Condo

Counterinterp we get what we did we know its arbitrary but its still a ceiling on abuse and
so is theirs

Offense:

Neg flex the job of the neg is to assault the aff from as many angles as possible theres no
definition of substantial and anything could be development of space conditionality is the only
equalizer

Education condo increases ideological flex the real world forces the aff to defend against the
left and the right condo is key to those advocacy skills and this is the only way to get that type
of education

Logic a rational policymaker wouldnt stick the neg with the CP if the status quo was a better
option

Research conditionality is a gateway issue not everyone becomes policymakers but research
is a portable skill no matter we become

New affs fairness scenarios are marginal theres no difference between one and two CPs but
facing a new aff without conditionality would be devastating

Defense:

Perms check theyre blippy arguments that take a long time to answer

2nr solves were only going for one which means the 2AR can leverage offense

Skew inevitable I am faster than jding but you shouldnt vote me down for it

Reject the argument not the team


Argument responsibility is bad: we should be able to change our minds and be flexible,
argument responsibility causes the ideological inflexibility that causes policy disasters like the
most recent congress

And, no offense, the aff is conditional they specified/didnt specify their agent, thats bad
because it denies politics and cp ground/spikes out of link ground for politics.


Solvency
Err neg best studies conclude Congress fails.
Douglas Kriner 2010, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, After the
Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 6-8

The role that Congress plays in deciding whether a war is continued or concluded is of intrinsic
interest to academics, policymakers, and casual observers of contemporary American politics
alike. Yet the belief that Congress retains some capacity to shape the conduct of military affairs
after a venture is launched is also a critically important and untested proposition underlying most
theories asserting congressional influence over the initiation of military action. Why, according to this
emerging literature, do presidents facing a strong opposition party in Congress use force less frequently than do their peers with
strong partisan majorities in Congress? The most commonly offered answer is that presidents anticipate Congress's likely reaction to
a prospective use of force and respond accordingly.14 Presidents who confront an opposition-led Congress anticipate that it is more
willing and able to challenge the administration's conduct of military action than a Congress controlled by their partisan allies.
Therefore, the frequency with which presidents use force abroad covaries with the strength of their party in Congress. However, this
anticipatory logic requires that Congress has the ability to raise the costs of military action for
the president, once that action has begun. If Congress lacks this capacity, presidents have little reason to
adjust their willingness to initiate the use of force in anticipation of an adverse congressional
response." As a result, determining whether and how Congress can influence the scope and duration of ongoing military
operations is critically important even to evaluating prior research that asserts congressional influence over the initiation of military
actions. Without it, such analyses rest on shaky ground. Unfortunately, because the dynamics change
dramatically once American troops are deployed abroad, simply drawing lessons from existing
studies of interbranch dynamics in military policymaking at the conflict initiation phase and applying them to the conflict
conduct phase is unlikely to offer much insight." The decision-making environment at the conflict
conduct phase differs from that at the conflict initiation phase along at least three key dimensions: the
incentives and constraints governing congressional willingness to challenge presidential discretion; the relative institutional
capacities of the executive and legislative branches to affect military policymaking; and finally, the ability of unfolding conflict events
to change further the political and strategic environment in which the two branches vie for power. With regard to the
political constraints that limit would-be adversaries in Congress, the president may be in an
even stronger position after American troops are deployed in the field. Ordering troops abroad is
akin to other unilateral presidential actions; by seizing his office's capacity for independent action, a president can
dramatically change the status quo and fundamentally alter the political playing field on
which Congress and other actors must act to challenge his policies.17 Once the troops are
overseas, the political stakes for any congressional challenge to the president's policies are
inexorably raised; any such effort is subject to potentially ruinous charges of failing to support the troops. Georgia Senator
Richard Russell's conversion from opposition to U.S. intervention in Vietnam in the early 196os to stalwart support for staying the
course after Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the American commitment there illustrates this change: "We are there now, and the
time for debate has passed. Our flag is committed, andmore importantlyAmerican boys are under fire."" Russell's sentiment was
loudly echoed forty years later in the allegations by the Bush administration and its partisan allies in Congress that any legislative
efforts to curtail the war in Iraq undermined the troops. As a result of these potentially intense political
costs , there are reasons to question whether Congress can mount an effective challenge to the
policies of the commander in chief. If it cannot, this would compel a reassessment of prior theories asserting
congressional influence over the initiation of military actions through the logic of anticipated response. Certainly, more empirical
analysis is needed to answer this question.
Turns signaling.
Neack 7 (Laura, Professor of Political Science Miami University (Ohio), Security: States
First, People Last, p. 106)

Although our discussion has been about the use of military force, we still are on the topic of
defense and deterrence rather than on the offensive use of force. It is, though, in some sense
hard to dispute the old axiom that what appear as defensive measures to some
appear as offensive and therefore threatening measures to others. This is part of the dilemma in the
security dilemma. Sometimes countries embrace this ambiguity to enhance the danger
of underestimating them, and sometimes countries attempt to dispel this ambiguity by adopting policies that are
overtly transparent and nonthreatening.
They should lose because of plan vagueness Obama would ninja
around the plan hed arbitrarily define words
Pollack, 13 -- MSU Guggenheim Fellow and professor of history emeritus [Norman, "Drones, Israel, and the Eclipse of
Democracy," Counterpunch, 2-5-13, www.counterpunch.org/2013/02/05/drones-israel-and-the-eclipse-of-democracy/, accessed 9-
1-13, mss]

Bisharat first addresses the transmogrification of international law by Israels military lawyers. We might call this damage control,
were it not more serious. When the Palestinians first sought to join the I.C.C., and then, to receive the UNs conferral of nonmember
status on them, Israel raised fierce opposition. Why? He writes: Israels frantic opposition to the elevation of Palestines status at
the United Nations was motivated precisely by the fear that it would soon lead to I.C.C. jurisdiction over Palestinian claims of war
crimes. Israeli leaders are unnerved for good reason. The I.C.C. could prosecute major international crimes committed on
Palestinian soil anytime after the courts founding on July 1, 2002. In response to the threat, we see the deliberate
reshaping of the law: Since 2000, the Israel Defense Forces, guided by its military lawyers, have attempted to
remake the laws of war by consciously violating them and then creating new legal
concepts to provide juridical cover for their misdeeds. (Italics, mine) In other words, habituate the law to the
existence of atrocities; in the USs case, targeted assassination, repeated often enough, seems
permissible, indeed clever and wise, as pressure is steadily applied to the laws of war. Even then, collateral
damage is seen as unintentional, regrettable, but hardly prosecutable, and in the current atmosphere of complicity and
desensitization, never a war crime. (Obama is hardly a novice at this game of stretching the law to
suit the convenience of, shall we say, the national interest? In order to ensure the distortion in
counting civilian casualties, which would bring the number down, as Brennan with a straight
face claimed, was zero, the Big Lie if ever there was one, placing him in distinguished European company, Obama
redefined the meaning of combatant status to be any male of military age throughout the
area (which we) declared a combat zone, which noticeably led to a higher incidence of sadism, because it allowed for second
strikes on funeralsthe assumption that anyone attending must be a terroristand first responders, those who went to the aid of
the wounded and dying, themselves also certainly terrorists because of their rescue attempts.) These guys play hardball, perhaps no
more than in usingby reportthe proverbial baseball cards to designate who would be next on the kill list. But funerals and first
respondersverified by accredited witnessesseems overly much, and not a murmur from an adoring public.

historical record goes neg Public wont attack the President and
political restraint only impacts Congress.
Devins 9Professor of Law and Professor of Government @ College of William and Mary
[Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today's Congress
Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, Willamette Law Review, Vol. 45,
Issue 3 (Spring 2009), pp. 395-416]

Unlike the presidency, the individual and institutional interests of members of Congress are often in conflict
with one another. While each of Congress's 535 members has some stake in
Congress as an institution, parochial interests will overwhelm this collective good.
In particular, members of Congress regularly tradeoff their interest in Congress as
an institution for their personal interests-most notably, reelection and advancing their (and their constituents')
policy agenda. In describing this collective action problem, Moe and Howell note that lawmakers are "trapped in a
prisoner's dilemma: all might benefit if they could cooperate in defending or
advancing Congress's power, but each has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of
the local constituency. For this reason, lawmakers have no incentive to stop presidential
unilateralism simply because the President is expanding his powers vis-A-vis
Congress. Consider, for example, the President's use of executive orders to advance
favored policies and presidential initiatives to launch military initiatives. Between
1973 and 1998, Presidents issued about 1,000 executive orders. Only 37 of these
orders were challenged in Congress and only 3 of these challenges resulted in
legislation. 9 Presidential unilateralism in launching military operations is even more striking-because it involves the President's willingness to
commit the nation's blood without congressional authorization. Notwithstanding the clear constitutional
mandate that Congress play a significant role in triggering military operations,
Congress has very little incentive in playing a leadership role. Rather than oppose
thePresident on a potential military action, most members of Congress find it more convenient
to acquiesce and avoid criticism that they obstructed a necessary military operation. Pg.
400-401


Small forces dont trigger the wpr
Vigeant 14. (Matthew E., B.A. in American Politics from Westpoint, current JD student at
Columbia Law and MPA student at Harvard Kennedy School of Public Policy. Unforeseen
Consequences: The Constitutionality of Unilateral Executive R2P Deployments and the Need for
Congressional and Judicial Involvement. Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems.
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Spring2014/Vigeant.pdf
Since a pattern of executive conduct, made under claim of right, extended over many decades and engaged in by Presidents of both
parties, evidences the existence of broad constitutional power in this area of law, the proposition that minor
engagements do not trigger the WPR is now a quasi-constitutional custom meaning that even if the
drafters of the WPR did not imagine Presidential deployments of thousands of troops without Congressional authorization, the
President now has the constitutional authority to do this.80 Thus in Libya, the Obama Administration
reiterated the distinction between full military encounters and more constrained operations, stating that intermittent
military engagements did not require Congressional approval, and the definition of hostilities
will be satisfied only by prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving
exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.81 Because the Libyan
intervention was limited to an air campaign, the risk of U.S. forces being injured or killed was low. Similarly, the risk of escalation of
the campaign would also be minimal, and the scope of U.S. involvement limited to en-forcing a no-fly zone and protecting
civilians.82 Therefore, according to the Obama administration, this engagement did not reach the level of action requisite to
implicate hostilities under the WPR.83

President can still intervene on foreign relations grounds
Vigeant 14. (Matthew E., B.A. in American Politics from Westpoint, current JD student at
Columbia Law and MPA student at Harvard Kennedy School of Public Policy. Unforeseen
Consequences: The Constitutionality of Unilateral Executive R2P Deployments and the Need for
Congressional and Judicial Involvement. Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems.
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Spring2014/Vigeant.pdf

The Meeker view on Presidential powers and the WPRs constraints, set the baseline for modern Executive war powers. For
subsequent unilateral deployments, under the theory that past practices between the political branches in national security affairs
defines the political branches respective powers, according to the OLC, the framework for deciding whether a unilateral
Presidential deployment of troops abroad is legally justified or not: turns on two questions: first,
whether United States operations [abroad] would serve sufficiently important national interests
to permit the Presidents action as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his authority to
conduct U.S. foreign relations; and second, whether the military operations that the President anticipated
ordering would be sufficiently extensive in nature, scope, and duration to constitute a war requiring prior specific
congressional approval under the Declaration of War Clause.70


Nothing has ever happened to make this suggestion apply


Missions that are just R2P have never happened and they have to
mandate court doctrine shifts
Vigeant 14. (Matthew E., B.A. in American Politics from Westpoint, current JD student at
Columbia Law and MPA student at Harvard Kennedy School of Public Policy. Unforeseen
Consequences: The Constitutionality of Unilateral Executive R2P Deployments and the Need for
Congressional and Judicial Involvement. Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems.
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Spring2014/Vigeant.pdf)



R2P missions present many possible dangers. While no past unilateral deployment has ever been premised solely
on humanitarian interests, due to the evolution of unilateral Presidential deployments and the
concomitant acquiescence of Congress to this practice, if the President chose to deploy troops in the name of R2P, he would be legally justified in doing
so. Therefore, to ensure that a President does not rashly involve American soldiers in a mission that leads to deadly consequences, Congress should
restrain the Presidents ability to unilaterally conduct R2P mis-sions. But in order to ensure a legislative restraint is
actually enforced, courts must modify their justiciability doctrines and be willing to weigh in on national security
cases, which are no harder to judge or more abstract than other issues courts deal with on a daily basis.


Abramowitz 13 (Michael, Washington Post, Does the United States have a responsibility
to protect the Syrian people? http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/does-the-united-
states-have-a-responsibility-to-protect-the-syrian-people/2013/09/06/5decf4c0-167d-11e3-
be6e-dc6ae8a5b3a8_story.html)


Its the foreign policy doctrine that sounds like a Star Wars droid. Its the argument that a former supreme commander of NATO,
Adm. James Stavridis,thinks could be a basis for military action against Syria. And its the idea that Washington Post columnist
George Willargues by no means justifies a U.S. strike. The responsibility to protect known in international-relations circles as
R2P is a straightforward, if often misunderstood, notion: Nations must protect their citizens
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and must take action
to help other nations whose governments cant or wont protect their peoples. Its hard to see
how R2P would not apply in the case of Syria, where more than 100,000 people have been killed, 5 million
displaced from their homes, 2 million refugees sent fleeing and numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity committed,
including with chemical weapons, according to independent human rights monitors and the United Nations. A recent study for the
U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum concluded that genocidal violence against Christian, Sunni, Alawite and other groups is possible
if the conflict escalates. Yet there is one person who has studiously avoided invoking R2P: President
Obama. When making the case for airstrikes, he has stressed the need to enforce the worldwide ban on the
use and production of chemical weapons. When theres a breach this brazen of a norm this important, and the
international community is paralyzed and frozen and doesnt act, then that norm begins to unravel, Obama warned in a Friday
news conference at the G-20 summitin St. Petersburg. Yet the chemical weapons ban is not the only
international norm at stake in the Syrian civil war. Although the U.S. government has endorsed
R2P most recently in the presidents 2010 National Security Strategy U.S. officials appear unenthusiastic
about invoking it as a rationale for combating mass murder and atrocities. While the Syrian
conflict has grown in scale and intensity, Obama and his aides have not used responsibility to
protect to rally the international community to help civilians. Of course, R2P is not the only tool
the administration has to address genocide and other mass atrocities. Officials say their policy is
to work aggressively to stop such crimes, though not necessarily through the prism of R2P. Asked
about the doctrine at her July confirmation hearing to be ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power said it is less
important, I think, than U.S. practice and U.S. policy, which is that when civilians are being murdered by their governments or by
nonstate actors, its incumbent on us to look to see [what we] might do in order to ameliorate the situation. The Obama
administrations apparent distancing from R2P speaks to the tremendous challenge of
mobilizing Americans whether politicians or the public to support action on humanitarian grounds.
Saving lives is a hard sell these days. Developed in the early part of the last decade, after the genocide in Rwanda and the failed
efforts to prevent massive violence in the Balkans, R2P was supposed to help bypass the idea that has blocked effective action
against genocide since the Holocaust: that state sovereignty prohibits countries from meddling in others internal affairs. Adopted
by U.N. member states (including Syria) at the 2005 World Summit in New York, R2P places the onus for protecting civilians on
governments themselves; only if they fail to protect their own civilians or even worse, if they attack them should the
international community step in. Even then, military action is supposed to be a last resort, and only after approval by the U.N.
Security Council. There have been reasonable criticisms of R2P. It does little to address the roadblocks in the Security Council that
have often impeded effective action against countries perpetrating atrocities. Nations in the developing world complain that it is a
cover for regime change by Western countries, such as in Libya. But R2P has been a useful frame for focusing diplomacy and peace-
building efforts in a number of countries at risk of horrific violence against civilians. In Kenya, for example, the United Nations and
some governments used R2P as a rallying cry for their work, along with Kenyans themselves, to prevent the violence that some
expected after this years presidential elections. Similarly, in 2011, as South Sudan prepared for its historic referendum and ultimate
separation from Khartoum after a devastating 23-year civil war, R2Ps preventive powers were brought into high relief. An
international coalition including such unlikely allies as Russia, China, Norway, the Arab League, the African Union and the United
States flooded the zone with preventive diplomacy, expanded peacekeeping mandates and used high-level political involvement
to ensure that the separation did not ignite new bouts of violence. However unpopular or unknown R2P might be
in the United States, it has emerged as a preferred vehicle in other parts of the world for
mobilizing support for action against potential mass atrocities. Even China and Russia have
endorsed the concept, and in the case of Libya, they allowed an intervention justified in the
name of R2P to go forward. It is usually in the hardest, most extreme cases, such as Syria where it is too late for
prevention and diplomatic efforts have not deterred the regime from slaughtering its citizens that R2P has failed to erase the
polarizing debates over military intervention. The official U.S. reticence to emphasize the responsibility to protect reflects, in part,
a bipartisan reluctance to sign on to anything that smacks of the United Nations. Another possible drawback to R2P is the erroneous
perception that it requires a military deployment or other steps that Americans may not believe are in the national interest. R2P
contemplates a range of preventive moves intended to forestall the need for military force. If
properly working, it should be a stimulus for international action, not a straightjacket.


Expansion of R2P risks undermining UN legitimacy
Bush, Martinello, and Mercer 11 (Ray, school of politics and internation studies,
University of Leeds, Guiliano, indeendent scholar and activist, and Claire, dept. of geography
and environmnet, 8/26/11 London school of economics, r (2011): Humanitarian
imperialism, Review of African Political Economy, 38:129, 357-365)
Imperialist intervention uses the language of humanitarianism to justify its use of force. But it is
unclear how the bombing of people and their homes, whether it is in Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya helps to protect them. Military
intervention is more likely to create the atrocities and casualties, death and destruction NATO and US policy makers say they are
intervening to stop. Since the 2005 UN World Summit, the international community has adopted the idea of the responsibility to
protect (R2P). The central rhetorical concern of R2P is the desire to protect people from human rights violations. In the wake of
revolutionary struggles in Tunisia and Egypt, the intervention in Libya authorised by UN Security Council
Resolution 1973 (2011) called for a ceasere in Libya and an end to the current attacks against civilians, which
might constitute crimes against humanity. The resolution imposed a no-y zone over Libya, sanctions against the government and
authorised all possible force to protect civilians (UN 2011). R2P was used in the Libyan case as a pre-emptive
rationale for intervention to prevent greater loss of civilian life after some had died in state violence, while in Syria
thousands of civilians have actually been slain by security forces and repression in Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia has reinforced
state power against demonstrators calling for political reform. The Security Council has effectively been
privatised by the US, UK and France (Mazover 2011). The credibility and reputation of
the UN as an impartial arbitrator for defence and promotion of human rights and
defender of international law is further damaged. The institution was already struggling to project
even-handedness after it orchestrated the theatre of lies justifying intervention in Iraq. And Secretary General Ban Ki Moon failed in
Sri Lanka to question human rights abuses at the end of the countrys civil war. Only 10 members of the Security Council voted for
Resolution 1973 while ve abstained Russia, China, India, Brazil and Germany. In other words the representatives of
the majority of humankind did not support military intervention in Libya. Regional actors Egypt
and Turkey were also not keen about the terms of military intervention. And although the Arab League
initially supported the resolution it quickly changed its mind when the scale and ferocity of bombing commenced and the removal of
Qadda was identied as the priority. The Arab League requested a motion for a no-y zone over Gaza too, but this was not reported
by international media or discussed by the Security Council. Ignoring the Arab Leagues suggestion to limit Israels militarisation of
the Middle East is not surprising, as the US had not set limits on Israels invasion of Lebanon in 2006 and Obamas continued
support for Zionism during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza 2008 2009.

Politics
Overview
Sanctions kills US cred and alliancesleads to US-Iran war and prolif
Nader 13 [Alirez, Pause on additional Iran sanctions crucial to negotiations 11-5-13
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/189371-pause-on-additional-iran-sanctions-crucial-to-
negotiations]

Iran has demonstrated a different tone and approach to nuclear negotiations since the June 14 election of
Hassan Rouhani as president. Nothing concrete has emerged yet, but the U.S. negotiating team, headed by
Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman, has described the last round of negotiations as positive and different from
previous sessions with the Iranian team under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. ADVERTISEMENT Rouhanis
election and, more importantly, Irans dire economic condition are the reasons for Tehrans new
approach. Some have taken this to mean that more sanctions are needed. However, just because Tehran is seeking to
ease the pressure brought on by the sanctions that exist today does not mean that it will yield to
new sanctions tomorrow. Rouhani has a limited mandate to solve the nuclear crisis and lift sanctions.
However, more radical elements of the Iranian political system, marginalized for now, are waiting for him to
fail. They believe that the American government is either duplicitous or will be unable to deliver a deal. New
sanctions would confirm their view and further their goals of ending negotiations and sidelining
Rouhani. New sanctions passed before a true test of Irans intentions could result in a bleak
future: a risky and costly war with Iran with no guarantee of success, or the acceptance of an
increasingly embittered, isolated, repressive and nuclear capable Islamic Republic. The Iranian
people have borne the brunt of sanctions, but it would be hard to argue that the Iranian regime has not felt the pressure as well. And
it is this crucial portfolio that could determine his fate. He has the support of Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard, without which he would not be able to negotiate or even run his
government. But Khamenei and the Guard are under no illusion that negotiations are sure to succeed; nor
are they willing to continue negotiations under humiliating conditions. Sanctions are a danger to
their rule, but weakness in the face of pressure might be no less a threat. They must give Rouhani a chance
because the Iranian people and key political constituents support negotiations. The viability of
Rouhanis platform of moderation and engagement with the West hangs in balance. Khamenei and
hard-line Guard are willing to test America as much as the Obama administration is willing to
test Tehran. New sanctions under consideration by Congress could lead to a weakening of the
overall U.S. position. First, Rouhani could lose his mandate to continue negotiations. Second, Iran
could begin to undermine the international coalition that has created the harshest peacetime
sanctions in history. Rouhani, weakened at home but still respected abroad, could persuade major Iranian oil
buyers such as China, India, Japan and even European that Iran attempted to negotiate in good
faith but was rebuffed by the United States. Third, Iran could successfully cause a split between the
group. China and Russia might believe that Congress wants regime change in Iran instead of a
diplomatic solution. Germany, which has close business ties with Iran, could become unhappy about its
economic sacrifices. And even the U.K. and France could begin to doubt U.S. intentions .
Congress deserves credit for pressuring the Iranian regime, but it should pause the march
toward new sanctions to give the negotiations a chance. Current sanctions against Iran are effective, and new
sanctions can always be imposed if Iran does not budge. A smart approach toward Iran does not only entail
creating pressure but using it correctly, and for the right goals.

Deal failure itself causes Russia war
PressTV, 11/13/13 (Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks
fail, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-
fail/)

A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world
powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says. If the talks fail, if the
agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be
enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack]
Obama leaves office and thats a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of, senior editor at the
Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. The United States could find itself on one
side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to
miscalculation and general roar, Steinberg said. So the danger in this situation is that if these talks dont go forward, we
could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and thats got to be avoided at all costs
when youve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with their arsenals of
nuclear weapons, he warned. The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions
against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war.

Uniqueness
Issues only cost capital once they reach the finish line.
Drum, 3/10/10 (Kevin political blogger for Mother Jones, Immigration coming off the back
burner?, Mother Jones, p. http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/03/immigration-coming-
back-burner)
Not to pick on Ezra or anything, but this attitude betrays a surprisingly common misconception about
political issues in general. The fact is that political dogs never bark until an issue becomes an active
one. Opposition to Social Security privatization was pretty mild until 2005, when George Bush
turned it into an active issue. Opposition to healthcare reform was mild until 2009, when Barack Obama turned it into an active issue.
Etc. I only bring this up because we often take a look at polls and think they tell us what the public thinks
about something. But for the most part, they don't.1 That is, they don't until the issue in question is
squarely on the table and both sides have spent a couple of months filling the airwaves with
their best agitprop. Polling data about gays in the military, for example, hasn't changed a lot over the past year or two, but once Congress
takes up the issue in earnest and the Focus on the Family newsletters go out, the push polling starts, Rush Limbaugh picks it up, and Fox News creates
an incendiary graphic to go with its saturation coverage well, that's when the polling will tell you something. And it will probably tell you something
different from what it tells you now. Immigration was bubbling along as sort of a background issue
during the Bush administration too until 2007, when he tried to move an actual bill . Then
all hell broke loose. The same thing will happen this time, and without even a John McCain to act as a conservative point man for a moderate
solution. The political environment is worse now than it was in 2007, and I'll be very surprised if it's possible to make any serious progress on
immigration reform. "Love 'em or hate 'em," says Ezra, illegal immigrants "aren't at the forefront of people's minds." Maybe not. But they will be soon.


The GOP will exploit a loss to flip Democratic votes on Irancauses
sanctions
Josh Rogin, Daily Beast, 2/5/14, GOP Will Force Reid to Save Obamas Iran PolicyOver and
Over Again, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/05/gop-will-force-reid-to-save-obama-s-
iran-policy-over-and-over-again.html

Dozens of Republican senators joined Wednesday to demand that Harry Reid allow a floor vote
on a new Iran sanctions bill. If he doesnt, they are planning to make his life miserable.
The Republican Senate caucus is planning to use every parliamentary trick in the book to push
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to allow a floor vote on a new Iran sanctions bill that the Obama
administration strenuously opposes. The Obama White House has succeeded in keeping most Democrats in
line against supporting quick passage of the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act, which currently has 59 co-
sponsors, including 13 Democrats. Reid has faithfully shelved the bill, pending the outcome of negotiations
between Iran and the worlds major powersthe so-called P5+1. But tomorrow, Republicans plan to respond by using
an array of floor tacticsincluding bringing up the bill and forcing Reid to publicly oppose itas a means of putting public
pressure on Reid and Democrats who may be on the fence . Now we have come to a
crossroads. Will the Senate allow Iran to keep its illicit nuclear infrastructure in place, rebuild its teetering economy and
ultimately develop nuclear weapons at some point in the future? 42 GOP senators wrote in a letter sent to Reid late Wednesday and
obtained by The Daily Beast. The answer to this question will be determined by whether you allow a vote on S. 1881, the bipartisan
Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act, which is cosponsored by more than half of the Senate. The GOP letter calls on Reid to allow a vote
on the bill during the current Senate work periodin other words, before the chambers next recess. Senate GOP aides said that until
they get a vote, GOP senators are planning to use a number of procedural tools at their disposal to keep this issue
front and center for Democrats. Since the legislation is already on the Senates legislative
calendar, any senator can bring up the bill for a vote at any time and force Democrats to publicly
object. Senators can also try attaching the bill as an amendment to future bills under consideration. Senate Minority Leader Mitch
McConnell has been a harsh critic of Reids shelving of the bill, so he could demand a vote on it as a condition of moving any other
legislation. If those amendments are blocked by Reid, Senators can then go to the floor and make speech after speech
calling out Reid for ignoring a bill supported by 59 senatorsand calling on fence-sitting
Democrats to declare their position on the bill. This letter is a final warning to Harry Reid that if Democrats want to block
this bipartisan legislation, they will own the results of this foreign policy disaster, one senior GOP senate aide said. The
Republican senators believe, based on recent polls, that the majority of Americans support moving forward with the Iran
sanctions bill now. They also believe that if Reid did allow a vote, the bill would garner more than the 59 votes of
its co-sponsors and that Democrats vulnerable in 2014 races would support it, pushing the vote total
past a veto-proof two-thirds supermajority.
Vote switching possible based on Obamas standing
KRASUHAAR 13 political editor for National Journal [Josh Krasuhaar,
National Journal, The Iran Deal Puts Pro-Israel Democrats in a Bind
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-iran-deal-puts-pro-israel-democrats-in-a-bind-
20131121]

All of this puts Democrats, who routinely win overwhelming support from Jewish Americans on
Election Day, in an awkward position. Do they stand with the president on politically sensitive
foreign policy issues, or stake their own course? That difficult dynamic is currently playing out
in Congress, where the Obama administration is resisting a Senate push to maintain tough
sanctions against Iran. This week, Obama met with leading senators on the Banking and Foreign Relations committees to
dissuade them from their efforts while diplomacy is underway. "There's a fundamental disagreement between the
vast majority of Congress and the president when it comes to increasing Iran sanctions right
now," said one Democratic operative involved in the advocacy efforts. "Pro-Israel groups, like AIPAC, try to do things in a
bipartisan way; they don't like open confrontation. But in this instance, it's hard." That awkwardness has been evident in the
lukewarm reaction from many of Obama's Senate Democratic allies to the administration's outreach to Iran. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez of New Jersey said last week he was concerned that the administration seems "to
want the deal almost more than the Iranians." Normally outspoken Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York, a reliable ally of Israel, has
been conspicuously quiet about his views on the negotiations. In a CNN interview this month, Democratic Rep. Debbie Wasserman
Schultz of Florida, whose job as chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee is to defend the president, notably declined to
endorse the administration's approach, focusing instead on Obama's past support of sanctions. This, despite the full-court press
from Secretary of State John Kerry, a former congressional colleague. On Tuesday, after meeting with Obama, Menendez and
Schumer signed a bipartisan letter to Kerry warning the administration about accepting a deal that would allow Iran to continue its
nuclear program. The letter was also signed by Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., Susan Collins, R-Maine, and
Robert Casey, D-Pa. Democrats, of course, realize that the president plays an outsized role in the policy direction of his party. Just as
George W. Bush moved the Republican Party in a more hawkish direction during his war-riven presidency, Obama is nudging
Democrats away from their traditionally instinctive support for the Jewish state. "I can't remember the last time the differences
[between the U.S. and Israel] were this stark," said one former Democratic White House official with ties to the Jewish community.
"There's now a little more freedom [for progressive Democrats] to say what they want to say, without fear of getting their tuchus
kicked by the organized Jewish community." A Gallup survey conducted this year showed 55 percent of Democrats sympathizing
with the Israelis over the Palestinians, compared with 78 percent of Republicans and 63 percent of independents who do so. A
landmark Pew poll of American Jews, released in October, showed that 35 percent of Jewish Democrats said they had little or no
attachment to Israel, more than double the 15 percent of Jewish Republicans who answered similarly. At the 2012 Democratic
National Convention, many delegates booed a platform proposal supporting the move of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem. In 2011, Democrats lost Anthony Weiner's heavily Jewish, solidly Democratic Brooklyn House seat because enough
Jewish voters wanted to rebuke the president's perceived hostility toward Israel. Pro-Israel advocacy groups rely on the mantra that
support for Israel carries overwhelming bipartisan support, a maxim that has held true for decades in Congress. But most also
reluctantly acknowledge the growing influence of a faction within the Democratic Party that is more critical of the two countries'
close relationship. Within the Jewish community, that faction is represented by J Street, which positions itself as the home for "pro-
Israel, pro-peace Americans" and supports the Iran negotiations. "Organizations that claim to represent the American Jewish
community are undermining [Obama's] approach by pushing for new and harsher penalties against Iran," the group wrote in an
action alert to its members. Some supporters of Israel view J Street with concern. "There's a small cadre of people that comes from
the progressive side of the party that are in the business of blaming Israel first. There's a chorus of these guys," said a former Clinton
administration foreign policy official. "But that doesn't make them the dominant folks in the policy space of the party, or the Hill."
Pro-Israel activists worry that one of the ironies of Obama's situation is that as his poll numbers sink, his interest in striking a deal
with Iran will grow because he'll be looking for any bit of positive news that can draw attention away from the health care law's
problems. Thus far, Obama's diminished political fortunes aren't deterring Democrats from
protecting the administration's prerogatives. Congressional sources expect the Senate Banking
Committee, chaired by South Dakota Democrat Tim Johnson, to hold off on any sanctions legislation until
there's a resolution to the Iranian negotiations. But if Obama's standing continues to
drop , and negotiations produce a deal that Israel doesn't like, don't be surprised to see Democrats become less
hesitant about going their own way.

And, default to maintaining PC Negotiations will be tough
Sanctions are always on the table to sabotage a deal.
Paul R. Pillar 2/17/14, http://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/paul-pillar/the-iran-
negotiations-begin-9894

Given that vigorous opposition to reaching any agreement with Iran persists on the U.S. side (or
more accurately, the Israeli side), even though that opposition suffered a temporary defeat
with the sidelining of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill, expect to hear in the weeks ahead much
commentary about any sour notes that are struck in the negotiations or in anything that takes
place alongside the negotiations. The negative commentary will be coming not from people who,
like the ayatollah, are trying to shield themselves from political ramifications of failure that may
stem from reasons outside their control. Rather, it will come from people who want the
negotiations to fail and will enthusiastically highlight anything that could be used as an
argument to abandon the talks.


AT: Obama threatening them

Jazayeri dismissed Obamas statements regarding the deployment of US troops as
completely inexpert remarks far from the reality, and these statements can be
used as the joke of the year.


Deal now with pressurethats Glassthe full court press has bought
negotiation time, but must be used wisely.

Negotiations succeeding now

Iran wants a deal
ALI AROUZI and F. BRINLEY BRUTON 3/22/14,
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/why-u-s-iran-are-both-desperate-seal-nuclear-deal-
n57731

The latest round of Iran nuclear negotiations closed with an unprecedented outbreak of
cordiality . Catherine Ashton, the chief negotiator for world powers trying to make sure Iran does not develop nuclear
weapons, wished her Iranian counterparts Happy Nowruz, or New Year, in Persian. Irans Foreign Minister Javad Zarif,
meanwhile, said he was optimistic that a July deadline for a deal could be reached . Wednesday's
upbeat statements, which were accompanied by the now-regular smiles and jokes between Zarif and Ashton, are the
latest indication of how desperate both sides are to resolve a dispute that in recent
years has threatened to trigger a new war in the Middle East . U.S. could use a diplomatic
victory An agreement with Iran over its nuclear program, which Tehran insists is peaceful but the West fears could be aimed at
developing nuclear weapons, would be rare good news for the United States. Elsewhere in the world the U.S. is trying to manage
one crisis after another. Iran is [President Barack] Obamas best opportunity for a major foreign policy victory, said Karim
Sadjadpour, a researcher on Iran at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Even the fact that talks are continuing can be
seen as a success against a backdrop of seemingly intractable challenges facing the U.S. and its allies. Russia has annexed part of
Ukraine, the Israelis and Palestinians have not agreed to an American-backed peace plan, and Afghanistans president refuses to
sign a key security agreement with the U.S. Meanwhile in Syria, a war rages even after Obama set a red line on the issue of
chemical weapons for President Bashar Assad, and then did not act when evidence emerged that forces loyal to the Syrian leader had
gassed civilians. Iran wants a deal, too Iran also really needs a deal , or the end of
international economic sanctions crippling its economy and making life almost unbearable for regular Iranians.
Inflation is running at close to 50 percent, sending the price of basic necessities like bread and soap skyrocketing, and raising the
prospect of paralyzing popular unrest. A recent sign of Tehrans commitment to talks came when
senior lawmaker Abbas Ali Mansouri urged all political parties to avoid making remarks
which might weaken the negotiating team, according to the state-run IRNA news service. Meanwhile, the
usually constant drumbeat of anti-Western proclamations from Iranian hardliners has been more muted recently. And earlier this
month, a spat that in the past would have derailed talks ended up being a bump in the road. During an unprecedented visit to
Tehran earlier in March, Ashton infuriated the government by meeting rights activists and mothers of protesters killed during 2009
demonstrations. The foreign ministry reprimanded Ashtons unsanctioned visit, and a traditional dinner between her and Zarif on
the eve of the negotiations was canceled. But while the last team of negotiators may have allowed this kind of
diplomatic scuffle to torpedo talks, this time they didn't. Key for the Iranian team is that Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's backs the talks , something neither of his predecessors enjoyed. The game
changer from where I sit is that [President Hassan] Rouhani seems to enjoy support of the supreme
leader, said Eugene Rogan, professor of modern Middle Eastern history at Oxford University and author of "The
Arabs: A History." It makes me think that there may really be a chance here , that there is something
in this and we should be pursuing this with everything within our means. The terrible
alternative would be a nuclear Iran, and America trying to go war with it , Rogan said. It would
be beyond disruptive, a regional war so big that it is irresponsible even to contemplate it.

Diplomatic momentum now
Colin Kahl, 1/7/14, Still Not Time to Attack Iran,
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140633/colin-h-kahl/still-not-time-to-attack-iran

In my article Not Time to Attack Iran (March/April 2012), I made the case for pursuing a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge,
arguing that, because of the risks and costs associated with military action, force is, and should remain, a last resort, not a first choice. Key
developments in 2013 -- namely, the election of Hassan Rouhani, a moderate, as Irans new president and the signing of an interim nuclear deal by Iran
and the United States and its negotiating partners -- reinforce this conclusion. Whatever hawks such as Reuel Marc Gerecht or Matthew Kroenig might
argue, it is still not time to attack Iran. Indeed, the prospects for reaching a comprehensive agreement to resolve the
nuclear impasse peacefully, while far from guaranteed, have never been brighter. A LIGHT AT THE END
OF THE TUNNEL After decades of isolation, the Iranian regime may finally be willing to place
meaningful limits on its nuclear program in exchange for relief from punishing economic sanctions. In
Irans June 2013 presidential election, Rouhani handily defeated a slate of conservative opponents, including the hard-line
nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, who had campaigned on continuing Irans strategy of nuclear resistance. Rouhani, in contrast, pledged to
reach a nuclear accommodation with the West and free Iran from the economic burden imposed by sanctions. Rouhani, also a
former nuclear negotiator, believes he has the support of the Iranian people and a green light from
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to reach a comprehensive nuclear accord with the United States and the other members of the P5+1
(Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia). The first step on the road to a comprehensive deal came in November 2013 with an
interim agreement in Geneva, in which Tehran agreed to freeze and modestly roll back its nuclear program in exchange for a pause in new
international sanctions and a suspension of some existing penalties. The deal represents the most meaningful move
toward a denuclearized Iran in more than a decade. It neutralizes Irans stockpile of 20 percent
uranium and therefore modestly lengthens Irans breakout timeline -- the time required to enrich uranium to weapons
grade -- by one or two months. A new inspections regime also means any breakout attempt would be detected
soon enough for the international community to react, and expanded International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to Irans nuclear
infrastructure will make it more difficult for Iran to divert critical technology and materials to new secret sites. The terms
also preclude the new plutonium reactor at Arak from becoming operational, halting the risk that Iran could soon use plutonium
to build a bomb. For all its good points, the interim agreement does not by itself resolve the Iranian nuclear
challenge. Rather, the accord is designed to create at least a six-month diplomatic window (the initial period of the agreement), or longer if the
agreement is extended, to negotiate a final, comprehensive solution. At the very least, U.S. officials have suggested that the ultimate deal must
permanently cap Irans enrichment at five percent; substantially reduce Irans low-enriched uranium stockpile; place significant limits on the number
of Iranian centrifuges and enrichment facilities; dismantle Arak or convert it to a proliferation-resistant light-water reactor; allow much more intrusive
inspections of both declared and undeclared facilities; and account for the past military dimensions of Irans nuclear research. In exchange, Iran
would receive comprehensive relief from multilateral and national nuclear- and proliferation-related sanctions. GOING FOR BROKE Some analysts
argue that U.S. negotiators should use the leverage created by crippling economic sanctions and Irans apparent willingness to negotiate to insist on a
total dismantling of Irans fuel-cycle activities. The maximalist approach is reflected in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahus stated
requirements for a final deal: no uranium enrichment at any level, no stockpile of enriched uranium, no centrifuges or centrifuge facilities, and no Arak
heavy-water reactor or plutonium reprocessing facilities. Attempting to keep Iran as far away from nuclear weapons as possible seems prudent and
reasonable. It is imperative that any final deal prohibits Iran from possessing facilities that would allow it to produce weapons-grade plutonium, for
example. But in reality, the quest for an optimal deal that requires a permanent end to Iranian enrichment at any
level would likely doom diplomacy, making the far worse outcomes of unconstrained nuclearization
or a military showdown over Tehran's nuclear program much more probable. Regardless of
pressure from the United States, its allies, and the wider international community, the Iranian regime is unlikely to agree to
end all enrichment permanently. Khamenei, the ultimate decider on the nuclear file, has
invested far too much political capital and money (more than $100 billion over the years) in mastering
enrichment technology and defending Iran's nuclear rights (defined as domestic enrichment). The
nuclear program and resistance to arrogant powers are firmly imbedded in the regimes ideological raison dtre. So, even in the face of withering
economic sanctions, Khamenei and hard-liners within the Revolutionary Guard are unlikely to sustain support for further negotiations -- let alone
acquiesce to a final nuclear deal -- if the end result reflects a total surrender for the regime. As Alireza Nader, an Iran analyst at the RAND Corporation,
observes, [S]anctions are a danger to their rule, but weakness in the face of pressure might be no less a threat. Nor are Rouhani and his
negotiating team likely to agree to halt enrichment or advocate for such a policy, since doing so would be political suicide. In 2003,
during Rouhanis previous role as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, he convinced Khamenei to accept a temporary suspension of enrichment. But further
talks with the international community stalled in early 2005 over a failure to agree on Irans asserted right to enrichment, and Tehran ended its
suspension shortly thereafter. Rouhani is unlikely to let that happen again. PLAYING CHICKEN Given the certainty that Iran will reject maximalist
demands from the United States, the United States should only make such demands if it is willing to go to the brink of the abyss with Iran, escalating
economic and military threats to the point at which the regimes survival is acutely and imminently in danger. Yet pursuing such a high-risk strategy is
unlikely to succeed, and the consequences of failure would be profound. First, it is unclear whether any escalation of sanctions could bring the regime to
its knees in time to prevent Iran from achieving a breakout capability. Irans apparent willingness to negotiate under pressure is not, in and of itself,
evidence that more pressure will produce total surrender. Irans economy is in dire straits, but the country does not appear to be facing imminent
economic collapse. Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard also seem to believe that the Islamic Republic weathered far worse during the Iran-Iraq
War, an eight-year conflict that killed hundreds of thousands of Iranians and produced over half a trillion dollars in economic losses before Iran agreed
to a cease-fire. Even if Washington goes forward with additional sanctions, economic conditions are not likely to produce enough existential angst
among Iranian leaders, generate mass unrest, or otherwise implode the regime before Iran achieves a nuclear breakout capability. And even if they did
lead to regime change, it still might not prove sufficient to force a nuclear surrender. After all, the imprisoned leaders of the Green Movement and
Iranian secularists opposed to the Islamic Republic, as well as a significant majority of the Iranian people, also support Irans declared right to
enrichment. Second, and somewhat paradoxically, ramping up sanctions to force regime capitulation now could end up weakening international
pressure on Iran. For better or worse, Rouhani has already succeeded in shifting international perceptions of Iran. If the United States, rather than
Iran, comes across as intransigent, it will become much more difficult to maintain the international coalition currently isolating Tehran, particularly on
the parts of China, Russia, and numerous other European and Asian nations. Some fence sitters in Europe and Asia will start to flirt with Iran again,
leaving the United States in the untenable position of choosing between imposing extraterritorial sanctions on banks and companies in China, India,
Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and elsewhere, or acquiescing to the erosion of the international sanctions architecture. Third, issuing more explicit
military threats (through public warning by U.S. President Barack Obama or congressional passage of a resolution authorizing the use of military force,
for example) is also unlikely to achieve a maximalist diplomatic outcome. There is little doubt that maintaining a credible military option affects the
Iranian regimes calculations, raising the potential costs associated with nuclearization. And if diplomacy fails, the United States should reserve the
option of using force as a last resort. But threats to strike Iranian nuclear sites surgically, no matter how credible, would not create a sufficient threat to
the survival of the regime to compel it to dismantle its nuclear program completely. Finally, attempting to generate an existential crisis for the Islamic
Republic could backfire by increasing the regimes incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. If the United States escalates economic or military pressure
at the very moment when Iran has finally begun to negotiate in earnest, Khamenei will likely conclude that the real and irrevocable goal of U.S. policy is
regime change. Solidifying this perception would enhance, rather than lessen, Tehrans motivation to develop a nuclear deterrent. In short, playing
chicken with Iran will not work and is likely to result in a dangerous crash. Gambling everything by insisting on an optimal deal could result in no deal
at all, leaving Iran freer and potentially more motivated to build atomic arms and making a military confrontation more likely. STILL TIME FOR
DIPLOMACY During a December 2013 forum hosted by the Brookings Institution, Obama said, It is in Americas national security interests . . . to
prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. . . . But what Ive consistently said is, even as I dont take any options off the table, what we do have to test
is the possibility that we can resolve this issue diplomatically. When asked by a former Israeli general in the audience what he would do if diplomacy
with Iran breaks down, Obama said, The options that Ive made clear I can avail myself of, including a military option, is one that we would consider
and prepare for. Given the dangers associated with a nuclear-armed Iran, Obama is right to keep the military option alive. But he is also right to
strongly prefer a diplomatic outcome. Leadership changes


in Tehran and the diplomatic momentum created by the Geneva interim accord mean that there
is a real chance that the Iranian nuclear crisis -- a challenge that has haunted the international community for decades --
could finally be resolved peacefully. No one can say for sure how high the odds of success are. But given the enormous
dangers associated with both an Iranian bomb and the bombing of Iran, it is imperative to give
diplomacy every chance to succeed.


Politics Theory