United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

November 5, 2009

Congressional Committees

Subject: Afghanistan’s Security Environment

In March 2009, out of concern that the overall security situation in Afghanistan had
not improved after more than 7 years of U.S. and international efforts, the
administration completed a 60-day strategic review of U.S. policy and the security
1
environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Based on this review, and recognizing
the vital U.S. interest in addressing security threats posed by extremists in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the administration announced a strategic goal of
disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating these extremists and eliminating
2
their safe havens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Subsequently, in August 2009,
the United States issued an integrated civilian-military campaign plan for support to
Afghanistan.3 The strategy and campaign plan call for, among other things, the
execution of an integrated counterinsurgency mission and continued efforts to
build the capacity of military and civilian elements of the Afghan government to
lead counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts and provide internal security
for the Afghan people. Accordingly, the focus for U.S. forces in Afghanistan will be
to (1) secure Afghanistan from insurgent and terrorist threats and (2) rapidly train
Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)4 to lead military and law enforcement
operations.

We have previously reported on security conditions in Afghanistan and the need for
5
additional personnel to help build capable ANSF. This report provides updated
information on (1) the security situation as gauged by trends in enemy-initiated
attacks, (2) challenges for U.S. reconstruction efforts posed by security conditions,
and (3) the recent increase in U.S. and coalition troop presence. To address these
objectives, we incorporated information from our past and continuing work;

1
A subsequent assessment of the situation in Afghanistan by the commander of the International Security
Assistance Force and U.S. forces in Afghanistan is currently under way. The commander’s initial assessment
was completed in August 2009.
2
The President announced his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan on March 27, 2009.
3
GAO is currently performing a separate congressionally mandated review of the U.S. campaign plan for
Afghanistan.
4
The ANSF consists of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. We reported on U.S. efforts to
develop capable ANSF in June 2008. See GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be
Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security
Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008).
5
See GAO, Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-09-473SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21,
2009).

Page 1 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

analyzed updated data on attacks, troop numbers, and U.S. funding; and reviewed
relevant documents from the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State), as
well as the administration’s White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report
on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan and the recently developed civilian-
military campaign plan for Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s Security Situation Continues to Worsen as Enemy-Initiated

Attacks Increase

Afghanistan’s security situation has deteriorated significantly since 2005, affecting

all aspects of U.S. and allied reconstruction operations. As we reported in April
2009, the rise in enemy-initiated attacks on civilians and on U.S., Afghan, and
coalition security forces has resulted from various factors, including a resurgence
of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, a thriving illicit
drug trade, and threats emanating from insurgent safe havens in Pakistan.

Since 2005, attacks on civilians, as well as on Afghan and coalition forces, have
increased every year. The most recent data available, as of August 2009, showed the
highest rate of enemy-initiated attacks since Afghanistan’s security situation began
to deteriorate. Overall, nearly 13,000 attacks were recorded between January and
August 2009—more than two and a half times the number experienced during the
same period last year and more than five times the approximately 2,400 attacks
reported in all of 2005. Violence has generally been concentrated in the eastern and
southern regions of Afghanistan where U.S. forces operate, with insurgents making
increasing use of improvised explosive devices, suicide attacks, and attacks
targeting infrastructure and development projects. As figure 1 illustrates, the
pattern of attacks is seasonal, generally peaking from June through September each
year.

Page 2 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Figure 1: Average Daily Reported Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type in Afghanistan, May 2003 to August
2009

Number of average daily attacks per month

Aug. 20, 2009
100 Elections for
Sept. 18, 2005
president and
90 Elections for lower
provincial councils
Oct. 9, 2004 house of National
80 First democratic Assembly and
presidential provincial councils
70 election in
Afghanistan
60

50

40

30

20

10

c.
c.

b.

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c.

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b.

c.

g.

b.

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ne

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ne

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Oc

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Ap
Oc

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Ap
Ap

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De

De
De
Fe

Fe

De
De
Fe
Fe

Au

Fe

Au
Au

Fe
Au
Au

Au
Au

Ju

Ju
Ju
Ju

Ju
Ju
Ju

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Average daily attacks on International Security Assistance Force and coalition forces
Average daily attacks on civilians
Average daily attacks on Afghan National Security Forces
Total average daily attacks
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Data on attacks against civilians include attacks against Afghan nationals and other civilians, U.S. and non-U.S.
contractors, nongovernmental organizations, and Afghan government personnel. Data on attacks against the International
Security Assistance Force and coalition forces include attacks against U.S. and International Security Assistance Force
military personnel.

Although never reaching the highest level of attacks in Iraq, the number of attacks
in Afghanistan surpassed those in Iraq for the first time in July 2008 and has
continued to exceed levels in Iraq in recent months (see fig. 2).6

6
According to Defense Intelligence Agency officials, attack data in figures 1 and 2 do not include violent
incidents that coalition or Afghan security forces initiated, but represent a reliable and consistent source of
information that can be used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security situation.

Page 3 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Figure 2: Average Daily Reported Enemy-Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, May 2003 to August
2009

Number of average daily attacks per month

200

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

ne

ne
e

ne

ne

ne

ne

g.

g.

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g.

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b.

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n

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Au

Au
Au

Au

Au

Au

Fe

Fe
Fe

Fe

Fe

Fe

Ju

Ju
Ju

Ju

Ju

Ju

Ju
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Average daily attacks in Afghanistan

Average daily attacks in Iraq

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Security Situation Continues to Challenge U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan

Developing a self-reliant Afghanistan is a key end-state goal articulated in the U.S.

strategy for Afghanistan, which notes that achieving such an outcome will enable
the United States to withdraw combat forces and make a sustained commitment to
Afghan political and economic development. While U.S. and international
development projects in Afghanistan have made some progress, the deterioration of
security has impeded efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country. In particular, U.S.
officials have cited poor security as having caused delays, disruptions, and even
abandonment of certain reconstruction projects, while also hampering
management and oversight of such efforts. For instance, the administration’s
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan has identified the need for
more security in order for civilian personnel and contractors to do their work in
Afghanistan. Similarly, the commander of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF)7 and U.S. forces in Afghanistan testified in his June 2009 confirmation
hearing that improving security was a prerequisite for the development of local
governance and economic growth in Afghanistan. The following list provides some
specific examples of how the security situation in Afghanistan hampers U.S. efforts:

• Development programs delayed or abandoned. U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) staff in Afghanistan cited security as a
major challenge to implementing development projects. According to USAID,
programs ranging from road reconstruction to power generation and
agricultural development face significant cost increases and have been delayed
or abandoned due to a lack of security. For example, because attacks prevented

7
As of October 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led ISAF consisted of troops from 42 countries
engaged in efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan.

Page 4 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

 contractors from working on an Afghan road to the Kajaki dam, USAID
8
terminated the road contract after it had spent about $5 million on it. USAID
further noted in its comments on this report that supplies for the Kajaki dam
project must now be flown in due to the deteriorating security environment.
Additionally, DOD has reported that, although progress has been made in
completing construction of the “ring road”—Afghanistan’s major highway—a
lack of security has increased the risk of using Afghan roads.

• Disruption of supply lines. Supply transportation operations in Afghanistan

continue to depend on treacherous overland routes. Although sensitive
equipment is flown in by plane, supply convoys moving overland from Pakistan
have been subject to repeated threats and attacks.

• Development of Afghan security forces impeded by security problems.

U.S. officials have reported that efforts to train ANSF have been hindered by
security problems. For example, despite the fact that the Afghan National Army
is charged with defeating the insurgency and terrorism, Afghan National Police
are often reassigned from their training courses to provide immediate
assistance with the counterinsurgency effort, thus delaying the completion of
their training. Additionally, DOD officials have indicated that distributing
equipment to police in the field has been challenged in part by the unstable
security situation.

• Counternarcotics operations challenged by insurgent activity. About 98

percent of Afghanistan’s opium poppy cultivation is concentrated in the
southern provinces where insurgent activity has been heaviest. Recognizing the
nexus between the drug trade and the insurgency, in December 2008 DOD
adopted policies that allow the U.S. military to increase its involvement in
counternarcotics operations.

• Oversight of ongoing programs restricted. Afghanistan’s security situation

has contributed to U.S. funds being expended with limited U.S. government
oversight. For example, USAID officials told us their ability to monitor and
evaluate ongoing programs has been restricted by security constraints. In
comments on this report, USAID noted that due to deteriorating security in
southern and eastern Afghanistan, monitoring of the delivery of health services
has been significantly hindered or stopped in some areas. Similarly, State
officials told us that poor security has considerably inhibited the oversight of
counternarcotics efforts outside Kabul, including programs such as opium
eradication, alternative livelihoods, and public information.

8
We reported in July 2008 about U.S. and donor efforts to build roads in Afghanistan. See GAO, Afghanistan
Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and a
Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed, GAO-08-689 (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2008).

Page 5 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Increased U.S. and Coalition Troop Presence Is Intended to Help Secure
Afghanistan and Develop ANSF Capacity

As of November 2009, there were reportedly about 67,000 U.S. military personnel in
Afghanistan—an increase of more than 90 percent from the force level of 35,000 we
previously reported as of February 2009.9 According to DOD, by the end of 2009
U.S. troop levels will rise further to about 68,000. Additionally, as of October 2009,
there were reportedly about 36,000 non-U.S. military personnel in ISAF—an
increase from the reported February 2009 force level of about 32,000. Furthermore,
as of September 2009, DOD reported 95,000 Afghan National Army personnel
assigned to the ANSF.10 According to DOD, the ANSF will reach its authorized end-
strength of 230,000 army and police personnel by October 2010. Figure 3 shows the
reported increase in U.S., coalition, and Afghan military troop strength between
February 2009 and November 2009.

9
Part of the increase in U.S. troop levels is a result of the President’s February 2009 approval to deploy more
than 21,000 additional troops to Afghanistan this year. Of these 21,000 troops, about 17,700 are intended to
stabilize southern Afghanistan and about 4,000 are intended to support the ANSF development mission.
10
DOD also indicated that there were about 93,000 Afghan National Police assigned to the ANSF as of
September 2009. We previously reported in June 2008 that Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior produces the
number of police assigned and that, according to DOD, these numbers may not be reliable. Subsequently, in
March 2009, we noted that DOD was working with the Afghan government to identify and validate all police
personnel on the payroll. See GAO-08-661 and GAO, Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform
Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenges by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation,
GAO-09-280 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2009).

Page 6 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Figure 3: Increase in Reported U.S., Coalition, and Afghan Military Troop Strength between February
2009 and November 2009

Number of troops
100,000 95,000
90,000
16,000
80,000 80000

70,000 67,000

60,000

50,000 32,000

79,000
40,000 36,000
4,000
30,000

20,000 35,000 32,000

10,000

0
United ISAF Afghan
States (non-U.S.) National
Army
Location

Increase since February 2009

Troop strength as of February 2009

Source: DOD and ISAF data.

Note: U.S. figures are as of November 2009. ISAF figures are as of October 2009. Afghan National Army figures are as of
September 2009.

Since 2001, more than half of the U.S. funding provided to support Afghanistan’s
security, governance, reconstruction, and counternarcotics goals as set out in the
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) has been dedicated to
supporting the development of ANSF. As shown in figure 4, the United States has
provided more than $38.6 billion11 to support the ANDS goals since 2001, of which
more than $21 billion has been dedicated to ANSF development. In its 2010 budget
request, DOD asked Congress to provide $7.5 billion for the Afghanistan Security
Forces Fund,12 representing an almost 34 percent increase over 2009 funding levels.

11
This figure does not include funding for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.
12
The Afghan Security Forces Fund is used to plan, program, and implement structural, institutional, and
management reforms of the ANSF.

Page 7 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Figure 4: Breakdown of $38.6 Billion in U.S.-Provided Support to Afghanistan for Fiscal Years 2002 to
2009

Dollars (in billions)

Governance, rule of law, and human rights

($2.5 billion)

6% Counternarcotics
9% ($3.5 billion)

56% 29% Economic and social development

($11 billion)

Security
($21.6 billion)
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, USAID, and State. DOD and USAID
provided written comments, which are reprinted in enclosures I and II of this
report, respectively. In response to DOD’s comment that the report should be
labeled “For Official Use Only,” we modified sections of the report, resulting in
DOD’s determination that the report was no longer “For Official Use Only.” DOD
stated that the facts presented in our report are accurate but asserted that our
report treats security and development as independent entities rather than
interrelated activities. We agree with DOD that security and development are
interrelated activities, and our report illustrates several ways in which
Afghanistan’s unstable security situation challenges development. For additional
details, see GAO comments that follow enclosure I. DOD also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. USAID provided updated
information on the impact of Afghanistan’s deteriorating security situation on
implementation and oversight of U.S. reconstruction efforts. State did not provide
written comments.

Scope and Methodology

This report represents an update to our prior work on security conditions in

Afghanistan and is based on past and continuing work. To address our objectives,
we incorporated updated information from current budget and program
documents, including updated financial data from DOD. We also incorporated
updated attack data from DOD, which we used to assess the level of enemy-

Page 8 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

initiated attacks on civilians and on U.S., Afghan, and coalition security forces. We
have assessed the reliability of these financial and attack data as part of our
previous work and have determined that they are sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. Because DOD uses similar methodologies to derive the attack data it
reports for Afghanistan and Iraq, we were able to compare both sets of data. The
report also incorporates updated data on troop numbers for the Afghan National
Army, ISAF, and the United States. We have assessed these data as part of our
previous and ongoing work and have determined that they are sufficiently reliable
for broad comparative purposes to identify changes in troop numbers over time.
However, the report also notes our previously reported concerns with regard to the
reliability of figures on the number of Afghan National Police. In addition to
incorporating updated data, we also reviewed relevant documents from DOD and
State, as well as the administration’s White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s
Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan and the recently developed
civilian-military campaign plan for Afghanistan.

We conducted our work from August 2009 to November 2009 in accordance with all
sections of GAO’s Quality Assurance Framework that are relevant to our
objectives. The framework requires that we plan and perform the engagement to
obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to meet our stated objectives and to
discuss any limitations in our work. We believe that the information and data
obtained, and the analysis conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings
and conclusions.

------

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, DOD,

State, and USAID. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's
Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key
contributors to this report are listed in enclosure III.

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

Director, International Affairs and Trade

Enclosures

Page 9 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chair
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable John F. Kerry

Chair
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chair
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy

Chair
The Honorable Judd Gregg
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Chair
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Howard L. Berman

Chair
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives

Page 10 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

The Honorable Edolphus Towns
Chair
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey

Chair
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The Honorable John Tierney

Chair
The Honorable Jeff Flake
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives

Page 11 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

 Enclosure I

Comments from the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

Page 12 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

 Enclosure I

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Page 13 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Enclosure I

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s written responses, dated November
2, 2009, to our draft report.

GAO Comments

1. We modified sections of the report in response to DOD’s technical comments.

DOD subsequently agreed that our report did not need to be labeled “For
Official Use Only.”

2. DOD states that higher levels of security incidents are one measure of the
security situation but do not reflect the scope, character, and impact of the
incidents. Although a full characterization of attacks in Afghanistan is beyond
the scope of this report, we provide several examples of how instability affects
U.S. efforts. Furthermore, while we acknowledge DOD’s position that a higher
number of attacks can reflect a worsening situation for the enemy, the
commander of ISAF and U.S. forces in Afghanistan stated in his August 2009
initial assessment of the situation in Afghanistan that the insurgency is
resilient and growing.

3. DOD asserts that the comparison between attack levels in Iraq and
Afghanistan is inaccurate. However, all attack figures found in our report are
based on DOD data that Defense Intelligence Agency officials consider a
reliable and consistent source of information that can be used to identify
trends in enemy activity and the overall security situation. DOD further asserts
that the comparison between Iraq and Afghanistan loses context without
further explanation. However, a detailed evaluation of factors affecting the
levels of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan would involve sensitive information
that could not be included in this report.

4. DOD acknowledges that the enemy has hindered ANSF development but notes
that a deeper analysis identifying the scope and character of the impact is
needed. Although we did not include such an analysis in this update, our prior
work on the ANSF has identified specific ways in which the lack of security
has affected ANSF development. For example, we noted in March 2009 that a
new program to retrain the Afghan National Police and build professional and
fully capable police units was taking longer than DOD initially projected, due
13
in part to growing security threats affecting the program. In addition, we are
currently conducting a separate review of U.S. efforts to develop capable
Afghan National Army forces. We look forward to working with DOD on that
review to examine in further detail how the security situation has impeded
development of the Afghan National Army, to include training timelines.

5. We have modified our report to note that the authorized end-strength of the
ANSF is now 230,000.

13
GAO-09-280.

Page 14 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Enclosure I

6. DOD contends that this report treats security and development as independent
entities rather than interrelated activities. We agree with DOD that security
and development are interrelated activities, and our report illustrates several
ways in which Afghanistan’s unstable security situation challenges
development.

Page 15 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Enclosure II

Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 16 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Enclosure II

Page 17 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

Enclosure III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant Director),

Aniruddha Dasgupta, Emily Rachman, Gloria Leila Mahnad, Joseph Carney, Martin
de Alteriis, and Mark Dowling made key contributions to this report. Sarah
McGrath, Jeremy Sebest, and Cynthia Taylor provided technical assistance.

(320709)

Page 18 GAO-10-178R Afghanistan’s Security Environment

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