1

CUDECO SHAREHOLDER RESEARCH

CHAPTER 8:
ASIC COMPLAINTS CONCERNING CuDECO TRADING


8.2 A Review of Trading Associated with the Accumulation of
Shares by the M&G Group
(October, November and December 2010)







DISCLAIMER: All Information presented as shareholder research has been sourced from
broker trading records and Cudeco registry records. While the author considers the data
to be accurate and the summaries presented as also being an accurate reflection of
trading, no guarantees are given as to the reliability of data or any conclusions put
forward. Shareholders and investors are encouraged to do their own Due Diligence and to
make up their own minds in regard to any trends present in the trading data.
2

REFERENCE LINKS TO PUBLISHED RESEARCH



Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Why Blog?
1.2 The Current Situation
1.3 Blog Content
Chapter 2: An Overview of Trends Associated With 15 Months of Trading
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Trading Trends Over a 15 Month Period
Chapter 3: Trading Trends Leading up to Aug 18, 2010
3.1 Trading Leading Up to the Aug 18 Resource Upgrade
3.2 An Analysis of Price Under-Performance During Jan-Feb 2010
3.3 Market Manipulation Issues, 7.5 Months of Auction Investigations and Downtick Analysis
3.4 A Review of June/July 2006 JORC Issues
3.5 Market Reactions to Significant Announcements 2010
3.6 The 2010 Resource Estimate and Issues Related to JORC Code Compliance
Chapter 4: Trading that Occurred Following the Aug 18, 2010 Resource Upgrade
4.1 Historic Trends and Aug 18, 2010 Trading Data
Chapter 5: Trading Updates
5.1 Short Position Update - Nov 1, 2011
5.2 Registry Update as at Nov 3, 2011
5.3 Market Update Nov 14
5.4 Summary of Issues Plus Trading Anomalies During November 2011 and in a Broader Context
Chapter 6: Registry Anomalies
6.1 An Overview of Monthly Registry Anomalies Spanning 2 Years of Trading
6.2 Increased Registry Activity Versus ASX Buying and Selling
6.3 Trading Featuring Substantially Increased Registry Activity Over ASX Activity - Part 2
6.4 Trading Featuring Substantially Increased ASX Activity Over Registry Activity.
6.5 The Impact of Institutions on the CuDeco Register
Chapter 7: Research Into Other ASX Companies
7.1 Research Findings in Relation to CDU, LYC, BBG and EGP
7.2 Further Research Into ASX 200 Companies - Linc Energy (LNC)
7.3 ASX 200 Company Research Billabong Broker Data (BBG)
7.4 ASX 200 Company Research Lynas Broker Data (LYC)
Chapter 8: Official Complaints to ASIC Concerning Trading in CuDeco
8.1 ASIC Complaint 2013-1
8.2 ASIC Complaint 2013-2



8.1 ASIC Complaint 2013-1


3

FOREWORD

The current ASIC complaint refers to the period when the M&G Group accumulated CuDeco shares during
late 2010. It brings to attention further manipulative trading issues on the ASX that have been sanctioned
by regulatory authorities. Certainly, the trading behaviours identified in all research published to date on
the shareholder blog, www.scribd/com/cudeco_research, are diametrically opposed to the guidelines
provided by the ASX (i.e., back when it was a self-regulated organization), and the guidelines given by the
High Court in its recent judgement <Refer Pg 8, ASIC Complaint 2013-1>. The manipulative behaviours
identified are all based on anomalous trends drawn from empirical data that cannot be adequately
explained in terms other than share price manipulation.
A distinction needs to be made between share price manipulation, which is illegal, and an unfair market,
which is a fact of life for retail investors. Fairness issues are widely acknowledged. There is no question
that the ASX provides an un-level playing field with sophisticated investors granted privileges that
advantage them in the market over all other investors. The privileges include streamlined access to ASX
computers which provides superior execution speeds for trades and an ability to view and react to all
orders instantly as they arrive on the ASXs electronic trading platform, thereby pre-empting impending
trades in the queue awaiting execution.
The privileges also apply to the use of trading algorithms that are able to institute large numbers of small
trades, but by their very design deliver strategic advantages over all other investors. Retail investors, who
have to deal with higher transaction costs particularly for small trades as well as markedly inferior access
speeds regarding order execution, simply cannot compete.
However what large numbers of small private investors and mum-and-dad retail investors are generally
not aware of, and what shareholder research has brought to attention, is the widespread manipulative
activity taking place that is both sanctioned and generally ignored or dismissed by regulatory authorities.
What has emerged through research is that the trading issues raised concerning CuDeco apply equally to
other stocks as well, and that CuDeco trading data has simply provided a window into systemic problems
that require urgent attention. The crucial point is that markets are not only unfair, but manipulative
activity is sanctioned that is destroying large amounts of wealth of Australian citizens and indeed the
Australian economy. The wealth destruction obviously impacts small retail investors who are unable to
compete in the market, but it has also decimated compulsory superannuation holdings of Australian
workers in the years following the Global Financial Crisis.
The fund management industry is heavily associated with all of the share market manipulation issues
outlined by research. The trading issues brought to attention from late 2010 through to 2013 highlight the
mechanisms whereby large amounts of superannuation capital are able to be successfully drained from the
system. In fact the entire dysfunctional ASX system appears to heavily rely upon a regulator that generally
ignores complaints and acquiesces to the demands of vested interests while attempting to normalize
dubious trading activities. The acceptance by ASIC of dark pools, HFT trading and highly manipulative short
selling practices, despite the destruction of wealth that accompany them, is clearly unacceptable and each
day that passes with nothing done about such systemic problems, is another day when large amounts of
wealth are stripped from unsuspecting investors.
4

Unfairness is one thing, but interminably corrupted markets that Australian citizens are forced to engage in
through compulsory superannuation, is quite another. Importantly, Government regulators are established
to ensure markets are not unfair or corrupt and to protect its citizens from these practices. This is not
happening with regard to the ASX.
Already the response to poor superannuation returns following the GFC has been for the previous Labor
Government to be persuaded to legislate for increased contributions. Under current arrangements, it
represents substantially more easily exploited capital for the industry to thrive on, with dubious benefits
for contributors. The funds management industry is actually planning to harvest a cash-engorged future
with funds under management expected to increase from around $1.3 trillion currently, to around $6
trillion by the year 2030 <CLICK: Reference Link>.
Importantly the profit generation that accompanies the management of superannuation holdings such as the
$78 billion stripped from the market through short selling in the 18 months between August 2010 and January
2012 <CLICK: Reference Link> has to come from somewhere. In this instance it is likely to be associated with
the lending of clients pooled shares (usually super funds, pension funds, mutual funds etc.) where the value
of holdings has been decimated in support of windfall gains for those engaged in short selling led by
institutions and hedge funds. Then there are the account fees and commissions earned through the over-
trading of accounts under management. It is no surprise that superannuation returns have been severely
impacted irrespective of the difficult economic environment ushered in by events surrounding the GFC. The
actions of a fund management industry in making other peoples shares available to privileged insiders to
profit from difficult trading conditions is not only highly questionable, it is deplorable, as the investing public
has been hoodwinked in the process. Essentially, the market is far removed from what it is held up to be.
ASIC has been made aware of trading anomalies in relation to CuDeco since at least December 2010, and has
been advised of continuing problems on several other occasions by several CuDeco shareholders. The ASIC
Complaint referenced as 2013-1 was lodged on August 16, 2013 <CLICK: Reference Link> and to date hasnt had
a response despite many of the issues already being referred to them by other shareholders from
information published on the research blog. It comes as no surprise, as generally, complaints are met by
long drawn-out silences and are eventually followed by decisions advising that the regulator doesnt have a
problem with what has been referred to them.
A case in point was the response to recent concerns by a CuDeco shareholder about peculiar small trades
flooding the market. The response in part is summarized below.
ASICs Surveillance team is aware of the above allegations and has already conducted extensive enquiries
and research into the trading of CuDeco shares. It is important to note that the small value transactions to
which you refer in your letter, are largely the result with algorithmic trading which often break down larger
orders to minimise market impact by trading a large number of small orders throughout the day. While the
transactions can appear unusual when looked at in isolation, they are not necessarily indicative of market
manipulation.

In sanitizing small trades, the response is seen to ignore the manipulative function of those small trades,
many of which can be small crossings continuously put through the market to force Downticks in price. Such
activity regarding CuDeco has been extremely manipulative. The advice also doesnt address the fact that
although the small trades might represent large volumes broken into small parcels, a lot of the trading
represents Wash Trades with no impact on the register, and with entities trading back and forth between
each other in a cartel-like approach to trading. Nor does it address the artificial pricing structures
introduced by repetitive small trades and the non-genuine buying and selling they often represent.

5

Importantly, there are several additional trading issues that are referred to by research that are either
ignored or downplayed by regulatory authorities. Additional issues with wide ranging ramifications for all
stocks trading on the ASX include:
dark pool trades about which very little is known despite frequent concerns expressed by
authorities;
large volumes of off-market transactions that have taken place in critical months with CuDeco,
which may reflect the re-adjustment of holdings between trading partners after manipulative
trades on the ASX;
manipulative short selling practices which are ever present and which can be implemented through
a majority of brokers on any trading day; these contribute to an extremely artificial market;
the covering of open short exposures through off-market adjustments which completely avoid price
discovery. The practice represents a flagrant contradiction to official claims of fair markets;
the flooding of markets with buying and selling across a large range of brokers but where the trades
effectively relate back to the same interests, or interests who are affiliated with their trading. Such
trading is highly manipulative as it involves non-genuine Wash Trades or trades that may not qualify as
Wash Trades but nevertheless do not result in beneficial changes to ownership. It again raises
concerns of cartel-like control over trading which is meant to be outlawed by both ASIC and the ACCC;
broker collusion/ cartel activity with non-genuine trades back and forth to each other and with a
rotation of roles as prominent sellers and prominent buyers on almost a daily basis;
absolute control over auction prices enforced by a small groups of institutional brokers who again
have rotated roles as prominent brokers on a daily basis;
institutional algorithms being able to choose who they wish to trade with, and if necessary,
avoiding retail orders. The front running of orders and the instantaneous withdrawal of liquidity in
response to the arrival of genuine orders is a major issue, but so too is the corporate targeting of
companies such as CuDeco by trades over longer periods of time designed to constrain prices and
to force prices lower;
the deliberate targeting of lower prices with small parcels of shares sold to force Downtick
transactions where the trades are between brokers who are affiliated in their trading and where
many of the Downticks have involved small parcels of shares put through as crossings.;
the deliberate selling down of positive announcements serving to destroy sentiment for the stock;
and
insider trading issues regarding a number of ASX companies, specifically evident in regard to
CuDeco during the period M&G accumulated shares during late 2010.
The extremely bleak picture of what takes place on the ASX in all stocks, not just CuDeco, is made even
worse by the fact that the majority of trades are completely opaque to the market and a great many of
them are non-genuine in makeup. Sadly, it is a serious indictment of officials who claim our markets are
fair and transparent, and also of those responsible for administering and regulating the markets daily
operations that they cannot quickly identify entities associated with dubious trading activity and make
them responsible for any manipulative impact their trading might have on the market.

The bottom line associated with all of the above is that the Australian public need to be properly informed
about systemic manipulation issues not addressed under current arrangements. They need to be able to make
independent decisions about their investments and not be forced into a deeply compromised system by
Government decree such as with compulsory superannuation. Such forewarning is required at least until such
time as a major overhaul of the system can be implemented that can guarantee fair and transparent markets,
and can ensure an effective and responsive regulatory regime is in place.
6

ASIC COMPLAINT 8.2 SUMMARY
TRADING ISSUES ACCOMPANYING M&G BUYING DURING 2010
ASIC Complaint 8.2 relates to the trading of CuDeco shares that took place during late October and through
November and December 2010 when the M&G Group extended their substantial shareholding in the
Company. The on-market buying which amounted to 10.25 million shares between October 29 and December
14, 2010, followed a 10 million share placement secured from CuDeco when the Company was under pressure
following a resource upgrade released on August 18, 2010. The resource statement was surrounded by
confusion because reported JORC compliant resources didnt seem to reflect the likely realities of mining,
especially given that large amounts of high grade copper mineralisation, previously reported by the Company
in numerous Market Releases, did not appear to be adequately represented in resource estimates.
The confusion about the resource was seized upon by sophisticated investors who destabilized the
company by taking prices much lower. Three observations stand out in relation to events surrounding the
August 18 announcement.
The share price following the resource upgrade did not fairly reflect the economic attributes of the
measured and indicated resource as announced, irrespective of the large amounts of high grade
copper seemingly not included in estimates.
The placement secured by M&G was granted in an attempt to stabilize the Company and wouldnt
have occurred if it wasnt for the dramatic share price slump.
Trading and registry data demonstrate that trading behaviours used to destabilize the Company by
taking prices substantially lower were highly manipulative.
Importantly, the dubious trading behaviours used to collapse the share price in August 2010 were again
evident in subsequent trading as M&G increased their stake through on-market buying. However when
trading data is assessed in light of the guidelines provided by a recent High Court decision regarding share
price manipulation, entities responsible for aberrant trading trends appear to have seriously compromised
the market. Research has shown that artificial pricing levels and non-genuine buying and selling were
clearly the dominant features of the trading that took place during late 2010 and early 2011.
Events surrounding the M&G buying campaign that can only be explained satisfactorily in terms of share
price manipulation include:
Large volumes of non-genuine trading churn were supplied to the market.
Trading churn was a feature of trading immediately following the August 18, 2010 announcement
and continued unabated until after the M&G accumulation was completed on December 14, 2010.
The trend is reflected by monthly trading volumes and periods where large amounts of trading didnt
impact the register. In November when the bulk of M&G buying took place, around 39% of broker
trading appeared to go missing as it didnt have an impact on the register. <Refer Complaint 1 Pg. 39>
Period Monthly Volumes
Comment
Jan-July Average - 2010 12,449,839
Months preceding the resource upgrade
August 93,327,086
Trading associated with the resource up-grade
September 24,052,817
Months following the resource up-grade
October 32,055,511
November 42,533,272
The majority of M&G buying took place in November
December 15,595,948
Trading volumes immediately fell once the M&G buying
was completed (There were just 4 days of M&G buying
during early December)
January - 2011 7,494,594
February - 2011 7,079,896

Large
volumes of
Wash Trades
occurred
during these
2 months
7

Trading was compromised well before M&G commenced their buying and continued to be
compromised as accumulation took place. Research also suggests that following the completion of
M&G buying, manipulative trading behaviours then focussed on capping share prices.
Non-genuine strategic selling was supplied to the market that appears to have targeted lower
prices, not maximum returns for clients. Brokers alternated roles almost on a daily basis in terms
of being prominent selling brokers especially in regard to Downtick transactions. It suggests both
collusion between brokers and high levels of co-ordination. (Refer to Charts on Pg. 7)
Such trading contradicts the clarifications provided by the High Court that plainly stated genuine
sellers are expected to target the highest prices possible for their shares. Instead, relatively small
amounts of selling resulted in large numbers of downward movements in price.
Broker collusion and/or entities using multiple brokers to facilitate unfair trading objectives was
a prominent feature of trading. Collusion is highlighted by the trading volumes associated with
M&G accumulation. M&G bought shares in the period October 29 to December 14 with buying
taking place on 19 of the days throughout the period, and the remaining 14 days experiencing no
M&G involvement. Critically, a 227% increase in average daily trading volumes accompanied the
buying for M&G.
M&G ABSENT FROM THE MARKET M&G ACTIVE IN THE MARKET
14 Day Period Volumes Traded M&G Buying 19 Period Day Volumes Traded M&G Buying
Totals 14,616,565 0

Totals 47,794,761 10,251,458
Average/Day 769,293 0

Average/Day 2,515,514 539,550

Clearly, a motivated buyer standing independently in the market to accumulate just over 500,000 shares
per day on average, should not have resulted in volumes spiralling multiples higher. The co-operation of
other brokers resulted in suppling additional selling and buying to assist in managing the market in
support of accumulation by M&G. Such activity suggests both collusion and insider trading activity. It
would also have resulted in the setting and maintenance of artificial pricing levels, a situation that was
grossly unfair to all other investors, including those who sold their shares because of the confusing
market signals generated (i.e., price rises were accompanied by a wall of selling that was non-genuine).
Further Collusion issues
The issue of collusion by brokers and the likelihood of a rigged or artificial market, as M&G carried out
their accumulation program, are further supported by these relationships and events:
Multiple brokers were directly involved in buying shares for M&G. They were Morgan Stanley,
Citigroup Global and JP Morgan. While active on some days specifically for M&G, there is the
question of who were they trading for on other days if not in support of the accumulating entity?
Formal relationships existed between brokers who were substantially involved in trading and
actively supporting M&G. They include Citigroup Global (CITI), Morgan Stanley (MSDW) and Smith
Barney (SBAR) whose affiliations were detailed in Research Paper 6.5 <CLICK: Reference Link Pg 34>.
Smith Barneys trading profile was reduced somewhat compared to MSDW and CITI during the
period M&G accumulated shares, however they did provide high levels of trading churn and
helped to process the 10 million share placement procured by M&G in October. The placement
shares flowed through the SBAR broker nominee account on their way to custodial ownership
with HSBC Nominees and JP Morgan Nominees.


Multiple brokers informally assisted M&G accumulation by providing high volumes of non-
genuine trading churn to the market. Included in this group were COMM, UBS, DMG, BBY,
MACQ and others.

8

Brokers traded so as to deliberately target lower prices as suggested by persistently anomalous
trends regarding Downtick statistics. The overwhelming trend has been for brokers with relatively
small selling involvements being responsible for a majority of DTs, and brokers with relatively
small buying involvements being the purchasers of large numbers of DT transactions.
Trading algorithms facilitated shared trading objectives by directing trades between designated
sellers and preferred buyers, representing non-genuine trading that didnt result in changes to
beneficial ownership of shares. To work effectively such algorithms require multiple brokers
running similar programs. Collusion issues stem from high frequency order execution that can
ensure institutional orders execute collusively ahead of retail orders.
Absolute control over all auctions pricing by a small subset of brokers also suggests that brokers
were acting collusively or that a cartel of interests was dictating terms to the rest of the market.
UBS Securities being involved in the settlement of trades far in excess of its own buying and selling
demonstrates an overt involvement with other brokers, and also suggests that a good deal of its
own trading was likely to be strategic and in support of shared trading objectives.
UBS engaged in large numbers of Downtick crossings that also provided constant downward
pressures to prices, yet the crossings were for only tiny parcels of shares.
o During November 2010, UBS Securities was responsible for 24 % of all Downtick transactions
but held a selling market share of of just 7.3%. Furthermore, almost half (i.e., 47.6%) of UBS
DT transactions were crossings and 92% of those crossing were for parcels of shares well
under 400 shares in size (i.e., 92% of DT all crossings represented small transactions averaging
just 124 shares). The trading behaviour strongly reflects attempts to provide downward
pressure to prices rather than genuine exchanges of shares between clients.
o Over four months of trading (October, November, December 2010 and January 2011) UBS
were responsible for 24.5% of all Downticks but held a selling market share of 8.4%
o UBS is also seen to be active in supporting Downticks by being the buyer of 20.3% of all
Downtick transactions over the four-month period, with just over half of them being
crossings.
Anomalous Trading Data
The trading statistics by leading brokers over the four- month period are summarized in the table. They
are listed in order of selling volumes.
SELLING STATISTICS BUYING STATISTICS
Broker Volume % Sells DT % Volume % Buys DT % NET
COMM 18,678,502 19.1% 12.4% 16,602,356 17.0% 14.0% -2,076,146
DMG 7,998,929 8.2% 17.0% 7,631,583 7.8% 4.8% -367,346
ETRD 7,448,115 7.6% 4.9% 6,374,547 6.5% 3.9% -1,073,568
UBS 8,157,807 8.4% 24.5% 5,155,406 5.3% 20.3% -3,002,401
MSDW 1,660,456 1.7% 2.4% 10,133,756 10.4% 10.1% 8,473,300
CITI 4,996,953 5.1% 3.3% 5,875,168 6.0% 12.0% 878,215
AIEX 6,310,349 6.5% 4.1% 5,261,713 5.4% 4.4% -1,048,636
SBAR 5,661,204 5.8% 2.7% 5,770,389 5.9% 2.0% 109,185
BBY 3,928,033 4.0% 2.0% 3,433,923 3.5% 2.8% -494,110
MACQ 3,314,718 3.4% 2.3% 2,527,282 2.6% 3.5% -787,436
SOSL 2,736,864 2.8% 1.4% 2,750,292 2.8% 1.6% 13,428
GS 2,376,978 2.4% 2.3% 2,403,768 2.5% 2.1% 26,790
HUB24 2,766,426 2.8% 0.5% 2,649,415 2.7% 1.1% -117,011
MERL 1,969,193 2.0% 6.2% 2,161,371 2.2% 2.7% 192,178
INST 2,193,823 2.2% 1.6% 1,949,553 2.0% 2.8% -244,270
CSUI 1,771,482 1.8% 2.7% 1,981,372 2.0% 3.5% 209,890
MACP 2,029,476 2.1% 1.2% 1,515,814 1.6% 1.1% -513,662
M&G
9

SELLING STATISTICS BUYING STATISTICS
Broker Volume % Sells DT % Volume % Buys DT % NET
Owntick
TPPM
1,674,873 1.7% 0.9% 1,585,066 1.6% 1.0% -89,807
BELL 1,940,307 2.0% 0.9% 2,053,934 2.1% 1.0% 113,627
SUSQ 1,591,218 1.6% 0.9% 1,578,257 1.6% 0.1% -12,961
JPM 275,912 0.3% 0.1% 2,440,524 2.5% 1.6% 2,164,612
PSL 1,003,917 1.0% 0.6% 202,966 0.2% 0.1% -800,951
FOST 519,775 0.5% 0.1% 851,175 0.9% 0.2% 331,400
D2MX 516,920 0.5% 0.3% 561,500 0.6% 0.1% 44,580
Others 6,157,018 6.5% 5.3% 4,228,118 4.3% 5.1% -1,928,900
Total 97,679,248 100.0% 100% 97,679,248 100.0% 100% 0


o Of the 97.7 million shares traded, around 30 million buys and sells didnt make it to the register,
representing either illegal Wash Trades or dubious back and forth trades that were netted out.
During November when the majority of M&G accumulation took place, missing trades
represented 39% of all broker activity, providing a very strong pointer to aberrant trading activity.
o Commonwealth Securities played a pivotal role in trading with the register showing 1.36 million
shares being net sold by retailers. However COMM broker trading showed net selling of 2.08
million shares. Retail activity represented around 43% of all COMM buying & selling over the
four-month period, revealing COMM trading to be heavily influenced by sophisticated investors
or institutions. Around 57% of all trades represented non-retail trades that were camouflaged
through the settlement process. It represents a large volume of trading that requires proper
investigation given the highly dubious trading data accompanying the M&G accumulation.
o Apart from UBS Downtick (DT) selling, the DT selling by DMG is also anomalous compared to its
selling profile (i.e., 17.0% cf. 8.2%). So too is the DT buying by CITI compared to its buying profile
(i.e., 12.0% cf. 6.0%). The activities of these brokers are extremely contradictory to the
clarifications about trading recently spelt out by the High Court.

M&G
COMMENT
Broker collusion issues and/or the spreading of buying and selling orders by entities across a wide network
of brokers, have critical implications for share price manipulation. If retail investors were to continuously
buy and sell back and forth to themselves, either using the same broker and two different accounts or even
using two different brokers, the activity would be correctly flagged as non-genuine and instrumental in
setting a false or artificial market.
By comparison, sophisticated investors and institutions can do precisely the same thing by involving
multiple brokers, and by dispensing large numbers of tiny buy and sell orders via trading algorithms with an
ability to choose who they wish to engage with; yet such trading is able to be regarded as legitimate. The
situation is akin to having multiple dummy bids in a property auction, which is clearly unacceptable.
The advent of technology without proper regard to consequences, combined with the concessions granted
to sophisticated investors, again without proper regard for the consequences, has completely sabotaged all
notions of fair trading. It has led to an ability to manage prices by creating non-genuine/ artificial trading
environments involving large volumes of back-and-forth buying and selling between the same interests or
interests who are affiliated with their trading.
Large numbers of trades do not impact the register because they cancel out - as revealed for example during
August 2010 following a resource upgrade, and during the period M&G accumulated shares. Trading churn
back-and-forth between the same entities also means that profits and losses essentially cancel out as it is a
zero-sum game. It suggests that artificial trading activity is able to forgo profits when the priority might be
control over pricing levels. However trading that attempts to control share prices by setting and maintaining
artificial prices is illegal, and the responsibility for dealing with the situation rests solely with the regulator.
It needs to
10

Anomalous Downtick Data
A comparison of the numbers of Downticks recorded by brokers as a result of their sell transactions,
against their selling volumes in the market generally, can be used to pinpoint manipulative trading
activity. It is reasonably expected, for example, that if a broker was responsible for 10% of all selling put
through the market, then the number of Downticks associated with that selling should also approximate
10%. Extremes either side are not only viewed as anomalous but they are most likely manipulative and a
reflection of dubious trading agendas rather than genuine selling.

Brokers who consistently record high levels of Downticks but only have small selling profiles in the
market appear motivated by forcing prices lower, rather than genuinely attempting to achieve the best
prices for their clients. Despite reduced selling profiles as measured by the volume of selling, large
numbers of Downticks are usually achieved by brokers using large numbers of small transactions,
including broker crossings, that force price reductions.

Aberrant trading characteristics are exemplified by UBS Securities with the following charts comparing
their DT involvements against their selling market shares for the months October 2010 through January
2011. The charts show recurring monthly anomalies where small volumes of selling have resulted in
disprortionately high volumes of Downticks.

UBS Securities clearly doesnt appear to be motivated by maximizing returns for their clients and their
trading requires a thorugh examination. UBS Securities however is not the only broker exhibiting
anomalous Downtick trends and a complete review of all such trading is urgently required as it is a trend
that is prevalent across all ASX stocks, not just CuDeco.
UBS - Downticks Versus Selling - October 2010
The chart draws attentions to days where trading has been contrary to the directions set out by High Court
that referred to genuine sellers as seeking to achieve the highest possible prices for their shares. Selling on
October 5, 8, 11, 12, 18, 19, 25, 26 and 29 clearly represents small volumes of selling that looks to have
aggressively targeted lower prices. The table lists the proportion of transactions fewer than 400 shares
each day together with the average parcel size for such small trades.


0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Oct
1
Oct
4
Oct
5
Oct
6
Oct
7
Oct
8
Oct
11
Oct
12
Oct
13
Oct
14
Oct
15
Oct
18
Oct
19
Oct
21
Oct
22
Oct
25
Oct
26
Oct
27
Oct
28
Oct
29
High Levels of
Downticks
Selling at a level much lower
than the level of DTs generated.

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Day <400 Avg.
Oct-05 100% 87
Oct-08 98% 125
Oct-11 100% 100
Oct-12 94% 176
Oct-18 100% 11
Oct-19 85% 160
Oct-25 28% 298
Oct-26 100% 89
Oct-29 48% 105

On Oct 18, Downtick trades had parcel sizes
between 8 and 16 shares
11

UBS - Downticks Versus Selling - November 2010

UBS - Downticks Versus Selling - December 2010

UBS - Downticks Versus Selling - January 2011



0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
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Nov
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Nov
2
Nov
3
Nov
4
Nov
5
Nov
8
Nov
9
Nov
10
Nov
11
Nov
15
Nov
16
Nov
17
Nov
18
Nov
19
Nov
22
Nov
23
Nov
24
Nov
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30
0%
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60%
70%
Dec
1
Dec
2
Dec
3
Dec
7
Dec
8
Dec
9
Dec
10
Dec
13
Dec
14
Dec
15
Dec
16
Dec
17
Dec
20
Dec
21
Dec
22
Dec
24
Dec
29
Dec
30
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Jan
4
Jan
5
Jan
7
Jan
10
Jan
11
Jan
12
Jan
14
Jan
17
Jan
18
Jan
19
Jan
20
Jan
25
Jan
27
Jan
28
Jan
31

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Days when UBS anomalism
wasn't prominent saw other
brokers such as DMG, MERL,
GS and INST, or combinations
thereof, take their place.


% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Trading data shows a
consistent trend by UBS
across all trading
whereby reduced selling
profiles have still resulted
in a lot of downward
pressure on prices.

The pressure has been
aided by large numbers
of small crossings that
have forced DTs.


% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




The persistent trend across all
trading is for downward pressure to
the share price being applied by a
group of brokers, led by UBS
Securities, where in each case large
numbers of DTs have been generated
from relatively minor selling
volumes.
It suggests a targeting of lower prices
and the behaviours appear highly
manipulative, as the selling is non-
genuine and is not attempting to
receive the best returns for clients.
The fact that prominence regarding
DT sales is consistently shared
around from broker to broker also
suggests high levels of co-ordination
and collusion by brokers.
SUMMARY
Similar anomalies are in evidence regarding the brokers who have been the prominent buyers of Upticks.
Brokers being able to achieve large numbers of opportunistic DT purchases with only relatively small
amounts of buying, again suggests collusion and manipulative trading. The collusion appears to be managed
by trading algorithms that are capable of matching designated sellers with designated buyers through
preferential high frequency interactions.

12

OVERVIEW
The research approach has been to assess all aspects of trading prior to the M&G buying, during the period
M&G accumulated shares and after the M&G buying ceased. Dubious trading behaviours are clearly
evident in all trading taking place with an initial focus on controlling the market in preparation for the M&G
buying campaign, and then on constraining prices once M&G accumulation began and after it was
completed. All inferences regarding trading are strongly supported by trading and registry data.
The research findings draw attention to a number of brokers whose trading requires proper investigation
and whose client accounts also require close scrutiny. However, the trading by brokers, irrespective of
who their clients were, makes them fully responsible for any share price manipulation issues.
Importantly, the dubious trading behaviours identified by research during late 2010 are also evident in
trading during 2011, 2012 and in trading throughout 2013, particularly throughout the period June, July,
and August 2013 when M&G disposed of their substantial holding.
Persistently anomalous trading trends illustrate that the market has been allowed to operate for long
periods with highly dubious trading behaviours permitted to hold sway. During recent months half a billion
dollars has been unfairly removed from CuDecos market capitalization while the same trading behaviours
have again controlled pricing levels. It represents an intolerable situation that requires an urgent review by
the regulator, who since December 2010 has been unable to acknowledge that there is even a problem
despite large volumes of data signalling acute trading issues. It remains to be seen if the recent clarification
by the seven High Court judges makes any difference.
Certainly widespread trading anomalies have led to undervalued pricing levels for CuDeco shares that do
not fairly reflect the Companys fundamentals; whatever the company is able to achieve operationally and
announce to the market, is all but irrelevant as far as the share price is concerned. Yet the reasons for the
discrepancies are abundantly evident in trading data but still nothing is done. The situation is hugely
destructive to both shareholder wealth and market integrity and can no longer be tolerated.




13


CONTENTS


Section 1 ..... Pg. 14
8.2.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION CONCERNING CuDECO TRADING
Section 2 ........ Pg. 16
8.2.2 CuDECO TRADING PRIOR TO M&G ACCUMULATION OCT 1 to OCT 28, 2010
Section 3 Pg. 27
8.2.3 CuDECO TRADING ASSOCIATED WITH ACCUMULATION BY M&G OCT 29, NOV & DEC 2010
Section 4 Pg. 33
8.2.4 CuDECO TRADING DATA COINCIDING WITH M&G BEING ABSENT FROM THE MARKET
Section 5 Pg. 37
8.2.5 DECEMBER TRADING DATA AFTER THE M&G GROUP HAD COMPLETED THEIR BUYING.
Section 6 Pg. 41
8.2.6 CuDECO TRADING DATA FOR JANUARY
Section 7 Pg. 46
8.2.7 AUCTION TRENDS DURING NOVEMBER, DECEMBER, 2010 and JANUARY 2011

Section 8 Pg. 55
8.2.8 UPTICK TRENDS
Section 9 Pg. 59
8.2.9 AN OVERVIEW OF 4 MONTHS OF TRADING IN CuDECO Oct 2010 to Jan 2011


APPENDIX 1: CuDECO BROKER TRADING DATA CORRESPONDING TO M&G BUYING Pg. 77
APPENDIX 2: RETAIL BROKER MONTHLY TRADING STATISTICS FOR CuDECO 2010 Pg. 87


14

Section 8.2.1
BACKGROUND INFORMATION CONCERNING CuDECO TRADING
The M&G Group secured a 10 million share placement from CuDeco in September 2010. The placement
followed a resource upgrade announced on August 18, 2010 that was met by high levels of confusion and a
sharp market reaction. The share price lost 48.8% of its value on the day of the announcement, and
continued selling saw a share price low of $1.69 three days later. The low represented a fall of 64.7% from
the levels that stood before the announcement.
Extensive media reporting derided the Companys resource statement suggesting that it had under-
delivered on promises and that shareholders were disappointed and selling out. The reality of the situation
was more associated with:
The difficulties in accurately assessing high grade copper ore and in having estimates comply with
the ASX JORC code reporting standards. The situation led to massive levels of confusion that to this
day remain unresolved despite the Company subsequently upgrading the resource and clarifying
grades with bulk mining trials, and
Trading activity by sophisticated investors that involved large volumes of shares traded back and
forth to themselves that triggered the margin limits of retail investors who were either forced to
sell or sold in panic.
Importantly, institutions held onto their CuDeco shares despite the large volumes traded back and forth
amongst themselves. Trading and registry data suggests that the response to the announcement was a
carefully orchestrated sting operation by sophisticated investors, much to the detriment of retail investors.
Issues concerning the JORC code and the difficulties in accurately assessing the complex Rocklands
resource have been detailed in Research Paper 3.6 <Click: Reference Link>
Critically, the M&G Group became a subtantial shareholder after doing extensive Due Diligence based on
the same information that was the catalyst for a share price crash on August 18. M&G then proceeded to
increase their stake through on-market buying during November and early December, taking prices back
up to $4.64. Their solid buying further highlights the irrational market response on August 18. Their strong
accumulation in CDU shares also draws attention to trading behaviours that were likely to have resulted in
an artifical market for much of August and September 2010.
The current complaint examines trading that occurred while accumulation was taking place by M&G and
compares trading patterns before their buying commenced and after it ceased. Trends that strongly
suggest an artificial market in CuDeco securities are evident throughout all periods. Share price
manipulation looks to have been responsible for capping prices both before and after accumulation by
M&G, and also looks to have facilitated the accumulation as well.
Concerns regarding share market manipulation were addressed in ASIC Complaint 8.1 in terms of historic
advice released by the ASX, together with the results of a recent unanimous High Court decision where
seven judges declared it illegal to attempt to create artificial prices.
The High Court decision has particular relevance in regard to trading in CuDeco over at least the last 3.5
years. Several trading behaviours that have been identified and documented by research have resulted in
an artificial market over long periods of time. The creation and maintenance of an artificial market has
been very much to the detriment of the Company and its non-institutional shareholders. Essentially it is
15

the trading by sophisticated investors, whose activities are camouflaged within institutional holdings, who
have been engaging in trading activity referred to as illegal by the High Court.
The High Court was unequivocal in stating that:
The forces of genuine supply and demand are those which are created in a market by buyers whose
purpose is to acquire at the lowest available price and sellers whose purpose is to sell at the highest
realisable price. <Refer Appendix 1, ASIC Complaint 8.1 Pg. 131>

The advice provides strong directions as to how trading should be assessed, a point noted by legal experts
who were quoted as saying: The unanimous ruling on the definition of maintaining an artificial price
gives the Australian Securities and Investments Commission a powerful new weapon to use against people
who trade shares to deliberately influence trading on the Australian Securities Exchange
Many share price manipulation issues, all identifiable with maintaining artificial pricing levels and unfairly
influencing trading, are present in trading throughout the period October 2010 through to January 2011.
The issues were addressed in detail in ASIC Complaint 8.1 and are summarized below in relation to M&G
trading of CuDeco shares:
Collusion between brokers in achieving shared trading objectives;
The use of a network of brokers by M&G interests and/or related parties to:
o constrain prices;
o create volatility; and
o assist with accumulation.
Strategic selling and/or strategic buying designed to impact prices in attempts to control the market
and to facilitate the accumulation of shares. The co-ordinated, strategic approach to trading has
resulted in persistent anomalies in daily Downtick and Uptick data identifiable with setting artificial
pricing levels;
Control over pricing levels through all auction periods;
Manipulative short selling to facilitate the accumulation of shares and to restrain price rises;
Generating extensive volumes of Wash Trades and/or trades resulting in no changes to beneficial
ownership in an attempt to influence the market in favour of accumulation by M&G;
The widespread use of broker cross-trades and other crossings to control prices.
The majority of trading represented strategic, but manipulative, buying and selling designed to control the
market by setting artificial prices as shares were strongly accumulated by the M&G Group. The trading
activity distorted the market with substantial volumes of buying and selling being non-genuine as per the
High Court definitions.
The trends demonstrate a wolf-pack type trading mentality where multiple brokers have been used to
control prices and to facilitate the accumulation of shares undertaken by the M&G Group. Importantly,
unfair control over the market is seen to be facilitated by high speed interactions between proprietary
trading algorithms able to set prices through continuous interactions between preferred buyers and
preferred sellers.
The research that follows looks closely at trading from Oct 2010 to Jan 2010 and assesses trading prior to
M&Gs involvement, during M&Gs accumulation campaign, and after M&G had completed their buying. The
broker trends brought to attention are the result of a highly orchestrated approach to trading, not chance
events. They need to be assessed and dealt with in terms of the directions provided by the Australian High
Court. The issues identified concerning CuDeco trading strongly point towards share price manipulation and
the same issues have ramifications for all stocks listed on the ASX.
16


Section 8.2.2
CuDECO TRADING PRIOR TO M&G ACCUMULATION
Oct 1 to Oct 28, 2010
Trading during October 2010 mostly took place without the M&G Group having a presence in the market
that required disclosure. M&G buying began buying CuDeco shares on October 29 and finished on
December 14, 2010. The following review of October trading therefore excludes October 29 trading.
Trading for October before M&G began their buying has been assessed in terms of broker involvements
with Downticks and broker involvements regarding the setting of auction prices. Both indicators assist in
determining which brokers were the most influential in controlling prices. They provide information where
attempts to set or maintain artificial prices can be observed before M&G began buying.
Assessments in relation to trading have used the common sense approach to fair trading that was re-
affirmed by the recent High Court decision, part of which may be stated as:
Genuine sellers seek to achieve the highest possible prices for their shares while genuine buyers look to
pay the minimum to secure their requirements.
The realities of the market usually means that prices are transacted somewhere between the two
extremes. Logically, it follows that:
genuine sellers would prefer to avoid high levels of Downticks in price as that would mean that they
are receiving less for their shares. Data trends where the proportion of Downticks generated is far
greater than an entitys overall share of selling are therefore highly dubious, as the seller appears to
be targeting lower prices rather than extracting maximum returns for their shares.
buyers that are able to achieve large numbers of purchases associated with Downticks in prices,
compared to their overall share of buying in the market, also attract suspicion. It is not reasonable
to expect small amounts of buying to nearly always attract low prices, yet that has been a regular
feature of the trading by some brokers in relation to CuDeco.

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to explain anomalous trading patterns from a perspective of
genuine trading so explanations involving collusion, artificial markets, non-genuine trading and
share price manipulation need to be considered. Data trends that consistently suggest share price
manipulation appear to manifest through the design of high frequency trading algorithms where
preferential order execution seems able to connect preferred sellers with preferred buyers. In
doing so the market becomes extremely compromised and decidedly unfair to all other
participants.

17

8.2.1 MANIPULATIVE TRADING TRENDS
Share price manipulation issues are particularly evident when attention is directed to the price movements
reflected by Downtick data (and for that matter, Uptick data).
Price movements and volume movements provide key trading signals that are monitored by ASX surveillance
teams in their role as market regulators. However the sort of analysis undertaken by research appears to
have been ignored as extremely anomalous data trends in respect of CuDeco have been tolerated for over
three years. The regulator was in fact alerted that something was radically wrong with the trading in CuDeco
back in December 2010, and in recent months trading anomalies have reached alarming levels.
The basis used for analysis is a statistical expectation that over time, the number of Downticks a broker is
associated with should be commensurate with the amount of selling undertaken.
There are three scenarios possible when a brokers market share of Downticks as a seller is compared to
their market share of selling, two of which suggest share price manipulation as shown in the charts below.










Similarly, there are three scenarios possible when a brokers market share of Downticks as a buyer is
compared to their market share of all buying, two of which again suggest share price manipulation.









Analysis on a daily basis over long

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Broker
A
Broker
B
Broker
C
Broker
D
Broker
E

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Broker
E
Broker
C
Broker
C
Broker
D
Broker
A
- Broker D represents an acceptable trading situation.

- Brokers A and B show DTs as sellers far in excess of
their share of selling, indicating that they have targeted
lower prices. Such behaviour repeated over and over
from one day to the next is manipulative. Period!

- Broker C sold large volumes but avoided DTs which is
trading that also attracts suspicion. Such trading
continuously occuring from one day to the next would
also be suggestive of share price manipulation.

- Note: HFT algorithms are capable of conducting sales
between preferred sellers and preferred buyers so as to
either target Downticks in price or to avoid Downticks
in price. The trading in such instances is non-genuine
and creates an artificial trading envionment.

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



Broker DT involvement as Sellers
Broker DT involvement as Buyers
- The buying by Broker B appears reasonable with DT
purchases matching the brokers buying profile across
the market.

- Broker E shows DTs as a buyer far in excess of their
share of buying across the market indicating either
fortuitous trading or manipulative activity.

- Broker C bought large volumes but somehow avoided
DTs purchases, which again suggests suspicious trading
activity.

Analysis of long term data trends suggests that the majority of trading taking place is strategic and has resulted
in an artificial or contrived market. The bulk of trading is non-genuine with algorithms continuously performing
actions designed to deliver strategic advantage but which at their core represent share price manipulation.
B
18

8.2.2.2 OCTOBER 2010 BROKER TRADING DATA
Broker trading from October 1 to October 28 2010 before M&G began their on-market buying on October
29, 2010, is summarized below. Overall market shares of brokers are based on the total value of buying &
selling while the market shares for purchases and sales are based on the volumes traded.

Market Share Selling
Market
Share
Buying Market Share NET
Broker Name Code Overall Volume Selling Volume Buying Volume
Commonwealth COMM 19.4% 5,269,901 20.0% 4,849,358 18.4% -420,543
Deutsche DMG 7.3% 1,907,593 7.2% 1,965,836 7.5% 58,243
Morgan Smith SBAR 6.9% 1,192,366 4.5% 2,376,661 9.0% 1,184,295
AIEX AIEX 6.8% 1,829,852 6.9% 1,781,563 6.8% -48,289
E-Trade ETRD 6.6% 1,773,436 6.7% 1,698,009 6.4% -75,427
UBS UBS 5.2% 1,659,800 6.3% 1,109,854 4.2% -549,946
Bell Potter BELL 4.9% 996,164 3.8% 1,609,029 6.1% 612,865
HUB24CS HUB24 4.3% 963,489 3.7% 1,247,489 4.7% 284,000
BBY BBY 4.1% 1,036,270 3.9% 1,109,515 4.2% 73,245
Macquarie Insto MACQ 3.9% 1,398,260 5.3% 630,896 2.4% -767,364
Citigroup Global CITI 3.6% 974,589 3.7% 929,302 3.5% -45,287
Instinet Nomura INST 2.9% 941,676 3.6% 589,579 2.2% -352,097
State One Stock SOSL 2.4% 634,365 2.4% 644,165 2.4% 9,800
Merrill Lynch MERL 2.2% 554,333 2.1% 612,325 2.3% 57,992
Macquarie Retail MACP 2.1% 389,072 1.5% 715,678 2.7% 326,606
Morgan Stanley MSDW 1.8% 469,774 1.8% 514,658 2.0% 44,884
Foster Stockbroking FOST 1.8% 299,972 1.1% 649,972 2.5% 350,000
Credit Suisse CSUI 1.7% 408,049 1.5% 483,668 1.8% 75,619
Goldman Sachs GS 1.6% 377,477 1.4% 490,503 1.9% 113,026
Hartleys HART 1.6% 896,000 3.4% 0 0.0% -896,000
Susquehanna SUSQ 1.3% 322,635 1.2% 351,733 1.3% 29,098
Taylor TAYL 0.9% 175,418 0.7% 325,000 1.2% 149,582
Third Party TPPM 0.9% 241,297 0.9% 227,800 0.9% -13,497
Southern Cross STHC 0.8% 205,887 0.8% 204,387 0.8% -1,500
Others (29 in Number)

4.6% 1,432,359 5.4% 1,233,054 4.7% -199,305
TOTALS

100% 26,350,034 100% 26,350,034 100% 0

The following observations compare broker data to registry data for October.
Commonwealth Securities trading only resulted in registry share flows of around 1.96 million shares
OFF and 1.84 million shares ON. It leaves more than 3 million buys and sells unaccounted for.
Etrade Securities trading resulted in registry flows of 0.78 million shares OFF and 0.74 million shares
ON leaving around 1 million buys and sells unaccounted for. A further 1 million unaccounted for
buys and sells were associated with AIEX trading.
The net buying of 1.18 million shares by Morgan Smith (SBAR) follows the processing of 10 million
placement shares on behalf of M&G through their settlement accounts. Yet only 400 thousand
shares appeared on the register in relation to client purchases.
UBS saw 2.22 million shares flow out of its broker nominee accounts and 2.19 million shares flowing
in. The activity is at odds with their net selling of over half a million shares and their settlement
accounts being responsible for 13.9% of settlement transactions despite a market share in trading
of only 5.2%. The data suggests widespread co-operation between brokers or indeed collusion.
The trading by broker Citigroup Global (974,589 sales, 929,302 buys) compares to registry
movements for Citicorp Nominees of 5.5 million shares OFF the register and 5.8 million shares ON to
the register, again showing other brokers were heavily involved with its trading but not disclosed.
The trading by broker Deutsche Bank (1.91 million sales, 1.97 million buys) compares to registry
movements of only around 400 thousand shares in and out of its broker nominee account.

The data demonstrates how difficult it is to reconcile broker trading against the entities responsible for placing the
orders and how difficult it is to quantify the impact particular entities have on the market with their buying and selling.
It also highlights why audits are necessary to properly assess suspicious trading behaviours.
19

8.2.2.3 OCTOBER 2010 DOWNTICK TRENDS (Excluding Oct 29)
The table and chart contrast the involvement of brokers with forcing Downticks in price as sellers
throughout October trading, (except for Oct 29 when M&G commenced their buying) , and also compares
broker market shares regarding all selling.










The table and chart contrast the involvement of brokers as buyers of Downticks in price throughout
October (excluding Oct 29) and also compare broker buying profiles regarding all buying.










UBS SECURITIES - DOWNTICK DATA
Iress broker data reveals that UBS cross-trades represented 64.6% of all UBS Downtick sales, and 77.6 % of
their Downtick purchases. Around 90% of UBS Downtick sales involved parcel sizes fewer than 400 shares
where the average parcel was just 125 shares.


Broker DT % % Sells
UBS 28.4% 6.3%
DMG 22.6% 7.2%
COMM 11.7% 20.0%
MSDW 4.9% 1.8%
AIEX 4.3% 6.9%
ETRD 3.8% 6.7%
CITI 2.8% 3.7%
MERL 2.0% 2.1%
BBY 1.8% 3.9%
INST 1.7% 3.6%
BELL 1.5% 3.8%
CSUI 1.5% 1.5%
MACQ 1.5% 5.3%
SBAR 1.5% 4.5%
GS 1.2% 1.4%


0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
UBS and DMG are clearly seen to be active in forcing
downward movements in price throughout October. Broker
MSDW has also shown a tendency to seek lower prices with
the small amount of selling they supplied to the market
The strong levels of DT purchases by
UBS is partly because of high levels of
UBS crossings that forced DTs.
DT Involvement as Sellers

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




Broker DT % % Buys
UBS 23.6% 4.2%
COMM 18.3% 18.4%
AIEX 6.7% 6.8%
CITI 5.9% 3.5%
DMG 5.1% 7.5%
ETRD 5.0% 6.4%
MSDW 4.2% 2.0%
INST 3.9% 2.2%
SBAR 3.1% 9.0%
MACQ 2.7% 2.4%
HUB24 2.6% 4.7%
BELL 2.6% 6.1%
MACP 2.4% 2.7%
STBG 2.2% 1.2%
BBY 1.4% 4.2%

DT Involvement as Buyers
The crossing data clearly represents strategic transactions designed to lower the share price rather than
the genuine matching of client buying and selling orders.
20

8.2.2.4 INDIVIDUAL BROKER CHARTS Sellers of Downticks in October 2010 Trading
The selling pressure supplied by brokers throughout October is summarized in the following charts. The
charts only feature the brokers where anomalism has occurred at prominent levels. With just a few brokers
featured, (i.e., UBS, DMG, MSDW, COMM and CITI) the collusive nature of trading is observed with the
rotation of prominent roles between brokers on a daily basis, with other brokers who are generally
inconspicuous with their trading, also becoming prominent on occasions. All of the trading activity of
prominent brokers is likely to be on behalf of institutional clients.
The extent of anomalies raises deep concerns about the status of the market during October and the
accuracy of price discovery. In each case, trading appears strongly focussed on reducing prices using a tag-
team approach, rather than achieving the best selling outcomes for clients.




0%
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60%
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80%
Oct
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Oct
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Oct
29
Deutsche Bank (DMG)
UBS Securities (UBS) October Trading


% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Selling activity by
UBS Securities and
Deutsche Bank
below, resulted in
highly anomalous
trading data.

Small amounts of
selling are seen to
have had a very
substantial impact
on prices.

Also, selling by
both brokers was
non-genuine in the
sense that it didnt
seek the best
possible prices
Highly anomalous numbers of DTs
corresponding to the UBS selling profile
Highly anomlaous DT numbers
given the DMG trading profiles
21

The rotation of roles as leading sellers of Downtick transactions is evidenced in the charts but also by the
list of prominent brokers each day which is provided below. The brokers have been colour coded so that
the changes in leading roles are more easily noticed.
Day Broker DT %

Day Broker DT %

Day Broker DT %
Oct-01 CITI 44.4%

Oct-12 COMM 20.9%

Oct-21 MERL 13.3%
Oct-04 DMG 30.6%

Oct-13 DMG 25.0%

Oct-22 DMG 52.9%
Oct-05 UBS 44.0%

Oct-14 DMG 26.5%

Oct-25 UBS 33.3%
Oct-06 MERL 32.6%

Oct-15 DMG 27.8%

Oct-26 UBS 40.6%
Oct-07 DMG 28.2%

Oct-18 COMM 20.5%

Oct-27 DMG 53.8%
Oct-08 UBS 56.3%

Oct-19 UBS 73.5%

Oct-28 DMG 34.5%
Oct-11 UBS 22.5%

Oct-20 COMM 30.8%

Oct-29 UBS 38.3%

Trading by Commonwealth Securities is difficult to categorize because of the mix of retail trading and
institutional trading it caters for. It was responsible for both high levels of Downtick transactions from time
to time, and high levels of selling generally. Its selling profile for October is included below. (Registry data
and Iress broker data has been used for the trading statistics listed adjacent to the chart).


Considerable selling pressure is seen to have emanated from COMM, both in terms of the volumes of
shares put up for sale, and the downward movements in price caused. Occasional brokers include CITI and
MSDW whose selling profiles are shown below.








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Oct 1 Oct 5 Oct 7 Oct
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The trading by all five brokers, but by UBS in particular, would have been instrumental in preparing the market for the
accumulation that took place by M&G in November. Certainly shareholders were frustrated by constant confusion about
the resource and the large volumes of trading churn that had constricted the market since August.

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Commonwealth Securities (COMM)


The following COMM data for
October suggests that DT
transactions are likely to reflect
institutional sales more so than
retail selling.

COMM ASX Sales: 6.1 million
Retail Sales: 1.96 million



Total Retail Sell Trades: 278

Total ASX Sell Trades: 2,652

Retail Sales by Volume: 32%
Insto. Sales by Volume: 68%
Morgan Stanley (MSDW)


0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Oct
1
Oct
5
Oct
7
Oct
8
Oct
11
Oct
12
Oct
13
Oct
14
Oct
15
Oct
18
Oct
19
Oct
22
Oct
25
Oct
26
Oct
27
Oct
28
Oct
29
Citigroup (CITI)


% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



COMM Statistics

Regular anomalous
DT sells by MSDW
22

8.2.2.5 INDIVIDUAL BROKER CHARTS Buyers of Downticks in October 2010 Trading
Brokers who were able to secure large numbers of Downtick purchases as buyers during October 2010
trading included UBS, CITI, MSDW and COMM. Their ability to secure cheap shares with only small
amounts of buying supplied to the market is quite extraordinary and it is doubtful that the trading result is
due to good luck or good trading skills. The anomalous trends are more likely the result of collaboration by
brokers and share price manipulation delivered by HFT algorithms linking preferred buyers to designated
sellers in transactions required to lower prices. Essentially the trading mechanisms employed are quite
artificial and represent non-genuine selling and buying. High volumes of DT crossings by the likes of UBS
attract similar concerns as these transactions also identify with creating an artificial market.
The buying profiles of the leading Downtick purchasers are provided below.


UBS Downtick crossings also equate to DT purchases, however the broker has still facilitated a large number
of DT sales as a buyer with sales coming from other brokers. The facilitation of Downticks as a seller and as a
buyer raises share price manipulation issues as the trading appears to be contrived, not genuine.


0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Oct
1
Oct
5
Oct
6
Oct
7
Oct
8
Oct
11
Oct
12
Oct
13
Oct
14
Oct
15
Oct
18
Oct
19
Oct
20
Oct
21
Oct
22
Oct
25
Oct
26
Oct
27
Oct
28
Oct
29
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
Oct
4
Oct
5
Oct
6
Oct
7
Oct
8
Oct
11
Oct
12
Oct
13
Oct
14
Oct
15
Oct
18
Oct
19
Oct
20
Oct
21
Oct
22
Oct
25
Oct
26
Oct
27
Oct
28
Oct
29
Citigroup Global (CITI)
UBS Securities (UBS)

% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



High levels of DT
purchases on Oct
19 resulted from
high levels of DT
crossings. Crossings
represented 78.9%
of UBS sales and
95.6% of UBS buys
Highly anomalous
DT buys by UBS
Highly anomalous
DT buys by UBS
DT buys by CITI were
consistently anomalous
23


Once again the involvement by Commonwealth Securities in being the purchaser of large numbers of
Downtick trades is confused by retail activity taking place alongside amongst institutional activity. However
the trading data for COMM suggests that institutions dominated COMM trading and that a large proportion
of Downticks would have been picked up by institutional buying, again orchestrated by algorithms.


The other dubious feature of trading is the rotation of brokers in playing leading roles as buyers of Downtick
trades. The behaviour is particularly suspect given substantial interests could be switching orders from one
broker to the next to avoid being too obvious. COMM is the clear leader although in most cases UBS is a close
second. Audits are needed to clarify the situation regarding institutional dominance and those actually
responsible. The table highlights the leading buyer of DT trades each day.
Day Broker DT %

Day Broker DT %

Day Broker DT %
Oct-01 COMM 51.9%

Oct-12 COMM 20.9%

Oct-21 CMCS 36.7%
Oct-04 COMM 33.3%

Oct-13 COMM 18.4%

Oct-22 COMM 30.0%
Oct-05 COMM 34.0%

Oct-14 UBS 20.6%

Oct-25 UBS 34.5%
Oct-06 COMM 16.3%

Oct-15 COMM 13.0%

Oct-26 UBS 44.8%
Oct-07 INST 17.6%

Oct-18 COMM 21.8%

Oct-27 COMM 41.3%
Oct-08 UBS 44.4%

Oct-19 UBS 58.1%

Oct-28 COMM 25.9%
Oct-11 COMM 23.6%

Oct-20 UBS 15.4%

Oct-29 UBS 23.5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Oct
5
Oct
6
Oct
7
Oct
8
Oct
12
Oct
13
Oct
15
Oct
18
Oct
19
Oct
20
Oct
22
Oct
25
Oct
27
Oct
28
Oct
29
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Oct
1
Oct
4
Oct
5
Oct
6
Oct
7
Oct
8
Oct
11
Oct
12
Oct
13
Oct
14
Oct
15
Oct
18
Oct
19
Oct
20
Oct
21
Oct
22
Oct
25
Oct
26
Oct
27
Oct
28
Oct
29
Morgan Stanley (MSDW)
Commonwealth Securities (COMM)

% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



Regular anomalies in regard
to DT sales by COMM
Occasional anomalous
DT buys by MSDW
24

8.2.2.6 OCTOBER AUCTION TRENDS - Selling Brokers
As detailed in ASIC Complaint 8.1 the influence of brokers during auctions as sellers, can be gauged by
creating an index that takes into account their average selling and the number of auctions they have
participated in.
E.g., SELLING INDEX = [Average Selling Rate Across All Auctions] X [Auction Attendance]
Separate indexes can be calculated for opening auctions and closing auctions.
To identify brokers who have had prominent influences, the two indexes can be combined as shown in the
table. Prominence is seen to be driven by the volume of shares supplied to auctions and the frequency of
attendance. The need to be involved in price setting on a daily basis is particularly revealing in regard to
UBS given its minor market share over all trading. More reconcilable is the dominant selling by COMM at
auctions as it was a dominant seller across all trading. The ambiguity with COMM however relates to what
extent institutions were responsible for their prominence regarding auction selling.
Oct 2010 Opening Auctions -Sellers Closing Auctions - Sellers Overall
Broker
Avg.
Sells
Attendance
Index
(AM)
Avg.
Sells
Attendance
Index
(PM)
INDEX
COMM 24.6% 12 2.95 21.0% 15 3.14 6.09
DMG 7.9% 15 1.19 14.0% 21 2.94 4.13
BELL 35.4% 1 0.35 31.9% 11 3.50 3.86
AIEX 35.4% 7 2.48 14.1% 9 1.27 3.75
UBS 10.4% 20 2.08 8.5% 19 1.61 3.69
ETRD 22.0% 6 1.32 11.5% 6 0.69 2.01
INST 47.4% 4 1.90 0.00 1.90
MSDW 6.7% 5 0.34 10.7% 14 1.50 1.83
MACQ 10.2% 6 0.61 10.1% 12 1.22 1.83
CITI 18.5% 4 0.74 8.4% 10 0.84 1.58
IMCP 8.7% 11 0.96 3.9% 14 0.55 1.50
CSUI 17.2% 5 0.86 5.6% 8 0.44 1.30
SBAR 41.7% 3 1.25 0.00 1.25
SOSL 21.5% 5 1.08 7.4% 2 0.15 1.22
BBY 30.1% 2 0.60 22.6% 2 0.45 1.05
RBSM 31.0% 1 0.31 17.7% 3 0.53 0.84
MACP 10.5% 6 0.63 3.1% 1 0.03 0.66
SUSQ 0.00 16.1% 3 0.48 0.48
GS 10.5% 1 0.11 8.6% 4 0.34 0.45
MERL 25.6% 1 0.26 2.4% 7 0.17 0.43
RBC 0.00 41.3% 1 0.41 0.41
TPPM 15.4% 1 0.15 7.9% 2 0.16 0.31

The chart compares relative performances as sellers during opening and closing auctions.



0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00

Opening Auctions

Closing Auctions

Combined



Opening Auction Prominence
COMM, AIEX, UBS, INST, DMG

Closing Auction Prominence
BELL, COMM, DMG, UBS, MSDW

INDEX VALUES
SELLING COMPARISON - Opening Auctions Versus Closing Auctions
25

8.2.2.7 OCTOBER AUCTION TRENDS - Buying Brokers
The prominent brokers as buyers throughout opening and closing auctions during October 2010 were as
folllows.
Oct 2010 Opening Auctions -Buyers Closing Auctions - Buyers Overall
Broker
Average
Buys
Attendance
Index
(AM)
Average
Buys
Attendance
Index
(PM)
INDEX
COMM 30.0% 12 3.60 17.1% 14 2.40 6.00
DMG 10.1% 16 1.62 20.7% 21 4.34 5.95
BBY 41.4% 7 2.90 32.3% 8 2.58 5.48
UBS 23.7% 11 2.61 7.5% 19 1.42 4.02
SBAR 59.5% 1 0.60 20.4% 8 1.63 2.23
ETRD 23.5% 6 1.41 12.0% 6 0.72 2.13
BELL 32.5% 6 1.95 6.6% 2 0.13 2.08
HUB24 76.7% 2 1.53 25.0% 2 0.50 2.03
AIEX 16.5% 5 0.83 19.3% 6 1.16 1.98
GS 12.7% 2 0.25 15.9% 7 1.11 1.37
MSDW 9.3% 4 0.37 8.1% 12 0.98 1.35
CITI 11.7% 6 0.70 3.7% 10 0.37 1.07
IMCP 8.4% 7 0.59 4.0% 9 0.36 0.95
SUSQ 0.00 10.9% 8 0.87 0.87
CSUI 11.2% 5 0.56 3.0% 10 0.30 0.86
SOSL 5.2% 2 0.10 10.7% 6 0.64 0.75
MERL 18.3% 3 0.55 0.00 0.55
TPPM 2.6% 2 0.05 10.6% 4 0.42 0.47
MACQ 3.1% 5 0.16 3.1% 10 0.31 0.47
MACP 13.2% 2 0.26 13.8% 1 0.14 0.40
JPM 18.3% 1 0.18 2.0% 8 0.16 0.35

The chart compares relative performances as buyers during opening and closing auctions.









The rotation of roles between leading sellers and buyers at auctions can only be properly understood by
identifying the clients involved. For example one particular entity could completely dominate price setting by
spreading strategic buying and selling across multiple brokers. Indeed, algorithms could be designed to
implement such trading strategies and without audits any manipulation taking place would be extremely
difficult to detect. The fact that auctions were controlled by a small group of brokers throughout the entire
month is however a strong signal that vested interests sought to control prices.

0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0

Opening Auctions

Closing Auctions

Combined



INDEX VALUES
Opening Auction Prominence
COMM, BBY, UBS, BELL, DMG

Closing Auction Prominence
DMG, BBY, COMM, SBAR,UBS

BUYING COMPARISON - Opening Auctions Versus Closing Auctions
26

8.2.2.8 AUCTION TRADING VERSUS NORMAL TRADING
Another indicator to gauge attempts to control auction prices is afforded by comparing auction volumes by
brokers, to the volumes put through the market in normal trading.
The tables compare selling volumes at auctions to the selling in the normal course of trading, and the
buying volumes at auctions compared to normal trading. Increases during auctions are shown highlighted.
Oct 2010 SELLING MARKET SHARES

Oct 2010 BUYING MARKET SHARES
Sell Broker Index Normal Selling Auction Selling Buy Broker Index Normal Buying Auction Buying
COMM 6.09 20.6% 18.7% COMM 6.00 18.9% 16.6%
DMG 4.13 7.2% 7.0% DMG 5.95 6.9% 14.2%
BELL 3.86 3.2% 13.0% BBY 5.48 3.4% 14.5%
AIEX 3.75 7.0% 7.4% UBS 4.02 4.0% 5.9%
UBS 3.69 6.2% 6.7% SBAR 2.23 9.0% 7.0%
ETRD 2.01 6.7% 6.7% ETRD 2.13 6.7% 4.6%
INST 1.9 3.7% 2.2% BELL 2.08 6.0% 6.6%
MSDW 1.83 1.8% 3.3% HUB24 2.03 4.7% 2.1%
MACQ 1.83 4.9% 8.8% AIEX 1.98 7.3% 3.4%
CITI 1.58 3.7% 3.3% GS 1.37 1.7% 3.3%
IMCP 1.5 0.1% 1.5% MSDW 1.35 1.9% 3.8%
CSUI 1.3 1.5% 1.7% CITI 1.07 3.7% 1.3%
SBAR 1.25 4.6% 2.4% IMCP 0.95 0.1% 1.5%
SOSL 1.22 2.4% 2.5% SUSQ 0.87 1.3% 2.8%









0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%

0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
OF NOTE:

- The increase in selling at auctions by BELL,
and to a lesser extent by MACQ.

- For BELL to be holding back shares to deal
at the auction close may create regulatory
issues as orders are meant to be placed into
the market as they are received.

- DMGs increased buying in auctions is
balanced by subtle decreases by SBAR, HUB
24 and CITI, all identifiable with institutional
trading.

- Once again if selling and/or buying by a
major entitiy is distributed across a range of
brokers, individual contributions would
mean very little. The data by itself may not
present obvious concerns but when viewed
against Downtick data and high volumes of
Wash Trades the situation needs to be
properly clarified.

- Despite over 50 brokers trading CDU
shares in October, just a few brokers have
effectively controlled pricing levels at
auctions with the entities acting from within
COMM extremely influential.

- The disingenuous nature of COMMs
dominance at auctions is borne out by the
fact that despite having access to large
volumes of buyers and sellers only 15.9% of
their auction trades represented crossings.
Normal Selling versus Auction Selling

Normal Buying versus Auction Buying

Normal Buying

Auction Buying



Normal Selling

Auction Selling



Market Share
Market
Share
27


Section 8.2.3
CuDECO TRADING ASSOCIATED WITH ACCUMULATION BY M&G
OCTOBER 29, NOVEMBER & DECEMBER 2010

The buying program by the M&G Group extended from Oct 29, 2010 to December 14, 2010. Their buying
was somewhat intermittent with days where they were completely absent from the market. The
spasmodic nature of their buying provides an opportunity to compare broker trading trends for when M&G
were active in the market to the trading trends when they didnt have a market presence.
Any concerted attempts by brokers to influence prices need to be viewed against the backdrop of strong
buying by the M&G Group. Brokers acting to restrain prices would no doubt have assisted the
accumulation program undertaken by the M&G Group. It represents an issue that needs addressing
because of the obvious connotations of share price manipulation.

28

8.2.3.1 TRADING DATA ASSOCIATED WITH M&G ACCUMULATING SHARES: Oct 29 to Dec 14, 2010
Broker trading on the days M&G were in the market accumulating shares is summarized in the table.

Market Share Selling Market Share Buying Market Share NET
Broker Name Code Overall Volume Selling Volume Buying Volume
Commonwealth COMM 17.8% 9,267,964 19.4% 7,723,377 16.2% -1,544,587
Morgan Stanley MSDW 8.6% 634,091 1.3% 7,567,419 15.8% 6,933,328
Deutsche DMG 8.3% 4,097,135 8.6% 3,808,039 8.0% -289,096
E-Trade ETRD 7.5% 3,916,403 8.2% 3,288,325 6.9% -628,078
UBS UBS 6.8% 4,280,355 9.0% 2,184,707 4.6% -2,095,648
Morgan Smith SBAR 6.0% 3,160,794 6.6% 2,546,571 5.3% -614,223
Citigroup CITI 5.8% 2,393,336 5.0% 3,145,498 6.6% 752,162
AIEX AIEX 5.0% 2,720,988 5.7% 2,106,408 4.4% -614,580
State One Stock SOSL 4.1% 1,980,467 4.1% 1,959,143 4.1% -21,324
BBY BBY 3.7% 1,965,934 4.1% 1,608,966 3.4% -356,968
HUB24CS HUB24 3.0% 1,627,278 3.4% 1,248,187 2.6% -379,091
JPMorgan JPM 2.2% 69,835 0.1% 2,065,116 4.3% 1,995,281
Third Party TPPM 2.1% 1,016,202 2.1% 976,008 2.0% -40,194
Macquarie Insto MACQ 2.0% 1,092,144 2.3% 850,885 1.8% -241,259
Macquarie Retail MACP 1.9% 1,375,394 2.9% 447,621 0.9% -927,773
Goldman Sachs GS 1.8% 943,705 2.0% 738,778 1.5% -204,927
Susquehanna SUSQ 1.8% 925,418 1.9% 809,406 1.7% -116,012
Instinet Nomura INST 1.7% 792,704 1.7% 785,886 1.6% -6,818
Merrill Lynch MERL 1.6% 864,625 1.8% 674,838 1.4% -189,787
Credit Suisse CSUI 1.4% 686,106 1.4% 631,302 1.3% -54,804
Bell Potter BELL 0.9% 668,771 1.4% 191,345 0.4% -477,426
D2MX Pty Ltd D2MX 0.7% 283,520 0.6% 370,000 0.8% 86,480
Patersons PSL 0.6% 428,527 0.9% 163,600 0.3% -264,927
CMC Markets CMCS 0.5% 342,298 0.7% 140,414 0.3% -201,884
Burrell BRLL 0.4% 208,042 0.4% 212,722 0.4% 4,680
Others (31 Others)

3.6% 2,078,396 4.2% 1,575,871 3.3% -502,525
Totals 100% 47,820,432 100% 47,820,432 100% 0

OBSERVATIONS:
The leading broker on behalf of M&G was Morgan Stanley (MSDW).
Other brokers who purchased shares on behalf of M&G were JP Morgan and Citigroup which
demonstrates a joint approach to trading. Also suggestive of a joint approach to trading by
institutional brokers was the trading churn supplied to the market by brokers such as DMG, UBS,
SBAR, and SOSL that coincided with M&Gs buying. It is likely that the joint efforts of these brokers,
and others, resulted in a compromised, artificial trading environment.
Whether a network of brokers was acting on direct instructions from M&G or interests related to
M&G, or whether they were acting informally in relation to their own trading accounts, the large
volume trading accompanying M&G buying points towards insider knowledge, collusion and a
compromised market.
A review of the register for October and November shows that a large proportion of trading by
Commonwealth Securities was for sophisticated investors, not retail clients.
In the months October and November 14.5 million sellss and 13.5 million buys in the market
translated to 7.6 million share movements OFF the register and 6.2 million share movements ON to
the register for retail investors. It leaves 6.9 million sells and 7.3 million buys unable to accounted
for. Logically, the surplus trades would be attributable to institutional investors and camouflaged
through the settlement system.
It represents a very large number of trades with the potential to maintain an artificial market
perhaps in support of the accumulation of shares by affiliates or associates.
29

8.2.3.2 DOWNTICK TRENDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACCUMULATION OF SHARES BY M&G
The table and chart contrast the involvement of brokers with forcing Downticks in price as M&G
accumulated shares, and also compares their selling profiles in the market. M&G commenced their buying
on October 29 and it extended through November and early December.











The table and chart contrast the involvement of brokers with being the purchasers of Downticks in price
during the period M&G accumulated shares, and also compares broker buying profiles.












Broker DT % % Buys
UBS 18.0% 4.6%
MSDW 15.2% 15.8%
CITI 13.8% 6.6%
COMM 11.7% 16.2%
ETRD 4.0% 6.9%
INST 3.9% 1.6%
JPM 3.9% 4.3%
SOSL 3.5% 4.1%
DMG 3.4% 8.0%
AIEX 3.1% 4.4%
MERL 3.0% 1.4%
MACQ 2.9% 1.8%
BBY 2.7% 3.4%
SBAR 2.0% 5.3%
CSUI 1.8% 1.3%


Broker DT % % Sells
UBS 28.7% 9.0%
COMM 13.8% 19.4%
DMG 8.9% 8.6%
ETRD 5.9% 8.2%
MERL 5.7% 1.8%
AIEX 4.4% 5.7%
SBAR 3.7% 6.6%
SOSL 3.1% 4.1%
CITI 3.0% 5.0%
BBY 2.4% 4.1%
INST 2.4% 1.7%
MSDW 2.2% 1.3%
GS 2.1% 2.0%
MACQ 1.8% 2.3%
MACP 1.8% 2.9%


0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
UBS was the prominent broker regarding
Downticks as M&G accumulated shares. The
downward pressure on prices would have aided
the accumulation taking place.
The strong levels of UBS Downtick
purchases were mainly the result of
large volumes of crossings put through
the market at lower prices.
DT Involvement as Sellers
DT Involvement as Buyers

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



UBS SECURITIES - DOWNTICK DATA
Cross-trades represented 40.8% of all UBS Downtick sales, and 65.1 % of their Downtick purchases. Around
87% of UBS Downtick sales involved parcel sizes fewer than 400 shares where the average parcel was just 91
shares.

The data again suggests trading to impact prices rather than genuine selling, particularly as the selling
appears to have had little regard for receiving the best returns for clients.

30

8.2.3.3 BROKERS ASSOCIATED WITH ANOMALOUS TRADING TRENDS
The following charts feature brokers whose trading while M&G accumulated shares exhibits non-genuine
trading characteristics with a focus on reducing prices rather than attempting to achieve the best returns
for clients.





0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Oct
29
Nov
1
Nov
2
Nov
5
Nov
8
Nov
9
Nov
10
Nov
11
Nov
12
Nov
15
Nov
16
Nov
17
Nov
19
Nov
22
Nov
24
Dec
2
Dec
10
Dec
13
Dec
14
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Oct
29
Nov
2
Nov
5
Nov
8
Nov
9
Nov
10
Nov
11
Nov
12
Nov
15
Nov
17
Nov
19
Nov
22
Nov
24
Dec
10
Dec
13
Dec
14
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
Oct
29
Nov
1
Nov
2
Nov
8
Nov
9
Nov
10
Nov
11
Nov
12
Nov
15
Nov
16
Nov
17
Nov
19
Nov
22
Nov
24
Dec
2
Dec
14

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Deutsche Bank (DMG)
Merrill Lynch (MERL)

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Morgan Stanley (MSDW)

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Recurring anomalies
relating to Downticks
i.e., large numbers of
DTs corresponding to
minor selling profiles
Large numbers of DTs
corresponding to minor
selling profiles by MERL
DT trades larger in number
than suggested by MSDWs
share of selling
31




8.2.3.4 BROKERS EXIHIBITING OCCASIONAL TRADING ANOMALISM




0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
Oct
29
Nov
1
Nov
2
Nov
5
Nov
8
Nov
9
Nov
10
Nov
11
Nov
15
Nov
16
Nov
17
Nov
19
Nov
22
Nov
24
Dec
2
Dec
10
Dec
13
Dec
14
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
Oct
29
Nov
1
Nov
2
Nov
5
Nov
8
Nov
9
Nov
10
Nov
12
Nov
15
Nov
16
Nov
17
Nov
22
Nov
24
Dec
2
Dec
10
Dec
13
Dec
14
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
Oct
29
Nov
2
Nov
5
Nov
8
Nov
9
Nov
10
Nov
11
Nov
12
Nov
15
Nov
16
Nov
17
Nov
19
Nov
22
Nov
24
Dec
10
Dec
13
Dec
14
Macquarie Insto (MACQ)
UBS Securities (UBS)
Morgan Smith (SBAR)

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly irregular daily
trading profiles by UBS
featuring large numbers
of DTs corresponding to
minor selling market
shares
In contrast to UBS, SBAR was
associated with daily selling
profiles where their share of
selling was well above their
share of DT trades. The
exception is November 5.

A reluctance to force DTs
equates more with genuine
selling that is seeking higher
prices than the targeting of
DTs that appears to be
evident in trading by UBS,
DMG and MERL.


MACQ trading shows
evidence of two extremes
(i.e., Nov 8 & Nov 9 and Nov
19 & Nov 22), both of which
question what trading
algorithms were programmed
to achieve on those days. The
trading patterns look to be
contrived/strategic rather
than genuine especially when
viewed in context with the
algorithms of other brokers.


32




All of the brokers that show anomalism between Downticks and selling volumes are identifiable with
institutions. Prominence regarding Downticks is again seen to rotate from one broker to the next on almost
a daily basis. It gives the impression of sharing the load as attempts are made to control trading and to
set artificial prices. The rotations would have the effect of ensuring that no single broker became too
obvious in any attempts being made to unfairly manage the market.
Even so, the trading of UBS is a standout with, for example, 65% of all Downticks on a day when they were
associated with only 6% of all selling taking place. It is an extraordinary statistic and cannot be reconciled
with normal, genuine trading. Yet it is not an aberration as their dominance regarding Downticks, despite
generally minor selling volumes, extended across October, November and December.
The large levels of selling that caused lower prices would have strongly suited the accumulation taking
place for M&G. It is also most unlikely that the targeted selling responsible for widespread trading
anomalies and providing strong support for accumulation by M&G was merely a coincidence.
Although not illustrated in the current complaint, similar anomalism is evident in brokers such as CITI, UBS
and INST in regard to Downtick purchases. A large numbers of DT purchases by brokers have generally
been achieved with relatively minor buying profiles which again represent situations completely
counterintuitive to expectations of genuine trading.
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
Nov
1
Nov
2
Nov
5
Nov
8
Nov
11
Nov
12
Nov
15
Nov
16
Nov
17
Nov
19
Nov
22
Nov
24
Dec
2
Dec
10
Dec
14
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
Nov
2
Nov
5
Nov
15
Nov
17
Nov
24
Dec
13
Goldman Sachs (GS)
Instinet (INST)
Being responsible for 29.6% of Downticks but with
only 1.6 % of all selling is difficult to explain in
terms other than share price manipulation.
Anomalous trading activity
by GS occurred on Nov 11,
Nov 12 and Nov 15


% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



33


Section 8.2.4

CuDECO TRADING DATA COINCIDING WITH M&G BEING ABSENT
FROM THE MARKET

Trading on days when M&G withdrew from the market provides further insights into the relationships
between brokers. Concerns relate to possible collusion between brokers or between trading entities acting
through a wide cross section of brokers. Trading where buying and selling related to the same interests
(but largely unidentifiable amongst institutional nominee accounts without audits) is dispersed across the
entire market, is a recipe for market dysfunction, market rigging and artificial pricing levels. Yet such
trading appears to have been the norm rather than the exception in the period October 2010 to
January2010.
Brokers acting to restrain CuDeco prices on days that M&G accumulation wasnt taking place would have
helped to shape and prepare the market in favour of further accumulation.

34

8.2.4.1 TRADING DATA COINCIDING WITH M&G WITHHOLDING THEIR BUYING
M&G were active accumulators of CuDeco stock over the period October 29 to December 14, 2010
however there were several days when they withdrew from the market. No M&G buying was declared for
November 3, 4, 18, 23, 25, 26, 29 and November 30. During December and leading up to December 14,
they were also absent from the market on December 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 and December 9.
Broker data corresponding to days when M&G were absent from the market was as follows.

Market Share Selling Market Share Buying Market Share NET
Broker Name Code Overall Volume Selling Volume Buying Volume
Commonwealth COMM 17.7% 2,145,444 18.4% 1,969,107 16.9% -176,337
Deutsche DMG 8.8% 1,146,709 9.9% 893,362 7.7% -253,347
Morgan Stanley MSDW 8.0% 322,997 2.8% 1,546,842 13.3% 1,223,845
UBS UBS 8.0% 991,973 8.5% 872,529 7.5% -119,444
AIEX AIEX 7.1% 985,452 8.5% 655,122 5.6% -330,330
Citigroup CITI 7.1% 774,435 6.7% 885,771 7.6% 111,336
E-Trade ETRD 7.1% 868,281 7.5% 779,647 6.7% -88,634
Morgan Smith SBAR 5.4% 651,258 5.6% 613,765 5.3% -37,493
Goldman Sachs GS 3.8% 400,092 3.4% 484,407 4.2% 84,315
Macquarie Insto MACQ 3.7% 456,627 3.9% 397,858 3.4% -58,769
BBY BBY 3.5% 475,205 4.1% 333,695 2.9% -141,510
Third Party TPPM 2.5% 310,068 2.7% 277,514 2.4% -32,554
Credit Suisse CSUI 2.1% 264,738 2.3% 226,094 1.9% -38,644
Merrill Lynch MERL 2.1% 194,427 1.7% 288,450 2.5% 94,023
Instinet Nomura INST 1.8% 242,681 2.1% 181,158 1.6% -61,523
Susquehanna SUSQ 1.4% 131,418 1.1% 197,581 1.7% 66,163
RBS Morgans RBSM 1.3% 185,782 1.6% 107,640 0.9% -78,142
HUB24CS HUB24 1.2% 158,459 1.4% 124,100 1.1% -34,359
Macquarie Retail MACP 1.2% 93,729 0.8% 182,812 1.6% 89,083
Bell Potter BELL 0.7% 80,309 0.7% 89,293 0.8% 8,984
State One Stock SOSL 0.7% 80,548 0.7% 91,500 0.8% 10,952
Stonebridge STBG 0.7% 92,080 0.8% 82,033 0.7% -10,047
CMC Markets CMCS 0.6% 74,031 0.6% 71,000 0.6% -3,031
D2MX Pty Ltd D2MX 0.5% 0 0.0% 105,000 0.9% 105,000
JPMorgan JPM 0.5% 63,527 0.5% 52,932 0.5% -10,595
Others (25 Others) 2.4% 440,295 3.8% 121,353 0.9% -318,942
Totals 99.9% 11,630,565 100.1% 11,630,565 100.0% 0

OBSERVATIONS
Trading volumes were well below the levels that occurred when M&G were active in the market.
Morgan Stanley (MSDW) continued to be a strong net buyer of stock even though their major client had
withdrawn from the market. It is possible that they were accumulating stock ready to pass on to M&G.
The above volumes total 11.63 million shares which compares to 47.8 million shares trading on the days
when M&G accumulated stock. With MSDW the main buyer for M&G it doesnt follow that their standing
in the market as a net buyer should cause all other brokers to go into a trading frenzy. The situation
demonstrates the collusive nature of trading and an artificial market environment created in support of
accumulation.
Nearly all other brokers were net sellers with back and forth trading churn the major feature of trading.
The back and forth trading churn is also an indicator of artificial trading with many transactions netted
out and so not impacting the register.
The result has generally been a capped/static share price that drifted lower through short selling and an
absence of M&G buying.
35

8.2.4.2 DOWNTICK TRENDS CORRESPONDING TO M&G BEING ABSENT FROM THE MARKET
The table and chart compares broker Downtick involvements and broker selling involvements
corresponding to the days when M&G were absent from the market for CuDeco shares.










The table and chart below contrast the involvements of brokers with being the purchasers of Downticks in
price during the period M&G were absent from the market and also compares broker buying profiles..










UBS SECURITIES - DOWNTICK DATA
Cross-trades represented 55.2% of all UBS Downtick sales, and 58.2 % of their Downtick purchases.
Around 93% of UBS Downtick sales involved trades of fewer than 400 shares where the average parcel was
just 65 shares. UBS are again to be seen as active in targeting lower prices and not seeking to achieve the
maximum returns for sales.

Broker DT % % Buys
UBS 20.5% 7.5%
CITI 13.1% 7.6%
COMM 12.9% 16.9%
MSDW 12.6% 13.3%
MACQ 4.9% 3.4%
DMG 4.4% 7.7%
MERL 4.1% 2.5%
GS 4.0% 4.2%
ETRD 3.7% 6.7%
AIEX 3.3% 5.6%
BBY 2.8% 2.9%
SBAR 2.7% 5.3%
CSUI 2.6% 1.9%


Broker DT % % Sells
DMG 22.4% 9.9%
UBS 21.7% 8.5%
COMM 12.4% 18.4%
MERL 6.5% 1.7%
ETRD 4.4% 7.5%
AIEX 4.3% 8.5%
GS 3.6% 3.4%
MACQ 3.0% 3.9%
CITI 2.7% 6.7%
INST 2.5% 2.1%
SBAR 2.4% 5.6%
MSDW 2.1% 2.8%
BBY 1.8% 4.1%
TPPM 1.2% 2.7%
CSUI 1.0% 2.3%


0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
UBS was joined by DMG as the prominent brokers
regarding Downticks as M&G withdrew from the market.
The strong levels of UBS Downtick purchases was
again the result of large volumes of small
crossings that served to reduce prices.
Anomalous trend
by MERL as well.
DT Involvement as Buyers
DT Involvement as Sellers

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



36

8.2.4.3 BROKERS ASSOCIATED WITH ANOMALOUS TRADING TRENDS
The following charts feature brokers whose trading on the days that M&G were absent from the market
exhibits non-genuine trading characteristics with a focus on reducing prices rather than attempting to
achieve the best returns for clients.







0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Nov
3
Nov
4
Nov
18
Nov
23
Nov
25
Nov
26
Nov
29
Nov
30
Dec
1
Dec
3
Dec
6
Dec
7
Dec
8
Dec
9
0%
5%
10%
15%
Nov
3
Nov
4
Nov
18
Nov
23
Nov
25
Nov
26
Nov
29
Nov
30
Dec
1
Dec
6
Dec
7
Dec
8
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Nov
3
Nov
4
Nov
18
Nov
23
Nov
25
Nov
26
Nov
29
Nov
30
Dec
1
Dec
3
Dec
7
Dec
8
Dec
9
Deutsche Bank (DMG)
Goldman Sachs (GS)

0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
Dec
3
Dec
6
Dec
9
Nov
18
Nov
23
Nov
26
Nov
29
Nov
3
Nov
30
Nov
4
Morgan Stanley (MSDW)

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Dec
1
Dec
6
Dec
7
Dec
8
Dec
9
Nov
18
Nov
23
Nov
26
Nov
29
Nov
3
Nov
30
Nov
4
Merill Lynch (MERL)

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



UBS Securities (UBS)
Trading again featured a rotation of roles on a daily basis but with the overall effect of providing downward pressure to
prices while M&G were absent from the market (Refer Section 8.2.8.8.7). A clearer picture would emerge from
identifying the clients that brokers were acting for. The same degree of anomalism is also present in the charts of
brokers who were leading buyers of Downticks.

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Trading trends unable to be explained
from a perspective of genuine trading
37


Section 8.2.5

DECEMBER TRADING DATA AFTER THE M&G GROUP HAD
COMPLETED THEIR BUYING

38

8.2.5.1 DECEMBER TRADING DATA FOLLOWING M&G COMPLETING THEIR BUYING
M&G completed their buying requirements on December 14, 2010. Broker trading data for CuDeco shares
on the remaining days in December was as follows.

Market Share Selling Market Share Buying Market Share NET
Broker Name Code Overall Volume Selling Volume Buying Volume
Commonwealth COMM 15.4% 710,992 16.2% 641,322 14.6% -69,670
UBS UBS 10.2% 519,809 11.9% 375,178 8.6% -144,631
Deutsche DMG 9.7% 446,111 10.2% 405,125 9.2% -40,986
Citigroup CITI 6.7% 264,650 6.0% 319,900 7.3% 55,250
AIEX AIEX 5.8% 297,151 6.8% 211,265 4.8% -85,886
Goldman Sachs GS 5.8% 258,661 5.9% 251,123 5.7% -7,538
Macquarie Insto MACQ 5.5% 142,092 3.2% 343,820 7.8% 201,728
Merrill Lynch MERL 5.2% 129,552 3.0% 330,190 7.5% 200,638
BBY BBY 4.8% 204,358 4.7% 218,219 5.0% 13,861
Credit Suisse CSUI 4.8% 93,963 2.1% 324,538 7.4% 230,575
E-Trade ETRD 4.0% 172,690 3.9% 177,920 4.1% 5,230
Morgan Stanley MSDW 3.7% 101,895 2.3% 226,640 5.2% 124,745
Instinet Nomura INST 2.6% 70,615 1.6% 156,986 3.6% 86,371
Morgan Smith SBAR 2.4% 197,704 4.5% 10,940 0.2% -186,764
Patersons PSL 1.7% 146,572 3.3% 0 0.0% -146,572
JPMorgan JPM 1.6% 51,104 1.2% 85,953 2.0% 34,849
Susquehanna SUSQ 1.4% 61,497 1.4% 62,048 1.4% 551
ITG Aust. ITG 1.1% 0 0.0% 94,117 2.1% 94,117
Macquarie Retail MACP 0.9% 71,200 1.6% 5,000 0.1% -66,200
Pershing PERSH 0.8% 71,752 1.6% 0 0.0% -71,752
Third Party TPPM 0.7% 30,626 0.7% 33,815 0.8% 3,189
CMC Markets CMCS 0.6% 34,450 0.8% 19,729 0.5% -14,721
Ord Minnett ORDS 0.6% 56,529 1.3% 0 0.0% -56,529
State One Stock SOSL 0.5% 22,000 0.5% 20,000 0.5% -2,000
IMC Pacific IMCP 0.4% 5,814 0.1% 25,941 0.6% 20,127
Others (22 Others) 3.1% 221,836 5.0% 43,854 1.0% -177,982
Totals 100.0% 4,383,623 100% 4,383,623 100.0% 0

OBSERVATIONS
CuDeco trading volumes dropped off remarkably as soon as M&G ceased their buying, although the
Christmas period would also have helped to reduce trading levels.
Trading churn was again the major feature of trading. The back and forth trading churn is also an
indicator of non-genuine trading and results in artificial prices. It was also responsible for a capped,
generally static share price through the remainder of December.
Prices closed at $4.64 on December 14 when M&G completed its buying, then fell to $4.40 the next
day before finishing at $4.59 in light trade at the end of December. The pricing levels further
highlight the artificial market that was created by dubious/illegal trading behaviours back on August
18. Nothing had changed materially regarding the company between Aug 18 and Dec 31, yet the
share price had recovered its losses in going from $4.62 on August 16 at the time of a trading halt,
to $2.45 on August 18 after a resouce upgrade, and then back to $4.55 on December 31.
A major finding of research across a range of ASX companies is the acceptance of manipulative
trading activity activity by the regulator (or a failure to recognize manipulative activity) on occasions
where news makes share price volatility somehow reasonable. The approach ignores an assessment
of the actual trading taking place. The approach also tends to ignore situations where significant
news fails to have an impact, and where illegal price capping is often responsible for subdued market
reactions. Section 10 of ASIC Complaint 8.1 <Reference LINK> amply demonstrates the illegal trading
behaviours that can be used to dampen significant company news.
39

8.2.5.2 DECEMBER DOWNTICK TRENDS FOLLOWING M&G COMPLETING THEIR BUYING
The table and chart compares broker Downtick involvements and selling involvements following M&G
withdrawing from the market. The period extends from December 15 to December 31, 2010.










The table and chart below contrast the involvements of brokers with being the purchasers of Downticks in
price after M&G ceased buying, and also compare broker buying profiles.










UBS SECURITIES - DOWNTICK DATA
Cross-trades represented 41.2% of all UBS Downtick sales, and 41.1.2 % of their Downtick purchases.
Around 87% of UBS Downtick sales involved trades of fewer than 400 shares where the average parcel was
just 67 shares. Cross-trades, like short selling appear to be key trading mechanisms that in the hands of
unscrupulous traders, can be used to force prices lower.

Broker DT % % Buys
UBS 23.1% 8.6%
CITI 12.5% 7.3%
COMM 12.2% 14.6%
CSUI 10.8% 7.4%
DMG 8.3% 9.2%
BBY 7.1% 5.0%
AIEX 4.3% 4.8%
MACQ 4.0% 7.8%
MSDW 3.9% 5.2%
MERL 3.5% 7.5%
ITG 2.4% 2.1%
ETRD 2.2% 4.1%
INST 1.2% 3.6%
GS 1.0% 5.7%


Broker DT % % Sells
DMG 29.9% 10.2%
UBS 23.0% 11.9%
MERL 13.0% 3.0%
COMM 7.5% 16.2%
CSUI 3.0% 2.1%
GS 2.6% 5.9%
ETRD 2.3% 3.9%
MACQ 2.3% 3.2%
AIEX 2.3% 6.8%
CITI 1.7% 6.0%
MACP 1.5% 1.6%
PSL 1.5% 3.3%
BBY 1.4% 4.7%
SBAR 1.3% 4.5%
MSDW 0.8% 2.3%

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
UBS and DMG were again the prominent brokers regarding
Downticks following the completion of M&G buying. MERLs
trading was similarly anomalous but to a lesser extent.
The strong levels of UBS Downtick purchases was
again the result of large volumes of small
crossings that resulted in reduced prices.
DT Involvement as Buyers
DT Involvement as Sellers

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



40

8.2.5.3 BROKERS ASSOCIATED WITH ANOMALOUS TRADING TRENDS
The following charts feature brokers whose trading after M&G ceased their buying in CuDeco exhibits non-
genuine trading characteristics, with a focus on reducing prices, rather than attempting to achieve the best
returns for clients. The daily rotations as prominent DT sellers by institutional brokers again suggests
collusion.





0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
Dec
15
Dec
16
Dec
17
Dec
20
Dec
21
Dec
22
Dec
24
Dec
29
Dec
30

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Dec
15
Dec
16
Dec
17
Dec
20
Dec
21
Dec
22
Dec
23
Dec
24
Dec
29
Dec
30
Dec
31

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Dec
15
Dec
16
Dec
17
Dec
20
Dec
22
Dec
23
Dec
29
Dec
30
UBS Securities (UBS)
Merrill Lynch (MERL)


0%
5%
10%
15%
Dec
15
Dec
16
Dec
17
Dec
21
Dec
22
Dec
23
Dec
29
Dec
31
Macquarie Insto (MACQ)

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Dec
16
Dec
17
Dec
20
Dec
22
Dec
23
Dec
30
Dec
31


0%
5%
10%
15%
Dec
15
Dec
16
Dec
17
Dec
20
Dec
22
Dec
24
Dec
29
Dec
30
Credit Suisse (CSUI) Citigroup Global (CITI)

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly anomalous
trading patterns
are unable to be
explained in
terms of genuine
trading.
Days where
reasonable levels
of selling has
avoided Downtick
trades (e.g., Dec
16) adds further
suspicion to UBS
trading activity
Deutsche Bank (DMG)
41


Section 8.2.6
CuDECO TRADING DATA FOR JANUARY
The months of September and October saw high volumes of trading which was characterized by the
churning of institutional holdings. The trading churn was accompanied by prices being held in check at
levels imposed after the August 18 resource announcement; the catalyst for a dramatic slump in the share
price.
Trading during November and December reflected the strong buying campaign conducted for M&G which
saw prices recapture their pre-August 18 levels, however trading in January with M&G absent from the
market, saw prices retreat substantially on low volumes.
The resource announcement paved the way for M&G to build a major stake in the company, firstly through
a placement from the company, and then through on-market buying. Trading churn was the distinguishing
feature of trading from immediately following the ill-fated Aug 18 resource upgrade announcement to
immediately M&G completed their buying campaign.
Trading then became listless with prices drifting in response to continued capping behaviours accompanied
by short selling.
It is extremely unlikely that the events were just random market fluctuations in response to confusing
news back in August 2010. The anomalous data trends accompanying all trading suggest a highly organised
campaign by sophisticated investors that created an extremely compromised, artificial market for the
entire period reviewed.

42

8.2.6.1 JANUARY TRADING DATA FOLLOWING M&G COMPLETING THEIR BUYING
M&G completed their buying requirements on Dec 14, 2010 which saw reduced volumes traded for the
remainder of December and through January 2011. Broker trading data for January 2011 was as follows.


Market Share Selling Market Share Buying Market Share NET
Broker Code Overall Volume Selling Volume Buying Volume
Commonwealth COMM 18.2% 1,284,201 17.1% 1,419,192 18.9% 134,991
UBS UBS 8.9% 705,870 9.4% 613,138 8.2% -92,732
Citigroup CITI 8.0% 589,943 7.9% 594,697 7.9% 4,754
E-Trade ETRD 7.7% 717,305 9.6% 430,646 5.7% -286,659
AIEX AIEX 6.5% 476,906 6.4% 507,355 6.8% 30,449
Deutsche DMG 6.5% 401,381 5.4% 559,221 7.5% 157,840
Goldman Sachs GS 5.6% 397,043 5.3% 438,957 5.9% 41,914
Morgan Smith SBAR 4.5% 459,082 6.1% 222,452 3.0% -236,630
Credit Suisse CSUI 4.3% 318,626 4.3% 315,770 4.2% -2,856
Macquarie Insto MACQ 3.5% 225,595 3.0% 303,823 4.1% 78,228
Merrill Lynch MERL 3.2% 226,256 3.0% 255,568 3.4% 29,312
Morgan Stanley MSDW 2.8% 131,699 1.8% 278,197 3.7% 146,498
BBY BBY 2.8% 246,266 3.3% 163,528 2.2% -82,738
Instinet Nomura INST 2.6% 146,147 2.0% 235,944 3.1% 89,797
Bell Potter BELL 2.3% 190,191 2.5% 154,267 2.1% -35,924
Susquehanna SUSQ 2.0% 150,250 2.0% 157,489 2.1% 7,239
Macquarie Retail MACP 1.8% 100,081 1.3% 164,703 2.2% 64,622
JPMorgan JPM 1.5% 44,986 0.6% 180,736 2.4% 135,750
Third Party TPPM 1.0% 76,680 1.0% 69,929 0.9% -6,751
BTIG BTIG 0.9% 160,704 2.1% 0 0.0% -160,704
Patersons PSL 0.7% 102,000 1.4% 0 0.0% -102,000
Shaw SHAW 0.7% 6,000 0.1% 109,000 1.5% 103,000
Ord Minnett ORDS 0.5% 26,700 0.4% 53,000 0.7% 26,300
RBS Morgans RBSM 0.5% 52,722 0.7% 22,112 0.3% -30,610
CMC Markets CMCS 0.4% 35,400 0.5% 29,789 0.4% -5,611
Others (24) 2.9% 222,560 2.9% 215,081 2.8% -7,479
TOTALS 100% 7,494,594 100% 7,494,594 100% 0

OBSERVATIONS
Broker volumes were substantially reduced following M&G withdrawing from the market, with only
7.5 million shares traded for the entire month. The contrast between the month of January and say
Oct 29 is extremely revealing. M&G commenced their buying on Oct 29 with 5.7 million shares
trading on a single day.
The data demonstrates a contrived, artificial market accompanying M&G accumulation where a
large number of brokers and large volumes of churn trades were used to create an artificial market
in support of accumulation.
Commonwealth Securities data again reflects trading by sophisticated investors as well as retail
activity. Of the 1.3 million sells and 1.4 million buys by COMM during January the register reveals
around 630,000 sells and 680,000 buys associated with retail activity.
Share prices retreated from $4.54 on Jan 1 to $3.38 on Jan 31


43

8.2.6.2 DOWNTICK TRENDS DURING JANUARY 2011
The table and chart compare broker Downtick involvements and broker selling involvements during
January 2011. M&G had no presence in the market having completed their buying in December 2010.










The table and chart below contrast the involvement of brokers with being the purchases of Downticks in
price during January 2011 and also compares broker buying profiles.










UBS SECURITIES - DOWNTICK DATA
UBS Cross-trades reduced considerably in January 2011 to only 18.9% of all Downtick sales, and 15.8% % of
their Downtick purchases. Around 86% of all UBS Downtick sales still involved trades of fewer than 400
shares but the average parcel for these trades fell to just 38 shares. The data clearly suggests trading
designed to lower prices rather than genuine selling.


Broker DT % % Buys
UBS 19.1% 8.2%
COMM 16.4% 18.9%
CITI 13.2% 7.9%
MSDW 7.7% 3.7%
AIEX 5.5% 6.8%
DMG 5.2% 7.5%
CSUI 4.9% 4.2%
ETRD 3.9% 5.7%
MACQ 3.9% 4.1%
GS 3.3% 5.9%
TPPM 2.4% 0.9%
INST 2.4% 3.1%
MERL 2.0% 3.4%
BELL 1.8% 2.1%


Broker DT % % Sells
UBS 16.0% 9.4%
COMM 13.9% 17.1%
DMG 12.4% 5.4%
CSUI 9.8% 4.3%
MERL 6.5% 3.0%
CITI 6.3% 7.9%
ETRD 6.3% 9.6%
AIEX 4.4% 6.4%
SBAR 3.5% 6.1%
MACQ 3.4% 3.0%
GS 2.3% 5.3%
BBY 2.0% 3.3%
MSDW 1.5% 1.8%
BELL 1.3% 2.5%
MACP 1.3% 1.3%
IMCP 1.1% 0.3%


0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
UBS, DMG, CSUI and MERL all exhibited anomalous
selling activity throughout January where forcing prices
lower appeared to be a higher priority than selling to
receive maximum returns.
The strong levels of UBS Downtick purchases was
again the result of large volumes of small
crossings that served to reduce prices.
CITI & MSDW showed
support for DTs as buyers
DT Involvement as Sellers
DT Involvement as Buyers

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



44

8.2.6.3.1 BROKERS ASSOCIATED WITH ANOMALOUS TRADING TRENDS
The following charts feature brokers whose trading exhibited non-genuine trading characteristics with a
focus on reducing prices rather than attempting to achieve the best returns for clients.






0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Jan
4
Jan
5
Jan
7
Jan
10
Jan
11
Jan
12
Jan
14
Jan
17
Jan
18
Jan
19
Jan
20
Jan
25
Jan
27
Jan
28
Jan
31
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Jan
4
Jan
5
Jan
6
Jan
7
Jan
11
Jan
12
Jan
13
Jan
14
Jan
17
Jan
18
Jan
19
Jan
20
Jan
21
Jan
24
Jan
25
Jan
27
Jan
28
Jan
31
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Jan
4
Jan
5
Jan
6
Jan
7
Jan
10
Jan
11
Jan
12
Jan
13
Jan
14
Jan
17
Jan
18
Jan
20
Jan
21
Jan
24
Jan
25
Jan
27
Jan
28
Jan
31
UBS Securities (DMG)
Deutsche Bank (DMG)
Credit Suisse (CSUI)

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




Trading throughout January
showed the same anomalous
trading patterns by the same
group of brokers as previous
trading periods.
Share price manipulation is
more plausible when
assessing trading rather than
attempting to apply a mantle
of genuine trading.
Brokers consistently sold the
stock down to receive the
lowest returns on sales and
alternated from one day to
the next in sharing prominent
roles as sellers.
The trading activity suggests
collusion with strategies
implemented to both limit
price increases and to force
prices lower - Judging by the
share price slide in January
the strategies were quite
successful.
COMMENTS
45

8.2.6.3.2 LESS PROMINENT BROKERS





0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
Jan
5
Jan
7
Jan
11
Jan
12
Jan
14
Jan
19
Jan
20
Jan
21
Jan
27
Jan
28
Jan
31
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Jan
4
Jan
5
Jan
7
Jan
10
Jan
11
Jan
12
Jan
13
Jan
18
Jan
19
Jan
21
Jan
24
Jan
25
Jan
27
Jan
28
Jan
31
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
Jan
4
Jan
6
Jan
7
Jan
10
Jan
12
Jan
17
Jan
18
Jan
21
Jan
24
Jan
28
Jan
31
Macquarie Insto (MACQ)
Merrill Lynch (MERL)
Morgan Stanley (MSDW)
The rotation of brokers as prominent
sellers as far as Downticks in price are
concerned is also seen to include brokers
such as Macquarie, Merrill Lynch and
Morgan Stanley.
Commonwealth Securities is also
responsible for large quantities of
Downticks although it is not known what
proportion relates to retail trades and
what proportion relates to institutions,
where targeted or manipulative selling
might be an issue.
The rotation of brokers as leading sellers
of Downticks is evident in the list of
leading daily sellers that follows.
Day Broker DTs %
Jan-04 DMG 41.7%
Jan-05 UBSW 32.3%
Jan-06 CITI 15.4%
Jan-07 UBSW 24.4%
Jan-10 COMM 31.0%
Jan-11 COMM 23.5%
Jan-12 DMG 19.2%
Jan-13 DMG 23.1%
Jan-14 UBSW 28.6%
Jan-17 UBSW 34.6%
Jan-18 UBSW 57.6%
Jan-19 CITI 19.0%
Jan-20 UBSW 12.1%
Jan-21 MERL 36.0%
Jan-24 MERL 36.0%
Jan-25 DMG 32.3%
Jan-27 DMG 27.3%
Jan-28 UBSW 24.0%
Jan-31 COMM 23.7%

46


Section 8.2.7

AUCTION TRENDS DURING NOVEMBER, DECEMBER, 2010
and JANUARY 2011

47

8.2.7.1.1 AUCTION TRENDS FOR NOVEMBER Leading Selling Brokers
The brokers with the leading selling influences on CuDeco prices at auctions through November are
summarized below. The standout feature is the dominance by Commonwealth Securities. The entities
responsible for COMMs dominant profile require identification, as its status as a retail broker may have
been used to hide orchestrated institutional share price manipulation.
Nov 2010 Opening Auctions -Sellers Closing Auctions - Sellers Overall
Broker
Avg.
Sells
Attendance
Index
(AM)
Avg.
Sells
Attendance
Index
(PM)
INDEX
COMM 35.5% 19 6.7393 25.2% 20 5.038 11.8
UBS 12.3% 21 2.5746 10.5% 17 1.7782 4.4
DMG 8.4% 17 1.4297 13.1% 22 2.8864 4.3
BBY 20.9% 7 1.4623 18.9% 12 2.2728 3.7
ETRD 16.1% 15 2.4165 7.2% 8 0.5784 3.0
AIEX 14.0% 10 1.402 9.8% 8 0.7808 2.2
CSUI 18.7% 8 1.496 2.0% 13 0.2535 1.7
MSDW 1.2% 8 0.0992 8.1% 17 1.3838 1.5
SBAR 17.6% 4 0.7032 16.1% 4 0.644 1.3
TPPM 5.5% 4 0.218 26.1% 4 1.0452 1.3
MACQ 4.0% 7 0.2793 7.3% 11 0.7975 1.1
CITI 5.0% 8 0.4 4.7% 13 0.6045 1.0
D2MX 11.4% 1 0.114 33.8% 2 0.676 0.8
MACP 10.5% 4 0.4192 20.4% 2 0.408 0.8
RBSM - - 0 71.8% 1 0.718 0.7
BELL 11.2% 2 0.224 17.3% 2 0.345 0.6
IMCP 4.8% 11 0.5324 0.8% 13 0.1014 0.6
GS 2.2% 3 0.0669 7.0% 6 0.4188 0.5
INST 11.5% 3 0.3459 2.7% 1 0.027 0.4
HUB24 4.5% 2 0.09 12.4% 2 0.248 0.3
MERL 1.2% 8 0.0944 3.6% 6 0.213 0.3
NAL 15.7% 1 0.157 11.9% 1 0.119 0.3

The chart compares broker selling influences in opening and closing auctions during November 2010.

0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14

Opening Auctions

Closing Auctions

Combined


Index Values
A level of dominance that
requires investigation
48

8.2.7.1.2 AUCTION TRENDS FOR NOVEMBER Leading Buying Brokers
Buying throughout auctions in November was distributed more evenly than the selling, with Morgan
Stanley the leading broker. MSDWs leading role is expected due to their strong buying for M&G
throughout the month. Further suspicion about Commonwealth Securities activity arises from their low
level of crossings (16.3%) during auctions despite having access to large volumes of buying and selling.

Nov 2010 Opening Auctions -Buyers Closing Auctions - Buyers Overall
Broker
Average
Buys
Attendance
Index
(AM)
Average
Buys
Attendance
Index
(PM)
INDEX
MSDW 18.4% 9 1.7 28.1% 18 5.1 6.7
COMM 24.4% 18 4.4 15.2% 12 1.8 6.2
BBY 42.4% 9 3.8 23.2% 3 0.7 4.5
DMG 7.2% 13 0.9 11.5% 22 2.5 3.5
CITI 11.9% 10 1.2 11.5% 13 1.5 2.7
JPM 22.3% 4 0.9 8.4% 14 1.2 2.1
UBS 4.6% 14 0.6 8.1% 18 1.5 2.1
ETRD 10.5% 10 1.1 9.4% 10 0.9 2
SBAR 26.3% 4 1.1 9.6% 8 0.8 1.8
HUB24 32.4% 4 1.3 11.4% 3 0.3 1.6
MERL 6.3% 11 0.7 13.3% 6 0.8 1.5
D2MX - - 0 67.8% 2 1.4 1.4
AIEX 12.8% 7 0.9 5.9% 7 0.4 1.3
CSUI 8.8% 10 0.9 5.9% 6 0.4 1.2
GS 3.6% 4 0.1 6.7% 12 0.8 1
MACQ 12.9% 7 0.9 - - 0 0.9
MACP 3.9% 4 0.2 7.4% 9 0.7 0.8
SUSQ - - 0 12.3% 5 0.6 0.6
SOSL 7.1% 4 0.3 2.8% 3 0.1 0.4
IMCP 2.3% 8 0.2 1.6% 8 0.1 0.3
BELL 16.4% 1 0.2 - - 0 0.2

The chart compares November buying activity during opening and closing auctions.

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Dominant buying by MSDW, COMM, BBY and DMG, and dominant selling
by COMM, UBS, DMG and BBY may effectively involve Wash Trades if the
same entities are spreading their orders across all brokers.

Opening Auctions

Closing Auctions

Combined



Index Values
49

8.2.7.2.1 AUCTION TRENDS FOR DECEMBER Leading Selling Brokers
The brokers with the leading selling influences at auctions through December are summarized below.
Commonwealth Securities is once again seen to be the most influential broker as a seller during auctions,
closely followed by UBS Securities and Deutsche Bank. The high attendance rates of the 3 brokers
generally, and by Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs in closing auctions, gives further cause for concern. The
situation can only be clarified through audits where the focus needs to be on identifying those responsible
for controlling auctions and on whose behalf they were acting.

Dec 2010 Opening Auctions -Sellers Closing Auctions - Sellers Overall
Broker
Avg.
Sells
Attendance
Index
(AM)
Avg.
Sells
Attendance
Index
(PM)
INDEX
COMM 34.20% 12 4.1 24.70% 13 3.2 7.3
UBS 11.90% 13 1.5 22.20% 19 4.2 5.8
BBY 42.30% 9 3.8 19.70% 8 1.6 5.4
DMG 19.20% 9 1.7 11.50% 21 2.4 4.1
AIEX 27.90% 6 1.7 14.20% 7 1 2.7
ETRD 38.10% 6 2.3 4.40% 8 0.4 2.6
CSUI 32.10% 6 1.9 4.70% 11 0.5 2.4
GS - - 0 15.70% 11 1.7 1.7
MSDW 0.50% 1 0 17.90% 9 1.6 1.6
CITI 11.50% 4 0.5 10.90% 8 0.9 1.3
SBAR 11.50% 3 0.3 13.20% 6 0.8 1.1
MERL 2.70% 8 0.2 9.90% 7 0.7 0.9
WILS 57.20% 1 0.6 1.00% 1 0 0.6
JPM 33.00% 1 0.3 6.10% 4 0.2 0.6
TPPM 12.00% 4 0.5 9.20% 1 0.1 0.6
MACQ 5.50% 3 0.2 5.30% 6 0.3 0.5
MACP 21.60% 1 0.2 24.70% 1 0.2 0.5
IMCP 1.80% 4 0.1 4.50% 8 0.4 0.4
CMCS 12.20% 3 0.4 - - 0 0.4
ORDS 28.20% 1 0.3 - - 0 0.3
MINC - - 0 24.10% 1 0.2 0.2
PERSH - - 0 10.60% 2 0.2 0.2
The chart compares broker selling influences across opening and closing auctions during December 2010.


0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Opening Auctions

Closing Auctions

Combined


Index Values
OF NOTE:
- The leading selling
influences by COMM, UBS,
BBY and DMG over all other
brokers
- The dominance by UBS in
closing auctions
- The dominance by BBY in
closing auctions as well as
the influences of GS and
MSDW in closing auctions
- The variations in CSUI
trading patterns, with large
sales and fewer appearances
in opening auctions
contrasting with small sales
and frequent appearances in
closing auctions.
50

8.2.7.2.2 AUCTION TRENDS FOR DECEMBER Leading Buying Brokers
Buying throughout auctions in December again saw Morgan Stanley as the leading buying broker and by a
wider margin than during November. UBS, COMM and DMG again had significant involvements as well.

Nov 2010 Opening Auctions -Buyers Closing Auctions - Buyers Overall
Broker
Average
Buys
Attendance
Index
(AM)
Average
Buys
Attendance
Index
(PM)
INDEX
MSDW 29.10% 11 3.2 33.70% 16 5.4 8.6
UBS 17.00% 16 2.7 14.70% 20 2.9 5.7
COMM 33.00% 11 3.6 11.10% 9 1 4.6
DMG 12.10% 12 1.5 9.50% 21 2 3.4
BBY 44.10% 5 2.2 18.00% 3 0.5 2.7
MACQ 17.20% 7 1.2 15.00% 8 1.2 2.4
CSUI 16.40% 8 1.3 6.70% 13 0.9 2.2
ETRD 21.60% 8 1.7 5.40% 6 0.3 2.1
CITI 8.70% 11 1 7.40% 14 1 2
MERL 6.30% 8 0.5 17.40% 5 0.9 1.4
INST 27.50% 1 0.3 43.00% 2 0.9 1.1
AIEX 17.80% 3 0.5 9.30% 4 0.4 0.9
TPPM 4.50% 3 0.1 21.80% 3 0.7 0.8
JPM - - 0 7.40% 10 0.7 0.7
IMCP 3.60% 7 0.3 3.20% 15 0.5 0.7
SBAR 8.90% 1 0.1 16.70% 2 0.3 0.4
CMCS 1.40% 1 0 39.80% 1 0.4 0.4
SUSQ - - 0 13.70% 3 0.4 0.4
PERSH 2.50% 1 0 33.80% 1 0.3 0.4
GS 9.10% 1 0.1 3.30% 7 0.2 0.3
HUB24 22.50% 1 0.2 - - 0 0.2

The chart compares December buying activity by brokers during opening and closing auctions but once
again it is the entities responsible for the transactions that need identification. Buying and selling by much
the same the same interests, across all leading buying and selling brokers, would mean that the market
was interminably compromised.

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Opening Auctions

Closing Auctions

Combined


Index Values
51

8.2.7.3 AUCTION ACTIVITY VERSUS NORMAL TRADING November and December 2010
The charts compare the selling (and buying) profiles of brokers in normal trading during November and
December to the selling (and buying) profiles of brokers during auctions. Market shares are based on the
volumes of sales in normal trading (or in auctions) compared to the total volumes of sales in normal
trading (or in auctions). Increases in trading activity during auctions may be suggesting manipulative
activity. Such instances have been highlighted.
As a general trend with CuDeco trading, reductions in activity by institutional brokers during auctions are
generally compensated by increases by other institutional brokers. However it is the identity of broker
clients that hold the key to assessing any manipulative behaviour; particularly if the influence of a major
trading entity happens to be dispersed across a wide range of brokers. Wide ranging anomalies regarding
CuDeco require such assessments to be made in order to properly assess what has taken place.

Nov 2010

SELLING MARKET SHARES

Nov 2010

BUYING MARKET SHARES
Sell
Broker
Index
Normal
Selling
All Auction
Selling

Buy
Broker
Index
Normal
Buying
All Auction
Buying
COMM 11.8 19.4% 24.8% MSDW 6.7 11.6% 16.2%
UBS 4.4 7.1% 9.6% COMM 6.2 19.2% 12.3%
DMG 4.3 9.3% 8.9% BBY 4.5 2.2% 11.1%
BBY 3.7 3.5% 10.0% DMG 3.5 7.5% 7.7%
ETRD 3 8.6% 6.8% CITI 2.7 7.7% 5.9%
AIEX 2.2 6.3% 6.4% JPM 2.1 4.9% 4.9%
CSUI 1.7 1.2% 3.4% UBS 2.1 5.1% 3.5%
MSDW 1.5 1.3% 3.2% ETRD 2 7.3% 6.0%
SBAR 1.3 6.4% 1.6% SBAR 1.8 4.2% 3.6%
TPPM 1.3 1.8% 3.7% HUB24 1.6 1.8% 3.8%
MACQ 1.1 3.1% 2.3% MERL 1.5 1.7% 2.6%
CITI 1 5.8% 2.0% D2MX 1.4 0.8% 4.7%
D2MX 0.8 0.6% 1.1% AIEX 1.3 5.8% 3.4%
MACP 0.8 2.7% 1.6% CSUI 1.2 1.2% 2.7%

Dec 2010

SELLING MARKET SHARES

Dec 2010

BUYING MARKET SHARES
Sell
Broker
Index
Normal
Selling
Auction
Selling

Buy
Broker
Index
Normal
Buying
Auction
Buying
COMM 7.3 18.4% 17.7% MSDW 8.6 11.7% 5.6%
UBS 5.8 10.3% 15.0% UBS 5.7 6.2% 8.0%
BBY 5.4 3.3% 9.5% COMM 4.6 3.8% 5.1%
DMG 4.1 7.0% 8.6% DMG 3.4 7.6% 7.5%
AIEX 2.7 7.8% 4.4% BBY 2.7 0.0% 2.6%
ETRD 2.6 6.7% 4.3% MACQ 2.4 7.0% 2.7%
CSUI 2.4 1.6% 4.3% CSUI 2.2 3.2% 8.2%
GS 1.7 3.8% 6.0% ETRD 2.1 4.1% 2.1%
MSDW 1.6 1.8% 9.5% CITI 2 21.5% 23.5%
CITI 1.3 6.4% 4.0% MERL 1.4 6.5% 4.9%
SBAR 1.1 6.1% 2.8% INST 1.1 3.3% 4.5%
MERL 0.9 3.2% 2.7% AIEX 0.9 2.8% 7.1%
WILS 0.6 0.6% 0.1% TPPM 0.8 0.01% 0.02%
JPM 0.6 0.3% 3.0% JPM 0.7 0.7% 1.5%

Broker Citigroup Global (CITI) is seen to have adapted a high profile as a buyer in auctions during December
which corresponded to reduced activity by Morgan Stanley following the completion of M&G buying. It
appears that CITI stood aside during the accumulation program conducted for M&G.
52

8.2.7.4.1 AUCTION TRENDS FOR JANUARY 2011 Leading Selling Brokers
The brokers with the leading selling influences at auctions through January are summarized below.
Commonwealth Securities is once again seen to be the most influential broker as a seller during auctions
and by a very wide margin. Also influential were BBY, DMG and UBS. The high attendance rates by Credit
Suisse and Goldman Sachs in closing auctions is again noted. Morgan Stanley was also active in closing
auctions despite their reduced involvement in the market following the completion of M&Gs buying.

Jan 2011 Opening Auctions -Sellers Closing Auctions - Sellers Overall
Broker
Avg.
Sells
Attendance
Index
(AM)
Avg.
Sells
Attendance
Index
(PM)
INDEX
COMM 45.8% 12 5.5 19.6% 13 2.5 8.0
BBY 56.0% 6 3.4 38.5% 3 1.2 4.5
DMG 8.7% 10 0.9 13.4% 19 2.5 3.4
UBS 12.1% 9 1.1 16.4% 14 2.3 3.4
MSDW 4.8% 5 0.2 16.9% 13 2.2 2.4
INST 75.1% 3 2.3 0.0 2.3
GS 0.0 19.6% 11 2.2 2.2
CSUI 19.2% 2 0.4 12.0% 11 1.3 1.7
CITI 21.2% 6 1.3 2.4% 8 0.2 1.5
SBAR 25.1% 3 0.8 18.1% 2 0.4 1.1
MACQ 17.9% 6 1.1 0.0 1.1
ETRD 11.2% 4 0.4 20.2% 3 0.6 1.1
BELL 0.0 29.6% 2 0.6 0.6
MACP 13.8% 2 0.3 2.5% 11 0.3 0.5
IMCP 3.1% 8 0.2 2.5% 12 0.3 0.5
MERL 17.4% 2 0.3 3.9% 4 0.2 0.5
RBSM 44.6% 1 0.4 2.6% 1 0.0 0.5
JPM 6.7% 1 0.1 4.5% 8 0.4 0.4
AIEX 10.1% 1 0.1 10.3% 3 0.3 0.4
MINC 0.0 34.6% 1 0.3 0.3
SUSQ 0.0 8.3% 4 0.3 0.3
TPPM 3.4% 1 0.0 9.6% 3 0.3 0.3

The chart compares broker selling influences across opening and closing auctions during January 2011


0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0

Opening Auctions

Closing Auctions

Combined


Index Values
OF NOTE:
- The leading selling
influences by COMM, BBY,
DMG and UBS over all other
brokers
- The dominance by
UBS,COMM, DMG, MSDW
and GS in closing auctions
- INSTs prominence in a few
opening auctions and no
presence in closing auctions.
53

8.2.7.4.2 AUCTION TRENDS FOR JANUARY Leading Buying Brokers
COMM was also prominent as a buyer across auctions in January, although with access to both buyers and
sellers crossings only represented 24.1% of sales and 15.3% of buys. It might be expected that crossings
would have run at much higher levels. DMG, UBS, and MSDW were the other prominent buyers at
auctions. The same brokers always being prominent as buyers and sellers focusses attention on the large
amount of non-genuine trading /Wash Trades likely to be taking place in controlling auction outcomes.

Jan 2011 Opening Auctions -Buyers Closing Auctions - Buyers Overall
Broker
Average
Buys
Attendance
Index
(AM)
Average
Buys
Attendance
Index
(PM)
INDEX
COMM 38.8% 11 4.3 32.1% 11 3.5 7.8
DMG 25.6% 13 3.3 10.4% 19 2.0 5.3
UBS 10.9% 13 1.4 17.3% 17 2.9 4.3
MSDW 41.1% 3 1.2 13.9% 19 2.6 3.9
BBY 53.1% 1 0.5 37.0% 5 1.9 2.4
MACQ 17.7% 10 1.8 4.0% 9 0.4 2.1
AIEX 23.1% 6 1.4 32.7% 2 0.7 2.0
ETRD 22.5% 6 1.3 13.1% 4 0.5 1.9
GS 99.6% 1 1.0 9.3% 3 0.3 1.3
MACP 9.5% 4 0.4 85.4% 1 0.9 1.2
JPM - - 0.0 21.3% 5 1.1 1.1
CSUI 1.9% 4 0.1 6.5% 14 0.9 1.0
IMCP 7.9% 8 0.6 4.2% 8 0.3 1.0
MERL 17.0% 2 0.3 7.7% 3 0.2 0.6
CLSA 54.7% 1 0.5 - - 0.0 0.5
CITI 6.2% 6 0.4 5.0% 3 0.2 0.5
SUSQ - - 0.0 9.2% 5 0.5 0.5
HUB24 25.4% 1 0.3 - - 0.0 0.3
INST - - 0.0 19.6% 1 0.2 0.2
CMCS 12.9% 1 0.1 - - 0.0 0.1
TIMB - - 0.0 1.4% 3 0.0 0.0

The chart compares January buying activity by brokers during opening and closing auctions.


0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0

Opening Auctions

Closing Auctions

Combined


Index Values
54

8.2.7.5 AUCTION ACTIVITY VERSUS NORMAL TRADING January 2011
The tables provided compare the selling (and buying) profiles of brokers in normal trading during January
to the selling (and buying) profiles of brokers during auctions. Increases in trading activity during auctions
may be suggesting manipulative activity. Such instances have been highlighted.


Jan2011

SELLING MARKET SHARES

Jan2011

BUYING MARKET SHARES
Sell
Broker
Index
Normal
Selling
Auction
Selling

Buy
Broker
Index
Normal
Buying
Auction
Buying
COMM 8.0 17.3% 15.7% COMM 6.0 18.4% 24.7%
BBY 4.5 2.7% 9.4% DMG 6.0 7.2% 10.5%
DMG 3.4 5.0% 9.5% BBY 5.5 1.4% 10.2%
UBS 3.4 9.4% 10.1% UBS 4.0 8.1% 9.2%
MSDW 2.4 1.1% 8.2% SBAR 2.2 3.3% 0.0%
INST 2.3 1.7% 4.4% ETRD 2.1 5.9% 4.4%
GS 2.2 5.0% 8.4% BELL 2.1 2.3% 0.0%
CSUI 1.7 4.0% 6.8% HUB24 2.0 0.2% 1.7%
CITI 1.5 8.5% 1.4% AIEX 2.0 7.0% 4.8%
SBAR 1.1 6.5% 2.1% GS 1.4 6.3% 1.7%
MACQ 1.1 3.1% 2.0% MSDW 1.4 3.1% 9.8%
ETRD 1.1 10.0% 5.4% CITI 1.1 8.6% 1.6%
BELL 0.6 2.5% 2.9% IMCP 1.0 0.1% 0.8%
MACP 0.5 1.4% 0.2% SUSQ 0.9 2.1% 2.1%

Broker BBY was particularly active as both a buyer and a seller in auctions, as were Morgan Stanley
(MSDW),and Deutsche Bank (DMG).
Citigroup Global (CITI ) on the other hand had reduced buying and selling profiles in auctions compared to
their market shares in normal trading.
The identities of the clients being serviced by these brokers is required if a proper view of trading is to be
achieved and the extent of cartel type activity or Wash Trades is to be gauged correctly.

55


Section 8.2.8
UPTICK TRENDS
Research into trading has looked into Downticks and auction pricing which provide some critical insights
about the brokers who have been prominent in setting/controlling prices. It is also of interest to assess
Uptick trends against the directions outlined by the High Court.
i.e., Genuine sellers seek to achieve the highest possible prices for their shares while genuine buyers look
to pay the minimum to secure their requirements.
In regard to Upticks in price, it logically follows that:
Genuine buyers would prefer to avoid Upticks in price as that would mean that they are generally
paying increased prices for their purchases. Data trends where the proportion of Upticks generated
by brokers is far greater than an entities share of buying are therefore highly dubious, as the buying
entity appears to be targeting higher prices rather than looking to minimize their purchase outlays.

Sellers that are able to achieve large numbers of sales associated with Upticks in prices, compared
to their selling profile in the market, also attract suspicion. It is not reasonable to expect small
amounts of selling to nearly always attract increased prices without collusion being involved
between the buying entity and the selling entity.

Data trends that consistently suggest collusion appear to manifest through the design of high
frequency trading algorithms where, again, preferential order execution seems able to connect
preferred buyers with preferred sellers.
Charting broker Upticks as buyers against their share of all buying can therefore highlight where dubious
trading is taking place. Similarly charting broker Upticks as sellers against their share of all selling can also
reveal where dubious trading has occurred.
The premise used to assess trading is that it can be reasonably expected that the numbers of Upticks
recorded by brokers as buyers ought to be commensurate with the levels of buying undertaken. Where
there are strong imbalances day after day, the situation requires close scrutiny as non-genuine trading is
likely to be responsible and non-genuine trading activity usually goes hand in hand with share price
manipulation.

56

8.2.8.1 UPTICK TRENDS DURING OCTOBER 2010: October 1 through October 28, 2010
The table and chart compare broker Uptick involvements (UTs) and broker buying involvements during
October 2010 prior to the M&G Group accumulating shares. Imbalances between the numbers of Upticks
recorded by brokers and the buying market shares of brokers draw attention to dubious trading behaviours










Uptick Sales versus Selling Volumes: Period October 1, through October 28, 2010












Broker UT % % Buys
COMM 350 20.0%
UBS 271 6.3%
MSDW 102 1.8%
CITI 100 3.7%
BBY 83 3.9%
AIEX 74 6.9%
ETRD 69 6.7%
DMG 57 7.2%
MACQ 50 5.3%
BELL 49 3.8%
INST 49 3.6%
SOSL 48 2.4%
CSUI 46 1.5%
SBAR 40 4.5%


Broker UT % % Buys
UBS 20.2% 4.2%
DMG 17.3% 7.5%
COMM 11.3% 18.4%
MACQ 11.1% 2.4%
CITI 4.6% 3.5%
MSDW 4.4% 2.0%
MERL 3.7% 2.3%
AIEX 3.4% 6.8%
ETRD 3.1% 6.4%
SBAR 2.4% 9.0%
BELL 2.0% 6.1%
GS 1.8% 1.9%
SOSL 1.8% 2.4%
CSUI 1.7% 1.8%


0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
UBS, DMG and MACQ were associated with anomalous
trends where minor volumes of buying sought higher
prices. The trends are entrenched into nearly a months
trading so are not transient events
Small amounts of selling by UBS, MSDW and CITI has
consistently resulted in increased prices which again
suggests a non-genuine orchestrated approach to trading.
UBS SECURITIES - UPTICK DATA
Cross trades represented 47.7% of all UBS Uptick purchases, and 49.8% of all UBS Uptick sales. Around 97% of
all UBS Uptick purchases involved trades of fewer than 400 shares but the average sized parcel for all of these
buy trades was only 68 shares. The trading data overwhelmingly suggests unorthodox trading behaviours
designed to impact prices rather than to genuinely buy and sell shares for clients, particularly as UBS trading
algorithms have sought to receive less for sales and to pay more for purchases. The behaviour conflicts with
principles of genuine trading as referred to by the High Court in its recent decision.
Uptick Involvements as
Sellers
Uptick Involvements as
Buyers

% of UTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of UTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



57

8.2.8.2 UPTICK TRENDS ASSOCIATED WITH M&Gs BUYING DURING NOVEMBER 2010
The table and chart compare broker Uptick involvements and broker buying involvements during November
2010, a month where M&G strongly accumulated shares. Again, imbalances between the numbers of
Upticks recorded by brokers compared to their buying market shares, highlight dubious trading behaviours.












Uptick Sales versus Selling Volumes: November 2010











Broker UT % % Buys
UBS 22.7% 7.3%
COMM 13.6% 19.8%
CITI 11.7% 5.5%
DMG 5.2% 9.3%
ETRD 5.0% 8.5%
MACQ 4.4% 3.0%
AIEX 3.9% 6.3%
BBY 3.8% 3.9%
SOSL 3.2% 3.3%
MSDW 2.9% 1.5%
SBAR 2.4% 6.1%
INST 2.4% 2.0%
MERL 2.3% 1.5%


Broker UT % % Buys
UBS 23.1% 5.0%
COMM 16.4% 18.6%
DMG 9.3% 7.5%
CITI 6.4% 7.6%
ETRD 6.2% 7.2%
MERL 5.3% 1.8%
MSDW 5.1% 11.9%
AIEX 4.7% 5.6%
SOSL 3.2% 3.3%
GS 2.9% 1.9%
BBY 2.7% 2.9%
JPM 2.2% 4.9%


0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
Highly anomalous trading by UBS resulted in low levels
of buying being associated with disproportionately
large numbers of Upticks. Genuine buyers tend to want
to pay less than the prevailing rate, not more.
Comparitively small amounts of selling by UBS and CITI
fortuitously resulted in increased prices. Rather than
good luck however, it was more likely that trading
algorithms were responsible for orchestrated trades
between designated sellers and designated buyers. The
situation again suggests collusion
Uptick Involvements as
Buyers
Uptick Involvements as
Sellers

% of UTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of UTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



Yet the strongly motivated buying by MSDW
for M&G tended to avoid Upticks in price.
58

8.2.8.3 UBS SECURITIES - UPTICK DATA

Cross-trades represented 51.6% of all UBS Uptick purchases, and 52.4% of all UBS Uptick sales. Around
95% of all UBS Uptick purchases involved trades of fewer than 400 shares but the average parcel size for all
of their buy trades was only 63 shares.

COMMENT
The trading data overwhelmingly suggests unorthodox trading with UBS algorithms consistently managing
to receive less for sales and to pay more for purchases. The trading is at odds with what the High Court has
decreed regarding genuine trading.
Viz., The forces of genuine supply and demand are those which are created in a market by buyers
whose purpose is to acquire at the lowest available price and sellers whose purpose is to sell at the highest
realisable price <CLICK: Reference Link>.
It is also at odds with a common sense perspective in regard to how fair markets should operate.
A broker with access to the most efficient and state-of-the-art trading platforms engaging in trading
behaviours that are at odds with how markets are meant to operate, is likely to be providing strong clues
as to how share price manipulation takes place in our financial markets. It would appear that trading that
equates to share price manipulation is intricately woven into the design of sophisticated trading
algorithms, and require multiple brokers running similar programs to achieve trading objectives.
Unfortunately, dubious trading objectives that involve collusion between brokers for implementation is
wreaking havoc across the entire ASX by advantaging sophisticated investors over all others. When
combined with manipulative short selling, their trading is destroying or limiting the prospects of companies
and eroding the superannuation holdings and investments of the nations workers and retirees.

59


Section 8.2.9
AN OVERVIEW OF FOUR MONTHS OF TRADING IN CuDECO

60

8.2.9.1 A FOUR MONTH OVERVIEW: October 2010 through January 2011
The table and chart compare broker Downtick involvements and broker selling involvements during the
entire period from October 2010 through to the end of January 2011. Importantly, trends evident in the
charts are the result of entrenched trading behaviours over a period of four months.











Downtick Purchases versus Buying Volumes: October 2010 through January 2011












Broker DT % % Buys
UBS 20.3% 5.3%
COMM 14.0% 17.0%
CITI 12.0% 6.0%
MSDW 10.1% 10.4%
DMG 4.8% 7.8%
AIEX 4.4% 5.4%
ETRD 3.9% 6.5%
MACQ 3.5% 2.6%
CSUI 3.5% 2.0%
BBY 2.8% 3.5%
INST 2.8% 2.0%
MERL 2.7% 2.2%
GS 2.1% 2.5%
SBAR 2.0% 5.9%
SOSL 1.6% 2.8%
JPM 1.6% 2.5%
HUB24 1.1% 2.7%
MACP 1.1% 1.6%
TPPM 1.0% 1.6%
BELL 1.0% 2.1%

Broker DT % % Sells
UBS 24.5% 8.4%
DMG 17.0% 8.2%
COMM 12.4% 19.1%
MERL 6.2% 2.0%
ETRD 4.9% 7.6%
AIEX 4.1% 6.5%
CITI 3.3% 5.1%
SBAR 2.7% 5.8%
CSUI 2.7% 1.8%
MSDW 2.4% 1.7%
GS 2.3% 2.4%
MACQ 2.3% 3.4%
BBY 2.0% 4.0%
INST 1.6% 2.2%
SOSL 1.4% 2.8%
MACP 1.2% 2.1%
TPPM 0.9% 1.7%
SUSQ 0.9% 1.6%
BELL 0.9% 2.0%
PSL 0.6% 1.0%


0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
UBS, DMG and MERL are seen to be associated with
anomalous selling trends for the entire 4 month period
The strong levels of UBS Downtick purchases is
generally the result of large volumes of small
crossings that resulted in reduced prices.
CITI s fortuitous buying of Downticks over a 4
month period is likely to reflect more on
collaborative trading than good fortune.

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



DT Involvement as Sellers
DT Involvement as Buyers
UBS SECURITIES DOWNTICK DATA
Cross trades represented 45.9% of all UBS Downtick sales, and 55.3% % of all UBS Downtick purchases.
Around 88% of all UBS Downtick sales involved trades of fewer than 400 shares but the average parcel size for
all of their sell trades was only 85 shares. Again the data overwhelmingly suggests trading behaviours designed
to reduce prices rather than to achieve the best prices for clients.
61

8.2.9.2 BROKER TRADING OVER FOUR MONTHS: October 2010 through January 2011
The table summarizes the trading of the leading brokers over the four-month period.

Market Share Selling Market Share Buying Market Share NET
Broker Code Overall Volume Selling Volume Buying Volumes
Commonwealth COMM 17.9% 18,678,502 19.1% 16,602,356 17.0% -2,076,146
Deutsche DMG 7.8% 7,998,929 8.2% 7,631,583 7.8% -367,346
E-Trade ETRD 7.1% 7,448,115 7.6% 6,374,547 6.5% -1,073,568
UBS UBS 6.9% 8,157,807 8.4% 5,155,406 5.3% -3,002,401
Morgan Stanley MSDW 6.3% 1,660,456 1.7% 10,133,756 10.4% 8,473,300
Citigroup CITI 6.1% 4,996,953 5.1% 5,875,168 6.0% 878,215
AIEX AIEX 5.9% 6,310,349 6.5% 5,261,713 5.4% -1,048,636
Morgan Smith SBAR 5.4% 5,661,204 5.8% 5,770,389 5.9% 109,185
BBY BBY 3.8% 3,928,033 4.0% 3,433,923 3.5% -494,110
Macquarie Insto MACQ 2.9% 3,314,718 3.4% 2,527,282 2.6% -787,436
State One Stock SOSL 2.8% 2,736,864 2.8% 2,750,292 2.8% 13,428
Goldman Sachs GS 2.7% 2,376,978 2.4% 2,403,768 2.5% 26,790
HUB24CS HUB24 2.4% 2,766,426 2.8% 2,649,415 2.7% -117,011
Merrill Lynch MERL 2.2% 1,969,193 2.0% 2,161,371 2.2% 192,178
Instinet Nomura INST 2.1% 2,193,823 2.2% 1,949,553 2.0% -244,270
Credit Suisse CSUI 2.0% 1,771,482 1.8% 1,981,372 2.0% 209,890
Macquarie Retai MACP 1.8% 2,029,476 2.1% 1,515,814 1.6% -513,662
Third Party TPPM 1.7% 1,674,873 1.7% 1,585,066 1.6% -89,807
Bell Potter BELL 1.7% 1,940,307 2.0% 2,053,934 2.1% 113,627
Susquehanna SUSQ 1.7% 1,591,218 1.6% 1,578,257 1.6% -12,961
JPMorgan JPM 1.6% 275,912 0.3% 2,440,524 2.5% 2,164,612
Patersons PSL 0.6% 1,003,917 1.0% 202,966 0.2% -800,951
Foster Stockbro FOST 0.6% 519,775 0.5% 851,175 0.9% 331,400
D2MX Pty Ltd D2MX 0.5% 516,920 0.5% 561,500 0.6% 44,580
Others (41 in Number)

5.5% 6,157,018 6.5% 4,228,118 4.3% -1,928,900
TOTALS 100.0% 97,679,248 100.0% 97,679,248 100.0% 0

OBSERVATIONS
The leading seller Commonwealth Securities with 19.1% of all selling was responsible for only 12.4%
of Downticks, yet UBS Securities with a selling market share of 5.3% was responsible for 24.5% of all
Downticks. It is a highly irregular outcome that requires investigation.
The anomalous data focusses attention on the so-called strategic advantages offered by algorithms
and suggests that sophisticated clients are advantaged by superior technology and trading systems
and concessions granted by the ASX, they are also advantaged by an ability to set and maintain
artificial prices and to manipulate the market.
Any strategic advantage of being able to create the maximum amount of selling pressure through
the minimum volume of shares sold, can only be explained in terms of market manipulation, as
genuine sellers would want to maximize returns, not minimize them.
The 6.2 million sales and 4.2 million buys grouped as Others are likely to be associated with
sophisticated investors/institutions as the numbers are required to reconcile institutional trading;
furthermore, as the short selling on August 9, 2011 revealed <LINK: ASIC Complaint 8.1 -Refer Pg. 106>,
the institutional presence infiltrates the activities of practically all brokers. It makes for an
extremely compromised market.


62

8.2.9.3 REGISTRY CHANGES OVER FOUR MONTHS
The following table provides a breakdown of shareholder registry activity over the four-month period.
ENTITY OFF ON NET
Broker Nominees 14,031,369 13,231,575 -799,794
Corporate Entities 3,758,039 3,314,402 -443,637
Professional Funds 481,658 391,509 -90,149
Institutions 35,732,297 46,753,142 11,020,845
Retail Investors 27,810,467 18,653,205 -9,157,262
Totals 81,813,830 82,343,833 530,003

Categories Used:
Institutional shareholders: include National Nominees, HSBC Nominees, Citicorp Nominees and JP
Morgan Nominees (2 entities).
Corporate Shareholders: include large private companies, and entities such as Queensland
Investment Corporation, UBS Wealth Management, etc. which appear as shareholders on many ASX
company registers.
Funds: include the likes of BT Portfolio Management, RBX Dexia Services, Bond Street Custodians,
etc., all of whom also appear on the registers of many ASX entities.
Broker Nominees: include the entities used by brokers to facilitate the share flows resulting from
short selling and short covering. The buying and selling that they represent shows up in the
institutional holdings that are associated with stock lending.
Deducting the Broker Nominees settlement share flows results in registry movements of 67.78 million OFF
the register and 69.11 million shares ON to the register as far as shareholders are concerned. The
difference represents shares that would be held in broker settlement accounts at the end of the period.
OFF ON
REGISTER less Broker Nominees 67,782,461 69,112,258
INSTITUTIONS 35,732,297 46,753,142
52.7% 67.6%
ALL OTHER 32,050,164 22,359,116
47.3% 32.4%

Institutions represented 52.7% of all selling (OFF movements) and 67.4% of all buying (ON Movements)
that impacted the register. Retailers and others represented the balance.
A very major concern is the large number of trades that didnt make it to the register as shown below.
OFF ON
REGISTER less Broker Nominees 67,782,461 69,112,258
SELLS BUYS
BROKER TRADES 97,679,248 97,679,248
MISSING TRADES 29,896,787 28,566,990
31% 29%

Any assessement of trading over the four-month period needs to be able to satisfactorily account for the
impact on the market of almost 30 million buys and sells that didnt actually impact the register. The
trading data strongly suggests that an artificial trading environment accompanied the accumulation of
shares by M&G. The situation requires a thorough investigation.
63

8.2.9.4 TRANSPARENCY ISSUES
Major issues concerning the ASX market place include a lack of transparency that exists concerning trading
and the amount of flexibility associated with trading and settlements. It makes trading particularly
advantageous for sophisticated investors who are able to exploit the situation.
Trading flexibility issues include:
Orders by sophisticated investors are dispersed amongst large numbers of brokers, thereby
extending their presence widely across the market. Transactions often net out and dont impact
the register, thereby resulting in minor changes to beneficial ownership, especially through
critical/volatile trading periods. The activity raises the possibility of entities trading back and forth
between themselves or their preferred trading partners and fixing prices while doings so.
Cost structures that enable large numbers of small orders by sophisticated investors to be
processed at minimal cost compared to retail investors who would pay a fixed charge for each
transaction.
Trading algorithms specifically designed to advantage sophisticated investors over all other
trading participants and which impact the market to generate artificial trading environments.
The ability to sell-down stocks on the ASX to trading affiliates and to recover the shares off market
by broker to broker exchanges (i.e. Dark Pools) or other off-market adjustments.
An ad hoc system of short selling used extensively to manipulate share prices. Short selling into the
market has led to chronic undervaluations in stocks across the ASX yet exposed open short positions
are invariably managed without price discovery. The management process often involves off-market
adjustments between parties who are likely to be colluding with their trading.
Institutions being able to trade anonymously and with the brokers involved not identified on the
register. On the other hand retail trading is completely transparent. It means that powerful interests
can trade anonymously and without accountability for any impact they have on the market.

The widespread flexibility within the system, whether it be the trading system, the system of settlements,
the system of securities lending or even the system of regulation, provides enormous scope for interests
who are inclined to exploit the situation. In doing so unfair advantages are secured at the expense of all
other participants. There can be no doubt that the extent of non-transparency that exists provides
enormous scope for deception and engaging in illegal trading practices without entities being made
accountable for their trading actions.

The extent of non-transparency regarding trading for the period October 2010 through January 2011 has
been quantified below.








Trading Summary
Sells Buys
Broker Trades 97,679,248 97,679,248
Comprising

Institutions 35,732,297 46,753,142
Other Trades 32,050,164 22,359,116
Missing Trades 29,896,787 28,566,990

NOTE:
Institutional trading is regarded as non transparent as the brokers responsible for trading (which
on occasions includes practically all of them) are not identified on the register.
Missing Trades represent buying & selling that didnt impact the register during the period.
Other Trades mostly comprise retail trades and trades by private companies that are fully
disclosed on the register along with the brokers responsible.

ASX ACTIVITY Oct 2010 to Jan 2011
CuDeco Trading
Non Transparent: 72%
Transparent
28%
30%
42%
64

8.2.9.5 COMMONWEALTH SECURITIES TRADING
Commonwealth Securities was the leading broker over the period October 2010 through January 2011 by a
very wide margin. Its overall market share (by total value of trades) was 17.9% and compares to 7.7% for
second placed Deutsche Bank. Retail trades within Commonwealth Securities represented around 7.8% of
the 97.7 million shares traded over the period leaving 10.1% of COMMs market share attributable to
institutions. It means that COMM was both the leading retail broker and the leading institutional broker.
The breakdown between the two categories of investors within Commonwealth Securities (COMM) is
provided in the table:
Sells Buys
COMM Broker Trades 18,678,502 16,602,356
OFF ON
COMM Retail Activity 8,289,531 6,927,173
Sells Buys
Other Trades 10,388,971 9,675,183

56% 58%
The broker trades identified as Other Trades are either Wash Trades that didnt make it to the register or
they represent institutional trades. It suggests that a majority of trades (56% of sells and 58% of buys) have
taken place with no way of knowing, other than through audits, who was responsible for them. Their impact
on the market and whether their trades supported artificial pricing levels needs to be properly established.
The extent of institutional involvement can be further clarified by comparing the trades put through the
market by COMM to the registry share movements of COMM retail clients.
The following tables compare on a month by month basis, the sell trades by Commonwealth Securities
against monthly share flows OFF the CuDeco register by Commonwealth Securities retail clients.
October 2010
COMM Broker Trading
(Iress Data)
Registry Transactions of
COMM Retail Clients
Parcel Size
Number of
Sells
% of all Sell
Transactions
Number of
Sells
% of all Sell
Transactions
<=400 shares 612 39% 11 4%
401 to 1000 shares 151 10% 52 19%
1000 to 5000 shares 454 29% 125 45%
> 5001 shares 338 22% 90 32%
Totals 1,555 100% 278 100%

The number of small sell trades for fewer than 400 shares (i.e. 612) in October was far greater than the
registry transactions corresponding to parcels fewer than 400 shares by shareholders dealing through
COMM (i.e. 11). The excess small trades represent the algo trades of sophisticated investors, not retailers.
The same pattern occured across all parcel sizes with the number of sell trades in the market mostly
representing the activity of sophisticated investors/institutions rather than retail investors who deal
through COMM. The data provides powerful insights into trading given that Commonwealth Securities
dominated all auction markets as well, and was by far the most dominant broker in all trading.

The trading patterns for November, December and January were similar as shown below.
November 2010 COMM Broker Trading COMM Registry Transactions
Parcel Size
Number of
Sells
% of all Sell
Transactions
Number of
Sells
% of all Sell
Transactions
<=400 shares 438 20.7% 29 5.8%
401 to 1000 shares 290 13.7% 99 19.7%
1000 to 5000 shares 882 41.7% 233 46.4%
> 5001 shares 505 23.9% 141 28.1%
Totals 2,115 100% 502 100%

65

December 2010 COMM Broker Trading COMM Registry Transactions
Parcel Size
Number of
Sells
% of all Sell
Transactions
Number of
Sells
% of all Sell
Transactions
<=400 shares 371 35.2% 29 8.3%
401 to 1000 shares 153 14.5% 84 24.0%
1000 to 5000 shares 375 35.6% 172 49.1%
> 5001 shares 155 14.7% 65 18.6%
Totals 1,054 100% 350 100%

January 2011 COMM Broker Trading COMM Registry Transactions
Parcel Size
Number of
Sells
% of all Sell
Transactions
Number of
Sells
% of all Sell
Transactions
<=400 shares 339 45.7% 14 8.4%
401 to 1000 shares 122 16.4% 38 22.8%
1000 to 5000 shares 231 31.1% 83 49.7%
> 5001 shares 50 6.7% 32 19.2%
Totals 742 100% 167 100%

4 Month Summary Broker Trading
COMM Registry Transactions
Parcel Size
Number of
Sells
% of all Sell
Transactions
Number of
Sells
% of all Sell
Transactions
<=400 shares 1760 32.2% 83 6.4%
401 to 1000 shares 716 13.1% 273 21.0%
1000 to 5000 shares 1942 35.5% 613 47.3%
> 5001 shares 1048 19.2% 328 25.3%
Totals 5466 100% 1297 100%

8.2.9.6 OTHER RETAIL BROKERS
The other two leading retail brokers were Etrade and AIEX. Estimates for retail trading versus institutional
trading by these two brokers for the four-month period are as follows.
Sells Buys

Sells Buys
ETRD Broker Trades 7,448,115 6,374,547

AIEX Broker Trades 6,310,349 5,261,713
OFF ON

OFF ON
ETRD Retail Activity 3,519,725 2,691,991

AIEX Retail Activity 3,615,772 2,376,511
Sells Buys

Sells Buys
Surplus/Institutional Trades 3,928,390 3,682,556

Surplus/Institutional Trades 2,694,577 2,885,202
53% 58%

43% 55%

Institutions are seen to be extremely influential within retail brokers where their activity is conveniently
camouflaged amongst retail trades. The data provides a strong incentive to investigate via audits the
dominant auction selling by Commonwealth Securities. There is the strong likelihood that institutions
flooded the market with buying and selling, thus interacting with the other dominant institutional brokers
such as DMG, UBS and BBY to ensure control over prices. Such a scenario would represent an extremely
artificial trading environment with ramifications for all ASX trading.
Appendix 2 tracks the involvement of institutions within the three leading retail brokers throughout 2010.

66

8.2.9.7 CROSS TRADES: October 2010 through January 2011
Commonwealth Securities was also noted for the large volumes of crossings it facilitated over the period.
Institutional investors acting within COMM, perhaps associated with M&G interests, may have been
scooping up sales by retail clients as they became confused by the high levels of churn and the continuous
waves of selling that occurred despite price rises. As already demonstrated in Section 8.2.9.3, large
volumes of selling was non-genuine and either didnt result in beneficial changes to ownership or didnt
impact the register.
If institutional buying took advantage of retail selling within Commonwealth Securities in amongst the high
volumes of trading churn generated, then the broker has in effect contributed to the demise of its retail
investors by facilitating dubious trading practices in favour of its larger clients.
The extents of broker crossings over the four-month period are quantified below.
Broker
Number of
Crossings
Average
Parcel
Volume of
Crossings
Volume of
all Sales
Crossings
cf Sales%
UBS 5,502 162 892,148 8,157,807 10.9%
DMG 1,856 626 1,162,521 7,998,929 14.5%
COMM 1,385 2,714 3,759,058 18,678,502 20.1%
CITI 523 989 517,502 4,996,953 10.4%
MSDW 437 455 198,973 1,660,456 12.0%
MERL 218 531 115,812 1,969,193 5.9%
ETRD 167 3,459 577,594 7,448,115 7.8%
CSUI 161 1,637 263,527 1,771,482 14.9%
GS 137 3,328 455,872 2,376,978 19.2%
MACQ 135 1,984 267,836 3,314,718 8.1%









The other highly anomalous feature of crossing data is the large number of small crossings put through
the market by UBS Securities. The proportion of crossings under 100 shares was 56%, with 93% of all
UBS crossings featuring parcels under 400 shares in size. The plethora of small crossings, many of which
were used to force Downticks in price, again demonstrates manipulative control over prices rather than
the authentic transfer of shares between genuine sellers and genuine buyers.
Deutsche Bank trading invokes similar concerns where 60% of crossings were for 100 shares or less and
79% of DMG crossings were 200 shares or less.
67

8.2.9.8.1 BROKERS ACTING FOR THE M&G GROUP
Appendix 1 lists the broker trading data for when M&G were active in the market accumulating shares.
An abbreviated summary of the net-buying and net-selling by leading brokers for November and December is
provided below. The brokers mainly acting on behalf of M&G each day are shown highlighted.
M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys
Nov 1 1,035,163 Nov 2 80,457 Nov 5 1,000,000 Nov 8 949,822 Nov 9 687,554 Nov 10 362,624

Net Buys
MSDW 952,687 COMM 375,516 MSDW 1,002,906 MSDW 928,671 MSDW 697,184 MSDW 337,657
ETRD 153,990 ETRD 100,106 SBAR 125,000 COMM 293,442 COMM 123,123 ETRD 49,870
AIEX 57,568 MSDW 48,817 INST 59,673 AIEX 120,775 AIEX 31,583 MACP 35,600
SUSQ 49,271 MERL 32,961 TPPM 36,035 RBSM 42,521 ETRD 29,318 GS 31,436
ORDS 36617 MACQ 24,964 CSUI 23,344 MERL 40,508 CITI 16,371 COMM 25,583
CITI 33,471 WILS 7,900 CITI 19,955 TPPM 36,195 RBSM 13,205 AIEX 23,286

Net Sells

HUB24 -490,225 DMG -172,977 COMM -564,014 UBS -541,395 SBAR -308,136 UBS -188,445
COM
M
-286,388 CSUI -73,750 AIEX -193,401 PSL -205,700 EVAN -250,000 SBAR -115,000
SBAR -165,436 SUSQ -65,894 UBS -130,974 MACQ -155,374 DMG -135,419 CITI -96,507
INST -108,693 INST -62,138 ETRD -124,946 DMG -136,525 MACQ -111,898 BELL -78,700
HART -50000 GS -48,421 BELL -85,845 SBAR -58,964 SUSQ -34,715 DMG -40,867
CMCS -41,925 SBAR -46,000 MACP -54,500 ETRD -55,861 ORDS -33,021 BBY -15,965

M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys
Nov 11 20,559 Nov 12 550,384 Nov 15 394,732 Nov 16 650,439 Nov 17 424,561 Nov 19 747,000


WILS 62,900 JPM 549,602 JPM 398,837 JPM 650,999 JPM 422,098 CITI 596,205
CSUI 39,951 D2MX 83,900 D2MX 38,500 COMM 96,956 FOST 100,000 D2MX 66,000
MSDW 25,204 CITI 37,550 SUSQ 28,825 AIEX 53,055 BAIL 18,372 INST 44,259
MERL 20,728 INST 27,706 HUB24 20,000 ETRD 37,091 AIEX 12,899 SBAR 17,500
MACQ 18,413 MACQ 24,169 COMM 13,721 HUB24 35,000 BYS 10,090 CSUI 15,241
ETRD 16,442 STBG 14,000 BYS 10,000 CMCS 19,434 BBY 5,207 PSL 10,000

MACP -57,293 COMM -277,742 MACP -70,450 MACP -186,892 ETRD -72,697 ETRD -269,013
NAL -56,783 AIEX -105,088 BELL -56,280 INST -129,443 COMM -66,815 RBSM -101,000
COMM -49,455 ETRD -71,972 ETRD -52,380 UBS -123,767 INST -65,013 DMG -92,133
UBS -33,348 BBY -47,000 FOST -50,000 DMG -109,212 CITI -59,558 BELL -41,000
AIEX -25,498 UBS -45,931 SHAD -50,000 BBY -89,896 MSDW -50,842 HUB24 -39,066
DMG -16,252 MACP -37,707 INST -37,131 GS -73,971 MACP -46,829 CMCS -32,891

M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys M&G Buys
Nov 22 253,000 Nov 24 500,000 Dec 2 500,000 Dec 10 237,257 Dec 13 226,789 Dec 14 746,737


CITI 266,224 MSDW 532,866 MSDW 435,072 MSDW 232,944 MSDW 253,697 MSDW 740,802
INST 37,991 DMG 100,209 ETRD 169,340 CSUI 91,297 INST 96,196 PERSH 120,170
DMG 32,764 MACQ 48,159 DMG 163,316 AIEX 39,772 DMG 36,925 INST 104,294
CSUI 15,838 INST 21,475 STBG 51,250 CITI 18,281 ITG 26,463 CSUI 39,558
MERL 14,930 ORDS 14,660 MACQ 46,867 ETRD 15,411 CSUI 10,995 DMG 20,751
CMCS 13,375 UBS 10,130 BRID 17,500 GS 12,236 MACQ 9,423 MACQ 6,852


COMM -150,826 COMM -209,548 COMM -325,984 MERL -151,875 UBS -148,673 COMM -290,868
SBAR -60,000 ETRD -177,906 UBS -120,987 UBS -81,233 HART -71,300 AIEX -215,693
AIEX -32,689 AIEX -114,494 SBAR -97,865 LODG -62,500 SBAR -46,015 ETRD -165,050
ETRD -31,596 GS -54,974 AIEX -93,737 COMM -53,596 AIEX -31,550 MACP -125,542
BBY -27,844 PSL -33,750 MACP -81,388 SBAR -39,000 COMM -28,222 SBAR -68,909
D2MX -19,700 CMCS -28,284 BBY -37,888 MACP -20,000 ORDS -24,000 CITI -27,339

The trading data reveals that while MSDW was the broker mainly used to acquire shares for M&G, brokers CITI
and JPM were also directly involved. The acquisition of shares is seen to be a collaborative effort by these three
but the trading churn by a large number of other brokers also appears to be an integral part of M&Gs trading
strategy. It is a strategy that looks to have resulted in a compromised, and somewhat artificial market.
68

8.2.9.8.2 The acquisitons by M&G are summarized below.
ACTIVE BROKER FOR M&G PURCHASES
DATE
2010
DAILY
VOLUME
M&G
PURCHASES
M&G % of
Daily Volume
Broker Sells Buys Net
Oct-29 5,705,475 884,380 15.50% MSDW 41,229 887,189 845,960
Nov-01 5,477,122 1,035,163 18.90% MSDW 96,473 1,049,160 952,687
Nov-02 2,504,277 80,457 3.20% MSDW 45,662 94,479 48,817
Nov-05 3,824,759 1,000,000 26.10% MSDW 41,595 1,044,501 1,002,906
Nov-08 3,347,225 949,822 28.40% MSDW 49,258 977,929 928,671
Nov-09 2,005,022 687,554 34.30% MSDW 18,391 715,575 697,184
Nov-10 1,622,500 362,624 22.30% MSDW 48,229 385,886 337,657
Nov-11 826,528 20,559 2.50% MSDW 2,430 27,634 25,204
Nov-12 2,855,670 550,384 19.30% JPM 782 550,384 549,602
Nov-15 2,215,093 394,732 17.80% JPM 4,105 402,942 398,837
Nov-16 3,190,583 650,439 20.40% JPM 6,580 657,579 650,999
Nov-17 2,901,469 424,561 14.60% CITI 194,141 790,346 596,205
Nov-19 1,812,197 747,000 41.20% CITI 194,141 790,346 596,205
Nov-22 717,877 253,000 35.20% CITI 40,524 306,748 266,224
Nov-24 2,379,847 500,000 21.00% MSDW 26,335 559,201 532,866
Dec-02 2,302,622 500,000 21.70% MSDW 79,315 514,387 435,072
Dec-10 799,691 237,257 29.70% MSDW 79,315 514,387 435,072
Dec-13 715,144 226,789 31.70% MSDW 0 253,697 253,697
Dec-14 2,591,660 746,737 28.80% MSDW 29,735 770,537 740,802
Totals 47,794,761 10,251,458 22.80%

998,240 11,292,907 10,294,667

NOTE: The NET buying by the active broker for M&G doesnt equate to number of shares purchased for
M&G because the active broker would have bought and sold shares for other clients as well.

8.2.9.8.3 COMPARISON OF TRADING M&G Buying Day Volumes versus Non-Buying Day Volumes
The market activity accompanying the buying by M&G provides a clear indication that the M&G buying was
a stage managed event, particularly when daily trading is separated into M&G non-buying days and M&G
buying days as shown below.
DAYS WHEN M&G WERENT BUYING M&G BUYING DAYS

DAY (2010) ASX VOLUME M&G BUYS DAY ASX VOLUME M&G BUYS
Nov 3 786,416 0

Oct-29 5,705,475 884,380
Nov 4 753,188 0

Nov-01 5,477,122 1,035,163
Nov 18 1,982,155 0

Nov-02 2,504,277 80,457
Nov 23 1,223,409 0

Nov-05 3,824,759 1,000,000
Nov 25 659,029 0

Nov-08 3,347,225 949,822
Nov 26 465,337 0

Nov-09 2,005,022 687,554
Nov 29 429,877 0

Nov-10 1,622,500 362,624
Nov 30 534,379 0

Nov-11 826,528 20,559
Dec 1 557,390 0

Nov-12 2,855,670 550,384
Dec 3 1,466,104 0

Nov-15 2,215,093 394,732
Dec 6 964,300 0

Nov-16 3,190,583 650,439
Dec 7 771,199 0

Nov-17 2,901,469 424,561
Dec 8 524,671 0

Nov-19 1,812,197 747,000
Dec 9 513,111 0

Nov-22 717,877 253,000
Dec 15 902,700 0

Nov-24 2,379,847 500,000
Dec 16 670,400 0

Dec-02 2,302,622 500,000
Dec 17 601,600 0

Dec-10 799,691 237,257
Dec 20 468,400 0

Dec-13 715,144 226,789
Dec 21 342,900 0

Dec-14 2,591,660 746,737




Totals 14,616,565 0

Totals 47,794,761 10,251,458
Average 769,293 0

Average 2,515,514 539,550

Trading volumes spiked remarkably when M&G were buyers. It suggests other brokers traded with knowledge of M&Gs
intentions and were possibly facilitating the accumulation by supplying trading churn to camouflage what was taking place.
69

8.2.9.8.4 COMMENT


















8.2.9.8.5 WASH TRADE ACTIVITY FOR NOVEMBER 2010
Despite regular updates by M&G via substantial shareholder notices from November 2, their on-market
buying almost always attracted high volumes of non-genuine selling that didnt impact the register. The effect
was to create confusion and a sense of urgency for holders to take advantage of prices before they retreated.
Large volumes of selling avoided the broker buying for M&G and found its way to buyers representing much
the same interests as the selling entities. The high levels of non-genuine Wash Trades flooding the market
would no doubt have been facilitated by the trading algorithms used by entities who faciliated the M&G
accumulation. The November trading and registry data is summarized below with broker nominee share
flows again not included as they generally represent settlement share flows associated with securities
lending. The associated buying and selling generally shows up in the holdings of sophisticated investors.
NOVEMBER ASX ACTIVITY REGISTRY MOVEMENTS REGISTRY Vs ASX Activity
SELLS BUYS OFF ON RATIO Shortfall

42,533,272 42,533,272 25,816,244 26,361,264 61% 39%
A key concern about the trading place is that a genuine buyer standing in the market to acquire shares
shouldnt result in a dramatic increase in trading volumes. Yet a dramatic increase in trading volumes was a
stand-out feature of the accumulation by M&G.
A single broker buying stock and then selling some to take profits into a rising market before repeating the
process when the market settled, would be a reasonable approach to building a holding. However having
multiple brokers involved, all acting for the same beneficial interest leads to a rigged/compromised market.
It also means means that the market is non-genuine and pricing levels are artificially set and maintained.
The confusing market signals generated by such trading activity would have provided an unfair advantage to
the accumulating entitity. For example, the wall of selling accompanying price increases would most
certainly have panicked some holders into disposing of shares yet much of the selling wasnt genuine as it
represented Wash Trades or trades that that didnt impact the register.
The following observations all raise concerns about the market activity that occurred during November and
December 2010 while M&G were in the market buying shares.
As mentioned, average daily trading volumes increased from 769,293 shares when M&G werent in
the market to 2,515,514 shares when they were, which represents a 227% increase;
Logically, it doesnt follow that an anonymous buyer in the market should cause volumes to spike.
Yet that is what occurred on October 29 and November 1 prior to M&G informing the market about
their buying which occurred on November 2;
The data suggests that entities were trading on October 29 and November 1 with inside knowledge
about the buying taking place by M&G;
The data also suggests that entities acting in a collusive manner were trading large volumes back and
forth between themselves while M&G were accumulating shares from genuine sellers, with much of
the trading being non-genuine and not resulting in changes in ownership. The effect was to distort
trading and to unsettle the market.
The trading behaviours need to be viewed in the context that Wash Trades are illegal and trading
designed to set and maintain artificial prices is also illegal.

A substantial volume of buying
and selling didnt impact the
register which casts huge doubts
about the integrity of trading.
70

To more accurately contrast broker activity with the impact it has had on the register, the data should be
adjusted to allow for T+3 settlements. Registry data for November (i.e. from Nov 1 to Nov 30) ought to
compare the broker activity that took place late October and which was settled in November (i.e. 27, 28 &
29 October) and shouldnt include the broker activity that took place late November and which was settled
in early December (i.e., 26, 27, & 30 November).
Adjusting for T+3 settlements and again ignoring broker nominee share movements the revised table for
November is as follows.
NOVEMBER ASX ACTIVITY REGISTRY MOVEMENTS REGISTER Vs ASX ACTIVITY
SELLS BUYS OFF ON RATIO
Shortfall
48,425,421 48,425,421 25,816,244 26,361,264 54% 46%

It is apparent that a very substantial amount of buying and selling during November didnt make it to the
register coinciding with M&G accumulating a major stake in the Company. The missing trades amounted
to around 22.5 million sells and 22.0 million buys.
The trend in November accompanying M&Gs buying is seen to be remarkably similar to what occurred in
August 2010 although the number of Wash Trades in August was elevated even further. The table below
summarizes ASX Activity and Registry Activity for August 2010.
AUGUST ASX ACTIVITY REGISTRY MOVEMENTS REGISTRY Vs ASX Activity
SELLS BUYS OFF ON RATIO CHANGE
93,327,086 93,327,086 43,682,825 41,680,910 46% -54%






During August 2010, non-genuine buying and selling of the order of 50 million shares washed back and
forth between related entities, dramatically affecting the share price but not impacting the register. The
entities responsible for such aberrant trading data still need to be identifed and their trading properly
assessed.
Almost half of the ASX
buys and sells in
November didnt make
it to the register.
More than half of
the ASX buys and
sells in Aug 2010
didnt make it to
the register
71

8.2.9.8.6 TRADING DATA ASSOCIATED WITH M&Gs BUYING IN NOVEMBER & DECEMBER 2010
The table summarizes M&Gs buying as disclosed in various substantial shareholder notices, together with
the corresponding daily trading statistics.
Trading
Day
ASX
Volume
M&G
Buying
M&G as a % of
Daily Turnover
Closing
Price
Close Below
Daily High
Daily
Change
Days
High
Days
Low
Daily
Range
Oct-29 5,705,475 884,380 15.5% $2.39 $0.02 $0.24 $2.41 $2.18 $0.23
Nov-01 5,477,122 1,035,163 18.9% $2.60 $0.03 $0.21 $2.63 $2.41 $0.22
Nov-02 2,504,277 80,457 3.2% $2.61 $0.07 $0.01 $2.68 $2.52 $0.16
Nov-05 3,824,759 1,000,000 26.1% $2.87 $0.05 $0.34 $2.92 $2.61 $0.31
Nov-08 3,347,225 949,822 28.4% $3.03 $0.10 $0.16 $3.13 $2.96 $0.17
Nov-09 2,005,022 687,554 34.3% $3.06 $0.09 $0.03 $3.15 $3.04 $0.11
Nov-10 1,622,500 362,624 22.3% $3.04 $0.14 -$0.02 $3.18 $3.00 $0.18
Nov-11 826,528 20,559 2.5% $3.05 $0.05 $0.01 $3.10 $2.96 $0.14
Nov-12 2,855,670 550,384 19.3% $3.35 $0.05 $0.30 $3.40 $3.01 $0.39
Nov-15 2,215,093 394,732 17.8% $3.62 $0.06 $0.27 $3.68 $3.31 $0.37
Nov-16 3,190,583 650,439 20.4% $4.01 $0.00 $0.39 $4.01 $3.71 $0.30
Nov-17 2,901,469 424,561 14.6% $3.97 $0.02 -$0.04 $3.99 $3.66 $0.33
Nov-19 1,812,197 747,000 41.2% $3.91 $0.17 -$0.03 $4.08 $3.91 $0.17
Nov-22 717,877 253,000 35.2% $3.91 $0.07 $0.00 $3.98 $3.91 $0.07
Nov-24 2,379,847 500,000 21.0% $3.80 $0.02 $0.16 $3.82 $3.80 $0.02
Dec-02 2,302,622 500,000 21.7% $4.01 $0.00 $0.35 $4.01 $3.73 $0.28
Dec-10 799,691 237,257 29.7% $4.16 $0.09 -$0.07 $4.25 $4.13 $0.12
Dec-13 715,144 226,789 31.7% $4.15 $0.03 -$0.01 $4.18 $4.10 $0.08
Dec-14 2,591,660 746,737 28.8% $4.64 $0.08 $0.49 $4.72 $4.13 $0.59
Totals 47,794,761 10,251,458 Average 22.8%

COMMENTS
The data demonstrates the impact that Wash Trades and short selling have had on trading where
prices have generally been subdued despite a strong buying presence in the market. For example,
on November 19, M&G accounted for 41% of all buying but the share price fell on the day.
Price falls on other days also demonstrate the control over pricing levels by entities likely to be
supporting the accumulation by M&G.
Very few days resulted in the share price closing near its highs, despite M&Gs strong buying .
Closing prices on average were 6 cents below the daily highs.

8.2.9.8.7 NOVEMBER TRADING DATA FOR WHEN M&G WERENT BUYING
Trading
Day
ASX
Volume
M&G
Buying
Closing
Price
Close Below
Daily High
Daily
Change
Days
High
Days
Low
Daily
Range
Nov-03 786,416 0 $2.52 $0.11 -$0.09 $2.63 $2.51 $0.12
Nov-04 753,188 0 $2.53 $0.05 $0.01 $2.58 $2.51 $0.07
Nov-18 1,982,155 0 $3.94 $0.23 -$0.03 $4.17 $3.87 $0.30
Nov-23 1,223,409 0 $3.64 $0.24 -$0.27 $3.88 $3.60 $0.28
Nov-25 659,029 0 $3.76 $0.20 -$0.04 $3.96 $3.75 $0.21
Nov-26 465,337 0 $3.81 $0.06 $0.05 $3.87 $3.71 $0.16
Nov-29 429,877 0 $3.73 $0.06 -$0.08 $3.79 $3.67 $0.12
Nov-30 534,379 0 $3.72 $0.11 -$0.01 $3.83 $3.68 $0.15
Share prices tended to fall in the absence of M&G buying which may be considered a normal reaction to
price increases. However the extent of Wash Trades and short selling on days that M&G werent active are
likely to have had an unfair impact on prices as well.
72

8.2.9.8.8 SHORT SELLING DATA
The buying by M&G was accompanied by an escalation in the volumes of short selling supplied to the
market, with most short sales generally covered each day judging by ASICs open short data. To be able to
heavily short sell, knowing that the sales would be easily covered again suggests high levels of collusion
between brokers. The high levels of shorting and short covering accompanying M&Gs buying, with
minimal impact to the register, again focusses attention on the non-genuine nature of trading.

M&G ABSENT FROM THE MARKET M&G ACTIVE IN THE MARKET

DAY (2010) ASX VOLUME Shorts M&G BUYS DAY ASX VOLUME Shorts M&G BUYS
Nov-03 786,416 79,211 0 Oct-29 5,705,475 355,214 884,380
Nov-04 753,188 117,818 0 Nov-01 5,477,122 638,392 1,035,163
Nov-18 1,982,155 251,535 0 Nov-02 2,504,277 364,817 80,457
Nov-23 1,223,409 174,773 0 Nov-05 3,824,759 270,023 1,000,000
Nov-25 659,029 58,176 0 Nov-08 3,347,225 387,828 949,822
Nov-26 465,337 121,829 0 Nov-09 2,005,022 431,147 687,554
Nov-29 429,877 58,902 0 Nov-10 1,622,500 267,216 362,624
Nov-30 534,379 59,200 0 Nov-11 826,528 61,180 20,559
Dec-01 557,390 118,833 0 Nov-12 2,855,670 326,858 550,384
Dec-03 1,466,104 240,279 0 Nov-15 2,215,093 237,212 394,732
Dec-06 964,300 170,248 0 Nov-16 3,190,583 613,165 650,439
Dec-07 771,199 91,342 0 Nov-17 2,901,469 438,185 424,561
Dec-08 524,671 101,773 0 Nov-19 1,812,197 195,271 747,000
Dec-09 513,111 79,527 0 Nov-22 717,877 83,889 253,000
Dec-15 902,700 124,090 0 Nov-24 2,379,847 202,656 500,000
Dec-16 670,400 77,472 0 Dec-02 2,302,622 138,431 500,000
Dec-17 601,600 127,141 0 Dec-10 799,691 77,233 237,257
Dec-20 468,400 75,044 0 Dec-13 715,144 53,783 226,789
Dec-21 342,900 55,545 0 Dec-14 2,591,660 250,360 746,737
Totals 14,616,565 2,182,738 0 Totals 47,794,761 5,392,860 10,251,458

COMMENTS:

10.2 million purchases by M&G were matched by 5.3 million short sales.

During November, Open Short Positions increased from 395,991 shares (Oct 29) to 1,114,284
shares (Nov 30) coinciding with M&G doing most of their buying. M&G obviously had the view that
CDU shares were already cheap, not overvalued, hence their decision to pursue a significant stake
in the company through on-market buying. Shorting by interests associated with M&G is therefore
seen to be manipulative in intent rather than seeking genuine price discovery.

Any attempts to shape the market through trading churn or manipulative short selling, in support
of an energetic buying campaign, needs to be viewed in context with the High Courts clarifications
on creating and maintaining an artificial market.

There is the possibility that Interests separate to M&G may have seen the M&G buying as folly and
shorted accordingly, which might also explain the high level of shorts. However, genuine shorting
would have impacted the register whereas the overwhelming trend during November was for large
volumes of trading churn that didnt make it to the register.

As the M&G buying dissipated during December, Open Positions decreased from the Nov 30 high
back to 692,971 by Dec 31. The data suggests that increased levels of shorting and increased levels
of Wash Trades were an integral part of strategies designed to support M&Gs buying in the
market. Such activity also suggests collusion between entities in support of M&Gs buying as the
covering of shorts had zero price impact..
73

8.2.9.8.9 TRADING TRENDS: October 2010 to January 2011
Despite the short selling and the high volumes of back and forth trading churn supplied to the market as
M&G accumulated shares, prices eventually recovered to the levels seen prior to the August 18 resource
upgrade.
The price increases suggest a reasonably tight register but also, that events surrounding the August
resource announcement resulted in a grossly undervalued and somewhat misinformed market.






























PRICE CHART versus DAILY TRADING VOLUMES versus DAILY SHORT SALES
2010

M&G BUYING
Pre-Jorc Aug 15 $3.79
Daily Trading Volumes
accompanying M&G Buying
PRICES
TRADING VOLUMES
Daily Shorting Volumes
accompanying M&G Buying
NOTE: Different scale to
trading volumes
SHORT SALE VOLUMES
Trading volumes fell sharply after
M&G ceased buying
Short selling tends to mirror trading volumes suggesting that it is a manipulative ploy accompanying trading with very
little to do with fair price discovery. The same could be said of the large volumes of small crossings used to lower prices.
74

8.2.9.8.10 GENERAL COMMENTS
An examination of the trading data accompanying the accumulation by M&G reveals that the buying was
very much a stage-managed event with a range of institutional brokers aiding the process. The volume
spikes accompanying each day of buying are the first sign that brokers were combining with their
endeavours to help to shape the market so that shares would be made available to M&G. Logically it
would make sense if the broker acting for M&G released shares back into the market to dampen
expectations as shares were being accumulated. However given the large number of shares required to be
bought, selling, as well as buying, may have telegraphed their intentions to the wider market and slowed
down attempts to accumulate shares. Instead non-genuine selling looks to have been put through other
brokers perhaps to dampen expectations, while M&G bought large volumes of shares.The problem with
such an approach is that collusive trading with entities dispensing buy and sell orders through a network of
brokers in support of accumulation by an associate, very much has the look of price fixing about it. It is
illegal on many levels including trading to create an artificial market and engaging in cartel price fixing
activity.
Also, trading churn with brokers acting for much the same interests invariably results in trading losses for
some and trading profits for others, but where the overall result is minimal profits or losses and minimal
changes to beneficial ownership. i.e. Such trading represents a zero-sum game and further reflects on the
non-genuine nature of trading.
8.2.9.8.11 BROKER SETTLEMENT SHARE FLOWS VERSUS BUYING & SELLING
Table 8.2.9.2 listed the ASX buying and selling data for the leading brokers for the period October 2010
through January 2011. Further insights into trading can be gained by comparing settlement share flows
through broker nominee accounts. There are two categories.
1. Broker nominee share flows reported in Market Movement reports
The nominee accounts are used primarily to provide safe passage for shares passing between
shareholders who are lenders of shares and broker clients involved with short selling or short
covering. Market Movement reports therefore list the share flows through shareholder accounts as
a result of buying and selling together with the share flows through broker nominee accounts.
2. Broker Nominee share flows reported in Net Movement reports
Broker nominee accounts also support settlements for normal trading, as well as providing a vehicle
for share flows associated with securities lending where shares flow back and forth between
lenders and broker custodial accounts. Firstly to make them available for short selling by depositing
them in broker custodial accounts, and secondly to return loaned shares back to lenders after short
covering transactions are settled. Net movement reports include all Market Movement data (i.e.,
shareholder movements and broker nominee movements that facilitate short selling) as well as
broker settlement share flows.
The table that follows compares broker buying and selling with broker settlement share flows and also
includes broker registry share flows on behalf of clients. Also provided is a breakdown of broker nominee
share flows that have supported securities lending transactions as evidenced in Market Movement reports.
Of around 82 million shares flowing OFF and ON the register over the four-month period, 14.03 million
shares were moved out of broker nominee accounts and 13.23 million shares moved into such accounts.
The remainder of share movements concerned shareholder accounts.
75

The registry involvements of brokers are reduced compared to their buying and selling in the market as
large volumes of trades are done by most brokers on behalf of institutions that are settled elsewhere (e.g.,
they are settled not by the brokers but by custodians and/or settlement specialists). Also, adding to the
confusion, several brokers have dealings in broker nominee accounts associated with securities lending
share flows, but dont appear on the register regarding specific clients.
The result is a trading summary where large discrepancies exist between buying and selling in the market
and the processing of trades that show up on the register. Confusion is the dominate feature of trading
and settlements, at least when viewed from a lay perspective, yet buying and selling is a straight forward,
simple process that ought to be readily reconciled amongst those involved. The fact that it isnt rings loud
warning bells in regard to market transparency and market integrity.

BROKER
Broker
Code
% of ASX
Trading
% of Broker
Settlements
% of
Registry
Flows

Broker Nominee Entity
(Re: Market Movements)
% of
Nominee
Flows
Commonwealth Securities COMM 17.9% 15.1% 11.3% Share Direct Nominees 1.0%
Deutsche Bank DMG 7.8% 6.5% 0.0% Pan Australia Nominees 2.8%
E-Trade Securities ETRD 7.1% 8.4% 4.6% - 0.0%
UBS Securities UBS 6.9% 21.6% 0.0% UBS Nominees 65.9%
Morgan Stanley MSDW 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% Morgan Stanley Nominees 2.0%
Citigroup Global CITI 6.1% 4.9% 0.0% - 0.0%
AIEX AIEX 5.9% 3.4% 4.4% - 0.0%
Morgan Smith SBAR 5.4% 2.5% 1.6% Skeet Nominees 0.6%
BBY BBY 3.8% 0.0% 0.0% - 0.0%
Macquarie Insto MACQ 2.9% 3.9% 0.5% Buttonwood Nominees 0.0%
State One Stockbroking SOSL 2.8% 0.2% 0.1% - 0.0%
Goldman Sachs GS 2.7% 0.0% 0.1% - 0.0%
HUB24CS HUB24 2.4% 1.9% 0.2% - 0.0%
Merrill Lynch MERL 2.2% 3.6% 0.0% MLEQ & Merrill Lynch 11.9%
Credit Suisse CSUI 2.0% 1.1% 0.0% CS Fourth Nominees 8.2%
JP Morgan JPM 1.6% 2.0% 0.0% New Economy Nominees 1.6%
ABN Amro ABNA 0.01% 0.0% 0.0% ABN Amro Nominees 6.0%

The substantial variations between buying and selling involvements, settlement transactions and registry
share flows reflect badly on a system that tolerates the large scale obfuscation of trading records. As
brought to attention by research into trading data, buying and selling by a substantial interest can be
disguised through the use of multiple brokers with settlements then being directed elsewhere.
An analogy that helps to put matters into perspective is that major entities trading through multiple
brokers and where collusion ensures effective control is held over trading outcomes with the ownership
over shares not changing materially, is akin to a property auction where the majority of bids are dummy
bids representing the one interest either as a buyer or seller. The situation is hugely lacking in regard to
market integrity.
It comes as no surprise that the financial regulator claims it is often difficult to gather evidence to prove
wrong doing <CLICK: Reference Link> and that would especially apply to the share market. The system by its
very design ensures that it is very difficult to make entities accountable for the impact their trading has on
the market, whether it be trading in CuDeco or trading in any other stock on the ASX. It follows that
without a willingness to conduct audits, glaring trading anomalies cannot possibly be accurately assessed.
76

And without audits any attempts to set artificial prices or to manipulate the market, whether by a single
entity or entities colluding with their trading, cannot be successfully prosecuted.
However, what can be proceeded with immediately is an investigation into broker activity that has resulted
in overwhelmingly anonymous trading trends and dubious trading statistics as such behaviours are starkly
obvious as demonstrated by research. Whether responsible in their own right or merely implementing the
orders of clients, brokers need to be held accountable for trading that is manipulative and which creates
artificial prices.
The standout features of the previous table include:
UBS Securities dominance regarding settlements (21.6%) and securities lending share flows (65.9%)
but with a market share of only 6.9%.
The low profiles of MSDW, CITI, DMG, SBAR and MACQ regarding settlements despite dominant
buying and selling profiles in the market.
The use of the ABN Amro Nominees account for securities lending share flows despite the broker
having virtually no involvement in the market or appearing on the register regarding settlements.
The absence of broker details regarding institutional dealings who accounted for over 60% of all
shareholder register movements through entities such as JP Morgan Nominees, HSBC Nominees,
Citicorp Nominees and national Nominees. (Refer Table 8.2.9.3)
The absence of information concerning retail brokers regarding their non-retail client activity
estimated at between 50% and 60% of their trading volumes, and the absence of information
concerning brokers who use 3
rd
party agents to settle their trades. The trading within
Commonwealth Securities requires particular scrutiny because of the potential for institutional
trading within COMM to be taking advantage of large numbers of COMM retail clients aided by the
confusing market signals generated by dubious trading algorithms.
The data strongly suggests that UBS Securities has been the hub where a lot of buying and selling
has been channelled through regarding settlements, and where its dominant profile in facilitating
lower prices through Downticks, short selling and influence during auctions has restrained prices
while a major accumulation has taken place.

Given the extensive anomalies surrounding trading, it is inconceivable that the situation concerning M&G
accumulation back in Nov 2010 met with regulatory approval, yet that is what has occurred up until the
present time. It is also inconceivable that trading throughout August 2010 met with regulatory approval
even though the trading anomalies were on a far greater scale to that addressed by the current complaint.
And it is inconceivable that M&G trading through June, July and August this year (i.e., 2013) has to date
met with regulatory approval, when trading anomalies associated with the sell down of the holding point
to a grossly unfair and artificial trading environment as well.
It is requested that a review of all trading be undertaken and corrective action taken so that CuDeco can
trade unshackled from the manipulative influences that have held sway for such a long time.

77

APPENDIX 1: CuDECO BROKER TRADING DATA CORRESPONDING TO M&G BUYING

The tables list brokers in terms of net-accumulation and net-selling on the days that the M&G Group
accumulated shares in CuDeco.

OCT 29, 2010 M&G Buys: 884,380 shares NOV 1, 2010 M&G Buys: 1,035,163 shares
M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW) M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW)

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS
MSDW 41,229 887,189 845,960 0.7% 15.5%

MSDW 96,473 1,049,160 952,687 2.0% 19.0%
SBAR 539,186 871,437 332,251 9.5% 15.3%

ETRD 391,194 545,184 153,990 7.0% 10.0%
HUB24 345,864 457,089 111,225 6.1% 8.0%

AIEX 198,815 256,383 57,568 4.0% 5.0%
DMG 637,116 733,412 96,296 11.2% 12.9%

SUSQ 35,390 84,661 49,271 1.0% 2.0%
HART 40,000 90,000 50,000 0.7% 1.6%

ORDS 0 36,617 36,617 0.0% 1.0%
GS 13,074 61,248 48,174 0.2% 1.1%

CITI 156,784 190,255 33,471 3.0% 3.0%
INST 22,803 59,194 36,391 0.4% 1.0%

UBS 285,631 318,271 32,640 5.0% 6.0%
PSL 22,000 57,100 35,100 0.4% 1.0%

JDV 4,000 22,733 18,733 0.0% 0.0%
CITI 119,529 147,260 27,731 2.1% 2.6%

STBG 4,579 18,000 13,421 0.0% 0.0%
STBG 5,824 27,461 21,637 0.1% 0.5%

DMG 606,250 614,806 8,556 11.0% 11.0%
TPPM 207,278 218,304 11,026 3.6% 3.8%

BRID 0 3,000 3,000 0.0% 0.0%
TIMB 2,000 7,000 5,000 0.0% 0. 1%

IMCP 0 2,815 2,815 0.0% 0.0%
JDV 0 2,500 2,500 0.0% 0.0%

WILS 0 2,250 2,250 0.0% 0.0%
MINC 50,000 50,000 0 0.9% 0.9%

BRLL 0 1,980 1,980 0.0% 0.0%


JPM 0 1,247 1,247 0.0% 0.0%
UBSW 1,002,534 331,038 -671,496 17.6% 5.8%

SOSL 160,000 161,000 1,000 3.0% 3.0%
ETRD 329,706 164,117 -165,589 5.8% 2.9%

DAIW 0 675 675 0.0% 0.0%
COMM 834,420 676,128 -158,292 14.6% 11.9%

MACP 116,789 117,350 561 2.0% 2.0%
CSUI 176,418 57,616 -118,802 3.1% 1.0%


MACP 119,111 6,000 -113,111 2.1% 0.1%

HUB24 598,043 107,818 -490,225 11.0% 2.0%
AIEX 163,956 68,955 -95,001 2.9% 1.2%

COMM 956,545 670,157 -286,388 17.0% 12.0%
BELL 73,550 8,000 -65,550 1.3% 0.1%

SBAR 892,743 727,307 -165,436 16.0% 13.0%
CMCS 61,310 2,000 -59,310 1.1% 0.0%

INST 115,718 7,025 -108,693 2.0% 0.0%
MACQ 101,674 63,545 -38,129 1.8% 1.1%

HART 50,000 0 -50,000 1.0% 0.0%
SUSQ 50,940 19,891 -31,049 0.9% 0.3%

CMCS 55,370 13,445 -41,925 1.0% 0.0%
BBY 356,186 328,141 -28,045 6.2% 5.8%

TPPM 91,168 50,732 -40,436 2.0% 1.0%
D2MX 27,500 0 -27,500 0.5% 0.0%

BELL 57,500 20,000 -37,500 1.0% 0.0%
MERL 38,068 19,653 -18,415 0.7% 0.3%

MACQ 146,371 116,004 -30,367 3.0% 2.0%
RBSM 13,850 0 -13,850 0.2% 0.0%

BBY 180,420 151,601 -28,819 3.0% 3.0%
SOSL 294,337 287,537 -6,800 5.2% 5.0%

MERL 42,059 18,858 -23,201 1.0% 0.0%
EURO 5,000 0 -5,000 0.1% 0.0%

RBSM 15,000 0 -15,000 0.0% 0.0%
TAYL 5,000 0 -5,000 0.1% 0.0%

CSUI 29,375 19,213 -10,162 1.0% 0.0%
IMCP 6,012 3,660 -2,352 0.1% 0.1%

TAYL 10,000 0 -10,000 0.0% 0.0%

MINC 69,710 60,290 -9,420 1.0% 1.0%
PSL 39,855 34,000 -5,855 1.0% 1.0%

GS 48,840 43,285 -5,555 1.0% 1.0%

SHAD 4,000 0 -4,000 0.0% 0.0%

PERSH 3,500 0 -3,500 0.0% 0.0%

D2MX 10,000 8,000 -2,000 0.0% 0.0%

TIMB 5,000 3,000 -2,000 0.0% 0.0%
Totals 5,705,475 5,705,475 0 100% 100%

Totals 5,477,122 5,477,122 0 100% 100%


78

APPENDIX 1: BROKER TRADING DATA CORRESPONDING TO M&G BUYING (contd)


NOV 2, 2010 M&G Buys: 80,457 shares NOV 5, 2010 M&G Buys: 1,000,000 shares
M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW) M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW)

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS
COMM 498,968 874,484 375,516 19.9% 34.9% MSDW 41,595 1,044,501 1,002,906 1.1% 27.3%
ETRD 240,629 340,735 100,106 9.6% 13.6% SBAR 354,103 479,103 125,000 9.3% 12.5%
MSDW 45,662 94,479 48,817 1.8% 3.8% INST 22,237 81,910 59,673 0.6% 2.1%
MERL 35,530 68,491 32,961 1.4% 2.7% TPPM 77,300 113,335 36,035 2.0% 3.0%
MACQ 57,804 82,768 24,964 2.3% 3.3% CSUI 19,067 42,411 23,344 0.5% 1.1%
WILS 0 7,900 7,900 0.0% 0.3% CITI 138,882 158,837 19,955 3.6% 4. 2%
ORDS 0 7,700 7,700 0.0% 0.3% TIMB 3,000 19,300 16,300 0.1% 0.5%
CMCS 0 7,210 7,210 0.0% 0.3% HUB24 120,226 135,226 15,000 3.1% 3.5%
HUB24 108,710 114,035 5,325 4.3% 4.6% BRID 0 11,000 11,000 0.0% 0.3%
BELL 0 5,000 5,000 0.0% 0.2% PSL 0 10,000 10,000 0.0% 0.3%
MORR 0 5,000 5,000 0.0% 0.2% SHAD 0 10,000 10,000 0.0% 0.3%
CLSA 0 3,152 3,152 0.0% 0.1% STBG 0 9,000 9,000 0.0% 0.2%
AIEX 202,310 203,032 722 8.1% 8.1% CLSA 0 4,619 4,619 0.0% 0.1%
SHAD 0 600 600 0.0% 0.0% MINC 0 2,500 2,500 0.0% 0.1%
ABNA 4,000 4,100 100 0.2% 0.2% IMCP 8,816 10,474 1,658 0.2% 0.3%
JPM 0 999 999 0.0% 0.0%
DMG 354,827 181,850 -172,977 14.2% 7.3%
CSUI 79,462 5,712 -73,750 3.2% 0.2% COMM 1,009,169 445,155 -564,014 26.4% 11.6%
SUSQ 90,039 24,145 -65,894 3.6% 1.0% AIEX 299,873 106,472 -193,401 7.8% 2.8%
INST 89,646 27,508 -62,138 3.6% 1.1% UBS 235,868 104,894 -130,974 6.2% 2.7%
GS 112,235 63,814 -48,421 4.5% 2.5% ETRD 330,366 205,420 -124,946 8.6% 5.4%
SBAR 50,000 4,000 -46,000 2.0% 0.2% BELL 110,475 24,630 -85,845 2.9% 0.6%
TPPM 57,867 22,413 -35,454 2.3% 0.9% MACP 74,500 20,000 -54,500 1.9% 0.5%
PSL 39,250 9,000 -30,250 1.6% 0.4% MERL 100,840 54,241 -46,599 2.6% 1.4%
CITI 118,249 91,991 -26,258 4.7% 3.7% MACQ 94,430 67,396 -27,034 2.5% 1.8%
BBY 63,181 43,000 -20,181 2.5% 1.7% RBSM 21,000 1,030 -19,970 0.5% 0.0%
MACP 21,505 2,080 -19,425 0.9% 0.1% JDV 24,000 5,000 -19,000 0.6% 0.1%
UBS 185,766 173,303 -12,463 7.4% 6.9% CMCS 20,778 6,113 -14,665 0.5% 0.2%
SOSL 31,000 26,000 -5,000 1.2% 1.0% DMG 273,269 258,747 -14,522 7.1% 6.8%
JDV 9,500 6,000 -3,500 0.4% 0.2% GS 91,857 81,253 -10,604 2.4% 2.1%
TIMB 6,000 3,460 -2,540 0.2% 0.1% BBY 93,950 83,950 -10,000 2.5% 2.2%
IMCP 2,137 1,315 -822 0.1% 0.1% INTS 10,000 0 -10,000 0.3% 0.0%
WILS 12,000 3,700 -8,300 0.3% 0.1%
SOSL 143,000 136,000 -7,000 3.7% 3.6%
SHAW 5,000 0 -5,000 0.1% 0.0%
ORDS 1,615 0 -1,615 0.0% 0.0%
SUSQ 87,543 87,543 0 2.3% 2.3%
TAYL 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0%

Totals 2,504,277 2,504,277 0 100% 100% Totals 3,824,759 3,824,759 0 100% 100%


79

APPENDIX 1: BROKER TRADING DATA CORRESPONDING TO M&G BUYING (contd)


NOV 8, 2010 M&G Buys: 949,822 shares NOV 9, 2010 M&G Buys: 687,554 shares
M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW) M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW)

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS
MSDW 49,258 977,929 928,671 1.5% 29.2% MSDW 18,391 715,575 697,184 0.9% 35.7%
COMM 391,472 684,914 293,442 11.7% 20.5% COMM 223,232 346,355 123,123 11.1% 17.3%
AIEX 24,488 145,263 120,775 0.7% 4.3% AIEX 107,071 138,654 31,583 5.3% 6.9%
RBSM 0 42,521 42,521 0.0% 1.3% ETRD 108,107 137,425 29,318 5.4% 6.9%
MERL 38,068 78,576 40,508 1.1% 2.3% CITI 44,548 60,919 16,371 2.2% 3.0%
TPPM 40,389 76,584 36,195 1.2% 2.3% RBSM 0 13,205 13,205 0.0% 0.7%
SUSQ 56,542 91,257 34,715 1.7% 2.7% CSUI 56,039 68,488 12,449 2.8% 3.4%
CARM 0 10,000 10,000 0.0% 0.3% CMCS 0 9,855 9,855 0.0% 0.5%
SOSL 92,000 101,700 9,700 2.7% 3.0% WILS 3,800 11,600 7,800 0.2% 0.6%
SHAW 0 8,333 8,333 0.0% 0.2% SHAW 2,000 8,000 6,000 0.1% 0.4%
ORDS 0 5,450 5,450 0.0% 0.2% BAIL 0 5,000 5,000 0.0% 0.2%
CLSA 0 2,895 2,895 0.0% 0.1% STBG 0 4,634 4,634 0.0% 0.2%
JDV 9,730 12,216 2,486 0.3% 0.4% GS 38,780 43,140 4,360 1.9% 2.2%
WILS 0 1,650 1,650 0.0% 0.0% BELL 25,000 27,000 2,000 1.2% 1.3%
EURO 0 1,000 1,000 0.0% 0.0% BRLL 0 1,900 1,900 0.0% 0.1%
FOST 21,003 21,003 0 0.6% 0.6% HUB24 0 1,650 1,650 0.0% 0.1%
MERL 18,411 19,584 1,173 0.9% 1.0%
UBS 604,496 63,101 -541,395 18.1% 1.9% TPPM 2,161 2,512 351 0.1% 0.1%
PSL 210,700 5,000 -205,700 6.3% 0.1% BBY 7,768 7,768 0 0.4% 0.4%
MACQ 189,443 34,069 -155,374 5.7% 1.0%
DMG 341,836 205,311 -136,525 10.2% 6.1% SBAR 308,916 780 -308,136 15.4% 0.0%
SBAR 118,702 59,738 -58,964 3.5% 1.8% EVAN 250,000 0 -250,000 12.5% 0.0%
ETRD 229,621 173,760 -55,861 6.9% 5.2% DMG 280,120 144,701 -135,419 14.0% 7.2%
MACP 83,400 28,194 -55,206 2.5% 0.8% MACQ 163,802 51,904 -111,898 8.2% 2.6%
BBY 123,598 72,598 -51,000 3.7% 2.2% SUSQ 34,715 0 -34,715 1.7% 0.0%
GS 103,074 53,703 -49,371 3.1% 1.6% ORDS 34,654 1,633 -33,021 1.7% 0.1%
CSUI 62,193 21,051 -41,142 1.9% 0.6% MACP 85,840 55,000 -30,840 4.3% 2.7%
BELL 52,104 11,655 -40,449 1.6% 0.3% INST 39,641 10,804 -28,837 2.0% 0.5%
CMCS 41,900 6,826 -35,074 1.3% 0.2% JDV 15,000 4,300 -10,700 0.7% 0.2%
JPM 40,000 7,155 -32,845 1.2% 0.2% BRID 10,000 330 -9,670 0.5% 0.0%
D2MX 21,000 0 -21,000 0.6% 0.0% UBS 90,908 83,664 -7,244 4.5% 4.2%
INST 40,601 19,848 -20,753 1.2% 0.6% SOSL 24,700 21,000 -3,700 1.2% 1.0%
HUB24 221,154 206,154 -15,000 6.6% 6.2% D2MX 5,200 4,000 -1,200 0.3% 0.2%
TIMB 14,000 5,000 -9,000 0.4% 0.1% JPM 442 0 -442 0.0% 0.0%
CITI 99,625 95,579 -4,046 3.0% 2.9% TIMB 2,000 1,700 -300 0.1% 0.1%
STBG 3,894 0 -3,894 0.1% 0.0%
MINC 8,500 6,000 -2,500 0.3% 0.2%
BRID 2,340 0 -2,340 0.1% 0.0%
IMCP 12,094 11,192 -902 0.4% 0.3%
Totals 3,347,225 3,347,225 0 100% 100% Totals 2,005,022 2,005,022 0 100% 100%


80

APPENDIX 1: BROKER TRADING DATA CORRESPONDING TO M&G BUYING (contd)


NOV 10, 2010 M&G Buys: 362,264 shares NOV 11, 2010 M&G Buys: 20,599 shares
M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW) M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW)

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS
MSDW 48,229 385,886 337,657 3.0% 23.8% WILS 2,000 64,900 62,900 0.2% 7.9%
ETRD 107,386 157,256 49,870 6.6% 9.7% CSUI 6,110 46,061 39,951 0.7% 5.6%
MACP 14,400 50,000 35,600 0.9% 3.1% MSDW 2,430 27,634 25,204 0.3% 3.3%
GS 13,210 44,646 31,436 0.8% 2.8% MERL 20,122 40,850 20,728 2.4% 4.9%
COMM 384,403 409,986 25,583 23.7% 25.3% MACQ 6,341 24,754 18,413 0.8% 3.0%
AIEX 118,292 141,578 23,286 7.3% 8.7% ETRD 36,260 52,702 16,442 4.4% 6.4%
STBG 0 21,245 21,245 0.0% 1.3% BBY 48,914 64,879 15,965 5.9% 7.8%
MACQ 5,414 25,221 19,807 0.3% 1.6% RBSM 0 13,411 13,411 0.0% 1.6%
PSL 2,000 15,000 13,000 0.1% 0.9% STBG 0 10,000 10,000 0.0% 1.2%
CSUI 20,934 24,191 3,257 1.3% 1.5% INST 5,960 15,939 9,979 0.7% 1.9%
WILS 0 3,200 3,200 0.0% 0.2% SBAR 1,000 10,000 9,000 0.1% 1.2%
SUSQ 11,410 14,463 3,053 0.7% 0.9% MINC 0 6,500 6,500 0.0% 0.8%
TIMB 2,172 4,500 2,328 0.1% 0.3% JDV 0 6,230 6,230 0.0% 0.8%
BAIL 0 1,628 1,628 0.0% 0.1% TPPM 5,000 9,369 4,369 0.6% 1.1%
CMCS 609 2,065 1,456 0.0% 0.1% SUSQ 13,349 17,252 3,903 1.6% 2.1%
PERSH 1,000 1,000 0 0.1% 0.1% CITI 28,647 31,311 2,664 3.5% 3.8%
SOSL 6,000 6,000 0 0.4% 0.4% JPM 0 1,462 1,462 0.0% 0.2%
IMCP 1,784 2,964 1,180 0.2% 0.4%
UBS 235,113 46,668 -188,445 14.5% 2.9% CAM 0 1,000 1,000 0.0% 0.1%
SBAR 125,000 10,000 -115,000 7.7% 0.6% SOSL 10,000 10,000 0 1.2% 1.2%
CITI 159,204 62,697 -96,507 9.8% 3.9%
BELL 78,700 0 -78,700 4.9% 0.0% MACP 57,293 0 -57,293 6.9% 0.0%
DMG 206,286 165,419 -40,867 12.7% 10.2% NAL 56,783 0 -56,783 6.9% 0.0%
BBY 15,965 0 -15,965 1.0% 0.0% COMM 227,816 178,361 -49,455 27.6% 21.6%
INST 24,952 15,208 -9,744 1.5% 0.9% UBS 80,679 47,331 -33,348 9.8% 5.7%
MERL 21,891 12,498 -9,393 1.3% 0.8% AIEX 73,284 47,786 -25,498 8.9% 5.8%
JDV 9,650 2,145 -7,505 0.6% 0.1% DMG 69,713 53,461 -16,252 8.4% 6.5%
ORDS 6,000 0 -6,000 0.4% 0.0% CMCS 10,000 0 -10,000 1.2% 0.0%
IMCP 2,261 0 -2,261 0.1% 0.0% GS 36,143 30,371 -5,772 4.4% 3.7%
TPPM 1,128 0 -1,128 0.1% 0.0% BELL 13,000 8,000 -5,000 1.6% 1.0%
JPM 891 0 -891 0.1% 0.0% HUB24 5,000 0 -5,000 0.6% 0.0%
PSL 8,900 4,000 -4,900 1.1% 0.5%







Totals 1,622,500 1,622,500 0 100% 100% Totals 826,528 826,528 0 100% 100%


81

APPENDIX 1: BROKER TRADING DATA CORRESPONDING TO M&G BUYING (contd)


NOV 12, 2010 M&G Buys: 550,384 shares NOV 15, 2010 M&G Buys: 394,742 shares
M&G Broker: JP Morgan (JPM) M&G Broker: JP Morgan (JPM)

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS
JPM 782 550,384 549,602 0.0% 19.3% JPM 4,105 402,942 398,837 0.2% 18.2%
D2MX 123,100 207,000 83,900 4.0% 7.2% D2MX 11,500 50,000 38,500 0.5% 2.3%
CITI 185,795 223,345 37,550 7.0% 7.8% SUSQ 52,918 81,743 28,825 2.4% 3.7%
INST 48,138 75,844 27,706 2.0% 2.7% HUB24 0 20,000 20,000 0.0% 0.9%
MACQ 29,707 53,876 24,169 1.0% 1.9% COMM 464,394 478,115 13,721 21.0% 21.6%
STBG 0 14,000 14,000 0.0% 0.5% BYS 0 10,000 10,000 0.0% 0.5%
DMG 162,757 174,383 11,626 6.0% 6.1% UBS 180,689 189,750 9,061 8.2% 8.6%
BELL 12,057 15,200 3,143 0.0% 0.5% SOSL 97,200 101,200 4,000 4.4% 4.6%
ORDS 0 1,502 1,502 0.0% 0.1% MERL 40,193 44,121 3,928 1.8% 2.0%
CSUI 61,853 63,045 1,192 2.0% 2.2% SHAW 0 3,400 3,400 0.0% 0.2%
TIMB 3,000 4,000 1,000 0.0% 0.1% BRLL 0 2,700 2,700 0.0% 0.1%
BRID 8,000 8,000 0 0.0% 0.3% PSL 1,000 3,500 2,500 0.0% 0.2%
PERSH 2,011 2,011 0 0.0% 0.1% TIMB 3,000 4,490 1,490 0.1% 0.2%

COMM 768,369 490,627 -277,742 27.0% 17.2% MACP 97,800 27,350 -70,450 4.4% 1.2%
AIEX 185,227 80,139 -105,088 6.0% 2.8% BELL 56,280 0 -56,280 2.5% 0.0%
ETRD 258,881 186,909 -71,972 9.0% 6.5% ETRD 189,029 136,649 -52,380 8.5% 6.2%
BBY 92,487 45,487 -47,000 3.0% 1.6% FOST 50,000 0 -50,000 2.3% 0.0%
UBS 172,642 126,711 -45,931 6.0% 4.4% SHAD 50,000 0 -50,000 2.3% 0.0%
MACP 138,707 101,000 -37,707 5.0% 3.5% INST 63,887 26,756 -37,131 2.9% 1.2%
WILS 36,900 0 -36,900 1.0% 0.0% SBAR 51,000 16,300 -34,700 2.3% 0.7%
SBAR 42,000 5,500 -36,500 1.0% 0.2% STBG 32,816 138 -32,678 1.5% 0.0%
PSL 21,500 0 -21,500 1.0% 0.0% DMG 117,340 94,286 -23,054 5.3% 4.3%
MSDW 40,576 19,786 -20,790 1.0% 0.7% WILS 20,000 0 -20,000 0.9% 0.0%
RBSM 14,650 2,600 -12,050 1.0% 0.1% MSDW 19,437 0 -19,437 0.9% 0.0%
TPPM 40,966 31,824 -9,142 1.0% 1.1% CSUI 32,653 13,963 -18,690 1.5% 0.6%
HUB24 8,000 0 -8,000 0.0% 0.0% BBY 82,047 64,269 -17,778 3.7% 2.9%
GS 34,361 27,011 -7,350 1.0% 0.9% AIEX 114,752 99,999 -14,753 5.2% 4.5%
SOSL 175,454 170,454 -5,000 6.0% 6.0% CITI 142,932 129,757 -13,175 6.5% 5.9%
CMCS 14,700 10,000 -4,700 1.0% 0.4% MACQ 26,288 18,232 -8,056 1.2% 0.8%
SUSQ 113,573 110,180 -3,393 4.0% 3.9% JDV 12,679 6,990 -5,689 0.6% 0.3%
IMCP 2,959 0 -2,959 0.0% 0.0% CMCS 26,400 21,500 -4,900 1.2% 1.0%
MERL 50,518 49,152 -1,366 2.0% 1.7% ORDS 10,000 6,000 -4,000 0.5% 0.3%
JDV 6,000 5,700 -300 0.0% 0.2% IMCP 11,646 9,443 -2,203 0.5% 0.4%
TPPM 117,283 115,875 -1,408 5.3% 5.2%
GS 35,825 35,625 -200 1.6% 1.6%



Totals 2,855,670 2,855,670 0 100% 100% Totals 2,215,093 2,215,093 0 100% 100%


82

APPENDIX 1: BROKER TRADING DATA CORRESPONDING TO M&G BUYING (contd)


NOV 16, 2010 M&G Buys: 650,439 shares NOV 17, 2010 M&G Buys: 424,561 shares
M&G Broker: JP Morgan (JPM) M&G Broker: Citigroup Global (CITI)

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS
JPM 6,580 657,579 650,999 0.2% 20.6% CITI 194,141 790,346 596,205 10.7% 43.6%
COMM 596,710 693,666 96,956 19.0% 21.7% D2MX 35,000 101,000 66,000 2.0% 6.0%
AIEX 140,491 193,546 53,055 4.0% 6.1% INST 7,253 51,512 44,259 0.0% 3.0%
ETRD 185,546 222,637 37,091 6.0% 7.0% SBAR 0 17,500 17,500 0.0% 1.0%
HUB24 38,000 73,000 35,000 1.0% 2.3% CSUI 16,944 32,185 15,241 1.0% 2.0%
CMCS 5,055 24,489 19,434 0.0% 0.8% PSL 0 10,000 10,000 0.0% 1.0%
ORDS 14,000 32,500 18,500 0.0% 1.0% ORDS 11,200 20,000 8,800 1.0% 1.0%
SBAR 84,290 100,200 15,910 3.0% 3.1% JDV 0 6,300 6,300 0.0% 0.0%
TPPM 73,711 88,849 15,138 2.0% 2.8% MERL 18,569 24,002 5,433 1.0% 1.0%
BRLL 10,000 22,500 12,500 0.0% 0.7% BBY 96,007 97,344 1,337 5.0% 5.0%
JDV 0 7,160 7,160 0.0% 0.2% SOSL 6,000 6,000 0 0.0% 0.0%
BRID 0 6,500 6,500 0.0% 0.2%
EURO 0 4,750 4,750 0.0% 0.1% ETRD 327,963 58,950 -269,013 18.0% 3.0%
RBSM 106,000 5,000 -101,000 6.0% 0.0%
STBG 0 3,000 3,000 0.0% 0.1% DMG 144,742 52,609 -92,133 8.0% 3.0%
TIMB 3,750 4,650 900 0.0% 0.1% BELL 41,000 0 -41,000 2.0% 0.0%
MACP 192,892 6,000 -186,892 6.0% 0.2% HUB24 61,066 22,000 -39,066 3.0% 1.0%
INST 153,552 24,109 -129,443 5.0% 0.8% CMCS 33,361 470 -32,891 2.0% 0.0%
UBS 199,291 75,524 -123,767 6.0% 2.4% AIEX 155,523 123,187 -32,336 9.0% 7.0%
DMG 286,386 177,174 -109,212 9.0% 5.6% MACQ 56,788 28,114 -28,674 3.0% 2.0%
BBY 264,736 174,840 -89,896 8.0% 5.5% GS 27,977 1,832 -26,145 2.0% 0.0%
GS 73,971 0 -73,971 2.0% 0.0% SHAD 22,000 0 -22,000 1.0% 0.0%
FOST 100,000 50,000 -50,000 3.0% 1.6% SUSQ 30,971 11,307 -19,664 2.0% 1.0%
MACQ 62,310 18,993 -43,317 2.0% 0.6% MACP 14,700 0 -14,700 1.0% 0.0%
RBSM 60,000 27,300 -32,700 2.0% 0.9% COMM 285,105 274,138 -10,967 16.0% 15.0%
SUSQ 60,815 31,989 -28,826 2.0% 1.0% STBG 10,000 0 -10,000 1.0% 0.0%
D2MX 27,500 0 -27,500 1.0% 0.0% UBS 71,360 63,137 -8,223 4.0% 3.0%
BELL 43,545 17,700 -25,845 1.0% 0.6% AUST 8,000 0 -8,000 0.0% 0.0%
MERL 39,269 26,814 -12,455 1.0% 0.8% TIMB 6,250 0 -6,250 0.0% 0.0%
CSUI 25,951 15,795 -10,156 1.0% 0.5% TPPM 14,421 10,483 -3,938 1.0% 1.0%
WILS 10,000 0 -10,000 0.0% 0.0% MSDW 7,694 4,781 -2,913 0.0% 0.0%
MSDW 9,983 0 -9,983 0.0% 0.0% IMCP 1,967 0 -1,967 0.0% 0.0%
PSL 7,500 0 -7,500 0.0% 0.0% OPTV 195 0 -195 0.0% 0.0%
SHAD 2,500 0 -2,500 0.0% 0.0%
IMCP 1,522 0 -1,522 0.0% 0.0%
SOSL 257,167 256,167 -1,000 8.0% 8.0%
CITI 153,560 153,152 -408 5.0% 4.8%


Totals 3,190,583 3,190,583 0 100% 100% Totals 1,812,197 1,812,197 0 100% 100%


83

APPENDIX 1: BROKER TRADING DATA CORRESPONDING TO M&G BUYING (contd)


NOV 19, 2010 M&G Buys: 747,000 shares NOV 22, 2010 M&G Buys: 253,000 shares
M&G Broker: Citigroup Global (CITI) M&G Broker: Citigroup Global (CITI)

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS
CITI 194,141 790,346 596,205 10.7% 43.6% CITI 40,524 306,748 266,224 5.6% 42.7%
D2MX 35,000 101,000 66,000 2.0% 6.0% INST 1,375 39,366 37,991 0.2% 5.5%
INST 7,253 51,512 44,259 0.0% 3.0% DMG 37,504 70,268 32,764 5.2% 9.8%
SBAR 0 17,500 17,500 0.0% 1.0% CSUI 18,997 34,835 15,838 2.6% 4.9%
CSUI 16,944 32,185 15,241 1.0% 2.0% MERL 23,139 38,069 14,930 3.2% 5.3%
PSL 0 10,000 10,000 0.0% 1.0% CMCS 125 13,500 13,375 0.0% 1.9%
ORDS 11,200 20,000 8,800 1.0% 1.0% UBS 28,266 41,552 13,286 3.9% 5.8%
JDV 0 6,300 6,300 0.0% 0.0% TIMB 0 5,000 5,000 0.0% 0.7%
MERL 18,569 24,002 5,433 1.0% 1.0% MACQ 45,237 48,717 3,480 6.3% 6.8%
BBY 96,007 97,344 1,337 5.0% 5.0% GS 6,295 8,061 1,766 0.9% 1.1%
SOSL 6,000 6,000 0 0.0% 0.0% IMCP 0 621 621 0.0% 0.1%
JPM 5,671 6,217 546 0.8% 0.9%
ETRD 327,963 58,950 -269,013 18.0% 3.0%
RBSM 106,000 5,000 -101,000 6.0% 0.0% COMM 198,703 47,877 -150,826 27.7% 6.7%
DMG 144,742 52,609 -92,133 8.0% 3.0% SBAR 60,000 0 -60,000 8.4% 0.0%
BELL 41,000 0 -41,000 2.0% 0.0% AIEX 37,889 5,200 -32,689 5.3% 0.7%
HUB24 61,066 22,000 -39,066 3.0% 1.0% ETRD 49,546 17,950 -31,596 6.9% 2.5%
CMCS 33,361 470 -32,891 2.0% 0.0% BBY 42,075 14,231 -27,844 5.9% 2.0%
AIEX 155,523 123,187 -32,336 9.0% 7.0% D2MX 19,700 0 -19,700 2.7% 0.0%
MACQ 56,788 28,114 -28,674 3.0% 2.0% MACP 18,750 3,510 -15,240 2.6% 0.5%
GS 27,977 1,832 -26,145 2.0% 0.0% SUSQ 10,155 0 -10,155 1.4% 0.0%
SHAD 22,000 0 -22,000 1.0% 0.0% BELL 10,000 0 -10,000 1.4% 0.0%
SUSQ 30,971 11,307 -19,664 2.0% 1.0% RBSM 10,000 0 -10,000 1.4% 0.0%
MACP 14,700 0 -14,700 1.0% 0.0% WILS 10,000 0 -10,000 1.4% 0.0%
COMM 285,105 274,138 -10,967 16.0% 15.0% JDV 12,597 5,000 -7,597 1.8% 0.7%
STBG 10,000 0 -10,000 1.0% 0.0% TPPM 10,116 3,565 -6,551 1.4% 0.5%
UBS 71,360 63,137 -8,223 4.0% 3.0% PSL 5,000 0 -5,000 0.7% 0.0%
AUST 8,000 0 -8,000 0.0% 0.0% MSDW 5,330 1,590 -3,740 0.7% 0.2%
TIMB 6,250 0 -6,250 0.0% 0.0% ORDS 2,883 0 -2,883 0.4% 0.0%
TPPM 14,421 10,483 -3,938 1.0% 1.0% SOSL 8,000 6,000 -2,000 1.1% 0.8%
MSDW 7,694 4,781 -2,913 0.0% 0.0%
IMCP 1,967 0 -1,967 0.0% 0.0%
OPTV 195 0 -195 0.0% 0.0%







Totals 1,812,197 1,812,197 0 100% 100% Totals 717,877 717,877 0 100% 100%

84

APPENDIX 1: BROKER TRADING DATA CORRESPONDING TO M&G BUYING (contd)

NOV 24, 2010 M&G Buys: 500,000 shares DEC 2, 2010 M&G Buys: 500,000 shares
M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW) M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW)

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS
MSDW 26,335 559,201 532,866 1.1% 23.5% MSDW 79,315 514,387 435,072 3.4% 22.3%
DMG 141,287 241,496 100,209 5.9% 10.1% ETRD 208,954 378,294 169,340 9.1% 16.4%
MACQ 15,847 64,006 48,159 0.7% 2.7% DMG 24,016 187,332 163,316 1.0% 8.1%
INST 31,185 52,660 21,475 1.3% 2.2% STBG 0 51,250 51,250 0.0% 2.2%
ORDS 10,000 24,660 14,660 0.4% 1.0% MACQ 10,013 56,880 46,867 0.4% 2.5%
UBS 100,145 110,275 10,130 4.2% 4.6% BRID 0 17,500 17,500 0.0% 0.8%
BYS 0 5,000 5,000 0.0% 0.2% GS 49,545 63,958 14,413 2.2% 2.8%
HUB24 25,000 30,000 5,000 1.1% 1.3% INST 26,648 35,080 8,432 1.2% 1.5%
JDV 10,710 15,100 4,390 0.5% 0.6% CARM 0 6,109 6,109 0.0% 0.3%
CSUI 651 1,668 1,017 0.0% 0.1% TIMB 0 4,500 4,500 0.0% 0.2%
ABNA 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% JPM 0 2,875 2,875 0.0% 0.1%
AUST 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% IMCP 784 3,081 2,297 0.0% 0.1%
BBY 94,993 94,993 0 4.0% 4.0% PERSH 21,000 22,750 1,750 0.9% 1.0%
NAL 7,207 7,207 0 0.3% 0.3% CMCS 564 2,000 1,436 0.0% 0.1%
SOSL 135,407 135,407 0 5.7% 5.7%
COMM 640,271 314,287 -325,984 27.8% 13.6%
COMM 505,777 296,229 -209,548 21.3% 12.4% UBS 218,760 97,773 -120,987 9.5% 4.2%
ETRD 265,705 87,799 -177,906 11.2% 3.7% SBAR 168,125 70,260 -97,865 7.3% 3.1%
AIEX 248,335 133,841 -114,494 10.4% 5.6% AIEX 164,025 70,288 -93,737 7.1% 3.1%
GS 97,524 42,550 -54,974 4.1% 1.8% MACP 81,388 0 -81,388 3.5% 0.0%
PSL 40,250 6,500 -33,750 1.7% 0.3% BBY 93,329 55,441 -37,888 4.1% 2.4%
CMCS 35,324 7,040 -28,284 1.5% 0.3% CSUI 45,085 19,906 -25,179 2.0% 0.9%
MACP 27,333 0 -27,333 1.1% 0.0% SUSQ 43,215 18,459 -24,756 1.9% 0.8%
SBAR 80,000 54,691 -25,309 3.4% 2.3% CITI 124,151 103,170 -20,981 5.4% 4.5%
CITI 181,983 163,428 -18,555 7.6% 6.9% JDV 20,380 4,000 -16,380 0.9% 0.2%
TPPM 68,809 57,585 -11,224 2.9% 2.4% SHAW 13,000 0 -13,000 0.6% 0.0%
SUSQ 62,938 52,486 -10,452 2.6% 2.2% TPPM 39,764 27,258 -12,506 1.7% 1.2%
BELL 15,000 7,000 -8,000 0.6% 0.3% PSL 12,500 0 -12,500 0.5% 0.0%
RBSM 4,000 0 -4,000 0.2% 0.0% ORDS 10,000 0 -10,000 0.4% 0.0%
TIMB 8,500 5,000 -3,500 0.4% 0.2% WILS 10,000 0 -10,000 0.4% 0.0%
SHAD 3,140 0 -3,140 0.1% 0.0% MERL 42,048 33,994 -8,054 1.8% 1.5%
MINC 2,702 0 -2,702 0.1% 0.0% SOSL 147,742 141,790 -5,952 6.4% 6.2%
MERL 46,708 44,025 -2,683 2.0% 1.8% HUB24 5,000 0 -5,000 0.2% 0.0%
BRLL 81,900 80,000 -1,900 3.4% 3.4% SHAD 3,000 0 -3,000 0.1% 0.0%
IMCP 1,863 0 -1,863 0.1% 0.0%
BAIL 1,500 0 -1,500 0.1% 0.0%
D2MX 1,000 0 -1,000 0.0% 0.0%
JPM 789 0 -789 0.0% 0.0%

Totals 2,379,847 2,379,847 0 100% 100% Total 2,302,622 2,302,622 0 100% 100%


85

APPENDIX 1: BROKER TRADING DATA CORRESPONDING TO M&G BUYING (contd)

Dec 10, 2010 M&G Buys: 236,257 shares DEC 13, 2010 M&G Buys: 226,789 shares
M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW) M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW)

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS
MSDW 79,315 514,387 435,072 3.4% 22.3% MSDW 0 253,697 253,697 0.0% 35.5%
ETRD 208,954 378,294 169,340 9.1% 16.4% INST 1,503 97,699 96,196 0.2% 13.7%
DMG 24,016 187,332 163,316 1.0% 8.1% DMG 48,547 85,472 36,925 6.8% 12.0%
STBG 0 51,250 51,250 0.0% 2.2% ITG 0 26,463 26,463 0.0% 3.7%
MACQ 10,013 56,880 46,867 0.4% 2.5% CSUI 6,920 17,915 10,995 1.0% 2.5%
BRID 0 17,500 17,500 0.0% 0.8% MACQ 5,622 15,045 9,423 0.8% 2.1%
GS 49,545 63,958 14,413 2.2% 2.8% IMCP 0 2,679 2,679 0.0% 0.4%
INST 26,648 35,080 8,432 1.2% 1.5% JPM 0 1,583 1,583 0.0% 0.2%
CARM 0 6,109 6,109 0.0% 0.3% SUSQ 22,083 22,848 765 3.1% 3.2%
TIMB 0 4,500 4,500 0.0% 0.2% BBY 3,212 3,212 0 0.4% 0.4%
JPM 0 2,875 2,875 0.0% 0.1%
IMCP 784 3,081 2,297 0.0% 0.1% UBS 182,796 34,123 -148,673 25.6% 4.8%
PERSH 21,000 22,750 1,750 0.9% 1.0% HART 71,300 0 -71,300 10.0% 0.0%
CMCS 564 2,000 1,436 0.0% 0.1% SBAR 46,015 0 -46,015 6.4% 0.0%
AIEX 33,550 2,000 -31,550 4.7% 0.3%
COMM 640,271 314,287 -325,984 27.8% 13.6% COMM 89,322 61,100 -28,222 12.5% 8.5%
UBS 218,760 97,773 -120,987 9.5% 4.2% ORDS 24,000 0 -24,000 3.4% 0.0%
SBAR 168,125 70,260 -97,865 7.3% 3.1% MERL 35,106 13,193 -21,913 4.9% 1.8%
AIEX 164,025 70,288 -93,737 7.1% 3.1% CMCS 20,000 0 -20,000 2.8% 0.0%
MACP 81,388 0 -81,388 3.5% 0.0% TPPM 10,562 881 -9,681 1.5% 0.1%
BBY 93,329 55,441 -37,888 4.1% 2.4% BELL 9,500 0 -9,500 1.3% 0.0%
CSUI 45,085 19,906 -25,179 2.0% 0.9% RBSM 9,000 0 -9,000 1.3% 0.0%
SUSQ 43,215 18,459 -24,756 1.9% 0.8% MACP 9,578 2,100 -7,478 1.3% 0.3%
CITI 124,151 103,170 -20,981 5.4% 4.5% TIMB 3,000 0 -3,000 0.4% 0.0%
JDV 20,380 4,000 -16,380 0.9% 0.2% GS 15,448 13,214 -2,234 2.2% 1.8%
SHAW 13,000 0 -13,000 0.6% 0.0% CITI 38,336 36,132 -2,204 5.4% 5.1%
TPPM 39,764 27,258 -12,506 1.7% 1.2% SOSL 1,572 0 -1,572 0.2% 0.0%
PSL 12,500 0 -12,500 0.5% 0.0% ETRD 27,327 25,788 -1,539 3.8% 3.6%
ORDS 10,000 0 -10,000 0.4% 0.0% BRID 845 0 -845 0.1% 0.0%
WILS 10,000 0 -10,000 0.4% 0.0%

MERL 42,048 33,994 -8,054 1.8% 1.5%

SOSL 147,742 141,790 -5,952 6.4% 6.2%

HUB24 5,000 0 -5,000 0.2% 0.0%

SHAD 3,000 0 -3,000 0.1% 0.0%











Totals 2,302,622 2,302,622 0 100% 100% Total 715,144 715,144 0 100% 100%


86

APPENDIX 1: BROKER TRADING DATA CORRESPONDING TO M&G BUYING (contd)

Dec 14, 2010 M&G Buys: 746,367 shares
M&G Broker: Morgan Stanley (MSDW)

BROKER SELLS BUYS NET % SELLS % BUYS
MSDW 29,735 770,537 740,802 1.1% 29.7%
PERSH 29,830 150,000 120,170 1.2% 5.8%
INST 13,303 117,597 104,294 0.5% 4.5%
CSUI 9,712 49,270 39,558 0.4% 1.9%
DMG 113,617 134,368 20,751 4.4% 5.2%
MACQ 23,881 30,733 6,852 0.9% 1.2%
SOSL 188,893 190,893 2,000 7.3% 7.4%
MERL 50,494 52,056 1,562 1.9% 2.0%
TIMB 1,000 1,618 618 0.0% 0.1%
SUSQ 99,231 99,239 8 3.8% 3.8%
BRLL 40,001 40,001 0 1.5% 1.5%
HUB24 71,215 71,215 0 2.7% 2.7%

COMM 468,983 178,115 -290,868 18.1% 6.9%
AIEX 287,081 71,388 -215,693 11.1% 2.8%
ETRD 244,300 79,250 -165,050 9.4% 3.1%
MACP 125,542 0 -125,542 4.8% 0.0%
SBAR 138,838 69,929 -68,909 5.4% 2.7%
CITI 138,120 110,781 -27,339 5.3% 4.3%
SHAD 25,000 0 -25,000 1.0% 0.0%
GS 59,497 38,175 -21,322 2.3% 1.5%
UBS 123,304 105,208 -18,096 4.8% 4.1%
BELL 50,860 36,360 -14,500 2.0% 1.4%
ORDS 12,945 0 -12,945 0.5% 0.0%
BAIL 10,000 0 -10,000 0.4% 0.0%
TPPM 49,374 39,865 -9,509 1.9% 1.5%
RBSM 10,000 2,200 -7,800 0.4% 0.1%
BBY 139,393 134,332 -5,061 5.4% 5.2%
STBG 3,821 0 -3,821 0.1% 0.0%
PSL 13,072 9,500 -3,572 0.5% 0.4%
SHAW 3,200 0 -3,200 0.1% 0.0%
BRID 10,000 7,100 -2,900 0.4% 0.3%
CMCS 4,700 1,890 -2,810 0.2% 0.1%
MINC 2,000 0 -2,000 0.1% 0.0%
IMCP 677 0 -677 0.0% 0.0%
NAL 41 40 -1 0.0% 0.0%




Totals 2,591,660 2,591,660 0 100% 100%


87

APPENDIX 2: RETAIL BROKER MONTHLY TRADING STATISTICS FOR CuDECO - 2010
TRADING RETAIL ASX ACTIVITY REGISTRY DEALINGS SURPLUS TRADES SURPLUS
MONTH BROKER SELLS BUYS OFF ON SELLS BUYS TRADES %
JAN 2010 COMM 1,394,236 1,974,674 654,864 1,240,293 739,372 734,381 43.7%

ETRD 763,375 667,552 580,909 365,100 182,466 302,452 33.9%

AIEX 192,208 282,340 186,581 322,452 5,627 -40,112 -7.3%

FEB 2010 COMM 1,707,164 1,963,499 779,075 1,063,804 928,089 899,695 49.8%

ETRD 574,242 821,706 364,667 518,276 209,575 303,430 36.7%

AIEX 506,981 564,892 226,025 313,240 280,956 251,652 49.7%

MAR 2010 COMM 2,271,750 2,408,821 893,433 1,072,567 1,378,317 1,336,254 58.0%

ETRD 927,238 991,874 384,020 593,724 543,218 398,150 49.1%

AIEX 899,083 890,370 1,352,127 457,378 -453,044 432,992 -1.1%

APR 2010 COMM 1,459,536 1,453,436 855,696 904,433 603,840 549,003 39.6%

ETRD 482,728 377,302 303,292 171,365 179,436 205,937 44.8%

AIEX 498,923 489,811 404,525 282,084 94,398 207,727 30.6%

MAY 2010 COMM 2,046,956 2,328,713 985,187 1,409,600 1,061,769 919,113 45.3%

ETRD 858,065 870,641 461,353 588,927 396,712 281,714 39.2%

AIEX 975,482 1,044,926 461,902 476,695 513,580 568,231 53.5%

JUN 2010 COMM 2,124,762 2,221,874 893,127 1,008,819 1,231,635 1,213,055 56.2%

ETRD 562,338 659,942 417,095 467,787 145,243 192,155 27.6%

AIEX 607,851 696,232 419,179 349,653 188,672 346,579 41.0%

JUL 2010 COMM 2,150,992 2,018,744 1,180,468 1,073,637 970,524 945,107 45.9%

ETRD 817,575 849,405 506,450 441,920 311,125 407,485 43.1%

AIEX 989,352 1,190,931 431,503 1,728,073 557,849 -537,142 0.9%

AUG 2010 COMM 26,084,613 27,680,628 5,259,096 5,454,178 20,825,517 22,226,450 80.1%

ETRD 6,709,009 7,276,407 1,935,527 2,006,295 4,773,482 5,270,112 71.8%

AIEX 5,996,952 5,537,259 2,404,036 1,814,563 3,592,916 3,722,696 63.4%

SEP 2010 COMM 5,176,310 5,441,167 1,828,419 2,342,648 3,347,891 3,098,519 60.7%

ETRD 1,763,414 1,471,351 1,167,883 1,519,976 595,531 -48,625 16.9%

AIEX 2,536,046 1,793,753 1,273,646 750,468 1,262,400 1,043,285 53.3%

OCT 2010 COMM 6,104,321 5,525,486 1,957,690 1,836,944 4,146,631 3,688,542 67.4%

ETRD 2,103,142 1,862,126 784,170 742,354 1,318,972 1,119,772 61.5%

AIEX 1,993,808 1,850,518 830,008 625,092 1,163,800 1,225,426 62.1%

NOV 2010 COMM 8,427,019 7,922,475 3,572,703 3,082,741 4,854,316 4,839,734 59.3%

ETRD 3,612,441 3,064,619 1,599,557 971,233 2,012,884 2,093,386 61.5%

AIEX 2,673,611 2,371,345 1,712,457 940,863 961,154 1,430,482 47.4%

DEC 2010 COMM 2,855,250 1,727,528 2,122,752 1,328,796 732,498 398,732 24.7%

ETRD 1,001,479 1,017,156 671,452 745,286 330,027 271,870 29.8%

AIEX 1,165,214 529,234 884,731 494,882 280,483 34,352 18.6%

BROKER SELLS BUYS OFF ON SELLS BUYS TRADES %
FULL YEAR
2010
COMM 61,802,909 62,667,045 20,982,510 21,818,460 40,820,399 40,848,585 65.6%
ETRD 20,175,046 19,930,081 9,176,375 9,132,243 10,998,671 10,797,838 54.4%
AIEX 19,035,511 17,241,611 10,586,720 8,555,443 8,448,791 8,686,168 47.2%
Totals 60,267,861 60,332,591