Title Thirteen

CRIMES AGAINST HONOR

Chapter One. Libel
Section One. Definition, forms and punishment
of this crime
Article 353. Libel
Article 354. Requirement for publicit
Article 355. Libel b means of !ritin"s or
similar means
Article35#. $hreatenin" to publish and offer
to present such publication for a
compensation
Article 35%. &rohibited publication of acts
referred to in the course of official
proceedin"s
Article 35'. Slander
Article 35(. Slander b deed
Section $!o. )eneral &ro*isions
Article 3#+. &ersons responsible
Article 3#,. &roof of the truth
Article 3#-. Libelous remar.s
Chapter $!o. /ncriminator 0achinations
Article 3#3. /ncriminatin" innocent persons
Article 3#4. /ntri"uin" a"ainst honor
Article 353. Definition of Libel
A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a *ice or defect, real or ima"inar,
or an act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstances tendin" to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or 1uridical
person, or to blac.en the memor of one !ho
is dead.
2lements3
,. $here must be an imputation of a
crime, or of a *ice or defect, real or
ima"inar, or an act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance4
-. $he imputation must be made publicl4
3. /t must be malicious4
4. $he imputation must be directed at a
natural or 1uridical person, or one !ho
is dead4
5. $he imputation must tend to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of the
person defamed.
$here must be a defamator imputation. $he
imputation ma co*er3
a. crime alle"edl committed b
the offended part4
b. *ice or defect, real or
ima"inar, of the offended
part4 or
c. an act or omission, condition,
status of, or circumstance
relatin" to the offended part.
5Defamation6 is the proper term for libel as
used in Art. 353.
5Libel6 strictl is a defamation committed b
means of !ritin", printin", litho"raph,
en"ra*in", radio, phono"raph 7. or an similar
means.
8hen the defamation is oral, it is called
5slander6.
Seditious libel is punished not in this chapter
but in Art. ,4- 9/ncitin" to sedition:.
$est of defamator character of !ords used3
A char"ed is sufficient if the !ords are
calculated to induce the hearers to suppose
and understand that the person a"ainst !hom
the !ere uttered !as "uilt of certain
offenses, or are sufficient to impeach his
honest, *irtue or reputation, or to hold him up
to public ridicule.
$he meanin" of the !riter is immaterial. /t is
not the intention of the !riter or spea.er, or
the understandin" of the plaintiff or of an
hearer or reader b !hich the actionable
qualit of the !ords is to be determined, but
the meanin" that the !ords in fact con*eed
on the minds of persons of reasonable
understandin", discretion and candor, ta.in"
into consideration the surroundin"
circumstances !hich !ere .no!n to the hearer
or reader.
2L202;$ ,3 /0&<$A$/O;
2=amples3
> /mputation of a *ice imputin" upon a
person lasci*ious and immoral habits in an
article
> /mputation of an act or omission 5?
borro!s mone !ithout intention to pa, she
had her breasts au"mented !ithout pain" the
doctor6
> /mputation of condition, status or
circumstance callin" another a bastard or
man".u.ulam
2L202;$ -3 &<@L/CA$/O;
&ublication is the communication of the
defamator matter to some third person or
persons.
Aence, sendin" a latter in a sealed en*elope
throu"h a messen"er is not publication. @ut
sendin" to the !ife, a letter defamator of her
husband, is sufficient publication. 9$he person
defamed is the husband and the !ife is alread
considered a 3
rd
person:
/f the defamator imputation is not published
there is ;O crime. $he la! permits us to thin.
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as badl as !e please of our nei"hbors so lon"
as !e .eep our uncharitable thou"ht to
oursel*es.
2L202;$ 33 0AL/C2
0alice is used to indicate that the offender is
prompted b personal illB!ill or spite and
spea.s merel to in1ure the reputation of the
person defamed.
0alice ma be inBfact or inBla!.
Malice in fact
B must be pro*ed b a sho!in" of illB!ill, hatred
or purpose to in1ure
Malice in law
B is presumed from a defamator imputation
proof of malice is not required
9$he distinction e=ists for purposes of
determinin" 8O; there is defamation !here
pri*ile"ed communication is in*ol*ed thus3: As
a "eneral rule, malice in la! is presumed from
a defamator imputation. @ut !here pri*ile"ed
communication is in*ol*ed, malice 9in la!: is
;O$ presumed the plaintiff must pro*e
malice in fact. /n either case, !here malice in
fact is present, 1ustifiable moti*es cannot e=ist
and the imputations become actionable.

2L202;$ 43 /D2;$/C/CA$/O;
/t must be sho!n that at least a 3
rd
person
could identif the offended part as the ob1ect
of the libelous publication.
@ut libel published in different parts ma be
ta.en to"ether to establish the identification of
the offended part.
2L202;$ 53 D/SAO;OR, D/SCR2D/$, CO;$20&$
Dishonor D dis"race, shame, i"nomin
Discredit D loss of credit or reputation4
disesteem
Contempt D state of bein" despised
$here are as man offenses as there !ere
persons defamed 9&& *s. Del Rosario:. 8hen
the alle"ed slanderous utterances !ere
committed on the same date and at the same
place, but a"ainst t!o different persons, the
situation has "i*en rise to t!o separate and
indi*idual causes for prosecution, !ith respect
to each of the persons defamed.
Mercado vs. CFI
Petitioner was charged with libel for imputing to Mrs.
Virginia Mercado acts constituting enrichment thru corrupt
practices. The offensive telegram which contained the
allegations was addressed to the Secretary of the,
Department of Public Wors and !ommunications
purportedly in line with President Marcos" appeal to the
public to give information on undesirable employees in the
government service to achieve the ob#ectives of the $ew
Society. %e filed an MTD on the ground of the telegram
being privileged communication. &fter the same was
denied, a MT', alleging that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, was filed but when the same again
met with a denial, the present action was instituted to
annul the aforesaid orders. (espondents, in their
!omment, stressed there was absence of any privilege,
there being malice and bad faith, petitioner having been
motivated by vengeance and ill)will in maing the said
communication as established by his previous conduct vi* a
vi* the private respondent+ the filing of several complaints,
both administrative and criminal aimed to malign her good
character and reputation which were subse,uently
dismissed or closed for lac of merit and-or insufficiency of
evidence.
%./D+ Petition dismissed. 'ualified privilege
communication may be lost by proof of malice. The
prosecution should be given the opportunity of proving
malice in view of petitioner"s conduct towards private
respondent which casts doubt on his good faith.
Agbayani vs. Sayo
Mahinan, manager of the !agayan Valley 0ranch of the 1S2S
at !auayan, 2sabela, file at 0ayombong, $ueva Vi*caya a
complaint for written defamation against 3 subordinates.
The 3 accused filed a MT', contending that the !42 $ueva
Vi*caya has no #urisdiction over the case.
%./D+ The proper venue of Mahinan5s criminal action
against the petitioners is the !42 2sabela, since as 1S2S
branch manager, he was a public officer stationed at
!auayan, 2sabela and that alleged libel was committed
when he was in the public service.
ewswee! vs. IAC
&n article entitled 6&n 2sland of 4ear7 was published in
$ewswee. The author wrote that that the island province
of $egros 8ccidental is a place dominated by big
landowners who not only e9ploited the impoverished and
underpaid sugarcane laborers, but also brutali*ed and
illed them with impunity. The sugarcane planters
instituted a class action for libel.
%./D+ To maintain a libel suit, a victim must be
identifiable. Defamatory matter which does not reveal the
identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast
affords no ground of action unless it can be shown that the
readers of the libel could have identified the personality of
the individual defamed. Defamatory remars directed at a
group of persons is not actionable unless the statements
are all)embracing or sufficiently specific for the victim to
be identifiable.
Lacsa vs. IAC
/acsa and Mar,ue* were officers of the Philippine
!olumbian &ssociation. /acsa uncovered a glitch in the
,ualification of Mar,ue* to be president. %e addressed a
letter to Mar,ue* in the ff. tenor+ that Mar,ue* should step
down from the presidency, because the position is open
only for proprietary members and Mar,ue* has failed to
show any proof of his proprietary membership, that in view
of these, he has been holding the position in a de facto
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capacity. This letter was published in the publication of the
association.
%./D+ The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a
sentence into component phrases with the meticulous care
of the grammarian or stylist, but the import conveyed by
the entirety of the language to the ordinary reader. The
Sol1en is correct in holding that the imputation of being
called a de facto president is tantamount to being
acnowledged as a pretender or impostor.
Soriano vs. IAC
Soriano5s criminal liability was based on an article
published in 6The 1uardian7, of which he is the editor. The
basis of the article was a press release prepared in
Tacloban and delivered to various newspapers. The
intended circulation of 6The 1uardian7 is nationwide. The
libel case was doced at the (T! /etye. Soriano filed n
MT' on the basis of improper venue. %e argues that the
/eyte court had no #urisdiction because the publication
house of 6The 1uardian7 was located in 'ue*on !ity and
that Tantuico also holds office in '!.
%./D+ /ocal #urisprudence follow the 6multiple
publication7 rule : that each and every publication of the
same libel suit constitutes a separate offense, and warrants
a separate cause of action for filing a libel suit. %owever,
the publication re,uirement set forth by (P!;<= refers to
the 6publication7 >the official circulating organ? and not
the 6press release7. 2n harmoni*ing (P!;<= with the
6multiple publication7 rule, the 6press release7 is not the
document to be e9amined. Since the official publication is
produced in '! and was not proven to have been
produced-copied in /eyte or elsewhere, the trial should
have been handled by a '! court.
"#lle$in vs. oel
The article contained statements to the effect that
&merican influence was a significant driver of the political
ascendancy of the Mindalanos of /anao. !omplainants
claimed this was an insulting statement that damaged the
social standing of the clan.
%./D+ The published wor alleged to contain the libelous
e9cerpt must be e9amined and viewed as a whole. Titles of
royalty and nobility are not generally recogni*ed or
acnowledged socially in the national community. Personal
hurt or embarrassment, even if real, is not automatically
e,uivalent to defamation. The law against defamation
protects the interest of a person in ac,uiring, retaining,
and en#oying a reputation as good as one5s character and
conduct warrant in the community. 2t is the community
standards, not personal or family standards, that a court
must refer in evaluation a publication claimed to be
defamatory.
San$os vs. CA
The article published was a verbatim copy of a complained
filed by Sande#as with the S.! against the broerage firm
of !arlos Sison.
%./D+ The public article is but a faithful reproduction of a
pleading filed before a ,uasi)#udicial body. There are no
embellishments, wild imputations etc. calculated to
damage the reputation of the offended parties and e9pose
them to public contempt. $o valid cause of action to
institute an action for libel e9ists.
Sa%on vs. CA
%./D+ When the imputation is already held defamatory,
malice on the part of the defendant >malice)in)fact? need
not be proved because the law already presumes that the
imputation is malicious >malice)in)law?.
Defamatory remars and comments on the conduct or acts
of public officers which are related to the discharge of
their duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves
that truth of the imputation >thus a form of privileged
communication?, but any attac on the private capacities
of a public officer clearly beyond the scope of his official
duties may constitute libel.
.ven if the article falls under the cloa of privileged
communications, it will not discount the fact that he wrote
the same with malice, due to grudges an ill)will attendant
in the circumstances surrounding the facts.
&as'#e% vs. CA
%./D+ 2f the defamatory statement is made against a public
official with respect to the discharge of his official duties
and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the
accused will be entitled to an ac,uittal even though he
doesn5t prove that the imputation was published with good
motives and for #ustifiable ends. >0ecause, upon proof of
truth, the burden of proving that the offender acted with
malice would be on the public officer?
&ctual Malice (ule : .ven if the defamatory statement is
false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct,
unless the public official concerned proves that the
statement was made with nowledge that it was false or
with recless disregard of whether it was false or not.
avare$$e vs. CA
Petitioner claims that private respondent alluded to him
when she said the words @stupid@, @bastards@, @swindlers@,
and @plunderers@ while testifying on the Deed of Sale with
(ight of (epurchase sub#ect of a civil case. 2n her &nswer,
private respondent cited decisions

of the Supreme !ourt to
the effect that no action for libel or for damages may be
founded on utterances made in the course of #udicial
proceedings.
%./D+ 2t is a settled principle in this #urisdiction that
s$a$emen$s made in $(e co#rse o) *#dicial +roceedings
are absol#$ely +rivileged. This absolute privilege remains
regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of
malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to
the cause in hand or sub#ect of the in,uiry. Thus, the
person maing these statements such as a #udge, lawyer or
witness does not thereby incur the ris of being found
liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the
recovery of damages.
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The statements made during the course of #udicial
proceedings en#oy the shield of absolute privilege. The
privilege is not intended so much for the protection of
those engaged in the public service and in the enactment
and administration of law, as for the promotion of public
welfare, the purpose being that members of the
legislature, #udges of courts, #urors, lawyers and witnesses
may spea their minds freely and e9ercise their respective
functions without incurring the ris of a criminal
prosecution or an action for damages. 2n determining the
issue of relevancy of statements made in #udicial
proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by
resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy.
Without ,uestion, the use of blatantly defamatory language
lie @stupid@, @bastards@, @swindlers@, and @plunderers@ in
describing the adverse parties detract from the honor and
dignity that befits a court proceeding and should have been
stricen out of the records.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the !ourt finds that the
terms used by the private respondent in her pleading and in
her testimony cannot be the basis for an award of moral
damages and attorney"s fees in favor of petitioner.
-alandoni vs. .rilon
(espondents here were accused of printing libelous matter
in newspapers. The matter pertained to actions by
Aalandoni as member of the P!11 alleged to be illegal and
unauthori*ed >sold certain shares of a company at
undervalued prices to (!0! thereby defrauding the
government?. Austice secretary reversed the findings of
prosecutors and dismissed the complaints.
%./D+ &rticles are not libelous. &rticles merely stated
insinuations on the deal between (!0! and Aalandoni as
part of the P!11. 2t #ust served to inform the public of
irregularities in the transaction. 2n libels against public
officers, to be liable, libel must relate to official conduct,
even if the statement is false, unless officer proves that it
was made with actual malice >with nowledge that it was
false or not?.
"or*al vs. CA
0or#al wrote a series of articles in his column about a
certain 6.dsa hero who is organi*ing conferences and
seminars and soliciting money in the name of the President
and D8T! secretary without the latter5s consent and
authority. Wenceslao filed a case for libel saying that he
felt alluded to in the articles as the organi*er and that he
was almost certain that it was him.
%./D+ $o libel. 2n libel, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable even if not actually named. 2t is not sufficient
that the victim himself made the identification, but it is
necessary that at least the victim be identifiable by a ;
rd
person.
!&0, no sufficient identification. Victim was not named,
there were many .dsa heroes and many organi*ers of the
seminars. &nd even the victim was not absolutely sure that
it was him being alluded to.
For$ic( vs. /alleron
4ortich is a salesman of San Miguel. %is supervisor 1alleron
suspected him of misappropriating the collections he
received retailers and buyers, so an investigation was
conducted on the matter. 1alleron submitted an inter)
office memorandum containing the results of his
investigation. The memo was addressed to the (egional
Sales Manager and contained this paragraph+
62n addition, 2 would lie to further inform management
that S-M Stanley 4ortich is an avid mah#ong player and a
cocfighting enthusiast. 2n spite of several advices, there
seems to be no change in his lifestyle. &lso, respondent had
a similar case last September BB, BCDE.7
%./D+ The controversial paragraph is not libelous. 4irst,
the memo was part and parcel of the investigation on
4ortich5s non)remittance of collections. Secondly, the
memo was notcirculated or publici*ed, much less read by
officers of the corporation other than those involved in the
investigation or those directly supervising the petitioner"s
wor. More importantly, 4ortich was unable to prove that
the issuance of the memo was motivated by malice.
While malice is presumed in every defamatory imputation,
there are certain e9ceptions to this rule. The memo falls
under the privileged communication rule. & privileged
communication is one made bona fide upon any sub#ect
matter in which the party communicating has an interest,
or in reference to which he has a duty. 2n the case at bar,
1alleron, being 4ortich5s supervisor, was charged with the
duty to carry out and enforce company rules and policies,
including the duty to undertae initial investigation of
possible irregularities in customer accounts. The memo
was an official act done in good faith, an honest innocent
statement arising from a moral and legal obligation which
the private respondent certainly owed to the company in
the performance of his duties.
Salcedo01r$ane% vs. CA
(afael filed an action for annulment of his marriage to
Teresita. &mong the evidence presented by (afael in the
trial court were several tape recordings of telephone
conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons.
The recordings were obtained when (afael allowed his
friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.
%./D+ (ep. &ct $o. 3F== entitled @&n &ct to Prohibit and
Penali*e Wire Tapping and 8ther (elated Violations of the
Privacy of !ommunication, and for other purposes@
e9pressly maes such tape recordings inadmissible in
evidence. &bsent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed to recording of the same,
the inadmissibility of the sub#ect tapes is mandatory under
(ep. &ct $o. 3F==.
2eo+le v. 1gie .ia% 320045
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or
identifiable from the contents of the libelous article. 2n
order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim
be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the
person be named. 2t is enough if by intrinsic reference the
allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters
of description or reference to facts and circumstances
from which others reading the article may now the person
alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by e9traneous
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circumstances so that those nowing such person could and
did understand that he was the person referred to. Gunle
v. !ablenews)&merican and /yons laid the rule that this
re,uirement is complied with where a third person
recogni*ed or could identify the party vilified in the
article.
Article 35. Re!"ire#ent for $"blicit%
2*er defamator imputation is presumed to
be malicious, e*en if it be true, if no "ood
intention and 1ustiable motice for ma.in" it is
sho!n, e=cept in the follo!in" cases3
,. A pri*ate communication made b an
person to another in the performance
of an le"al, moral, or social dut4
-. A fair and true report, made in "ood
faith, !ithout an comments or
remar.s, of an 1udicial, le"islati*e, or
other official proceedin"s !hich are not
of confidential nature, or of an
statement, report or speech deli*ered
in said proceedin"s, or of an other act
performed b public officers in the
e=ercise of their functions.
$he t!o e=ceptions in Art. 354 are the soB
called pri*ile"ed communications. 8hen
pri*ile"ed communication is in*ol*ed, malice in
fact must be pro*ed to con*ict the accused.
/llustration of Art. 3543 A tells C that @ is a
thief. $he fact is @ is reall is a thief, because
he !as pre*iousl con*icted of theft. Can it be
presumed that the imputation b @ is
maliciousE Fes, because Art. 354 sas that
5e*er defeamator imputation is presumed to
be malicious e*en if it be true.6
@ut the presumption of malice is rebutted if A
can sho! 9,: "ood intention and 9-: 1ustifiable
moti*e for ma.in" the imputation.
$hus, if @ is applin" for a position of securit
"uard in the store of C, brother of A, and the
purpose of A is to protect his brother from
undesirable emploees, then malice cannot be
presumed.
$!o .inds of pri*ile"ed communication3
9,: Absolute
B not actionable, 2G2; /C its author acted in
bad faith
B this class includes statements made b
members of Con"ress in the dischar"e of
their functions as such, alle"ations in
pleadin"s made b parties or their counsel,
ans!ers "i*en b !itnesses in repl to
questions propounded to them 9pro*ided
the ans!ers are responsi*e and the
alle"ations are rele*ant:
B usuall limited to le"islati*e and 1udicial
proceedin"s and other acts of state
9-: Conditional or qualified
B not actionable <;L2SS made !ith malice
or bad faith
B this class includes those communications
mentioned as e=ceptions in Art. 354
R23 &ar. , 9&ri*ate communication made b
an person to another7:
/llustration3 ? files a complaint in "ood faith
a"ainst a priest to his ecclesiastical superior
alle"edl for ta.in" indecent liberties of !omen
pri*ate communication in the performance of
a moral dut pri*ile"edH
<nnecessar publicit destros "ood faith.
So for e=ample, if a cop of the complaint
abo*e is sent to a ne!spaper for publication,
the pri*ile"e is destroed.
$hat the statement is a pri*ile"ed
communication is a matter of defense and, li.e
all other matters of defense, must be
established b the accused.
$apos, if the accused sets up pri*ile"ed
communication as a defense, to o*ercome it,
the prosecutions must pro*e that 9,: the
defendant acted !ith malice in fact 9because
the pri*ile"ed onl ne"ates the presumption of
malice in la!:, or 9-: there is no reasonable
"round for belie*in" the char"e to be true.
/llustration of 5no reasonable "round for
belie*in" the char"e to be true63 ? admitted
that he had personall made no in*esti"ation
!ith reference to the truth of man of the
statements made in the communication to the
Secretar of Iustice, especiall !ith reference
to the statements based on rumors that a
1ud"e recei*ed a bribe for dismissin" a murder
case.
R23 &ar. - 9Cair and true report of official
proceedin"s7:
Defamator remar.s and comments on the
conduct or acts of public officers !hich are
related to the dischar"e of their official duties
!ill not constitute libel if the defendant pro*es
the truth of the imputation. $he conduct of
public officers !hich are related to the
dischar"e of their official duties are matters of
public interest, and it is a defense to an action
for libel or slander that the !ords complained
of are a fair comment on a matter of public
interest.
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8hat is a fair commentE /f the comment is an
e=pression of an opinion, based upon pro*en
facts, then it is no matter that the opinion
happens to be mista.en so lon" as it mi"ht be
reasonabl inferred from the facts. Comment
ma be fair, althou"h !ron".
@ut an attac. upon the private character of
the public officer on matters !hich are not
related to the dischar"e of their official
functions, ma constitute libel. ;o one has the
ri"ht to in*ade anotherJs pri*ac.
Rule on selfBdefense D A person libeled is
1ustified to hit bac. !ith another libel. @ut the
defamator statements made b the accused
must be a fair ans!er to the libel made b the
offended part and must be related to the
imputation made. $he ans!er should not be
unnecessaril libelous.
/llustration3 A to @, C K D3 5Fou pimp, !omen of
ill repute, thie*es, paramours of m husband6.
@ to A3 5Fou are a !oman of the street, ou
smell bad, and our mone !as stolen from the
&CA<6 L C to A 5Fou are shameless,
blac.mailer, murderer6 L D to A 5Fou ha*e a
thic. face, ou are not le"all married, ou are
the paramour of Cather @aluut.6
Aeld3 $o repel attac., the defendant ma ma.e
an e=planation of the imputation, and it is onl
!here, if b e=plainin", he must of necessit
ha*e to use scurrilous and slanderous remar.s,
that he ma le"all be allo!ed to do so !ithout
placin" himself under criminal prosecution.
Aere, @, C, DJs remar.s !ere unnecessaril
scurrilous.
Article 355. Libel b% Mean& of 'ritin(& or
Si#ilar Mean&
A libel ma be committed b means of B
,. 8ritin"4
-. &rintin"4
3. Litho"raph4
4. 2n"ra*in"4
5. Radio4
#. &hoto"raph4
%. &aintin"4
'. $heatrical e=hibition4
(. Cinemato"raphic e=hibition4 or
,+. An similar means.
Defamation throu"h amplifier is not libel, but
oral )efa#ation. $he !ord MradioJ should be
considered in relation to the terms !ith !hich
it is associated D all of !hich ha*e a common
characteristic, namel, their permanent nature
as a means of publication.
@ut defamation made in a $G pro"ram is
libel. /t easil qualifies under the "eneral
pro*ision 5or an similar means6.
Magno v. 2eo+le 3200,5
Sending an unsealed libelous letter to the offended party
constitutes publication.
"#a$is v. 2eo+le 3200,5
4acts+ 8ne lawyer sent another an insulting letter, in
closing saying, 6Hours in Satan5s name7.
%eld+ There is publication in this case. 2n libel, publication
means maing the defamatory matter, after it is written,
nown to someone other than the person against whom it
has been written. 2e$i$ioner7s s#b*ec$ le$$er0re+ly i$sel)
s$a$es $(a$ $(e same was co+y )#rnis(ed $o all
concerned. Also8 +e$i$ioner (ad dic$a$ed $(e le$$er $o (is
secre$ary. I$ is eno#g( $(a$ $(e a#$(or o) $(e libel
com+lained o) (as comm#nica$ed i$ $o a $(ird +erson.
4urthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbo9, was
open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
While Vaca case is for violation of 0.P. FF, we find the
reasons behind the im+osi$ion o) )ine ins$ead o)
im+risonmen$ a++licable $o +e$i$ioner7s case o) libel. We
note that this is petitioner5s first offense of this nature.
%e never new respondent prior to the demand letter
sent by the latter to Mrs. 'uingco who then sought his
assistance thereto. %e appealed from the decision of the
(T! and the !& in his belief that he was merely e9ercising
a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private
complainant. 2n fact, petitioner could have applied for
probation to evade prison term but he did not do so
believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed
his case. We believe that the State is concerned not only in
the imperative necessity of protecting the social
organi*ation against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for
economic usefulness and other social ends. !onse,uently,
we delete the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and
instead impose a fine of si9 thousand pesos.
This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of
imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the crime of
libel. 2n Sazon v. Court of Appeals, petitioner was
convicted of libel and was meted a penalty of
imprisonment and fineI and upon a petition filed with us,
we affirmed the findings of libel but changed the penalty
imposed to a mere fine.
Article 35*. Threatenin( to $"bli&h an)
Offer to $re+ent S"ch $"blication for A
Co#,en&ation
Acts punished
,.$hreatenin" another to publish a libel
concernin" him, or his parents, spouse, child,
or other members of his famil4
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159
-. Offerin" to pre*ent the publication of such
libel for compensation or mone consideration.
@lac.mail B /n its metaphorical sense,
blac.mail ma be defined as an unla!ful
e=tortion of mone b threats of accusation or
e=posure. $!o !ords are e=pressi*e of the
crime B hush mone.
/n !hat felonies is blac.mail possibleE
@lac.mail is possible in 9,: li"ht threats under
Article -'34 and 9-: threatenin" to publish, or
offerin" to pre*ent the publication of, a libel for
compensation, under Article 35#.
Article 35-. $rohibite) $"blication of
Act& Referre) to in the Co"r&e of Official
$rocee)in(&
2lements
,. Offender is a reporter, editor or
mana"er of a ne!spaper, dail or
ma"aNine4
-. Ae publishes facts connected !ith the
pri*ate life of another4
3. Such facts are offensi*e to the honor,
*irtue and reputation of said person.
$he pro*isions of Art. 35% constitute the soB
called .Ga( Law/. ;e!spaper reports on
cases pertainin" to adulter, di*orce, issues
about the le"itimac of children etc., !ill
necessaril be barred from publication.
$he prohibition applies e*en thou"h said
publication be made in connection !ith or
under the prete=t that it is necessar in the
narration of an 1udicial or administrati*e
proceedin"s !herein such facts ha*e been
mentioned.
/llustration3 A uttered defamator remar.s
callin" a priest a sa*a"e and that he had a
concubine. 8hile the case !as pendin" trial, a
ne!spaper published the complaint *erbatim
includin" the defamator e=pressions of A.
RA,4%% D $he publisher, editor, columnist or
reporter of an periodical of "eneral circulation
cannot be compelled to re*eal the source of
an ne!s report or information appearin" in
said publication !hich !as related in
confidence to such publisher etc. unless the
court or a Aouse or committee of Con"ress
finds that such re*elation is demanded b the
securit of the State, !ithout pre1udice to the
publisherJs etc. liabilit under ci*il and criminal
la!s.
Article 350. Slan)er
Slander is oral defamation. $here are to!
.inds of oral defamation3
9,: Simple slander4 and
9-: )ra*e slander, !hen it is of a
serious and insultin" nature.
Cactors that determine the "ra*it of oral
defamation3
,. e=pressions used
-. personal relations of the accused and
the offended part
3. circumstances surroundin" the case
/llustration of "ra*e slander3 5Fou sold the
union. Fou s!indled the mone of the
members and recei*ed bribe mone in the
amount of &,+O76
/llustration of simple slander3 An accusation
that the offended part has been li*in"
successi*el and !ith se*eral men uttered
before se*eral persons, !hen intended to
correct an improper conduct of the offended
part, a .in of the accused, is onl simple
slander.
$he slander need not be heard b the
offended part, because a manJs reputation is
the estimate in !hich other hold him, not the
"ood opinion !hich he has of himself.
2eo+le vs. 2elayo
Pelayo told !lapano >councilor?, within the hearing of three
people, that in one of his investigations on illegal gambling,
an operator, /im Peng, told him &lmendras >governor?
received PJ== from said operator as protection money. The
following day, Pelayo delivered a privileged speech in the
!ity !ouncil5s session where it could be inferred that he
was referring to &lmendras as a 6tong collector7.
%./D+ 4acts of the case do $8T constitute intriguing
against honor where the source of the derogatory
information cannot be determined and defendant borrows
the same without subscribing to the truth thereof, passes it
to others. The information allegedly came from a definite
source >/im Peng? which he adopted as his, passed it to
another for the purpose of causing dishonor to the other5s
reputation. The act is slander >light oral defamation?.
&ic$orio vs. CA
4ather and son Victorio were overheard by people to have
uttered defamatory words against &tty. (ui* after a hearing
where &tty. (ui* moved for contempt of the counsel of
Victorio. They were found guilty of 1rave 8ral Defamation.
%./D+ 8ral defamation or slander has been defined as the
speaing of base and defamatory words which tend to
pre#udice another in his reputation, office, trade, business
or means of livelihood. The special circumstances of the
case, antecedents or relationship between offended and
offender, which might tend to prove intention of offender
at the time, aside from the sense and grammatical meaning
C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer
1,0
of the defamatory words are considered as guidelines in
determining whether the offense is serious or slight.
&ttributing to a prominent lawyer a crime >estafa? is a
serious and insulting imputation that stries deep into the
character of the victim. $o special circumstance need be
shown for defamatory words to be considered grave oral
defamation.
That defamatory words were uttered in the heat of anger
cannot lie where there was no reason or lawful cause to be
angry against (ui* who was merely performing his duties
aw a lawyer in defense of client, and no provocation.
2eo+le vs. 1rc#llo
Audge 8rcullo dismissed the case for oral defamation
against Peralta >she imputed adultery and prostitution
against 4lores? on the ground that it was a private crime to
be instituted by the offended party. S! reinstated case for
trial.
%./D+ The words said by Peralta are indubitably imputation
of the crime of prostitution, which can be prosecuted de
oficio and not adultery. !onnotation of hostess is
notoriously referred to prostitutes. 8nly when derogatory
remars clearly and categorically reflect the elements
constituting adultery would the complainant for libel by
the offended party be necessary to commence prosecution
&illan#eva v. 2eo+le 3200,5
The !ourt does not condone the vilification or use of
scurrilous language on the part of petitioner, but following
the rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the
accused must be taen in his favor, it is our considered
view that the slander committed by petitioner can be
characteri*ed as slight slander following the doctrine that
uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with
some provocation on the part of the offended party,
constitutes only a light felony.
Figeroa v. 2eo+le 3200,5
While it is true that a publication"s libelous nature depends
on its scope, spirit and motive taen in their entirety, the
article in ,uestion as a whole e9plicitly maes mention of
private complainant (ivera all throughout. 2t cannot be said
that the article was a mere general commentary on the
alleged e9isting state of affairs at the aforementioned
public maret because (ivera was not only specifically
pointed out several times therein but was even tagged with
derogatory names. 2ndubitably, this name)calling was, as
correctly found by the two courts below, directed at the
very person of (ivera himself.
Article 351. Slan)er b% Dee)
2lements
,. Offender performs an act not included
in an other crime a"ainst honor4
-. Such act is performed in the presence
of other person or persons4
3. Such act casts dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon the offended part.
Slander b deed refers to performance of an
act, not use of !ords.
$!o .inds of slander b deed
,. Simple slander b deed4 and
-. )ra*e slander b deed, that is, !hich is
of a serious nature.
8hat is slander b deedE /t is a crime a"ainst
honor !hich is committed b performin" an act
!hich casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt
upon another person.
/llustrations3 slappin" the face of another if the
intention is to cause shame and humiliation,
fi"htin" another !ith intention to humiliate him
*s. Act& of la&ci+io"&ne&&
Oissin" a "irl in public and touchin" her breasts
without lewd designs, committed b a re1ected
suitor to cast dishonor on the "irl is slander b
deed ;O$ acts of lasci*iousness.
*s. Maltreat#ent
$he nature and effects of the maltreatment
determine the crime committed. /f the
offended part suffered from shame or
humiliation caused b the maltreatment, it is
slander b deed.
2n3"&t
+e4ation
Slan)er b%
)ee)
Act& of
la&ci+io"&ne&&
/rritation or annoance
L 8ith publicit
and dishonor or
contempt
L presence of
the
circumstances
pro*ided for in
R&C 335 on
rape 9force or
intimidation,
unconscious
etc.: to"ether
!ith le!d
desi"ns
2eo+le vs. Mo$i$a
Motita used a mirror to view reflection of private parts of
/etada. !rowd nearby were laughing with their eyes
directed towards her.
%./D+ !rime committed was slander by deed.
Kn#ust ve9ation is committed when the offender5s act
caused annoyance, irritation, ve9ation, torment, distress or
disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is
directed. 2f there was attendant publicity and dishonor or
contempt in addition to the irrigation or annoyance,
offense would be slander by deed as in this case. 2f any of
the circumstances provided for rape together with lewd
designs were present in addition to the annoyance, the
offense would be act of lasciviousness.
C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer
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Article 3*5. $er&on& re&,on&ible
$he persons responsible for libel are3
1. $he person !ho publishes, exhibits or
causes the publication or exhibition of
an defamation in !ritin" or similar
means4
2. $he author or editor of a boo. or
pamphlet4
3. $he editor or business manager of a
dail ne!spaper ma"aNine or serial
publication4
4. $he o!ner of a printin" plant !hich
publishes a libelous article !ith his
consent and all other persons !ho in
an !a participate in or ha*e
connection !ith its publication.
Genue of criminal and ci*il actions for dama"es
in cases of !ritten defamations 9/n case one of
the offended parties is a pri*ate indi*idual:
,. 8here the libelous article is printed
and first published4 or
-. 8here an of the offended parties
actuall resides at the time of the
commission of the offense.
8here one of the offended parties is a public
officer, the action shall be filed in the CC/ 9,: of
the pro*ince or cit !here he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense OR 9-:
!here the libelous article is printed and first
published.
$he ci*il action shall be filed in the same
cdourt !here the criminal action is filed and
*ice *ersa.
$he court !here the criminal action or ci*il
action for dama"es is ,
st
filed shall acquire
1urisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.
/f the defamation consists in the imputation
of a crime !hich cannot be prosecuted de
oficio 9adulter, concubina"e, seduction,
abduction and acts of lasci*iousness:, then the
offended part must a complaint.
R23 DA0A)2S reco*erable
Actual dama"es need not be pro*ed, at least
9,: !here the publication is libelous per se or
9-: !hen the amount of the a!ard is more or
less nominal, because libel, b its nature,
causes in1ur to the reputation of the offended
part.
$here is no remed for dama"es for slander
or libel in case of absolutel pri*ile"ed
communication.
Article 3*6. $roof of the tr"th
/n e*er criminal prosecution for libel, the truth
ma be "i*en in e*idence to the court and if it
appears that the matter char"ed as libelous is
true, and, moreo*er, that it !as published !ith
"ood moti*es and for 1ustifiable ends, the
defendant shall be acquitted.
&roof of the truth of an imputation of an act or
omission not constitutin" a crime shall not be
admitted, unless the imputation shall ha*e
been made a"ainst the )o*ernment emploees
!ith respect to facts related to the dischar"e of
their duties.
/n such cases, if the defendant pro*es the truth
of the imputation made b him, he shall be
acquitted.
&roof of truth is admissible in an of the
follo!in"3
1. 8hen the act or omission imputed
constitutes a crime re"ardless of
!hether the offended part is a pri*ate
indi*idual or a public officer4
2. 8hen the offended part is a
Government employee, e*en if the act
or omission imputed doesnJt constitute
a crime, pro*ided, it is related to the
dischar"e of his official duties.
/llustration3 A said that @, a "o*Jt official, !as in
the habit of drin.in" durin" office hours and
that he !as al!as in a boisterous condition. /s
proof of truth allo!ed in case @ should file a
complaint a"ainst A for defamationE Fes. @oth
public interest and the "ood of the ser*ice
demand that a drun.ard be barred from the
ser*ice. @ut !hen the imputation in*ol*es the
pri*ate life of @ !hich is not related to the
dischar"e of his official duties, the offender
cannot pro*e the truth thereof.
Another illustration3 A made se*eral
imputations a"ainst C, a pri*ate indi*idual,
some of !hich insinuated the commission of
crimes and some did not. /s proof of truth
allo!edE /t depends. $he defendant !ill be
allo!ed to pro*e the truth of the imputations
constitutin" crimes but he !ill not be allo!ed
to pro*e the truth of the imputations not
constitutin" crimes.
C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer
1,2
D2C2;S2 in defamation, requisities3
,. $ruth
-. 0atter !as published !ith "ood
moti*es
3. Cor 1ustifiable ends
Retraction ma miti"ate dama"es. @ut in
order to ha*e the desired effect, the retraction
should contain an admission of the falsit of
the libelous publication and e*ince a stron"
desire to repair the !ron" occasioned thereb.
Article 3*7. Libelo"& re#ar8&
Libelous remar.s or comments connected !ith
the matter pri*ile"ed under the pro*isions of
Article 354, if made !ith malice, shall not
e=empt the author thereof nor the editor or
mana"in" editor of a ne!spaper from criminal
liabilit.
$hus, the author of a publication !ho
distorts or discolors official proceedin"s
reported b him, or adds comments thereon to
cast aspersion on the character of the parties
concerned, is "uilt of libel, not!ithstandin"
that the defamator matter is published in
connection !ith a pri*ile"ed matter.
Article 3*3. Incri#inatin( Innocent
$er&on&
2lements
,. Offender performs an act4
-. @ such an act, he incriminates or
imputes to an innocent person the
commission of a crime4
3. Such act does not constitute per1ur.
$his article is limited to 5plantin"6 e*idence
and the li.e, !hich do not in themsel*es
constitute false prosecutions but tend directl
to cause false prosecution.
Incri#inatin( an
innocent ,er&on
$er3"r% b% #a8in(
fal&e acc"&ation
Committed b
performin" an act b
!hich the offender
directl incriminates
another
$he "ra*amen is the
imputation itself, falsel
made before an officer
Limited to the act of
plantin" e*idence
)i*in" of false statement
under oath or ma.in" a
false affida*it, imputin"
to another the
commission of a crime
Incri#inator%
#achination&
Defa#ation
Offender doesnJt a*ail 8ords, !ritten or
himself of !ritten or
spo.en !ords in
besmirchin" the *ictimJs
reputation
spo.en, are a*ailed of
;ot required /mputation must be
public and malicious K
must be calculated to
cause the dishonor,
discredit or contempt of
the a""rie*ed part
$eo,le +&. Ala(ao
/s there a comple= crime of incriminatin" an innocent
person throu"h unla!ful arrestE
A2LD3 Fes. $he t!o acts imputed to the accused
closel follo!ed each other, the unla!ful arrest bein"
a necessar means to plant the incriminator
e*idence. <nder the circumstances of the case, the
accused had to arrest 0 because it !as the onl !a
that the could !ith facilit detain him, search his
person or effects and, commin"le there!ith the
mar.ed peso bill. A comple= crime !as committed.
H"((lan) +&. Lantin
Audge /antin was arrested for bribery for allegedly having
received mared money amounting to PJ,=== from one
Magdalena %uggland who was implicated in a criminal case.
The PJ,=== was allegedly part of the PFJ,=== being ased
by Audge /antin for the cancellation of the hold departure
order issued against Ms. %uggland. The issue is whether
this is case of entrapment or planting of evidence.
%./D+ This is a case of entrapment. /et us distinguish
entrapment from planting of evidence. 2n en$ra+men$, the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged
originates in the mind of the accused and the law
enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of
the offense, the accused cannot #ustify his conduct.
2lan$ing o) evidence or incriminating innocent person is
committed by performing an act by which the offender
directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the
commission of a crime.
4rom the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted
by the parties, there is reason to believe that indeed, this
is a case of entrapment not planting of evidence. The
conclusion is based on the following+
>B? The subpoena was illegally issuedI
>F? The Motion to 'uash %old Departure 8rder and the
8rder of !ancellation of the %old Departure 8rder were
prepared and typewritten by the respondentI and
>;? The Money used in the entrapment operation was
recovered from one of the left drawers of the respondent"s
table.
Article 3*. Intri("in( a(ain&t Honor
$his crime is committed b an person !ho
shall ma.e an intri"ue !hich has for its
principal purpose to blemish the honor or
reputation of another person.
C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer
1,:
Incri#inatin( an
innocent ,er&on
Intri("in( a(ain&t
Honor
Offender performs an
act b !hich he directl
incriminates or imputes
to an innocent person
the commission of a
crime
Offender resorts to an
intri("e for the purpose
of blemishin" the honor
or reputation of another
person
Defa#ation Intri("in( a(ain&t
Honor
Done b a*ailin" directl
of &,o8en wor)&
e=., "ossipin"
Committed b means
!hich consists of some
tric8% an) &ecret ,lot
Slan)er Intri("in( a(ain&t
Honor
$he source of the info
can be ,in,ointe) and
the defendant, adoptin"
as his o!n the
information he has
obtained, passes the
same to another for the
purpose of causin"
dishonor to
complainantJs reputation
$he source or the author
of the dero"ator info
cannot be )eter#ine)
and the defendant
borro!s the same, and
!ithout subscribin" to
the truth thereof, passes
it to others
RE$29LIC ACT No. 755
AN ACT TO $ROHI9IT AND $ENALI:E 'IRE
TA$$ING AND OTHER RELATED ;IOLATIONS O<
THE $RI;AC= O< COMM2NICATION> AND <OR
OTHER $2R$OSES
/t shall be unla!ful3
a) for any person, not bein" authoriNed b all
the parties to an pri*ate communication or
spo.en !ord, to tap any wire or cable, or by
using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spo.en !ord b usin" a
de*ice commonl .no!n as a dictaphone or
dicta"raph or dictaphone or !al.ieBtal.ie or
tape recorder, or ho!e*er other!ise
described4
b) for any person, be he a participant or not in
the act or acts penaliNed in the ne=t
precedin" sentence, 9,: to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc
record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of an communication or spo.en
!ord secured either before or after the
effecti*e date of this Act in the manner
prohibited b this la!4 or 9-: to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or (3)
to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or (4) to furnish
transcriptions thereof, !hether complete or
partial, to an other person. $ro+i)e),
$hat the use of such record or an copies
thereof a& e+i)ence in an% ci+il> cri#inal
in+e&ti(ation or trial of offen&e&, shall
not be co*ered b this prohibition4
c) for any person !ho willfully or knowingly
does or !ho shall aid, permit, or cause to be
done any of the acts declared to be
unlawful or who violates the provisions of
the following section or of any order issued
thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such
violation.
/t is not unla!ful3
a) for an peace officer, !ho is authoriNed b a
!ritten order of the Court, to e=ecute an of
the acts declared to be unla!ful in cases
in*ol*in" the crimes of treason, espionage,
provoking war and disloyalty in case of war,
piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to
sedition, kidnapping as defined b the
Re*ised &enal Code, and *iolations of
Common!ealth Act ;o. #,#, punishin"
espiona"e and other offenses a"ainst
national securit3 $ro+i)e), $hat &"ch
written or)er &hall onl% be i&&"e) or
(rante) ",on written a,,lication an)
the e4a#ination "n)er oath or
affir#ation of the a,,licant an) the
witne&&e& he #a% ,ro)"ce an) a
&howin(? 9,: that there are reasonable
"rounds to belie*e that an of the crimes
enumerated hereinabo*e has been
committed or is bein" committed or is about
to be committed3 $ro+i)e)> howe+er>
$hat in cases in*ol*in" the offenses of
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and
inciting to sedition, such authorit shall be
"ranted onl upon prior proof that a
rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case
ma be, ha*e actuall been or are bein"
committed4 9-: that there are reasonable
"rounds to belie*e that e*idence !ill be
obtained essential to the con*iction of an
person for, or to the solution of, or to the
pre*ention of, an of such crimes4 and 93:
that there are no other means readil
a*ailable for obtainin" such e*idence.
2ffect of *iolation of the la!3 An communication or
spo.en !ord, or the e=istence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meanin" of the same or an part
thereof, or an information therein contained
obtained or secured b an person in *iolation of this
Act &hall not be a)#i&&ible in e+i)ence in an%
3")icial> !"a&i@3")icial> le(i&lati+e or
a)#ini&trati+e hearin( or in+e&ti(ation.
/aanan vs. IAC
&tty. Pinto filed a complaint for direct assault against &tty.
/aconico. Pintor, through phone, offered to withdraw the
complaint for consideration. &tty. 1aanan was able to
overhear this conversation through a telephone e9tension.
Pinto was arrested for e9tortion. 0ut 1aanan and /aconico
C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer
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were charged with violation of (&3F== and found guilty by
the lower court.
%./D+ The phrase 6any other device or arrangement7 in the
&nt)Wiretapping /aw doesn5t cover an e9tension line. The
law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device
or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording the communication. There must
be the physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order
to overhear, intercept or record the spoen words. The
e9tension here was not installed for the purpose but for
ordinary office use. &lso, an e9tension phone is an
instrument which is very common, not what the law refers
to in which the presence of such devices cannot be
presumed by the party being overheard.
Ramire% vs. CA
(amire* field a civil case for damages against 1arcia. 2$
support of her claim, she produced a verbatim transcript of
the confrontation with 1arcia where the latter allegedly
ve9ed, insulted and humiliated her. The transcription on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. &s a
result of the recording, 1arcia filed a criminal case against
(amire* for violation of (& 3F==.
%./D+ The law maes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penali*ed by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute5s intent to penali*e all persons
unauthori*ed to mae such recording is underscored by the
use of the ,ualifier 6any7. !onse,uently, as respondent !&
correctly concluded, even a person privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with
another without the nowledge of the latter >will? ,ualify
as a violator under the provisions of (&3F==. The
lawmaers contemplated to mae illegal unauthori*ed
taped recording of private conversation or communication
taen by either of the parties themselves of by third
persons. The nature of the conversation is immaterial for
conviction of the crime and communication as used
includes conversation.
C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer
1,5