,ondary 4ommission, he wroteD
G I may have to visit Sokoto with a strong force at the same time and !t
an end to the !resent nsatisfactory state with regard to that town 10.
+e also made !rovision in his financial estimates for the following year for
the new Provinces of Sokoto, :ano, and :atsina? in the accom!anying
dis!atch, dated 91 (ovember, he added a brief note e)!laining that these
new items had been inclded becase it wold be im!ossible to !ost!one
mch longer the im!ending crisis with the Sltan 11. 2gard knew
!erfectly well that these dis!atches wold take well over a month to reach
2ondon and, from the way he !resented the information, it is fair to
245
assme that he ho!ed that even then it wold !ass nnoticed. *f the
telegra!h, by means of which he cold convey clear or code messages to
2ondon in the s!ace of a day or two, he made no se. It is im!ossible to
believe that, in a man of sch com!etence and e)!erience, these la!ses
were the reslt of inadvertence or lack of savoir3faire. It mst be
conclded, therefore, that they were deliberate and that, dobting his
ability to convince the ,ritish >overnment of the necessity for the :ano3
Sokoto ")!edition, he had decided to force their hand by going !ast the
!oint3of3no3retrn.
2gardCs tactics were for a time sccessfl. +is dis!atch of 6 *ctober
reached the 4olonial *ffice and e)cited no notice. ,t on < .ecember his
!lans were !set when the 2ondon !ress !blished a re!ort from Reter
describing the military !re!arations that were being made in Aaria for an
attack on :ano. 4hamberlain, the Secretary of State, was away in (atal at
the time and his res!onsibilities were being discharged by his Ender
Secretary, the "arl of *nslow. +e and the officials of the 4olonial *ffice
thoght that there mst have been a misnderstanding, bt they were
neasy and so on 10 .ecember they telegra!hed to Anger saying that
they !resmed that ReterCs re!ort referred to an e)!edition which was
intended to s!!ort the #nglo3French ,ondary 4ommission, not to attack
:ano, bt that in any case the +igh 4ommissioner was to state in otline
what his !lans were 19.
"ven then 2gard !layed for more time. +e telegra!hed back on 19
.ecember saying that he had received information that :ano had
com!leted !re!arations for !rovoking war and that the safety of the Aaria
garrison, the delimitation of the international bondary, and the !restige
of the ,ritish >overnment de!ended on energetic action. ,t, instead of
smmarizing his !lans as instrcted, he referred the Secretary of State to
the three dis!atches, inclding those of 6 *ctober and 91 (ovember
mentioned above, in which he had dro!!ed his hints, im!lying that all the
information re-ired was given in them 11. It did not take the 4olonial
*ffice long to establish that two of the three dis!atches contained very
little that was relevant. #s the third had not arrived, however, it was
assmed that it mst embody a fll accont. &dgement was therefore
ss!ended and 2gard gained his res!ite.
,t at least one of the civil servants in the 4olonial *ffice was ss!icios.
4ommenting on 2gardCs telegram of 19 .ecember, he wroteD
I am inclined to think that Sir F. 2gard has tried to follow his favorite
!olicy of kee!ing silence ntil the co! has been made 1;.
#fter digesting this and other mintes *nslow decided on 1/ .ecember to
send a telegram to 2gard, which began as follows\
#s yo are aware, +is 'a$estyCs >overnment are an)ios to avoid military
o!erations in West #frica. We have fll confidence that yo will not
engage in them nless they are absoltely necessary for defensive
!r!oses bt if in yor $dgement they are necessary we leave yo fll
discretionary !owers... 1<
246
#s 2gardCs third dis!atch had still not arrived, the telegram went on to
demand a definite statement of his !lans. Five days later *nslow followed
this ! with another telegram, which stated blntly that the ,ritish
>overnment mst have the information before any e)!edition started for
:ano 15.
In res!onse to the first of these telegrams, 2gard telegra!hed back on 91
.ecember and at last admitted that he was !lanning to march on :ano. %o
em!hasize the imminence of the s!!osed threat from that -arter he
-oted #badieCs re!ort that towards the end of *ctober the "mir had
actally started marching on Aaria 16. +e went on to sayD
G Re!orts have been s!read throgh all the Protectorate concerning the
movement of troo!s. 4onse-ently !rotected States -ite certain
imminence of fighting and therefore hesitation wold be ascribed to fear,
endangering other allegiance 1=.
In other words, 2gard was now saying that he had !assed the !oint3of3
no3retm and mst be allowed to go on.
In the meantime, however, Sir 4harles .ilke had made a s!eech in the
+ose of 4ommons condemning the !ro!osed e)!edition and the
'anchester >ardian was flminating abot it. *n receiving 2gardCs
telegram of 91 .ecember, *nslow therefore !re!ared a !a!er for the
information of the 4abinet and sent a cable to 4hamberlain in (atal asking
whether he athorized 2gardCs !lan. *n 9= .ecember 4hamberlain
re!lied giving -alified assentD
G I a!!rove of the e)!edition assming that yo are satisfied that the
force is e-al to any emergency and that the +igh 4ommissioner has good
gronds for antici!ating attack. Enless clearly called for by the attitde of
the Sltan, I shold de!recate aggressive action 1/.
"vidently, #badieCs story of the "mir of :ano marching against Aaria had
convinced *nslow that there were good gronds for antici!ating an attack
becase, thogh 2gard was asked for an assrance on the first of
4hamberlainCs !oints, no mention was made of the second. #nd so on =
&anary 1/01, after 2gard had re!lied confirming that his forces were
e-al to any emergency, another telegram was sent to him which began
as followsD
+is 'a$estyCs >overnment have careflly considered yor telegram (o. ;,
;th &anary, and the !revios corres!ondence on sb$ect of :ano. %hey
desire to im!ress on yo that there is strong feeling in this contry
amongst those most dee!ly interested in (orthern (igeria that military
o!erations shold he avoided if !ossible. %he information in !ossession of
+is 'a$estyCs >overnment is not so com!lete as they cold have wished
bt they nderstand that it is, in yor o!inion, absoltely necessary as a
defensive measre and in the interests of !rotected native States, as well
as for safety of ,ondary 4ommissions, that :ano shold be occ!ied by
yo in antici!ation of attack on Aaria which "mir is !re!aring to make,
that yo have e)hasted all means of arriving at a !eacefl settlement,
and that yo consider force at yor dis!osal am!le for yor !r!ose and
are satisfied that reserves of men now !ro!osed are sfficient for any
247
!robable
contingency. In these circmstances +is 'a$estyCs >overnment will not
withhold their consent to des!atch of e)!editionary force... ;0
*nslow went on to say that the ,ritish >overnment considered that the
command shold be given to ,rigadier3>eneral :emball, the Ins!ector3
>eneral of the West #frican Frontier Force, and that other troo!s in West
#frica shold stand by in case of need.
%he !oint in this telegram which shold have given 2gard !ase was the
,ritish >overnmentCs insistence that they considered a military move
$stified only if all !ossibility of negotiation had been e)hasted and then
only as a defensive measre in antici!ation of an attack by :ano on Aaria.
In fact, he ignored these sti!lations com!letely bt took ! the cdgels
on the -estion of whether :emball or 'orland shold be in command and
whether it was necessary to mobilize reserves in other !arts of West
#frica. %hese wrangles served to distract attention from the fndamental
-estion of whether or not the ")!edition was necessary. %hey also led to
frther delays and so it was not ntil 1/ &anary that *nslow at length
sent a telegram athorizing an advance and not ntil 9/ &anary that the
e)!editionary force actally marched ;1.
We know now that on 9 &anary, nearly for weeks earlier, the "mir of
:ano, accom!anied by half his fighting men, had set ot from his ca!ital,
not with the ob$ect of attacking the ,ritish in Aaria bt in order to go to
Sokoto and !ay his res!ects to the new Sltan ;9. It 'ay be that the
nderlying ob$ect of this strangely timed $orney was to rge on the new
Sltan the !olicy that the Flani, rather than sbmit to a 4hristian !ower
or fight a war they cold not ho!e to win, shold emigrate en masse. ,e
that as it may, when the ,ritish e)!editionary force set ot to ni! in the
bd the threat that the "mir of :ano was s!!osed to re!resent, he was,
in fact, two hndred and fifty miles away. #s he was accom!anied by a
force of not merely hndreds bt thosands, it is astonishing that the
,ritish did not get accrate information abot his movements. In 2gardCs
dis!atches and telegrams, however, there is no mention of them ntil 91
&anary when he at length -oted a re!ort that the "mir had moved ot
to a war cam! twenty3for miles west of the 4ity ;1. So mch for #badieCs
intelligence systemD there cold be no more striking !roof than this of how
mis!laced was 2gardCs faith in the accracy and ob$ectivity of the re!orts
that he received from this -arter.
What verdict shold be !assed on 2gardCs condct in this e!isodeP %he
first accsation against him mst be that, by choosing to believe in
#badie, whom he liked, and to ignore ,rdon, who irritated him ;;, he
formed a badly distorted conce!tion of the !roblem which confronted him.
In the light of the facts related here, !articlarly the com!lete
ntrstworthiness of #badieCs re!orts, it is im!ossible to ac-it him of this
charge. %he verdict against him, incidentally, serves to confirm the
$dgement of his biogra!her that two of his greatest failings were
tendencies to cltivate favorites and to allow !rivate feelings to inflence
official decisions ;<.
248
%he second charge, which arises ot of the first, is that, by withholding
information abot Sltan #bdCs death and !rsing his own !re!arations
in secret, 2gard forced the ,ritish >overnment into athorizing an
enter!rise which, if they had been !ro!erly conslted, they wold
!robably never have sanctioned. *r, in other words, that he deliberately
!reci!itated a cam!aign which cold certainly have been !ost!oned and
might !ossibly have been avoided altogether. *n this charge, too, the
verdict mst be that he was gilty. In his defence, however, let it be said
that he acted as he did becase he thoght the end $stified the means
and that for him the great ob$ective was not winning minor battles in an
obscre cam!aign bt clearing the site for the new contry that he was
im!atient to bild ;5.
G %he advocates of conciliation at any !rice, he wrote at abot this time,
a!!ear to forget that their nation has assmed before >od and the
civilized world the res!onsibility of maintaining !eace and good order in
the area declared as a ,ritish Protectorate ;6.
Whether the end he soght can be held to $stify the dbios means he
em!loyed is a -estion which mst be left to individal $dgement.
(otes
1. 'ffett, o!. cit.
9. #nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311, !. =1.
1. 'ffett, o!. cit. !. 10.
;. 4la!!erton, %ravels, vol. II, 1<9.
<. #!!endi) I, (ote #.
5 'ffett, o!. cit. !. 9=, n. ;.
6. 4onfidential .is!atch of 91 &anary 1/01 in 4* ;;5[10.
=. #nnal Re!orts, 1/00311, !!. 1<63=.
/. #nnal Re!orts, 1/00311, !. =9.
10. Ibid. !. 1<=.
11. 'ffett, o!. cit. !. ;<.
19. 'ffett, o!. cit. %he translation is ,rdonCs and differs slightly from the version given
by 2gard in his #nnal Re!ort for 1/09.
11. #nnal Re!orts, 1/00311, !!. =93=1.
1;. 'ffett, o!. cit. !!. ;13<1.
1<. 'ffett, o!. cit. !. <1.
15. Ibid. !. <<.
16. Ibid.
1= 'ffett, o!. cit., !!. ;03;9.
1/. Ibid. !. ;9.
90. 4onfidential .is!atch of 19 .ecember 1/09 in 4* ;;5[95.
91. #nnal Re!orts, 1/00311, !. 61.
99. Ibid.
91. 2gard said nothing to the 4olonial *ffice abot Sltan #bdCs death ntil, in his
confidential dis!atch of 1/ .ecember 1/09, he mentioned it !arenthetically. "ven then
he gave no hint that it was an event of any im!ortance and of corse his dis!atch did not
reach 2ondon ntil 1/ &anary 1/01. See 4* ;;5[95.
9;. 'ffett, o!. cit. !. 61.
9<. Ibid. !. 5=.
95. 2gardCs confidential dis!atch of 19 .ecember 1/09 in 4* ;;5[95.
96. ,ackwell, !. cit. 2etter, no. 19<.
9=. Perham, 2gard? %he Bears of #thority, o!. cit. !. /;.
9/. Ibid.
249
10. 4* ;;5[95.
11. Ibid.
19 4* ;;5[95.
11. Ibid.
1;. Ibid.
1<. 4* ;;5[95.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
1=. Ibid.
1/. Ibid.
;0. 4* ;;5[10.
;1. Ibid.
;9. #nnal Re!orts, 1/00311, !. ==.
;1. 4* ;;5[10.
;;. Perham, o!. cit. !. 1=1. See also 'onthly and @arterly Re!orts from Sokoto
Province, 1/0135.
;<. Ibid. !!. 16/3=9.
;5. Ibid. !. 1;=
;6. .is!atch of 1< &anary 1/01 in 4* ;;5[10.
250
6lossary
Ajele
an e)ective official 7literally .e!ty8 in (!e.
Alhaji
cortesy title accorded to any man who has made the Pilgrimage to
'ecca. %he +asa form of +affl.
Alkali
a $dge in a 'oslem cort.
Alkalin Alkalai
'oslem 4hief &stice.
Ar4o
a Flani title, often accorded to the head of a clan or sb3clan.
Askia
the title of the rlers of the Songhai "m!ire after 'hammad #skia.
Atikawa
the members of the #tilm branch of the Sokoto rling family.
.awa
sffi) meaning Cthe !eo!le ofC, e.g. >obirawa, the !eo!le of >obir.
#a.
a !refi) which, if followed by a !lace name, means Sa man ofT, e.g.
,agobiri, a man of >obir.
#an!a #akwai
a !e$orative term, meaning roghly Sthe ,ogs SevenT, sed to
describe the States in or ad$oining +asaland which did not belong
to the athentic seven.
#arebari
,erber.
#irni7n8
a walled town, hence a city.
(hief
this title has been sed to describe the rlers of the +asa States in
distinction to C"mirC, which has been reserved for their Flani
sccessors.
(hiroma
a title originating in ,orn bt later widely ado!ted by the +asas
and die Flani. (ormally reserved for members of the rling family.
4agachi
another tide originating in ,orn bt ado!ted in +asaland,
!articlarly in the eastern "mirates, and retained by the Flani.
4an
son of, e-ivalent of #rabic bin or ibn.
4an 6aladima
a title.
4anyen Kasko
251
o!!robrios nickname bestowed on Sltan #bd, literally Sthe
Enbaked PotT.
4arb el.Arba-in
name given to the "gy!t34had caravan rote.
"mir
this title has been reserved to describe the Flani rlers in
distinction to S4hiefT, which has been sed for their +asa
!redecessors.
Etsu tide of the rler of (!e.
+illani
+asa name for the Flani.
+ul#e
the FlaniCs name for themselves.
+ulfulde
the Flani langage.
6aisuwa
literally SgreetingsT bt often meaning the gifts or sweeteners given
by inferiors to s!eriors or intermediaries.
6aladima a title originating in ,ormi bt ado!ted later throghot
+asaland.
6a!oan 6ulbi
the .ead River.
6ida7n8
the hose 7of8.
Haa#e
a word sed by the Flani to describe the indigenos !eo!les of the
Sdan.
Haj
the Pilgrimage to 'ecca.
Hajji
cortesy title accorded to any man who has made the Pilgrimage.
Sometimes sim!ly +a$.
Hakimi 7!lral .ai8
a ma$or vassal or fief3holder, a territorial magnate or .istrict +ead.
Haraji
!oll3ta) or general ta) on the farming commnity.
Hausa #akwai
the seven athentic States of +asaland.
7ja!a
the licence to teach.
Jama-a
the 'oslern 4ommnity, hence ShehCs followers.
Jangali
the ta) on cattle.
Jekada
the confidential messenger who acted as an intermediary between
an absent fief3holder and his fief.
252
Jihad
holy war in the Islamic sense.
Ji!ya
the levy that an Islamic State is entitled to im!ose on non3'oslem
sb$ects.
Kadiriyya
one of the great sects or brotherhoods of Islam, the followers of #bd
el3:adir el3&ilani of ,aghdad.
Kachalla
a ,orn title.
Kanemina
7!lral Kanembu8, a native of :anem.
Kofa
a 4oncillor or 4ortier who acted as an intermediary 7literally
doorway8 for an ot3lying "mirate or fief and ths ac-ired s!ecial
res!onsibility for it.
Kurdin Kasa
general ta) on the farming commnity.
<ami4o
title of the "mir of #damawa.
Madaki or Madawaki
a +asa title, literally S'aster of the +orseT.
Magaji
a +asa title.
Maghreb
'oslem (orth #frica.
Mahdiyya
the Islamic sect com!osed of followers of the 'ahdi 'hammad
#hmed.
Mai
in :anri the word re!resents the title of the Sltans of ,orn down
to 1=;5. In +asa it is a !refi) meaning the !ossessor of something,
e.g. 'ai3%ta, the flag3bearer. Makama
a +asa title.
Mallam
cortesy title accorded by the +asas to any man of learning.
Marafa
a +asa title.
Mith@al
a measre of gold, abot 1[9 once.
Modibbo
cortesy title accorded by the Flani to any man of learning, the
e-ivalent of the +asa 'allam.
Muharram
a month in the 'oslem year.
Hasida
#rabic ode.
253
$abo7n8
new, e.g. Sabongari meaning (ewtown.
$a-i
a title.
$ansani
a war3cam! or military ot!ost.
$arki7n8
4hief or "mir 7of8.
$arkin Musulmi
4ommander of the Faithfl, the +asa form of the title of the
Sltans of Sokoto.
$arkin Yaki
4a!tain3>eneral.
$eku
a corr!t form of the #rabic word Sheikh, sed in the western
Sdan and ado!ted as their title by the rlers of +amdallahi.
$hari-a
Islamic 2aw.
$hehu
the +asa and :anri version of the #rabic word Sheikh, reserved in
this book as the title of Esman dan Fodiyo.
$heikh
the title of "l3:anemi and his sccessors, first as the administrative
rlers of ,orn and after 1=;5 as the sr!ing bt acce!ted Sltans.
$iyasa
the discretionary athority, com!lementary to that defined in the
ShariCa, with which 'oslem rlers were endowed.
$udan
the belt of #frica lying between the Sahara to the north and the
e-atorial rain3forests to the soth. Where the term Ccentral SdanC
has been sed it is intended to indicate broadly the sector lying
between 2ake 4had and the (iger.
$ultan
this title has been reserved for the rlers of Sokoto to whom the
other "mirs owed allegiance. In theory it shold also be accorded to
the rlers of >wand, who were !aramont in their !art of the .al
"m!ire, bt since the advent of the ,ritish they have always been
known as "mirs of >wand and this !ractice has been followed.
Similarly, to avoid confsion, the !aramont rlers of ,orma have
not been styled Sltan bt, before 1=;5, 'ai and, after that date,
Sheikh.
$unna
the a!!roved cstoms of Islam.
$unni
orthodo) 'oslems.
*afida
a title.
254
*ambari
a %areg title.
*ijjani
a member of the %i$aniyya sect of Islam, the followers of #hmad
%i$$ani of Fez.
$ullubawa
a branch of the Flani !eo!le who !layed a !rominent !art in the
jihad in Sokoto, :atsina, and :ano.
*oronkawa
the branch of the Flani !eo!le to which the rling families of
Sokoto and >wand belong.
/bandawaki
a +asa title.
/bandoma
a +asa title.
ali
a 'oslem saint.
ambai
a title.
a!iri
Jizier.
Yarima
a title of ,orn origin widely ado!ted in +assland.
8akka
the Islamic tithe.
8aria and 8a!!au
in the +asa era, Aazza was the name of the State and Aaria the
name of the ca!ital. In the Flani and ,ritish !eriods, however, the
se of Aazza began to die ot and Aaria was em!loyed increasingly
to describe the "mirate as well as the city. In this book, therefore,
Aazza has been sed to denote the +asa State and Aaria the
Flani "mirate.
255
#ibliogra'hy
*n!lish and Fr$n+h S)ur+$s
#badie, '., 2a 4olonie d (iger, Paris, 1/96.
#bdllah Ibn 'hammad see the +asa and #rabic section? see also
in this section nder +iskett, '.
#fricans, 2eo, see the +asa and #rabic section.
#le)ander, +erbert, ,oyd #le)anderCs 2ast Borney, 2ondon, 1/19.
#rnett, ". &., %he Rise of the Sakoto Flani, :ano, 1/96, embodying
a translation or !ara!hrase of Sltan Ilhamonad ,elloCs InfakCl
'aisri.
,ackwell, +. R, %he *cc!ation of +asaland, 1/0031/0;, 2agos,
1/96.
,aldwin, %. +. 7translator and editor8, %he *bligations of Princes by
Sheikh 'hammad el3'aghili, ,eyroth, 1/19.
,arth, +einrich, %ravels and .iscoveries in (orthern and 4entral
#frica, 2ondon, 1=<6.
,ello, Sltan 'hammad, see the +asa and #rabic section? see
also in this section nder #rnett, ". &.
,ivar, #. .. +., see the section on Re!orts, >azetteers, and #rticles.
,ovill, ". W., %he >olden %rade of the 'oors, 2ondon, 1/51.
,ryan, '. #. 7in con$nction with .. Westermann8, %he 2angages
of West #frica, 2ondon, 1/<9.
,rdon, &. #., +istorical (otes on 4ertain "mirates and %ribes,
2ondon, 1/0/.
4la!!erton, +gh
o (arrative of %ravels and .iscoveries in (orthern and 4entral
#frica 7in con$nction with .. .enham and W. *dney8,
2ondon, 1=9=
o &ornal of a Second ")!edition into the Interior of #frica,
2ondon, 1=9/.
.aniel, F. im ", # +istory of :atsina, c. 1/16.
.enham, .. 7in con$nction with +. 4la!!erton and W. *dney8,
(arrative of %ravels and .iscoveries in (orthern and 4entral #frica,
2ondon, 1=9=.
Flint, &. "., Sir >eorge >oldie and the 'aking of (igeria, 2ondon,
1/50.
>entil, "mile, 2a 4hte de lC"m!ire de Rabeh, Paris, 1/09.
>reenrerg, &. +., 2angages of #frica, %he +age, 1/51.
+eath, F. 7translator and editor8, # 4hronicle of #b$a by 'allam.
+assan and 'allam ShCaib, Ibadan, 1/<9.
+ertslet, Sir "., %he 'a! of #frica by %reaty, 2ondon, 1/0/.
256
+iskett, '. 7translator and editor8, %azyin al3Wara-at by #bdllah
ibn 'hammad, Ibadan, 1/51. See also in the section on Re!orts,
>azetteers, and #rticles.
+ogben, S. &. 7in con$nction with #. +. '. :irk3>reene8, %he
"mirates of (orthern (igeria, 2ondon, 1/5<.
+o!en, 4. "., %he Pastoral Flbe Family in >toand, 2ondon, 1/<=.
&ohnson, Samel, %he +istory of the Borbas, 2ondon, 1/91.
&ohnston, +. #. S. 7translator and editor8, # Selection of +asa
Stories, *)ford, 1/55.
:ano 4hronicle, "nglish translation contained in vol. Ill of Sdanese
'emoirs by +. R. Palmer.
:irk3>reene, #. +. '.
o %he "mirates of (orthern (igeria 7in con$nction with S. &.
+ogben8, 2ondon, 1/55?
o #damawa Past and Present, 2ondon,1/<=.
2eo, see nder #FRic#(s in the +asa and #rabic section.
'argolioth, .. S., 'ohammedanism, 2ondon, 1/11
'any, Raymond, %ablea >Logra!hi-e de lC*est #fricain a
'oyen #ge, .akar, 1/51.
'eek, 4. :., (orthern %ribes of (igena, 9 Jols., 2ondon, 1/9<.
'onteil, 4., .e St. 2ois Z %ri!oli !ar le 2ac %chad, Paris, 1=/;.
'ffett, .. &. '., 4oncerning ,rave 4a!tains, 2ondon, 1/5;.
(adel, S. F., # ,lack ,yzantim, 2ondon, 1/;9.
*re, 4. W. $., %he 'aking of (orthern (igeria, 2ondon, 1/11.
*dney, W., see nder .enham.
Palmer, +. R., Sdanese 'emoirs, 1 vols., 2agos, 1/9=. See also the
section on Re!orts, >azetteers, and #rticles.
Park, 'ngo, %ravels in the Interior .istricts of #ffica, 2ondon,
16//.
Perham, 'argery
o 2gardD %he Bears of #dventre, 2ondon, 1/50.
o 2gardD %he Bears of #thority, 2ondon, 1/50.
Robinson, 4. +., +asaland, 2ondon, 1=/5.
Rodd, F. Rennell, %he Peo!le of the Jeil, 2ondon, 1/95.
Sheh, see the +asa and #rabic section nder Esman dan Fodiyo.
Smith, 'ary, ,aba of :aro, 2ondon, 1/<;.
Smith, '. >., >overnment in Aazza, 2ondon, 1/50.
Stenning, .. &., Savannah (omads, 2ondon, 1/</.
%rimingham, &. S., # +istory of Islam in West #frica, *)ford, 1/59.
Ervoy, Bves, +istoire de J"m!ire de ,omo, Paris, 1/;6.
Esman dan Fodiyo, see the +asa and #rabic section.
Jandeler, S., 4am!aining on the E!!er (ile and (iger, 2ondon,
1=/=.
Westerman, .. 7in con$nction with '. #. ,ryan8, %he 2angages of
West #frica, 2ondon, 1/<9.
,$()rts, -az$tt$$rs, and Arti+l$s
257
#nnal Re!orts, (orthern (igeria, 1/00311.
,ivar, #. .. +.
o #rabic .ocments of (orthern (igeriaT, ,S*#S, vol. MMII, no.
9, 1/</.
o %he #rabic 2iteratre of (igeria to 1=0;D a Provisional
#ccontT 7in con$nction with '. +iskett8, ,S*#S, vol. MMJ,
no. 1, 1/59
o see also nder Esman dan Fodiyo in the +asa and #rabic
section.
.istrict (otebooks, >wand 7n!blished8.
.istrict (otebooks, :ano 7n!blished8.
.istrict (otebooks, Sokoto 7n!blished8.
Folkes, 4. +., C%he #nglo3French ,ondary 4ommission, (iger to
2ake 4hadC, article in the Royal "ngineers &ornal, vol. 2MMIII, no, ;,
1/</.
>azetteer of ,achi Province, com!iled by F. ,. >all, 2ondon, 1/9o.
>azetteer of ,orn Province, com!iled by +. R. Palmer, revised by &.
,. Welman, 2agos, 1/9/.
>azetteer of :ano Province 7inclding :atsina8, com!iled by W. F.
>owers, 2ondon, 1/91.
>azetteer of Ilorin Province 7inclding :abba8, com!iled by :. J.
"l!hinstone, 2ondon, 1/91.
>azetteer of :ontagora Province, com!iled by ". 4. .ff, revised by
W. +amilton3,rowne, 2ondon, 1/90.
>azetteer of 'ri Province, edited by &. '. Freemantle, 2ondon,
1/99.
>azetteer of (!e Province, com!iled by ". >. '. .!igny, 2ondon,
1/90.
>azetteer of Sokoto Province, com!iled by ". &. #rnett, 2ondon,
1/90.
>azetteer of Bola Province 7#damawa8, com!iled by 4. *. 'igeod.
>azetteer of Aaria Province, com!iled by ". &. #rnett, 2ondon, 1/90.
>idley, 4. >. ,., S'antanfas3# Stdy in *ral %raditionT, #frican
2angage Stdies, vol. JI, 1/5<.
>mel "mirate (otebook 7n!blished8.
+iskett, '.
o S#n Islamic %radition of Reform in the Western Sdan from the
Si)teenth to the "ighteenth 4entryT, ,S*#S, vol. MMJ, no. 1,
1/59.
o S'aterial relating to the State of 2earning among the Flani
before their &ihadT, ,S*#S, vol. MIM, no. 1, 1/<6.
o S%he #rabic 2iteratre of (igeria to 1=0;? a Provisional
#ccontC 7in con$nction with #. .. +. ,ivar8, ,S*#S, vol.
MMJ, no. 1, 1/59
o see also nder Esman dan Fodiyo, #bdllah ibn 'hammad,
and S,agada, %he song ofT, in the +asa and #rabic section.
258
+odgkin, %homas, SEthman dan FodioT, article in (igeria, *ctober
1/50.
:azare "mirate (otebook 7n!blished8.
:ensdale, W. ". (., SField (otes on the #rabic 2iteratre of the
Western SdanT, &ornal of the Royal #siatic Society, 1/<<, 1/<5,
and 1/<=.
'onthly and @arterly Re!orts from Sokoto Province, 1/0135, now
in the (igerian (ational #rchives.
(otes on (assarawa Province, 2ondon, 1/90.
*lderogge, .. #., SFedalism in the Western Sdan from the
Si)teenth to the (ineteenth 4entriesT, Sovietskaya "tnografia, no.
;, 1/<6.
Palmer, +. R., see nder Esman dan Fodiyo in the +asa and
#rabic section.
Sokoto Provincial >azetteer, 'S. of revised edition !re!ared by P. >.
+arris, c. 1/1=, bt never !blished.
Waldman, '. R., S%he Flani yihad3a ReassessmentT, &#+, vol. JI,
no. 1.
Whitting, 4. ". $., see nder Said, +a$$i, in the +asa and #rabic
section.
&ausa and Arabi+ S)ur+$s
#bdlbaki, Sarkin ,rmi, #bdlbaki %animddarin %reta, Aaria,
1/<;.
#bdllah ibn 'hammad
o %azyin #I3Wara-at, translated and edited by '. +iskett,
Ibadan, 1/51
o Ida at3(skh, translated and edited by '. +iskett, ,S*#S,
vol. MlM, no. 1, 1/<6.
#bbakar, #lha$i, :ano to .abo 4igari, :ano, 1/<=.
#fricans, 2eo, %he +istory and .escri!tion of #frica, translated by
&ohn Pory, 1 vols., 2ondon, 1=/5.
,agada, %he song of, translated and edited by '. +iskett, ,S*#S,
vol. MMJII, no. 1 and vol. MMJIII, nos. 1 and 9, 1/5; and 1/5<.
,ello, Sltan 'hammad
o InfakCl 'aisri, translated or !ara!hrased and edited by ". &.
#rnett in %he Rise of the Sokoto Flani
o Sard al3:alam, translated into +asa in 2abarn +asawa da
'akwabtans, vol. I.
"l3'aghili, Sheikh 'hammad, %he *bligations of Princes, translated
by %.. +. ,aldwin, ,eyroth, 1/19.
+assan, 'allam 7in con$nction with 'allam ShCaib8, # 4hronicle
of #b$a, Ibadan, 1/<9.
+asa 4hronicle, given in +istorical (otes on 4ertain "mirates and
%ribes by &. #. ,rden, 2ondon, 1/0/.
259
+asa Stories, # Selection *f, translated and edited by +. #. S.
&ohnston, *)ford, 1/55.
&naid, #lha$i, %arihin Flani, Aaria, 1/<6.
:ano 4hronicle, +asa version contained in vol. + of 2abarn
+asawa da 'akwabtans.
2abarn +asawa da 'akwabtans, %ranslation ,rea, 9 vols.,
Aaria, 1/19 and 1/11.
'ahmd, #lha$$, S# 2ight for 2earners and a 2am! for the ,lindT,
n!blished 'S. on ,achi "mirate.
'ai 'aina, 2abarin 'ai 'aina no Bega, Aaria, 1/<=.
Said, +a$$i S#n #rabic +istory of SokotoT, e)tracts translated by 4. ".
&. Whitting and !blished in the &ornal of the Royal #frican Society,
no. 1== and #frican #ffairs, 1/;=.
Sheh, see nder Esman dan Fodiyo.
ShCaib, 'allam 7in con$nction with 'allam +assan8, # 4hronicle
of #b$a, lbadan, 1/<9.
%atsniyoyi na +asa, collected by F. "dgar, 1 vols., "dinbrgh and
,elfast, 1/11311.
Esman dan Fodiyo
o :itab al3Far-, translated and edited by.'. +iskett ,S*#S, vol.
MM+I, no. 1, 1/50
o %anbikhCl Ikhwan, translated and edited by +. R. Palmer,
&#S, vols. MIII3MIJ, 1/1131<
o Wathi-at #hl #l3Sdan, translated and edited by #. .. +.
,ivar, &#+, vol. II, no. 9, 1/51
Sira$ al3Ikhwan
o ,ayan al3,ida al3Shaytaniya
o (asaCih al3Emmat al3'hammadiya 7dealt with in S#n Islamic
%radition of Reform in the Western SdanT, by '. +iskett8.
260