Two Sides To Every Story:

In Defense of Bridgestone/Firestone
Continued from Winter (Jan. 2001)
By Dirk Gibson
T
Xhi
he controversy over the Bridgestone/Firestone
tire recall of 2000 was a focus of media and popular
attention during the summer, fall and winter of 2000.
The tiremaker received considerable criticism, for
the recall in general and recall-related public rela-
tions in particular. As Bridgestone/Firestone and
Ford Motor Company squared off, in the Congres-
sional hearing room and the court of public opin-
ion, and traded accusations of responsibility for the
series of tread separation accidents responsible for
nearly 200 deaths in the US and abroad, only one
thing was clear. The public and media reaction to
Bridgestone/Firestone's recall and communication
policies was one of skepticism and disfavor.
I was among the critics. I was quoted in the Wall
St. Journal as saying that "Firestone violated the
basic rules of a recall, and they're doing the same
today" (Aeppel, September 6, 2000, AlO). In a sim-
ilar vein, the Detroit Free Press included my state-
ment, "The situation is very simitar to the Firestone
Dirk C. Gibson
18
recall of 1978, except that I don't think the public
will be as forgiving this time" (Bodipo-Memba,
November 10, 2000, 2E).
Perhaps we were a bit hasty in our judgment of
the contemporary Bridgestone/Firestone recall. In
our on-going research into this highly publicized
public relations controversy, three factors have
emerged that signal the desirability of reassessing
our judgment of this recall. These three variables
are: 1) The Ford causal link, 2) The Goodyear 'silent
recall,' and 3) the intercultural communication
variable. We will conclude this essay with a series of
six lessons to be learned from the 2000 Bridge-
stone/Firestone recall.
The Causal Role of the Ford Explorer
One of the basic elements of the Bridgestone/
Firestone public position regarding the recall was
the refusal to accept responsibility for the tire prob-
lems. The Associated Press declared that "The chief
executive of Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. told attor-
neys during an eight-hour deposition Monday that
the company recalled 6.5 million tires in August for
safety purposes and that the decision did not mean
the company was admitting to any product defect"
(October 9, 2000, 1). One day later, the Washington
Post similarly noted, "One month after apologizing
to Congress for the circumstances surrounding the
recall of 6.5 million tires, the chief executive of
Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. testified yesterday that
his apology didn't mean that the tiremaker was ad-
mitting to defects in the tires linked to more than
100 deaths" (Grimaldi, October 10, 2000, 1).
Masatoshi Ono, in a deposition, was asked if
Bridgestone/Firestone denied being at fault in the
tread separation accidents. He responded, "However,
there are maybe outside causes that had caused the
accidents. Then, I wouldn't say we're responsible
for those accidents" (Grimaldi, October 10, 2000, 1).
Public Relations Quarterly
On December 19, Bridgestone/Firestone con-
cluded its internal probe into the causes of the
tread separation blowouts. "We are convinced that
the tire separations were not entirely to blame,
even though they may have been one of the causes
for the accidents in which people were hurt or
killed," declared Bridgestone CEO Yoichiro Kaizaki
at a Tokyo news conference (Schaefer, December
21, 2000, 5). The Associated Press decided that
Kaizaki "accepted partial responsibility for tire sep-
arations linked to 148 deaths in the United States/'
and it explained the factors identified by the
Bridgestone/Firestone internal investigation as
causal factors in the accidents: "In a report pub-
lished by Bridgestone/Firestone on Tuesday, it cited
four causes for the tire shreddings: the shoulder de-
sign of its 15-inch ATX tires, the unique way the
Perhaps we were a bit hasty
in our judgment of
the contemporary
Bridgestone/Firestone recall.
rubber was processed at its Decatur plant, and the
lower inflation pressure and the higher load limits
recommended by Ford for its Explorer sports-utility
vehicle" (Schaefer, December 21, 2000, 5).
The 'outside cause' alluded to by Ono is the Ford
Explorer. New Firestone President, John Lampe,
noted that "Tires will fail, and do so for a number
of reasons. In most cases, a vehicle that experiences
a tire failure can be safely brought under control.
However, we have seen an alarming number of
serious accidents from rollovers of the Explorer
after a tire failure" (Keating and Mayer, October 9,
2000, 3).
A Washington Post analysis of national accident
statistics, enhanced by comparison with detailed
Florida accident records, points an accusatory fin-
ger at the Explorer: "A Washington Post analysis of
national and Florida crash statistics shows, how-
ever, that the Ford Explorer has a higher rate of tire-
related accidents than other sports-utility vehicles,
even when the popular SUV is equipped with
Goodyear tires. The findings suggest that some-
thing about the Explorer may be contributing to
the accidents, auto analysts said" (Keating and
Mayer, October 9, 2000, 1).
According to James Feli, former head of research
at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion, the study provides "an indication that there
may be a factor with the Ford Explorer beyond the
tire issue. It's a first indicator that they may have a
stability problem" (Keating and Mayer, October 9,
2000, 1).
The Washington Post analysis pinpointed the Ex-
plorer's culpability in rollover accidents. It found
that "Explorer's higher fatality rate in blowout ac-
cidents may be related to rollovers...the Explorer
was 13 percent more likely to roll than other com-
pact SUVs, against which Ford likes to compare the
Explorer's rollover record. The Explorer was 53 per-
cent more likely than other compact SUVs to roll
over when an equipment failure such as faulty
brakes, bad tires or blowouts caused an accident"
(Keating and Mayer, October 9, 2000, 1).
The Washington Post report alleged that the Ex-
plorer was known by Ford to be a uniquely haz-
ardous SUV, in terms of rollover tendencies:
"According to a Ford document obtained by con-
gressional investigators, the company's own analy-
sis of rollovers after tire explosions in Venezuela
found the problem to be unique to the Explorer.
'High incidence of vehicle roll over after a tire blow
out or tread loss has not been detected for other
vehicle brands,' the document said" (Keating and
Mayer, October 9, 2000, 3).
A Reuters analysis clearly summarized the mag-
nitude of the Washington Posts findings: "Using
two different ways of measuring accident rates, the
Explorer was either three or four times as likely as
other SUVs to have a tire blowout contribute to an
accident, the Post said" (October 9, 2000, 2).
While Ford has steadfastly denied that the Ex-
plorer has been an element in the tire problems,
perhaps its corporate actions speak louder than
words. There have been two recent recalls of the
Explorer. A recall of 846,591 Explorers was an-
nounced on December 2, 2000, "to replace faulty
parts on the suspension system" (Pickler, December
2, 2000, C4). Ten days later. Ford recalled 110,633
Explorers and Mercury Mountaineers for a problem
with the speed limitation device ("Ford Recalls Too-
Fast SUVs," December 12. 2000, C4).
The issue of appropriate tire pressure enters the
equation, as well. Bridgestone/Firestone recom-
mends that tires be inflated to 30 psi, but Ford rec-
ommended inflation to only 26 psi, to improve
handling. Then, well into the recall, "While not
conceding any mistakes. Ford last Friday an-
nounced it was raising its recommended tire pres-
sure to 30 psi" (Zagorin, October 2, 2000, 59).
The Goodyear 'Silent Recall'
When the Los Angeles Times accused Goodyear of
conducting a 'silent recall,' on November 7, that was
the best news possible for beleaguered Bridge-
stone/Firestone. Attention was diverted from
Bridgestone/Firestone's tire quality problems, and
was focused on Goodyear instead.
Spring 2001
19
The lead paragraph of the LA Times piece told the
tale, "Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. for more than
four years has been quietly replacing thousands of
failed tires fitted on vans, light trucks and sports-
utility vehicles and writing checks to customers,
but only for those who complain, according to tire
dealers and consumers. Safety advocates and plain-
tiff attorneys say the Akron, Ohio, tire maker is en-
gaged in a controversial practice known as a 'silent
recall' and placing thousands of drivers and pas-
sengers at risk by not declaring a full public recall"
(Maharaj, November 7, 2000, 1).
The Associated Press noted the LA Times allega-
tions, and Coodyear's response: "Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. has been quietly offering free replace-
ments for thousands of tires in a practice known as
a 'silent recall,' the Los Angeles Times reported Tues-
day. Goodyear acknowledged last month that tread
separation involving its 16-inch Load Range E
light-truck tires have been linked to 120 injuries
and 15 deaths. Company officials said a recall was-
n't necessary because it found no defects in the
tires" (November 7, 2000, 1).
Goodyear denied the 'silent recall' accusation.
The same day, CNNfn noted the Goodyear corpo-
rate response, "Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ac-
knowledged Tuesday it has had problems with
some of its 16-inch tires but denied a Los Angeles
Times report that it was conducting what the news-
paper called a 'silent recall' (November 7, 2000, 1).
Interestingly, Goodyear had issued a somewhat
vague, general defense of its 16-inch tires on Octo-
ber 25, about two weeks prior to the LA Times ac-
cusations. Joseph M. Gingo, Senior Vice President
for Technology & Global Products Planning, as-
serted that "There have been misleading media re-
ports in print and on the air regarding Goodyear
light commercial tire applications, and their al-
leged role in accidents across the country that have
resulted in either serious injury or fatalities" (October
25, 2000, 1).
NHTSA was not swayed by Goodyear blanket re-
assurances, and "the federal government opened a
preliminary investigation Tuesday into Goodyear
light truck tires that have been linked to 15 deaths
in accidents involving tread separation, similar to
the problem with Firestone tires being recalled
nationwide." According to NHTSA statistics, there
have been 37 complaints about Goodyear tire tread
separation, including 31 reported crashes involving
129 injuries in addition to the deaths (Pickier,
November 22, 2000, B7).
If Goodyear tires have the same problems as the
recalled Firestone tires, clearly Bridgestone/Fire-
stone is not uniquely culpable in any way. In fact,
one can credit them with their willingness to
publicly recall defective Firestone tires, whereas
Goodyear may have chosen a clandestine recall
program resulting in suboptimal public protection.
The Intercultural Communication Variable
It might be unwise for Americans to apply West-
ern standards of judgment to Japanese public rela-
tions. We run the risk of lapsing into ethnocentric
criticism, where irrelevant and culturally-inappro-
priate criteria are used and negative results are vir-
tually preordained. Two sets of salient intercultural
communication variables can be identified: cul-
tural differences, and public relations differences.
Japanese/American Cultural Differences
One basic aspect of culture used by scholars to
categorize and analyze differences involves individ-
ualism vs. collectivism. For definitional purposes,
individualistic societies prize the abilities and
rights of individuals, while in collectivist cultures
the group is what matters most.
The Japanese culture is widely considered to be
primarily collectivist in nature. The Japanese work
long hours and spend relatively little leisure time
compared to Americans, for example. In the US, in-
dividualism is a cardinal, fundamental tenet of the
American way of life.
Japanese/American Public Relations Differences
I described Japanese public relations recently, in
a 1999 PRQ piece. Without repeating that analysis,
but making use of parts of it for the present analy-
sis, it is possible to identify four sets of differences
between Japanese and American public relations.
These systemic idiosyncrasies may have resulted in
inevitable public relations failure for a Japanese
leadership contending with a crisis in the US. These
four differences include; 1) Different public relations
tradition, 2) Media relations differences, 3) Crisis
management differences, and 4) Different public
relations strategies.
Japan has a far more limited tradition of public
relations practice than many Western nations. Be-
cause of the collectivist nature of the Japanese society
and its ethnic homogeneity, public reiations as an
organizational function failed to develop as early as
it did in other countries.
Media relations differs substantially between
Japan and the US. In Japan, there are institutions
called 'press clubs,' as fully described in the afore-
mentioned PRQ article and other published ac-
counts of Japanese public relations. These press
clubs serve as a means to restrict Japanese (and for-
eign) media coverage of events in Japan.
American media relations, on the other hand, is
almost completely decentralized and informal.
There is a variety of models of American media re-
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Public Relations Quarterly
lations, ranging from docile, source-coopted inter-
actions to adversary relationships characterized by
rancor and information restriction.
Crisis public relations differs in Japan, when
compared to the American model. Although there
is a vast and not entirely consistent literature on
American crisis management and public relations,
it is generally agreed that a relatively open com-
munication style is preferable, and that it is neces-
sary for the CEO or other ranking official to
apologize, take responsibility, and explain things to
the satisfaction of all salient stakeholders.
This is not the norm in Japan, where a less ag-
gressive media does not force organizational re-
sponses. The Bridgestone/Firestone corporate recall
public stance typified the non-confrontational,
subtle, low-key Japanese: "Bridgestone's overall
strategy seems to be a dogged one of hunkering
down and waiting for the cloud to blow over. Such
Crisis public relations
differs in Japan,
when compared to
the American model.
behavior is the norm in Japan, where few managers
are comfortable dealing with the press and in-
vestors" (Kunii and Foust, September 18, 2000, 43).
Eisenberg also noted the differences between
American and Japanese crisis management theory
and practice, as manifested in the Bridgestone/Fire-
stone recall, "For effective crisis management,
swift, decisive action, not to mention an appropri-
ate level of contrition, is the name of the game
today. Firestone has seemed slow and unrespon-
sive, a legacy, perhaps, of its insular parent com-
pany in Japan, where consumers have few rights
and product liability lawsuits hardly exist" (Septem-
ber 18, 2000, 39).
A Wall St. loumal investigation of the Bridge-
stone/Firestone recall revealed this conclusion: "In-
deed, another reason for the silence at Bridgestone
headquarters is that the company is feeling no pub-
lic pressure in Japan over the recall. The Japanese
press has shown scant interest in the story, as there
have been no reports of Japanese dying in acci-
dents, and the scope of the recall here was tiny"
(Zaun and Dvorak, September 5, 2000, A16).
"The Japanese don' t understand the value of PR,"
a US executive was quoted by Kunii and Foust as
saying (September 18, 2000, 43). That might be a
bit ethnocentric; what is true is that the Bridge-
stone/Firestone recall crisis public relations seems
to be in line with Japanese public relations and cul-
tural norms, not those of Americans engaged in
criticism of the Japanese firm's behavior.
A fourth, and final, major difference in Japanese
and American public relations can be identified:
basic public relations strategy differs considerably.
In the US, basic public relations strategy calls for
symbolic organizational responses to recalls and
other crises. This symbolic response is frequently
rhetorical in nature, and it inevitably uses commu-
nication to advance its interests.
In Japan, 'laying low' is considered an honorable,
face-saving, nonconfrontational solution to public
controversy. As Eisenberg explained, "Parent
Bridgestone's CEO Yoichiro Kaizaki, who gained a
tough-guy reputation in shaping the company's
American strategy, has been all but invisible. He
may be practicing what the Japanese call fugenjikko
- no words, only actions - but silence is deafening
here" (September 18, 2000, 39).
The Wall St lournal study of the Bridgestone/Fire-
stone recall suggested, "In Japan, Bridgestone has
said little about the matter. It has held just one
news conference on the recall, on the day after it
was announced. Otherwise, the company has con-
fined its remarks to terse written statements" (Zaun
and Dvorak, September 5, 2000, A16).
Lessons to Be Learned From the
2000 Bridgestone/Firestone Recall
There are six fundamental lessons we might glean
from the unfortunate experience of Bridgestone/
Firestone, during the 2000 recall of 6.5 million
tires. These six lessons include: 1) Be aware of in-
tercultural variables, 2) American recalls require ag-
gressive media relations, 3) The US recall regulatory
systems require open communication, 4) Proactive
public relations is necessary, 5) Rapid media and
public judgment requires recall 'first strike' tactics,
and 6) A variety of perspectives is usually available.
Be Aware of Intercultural Variables
It is vital, in international and/or intercultural
interactions, that all parties dispense with ethno-
centric normative preconceptions and remain cog-
nizant of potential intercultural misunderstandings.
It is only human for us to perceive reality and in-
teract with others from our own background, but
that background should not limit our understand-
ing of others or our interactions with them.
Aggressive Media Relations Is Necessary
In the US, where an aggressive media will ferret
out any covered-up angle of a recall, it is necessary
to take the initiative and use aggressive media rela-
tions tactics. This may disarm, and will certainly
Spring 2001
21
defuse, media criticism of the recalled if the recaller
is perceived as proactive and open.
US Regulatory Systems
Require Open Communication
Federal regulatory agencies with recall jurisdic-
tion, like NHTSA, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, the Food and Drug Administration,
and others, specify recalling firms' communication
responsibilities. Regulations specify communica-
tion tactics and messages, and even suggest appro-
priate communication media. The bottom line -
recallers must be specific about dangers posed by
products, and must communicate those dangers
effectively to salient publics.
Proactive Public Relations is Necessary
Limited research specifically on recalls supports
extensive research on mass communication in gen-
eral - it is easier to maintain a pre-existing image in
the event of a recall than it is to create a favorable
image during a recall event. A company cannot
wait until a recall strikes, then conduct the recall
while simultaneously trying to create favorable
media relations and general public relations. That
is 'old-school PR,' and it does not work anymore.
Rapid Public/Media Judgment
Requires 'First Strike' Tactics
People tend to make up their minds early, in the
proverbial rush to judgment, and the media caters
to this inclination towards rapidity through pre-
mature speculation and the industry-wide coveted
'scoop' over the competition. To take advantage of
this human and journalistic tendency, recailers
should not wait for news developments, but should
actively seek to fashion that media agenda through
information dissemination. (S)he who hesitates is
truly lost.
A Variety of Perspectives is Available
Reality is complex. There are almost always sev-
eral competing explanations of reality, based on
differences in perceptions, perceived stake, frames
of reference, and other personal and interpersonal
factors. The public relations representative, work-
ing within a recaller's approved boundaries, must
select public positions based on his/her assessment
of the situational variables.
Numbers often prove useful. Plaintiff's attorneys
are fond of the number 148, the estimated number
of American deaths linked to the recalled Firestone
tires. Other important numbers purportedly
demonstrate a disproportionate number of acci-
dents involving Firestone tires.
Numbers can defend Bridgestone/Firestone, too.
For instance. Harper's Index recently noted that the
"Percentage of Americans killed by faulty auto parts
in the 1990s who were killed by Firestone tires: 0.1"
(November, 2000, 13).
Another quantitative perspective further dimin-
ishes the role of tires in the current Firestone tire
safety fracas. According to the Washington Post
study, "In the national data. The Post identified
2,042 fatal SUV accidents from those model years,
including 377 Explorers that could be tracked to
their manufacturing plant by the VIN. There were
53 tire-related accidents. In the Florida data. The
Post identified 25,617 SUV accidents from those
model years, including 6,009 Explorers linked to
their manufacturing plant. There were 83 tire-
related accidents" (Keating, October 9, 2000, 1). In
other words, there is a large number of SUV acci-
dents, but relatively few involve the Ford Explorer,
and very few of the accidents involve tire failures.
Conclusion
Was the Bridgestone/Firestone recall of 2000 a
public relations debacle, as many have contended?
Or, was it a pragmatic series of management deci-
sions predicated on differing ideas of what was best
for the company, and heavily influenced by collec-
tivist values and intercultural variables?
If it turns out that the Firestone tires in question
were inherently fine, but that their use on Explor-
ers caused most of the rollover fatalities, will we re-
member that Bridgestone/Firestone executives
staunchly refused to take responsibility? If a con-
fluence of factors, including hot and humid
weather, underinflation, use on vehicles with un-
stable aerodynamics, and a tire design defect, com-
bined to cause the accidents, how shall we
apportion blame and assign legal responsibility?
Or, are these complex sets of causes too demanding
for a sound-bite seeking, issue-simplifying, 'story'-
driven media to understand and communicate?
Only time will tell.
PR9
References available on request to PRQ,
Dirk C. Gibson, Ph.D. is an associate professor in the
Department of Communication and Journalism at the
University of New Mexico, in addition to product recall, his
main research interests include Hispanic advertising,
Japanese public relations, litigation public relations, public
relations education, and public information. He was invited by
the Consumer Product Safety Commission in 1998 to make
a presentation to the CPSC National Forum on Improving
Recall Effectiveness, and he recently completed a two-vol-
ume, 460-page report on the U. S. Department of Agriculture
recall policies, performed at that agency's request. Those
interested in teaming more atx}ut these recall research
activities are invited to examine the website of The Product
Recall Research Group, at www.unm.edu/dirkcgib.
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Public Relations Quarterly