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America's search for a
postcold war grand strategy
M.E. Ahrari
a
a
US Armed Forces Staff College, Professor of
National Security and Strategy,
Version of record first published: 19 Oct 2007
To cite this article: M.E. Ahrari (1994): America's search for a postcold war
grand strategy, European Security, 3:3, 417-440
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839408407181
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America's Search for a Post-Cold War
Grand Strategy
M.E. AHRARI
The end of the Cold War in 1989 also brought about an end to contain-
ment, which evolved as a post-World War II grand strategy of the United
States. Now American foreign policy appears to be in quest of a new grand
strategy, one that is in pace with the revolutionary changes that have
occurred in superpower relations since 1985 - a year that witnessed
the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in the former USSR. When
the US-led international coalition dismantled the military machine of
Saddam Hussein in 1991, former President George Bush - who previously
admitted that he lacked 'the vision thing' - started to share with the
world his vision of an emerging new world order (NWO), and began to
describe, in general terms, the modalities of America's role in it. At
least for a while, it appeared that this discussion of the NWO was also
symbolizing America's quest for a new grand strategy. Thus far, President
Bill Clinton has been too busy with the domestic agenda to spell out his
own vision of America's strategic purpose in the post-Cold War world.
Even when he is forced to focus his attention on world affairs - as he
was on several occasions - his own perspective on America's strategic
purpose is not likely to deviate too far from what we have understood
about the generalities of the NWO. A new world order or not, in this
essay, I will examine problems and prospects that await US foreign
policy in the 1990s and beyond.
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
'Grand strategy' is one of those concepts whose meaning, though not at
all clear, is taken for granted. Barry Posen describes it as 'a political-
military means-ends chain, a state's theory about how it can best "cause"
security for itself. He further posits that a 'grand strategy must identify
likely threats to the state's security and it must devise political, economic
military, and other remedies for those threats."
Paul Kennedy's definition perhaps is most succinct. 'Grand Strategy',
he writes, is 'the highest type of strategy ..." which so integrates the
policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either
rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of
European Security, Vol . 3 , No. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp.417-440.
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
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418 EUROPEAN SECURITY
victory. It is pursued by a nation during peace and war times. The 'crux
of grand strategy lies . . . in policy that is in the capacity of the nation's
leaders to bring together all of elements, both military and non-military,
for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term . . . best
interests.'
2
A comprehensive analysis of the American grand strategy is not possible
in an essay. Instead, I will largely focus on the military aspect, while
pointing out the complementarity of military policies to other politico-
economic aspects of this grand strategy.
Posen treats military doctrine as a 'sub-component' of grand strategy
'that explicitly deals with military means'. I contend that in order for
a grand strategy to be effective at a given time, it has to be based on an
explicit military sub-component. Such an assigned significance to this
sub-component was perhaps most relevant to the Cold War environment
when the common enemy (i.e., international communism) was easy to
identify for the non-communist industrial world. The post-Cold War
environment, on the other hand, is devoid of such a visible enemy. This
might also account for the difficulty in developing a grand strategy on
the part of the United States, the only remaining superpower.
A standard definition of a doctrine is that it spells out 'fundamental
principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of
objectives.'
3
I am using the term military doctrine in a broader sense
than that. Fritz Ermarth's description of 'strategic doctrines' comes close
to what I intend military doctrine to mean in this essay. According to
him, strategic doctrine may be defined as 'a set of operative beliefs,
values, and assertions that in a significant way guide behaviour with
respect to strategic research development, weapons, choice, forces,
operational plans, arms control, etc.'
4
It is true that, as Aaron Friedberg
notes, 'by any reasonable definition of the word, this country has never
had a strategic doctrine.'
5
By, military doctrines, I am referring to broad
policy statements (i.e., a set of operative beliefs and assertions) that were
made by various administrations - from Truman to Bush - conveying
the essence of potential American military response to similar Soviet
actions in those areas regarded as part of its vital interests by the United
States. Two elements that are necessary preconditions for any military
doctrines (as the term is used here) are sufficient visibility of military
preparation and credibility.
Containment evolved as a grand strategy for the United States, especially
in National Security Council Directive 68, which was prepared during
the Truman administration. Since then, all presidents, including the last
Cold War president, George Bush, pursued it without doubting its validity
or relevance to the national security of the United States.
6
Even when
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US SEARCH FOR A GRAND STRATEGY 419
detente emerged as a major tactical characteristic during the Nixon-Ford
administrations, the United States did not abandon containment. The
temporary abandonment of detente during the Carter administration was
followed by a resuscitation of the Cold War rhetoric, which lasted through
the first Reagan administration. This resuscitation was in response to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that took place in the final year of the
Carter presidency.
The notion of continuity, which is a crucial condition for a grand
strategy, was also a characteristic of containment between 1947 and
1989 - the year the Berlin Wall came down, symbolizing the end of the
Cold War. Of course, one can expect a fine-tuning of various aspects of
a grand strategy as well as tactical variations that are warranted from
time to time (or from one President to the next). However, its abandon-
ment is not expected unless such a radical change is necessary because of
equally significant mutations in the international environment. According
to Paul Kennedy, grand strategy 'relies... on the constant and intelligent
reassessment of the polity's ends and means... '
7
Another concept that is worth defining is the 'new world order'
(NWO). It should be noted that no precise definition of this concept
exists. What follows is its broad outline based upon statements made by
numerous officials of the Bush administration - the last Cold War
administration - and on the thinking of various foreign policy specialists.
As the Bush administration perceived it, the NWO is likely to have the
following characteristics. First, it was to be a system of US dominance
of world political and economic scenes - a benign Pax Americana on a
global scale. Second, the US security capability under such a system would
serve as a protective umbrella against the shenanigans of a potential
aggressor in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. However, in the wake
of the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and after the dismantlement
of the military might of Saddam Hussein, no one seemed to have a clue
as to who the potential aggressors of the coming decades were likely to
be. Third, the NWO was envisioned as a system where disputes among
nations would be settled amicably and without resort to violence. The
United Nations would be playing an active role in mediating and settling
disputes. In the final analysis, the potential US intervention would be us-
ed to deter the aggressive designs of a nation. Fourth, the NWO would be
a system where economic cooperation - as opposed to disfunctional
economic nationalism - would be a dominant modus operandi among
nation-states. International trade was expected to continue its expansion
based on market-oriented economies. Fifth, in the realm of politics,
democratic ways of governance in the non-democratic parts of the world
were expected to be promoted in the NWO. Finally, the NWO would
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420 EUROPEAN SECURITY
be characterized by cooperation among all great powers on major
international issues.
The dynamics of conflicts in the post-Cold War years are such that new
modes must be devised to tackle them. Unlike the supposed monolithic
communism of the Cold War years, the bad guys are hard to discipline
even when they are identified as such. The United States has the military
capabilities to fight conventional conflicts of the Cold War years. How to
resolve the new ethnic conflicts that are based on chauvinistic nationalism
in Europe, for instance, is an issue no one has come to grips with. Moreover
the bad guys of the 1990s defy the kind of solution a policy like contain-
ment was aimed at imposing. Unlike the Cold War years, US leadership
is not going to be accepted by European allies with the single-mindedness
of the Cold War years to defeat an enemy. Most important, the post-
Cold War world is a place where America lacks a strategic purpose - a
grand strategy for its foreign policy.
In Part I of this essay I will present an overview of the evolution of
Containment as a grand strategy and its attendant military doctrines
between the 1940s and 1980s. The dominance of security-related threats
in the international political system to Western Europe and the US played
a crucial role in the evolution and pursuit of Containment. The superpower
military competition during these years was also equally significant in
focusing on, and targeting, an enemy - the USSR.
In the second part I will underscore how the emerging realities of the
international political and economic systems in the 1990s and beyond
are posing new challenges to the US dominance.
I. FORTY YEARS OF CONTAINMENT: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Jelling of Containment: 1945-1970
The Cold War, which lasted from 1945 to 1989, provided reasons for
stability and continuity in American foreign policy. Under the three-
pronged approaches of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and
containment, the United States set out to rebuild Western Europe in its
own image, and minimize the chances of takeover of that region by the
Soviet Union through overt or covert actions.
International communism had been perceived as a monolithic threat to
democratic pluralism since the 1920s. However, with the emergence of the
USSR as a major military power in the 1940s, the United States developed
an exaggerated perception of its capabilities. Of course, Stalin's maneuvers
in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War II convinced American
decisionmakers that the ultimate aim of that communist state was to
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US SEARCH FOR A GRAND STRATEGY 421
continue destabilizing European countries, thereby extending its control
westward.
The reconstruction of Western Europe in order to stabilize it econ-
omically, and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to protect it militarily, were the two chief responses of US
foreign policy. American resolve in creating a post-World War II order
in Western Europe through these actions had left no doubt for the Soviet
leaders as to how far the United States would go in defending it. The
short-lived American nuclear monopoly in the 1940s - in tandem with
its demonstrated willingness to use nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki - also served as a decisively credible deterrent against any
precipitous Soviet measures in Europe.
But Asia was still an open arena for US-Soviet rivalry. The success
of the communist revolution in China in 1949 and the outbreak of the
Korean conflict in 1950 served as persuasive evidence of the threats posed
by international communism to political stability in northeast Asia. As
far as the United States was concerned, the noncommunist political order
in East Asia was threatened by the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC)
and North Korea. The American inheritance of the Vietnamese conflict
after a decisive French defeat at Dien Bien Phu (1954) was rationalized
through the Domino Theory. Amplifying on this theory, President Dwight
Eisenhower, in a letter to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,
noted, 'If . . . Indochina passes into the hands of the Communists the
ultimate effect on our and your global strategic position with the conse-
quent shift in the power ratios through Asia and the Pacific could be
disastrous.'
8
In the Middle East, the Eisenhower administration followed a policy
of 'pactomania' to contain the Soviet Union. This phrase describes the
feverish pitch with which the United States was seeking allies to combat
international communism in the Third World. Even though this policy
created several alliances, its effectiveness to deal with various Third World
countries remained questionable, at best. For instance, this policy of
seeking allies brought the Cold War and Containment to the Middle East
with a vengeance. There was to be no difference between those nations
which sided with the Soviet Union and those who wished to remain
nonaligned.
The only serious challenge to American interests in the Middle East
stemmed from (at least as perceived by the American policy-makers) the
political and diplomatic maneuvers of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of
Egypt. Yet in reality, the struggle between the Nasserite and monarchical
forces in the 1950s and the 1960s was a natural outcome of that region's
gaining of independence from Western colonial subjugation. However,
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422 EUROPEAN SECURITY
the near-obsession of American decision-makers with the global con-
tainment of Communism kept them from understanding the real nature
of this struggle. It should be noted that the Eisenhower administration
came to this realization in the last two years of its tenure in office (1959
60).
9
Washington's involvement in Vietnam continued to escalate in the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations (1961 -68). The growing American
frustration with the intractability of this war was manifested in a rising
storm of public protest. This was also the beginning of a new congressional
assertiveness marked by the public prosecution of this war by Senator
William Fulbright in his capacity as the chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. The political unwillingness of America to win a
military victory in effect drove President Lyndon Johnson from office.
His successor Richard Nixon sought an end to this war through a dual-
track policy of graduated escalation and continued negotiations with the
representatives of North Vietnam.
In Nixon and in his European-born National Security Council Adviser
Henry Kissinger, the United States had two individuals who were seeking
a political resolution of the Vietnam war without damaging American
preeminence on the world scene. Both of them perceived their country
as a declining power. As such, the dynamics of bringing about an end
to American involvement in Vietnam was to have long-range implications
for US strategic interests worldwide. In their complex world-view,
Washington's disengagement from Vietnam had to be brought about in
a way that would render that superpower's dominance in Europe intact.
The United States had also been losing its economic dominance between
the 1940s and the 1970s.
10
This was dramatized in no less an event
than in the imposition of the oil embargo by the members of the Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).
11
B. Detente and the 'new Cold War': 1970s-1980s
Nixon and Kissinger definitely saw an international decline of American
power and prestige, more in the economic sphere than in the military
one. However, from their perspective, these erosions could be arrested
if Washington deliberately attempted to manage the world order along with
the USSR, Western Europe, Japan, and the PRC. This pentagonal manage-
ment could be in the best American interests if all the other managers,
but most importantly the Soviet Union, could be persuaded to go along.
12
This could only be done by creating a web of interests for the Soviet Union
as a quid pro quo for its cooperation. As one can imagine, the manichean
American perception of the Soviet Union as an evil force had undergone
considerable changes since the days of John Foster Dulles. Now Soviet
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US SEARCH FOR A GRAND STRATEGY 423
behavior was being judged on the basis of interests, a more realistic and
a hard-nosed approach. The complex thinking of Nixon-Kissinger even-
tually led to an equally sophisticated policy of detente between the United
States and the USSR. In order for detente to succeed, however, it had not
only to be managed at different levels, but coordinated among different
actors, and on a variety of issues. Its sheer complexity doomed it from
the very beginning because it contained enormous points of confusion,
potential for mixed signals, garbled messages, and misunderstandings.
The American defeat in Vietnam was brought about as a result of a
lack of political will on the part of the American leadership to win the
war. How the openness of a democratic system could become the very
source of its defeat in a unpopular war could have never become more
apparent than it was during the American involvement in the Vietnam
conflict. The public protestations and grumblings between 1965 and 1968,
and the public prosecution of this war by the Congress, were only manifesta-
tions of the declining American resolve to emerge victorious. President
Johnson's decision not to run for a second term of office was the most
effective public signal that the United States' extrication from Vietnam
was only a matter of time. The congressional and presidential tug-and-
pull on this issue conveyed to the North Vietnamese that their intransigence
at the negotiating table was bound to pay off.
The Watergate scandal of 1973 - that simultaneously brought about
the end of the 'imperial presidency' and marked the beginning of the
'tethered presidency' - was a major setback to Containment.
13
Nixon's
often-repeated 'peace with honor' lost its popular reception; the assertive
(according to some scholars, 'imperial') congress was in no mood to go
on financing an American presence in Vietnam or Cambodia.
The humiliating American withdrawal from Vietnam and Cambodia
also seriously tainted detente. Nixon - the President who, along with
Kissinger, clearly masterminded this complex relation with the Soviet
Union - resigned from his office in disrepute. President Gerald Ford,
his successor, had the difficult task of continuing the Nixon legacy of
detente, which was coming under increasing scrutiny between 1973 and
1975. In the American domestic arena, the Soviet Union was not making
the matter easy for the supporters of detente either.
One of the major reasons detente became so controversial within the
United States was that it was based on a system of reward and punishment
- a notion that was often described as 'linkages'. This type of relationship
can indeed become problematic between any two nations. For superpowers,
with their intricate and manifold interests, these problems were magnified.
First of all, there was a definitional problem. What exactly did each side
want from the other before it considered its counterpart in violation of
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424 EUROPEAN SECURITY
detente? Second, and related to the preceding, was a perceptual or boun-
dary problem. What were the mutually acceptable boundaries of behavior
on issues of strategic concern? Third, it was assumed by the United
States that cooperation in one area should be linked to others, while
the USSR had a vision of a compartmentalized relationship. According
to this view, each superpower was to act on different issues solely in
pursuit of its best interests. Such a pursuit might not strictly be in the
spirit of detente, however. Fourth, the notion of linkages also came into
conflict with the separation of powers that is a constitutional reality
of American government. For instance, while Nixon and Kissinger
wanted use the granting of the most-favored-nation (MFN) status to the
USSR as a carrot, in order to receive Soviet cooperation on the on-going
Vietnam negotiations and arms control, the US Senate, on the contrary,
linked the granting of MFN status to Jewish emigration from the Soviet
Union.
The most contentious problem related to detente was Moscow's
involvement in the Third World. The 1970s was a troubled decade from
the perspective of US foreign policy. A significant idiosyncrasy of
American politics is that foreign policy successes have accompanied a
period of great exhilaration and an attendant exaggerated notion of
American capabilities in the world arena. At the same time, foreign policy
failures - and Vietnam certainly falls in this category - led to a period
of pessimism that was also accompanied by a debate of gloom and doom
underscoring American impotency. The American withdrawal from
Vietnam, as can be expected, triggered a period of pessimism. Soviet
foreign policy activism in the Third World - which was labelled as
'adventurism' created within the United States demands for abandoning
detente and becoming 'tough' with that country. The American defeat in
Vietnam also convinced the foreign policy specialists of that country's
decline. Containment as a grand strategy fell also into disrepute. A
pessimistic debate also ensued in the domestic arena, whose purpose was
to find 'new creed, taking account of the failure in Vietnam' and to offer
'a new direction' for American foreign policy in the coming years.
14
Even though Containment as a grand strategy came under heavy
criticism, and detente as a tactical maneuver drew a lot of fire, there were
no alternatives to these. The world of the 1970s was too cumbersome to
look for easy solutions to intricate international problems. American
stakes were too high, and they involved too many allies, for that super-
power to wallow in any form of neo-isolationism. The European detente,
started by the Ostpolitik of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt,
remained intact. It was felt in Washington that Western Europe was not
about to abandon detente or put it in a deep freeze merely because
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US SEARCH FOR A GRAND STRATEGY 425
it became unpopular in America. For the United States, the choice was
rather straightforward, that is, to deal with the Soviet Union strictly in
pursuit of its own and allied interests and stakes. However, since the
nature of Soviet involvement in the Third World had become such a
lightning rod of controversy in the domestic arena, it was becoming
increasingly difficult for Washington to justify the continuation of detente
unless Moscow made suitable reciprocative gestures. The Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan could not have come at a more inappropriate time from
the perspective of a continued policy of detente.
One of the major contributions of the Nixon administration to Contain-
ment was the Nixon Doctrine. Through this, the United States was to rely
on regional powers to defend the noncommunist world order. In essence,
the enunciation of this doctrine may also be viewed as only a new wrinkle
to the policy of pactomania that was adopted during the first Eisenhower
administration (1953-57).
The application of the Nixon Doctrine in the Persian Gulf facilitated
the emergence of the Shah of Iran as a defender of the pro-Western status
quo in that region, especially since Great Britain's decision of 1970 to pull
out of that area. American dominance remained unchallenged in that
region until the twin-developments of 1978-79 - the Islamic revolution
in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Shah of Iran's rule
ended along with the monarchy. The Islamic revolution emerged as an
anti-superpower and anti-Western phenomenon. The Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan in December 1979, and that conflict lasted until 1988 when
it announced it intended to withdraw.
Even though the United States never attached much strategic value to
Afghanistan, its Soviet occupation in tandem with the end of monarchy
in Iran initiated a turn toward a military buildup. It was felt in the United
States that since the hostile forces in the international arena understood the
language of power, Washington must pay attention to supplying more
muscles to its military might. Now the United States was to indulge itself
in a massive military expansion and active involvement in different regions
of the world. The Reagan administration, which soon succeeded the Carter
administration, also resuscitated the Cold War rhetoric of depicting the
Soviet Union as an 'evil empire' and as the 'focus of evil'. Declaring that
the United States allowed the Soviet Union a military edge in the Strategic
Arms Limitations (SALT) talks, President Ronald Reagan announced a
military buildup of $1.6 trillion over a period of the next five years and
refused to continue arms control negotiations until America militarily
caught up with it. His rationale was that Washington was going to negotiate
from a position of strength. Thus, Containment took a new turn to the
pre-detente days of heated rhetorical exchanges and renewed arms buildup.
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426 EUROPEAN SECURITY
The hardline stance of President Reagan - especially his insistence on
negotiating with the Soviets from a position of strength and his refusal
to negotiate on arms control as agreed by the NATO Council in 1979 -
caused considerable friction among the European allies.
Reagan also wanted to increase the cost of military activism for the
Soviet Union by arming anti-Communist forces in Afghanistan, Mozam-
bique, Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. This policy,
dubbed the Reagan Doctrine, proved to be controversial for the US
Congress regarding the two Central American states.
Reagan's policy of 'global, all continents, coercive containment"
5
also raised a storm of controversy in the Middle East. It was either his
administration's lack of understanding of the intricacies of that region,
or its preoccupation with anti-Sovietism, or a combination of both that
resulted in the misguided policy of seeking a 'strategic consensus' among
the Middle Eastern states. This policy, in tandem with a high priority for
military assistance that was continuously pursued by the Reagan admin-
istration, did little to contain the rising spirals of arms races in the Middle
East. The Iran-Iraq war was only one reminder of how deadly the
regional conflict was becoming in that area in the 1980s.
One witnesses a modicum of realism regarding the Soviet Union in
the second term of President Reagan (1984-88). It was this realism that
resulted in the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)
treaty in December 1987. Yet one should realize that by that year,
Mikhail Gorbachev already had been at the helm of the Soviet Union
for almost three years (he came to power in March 1985). Gorbachev's
'new political thinking' will go down in history as one of the major
reasons underlying the eventual conclusion of the Cold War. Consequently,
Containment as a grand strategy became less relevant (if not irrelevant).
One can only enumerate some of the iconoclastic changes that were
brought about as a result of this thinking: the liberation of Eastern
European countries, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Moscow's
retrenchment from the competitive and confrontational conflicts of the
Third World, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the INF treaty, reunification
of Germany, etc.
C. Military Doctrines of the Containment Era: 1940s-1980s
The use of military strength as an instrument of power is as old as human
civilization. As one of the dominant nation-states of the post-World
War II era, the United States remained quite sensitive to this reality.
Appropriate military doctrines were required to pursue the political
objectives of Containment - that is offering credible evidence to the
Soviet Union that in the areas of vital American interests, no precipitous
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US SEARCH FOR A GRAND STRATEGY 427
act aimed at altering the political status quo would be tolerated. Of course,
not all areas of the world could have been labelled as part of vital
interests. George Kennan's writing became a sort of a blueprint of what
the United States regarded as its vital interests. As Kennan saw it, 'only
five centers of the industrial and military power in the world' are important
to the United States 'from the standpoint of national security'. These
included the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany,
and Japan. Only these regions had 'the requisite conditions of climate,
of industrial strength, of population and of tradition which would enable
people there to develop and launch the type of amphibious power which
would have to be launched if our national security were seriously
affected.'
16
The primary focus of Containment and its economic counter-
part, the Marshall plan, was on these regions. NATO was specifically estab-
lished to defend Europe militarily from any overt Soviet actions. The
Japanese-American Security Treaty of 1951 (revised in 1961), which is a
bilateral pact, made the United States responsible for the security of Japan.
Even before the atomic bomb became a reality, the focus of debate
among the top American decision-makers was not whether it should be used
as an instrument of policy, but how, when, and where to use it.
17
This was
the genesis of the military doctrines the United States developed in support
of its grand strategy. The fact that it used the atomic bomb on Japan in
1945 not only established a precedent but also served as unquestionable
evidence that it would use it again if and when its vital interests are
perceived to have been threatened. Moreover, even though the bomb was
used on Japan, its real audience was the Soviet Union, and the intent was
to make that country 'more manageable in Europe'.
18
Thus, the bomb
became an instrument of Containment. American reliance on nuclear
weapons also was in harmony with a strong historical tradition of not
maintaining a large standing army in peacetime. American military
capabilities 'were to be developed and maintained to assure the effective-
ness of President Truman's Cold War policies'.
19
The United States also
deliberately made its military capabilities 'sufficiently visible to deter any
potential aggressor'. This was the beginning of what was later on known
as the strategy of deterrence.
20
According to Henry Kissinger, 'Deterrence requires a combination of
power and the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential
aggressor. ' He goes on to observe that... 'deterrence is a product of those
factors and not a sum. If any one of them is zero, deterrence fails.'
21
The Truman administration's decision to use the bomb as an instrument
of deterrence, emerged as a tradition of complementing the grand strategy
of Containment with a variety of military doctrines. Successive admin-
istrations followed it as a creed.
22
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428 EUROPEAN SECURITY
During the first Eisenhower administration there emerged two significant
concepts. First, the United States remained preoccupied with protecting
its territory against a potential strategic bombardment. The second concept
was the administration's sustenance of massive retaliation capabilities,
which was perceived as a deterrent to any potential Soviet aggressive
designs. Even in terms of seeking allies in Asia and the Middle East, in
order to contain the USSR, the United States relied on security (not
economic) assistance. The rationale was to enhance the military capabilities
of its Third World allies and to stabilize their respective regions. The
administration's insistence on massive retaliation notwithstanding, the
United States 'had as early as 1956 accepted the essentials of mutual
strategic deterrence as an operational guide'.
23
The Soviet entry into space in 1957 caused considerable consternation
within the United States. However, by 1958, with the development of
1,500-mile range Thor and Jupiter missiles, which were to be deployed
in Britain. Italy and Turkey, the two superpowers closed whatever long-
range ballistic missile gap might have prevailed between them, thereby
establishing a delicate 'balance of terror'.
The perception of progress that the Soviet Union had created by
launching its Sputnik in 1957 created a widespread suspicion among the
US foreign policy elites that America was somehow lagging. The Eisen-
hower administration did its utmost to assure the absence of a deterrence
gap; however, the seed for what later turned out to be a pseudo 'missile
gap' debate were already sown. By 1961 a newly-orbited reconnaissance
satellite proved that the 'Soviet ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile]
force was in fact much smaller than the US forces.'
24
As the Soviet Union enhanced its own retaliatory capabilities in the
1960s, the United States moved away from massive retaliation to 'flexible
response', which involved 'a range of appropriate responses, conventional
and nuclear, to all levels of aggressions or threats of aggression'.
25
During the Kennedy administration (1961 -63 ), the US-Soviet struggle
widened into Third World countries. Under Nikita Khrushchev, the
USSR, at least rhetorically, was focusing on 'wars of national liberation'.
Since many Third World countries had either become independent from
colonial rule or were about to do so, the United States believed that
they would be more sympathetic to the anticolonial rhetoric of Marxism-
Leninism espoused by the Soviet Union.
The anti-Soviet alliance-formation, so heavily emphasized during the
Eisenhower administration, caused considerable controversy and ample
divisions in different regions of the world. However, the Kennedy
administration did not have a decisively different response. The Soviet
Union had to be contained in the Third World countries that covered
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US SEARCH FOR A GRAND STRATEGY 429
the three continents and were considerably more diversified than Western
Europe, where NATO as an alliance had become such an effective source
of deterrence.
In the absence of a military doctrine that would have been suitable to
any particular region of the Third World, the United States responded
to the Vietnamese conflict in a manner that was not only perceived as
prudent, but was also developed with a view to avoiding the disastrous
French experience. Yet, between 1961 and 1968, widening the scope of its
involvement in Vietnam was the only option which the United States
proceeded to adopt.
President Nixon's pragmatic contribution to American involvement
was 'Vietnamization' of this war. The Nixon Doctrine was globalization
of Vietnamization. It was also a tacit concession to the growing reality
that was otherwise labelled as the 'Vietnam syndrome'. According to this,
the United States would no longer get involved in a land war in order to
save a pro-Western regime.
No definitive statement can be made of the success or the failure of the
Nixon Doctrine. It was issued during a time when the prestige of the
United States was waning as a result of the Vietnam debacle. Because of
its timing, a rather charitable characterization of it would be to call it a
pragmatic option. Perhaps, a more realistic assessment would be to
describe it as a sort of a last-ditch attempt of the executive branch to
save face in areas of the world that were no longer considered vital
interests by the US Congress. In the Persian Gulf, however, the Nixon
Doctrine and the Shah of Iran's ambitions to dominate the region were
mutually complementary. So, while one may suggest that American
strategic interests were preserved in that area, it cannot be said with any
certainty that the Nixon Doctrine played a decisive role.
The emergence of strategic parity between the United States and the
Soviet Union in the 1960s played a crucial role in the realization that
American military power was no longer sufficient 'for containing the Soviet
Union within its current sphere of dominance . . . '
26
This realization, first
mentioned through the concept of 'strategic sufficiency' during the early
days of the first Nixon administration (1969-73), also played a crucial
role both in the emergence of detente and the superpower agreement to
limit nuclear weapons. Of course, the congressional insistence on reducing
defense expenditures also drove Nixon and Kissinger to seek a realistic
solution to the continuing arms race. The end result was the conclusion
in 1972 of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT I) treaties.
Neither detente nor these treaties resulted in lowering the superpower
competition in the Third World, however. In fact, as was previously
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43 0 EUROPEAN SECURITY
noted, detente fell prey to: perceptual differences, a chasm between (what
the superpowers regarded as) the 'code of conduct' governing detente,
and varied expectations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan proved to be
a turning point in the resuscitation of the Cold War and the Containment-
related rhetoric of the 1950s and the 1960s. The greatest problem of the
US-Soviet relationship regarding the Third World was that neither of
them could develop a uniform policy as they had in Europe. The very
geographic size, and the multi-dimensional diversity of the Third World
countries were chief obstacles to uniform American or Soviet policies
toward them. Moreover, not all Third World countries or regions were
of equal strategic significance to them.
Strategic sufficiency would have remained operational, at least as far
as the United States was concerned, but for the Soviet invasion and
occupation of Afghanistan. President Jimmy Carter's abandonment of
the ratification of the controversial SALT II treaty by the Senate, which
was negotiated by his administration, was a partial response to the Soviet
aggression. By invading Afghanistan, the USSR only substantiated a
growing criticism by the American conservative policy community that
Washington was pursuing the arms negotiations from a position of weak-
ness. In response, Jimmy Carter, a President who pursued a comprehen-
sive test ban treaty in the beginning of his administration, initiated a
significantly large military buildup toward the end of his term. Another
important aspect of the final days of his administration was what was
dubbed the Carter Doctrine, which committed the United States to
containing Communism and other regional trouble-makers in the Persian
Gulf region. It elevated the security of this region to that of Europe and
the Pacific.
27
The weakened American approach toward Containment, as perceived
by the conservatives, was corrected with the election of Ronald Reagan
in 1980. Under his administration, the United States abandoned detente,
initiated a policy of unilateral reassertion of American leadership in the
international arena, and started rebuilding its military strength. National
Security Decision Directive 75 confirmed containment and a limited
aspect of confrontation with the USSR.
28
One of the most significant contributions of the Reagan administration
to military doctrine was the shift in focus of the arms race from the
offensive to the defensive side. Rejecting the premise underlying the SALT
talks, which were focused on limiting offensive weapons on the basis of
parity, President Reagan advocated a reduction of arms - thus, a shift
from SALT to START (i.e., Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). This was
his stated rationale. In reality, however, Reagan wanted to attain a military
edge for the United States. This fact did not go unnoticed by the Soviet
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leadership, especially in Reagan's decision to initiate the largest US military
buildup in peacetime.
To add more intensity to the growing Soviet frustrations, President
Reagan, in March 1983, also announced his commitment to the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI), whose purpose was to alter radically the long-
established thrust of the superpower arms race from offensive to defen-
sive weapons. Even though SDI was not to be realized as a viable
defensive shield in the foreseeable future, the Kremlin leadership found
itself at a considerable disadvantage. Their own research breakthroughs
in this area were considerably more rudimentary than those attained
by American scientists. However, that was not the significant problem.
Under Reagan, superpower relations, as seen from the Soviet side, had
deteriorated considerably. In Reagan, they encountered a President who
did not share the sophisticated perspective of superpower relations, which
had been the basis of US-Soviet policy since the days of Richard Nixon.
Despite slight fluctuations since the Nixon presidency, superpower
relations essentially remained quite complex during the Ford and Carter
administrations. Whereas his immediate predecessors paid homage to the
growing complexity of the international system by allowing Soviet Union
advantages in some areas while retaining (or seeking) advantages for the
United States in others, Reagan revolutionized the superpower relations
by bringing them down to a lower plane where the pendulum of advantage
was to clearly swing in favor of Washington.
President Reagan remained quite consistent in his approach of limited
confrontation with the USSR. His response to what he perceived as the
growing boldness of the Soviet Union in the Third World - as manifested
in its direct or indirect involvement in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozam-
bique, Nicaragua - pursued an activist policy of furnishing military
assistance. This policy (i.e., the Reagan Doctrine), definitely raised the
economic stakes for the Soviet Union. Consequently, the cost of supporting
pro-Soviet forces rose substantially for Moscow, especially in Afghanistan,
Cambodia and Mozambique.
The death of Brezhnev in 1982, which was followed by the short and
indecisive tenures of his two successors - Yuri Andropov and Konstantin
Chernenko - did not allow the Soviet Union enough time to bring about
policy or doctrinal adjustments as proper responses to Reagan's approach
to the superpower relations. The top leadership in the USSR was stabilized
in 1985, when Gorbachev came to power. After remaining in office for
a very short time, he realized that the military aspect of superpower
competition had doomed the Soviet Union to remain as a fifth-rate
economic power. Gorbachev quickly concluded that if his country were
to emerge as an economic power, it had to seriously reexamine its
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432 EUROPEAN SECURITY
commitment to military competition against the United States, a super-
power whose military might the Soviet Union could barely match, but
whose economic power was way beyond its reach.
It can be argued that Gorbachev wanted his country to become simul-
taneously a military and economic power, la the United States, in the
foreseeable future. However, as the initial step toward this long march
to attain these powers, he had to convince Washington that he was serious
in abandoning the age-old Soviet-American military competition and
its attendant worldwide manifestations.
The resurgence of the superpower detente took place between 1985 and
1989 not because the United States and the USSR succeeded in resolving
their intricate differences regarding the Third World. Rather, it was a
unilateral Soviet decision that radically altered the hierarchy of Soviet
strategic objectives under Gorbachev. In the late 1980s the Soviet Union's
primary concern became restructuring of its economy {Perestroika), and
a new and refreshing openness (Glasnost) in domestic and, especially, in
foreign policy areas. The burden of military competition, which had kept
its economy at the level of a Third World country, had to be unloaded,
at least for the foreseeable future.
Thus, Containment as a grand strategy and its attendant military
doctrines led to the emergence of a cooperative Soviet Union between
1985 and 1989 largely because Gorbachev made a determined effort to
assign primacy to economic cooperation between Moscow and Washington.
The Reagan administration's inordinate military buildup may have driven
home the futility of military competition and its deleterious spillover
effects for the Soviet economy for Gorbachev much sooner than if the
superpower military competition had been sustained at its conventional
pace. The forces that he thus unleashed swept the Soviet Union itself to
the dustbin of history. Long before the collapse of the USSR as a super-
power on 25 December 1991, the Bush administration started the rhetoric
of the emergence of the NWO. Nevertheless, a relevant question at this
point is: what kind of a new world order awaits America in the 1990s
and beyond?
//. The NWO and the Search for a New Grand Strategy: Problems
and Prospects
The international system that existed in the immediate aftermath of
World War II was ideal for American leadership. Europe and Japan
were in ruins economically, politically, and militarily. The international
economic arrangements that prevailed before the war proved inadequate
and were in dire need of radical alterations. The United States was the
only power whose economy remained intact, and whose military might was
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also largely unaffected by the ravages of war. It was the most natural
actor to take charge. After all, it had played a crucial role in bringing
World War II to a successful end, and its leadership faced no serious
challenges.
Perhaps the most ideal variable that sustained the American leadership
in the Cold War years was the emergence of the Soviet Union as a threat
to Western European stability. It had already subjugated Eastern Europe;
and the Western countries of that continent needed no persuading about
the imminence of the Soviet threat to their freedom. The hyperbolic
language of the Truman Doctrine, describing the Soviet threat, was
primarily aimed at creating domestic support for Containment. The
Korean conflict, the Soviet military actions in Hungary (1956) and
Czechoslovakia (1968), the erection of the Berlin Wall, and the Vietnamese
conflict were some of the examples of what the West European countries
perceived as outcomes of a potential takeover by the Soviet Union. So, in
the final analysis, the very evolution of Containment as a grand strategy,
its sustained implementation by Washington, and its eventual success had
much to do with the nature of the threat itself. In other words, the con-
spiratorial and expansionistic nature of Soviet Communism enabled
Containment to remain focused on its activities, and was responsible for
the evolution of numerous military doctrines that were aimed at sustaining
American military power to contain the Soviets.
In the 1990s American military power is intact, but the international
system has undergone radical changes, thereby creating a mixed bag of
realities whose cumulative effects favor no particular actor or group
of actors. In some areas, the United States retains its preponderance,
but in others, it no longer remains that significant. Similarly, Western
Europe - most importantly Germany - and Japan have acquired new
significance in some areas, but in others, they must look to the United
States for leadership.
The fractious post-Cold War world is marked by increasing conflicts
that are related to ethno-nationalism, and religious fervor. There is a
growing search for regional trade blocs, a marked preoccupation with
domestic problems by major powers - including the United States - at
the expense of forestalling progress on such proven significant issues as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This preponderance
of conflict has led some thoughtful observers of international relations to
categorize these conflicts along the continuum of the 'West and the rest',
or even the 'clash of civilizations'.
29
What is significant in the post-Cold War world is that the primacy of
the industrial West (as opposed to western civilization per se) is being
challenged. The foremost example of this challenge is coming from the
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Asia-Pacific world. Even the Islamic challenge cannot be labelled purely
a civilizational clash, for Muslim countries are trying to come to grips
with the obdurate issue of how to modernize (i.e., adopt an extremely
significant trait of the West) without Westernizing themselves (i.e., avoid
the multitude of sociocultural aspects of the West that are anathema
to their religion). One such aspect of the technological culture inevitably
carries such values as, what Kishore Mahbubani describes as 'the belief
in scientific inquiry, the search for rational solutions, and the willingness
to challenge assumptions'. Yet, the application of such an inquiry to the
study of Islam has remained a powerful source of controversy in Muslim
countries. In the 1990s, this issue is likely to cause within borders much
controversy and its attendant political uncertainty, and even instability.
. The conflicts of the post-Cold War world require the attention of the
only remaining superpower. However, the type of solution that they deserve
requires the creation of consensus on a regular, if not on a case-by-case,
basis. For instance, when President Saddam Hussein took over Kuwait in
August 1990, the United States opted for coalition warfare. Toward that
end, President Bush played a role whose hallmarks were high visibility,
decisiveness, and a resolve aimed at reversing the aggression. And the
international coalition followed the lead. However, when the Yugoslavian
crisis worsened from June 1991, the United States opted to let the Europeans
play a leading role in resolving it. Even when European haplessness (or
unwillingness to resolve it) became apparent, Washington did not want
to take the lead.
Given the new realities of the post-Cold War world, it was possible
for the United States to lead the debate about utilizing NATO in some way
in the Yugoslavian imbroglio. This would have served the purpose of
America's insistence on continued primacy for NATO in a post-Soviet
Europe. After all, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) lacked even the institutional capability to take a decisive action.
The WEU was too fledgling to act as a military alliance. That left only
NATO to be visibly involved, a organization that is most well-equipped
to respond to the post-Cold War military exigencies within and outside
Europe.
30
Presidential candidate Bill Clinton found it easier to criticize President
Bush over his indecisiveness over Yugoslavia; however, when the policy
impasse over this conflict continued in 1993 because Britain and France
did not support an American preference for limited military actions against
the Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Clinton labelled it
the greatest disappointment of his fledgling presidency.
It is not that Washington lost its will to take military actions when it
deemed necessary. Regarding Saddam Hussein, the United States expressed
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its willingness to deal firmly during the last few weeks of George Bush's
presidency when Iraq was pounded for violating the so-called no-fly
zones, and for stalling the entry of the UN team into Iraq for on-site
inspection. The American action in Iraq proved that the resolve to act
was there, but it was to be used on a selective basis, thereby triggering the
Arab charge that Washington was exercising a 'double standard'. So, in
a unipolar world, America demonstrated that it would impose its will in
the Middle East, but not in Europe.
31
The other radical changes of the international system are manifesting
themselves in the increased competitive challenge from the robust economies
of the Pacific and Western Europe. However, in Eastern Europe and in
the Commonwealth of Independent States, the main question that is faced
by the United States and the industrial countries is how to rebuild the
economies of these nations, and how to integrate them in the international
economic system. Under the following two rubrics, challenges of the post-
Cold War world will be briefly examined
(1) Altered Nature of International Security and Growing Economic
Polycentrism:
International security in the 1990s promises to be very different from the
kind that prevailed during the Cold War years. There is no more inter-
national communist conspiracy that can be used as a rallying cry in the
West. There is no more highly visible enemy whose power and capabilities
the United States can overstate or understate in order to unite its allies
or calm their fears. In the coming years, the threats to regional security
are most likely to emanate from growing ethnic, religious, and economic
rivalries, and nuclear proliferation. What profound military doctrines
could be imagined to deal with these threats?
As the Soviet Union collapsed, an uppermost question was 'against
whom does the United States defend itself? ' Russia inherited the Soviet
nuclear assets, to be sure, but the ideological bone of contention between
the United States and Russia has gone. Regarding the Yugoslavian conflict,
Western Europe tried to take the lead. The Europeans also hoped to
evolve the Western European Union (WEU) as a relevant entity to control
the rising flames of conflict, but after two years of indecisiveness, a
consensus emerged on the peacekeeping role of NATO to enforce the
settlement reached by the warring parties.
32
The European performance during the Yugoslavian conflict underscores
the fact that American leadership in Europe will remain significant in
the 1990s. Even if the CSCE were to emerge as a major entity for peaceful
resolution of conflicts, it is the presence of military power that is likely
to make any political solution enforceable. And the United States already
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possesses that power. The evolution of WEU as a military organization
of any substance depends on the evolution of the European Union (EU)
as a politico-economic reality. In the absence of the latter reality, the
former is likely to remain an idea whose time has yet to arrive.
Another characteristic of the 1990s is growing economic polycentrism.
This reality is likely to make the international affairs of the 1990s less
manageable. The economic potential of the United States in this decade
might persuade one that this nation is 'bound to lead', but certainly not
the shape of its current deficit, and the state of its declining economic com-
petitiveness.
33
Japan and Germany are the ascending economic powers,
but neither wants to lead. The political baggage of their militaristic past
is likely to cause considerable consternation among their neighbors if they
become too assertive. Germany is too busy integrating former East
Germany in its economy. Even the EU, when it finally emerges as an
integrated entity, does not exactly appear exuberant about the prospects
of helping out the erstwhile Soviet satellites. Besides, the United States
might still reclaim its leadership role once it puts its economy in order.
Given the rising primacy of economic affairs, the trend of the 1990s
appears to be the formulation of regional free trade agreements (FTAs).
The United States has already signed a limited free trade agreement with
Israel in 1985. The growing economic challenge from Europe only inten-
sified American resolve to conclude the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico. Immediately after passage of the
NAFTA bill by the House of Representatives, President Clinton embarked
on another equally ambitious project. In a meeting of Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) on 20 November 1993 in Seattle,
Washington, he proposed that members of that organization become a
free trade zone. This is another bold departure from a long-held American
criticism of the European Economic Community as a regional fortress.
In the 1990s America was also busy creating such fortresses, hoping to
remain the leader, and intending to use such fortresses in dealing with
Western Europe on trade issues.
President Clinton's visible involvement in the passage of the NAFTA
bill and his activism at the APEC meeting in Seattle was his recognition
of the 'seamless connection' between economic (read trade) policy and
foreign policy. His description of the 'alphabetic shift' in the post-Cold
War years, from NATO, START, and SALT to NAFTA, APEC, and
GATT, was a defining moment in the American foreign policy in the
post-Cold War years.
34
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US SEARCH FOR A GRAND STRATEGY 43 7
(2) America's Quest for a Post-Cold War Grand Strategy: Some
Concluding Observations:
American perception of the NWO, as depicted in the opening pages of
this essay, is partially correct. The newness of the NWO includes the
demise of the Soviet Union, independence of Eastern Europe, and re-
unification of Germany. It is also new in the sense that there is no more
superpower military competition based on ideology. One of the most
significant developments of the post-Cold War world is the upsurge of a
paradoxical competition between the forces of 'integration' and 'frag-
mentation'.
35
The rise of nationalism as a divisive force resulted in the
failure of the EC to emerge as a politico-economic union toward the end
of 1992. The main reason underlying this development was largely the
decisions of various European countries either to reject the Maastricht
treaty as a basis for monetary union, vote for it only by a tiny majority,
or vote 'yes without consequence . . . '
3 6
There are other forces of fragmentation, to be sure, whose impact
on the international system is quite deleterious. Some examples of these
forces are the outbreak of ethnic hatred in the form of 'ethnic cleansing'
in Yugoslavia; eruption of violence against foreigners in the united
Germany, France, and even Vienna; the rise of protectionism in the United
States, Japan, and France; the 'peaceful divorce' between Czechs and
Slovaks; and the tightening rather than relaxation of intra-EU borders.
During the Cold War years, the United States and the USSR only went to
the brink of war once, in 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis. Otherwise, their
military competition was a highly managed one, but one cannot state
with certainty that the emerging interstate competitions and confrontations
in" the 1990s are likely to be similarly manageable. Economic competition
has a potential of getting out of hand. Then what? The United States and
other great powers have to keep their wary eyes on the potential nastiness
of the growing economic competition, which is destined to become acute
in the coming decades.
How orderly is this new world order likely to be? A persuasive discussion
of the rising disorderliness (if not its increasingly chaotic nature) is
provided in the 'clash of civilizations' theme developed by Samuel
Huntington in his aforementioned essay. Just look at the 11 republics of
the Commonwealth that replaced the USSR. The acuteness of economic
problems, ethnic tensions, and religious differences among them are
mind-boggling. Then, there are ethnic and religious tensions in some of
the East European states. Who is going to pay for the economic recon-
struction of that region? If no one is willing to bear the financial cost,
then, are the Europeans or the Americans willing to pay the political price?
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43 8 EUROPEAN SECURITY
Certainly not, but then no one seems to know what other alternatives are
available.
The security-related threat of the Cold War years was the glue that kept
the alliances with NATO countries and Japan intact. There is no more
unifying threat. How is one to develop a grand strategy for the post-
Cold War World? How would one go about defining the threat? If the
threat is defined along the lines of economic competition among nation-
states, then no one nation is to be blamed for it. All nation-states are
potential culprits in future conflicts. How is one to develop a strategy
against such a potential? If the threat is defined along the lines of ethnic
and religious differences, then the question still remains as to how nation-
states are to cope with these threats. How can one develop a strategy to
make sure that these differences do not lead to sectional or regional wars?
Looking at another troubled, if not the most troubled, region of the
world - the Middle East - one is more baffled about the newness or the
orderliness of the NWO. Political instability still lurks on the horizons of
the Persian Gulf. So do regional rivalries between Iran and Iraq, Saudi
Arabia and Iran, and Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The arms race is still
continuing at an escalated pace. The Palestinian question, despite the
signing of a historical agreement between Israel and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization governing interim self-rule in the Gaza Strip
and the town of Jericho on 13 September 1993, is still far from being
resolved.
In this rising wave of multiple conflicts, the most serious challenge
for the United States is to find a new purpose for its power, a new focus
for its foreign policy. The greatest challenge for the United States in the
1990s is to adjust itself to the new emerging realities of the international
and economic systems. It must learn to look for multilateral responses to
problems of economic competition and to security-related challenges,
without necessarily ruling out unilateralism if its vital interests are threaten-
ed. The world of this and ensuing decades is a world characterized by
polycentrism. Its problems should be tackled by a collective leadership
of nations. Regional solutions to problems must be secured and promoted,
with regional actors playing a leading role in resolving them. The great
powers must serve only as facilitators and peacemakers, assuming that
they can manage to stay away from starting wars of their own. American
power must be asserted in this regard. The problems of the 1990s do not
need a grand strategy. They should be managed by developing tedious and
cumbersome strategies evolved through regional approaches and collective
leadership. As the sole surviving superpower, the United States should
see to it on a sustained basis.
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US SEARCH FOR A GRAND STRATEGY 43 9
NOTES
1. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between
the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1984), p. 13.
2. Paul Kennedy, 'Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition', in
Paul Kennedy (ed.), Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, CT & London:
Yale UP, 1991), pp.2-6, passim.
3. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC:
USGPO, 1989), p. 118.
4. As cited in Aaron Friedberg, 'The Evolution of US Strategic "Doctrines", 1945 to 1981',
in Samuel Huntington (ed.), The Strategic Imperative (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982),
pp. 53-99.
5. Ibid., p. 56.
6. Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from
Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings Instn., 1985); also Stephen E. Ambrose,
'The Presidency and Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 70/5 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 120-37.
7. Kennedy (note 2), p, 6.
8. As cited in Seymon Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in UnitedStates
Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan (NY: Columbia UP, 1983), p. 80.
9. Brown, p. 129.
10. For an overview of the decline of American economic power, see Joan Spero, The
Politics of International Economic Relations, 4th ed. (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989).
11. See M.E. Ahrari, 'OAPEC and the "Authoritative", Allocation of Oil: An Analysis
of the Arab Oil Embargo', Studies in Comparative International Development 14/1
(Spring 1979), pp. 9-21.
12. For a discussion of the pentagonal order see Terry L. Diebel, Public Opinion and
Power: The Nixon, Carter and Reagan Years (NY: Foreign Policy Assoc. Headline
Series, 1987).
13. For a classic discussion of the evolution of imperial presidency see Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983). For an overview of
the tethered presidency see, Robert Franck (ed.), Congressional Restraints on Executive
Powers (NY: NY UP, 1981).
14. Carl Gershman, 'The Rise and Fall of the New Foreign Policy Establishment', in Charles
W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, Perspectives on American Foreign Policy
(NY: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 174-95.
15. Brown (note 8), p. 590.
16. As cited in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (NY: OUP, 1982), p. 30.
17. Henry T. Nash, American Foreign Policy: A Search for Security, 3rd ed. (Homewood,
IL: Dorsey Press, 1985), pp. 26-8.
18. Louis Morton, 'The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb', Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1957,
pp. 334-53.
19. Nash (note 17), p. 68.
20. Ibid.
21. As cited in James Daugherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of Inter-
national Relations (NY: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 376.
22. The first occasion when the bomb option was publicly mentioned was by President
Truman in Nov. 1950, immediately following the Chinese intervention in Korea. The
second time this option came up was in early 1951 when Gen. Douglas McArthur urged
the President to consider using it. The third occasion was in early 1953, when the
Eisenhower administration expressed its willingness to use atomic weapons against the
Peoples' Republic of China. See Nash (note 17), pp. 55-6.
23. Brown (note 17), pp. 118-19.
24. Arms Control and National Security: A n Introduction (Washington, DC: Arms Control
Assoc, 1989), p.23.
25. Ibid., p.24.
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440 EUROPEAN SECURITY
26. Brown (note 17), p. 335.
27. Dore Gold, America, the Gulf, and Israel: CENTCOM and Emerging US Regional
Security Policies in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988).
28. Garthoff (note 6), p. 1012.
29. Kishore Mahbubani, 'The West and the Rest', National Interest (Summer 1992),
pp. 3-12; Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', Foreign Affairs 72/3
(Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.
30. Charles L. Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe',
International Security 18/2 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-50.
31. This seeming double standard has been described in the Muslim world as an anti-
Islamic bias of American policy in the post-Cold War years.
32. 'NATO Steps Up Plans for Bosnian Force', New York Times, 18 March 1993.
33. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (NY:
Basic Books, 1990).
34. 'Clinton Preaches Open Market', Washington Post, 21 Nov. 1993.
35. John Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward the Post-Cold War World', Foreign Affairs 70/1 (Spring
1991), pp. 102-22.
36. Josef Joffe, 'The New Europe', Foreign Affairs 72/1, 'America and the World' (Spring
1993), pp.29-43.
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