From Rational Choice To Perspective

Paradigm Shift: From Rational Choice to
Perspective
KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE
ABSTRACT. Rational choice theory can be replaced as the leading
paradigm in political science by the theory of perspective, which argues
that how we see ourselves in relation to others sets and delineates the
range of options actors find available, not just morally but empirically.
The author begins by discussing the basic assumptions underlying the
theory of rational choice or rational action, discusses the main criticisms
of the theory, and argues that these criticisms, when taken in conjunction
with rational choice theorists response to them, provide us with a classic
Kuhnian example of a paradigm in stress. The author then argues that
the debate over rational choice has become unnecessarily acrimonious
because of the lack of a viable alternative theoretical structure. Political
psychology can provide such an alternative in a theory of perspective on
self in relation to others, and she suggests several ways in which this
theory will need to be developed as it grows and expands in the manner
described by Kuhn. She concludes that rational choice works well for
certain kinds of political phenomena, but does not work in all
circumstances. The disciplines attention should now focus on trying to
understand and to specify the conditions under which rational choice
theory will apply, and on distinguishing them from situations and
conditions under which perspective may provide a more valuable
theoretical framework.
Keywords: Paradigms Perspective theory Political psychology
Rational choice theory
My central thesis can be stated succinctly: rational choice is a paradigm under
stress, one whose dominion continues because no satisfactory alternative theory
has been offered. In this article I present such an alternative, one drawn from
political psychology and focusing on identity. I call this a theory of perspective.
The theory suggests our perceptions of ourselves in relation to others effectively
delineates and sets the domain of options we find available. I argue that rational
choice can effectively be treated as a subset of a theory of perspective.
International Political Science Review (2001), Vol 22, No. 2, 151172
0192-5121 (2001/02) 22:2, 151172; 016355 2001 International Political Science Association
SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
The article is organized in three sections. In the first section, I define what I
mean by rational choice theory or rational actor theoryI shall use the terms
interchangeablyand summarize the theorys main assumptions. In the second
section, I discuss the main criticisms of the theory and argue that these criticisms,
when taken in conjunction with rational choice theorists response to them,
provide us with a classic Kuhnian example of a paradigm in stress. In the final
section, I argue that the discussion over rational choice has become unnecessarily
acrimonious because of the lack of a viable alternative theoretical structure.
Political psychology can provide such an alternative, however, and I present one
example of an alternative theory, the theory of perspective on self in relation to
others. I conclude by suggesting ways in which this theory will need to be
developed as it grows and expands in the manner described by Kuhn.
Origins and Central Assumptions
Intellectual Origins in Economic Theory
Rational actor theory originated in the classical microeconomics of Adam Smith.
1
In its purest form, it refers to behavior by an individual actora person, a firm, or
a political entitydesigned to further the actors perceived self-interest, subject to
information and opportunity costs. The genius of Smiths inventionthe market
mechanism, regulated by an invisible handsolved a problem that had troubled
philosophers since Hobbes made his famous argument that there was one basic
human nature and that this nature was self-centered: how can a society of selfish
citizens produce collective welfare without authoritarian government?
2
Smiths
answer provided a venue through which the pursuit of individual welfare could
result in collective well being.
Smith did not intend to describe political behavior. Indeed, he found clear and
important reasons why his economic approach would not explain political action.
As Smiths work was revised, however, especially during the marginalist revolution
in economics, the broader philosophical context of his political economic thought
became less salient and economists introduced other, often more technical,
meanings into their basic conceptualizations of rational action (Whitehead, 1991).
Twentieth-century Developments
Distinguishing a separate specialty of rational choice within the general field of
rational actor theory is difficult because the term rational choice theory is so
frequently used interchangeably with rational actor theory. Rational choice
theory might most aptly be applied to Simons reformulation of rational actor
theory since it refers more properly to a decision-making process rather than to
actions themselves. But many analysts working in the field do not make this
distinction and use the two terms simply as verbal alternatives.
During the middle part of the twentieth century, rational actor theory
blossomed into the sub-disciplines of rational choice, public choice, and social
choice theory. Public choice theory emphasizes the way in which decisions
are made through non-market mechanisms.
3
Social choice theory originated
in the attempts by welfare economists and mathematicians to develop a
formal, axiomatic, and deductive method for analyzing the problems of social
decision-making. It focuses on the rules by which individual preferences are
152 International Political Science Review 22(2)
aggregated. Typical problems concern the intransitivity of preferences and the
construction of formal models of political phenomena, such as voting systems and
justice. Its concern with social welfare gives it a strong normative content.
4
As rational actor theory gave birth to the above-mentioned subspecialties, it also
expanded its range of topical purview. There was widespread dissatisfaction with
behavioralisms treatment of the mind as the mysterious little black box into
which inputs disappeared and outputs emerged, and social scientists yearned for a
theory that described the psychological process by which decisions were made and
inputs processed, (see Almond, 1991; Easton, 1997.) By the 1970s, rational actor
theory had developed into one of the dominant paradigms of social science,
precisely because it offered insightful, rigorous and parsimonious explanations of
this process. Analysts used the theory to explicate socio-political phenomena as
diverse as voting (Downs, 1957), coalition formation (Riker and Ordeshook,
1973), peasant revolts (Popkin, 1979), group formation and interactions (Olson
1965, 1982), law (Posner, 1973), and discrimination and marriage (Becker, 1976).
In the last thirty years, rational actor theorists have expanded their original
political concerns from arenas such as voting, where it could easily be argued that
individual preferences could be aggregated to express the common good, and
turned to political puzzles where the economic approach might not appear so
immediately relevant. The role of institutions (Fiorina, 1989; Shepsle, 1979; and
Weingast, 1979), and norms and culture (Axelrod, 1984, 1986), were introduced
into rational models and analysts have moved from applications within
postindustrial democracies to broader forms of comparative analysis (Bates, 1988;
Levi and Cook, 1990; North, 1990).
Key Assumptions
Throughout this process, distinctions over the definition of the basic concept
blurred.
5
In addition to its original meaning, rational action came to refer to the
crude pursuit of material self-interest,
6
to utility maximization,
7
to purposive
behavior,
8
and to goal-directed behavior.
9
Even allowing for this difference in
usage, however, it is possible to identify seven key assumptions that tend to
underpin the theory. (1) Actors pursue goals; (2) these goals reflect the actors
perceived self-interest; (3) behavior results from a process that actually involves
(or functions as if it entails) conscious choice; (4) the individual is the basic actor
in society; (5) actors have preference orderings that are consistent and stable; (6)
if given options, actors choose the alternative with the highest expected utility;
and (7) actors possess extensive information on both the available alternatives and
the likely consequences of their choices. The traditional rational actor is thus an
individual whose behavior springs from individual self-interest and conscious
choice. He or she is credited with extensive and clear knowledge of the
environment, a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and compu-
tational skills that allow the actor to calculate the best choice (given individual
preferences) of the alternatives available.
Critiques, and a Paradigm under Stress
Bounded Rationality
The first criticisms of this approach focused on the extent to which rational actor
MONROE: From Rational Choice to Perspective 153
theory contains no discussion about the nature of actors particular preferences.
It assumes little about the way in which actors make probability estimates of
uncertain events. It assumes that actors choose the alternative with the highest
expected utility, defined as the average of the utilities of all alternatives, each
weighted by the probability that the outcome will ensue if the alternative in
question is chosen (Simon, 1984: 296). Because of these concerns, Simon
developed what he called bounded or procedural rationality, a concept so
quickly incorporated by most rational actor theorists that it might also be
classified as a different variant of the basic theory.
10
Like traditional rationality,
bounded rationality posits that behavior results from individual actors consciously
choosing to pursue their perceived self-interest. Its inception in cognitive
psychology, however, and that subfields reaction against behaviorism, results in
bounded rationality placing greater emphasis on culture, history, and context, and
less on the external situation surrounding an actor. Bounded rationalitys
emphasis on mental representations or schemata makes rational choice as a
method only as effective as the actors decision-making and problem-solving
means permit.
To judge whether an act is rational according to bounded rationality, we need
to know the choosers goals, conceptualization of the situation, and abilities to
draw inferences from the available information. Bounded rationalitys emphasis
on processnot outcomemakes it analogous to the legal concept of procedural
due process, which asks whether the procedure that led to the result was fair,
rather than whether the outcome itself is fair. This emphasis stands in contrast to
the traditional economic concept of rationality, which stresses rational outcomes,
that is, outcomes occurring not necessarily from a rational process but as if they
had resulted from that process (Friedman, 1953).
While it retained the four foundation assumptions (individual action, pursuit of
goals, conscious choice, and self-interest), bounded rationality differs from the
traditional economic concept of rationality at several critical junctures. (1) Simon
assumed actors possess limited computational abilities. For bounded rationality
theorists, rational behavior is adaptive within the constraints imposed both by the
external situation and by the capacities of the decision-maker; (2) it assumed
uncertain and limited information, and that actors search for alternatives,
consequences, and information selectively and incompletely; (3) Simons concept
of satisficing suggests decisions are reached once a satisfactory alternative is found;
this alternative need not be the optimal one, merely one that satisfies some
minimum requirement of the actor; (4) predicting behavior requires extensive
supplemental knowledge of the actor, particularly the actors goals and conceptual
orientation to the world. This requirement stresses the cognitive component of
decision-making; (5) process, not outcome, is stressed.
11
Simons bounded rationality is but the best-known illustration of work utilizing
findings from cognitive and motivational psychology to explain political choices
and decision-making. Such research consistently shows that people do not
respond as specified in the traditional theory of rational choice when they form
their preferences, process information, or select memories relevant to the
decision-making process underlying political choice. Ironically, political psychol-
ogys very success in depicting the rich diversity of this human decision-making
process has contributed to the lack of any one alternative model emerging as the
counterpoint to the parsimonious model posited by rational choice, which
assumes preferences as given and following a single decision-rule.
General Critiques
As rational actor theory became the leading paradigm in social science, critiques
inevitably emanated from a wide variety of disciplines.
12
Some criticisms were quite
technical, focusing on explicitly stated postulates about human decision-making.
13
Other criticisms were more general, attacking what were seen as implied and
erroneous claims about a static human nature, particularly one so exclusively
self-interested and bound to the individual as its basic explanatory tool.
14
In
general, criticisms fall into three clusters, in addition to the technical modifica-
tions at the intersection of economics and cognitive psychology, illustrated by
bounded rationality and discussed above.
15
One, cultural theorists (Almond, 1991; Barber, 1984; Eckstein, 1991;
Mansbridge, 1980) argue that the theory ignores limitations on free choice
imposed by culture in the form of tradition, institutions, habit, or societally
imposed norms.
16
They further maintain that the difficulties involved in cross-
cultural analysis limit the theorys claim to scientific objectivity and mask a
Western, individualistic bias; two, empirical challenges from experimental
psychology on the existence of preferences, the process by which preferences are
pursued, and the evaluation of information in the basic decision-making process
suggested that none of these is nearly as consistent or efficient as the rational actor
theory posits (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Nisbett and Ross, 1980); and
finally, three, political scientists pointed out the theorys failures when applied to
collective political behavior and altruism (Green and Shapiro, 1994; Monroe,
1996).
Response by Rational Actor Theorists
Rational actor theorists who were themselves increasingly critical of specifics
within the approach but who sought revision within the general paradigm found
themselves with the dual challenge of defending their general approach while
seeking to modify its specifics. Notable examples here are economists such as
Amartya Sen (1973) and Thomas Schelling (1984), and political scientists such as
Robert Bates (1988), Jon Elster (1979, 1986b,c), Russell Hardin (1982, 1995), and
Elinor Ostrom (1998). The excitement of all this intellectual ferment carries the
richness of conceptual variety; it also entails some conceptual confusion, as
rational actor theory now ranges from highly technical axiomatic formalizations to
attempts to integrate Marxist and interpretivist theories of culture into the basic
rational model.
Kuhns Paradigm
There are interesting parallels between the intellectual history of rational actor
theory and Kuhns arguments of the progress of science.
17
Kuhn contrasts a
textbook view of sciencescientific advancement from gradual piecemeal
accumulation of knowledgewith scientific progress characterized by competing
paradigms in thought. Kuhn argues that because one paradigm ultimately fails to
adequately account for all of the observed phenomena, we find upheaval in the
discipline concerned and a revolutionary conceptualization of the phenomenon
being studied.
The history of rational actor theory follows the pattern described by Kuhn to a
remarkable degree. We can understand the advent of rational choice theory as a
response to behavioralisms failure to deal adequately with the human decision-
making process, thereby reducing much of the interesting aspects of political
choice to the infamous little black box (Easton, 1997). Much of the emotional
intensity surrounding the growth of rational choice theory also can be seen as a
normal part of science, rather than something peculiar to rational choice theory.
Rational choice theorists were for years cut out of the Academy; they had to be
particularly aggressive, metaphorically banging at the doors to gain entry. Once
they established a bulkhead, they raised their flag triumphantly. But, again quite
naturally if we adopt the Kuhnian view of scientific advance, rational choice
theorists had not answered all the questions, had not worked out all the parts of
their theory. Once critics raised objections or pointed out important issues left
undiscussed or unaccounted for, rational choice theorists hurried to deal with
these problems. Their response was not some kind of nefarious backpedaling, as
critics have often seemed to imply, but rather the normal practice of any scientific
paradigm attempting to deal with the challenges presented to it once it becomes a
leading intellectual power.
What happened, however, as the evidence against the theory continued to
mount? Kuhn suggests that theories and their supporting paradigms are not
abandoned when contradictory observations are made. Instead, analysts working
within the paradigm attempt to redefine the theory, to render precise the specific
conditions that account for the anomalous phenomena. Paradigms often survive
such contradictory evidence and reworking of relevant theories. As evidence that
the rationality paradigm as an approach to understanding man is at this stage,
consider just three important developments in rational actor theory.
One, Simons satisficing model was accepted as an important modification in
response to the evidence that actors do not always seek to maximize their
preferences; two, the growth of the new institutionalism or rational choices
excursions into comparative politics was a recognition that institutions and culture
shape the reality within which political choices are made. Bringing in institutional
factors as rules of the game that set the stage for strategic actors to pursue their
desired ends allowed rational actor theorists to apply the paradigm in diverse
contexts. But it also highlighted the fact that the rational choice paradigm, to the
extent that it leaves preferences determined exogenously to the model, cannot
analyze the ways in which institutional change shapes actors preferences and
identities themselves;
18
and finally, three, rational actor theorys intellectual shifts
toward goal-directed behavior and away from self-interest as the heart of the
theory should be seen not as an intellectual sleight of hand but rather as an
attempt to respond to the overwhelming evidence that collective and altruistic
behavior flourishes (Margolis 1982, 1991). As I have argued elsewhere (Monroe,
1991, 1996), however, this move may have weakened the theory irreparably insofar
as it reduces the heart of the theory to a tautology (Myers, 1983).
All this is classic Kuhn, who argues that advances in scientific understanding
occur when the anomalies become so overwhelming that it becomes obvious that
the paradigm is deficient in certain areas. Repeatedly in the history of science a
group of researchers will zero in on the anomalies and make these their center of
study. This is precisely what has occurred in the three illustrations mentioned
above. Such behavior, taken as a whole, characterizes a paradigm in stress.
Given the emotional intensity that has too often permeated the debate over
rational actor theory, I want to be very clear on one point. I am not arguing that
the rationality paradigm should be discarded entirely. But we should now
recognize the theorys limitations and focus our efforts on seeking to define those
conditions under which the rationality paradigm will work and to distinguish them
from conditions in which rational actor theory will have more limited value. Just as
Einsteins theory of relativity is inclusive of Newtonian physics, we should expect
any alternative paradigm for the study of human beings to include the
specification of a set of circumstances under which behavior is primarily utility-
maximizing in the sense described by the rational actor theory.
19
Perspective: A Viable Alternative Paradigm?
Perspective and Political Psychology Offer Alternative Paradigms
What is political psychology and why should we look to it for a new paradigm?
Political psychology studies the patterns of political thinking, feeling, and
identity, the interaction of these patterns, and their impact on political choice and
other forms of political behavior. All political psychologistsshare the assumption
that human cognition and emotion mediate the impact of the environment on
political action (Stein, forthcoming: 2). It is the obvious discipline to provide an
alternative paradigm since rational choice theory was designed initially to describe
the human psyche.
20
We find glimpses of what I call the theory of perspective in
many works of political psychologyincluding my owneven though it has never
before been offered as an alternative paradigm. Let me try to capture the essence
of perspective as succinctly as rational theory has been stated. In doing so, I focus
on explaining political behavior, although I believe the theory also can be usefully
applied to other domains of action within social science.
Essentially, the theory I propose argues that our perceptions of ourselves in
relation to others sets and delineates the range of options we find available, not
just morally but empirically. This effectively makes choice a function of identity
and, more particularly, our self-perceptions. This theory of perspective reduces
rational choice theory to a sub-theory, best utilized for certain kind of choice-
theoretic situations, specific kind of conceptualizations of the self, and certain
research methodologies.
21
Both psychology and economics were conceived in the rich intellectual ferment
at the seventeenth-century dawn of the Age of Science, as scholars like Hobbes,
Locke and Smith began their attempts to construct a science of politics and
political economy and to study, in a more scientific manner, how the human mind
works and affects behavior. Rational choice theory itself was born in the fertile
period of social scientific advances of the post-World War II period, when
analogous strides in social science occurred.
In contrast, perspective draws heavily on twentieth-century advances in
psychological research that provides us with more scientifically verifiable
information about the human psyche, information that in turn provides more
empirically-grounded answers to questions about the psyche that have occupied
philosophers since Plato. Psychoanalytic theories alerted us to the importance of
the unconscious and pre-conscious forces that drive behavior (Freud, 1938).
Developmental psychology has taught us more about the acquisition of political
beliefs and the importance of both genetics and early childhood experiences in
shaping our sense of who we are and how we see the world (Winnicott, 1986).
Cognitive psychology focuses on our mental processes, including how we first
interpret the myriad bits of information that bombard us and then weave these
strands together into a narrative that allows us to make sense of reality (Fiske and
Taylor, 1991). It points us in the direction of how we form beliefs and attitudes and
how these perceptions and interpretations about people and events feed back into
our interpretation of others actions (Aronson, 1998; Stein, forthcoming). This
interpretation in turn affects our acts. Work on cognitive maps suggests that
representations of objects, acts, events, or other actors relate to each other,
forming an organizing framework of causes and effects, with positive and negative
implications for decision-making, much as a road map gives us an organizing
framework for our geographic movements (Axelrod, 1976). Social psychology
greatly increased our understanding of how the social environment, especially the
behavior of others, influences our behavior, often through perceptions (Taylor,
Sears, and Peplau, 1997). Recent work on social perceptions and social cognition
underlines the importance of social influences on our behavior (Fiske and Taylor,
1991). The importance of constructs and construals of reality, as cognitive
representations and processes basic to all our human responses, cannot be
ignored as we seek to understand political actions. Learning theory has increased
our understanding of how our present behavior is influenced by prior learning.
This cognitive process works through classic forms of political socialization as well
as through the kind of Bayesian processes that economists posit.
Work in all of the above fields has helped political psychology understand the
importance of perception for the complex interrelationships among political
choice, political action, and thinking and feeling about politics. The importance
of perceptions also is evident through a phenomenon that may not be
immediately obvious: political sciences recent flirtation with postmodernism.
22
While postmodernism may be a natural response to the knowledge that reality is
perceived differentially, it also carries serious negatives, and does not, in the long
run, offer a fruitful solution for social scientists concerned with this legitimate
problem of differential interpretation of a shared reality. Political psychology
offers a more productive response, one grounded in a commitment to scientific
process (Suedfeld, forthcoming).
Consider one illustration of how political psychology can reveal the extent to
which there are systematic processes by which reality is perceived differentially.
Social representations theory (Moscovici, 1988) suggests that a persons unique
experiences lead to a set of individual representations of the world and that these
representations, in turn, influence the perception, interpretation and evaluation
of incoming information. This theory suggests behavior is highly dependent on
the perception of the situation and is influenced by affect and motivation (Bar-Tal,
forthcoming; Jervis, 1976; George, 1969). But it allows for this behavior in a way
that analysts can hope to eventually discern and understand. It can provide clues
about how cultural factors, for example, may shape social representations in
consistent and predictable ways for certain groups of people, or perhaps tell us if
there are certain ways in which all people perceive reality.
23
It is this kind of
consideration that I have tried to incorporate into my initial formulation of the
theory of perspective, and on which I hope others will build as the theory is tested
and refined.
Let me now suggest ways in which perspective incorporates rational choice
theory into a broader framework. This claim can be made best by contrasting the
two theories in terms of differences in assumptions and methodologies. Two
caveats are in order here: the first, although I conclude that rational actor theory
can be treated as a limiting case of perspective because perspective allows for a
more fully variegated sense of self, both theories have certain weaknesses that
must be recognized by the analyst. What is critical for future analysts, I suspect, will
be delineating the domain of action for which each theory is best suited and I will,
throughout my discussion, suggest questions I believe will facilitate this
delineation. Second, since I am effectively arguing that we need to move beyond
self-interest in constructing our most basic theories, I concentrate much of my
discussion on the different views of the self offered by perspective and rational
choice theory. I nonetheless believe the other ways in which perspective differs
from rational choice theory may be just as important, even though they are but
mentioned briefly here.
Contrasts with Rational Actor Theory
Conceptualization of the Self. Self-interest clearly explains much of human behavior.
We should not discard this construct as part of our theory of perspective. But we
need to recognize that rational theorys limits are exceeded when it is applied to
situations in which individual self-interest is not the dominant force behind
behavior and that many significant political acts, in particular, fall into this
domain. While self-interest can remain a basic part of our political theories, it
should be balanced by human needs for sociability, defined as a feeling of
belonging to a group or collectivity.
24
To understand when and why we pursue self-interested behavior and when we
exhibit more public-spirited behaviorsurely a question of some concern to
political scientistswe must understand the complex linkages between the actors
attempts to further his or her self-interest and an actors perception of himself or
herself in relation to others. Why is individual self-interest sometimes pursued and
group interest pursued at other times? The answer may depend on which of the
actors identities is made most salient by external conditions. One way to solve this
problem is through an emphasis on framing and social contexts. Such an
accentuation responds positively to both the cultural and the cognitive critiques of
rational actor theory.
Another more basic response, however, is simply to focus on the self as the
central pillar of a theory of political behavior. For this reason, I pass over other
psychological theories that might profitably be applied to politics and focus on
identity theory, particularly the literature on the self in relation to others. I do so
because I believe the assumption of self-interest is the heart of economic man
(Myers, 1983; Hirschman, 1977). Attempts to shift the emphasis of the theory to
goal-directed behavior reduce the theory to a tautology in which behavior
emanates from preferences that are, in turn, revealed through behavior.
25
The theory of perspective is based on the complexity of the personality and
the external factors that draw one particular part of this complex identity into
political salience. Perspective assumes that the self is highly complex and
variegated, far more so than the simple actor assumed in rational choice theory.
Perspective assumes that actors have multiple identities, whose importance varies
in response to cultural and situational contexts.
26
The key to understanding
political behavior would then lie in delineating the actors constant shift between
these identities and the manner in which the actors perception of his or
her identity in relation to others defines the domain of relevant options. To
determine when an actor pursues strategies to further individual self-interest
and when an agent will act to further interests as a member of a group, we must
understand how the perception of a critical identity will affect action. Traditional
political economists concerned with collective action have argued that individuals
join groups because the group mediates resources for that individual or provides
side benefits (Olson, 1965). But other forces also determine group memberships
(e.g., parental-offspring bonds or socialization). The logic of social and political
(as well as economic) competition is often mediated by a group; and the group to
which you give allegiance at a particular moment may be determined by the
problems you confront at the time and the way you view yourself in relation to
others in the group.
The marital relationship offers an instructive example. Husband and wife are a
couple, a single unit to deal with mutual problems. But during a fight, each
conceives of him or herself as an individual with conflicting interests. Political
negotiation may resolve many marital arguments, but just as many may be resolved
by each actor simply deciding whether to remain a part of the marital group.
While an economic calculus may explain part of this group behavior,
understanding why the group forms and exists is certainly more complex. To
understand group formation, we must focus on how groups mediate interests and
then act to replicate successful strategies. In this process, the perception of ones
central identity, and the way actors shift between their individual and their group
identities, are crucial.
27
Parsing out the relevant part of the process by which actors shift from
individual to group identity necessarily involves our understanding the cognitive
frameworks of different actors. This process allows for both internal stability and
for changing conditions. It again allows for cultural variations, especially in that
most critical variable: the actors view of the relationship between the individual
and society.
28
A viable successor to rational actor theory should allow for the
complex ties among individuals, groups, and society in general.
29
There is no one
magical methodological solution to this problem, but the focus on identity
perception seems the right route to pursue, not the least because it will reduce the
individualistic bias of rational actor theory, and will allow us to focus on the
politys role in shaping both public and private identities.
We thus need to allow for a conceptualization of the self that allows not only for
the times when the actor will respond as a self-interested individual but also for
those times when the actor conceives of himself or herself as part of a collective or
even as an altruist. Doing so will focus us on the individual, rather than on
preferences, and will encourage analysts to seek to understand how external
stimuli shift our perceptions of ourselves in relation to others. For example, in
certain situations Bert may see himself as in conflict with Ernie, and thus
presumably will act as the simple self-interested actor. At other times, Bert may see
that he and Ernie have collective interests. At others, Bert may even act
altruistically toward Ernie. Why? What external conditions alter Berts basic view of
himself in relation to Ernie? And how does that view in turn influence Berts
behavior toward Ernie? Such a conceptualization allows us to draw on the richness
of personality psychology, which might in this example help us understand why
Bert has an average position along a continuum running from self-interested to
altruistic behavior. But this conceptualization also allows us to benefit from work
in social psychology, which suggests how environmental factors help shift Bert
along different points on this continuum, as one aspect of Berts identity is
selected as more salient than others.
30
The Importance of Others. Perspective posits the self as a central conceptual pillar but
not as the only pillar supporting the theory. Perspective does not assume the lone
actor of social contract theory, an actor that dominates rational choice theory
because of its origin in classical economics.
31
Perspective conceptualizes the
individual as the basic actor, but conceptualizes this actor as an individual existing
in a social world populated by others whose behavior has direct and profound
consequences on the actors behavior, including the actors sense of self. This
broader conceptualization allows us to introduce both psychoanalytical and
sociological influences, including culture. It draws on social psychological work
that seeks to emphasize the affective aspect of the cognitive processes of
individuals.
It also suggests the important interactive effect of human behavior. Scholars
critical of rational actor theory
32
have noted this omission, and rational actor
theorists have responded by tryingmostly unsuccessfullyto incorporate these
interactive effects into the basic theory.
33
Such effects clearly exist, and need to be
allowed for in a myriad of ways. Jervis has demonstrated one response to this need
in his work on signaling at the international level. He argues persuasively that
actors need to pay attention to the cognitive predispositions of the people to
whom they are sending signals. If the United States wants to know whether one of
its acts will be interpreted as hostile by Russia, it needs to know how it is viewed by
Russia. Does Russia have an image of the United States as a country that means
well? Or does Russia view the US as a hostile actor? Jervis argues that whether a
promise or a threat will be viewed as credible, it is crucial to understand the
perceivers theories and beliefs about the actor. This shows the psychological
naivet of economics-based signaling theories which, although acknowledging the
importance of pre-existing beliefs, argue that new information is combined with
old as specified by Bayesian updating of prior beliefs on the basis of new
information (Jervis, forthcoming: 2829). Jervis points out that we all do this. We
perceive events in light of how we perceive the sender of the signal. Even what
might seem to be the clearest signals will make no impression if the perceivers
mind is made up or his focus is elsewhere (ibid.: 30).
This phenomenon occurs at the most intimate level of personal relationships
such as the trust we place in others because of their past behavioras well as in
politics at both the domestic and the international level.
34
We need to ask more
about how the behavior of others affects us. Such interactive effects are critical
parts of our own perceptions of our self in relation to others. They affect both how
we interpret others behavior, and how we construct our own responses toward
others.
There is yet a further important aspect of the intermingled relationship of self
to others. How do our acts, designed to influence others, affect us in turn, even if
these acts originally are designed only to deceive or manipulate others, and thus
can be said to be false to our sense of who we truly are? Our attempts to
influence the behavior of others may end by changing us, as Kurt Vonnegut
suggests in Mother Night, or as is depicted in the movie Johnny Brassco. In both
these fictional instances, the main character pretends to be something he is
not. Vonneguts Howard W. Campbell, Jr. is an American spy, posing as a
radio propagandist for the Nazis while secretly sending coded messages to the
Allies. Johnny Brassco is an FBI agent working undercover with mobsters. In
both instances, however, the character ends by becoming what he has pretended
to be. Campbell becomes the Nazis most valued propagandist and Brassco ends
by committing the horrendous deeds of the mobsters he has been sent to
infiltrate.
A concept of the self should be the cornerstone of our theory of perspective.
But it is important to emphasize the self in relation to others, for all the reasons
mentioned above; this is immediately evident when we consider one of the most
famous set of experiments in psychology, the Milgram (1974) experiments on
authority. Inspired by the belief that Nazism could be explained through German
authoritarianism, the experiments ended by revealing the alarming extent to
which situational factors can influence most people to obey authority, even when
doing so flies in the face of human decency. The Milgram experiments suggest
that when we underestimate the power of social influence, it gives us a feeling of
false security. (For example, if the Germans were more authoritarian than other
nationalities, then Americans would not ever have to worry about committing
genocide. But if Milgrams studies were correct, then we must fall back on some
other protection against such evils.) Furthermore, by failing to fully appreciate
the power of the situational factors, we tend to oversimplify complex situations.
Oversimplification decreases our understanding of the causes of a great deal
of human behavior. And among other things, this oversimplification can lead
us to blame the victim in situations where the individual was overpowered by
social forces too difficult for most of us to resist. By emphasizing the individual
set firmly within a social context, and by attempting to understand how that
context shapes the individual and his or her action, perspective hopes to avoid
such errors.
Construals and Perception. Rational choice theorists would argue that we need only
specify the objective properties of the situation, such as how rewarding a particular
choice is to the people concerned, and then document the behaviors that follow
from these objective properties.
35
They thus avoid dealing with issues like
cognition and feeling, concepts that are vague, mentalistic, and certainly not
sufficiently anchored to observable behavior. But years of work in psychology
reminds us that cognition and feeling are, indeed, critical to the human social
experience; we thus must allow for them in our theories and models, no matter
how challenging their detection turns out to be empirically.
36
Doing so responds to the trenchant criticisms of the rational choice approach
by scholars such as Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, whose criticisms suggest the
importance of heuristics and shortcuts in the basic decision-making process
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). Other scholars (Ross and Nisbett, 1991)
argue that we need to look at the situation from the viewpoint of the people in it,
to understand how they construe the world around them. This emphasis on what
social psychologists call construals has its roots in Gestalt psychology (Aronson,
Wilson, and Akert, 1974). This school originally stressed the importance of
studying the subjective way in which an object appears in peoples minds, rather
than the objective, physical attributes of the object.
37
Lewin (1943) applied Gestalt
principles beyond the perception of objects, to social perception, to ask how
people perceive other people and their motives, intentions, and behaviors. Lewin
was the first scientist to advocate detecting the perspective of the people in any
social situation to understand how they construethat is, perceive, interpret, and
distorttheir social environment. Social psychologists now routinely focus on the
importance of considering subjective situations, that is, how they are construed by
people. Indeed, social psychology is less concerned with social situations in any
objective sense than with how people are influenced by their interpretation or
construal of their social environment.
Political scientists need to follow this lead, and ask how people perceive,
comprehend, and interpret the socio-political world since this may be more
important than understanding the objective properties of the social world itself
(Aronson, Wilson, and Akert, 1974: 7). Perspective suggests that we pay a great
deal of attention to the origin of peoples interpretations of the social world and
try to discover whether there are certain recurring patterns in construals for all
people, or if particular patterns exist among certain groups, according to
ethnicity, religion, gender, and so on.
38
Methodology. Because it is not wedded to a cost/benefit calculus, perspective is less
committed to quantitative data than is rational choice theory. Because perspective
seeks to understand how the actor views reality, and because the actors conceptual
framework may differ significantly from that of the analyst, the obvious question is
how best to discover how different people construe reality? Direct questions posed
via survey questionnaires are probably not the best research methodology since
people are not always aware of the origins of their own responses (Nisbett and
Wilson, 1977) and thus have a limited understanding of their own motives.
Instead, the stories people tell that help them organize and make sense of reality
and others behaviortheir narrativesare a better tool for revealing the tacit
assumptions underlying peoples behavior, especially when the actors may not be
fully aware of their motives at a conscious level.
39
If perspective wants to bring in the importance of our view of others, how do we
do this? How do we measure the social situation? We can turn here to social
cognition research, which has developed elaborate techniques to suggest how
people think about themselves, about the social world and, more specifically, how
people select, interpret, remember, and use social information (Fiske and Taylor,
1991; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Constructing more systematic measurements of
these phenomena will prove exciting new ground for the inquisitive scholar, and I
look forward to much innovative methodological research in this area.
Reconceptualization of Choice. Rational actor theory is constrained by its over-
emphasis on conscious choice based on a rank ordering of preferences. Future
scholars should broaden the conceptualization of choice, redefining it so that it
also includes the following facets as well.
(a) Choice as a reflection of self. This facet makes choice a reflection of our
entire life experience, a natural outgrowth of who we are. Empirical work on
altruism (Oliner and Oliner, 1988; Monroe, 1991, 1996, inter alia) and genocide
(Monroe, 1994; Malbon, 2000) found that both genocidalists and rescuers of Jews
during Nazi-occupied Europe had no choice in their actions because of the kind
of people they were. This phenomenon is not restricted to such extraordinary
situations; it occurs at more mundane levels as well. Suppose we are mugged in a
town where we know no one to call for assistance. What will most of us do? Even
though we know that people mug others to get moneysince it has just happened
to usfew of us would even consider mugging someone else as an option. Why
not? Because it is not something that people like us do. Our sense of who we are
constrains the options we find available.
(b) Normative and positive domain. These situations frequently have normative
overtones. Indeed, this conceptualization builds on the idea in virtue ethics which,
beginning with Aristotle, has argued that to understand moral choice you have to
understand the entirety of a persons life.
40
We need to ask whether other, more
mundane choices reflect our sense of self. Consider the example of an Olympic
figure skater, deciding whether or not to attempt the third twirl of her jump.
There is indeed an option concerning the alternative to be followed: whether or
not to attempt the third twirl or stop at only two. The choice is probably reflexive,
reflecting the years of practice and the skaters instinctive sense of how much
momentum she has and whether or not this momentum will carry her through a
successful third jump. A sense of self enters this choice (to jump or not to attempt
the jump) although in a manner that differs from the moral choices discussed
above. While I suspect that many of the situations in which sense of self limits
choice will have normative overtones, the skating example suggests they are not
limited to the normative domain.
(c) Conflicts of core values. A discussion of the normative aspect of choice
reminds us of the agonistic choice that drives much moral theory, wherein an
actor is tortured by the difficulty of choosing between two options. Do I sacrifice
my son in a war to protect my country? Or, at a far less dramatic level, how do I
balance the demands of scholarship with those of family? Such choices are often
so wrenching precisely because they strike at our most basic sense of self, especially
when they reflect unresolved conflicts within our fundamental personality
structure. Psychoanalysts have long noted the potent force of such conflicts,
suggesting the constructive conceptualization out of these conflicts can provide
the driving force behind creativity.
41
These choices also reflect back onto our sense of self. This conceptualization is
articulated in literature in Frosts two roads diverged in the wood, and I took the
road less traveled by, and that has made all the difference. In Styrons literary
depiction of Sophies Choice, a woman forced to choose between her two children,
eventually kills herself; the choice strikes so deeply at her central core that she
cannot live with having been forced to choose. Empirically, cognitive dissonant
theorists have built such conceptual intricacies into their basic theory. Cognitive
dissonance refers to the feelings of discomfort that occur when Bert, for example,
holds two or more inconsistent cognitions and/or when Berts acts deviate from
his stated beliefs, especially when Berts action is discrepant from his customary,
typically positive self-conception (Aronson, Wilson, and Akert, 1974: 91).
Originally, theorists thought this dissonance was caused by any two discrepant
cognitions (Festinger, 1957; Festinger and Aronson, 1960; Brehm and Cohen,
1962; Wicklund and Brehm, 1976). Later work, however, suggests that not all
cognitive inconsistencies are equally troubling. Dissonance seems most powerful
and upsetting when people behave in ways that threaten their self-images, because
such behavior forces them to confront the discrepancy between who they think
they are and how they have acted (Aronson, 1968, 1969, 1992, 1998; Aronson,
Wilson, and Akert, 1974; Thibodeau and Aronson, 1992; Harmon-Jones and Mills,
1998. See also Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter, 1956; Brehm, 1956; Gilovich,
Medvec, and Chen, 1995; Aronson and Mills, 1959; Gerard and Mathewson,
1966.).
(d) Choice versus strategy.
42
Another option may be to de-emphasize choice
entirely. Explicit choices may well be less important than strategies that lead to
successful outcomes. Furthermore, choices need not be conscious. A successful
strategy can originate in unconscious choices, emotions, or chance. The conscious
element may enter when the success of a strategy is recognized or learned. Even
learning does not require consciousness, however, although in many cases
(perhaps even most), consciousness will exist ex post in recognition of the strategys
successful outcome. While this recognition may be conscious, it need not be; it
must be conscious only insofar as it is reproducible in the future, either by the
same actor or by another. This approach posits a close relationship between
outcomes and strategies and emphasizes both of these instead of individual
choice. Such a treatment would allow for non-conscious forces in behavior (such
as emotions and intuition), factors that now have to be introduced exogenously in
both traditional and bounded rational models (Damasio, 1999). And it would
provide perspective with a vitality that rational choice lost when it de-emphasized
the emotionally rich passions in preference for the more sterile, albeit
quantifiable, concept of preferences after the Marginalist revolution in economics
(Whitehead, 1991).
If we design a theory of perspective to include learned strategies that further
particular outcomes, rather than just focusing on the process of choice, we also
allow a role for culture in replicating the strategy that led to optimization. The
critical variables thus would not be the actual decisions and choices taken by an
actor but would instead become the outcomes, intended or fortuitous. The critical
component of behavior then would be the process of evolving toward some
stationary optimal point, not an actual decision itself. In this process, critical
distinctions should be made between the long term and the short term. Strategies
need not be the best (optimal) at any one particular moment, but they must be
good enough to allow the individuals following them to survive, or at least survive
long enough to reproduce. Behavior thus need not maximize in the short term,
although over the long term it must optimize and do better than all other existing
possibilities in order to survive. Optimal strategies, not individual choices, thus
would be the key. By emphasizing strategies in addition to choices, then,
perspective can allow for strategies that lead through adaptation to survival. Such
an approach would incorporate the muddling through we all know so well and
brings in some of the evolutionary considerations that scholars such as Axelrod
(1984) have introduced into their discussions. This approach resembles Simons
(1982) satisficing rather than maximizing behavior, but an emphasis on constant
movement and local adaptation would set a theory of perspective apart from
bounded rationalitys emphasis on the internal process of choice instead of the
outcome of a process and the forces that induce action.
Conclusion
I have argued that we need to move on, beyond self-interest as the critical driving
force behind our political theories and embrace a richer conceptualization of the
self in constructing our political theories. This one move will have profound
repercussions for social scientific theories of human behavior. As a discipline,
political science has wasted too much time debating the merits of rational choice
theory, spinning our intellectual wheels in far too fractious a debate over whether
rational choice provides the universal theory of human behavior claimed by its
more extreme proponents or is merely the ideologically bounded and method-
driven dogma described by certain critics.
43
Its opponents should accept that
rational choice provides a valid and useful theoretical framework for
understanding certain kinds of political phenomena, has produced many valuable
insights, forced us to consider old topics in fresh ways, and has generated the
debate necessary to stimulate research illuminating important aspects of political
life. Similarly, its defenders should concede that rational choice does not provide a
universal theory of political life and that it suffers from critical limitations. Let us
move beyond a debate grown tiresome to ask what we have learned that may be
utilized in the next stage in constructing more realistic theories of political life.
In arguing thus, my goal is ambitious. I wish to effect a paradigm shift within
political science, away from rational choice theoryarguably the leading
approach since the 1970sand toward a theory in which we understand political
actions as a function of how we see ourselves in relation to others. I call this a
theory of perspective, and have argued that rational choice is effectively a limiting
case of the broader theory, much as Newtonian physics is a limiting case of
Einsteins theoretical world. Just as Newtonian physics works well under certain
conditions, and as Einsteins physics allows for and specifies the nature of those
conditions, so rational choice works well in certain circumstances. But it does not
work under all conditions, and our attention should now focus on understanding
and specifying the conditions under which the limiting case will apply and
distinguishing them from situations and conditions under which it will not.
A successor to rational choice has to be a theory about the human psychology if
it wants to accurately predict political behavior. The power of rational actor theory
comes from the accuracy of its understanding of the human psyche, particularly
from the psyches need to protect and nurture itself. What rational actor theory
has omitted, however, is the role of others as affirming, nurturing, and validating
the self, and validating it in a manner that provides ontological security. Thus the
concept of self in relation to others should play a critical part in constructing
theories of human behavior. It is this critical factornoted by Aristotle when he
defined man as a social beingwhich reduces rational choice theory to a limiting
case of a broader theory, of the theory of self. Rational choice theory captures only
one aspect of this self, the aspect in which we see ourselves in a self-interested
mode, and respond accordingly.
In presenting my theory of perspective I have tried to allow for the complex
nature of humankind. I suggested that our basic identities are intricate and
multifaceted, and that what is critical for the analyst seeking to understand
political action is to understand which aspects of our identities in relation to
others come into play and in response to what outside stimuli. Only by
understanding how people see themselves in relation to others can we begin to
build a science of politics that allows for the complex interrelationship between
the human needs to protect and nurture our self-interest and the needs for human
sociability.
Political science is a discipline looking for a new paradigm, a discipline ready
for a new paradigm. Psychology and identity provide that paradigm through a
theory of perspective on self in relation to others.
Notes
1. I have discussed the intellectual origins of rational actor theory more extensively in
Monroe, 1991. This book is now out of print and I reproduce the essential argument
here since I have received so many requests from scholars unable to obtain the volume.
Parts of my discussion of the theory of perspective first appeared in Monroe, 1996.
2. See Mansbridge, 1990 or Myers, 1983 on the role of self-interest in social theory.
3. In economics, it is associated most closely with the work of James Buchanan and the
Virginia School and in political science with the work of William Riker and the
Rochester School of public choice.
4. Within economics, it is associated most closely with the work of Kenneth Arrow (1951,
1984) and Amartya Sen (1984). Its highly technical place within political science has
been ensured by analysts such as Gerald Kramer, Peter McKelvey, and Norman Schofield.
5. I will argue in the next section that this is to be expected in the progress of normal
science where there are a variety of different assumptions, methods and rules used
within the general paradigm (Kuhn, 1962: 4251).
6. Buchanan and Tollison, 1984: 13; Downs, 1957: 28.
7. Buchanan and Tullock, 1962: 2530; Buchanan and Tollison, 1984: 13; Arrow, 1963: 3.
8. Riker and Ordeshook, 1973: 10.
9. Riker and Ordeshook, 1973.
10. Indeed, Simon won his Nobel Prize in economics for this work.
11. Emphasis on the decision-making process of the unit analyzed (e.g., person, firm,
government) means that the process of decision-making itself, rather than the outcome
of that process, is the hallmark of bounded rationality.
12. I focus my discussion on political science since that is the literature with which I am
most familiar.
13. See Herbert Simons early work on bounded rationality and satisficing.
14. See the democratic theorists who stress the politys ability to transform the self through
communal deliberation (Barber, 1984; Taylor, 1987; and Sandal, 1984).
15. Simons concerns are shared by others (Kavka, 1991) who argue that utility maximi-
zation serves better as a heuristic than as a true representation of the human decision-
making process.
16. See Barry, 1970 or Harsanyi, 1969 on the difference between cultural and rational
choice models.
17. See Michael Struett, 1999.
18. See Bates, Johnson, and Lustick, 1997, Tsebelis, 1992 or North, 1990. Other theorists in
the new institutionalists camp, who work largely outside the rational choice paradigm,
have recognized that much of politics is conflict about institutional rules precisely because
these are seen as influencing subsequent behaviors, not just in terms of strategies but by
actually changing the ends actors wish to pursue and the ways that actors perceive them-
selves (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; and Olsen and March, 1989).
19. My interpretation of Kuhn may be overly sanguine, and the scientific enterprise may be
more a choice between competing paradigms than the less confrontational route I have
sketched above. Kuhn appears to endorse this latter view: Let us then assume that
crises are a necessary precondition for the emergence of novel theories and ask next
how scientists respond to their existence. Part of the answer, as obvious as it is
important, can be discovered by noting first what scientists never do when confronted
by even severe and prolonged anomalies. Though they may begin to lose faith and then
to consider alternatives, they do not renounce the paradigm that has led them into
crisis. They do not, that is, treat anomalies as counter-instances, though in the
vocabulary of philosophy of science that is what they are (Kuhn, 1962: 77).
20. The existence of a viable alternative theory, even though preliminary, seems necessary
for scientific advances to occur. Once it has achieved the status of a paradigm, a
scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative candidate is available to take its
place. No process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at all
resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with
nature. The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to
accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involved the comparison of
both paradigms with nature and with each other (Kuhn, 1962: 77).
21. These are discussed later in more detail.
22. Since postmodernism includes many different approaches, I should note that what I am
objecting to is that aspect of postmodern thought that rejects the idea of any objective
reality. Political psychology accepts that people interpret this reality differentially but
posits that scholars can nonetheless study these differences in interpretation in careful
and systematic ways.
23. The fundamental attribution error may exemplify this phenomenon.
24. This reflects the Aristotelian concept of man as a social being.
25. Ironically, Downs himself acknowledges this point in An Economic Theory of Democracy
(1957: 67.)
26. See Elster, 1986a or the vast literature on the self reviewed in Monroe and Levy, 1999.
27. This argument was first advanced in Monroe, 1996.
28. Both traditional and bounded concepts of rationality reflect a post-Enlightenment
framework that separates the individual from the collectivity. Interests are not identified
this way in many non-Western societies, however; and even in Western society,
individuals have conceptualized their relationships with society quite differently in
other historical eras. This strict differentiation of the individual from society or critical
groups may explain why so many Western decision models, based on individualistic
assumptions, often fail to predict behavior outside the Western market system.
29. Ostroms (1998) work on collective action constitutes an interesting and an important
move in this direction.
30. See Batson, 1991; Eisenberg, 1986; and Fogelman, 1994 for discussions of how
situational and personality factors influence altruism.
31. This speaks directly to the debate between communitarians and rational choice
theorists. See Sandal, 1984; Hardin, 1995.
32. I would classify Jerviss (1976) research as work in this mode.
33. I would classify Axelrods (1984, 1986) work on the evolution of cooperation as work in
this mode.
34. We can easily modify Jerviss work to illustrate this phenomenon at the level of domestic
politics. Consider the Clinton impeachment crisis as an example. Assume that Clinton
wanted to encourage other politicians to engage in behavior that was in Clintons
interests. Perceptions are also critical in this kind of strategic game. Clinton was
effectively engaged in signaling designed to further his own interests. But what was
revealed? How would others have interpreted the signals Clinton sent out? How did
Clinton know that Gore, for example, had interpreted Clintons act as Clinton intended
it? Signals can portray a false or a true message or image in electoral politics as at a
college mixer or during tense international negotiations.
35. This is not peculiar to rational choice theorists. Behaviorists followed the same tack. For
example, John Watson (1930) and B.F. Skinner (1938) suggested all behavior could be
understood by examining the rewards and punishments in the organisms environment
and that there was no need to study such subjective states as thinking and feeling.
36. This has been reinforced by work in neurobiology (Damasio, 1999) suggesting a more
significant role for emotions in the making of consciousness.
37. See work by Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Kohler, Max Wertheimer, all Gestalt theorists, or
work by Kurt Lewin, the founding father of modern experimental social psychology.
38. For example, when construing their environment, are most people concerned with
making an interpretation that places them in the most positive light, as the fundamental
attribution error in psychology suggests?
39. See Hirschman, 1977, for a description of how the worldview had to shift before
capitalism could come into being. See Patterson and Monroe, 1997, on narrative as a
general research methodology, including its drawbacks and limitations.
40. It is a frequent literary device to have action hang on the protagonists character, a
character that makes him blind to the consequences of certain choices or makes other
choices less viable. Can we imagine Othello suggesting he and Desdemona go for
marriage counseling, for example?
41. See work by Karen Horney (1945) as an example of this approach.
42. I use strategy not in the technical game theoretic sense but as evolutionary biologists
utilize the term to refer to routines and procedures.
43. Critics include Green and Shapiro, 1994; proponents include Gary Becker, 1976.
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Biographical Note
KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE is Professor of Political Science and associate director of
the program in political psychology at the University of California at Irvine.
Author of the prize-winning The Heart of Altruism (1996), Monroe works at
the intersection of political science, political psychology and ethics. Her most
recently edited volumes are Empirical Political Theory (1997) and the forthcoming
Political Psychology. She is currently working on two books suggesting how
identity constrained choice during the Holocaust. ADDRESS: Department of
Political Science, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697, USA. [e-mail:
KRMonroe@UCI.Edu]
Acknowledgements. The Earhart Foundation provided generous financial assistance, and Dani
Bar-Tal, Martha Crenshaw, Robert Jervis, and Janice Stein graciously allowed me to quote
from their manuscripts in my forthcoming edited volume on political psychology. Michael
Struett provided research assistance, funded through a generous grant from the School of
Social Science at UCI. Finally, I am grateful to Princeton University Press for allowing me to
reproduce the argument that originally appeared in The Heart of Altruism (1996).

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