De Gruyter

PLOTINUS' REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF "PARMENIDES" 130a-131d

Author(s): John Fielder
Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 12, No. 2 (December
1978), pp. 1-5
Published by: De Gruyter
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PLOTINUS' REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF PARMENIDES 130a-131d
In a well-known
passage
in the Parmenides
(130a- 132b)
Plato
presents
a series of
objections
to the
Theory
of Forms. The
youthful
Socrates is unable to
reply
to these
objections
and nowhere else in the
dialogues
do we find a refutation of them. Some of
these
arguments
are taken
up by
Plotinus.1 His
responses
have considerable
philosophical
merit and
provide
an additional
perspective
on the
philosophical possibilities
of the
Theory
of Forms. In what follows I set out Plotinus'
responses
to the
arguments
of
Parmenides 130a-131d and show how
they
meet the
objections
raised there.
There are two
arguments
to be examined.
1 . The extent of the realm of Forms.
Socrates
readily
admits Forms of
Goodness, Rightness,
and
Beauty,
is unsure about
Man, Fire,
and
Water,
and thinks it absurd that there could be Forms of
Mud, Hair,
and
Dirt.2 Parmenides has
caught
Socrates between two
conflicting
features of the
Theory
of
Forms. On the one hand the
theory gives
an account of names and common
features,
so
that if there are Forms
corresponding
to
goodness
and
justice,
there must also be Forms
for mud and hair. On the other
hand,
the Forms are
perfect
and
unchanging,
the
objects
of almost
religious veneration,
so that it seems absurd to
suggest
that Mud and Hair are
worthy companions
of
Beauty
and Justice. Parmenides
predicts
that in time Socrates will
no
longer despise
such
Forms, thereby indicating
that he does not
regard
this
argument
as
fatal to the
theory.
Even
so,
the
argument
is unanswered and in need of a more
philoso-
phically
mature
response.
Plotinus'
reply
to this
objection
follows the lines
suggested by
Parmenides. Forms
of
insignificant things
are not to be
despised,
for even
though they
are inferior to other
Forms, they
have an essential role to
play.
A
shape,
that of a man let us
suppose,
must include a certain number
of differences of
part
but all dominated
by
a
unity;
the
part
will be
inferior in
comparison
to the total but best in its
place. (VI, 7, 10)3
Thus
hair,
a
part
of
man,
is inferior to man as a
whole,
but without hair and similar
things
there could be no man. Such
things
are
insignificant
in themselves but have worth
by
virtue of their contribution to the whole. Socrates' mistake reflects the naivete of a
young
man
who,
because of lack of
experience,
does not
appreciate
the
importance
of
the minor
players
in the drama.
They
are not the stars of the
production,
but
they
are
not to be
despised
either.
There is another
issue,
not mentioned in the
dialogue,
which Plotinus takes
up.
He
is concerned about the last two
examples
used
by Parmenides,
mud and dirt
(tttjX
and
itfTO).
But on the
question
as to whether the
repulsive
and the
products
of
putridity
also have their Idea
-
whether there is an Idea of
filth and mud
-
it is to be observed that all that the Intellectual-
Principle (the
realm of
Forms)
derived from the First
(the One)
is
of the
noblest;
in those Ideas the base is not included: these
repulsive things point
not to the
Intellectual-Principle
but to the
Soul
which, drawing upon
the
Intellectual-Principle,
takes from
Matter certain other
things
and
among
them these. . . . The
products
of
putrefaction
are to be traced to the Soul's
inability
to
bring
some other
thing
into
being.
. .
(V, 9,14)
Apeiron
Vol. XII
(1978)
No 2.
1
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Hair is to be
distinguished
from mud and filth4 for the latter are the
'products
of
putridity' (t&v
n
ar}i//eco ). Hair, though insignificant
in
itself,
is an essential
part
of
something important.
Mud and filth are not essential
parts
of
something valuable,
nor are
they merely insignificant. They
have
negative
value rather than little or no value. Con-
sequently they
cannot have Forms
corresponding
to
them,
for
everything
in Nous is of
the noblest
(apeara).
If this were allowed it would violate the basic value orientation of
the
Theory
of Forms. Disvalue is characteristic
only
of the sensible
world, arising
from
the fact that it is an
imperfect copy
of the ideal world in Nous. The
imperfections
of the
sensible
world, therefore,
have no
corresponding Forms,
for
they
do not come about
through participation
but rather are the
by-products
of the Soul's creation of the sensible
world out of Matter. Hence Plotinus
supports
Socrates'
rejection
of Forms for mud and
filth,
for
they
are not
imperfect copies
of an ideal Form but are the
products
of
decay
and deterioration.
While it is clear that this
analysis
fits
vno,
since its
meaning
includes
disvalue,
the
inclusion of
tttjXoc,
is somewhat
puzzling.
The term is used to refer to the
clay
used
by
potters,
which is
hardly
an offensive substance. But
perhaps
Plotinus is
thinking
of some
sort of
festering
mire which would
belong
to the
'products
of
putrefaction.'5 Regardless
of
any disagreement
we
may
have with the details of his
analysis,
it is clear that not
only
has Plotinus met Parmenides'
objection
but he has also
brought
out the more basic issue
of the criteria for
deciding
which sensible characteristics have
corresponding
Forms.
2 .
Objections
to
'Participation9
Parmenides'
objections
to the doctrine of
participation
can be
put
in the form of a
dilemma: either a sensible
object partakes
of the whole Form and is
thereby separated
from itself in
many individuals,
or it
partakes
of
part
of a Form and as a result the Form
will not be one but
composed
of
many separable parts.6
Both alternatives lead to the loss
of the Form's
unity,
and since
they
are
apparently
exhaustive, participation
is demon-
strated to be inconsistent with the
Theory
of Forms. This is a more serious
objection,
and
there is no
suggestion
that a more mature Socrates will be able to meet it. Since
participa-
tion is a central
concept
of the
Theory
of Forms it is essential that these
objections
be
refuted if the
theory
is to be
accepted.
Parmenides'
argument
is not refuted in the
dialogue,
but there is an
intriguing
suggestion
that Socrates
puts
forward at 13 IB. In
response
to Parmenides' claim that if
that whole Form is shared
by many individuals,
the Form will be
separate
from
itself,
Socrates
responds by saying
that this
consequence
does not follow if the Form is like one
and the same
day
which is in
many places
at the same time and
yet
is not
separate
from
itself. But this
analogy
is not followed
up
and discussion turns to the
analogy
of a sail
and its
parts.
Runciman7 holds that this
suggestion
would not have avoided the
problem,
for to
say
that different
places
all share in the
daylight
is
only
to
say
that
many places
are
illuminated
by
the
daylight
at the same time. And this is
just
to
say
that there are
many
illuminated
things.
Hence the relation is not one of
participation (sharing in)
as in the
case of the sailcloth. But this
argument depends upon translating quepa
as
daylight8 (i.e.
the
light
of
day)
rather than
simply
the
day
or a
day.
It
may
not be the same
light
that
illuminates each of
us,
but it is the same
day
for each of
us, (e.g.
Nov.
5) regardless
of
our location. The
analogy
of the
day
offers a contrast to the sailcloth because a
day
is
not a
physical object
that can be shared
only by
division. Unlike the
sail,
the
day
is an
example
of
something
that can be in
many places
at one without
being
divided into
parts,
precisely
what is needed to avoid the
consequences
of Parmenides' dilemma. If the Form
2
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could be
present
to a number of individuals in the
way
that
they
all
partake
of the same
day,
then the first horn of the dilemma would be rendered harmless.
Cornford remarks that Parmenides'
arguments
understand
'part'
and 'whole' in the
most
gross
and material
sense,9
a
point
that is
emphasized by
Parmenides' insistence on
comparing
the division of a Form to
spreading
a sail over a number of individuals. Thus
what the
argument
shows is that if Forms are to be understood in terms of the division
of material
objects,
then no account of
participation
will be
satisfactory.
Plato seems to
realize this when he
proposes
the
analogy
of the
day,
but he
apparently
had no
developed
idea to offer.
Clearly
what is needed is a
concept
of
participation
that is not based on a
materialistic model of
parts
and wholes as these
apply
to Forms.
Plotinus
develops
such an account
by emphasizing
the
immateriality
of
intelligible
existence. Immaterial individuals are not
subject
to the
spatial
restrictions of sensible
existents,
and are
consequently
able to
occupy
a number of different
places
at the same
time.
Referring specifically
to this
argument
in the
Parmenides,
Plotinus writes:
We cannot think of
something
of God here and
something
else
there,
nor all of God
gathered
at one
spot:
there is an instantane-
ous
presence everywhere.
. .
(V, 5, 9)
In a similar
passage (IV, 7, 7)
Plotinus
points
out that such a division of an
intelligible
being
amounts to
making
it
corporeal.
This
omnipresence
of
intelligible reality (to
6v v Kai ran 6v
fja iravraxov
eivai
'ov)10
is Plotinus'
phrase
for an
entity being entirely present
in
many places
at
once,
a one that
pervades
a
plurality
of locations while
remaining
whole. As the
passage
states,
this
property
is characteristic
only
of
intelligible beings.
The
nature,
at once divisible and
indivisible,
which we affirm to
be
soul,
has not the
unity
of an extended
thing:
it does not
consist of
separate sections;
its
divisibility
lies in its
presence
at
every point
of the
recipient,
but it is indivisible as
dwelling
entire in the total and entire in
any part. (IV, 2,1)
Hence
any participation
must be the result of the immanent
presence
of a
higher reality
in a lower.
If, then,
the divided and
quantitatively
extended is to
participate
in another
kind,
is to have
any
sort of
participation,
it can
partici-
pate only
in
something undivided, unextended, wholly
outside of
quantity.
Therefore that which is to be introduced
by
the
participation
must enter as itself an
omnipresent
indivisible.
(VI, 4, 13)
Sensibles, therefore, participate
in Forms
by
virtue of the Forms'
omnipresence
in
identity
within their sensible
copies.
In other
words,
each
participant
has the whole
Form,
but since the Form is an immaterial
object
it is not divided
among
them. The one
Form is
simply present
in
many places
at once.11
It is clear that this
concept
delivers Plotinus from the dilemma
posed by
Parmenides.
For he has shown how it is
possible
for each sensible
copy
to
participate
in the whole
Form without the
consequence
of the Form
being separate
from itself. All that is
required
is to see that immaterial
individuals,
Forms or
souls,
are not bound
by
the same limita-
tions as material
things.
Parmenides'
argument
is based on
assumptions proper
to material
existence and when these are
exposed
the
argument collapses.
Plotinus refutes Parmenides'
objections by clearing away
the
philosophical
confusions
3
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on which
they
rest. The
problem
of characteristics for which Socrates is
unwilling
to
allow Forms is resolved
by distinguishing
between those
things
that are
insignificant
in
themselves but are essential
parts
of valuable wholes
(hair),
and those features of the
sensible world that reflect its
imperfections.
The former must have Forms because
they
are
part
of the overall character of
Nous;
the latter cannot have Forms because
they
are
inconsistent with a fundamental
epistemological
and
metaphysical
feature of the
Theory
of
Forms,
their
ideality. Having
made this distinction it is
easy
to
accept
a Form for hair
and
deny
it for filth.
The
argument against participation
is met
by exposing
the materialistic
assumptions
in it. Once we see that Parmenides' dilemma does not
apply
to immaterial entities the
argument
is rendered harmless. A
consequence
of this
way
of
handling
the
problem
of
participation
is that the Form itself is
present
in its sensible
images.
This has
important
implications
for the
Copy theory,
which I have examined elsewhere.12
Although
Plotinus is
clearly
concerned to defend the
Theory
of Forms
against
these two
objections
in the
Parmenides,
he is silent about another famous
argument
found in the same
dialogue,
the "Third Man"
argument (TMA).
No reference is listed in
the Henri and
Schywzer text,13
nor have I been able to discover
any
mention of the
argument
in the Enneads. This is
unusual, given
the
repetition
of the
argument by
critics
of Platonism.
Although
I do not have a
convincing
reason
why
Plotinus
ignored
this
argument,
I believe that his
philosophy possesses
the
philosophical
resources to disarm
TMA, just
as he was able to meet the other
objections posed by
Parmenides.14
John
Fielder,
Villanova
University.
Notes
1. Plotinus does not have
anything
to
say
about the Third Man'
argument {Parm.
130a
-
132b),
and
consequently
it is omitted from the
present
discussion. This
point
is discussed
briefly
at
the end of the article.
2. Parm. 130b-d.
3.
Quotations
from Plotinus are taken from Plotinus: The
Enneads, tr, Stephen
MacKenna
(Pantheon:
New
York), third edition with revisions
by
B.S.
Page.
4. MacKenna
-
Page
translate finoq
as filth rather than dirt. 'Dirt' does not have the
strong
implication
of foulness and
decay
of
/>i$tto, consequently
'filth' is a better translation here.
5. In a conversation on this issue John Immerwahr
suggested
that it is the
relatively
formless
nature of mud that makes it evil. The more
something
lacks formal
integrity
the closer it
is to
Matter,
hence the more evil.
6. Parm. 131a-c.
7. W.G.
Runciman,
"Plato's Parmenides" in Studies in Plato's
Metaphysics,
ed. R.E.
Allen,
(Routledge
and
Kegan
Paul: London
1965), p.
155.
8.
fnxepa
is
generally
translated
simply
as
'day'
rather than
'daylight'.
I
suspect
that if Plato had
wished to
emphasize
the role of
light
in this
analogy
he would have made a
specific
reference to
it rather than
simply using inpa.
4
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9. F.M.
Cornford,
Piato and
Parmenides, (Bobbs-Merrill:
New
York), p.
85.
10. Cf. The Titles of
VI,
4 and 5 .
11. A more extensive discussion oi inis nouon
may
oe iouna m
my
k,nonsmo5 anu emanation in
the
Philosophy
of
Plotinus",
in The
Significance of Neoplatonism,
ed. R. Baine
Harris, (Inter-
national Society
for
Neoplatonic Studies,
Old Dominion
University: Norfolk, 1976) pp.
101
-
121.
12. "Plotinus
Copy Theory", Apeiron,
1977.
13. Paul Henri and H-R.
Schwyzer, PlotiniOpera, (Desclee
De Brouwer et Cie.:
Paris, 1951-1973),
three volumes. Vol. Ill contains an Index Fontium.
14. A
paper
on this
topic
is in
preparation.
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