What can go wrong and how?

Hazard Identification
1
QRA procedure
Define the potential accident scenarios
Evaluate the consequences
Estimate the impact
Estimate the risk
Evaluate the risk
Identify and prioritize potential risk reduction measures
Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario Scenario 3 Scenario n
Estimate the frequencies
2
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
TECHNIQUES
3
Harmful, irritant or sensitising
Flammable
Corrosive
Oxidising
Toxic
Explosive
Dangerous for the environment
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Hazards related to the chemical itself
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Material property data for HA
Hazard Identification Methods
Non-Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure:
Safety Reviews
Checklist
Relative Ranking
Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure:
What-If Analysis
What-If/Checklist Analysis
HAZOP Hazards & Operability study
FMEA Failure Mode & Effects Analysis
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
ETA Event Tree Analysis
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Hazard Evaluation
Each technique has strengths and weaknesses;
Performing a hazard evaluation without understanding its
motivation and without no well-defined purpose is a
waste of time and efforts.
Factors that influence the selection of a techniques
include:
Motivation for the study
Type of results needed
Type of information available
7
Motivation for the study
Why do we want to do this study?
Development of new processes?
Improvement of existing process?
Extension of an existing process (change)?
Decommissioning of a process?
Satisfy a regulatory or legal requirement?
Is information needed to make risk-informed decisions
concerning a process?
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Type of Results Needed
List of hazards
List of potential incident situations
List of alternatives for reducing risk
Identification of areas needing further study
Input for a quantitative risk analysis
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Type of Information Available
Available information depends on:
Stage of life the process when the study needs to be done
E.g.: conceptual design of a process:
It is highly unlikely P&ID is already proposed:
E.g. What-If Analysis is more appropriate than HAZOP
Quality and currentness of documentation.
E.g., for an existing process, if P&IDs are not up-todate:
HAZOP can not be performed
Study may not only futile but a waste of time and resources.
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Type of Information Available to
Perform the Study
Choice of Hazard Evaluation
Techniques
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R&D
Conceptual Design
Pilot Plant Operation
Detailed Engineering
Construction / Start-up
Routine Operation
Expansion or Modification
Incident Investigation
Decommissioning
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Commonly Used Rarely Used or Inappropriate
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Typical Staff Effort
SAFETY REVIEWS
Non-Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure
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Purpose
Ensure that the plant and its operating and maintenance
practices match the design intent and construction
standards:
Keeps operating personnel alert to the process hazards;
Reviews operating procedures for necessary revisions;
Seeks to identify equipment or process changes (new hazards);
Evaluates the design basis of control systems, instrumented
protective systems, and emergency relief systems;
Reviews the application of new technology to existing hazards;
Reviews the adequacy of maintenance and safety inspections.
Success strongly depends on the experience of the Team
15
Types of Results
Provides qualitative descriptions of potential safety
problems and suggested corrective actions.
Report includes:
deviations from the design intentions;
deviations from authorized procedures;
lists of newly discovered safety issues.
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Resource Requirement
Process material safety properties;
Applicable codes and standards;
Previous safety studies;
Detailed plant descriptions (P&IDs and flowcharts);
Plant procedures for start-up, shutdown, normal
operation, maintenance, and emergencies;
Personnel injury reports / incident reports
Maintenance records (functional checks, PRV tests,
vessel inspections)
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3 steps of a Safety Review
Preparing for the review
Assemble a detailed description of the plant (See resource
requirements)
Schedule interviews with specific individuals responsible for safe
process operation
Performing the review
Should start with a general orientation tour of the plant and progress
to specific inspections and interviews
Roundtable discussion
Documenting the results
Report with specific recommended actions.
Justifications the recommendations
Plan for Follow up actions
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Some questions to be addressed
Is there a system for keeping important process documentation and drawings up to date?
Is the equipment in good condition?
Are the pressure reliefs or other safety devices properly installed, well-maintained, and
properly identified?
Do plant records show the history of inspecting and testing the equipment and safety
devices?
Are pressure vessels or critical or hazardous service equipment repaired by certified
welders?
For equipment that handles corrosive or erosive materials, have metallurgical inspections
and metal-wall-thickness measurements been taken at frequent intervals?
Does the plant have trained inspectors available whose recommendations for repair or
replacement are accepted by management?
Are safe work practices followed and permits used?
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CHECKLIST
Non-Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure
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Purpose
Uses a written list of items or procedural steps to verify
the status of a system in order to:
Ensure that organizations are complying with standard
practices.
Provide a common basis for the review of a hazard assessment
If combined with another hazard evaluation method (What-
If/Checklist Analysis) can be used to identify Hazards
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Types of Results
Qualitative results
List of questions which receive the following answers:
yes
no
not applicable
needs more information
List of possible safety improvement alternatives for
managers to consider
22
Resource Requirement
Appropriate checklist:
Based on deficiencies or differences with standard design or
operating practices
Checklist prepared from prior experience
Engineering design procedures
Standard Procedures Manual
Someone to complete the checklist who has basic
knowledge of the process being reviewed.
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Examples
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Examples
http://www.harsnet.net/harsmeth/HarsMeth%20text/HarsMeth%20version%202.pdf
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Examples
http://www.harsnet.net/harsmeth/HarsMeth%20text/HarsMeth%20version%202.pdf
RANKING METHODS
Non-Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure
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Purpose
Determine the process areas that present the most significant:
hazard of concern
the potential severity of consequences
the overall risk
Determine the processes that that present significant hazards
and require further deeper study.
Compare several process siting, generic design, or equipment
layout options, to choose the best option.
Should normally be performed early in the life of a process,
before the detailed design is completed
28
Ranking Methods
Numerical values that represent the relative level of
significance that the analyst gives to each hazard,
potential consequence or risk depending on the approach
used.
Ordered list of processes, equipment, operations, or
activities.
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Ressource Requirements
Basic physical and chemical data on the substances used in
the process or activity.
General process diagrams and equipment layout drawings
Maximum inventories of materials
Plants process conditions
Geographic layout of material storage areas is usually
needed.
Do not normally require detailed process drawing
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
Dow Chemicals have developed this method and found it
useful.
As part of safety promotion in the process industries,
they have made it available to others;
The Dow Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) rates relative
hazards of storing, handling, processing flammable and
explosive materials
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
Breaks the process down into units or sections
Methodology:
Define the material factor
Adjust this with various penalties
Then take credits for safety procedures and safety systems
Finally arrive at a number that rates the hazard
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
Material factor
The material factor is a
property of the chemicals
being handled.
Compute for mixtures or
use worst value
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
Dow Fire and Explosion Index
Penalties for general process hazards:
Exothermic reactions that might self-heat
Endothermic reactions that could react because of an external heat
source such as a fire
Material handling and transfer, including pumping and connection of
transfer lines
Enclosed process units preventing dispersion of escaped vapors
Limited access for emergency equipment
Poor drainage of flammable materials away from the process unit
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Penalties for
General Process
Hazards Factor
(F
1
)
F
1
General Process
Hazards Factor
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
Dow Fire and Explosion Index
Penalties for special process hazards:
Toxic materials, which could impede fire fighting
Less than atmospheric pressure operation with a risk of outside air entering
Operation in or near the flammable limits
Dust explosion risks
Higher than atmospheric pressure
Low-temperature operation with potential embrittlement of carbon steel
vessels
Quantity of flammable material
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Penalties for
Special Process
Hazards Factor
(F
2
)
F
2
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
Special Process
Hazards Factor
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
1 2 3
F F F
Process Unit Hazards Factor (F
3
)
3
F&EI F MF
Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI)
F&EI
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
Material
factor
General Process
Hazards Factor
Special Process
Hazards Factor
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
F&EI index value Degree of hazard
1 60 Light
61 96 Moderate
97 127 Intermediate
128 158 Heavy
128 158 Severe
Determining the degree of hazard from the Dow F&EI
Control
Isolation
Fire protection
C
2
C
1
C
3
Loss control credit factor
(C
1
x C
2
x C
3
)
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
F&EI
Loss control
credit factor
x
Base Maximum Probable
Property Damage
(Base MMPD in $)
Value of area of
exposure ($)
Damage factor
=
(based on F&EI
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
F&EI
Loss control
credit factor
x
Actual Maximum Probable
Property Damage
(Actual MMPD)
Loss control
credit factor
=
Base MMPD (in $)
Example: new facility for handling
tanker deliveries of butadiene
Butadiene has material factor of 24
(flashpoint -105
o
C, poor NFPA
health rating, high heat of
combustion)
1.5 x 2.94 = 4.41
FEI = 4.41 x 24 = 106
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Dow Fire and Explosion Index
PRELIMINARY HAZARD
ANALYSIS
Non-Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure
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Purpose
Evaluate hazards early in the life of a process.
Applied during the conceptual design or R&D phase of a
process plant and can be very useful when making site
selection decisions.
Used as a design review tool before a process P&ID is
developed.
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Types of Results
Qualitative description of the hazards related to a process
design.
Qualitative ranking of hazardous situations:
Based on the significance of the causes and effects of the incident:
Hazard Category I Negligible
Hazard Category II Marginal
Hazard Category III Critical
Hazard Category IV Catastrophic
Can be used to prioritize recommendations for reducing or
eliminating hazards in subsequent phases of the life cycle of the
process.
48
Resource Requirement
Available plant design criteria
Written description of the conceptual design
Equipment specifications
Material specifications
Basic chemicals, reactions, and process parameters
Major types of equipment
Other sources of information:
hazard studies of similar facilities
operating experience from similar facilities
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Some factors to be considered
Hazardous plant equipment and materials
e.g., fuels, highly reactive chemicals, toxic substances, explosives,
high pressure systems, and other energy storage systems
Safety-related interfaces between plant equipment items and
materials
Material interactions, fire/explosion initiation and propagation, and
instrumented protective systems
Environmental factors that may influence the plant
equipment and materials
earthquake, vibration, flooding, extreme temperatures, electrostatic
discharge, and humidity
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Some factors to be considered
Operating, testing, maintenance, and emergency
procedures
human error importance, operator functions to be
accomplished, equipment layout/accessibility, and personnel
safety protection
Facility support
storage, testing equipment, training, and utilities
Safety-related equipment
mitigating systems, redundancy, fire suppression, and personal
protective equipment
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Example
WHAT IF ANALYSIS
WHAT IF/CHECKLIST
Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure
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Purpose
Unstructured method to identify hazards, hazardous
situations, or specific hazard leading to a hazardous situation
from a What If Question
Not concerned with how failures occur
Identify possible their consequences
Identify existing safeguards
Suggests alternatives for risk reduction if possible
Powerful method for a very experienced team. Otherwise
elements may be missed.
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Type of Results
Answers to a list of questions about the process (tabular
listing).
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Resource Requirements
Chemical data, process descriptions, drawings, and
operating procedures.
Very flexible method that can be used at any stage of
the life cycle of a process;
Available information depends on the life cycle phase
Can be used even with limited process information and
knowledge;
Preliminary questions should be developed to start of the
discussion
56
Example of "What-If"
Question:
What if the raw material is the wrong concentration?
Answer:
If the concentration of the acid could be doubled, the reaction
could not be controlled and a rapid exotherm would result.
Recommendation:
Install emergency shut-down device
Install emergency relief system
or take special precautions when loading the raw material
Place a valve on the line just before the reactor, that way the inlet flow
can be controlled
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Example of "What-If"
What If/Checklist
Hybrid method combines the advantages of both methods What-If
and Checklist
Advantages Checklist part of the method:
Built from experience of people
Avoid missing known hazards
Gives a systematic nature to the analysis
Advantages What-If Analysis part of the method :
Allows creativity and brainstorming beyond the experience of the assessing
team
This technique is very effective and popular
Often used as a first hazard evaluation on a process (precursor for
more detailed studies).
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HAZARD AND OPERABILITY
STUDY (HAZOP)
Scenario Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure
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Objectives
Identify Hazards
Identify Operability Problems
HAZOPs Use Multi-Disciplinary Team Approach
Guide word based
Structured and Systematic
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Strengths
Creative approach for identifying hazards, particularly
those involving reactive chemicals
Exhaustively examines the potential consequences of
process upsets or failure to follow procedures
Systematically identifies engineering and
administrative safeguards and the consequences of
safeguard failures
Gives all participants a thorough understanding of the
system
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HAZOP Team Composition
Team Leader generally with HAZOP experience
5-7 team members optimum, depending on scope of
effort
Scribe
Consultants
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HAZOP Team Composition
Example of Technical Members for new design
Design Engineer
Process Engineer
Commissioning Manager
Instrument Design Engineer
Chemist
Example of Technical Members for Existing design
Plant Superintendent
Process Supervisor
Maintenance Engineer
Instrument Engineer
Technical Engineer
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Team Leader Attributes
Patience
Stamina
Organized
Quick thinking
Friendly and cooperative
Able to focus simultaneously
on multiple items
Able to read people
Imaginative
Seeks consensus
Respected by team
Diplomatic
Ability to keep meeting on
track
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Scribe Attributes
Attention to detail
Responsive
Good listener
Good typing skills
Good spelling/grammar skills
Process/technical knowledge
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HAZOP Methodology
Record and
assign action
items
Apply guide
words to process
parameters
Typical causes
of deviations
Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent
deviation
Assess
acceptability
based on
consequences
Develop Action
items
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Start
Select a
process
section
Explain the
design
intention
Select study
nodes
Pick a process
parameter
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HAZOP Methodology
Start
Select a
process
section
Explain the
design
intention
Select study
nodes
Selection of NODES
Major process vessels
Reactor
Storage vessel
Catch tank
Major process lines connected to process vessels
Inlet line for feed A
Inlet line for feed B
Discharge line
Pumps and compressors
Heat exchangers
Etc
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HAZOP Methodology
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HAZOP Methodology
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HAZOP Methodology
Start
Select a
process
section
Explain the
design
intention
Select study
nodes
Pick a process
parameter
Choice of a process parameter
Flow
Pressure
Temperature
Level
Composition
Source
Destination
Duration
Sequence
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HAZOP Methodology
Start
Select a
process
section
Explain the
design
intention
Select study
nodes
Pick a process
parameter
Record and
assign action
items
Apply guide
words to process
parameters
Typical causes
of deviations
Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent
deviation
Assess
acceptability
based on
consequences
Develop Action
items
Choice of a Guide Words
NO, NOT, NONE
MORE, HIGHER, GREATER
LESS, LOWER
AS WELL AS
PART OF
REVERSE
OTHER THAN
etc
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HAZOP Methodology
Choice of a
Guide word
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HAZOP Methodology
Start
Select a
process
section
Explain the
design
intention
Select study
nodes
Pick a process
parameter
Record and
assign action
items
Apply guide
words to process
parameters
Typical causes
of deviations
Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent
deviation
Assess
acceptability
based on
consequences
Develop Action
items
Choice of a Guide Words
NO, NOT, NONE
MORE, HIGHER, GREATER
LESS, LOWER
AS WELL AS
PART OF
REVERSE
OTHER THAN
etc
Parameter + Guide
Word = Deviation
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HAZOP Methodology
Parameter + Guide Word = Deviation
Parameter + Guide Word = Deviation
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HAZOP Methodology
HAZOP Methodology
Record and
assign action
items
Apply guide
words to process
parameters
Typical causes
of deviations
Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent
deviation
Assess
acceptability
based on
consequences
Develop Action
items
77
Start
Select a
process
section
Explain the
design
intention
Select study
nodes
Pick a process
parameter
HAZOP Methodology
Example on a particular node
Parameter: Flow
Guide Word: No
Deviation No + Flow
Cause
Supply pipe ruptured upstream
Consequences
Release of material with possible toxic effects and/or fire and explosion
Recommendation
Install pressure sensor
Mechanical integrity program
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HAZOP Example
FAILURE MODES AND
EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)
90
Purpose
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) identifies :
How single equipment can fail (or be improperly operated)
open, closed, on, off, leaks, etc
E.g. for pump: Fails to stop when required, Stops when required to run,
Seal leak/rupture, Pump casing leak/rupture
How each failure modes affects the system or plant:
Determines the effect (E) of the failure mode (FM) by the systems
response to the equipment failure
Generates recommendations for increasing equipment
reliability (improving process safety)
91
Type of Results
FMEA generates a qualitative, systematic reference list
of equipment, failure modes and effects.
A worst-case estimate of consequences resulting from
single failures is included.
But:
Rarely investigates damage or injury that could arise
Not useful for identifying combinations of failures
92
Resource Requirements
System or plant equipment list or P&ID
Knowledge of equipment function and failure modes
Knowledge of system and responses to equipment
failures
Staff requirements will vary with the size and
complexity of equipment
93
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Type of Results
95
Type of Results
96
Type of Results
SUMMARY
97
Typical outcomes of HazID
Techniques
Lists of identified hazards, perceived problems, or
potential incident scenarios;
Descriptions of the significance of these problems or
incidents (e.g., risk posed by each scenario);
Recommendations for:
Reducing or eliminating the hazards;
Coming into compliance with codes or standards;
Reducing the risks associated with the incident scenarios.
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99
Outcomes of HazID Techniques
How to prioritize actions
Most hazard evaluations result in lists of recommendations for reducing
the risks.
One could examine the potential causes and effects of an incident
(providing this is given by the technique)
How to rank these recommendation; Suggestions:
Identification of any situation that violates a regulations, standards;
Analysts understanding of the risk posed by the potential incidents;
Analysts perception of the risk reduction gained by implementing a specific
recommendation;
Risk reduction gained by implementing a specific recommendation in
comparison to the resources required to implement it.
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References