2008 Cases

Republic of the Philippines v. Royales

G.R. No. 168742
September 3, 2008


FACTS:

On July 7, 1970, the Director of Lands filed a cadastral case in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines Sur
for several parcels of land to be declared as public land. Norma Royales was a claimant of the said lots. Subsequently, a
notice was published in the Official Gazette.

On September 17, 1975, the CFI ruled in favour of Royales and ordered the registration of the lots in her name.
However, before the certificate of the finality of the decision and the order of the issuance of the decree of registration
could be issued by the court, the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur was razed by fire, burning all the titles and
documents therein.

After about 27 years, herein respondent filed a petition for the reconstitution of the CFI decision in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Camarines Sur. The RTC then set a date for the hearing without directing the respondent to cause the
publication of the said order in the Official Gazette. Subsequently, the RTC granted the petition and ordered the
reconstitution of the 1975 decision.

The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the CA, which upheld the decision of the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration was also denied, ruling that held that publication was no longer required because the CFI, through the
Land Registration Commission (predecessor of the LRA), had already caused the publication of the order in the Official
Gazette.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication was necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution
of a final and executory decision in a cadastral case.

HELD:

Yes, publication is an indispensible requirement in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

The action is one of a cadastral proceeding as it was initiated by the Republic of the Philippines and this remains
to be the case despite the earlier ruling of the CFI in favor of respondent since the decree of registration has not yet been
issued. This means the case remains to be a pending cadastral case. The pertinent provision, therefore, is Section 10 of Act
3110 which applies to the reconstitution of a pending cadastral action, a distinct kind of land registration process. It
provides:

SEC. 10. Pending cadastral case shall be reconstituted as follows:

The Court shall issue an order directing the person interested to file anew their replies, for which
purpose reasonable time may be allowed. The order shall be published in the Official Gazette and by
local notices during a period fixed in said order.

Consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over respondents petition for reconstitution for failing to
comply with the publication requirement.

However, this does not mean that the cadastral case should be filed anew. What the respondent has to do is to file
the petition for reconstitution anew and observe the requirements under Section 10 of Act 3110. Considering that there is
already a final decision in her favor, the case can continue and the court, if proper, may order the issuance of a decree of
registration.

Pasio vs. Monterroyo
G.R. No. 159494
July 31, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, against the respondents. The petitioners alleged that the
subject land was occupied, cultivated and cleared by Laureano Pasio in 1933 and that the land was part of the 24-hectare
public land, which was later declared alienable and disposable. Also, they alleged that Laureano filed a homestead
application over the entire 24-hectare land and the same was approved by the Director of Lands on in 1941. Laureano
died in 1950. Thereafter, the Director of Lands ordered the issuance of a homestead patent in his favor. However, the heirs
of Laureano did not receive the order. Consequently, the land was not registered under Laureanos name or under that of
his heirs.

Between 1949 and 1954, a cadastral survey was conducted and found that the subject land was divided by a creek
into two portions, identified as Lot No. 2138 and Lot No. 2139. Petitioners contended that they continuously possessed
and cultivated both lots. Jose Pasio, the son of Laureano, secured a title in his name for Lot No. 2138 and later disposed
of Lot No. 2139 in favor of his children (petitioners in this case) who, in 1994, simultaneously filed applications for grant
of Free Patent Titles over their respective shares of Lot No. 2139 before the Land Management Bureau of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources. The latter granted the applications and issued an Original Certificate of Title in
favor of the petitioners, who alleged that their possession of Lot No. 2139 was interrupted in 1993 when respondents
forcibly took possession of the property.

Respondents contended that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
lot by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest for over 30 years or since July 10, 1949. Furthermore, the
respondents alleged that Jose was not the owner of Lot No. 2139 and as such, he could not sell the land to his children.
They claimed that petitioners OCTs were null and void for having been procured in violation of the Public Land Act and
that the Land Management Bureau had no authority to issue the free patent titles because Lot No. 2139 was a private
land.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents stating that as of January 1994, Lot No. 2139 had already acquired
the character of a private land by operation of law thus the Land Management Bureau had no power or authority to
dispose of it by issuing free patent titles. According to the trial court, the order for the issuance of a patent in favor of
Laureano lapsed and became functus officio when it was not registered. Also, trial court found that the respondents were
in physical, open, public, adverse and continuous possession of the disputed lot in the concept of owner for at least 30
years prior to petitioners application for free patent titles over the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial courts ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject land had already become a private land prior to petitioners application for free
patent titles filed in 1994

HELD:

The Court ruled in favor of the respondents. In Director of Lands vs. IAC (146 SCRA 509 , 1986), the Court held
that alienable public land held by a possessor, continuously or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of 30 years is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the period, ipso jure.
The Court stated that once a homestead patent is registered in accordance with law, the certificate of title issued
by virtue of the patent has the force and effect of a Torrens title issued under the land registration law. In this case, the
issuance of a homestead patent in 1952 in favor of Laureano was not registered hence rendered it functus officio under Sec.
103 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Furthermore, considering that petitioners application for free patent titles was filed
only in 1994, when Lot No. 2139 had already become private land ipso jure, the Land Management Bureau had no
jurisdiction to entertain petitioners application.
Finally, according to the Court, the factual findings of the trial court and the CA support that the respondents
were able to establish that they have a better right to the subject land since they had long been in possession of the
property in the concept of owners, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. Therefore, despite the
irrevocability of the Torrens titles issued in their names and even if they are already the registered owners under the
Torrens system, petitioners may still be compelled under the law to reconvey the property to respondents.

DEHEZA-INAMARGA v. ALANO
G.R. No. 171321
December 18, 2008

FACTS:
Tomas Alano, husband of respondent Celenia Alano, owned two parcels of land covered by Original Certificates
of Title (OCT). He mortgaged the properties in favor of Renato Gepty on September 20, 1972. In 1976, Gepty demanded
that Tomas pay the loan. Tomas, however, did not have money at that time to redeem his properties so he sought help
from his niece, petitioner Mary Ann Deheza-Inamarga. Petitioner agreed to pay the loan while the spouses, in turn,
mortgaged said properties to her. Petitioner kept in her possession Original Certificates of Title (OCT) and asked the
spouses to sign blank pieces of paper which petitioner said will be converted into receipts evidencing their indebtedness
to her.
In November 1990, after Tomas had passed away, respondents Celenia and her children went to petitioner to
redeem the property. Petitioner, however, told them that she had mortgaged the property to the Rural Bank of Libacao.
Respondents verified the matter with the bank and discovered that OCT have been cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9080 and T-9081 were issued in petitioners name. Respondents learned that the TCTs in
petitioners favor were issued by virtue of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed by the Spouses Alano in her favor.
On January 24, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of document, reconveyance and
damages against petitioner and the Rural Bank of Libacao. Respondents contended that the deed of sale is null and void
because the signatures of the Spouses Alano were forged and even if they were the signatures of the spouses, they were
affixed on blank sheets of paper which were not intended to be a deed of sale.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the allegation of forgery and maintained that the deed of sale was valid. She
claimed that the spouses offered to sell her the property so they can use the purchase price of P7,000 to redeem the
property from Gepty. Petitioner added that the action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel.
On November 26, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision in favour of the respondents. Petitioner elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals but her appeal was denied. The Court of appeals affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Thus, a
petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals is filed
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Deed of Sale is a forgery;
(2) Whether or not the transaction between petitioner and the Spouses Alano is one of sale or equitable mortgage; and
(3) Whether or not respondents action is already barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.

HELD:
1. After a careful perusal of the records and a thorough consideration, the Court finds sufficient basis for the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the said signatures were indeed forged, signatures on the deed of sale appeared to be different in
characteristics, spacing and strokes from the signatures of the Spouses Alano. The question of forgery is one of fact. It is
well-settled that when supported by substantial evidence or borne out by the records, the findings of fact of the trial court
and Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.
2. The Court sustained the decision of the trial court holding that the transaction between the parties is an equitable
mortgage. An equitable mortgage is one which, although lacking in some formality, or form, or words, or other requisites
demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt and
contains nothing impossible or contrary to law.
In the instant case it is correctly found that more than one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 are present, to
wit: the inadequacy of the selling price of the properties in relation to its true value; the vendors (Spouses Alano)
remained in possession as lessee or otherwise; respondents paid the real property taxes; and the spouses secured the
payment of the principal debt owed to petitioner with said properties. On this score, the Court ruled that the parties
intended an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale.
3. Where there is no consent given by one party in a purported contract, such contract was not perfected; therefore, there
is no contract to speak of. The deed of sale relied upon by petitioner is deemed a void contract. This being so, the action
based on said deed of sale shall not prescribe in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
Lucasan v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
G.R. No. 176929
July 4, 2008

FACTS:

Spouses Lucasan were owners of 2 lots situated in Bacolod City. In 1979, Pacific Banking Corporation
(PBC) extended a P5, 000.00 loan to Lucasan, with Benares as co-maker, which they failed to pay when it became due and
demandable. As a consequence, PBC filed a collection case with the RTC of Bacolod. The RTC rendered a decision
ordering Lucasan and Bernales to pay PBC. Lucasan failed to pay the monetary award, thus, to satisfy the judgment, the
RTC issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to effect the levy on the properties owned by Lucasan and sell the
same at public auction. A Notice of Embargo was issued by the sheriff in 1981, which was annotated on the Transfer
Certificate of Title covering the two properties of Lucasan. Annotations as prior encumbrances on the same titles were the
mortgages in favor of two more banks, executed to secure Lucasans loans with said banks.

On May 13, 1981, the lots were sold at public auction and were awarded to PBC as highest bidder. A
certificate of sale was executed in its favor, registered and annotated on the titles on June 5, 1981. Mortgagee banks did
not assail the auction sale nor did Lucasan and the mortgagee banks redeemed the properties within the redemption
period. PBC, on the other hand, did not file a petition for consolidation of ownership.

In 1997, Lucasan wrote to PDIC, PBCs receiver and liquidator, seeking the cancellation of the certificate
of sale and offered to pay PBCs claim against him. PDIC denied the request stating that it was already beyond the
redemption period. Lucasan then filed a petition denomicated as declaratory relief seeking confirmation of his rights
provided in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1964 Rules of Court in relation to Section 75 of PD 1529.
PDIC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. RTC granted PDICs motion. Lucasan filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied by the RTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling, declaring that Lucasan
already lost his right of redemption when he failed to exercise it within prescribed period. The effect of such failure was to
vest in PBC absolute ownership over said properties.

ISSUE:

Is the annotations regarding the notice of embargo and certificate of sale beclouded the validity and efficacy
of Lucasans title which would warrant an action for quieting of title under Rule 63 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

HELD:

No.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud of doubt or uncertainty with respect to
real property. The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:

ART. 476. Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.

ART. 477. The plaintiff must have legal and equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, name: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a
legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity.

Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.

Admittedly, the subject parcels of land were levied upon by virtue if a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No.
12188. On May 13, 1981, a public auction of the subject parcels of land was held and the lots were awarded to PBC as the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale in favor of PBC was issued on the same day, and was registered and annotated on
TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816 as Entry No. 112552 on June 5, 1981.

Under the 1964 Rules of Court, which were in effect at that time, the judgment debtor or redemptioner had the
right to redeem the property from PBC within twelve (12) months from the registration of certificate of sale. With the
expiration of the twelve-month period of redemption and no redemption having been made, as in this case, the judgment
debtor or redemptioner lost whatever right he had over the land in question.

Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the properties within the redemption period, on account of his then
limited financial situation. It was only in January 1997 or fifteen (15) years later that he manifested his desire to reacquire
the properties. Clearly thus, he had lost whatever right he had over Lot Nos. 1500-A and 229-E.









Spouses Santos v. Heirs of Lustre
G.R. No. 151016
August 6, 2008

FACTS:
Lustre owned a lot which she mortgaged and later on sold to Natividad Santos, who subsequently sold it to her
son Froilan for which a TCT was issued in his name.
Lustres heirs Macaspac and Maniquiz filed with RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a Complaint for Declaration of the
Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against Froilan Santos.
Lustres other heirs filed a Complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title and Deed of Absolute Sale
against spouses Santos, Froilan Santos, R Transport Corp, Cecilia Macaspac with the same RTC. Macaspac was impleaded
as defendant in the 2
nd
case because she refused to join the other heirs as plaintiffs.
Alleging that the plaintiffs right of action for annulment of the Deed of Sale and TCT had long prescribed and
was barred by laches, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, also on the ground of litis pendentia.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA)
which dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription or laches apply.
HELD:
The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed
of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe. Moreover, a person acquiring
property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the
property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the
prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run
against him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of
title, an action that is imprescriptible.
It follows then that the respondents present action should not be barred by laches. Laches is a doctrine in equity,
which may be used only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Obviously, it cannot be set up to resist the
enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.

Eagle Realty Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 151424
July 4, 2008

FACTS:

On May 21, 1963, the spouses Casiano de Leon and Maria Socorro de Leon filed with the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal an application for registration of Lots 1 and 2, Plan Psu-173022-B, located at Barrio San Dionisio,
Paraaque, Rizal. The case was raffled to Branch II presided over by Judge Pedro C. Navarro and docketed as LRC Case
No. N-4140. On December 11, 1979, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of Casiano de Leon and his children, namely,
Esmeralda, Rosario Rodriguez, Bernardita, and Cesario.

Another decision, similar to the De Leon Decision but adjudicating the property to a certain Martina G. Medina, was
surreptitiously inserted in the records of the LRC. Medina Decision, was similarly dated December 11, 1979 and
purportedly signed by Judge Pedro C. Navarro. Likewise inserted in the records of the LRC was the Order for the
Issuance of the Decree dated February 14, 1980, also bearing what purports to be the signature of Judge Pedro C. Navarro,
with a Certification dated February 17, 1980 by Clerk of Court Nicanor G. Salaysay, attesting that the decision has not
been supplemented, amended or otherwise modified. Pursuant to these documents, Hon. Oscar R. Victoriano, then
Acting Land Registration Commissioner, issued Decree of Registration No. N-188044. In accordance with this Decree, the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City issued OCT No. 129 on July 7, 1983 in the name of a Martina G. Medina.

Medina later exchanged the property for a 3,000-hectare parcel of land in Norzagaray, Bulacan owned by Pilarita
Reyes through a Deed of Exchange dated September 12, 1983. On November 2, 1983, OCT No. 129 was cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 74216 issued in the name of Reyes. Thereafter, through a Deed of Sale dated
February 22, 1984, Reyes sold the property to petitioner for P1,200,000.00. On March 1, 1984, TCT No. 74216 was
cancelled, and TCT No. 78982 was issued in petitioners name.

Cesario de Leon discovered that OCT No. 129 was issued to Martina G. Medina. The De Leons sent a letter-
complaint to the LRC asking for an investigation on the matter. This was referred to Atty. Manuel Panis, Chief of the
Inspection and Investigation Division of the LRC. In a report dated July 20, 1984, Atty. Panis concluded that the Medina
Decision and the Order for the Issuance of Decree dated February 14, 1980 were fake. He then recommended that the
appropriate action be filed for the nullification of OCT No. 129 and its derivative titles TCT No. 74216 in the name of
Pilarita Reyes, and TCT No. 78982 in the name of petitioner Eagle Realty Corporation.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Acting Land Registration Commissioner, filed a complaint for
Annulment of Judgment and Cancellation of Decree and Titles against Martina G. Medina, Pilarita Reyes and petitioner
Eagle Realty Corporation.

The complaint alleged that the LRC received a copy of the De Leon Decision but this was surreptitiously
substituted with the Medina Decision, together with the Order for the Issuance of the Decree dated February 14, 1980, in
the LRC records. It further alleged that the LRC, unaware of any irregularity, issued OCT No. 129 to Martina Medina on
the basis of these fake documents.

Medina averred that she purchased the property from Justino de Leon on March 5, 1973. Justino, in turn, acquired
this property from Casiano and Maria de Leon on October 29, 1971 through a Deed of Absolute Sale. Eagle Realty
Corporation alleged, inter alia, as affirmative defenses, that (a) the Republic of the Philippines is not the real party-in-
interest since the subject property is private, (b) the one-year prescriptive period within which to seek a review of a decree
of registration has already lapsed, and (c) it is a buyer in good faith and for value. Petitioner also filed a cross-claim
against Pilarita Reyes to seek reimbursement for the purchase price and the Register of Deeds to hold the Assurance Fund
liable in case Reyes fails to pay. Later, petitioner filed a third-party complaint against the National Treasurer of the
Philippines, the public officer entrusted with the payment of claims against the Assurance Fund.

Pilarita Reyes interposed the same defenses as the petitioner. She further claimed that she had no knowledge of
any infirmity in Medinas title and that she entered into the Deed of Exchange in good faith and for value. As for the
petitioners cross-claim, she averred that she acted in good faith in selling the property to petitioner.

Heirs of Casiano and Maria de Leon filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene which the trial court granted.
On July 19, 1985, they filed a Complaint-in-Intervention praying that judgment be rendered in accordance with the
prayer alleged in the complaint and, in addition, order defendants jointly and severally to pay intervenors actual, moral
and nominal damages, attorneys fees plus legal interest. RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents Heirs of De Leon.
On appeal, the CA, affirmed the RTC decision with modifications.

The CA held that the complaint is actually an action for the annulment of a certificate of title, not for annulment of
judgment as alleged by petitioner; hence, the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction. It also upheld the LRCs personality to
institute the complaint based on Section 100 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 in order to protect the Assurance Fund
from being held accountable by the private respondents for the erroneous issuance of a certificate of title to Medina. It
dismissed the issue on prescription, ratiocinating that an action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and,
moreover, prescription does not run against the State.

According to the CA, the trial court was correct in finding that the Medina Decision and the Order for the
Issuance of Decree were both spurious and that petitioner was not an innocent purchaser for value because it failed to
make a prior inspection of the subject property which would have revealed that it was being occupied by the private
respondents. This omission amounted to a failure to exercise diligence which prevented it from becoming an innocent
purchaser for value. Hence, the Assurance Fund cannot be made liable.

ISSUE: Whether of not the Court of Appeals erred that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value entitled for
the Assurance fund.


HELD:

No. Case law has it that he who alleges that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value of registered land bears
the onus of proving such statement. This burden is not discharged by involving the ordinary presumption of good faith.
Petitioner failed to discharge this burden. In its Answer, petitioner merely alleged that it is an innocent purchaser for
value since it acquired the land from Pilarita Reyes for P1,200,000.00, without notice of any defect in her title and after
verifying the genuineness of the title in the Register of Deeds of Pasay City and the LRC. Petitioner did not present any
proof that would substantiate this allegation nor did it present any evidence to show that it took other steps to verify the
authenticity of its predecessors title.

The general rule is that a purchaser may rely on what appears on the face of a certificate of title. He may be
considered a purchaser in good faith even if he simply examines the latest certificate of title. An exception to this rule is
when there exist important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man to go beyond the present
title and to investigate those that preceded it. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then
prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor as appearing on the face of said
certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.

As correctly observed by the public respondent, the property covered by the void titles was transferred from
Medina to petitioner with unusual haste. Only 8 months lapsed since OCT No. 129 was issued on July 7, 1983 until it was
transferred to petitioner on February 22, 1984. The property was transferred to petitioner from Reyes only more than five
months after she herself acquired the property. These circumstances, plus the fact that the subject property is a vast tract
of land in a prime location, should have, at the very least, triggered petitioners curiosity.

Moreover, petitioner is a corporation engaged in the real estate business. A corporation engaged in the buying
and selling of real estate is expected to exercise a higher standard of care and diligence in ascertaining the status and
condition of the property subject of its business transaction. Similar to investment and financing corporations, it cannot
simply rely on an examination of a Torrens certificate to determine what the subject property, looks like as its condition is
not apparent in the document.

Petitioners claim against the Assurance Fund must necessarily fail. Its situation does not come within the ambit
of the cases protected by the Assurance Fund. It was not deprived of land in consequence of bringing it under the
operation of the Torrens system through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or misdescription in the
certificate of title. It was simply a victim of unscrupulous individuals. More importantly, it is a condition sine qua non
that the person who brings the action for damages against the Assurance Fund be the registered owner and, as the
holders of transfer certificates of title, that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for value and the petitioner does
not qualify as such.

Lourdes vs. Pascual
G.R. No. 162097
February 13, 2008
FACTS:
Pascua petitioned for the reconstitution of the original title of a parcel of land (Lot 3209) located in Pagsanjan,
Laguna. She said that the lot was sold to her parents in 1930 by a certain Limuaco who earlier acquired the land via a
cadastral proceeding. However, in the Deed of Absolute Sale between Limuaco and Pascuas parents, it was indicated
that the land was unregistered. Also, because of the war, the original copy as well as the duplicates were destroyed.
Pascua presented as evidence the said Deed of Sale as well as a tracing cloth plan and technical description and a tax
declaration. She claimed that the land issued to Limuaco was pursuant to a cadastral decree. And that she has been
paying taxes however the land reflecting on the tax declaration is Lot No. 19-pt. Pascua averred that Lot No. 19-pt is one
and the same as Lot 3209; that Lot 19-pt was the Assessors designation to the same land when the cadastral survey was
made but when the decree was issued, it was turned to Lot 3209.
The lower court denied her petition due to lack of evidence. She was not able to prove that Lot 19-pt is the same as Lot
3209.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to grant Pascuas petition.
HELD:
No. The evidence presented by Pascua to grant reconstitution are not those included in Section 2 of RA 26 which
provides:

SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available in the following order:

(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be pursuant to which the original
certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original has
been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.

Further, she presented two tax declarations: one pertaining to her parents and the other to hers. Her parents tax
declaration failed to reflect any Lot No. while hers reflected Lot No. 19-pt. It cannot be legally concluded that the land is
one and the same. She was not able to adduce any additional document to prove her claim.

Even if Lot No 3209 and Lot 19-pt are one and the same, no title can still be reconstituted to Pascua because there
is no convincing evidence that a certificate of title was ever issued for either land. Note that even the Deed of Sale
between Limuaco and Pascuas parents indicated that the land is unregistered.















2009


G.R. No. 175788 June 30, 2009
Petitioners: ENRIQUITA ANGAT and the LEGAL HEIRS OF FEDERICO ANGAT
Respondent: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ponente: Justice CHICO-NAZARIO

Doctrine:
It does not mandated under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26 that notice be specifically sent to adjoining property
owners; it only necessitated publication and posting of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution in accordance with
Section 9 of the Republic Act No. 26. Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26, requiring notice to adjoining property
owners, are actually irrelevant to the Petition for Reconstitution filed by Federico and Enriquita considering that these
provisions apply particularly to petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated under Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f),
3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of Republic Act No. 26.
However, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is already final and executory, and absolutely binds this Court, despite
any errors therein. And even if it were otherwise, the error committed by the appellate court as regards the notice
requirement would not necessarily result in a judgment favorable to petitioners. The failure of Federico and Enriquita to
immediately seek the reconstitution of TCT No. T-4399, and their procrastination for four decades before actually filing
their Petition, had allowed laches to attach.
Facts:
In February 1999, Federico and Enriquita (sister of Federico) filed before the RTC a verified Petition
5
for the reconstitution
of the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 covering a 3,033,846-square meter parcel of land located in Sapang, Ternate, Cavite
(subject property), presenting the owners duplicate copy of said TCT in their possession. Federico and Enriquita claimed
that the subject property has been registered with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite in their names, as the true and absolute
owners thereof, under TCT No. T-4399, covered by a certain plan PSU-91002. In 1959, the old Provincial Capitol Building
housing the former office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite was burned to ashes, totally destroying all the titles and
documents kept inside the office, including the original copy of TCT No. T-4399.
According to Federico and Enriquita, the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-4399 was intact and has been in their
possession since the time of its issuance and up to the present. The owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-4399 has not
been delivered to any other person or entity to secure payment or performance of any obligation nor was any transaction
or agreement relative to said TCT presented or pending before the Registry of Deeds of Cavite when its former office was
burned. No other lien or encumbrance affecting TCT No. T-4399 exists, except the right of Federico and Enriquita therein.
Federico and Enriquita attached to their Petition for Reconstitution a photocopy of their owners duplicate certificate of
TCT No. T-4399. They also appended to the Petition, however, a Certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite
stating that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4399, registered in the names of Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat,
3,033,846, more or less, are not existing and does not form part of their records. Based on the fact that all records and titles
were burned during the fire which razed to the ground the Old Capitol Building of Cavite City housing the Office of the
Register of Deeds we could not now find OCT No. 391 and TCT No. T-4399 or any trace thereof and their supporting
papers for its issuance including the Entry Book on which the pertinent documents were inscribed.
Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order dated 16 February 1999, setting the
initial hearing in LRC Case No. 1331 on 10 June 1999 at 8:30 in the morning. Publication, posting, and mailing
requirements are complied with. However, all the notices to the adjoining owners were returned unserved for the
following reasons: Ambrocio Arca: unlocated, no such name; heirs of Mariano Angat: deceased; Santiago de Guia:
unlocated, no such name; and the Office of the Provincial Governor, representing Palikpikan Creek: refused to receive.
The petitioners submitted to the LRA the survey plan of the subject property, PSU-91002, the tracing cloth plan with two
blueprint copies thereof; the technical description of the subject property; and the Certification dated 25 March 1998 of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite. On motion of the counsel of Federico and Enriquita, there being no oppositor nor written
opposition, the RTC declared a general default against the public and proceeded with the ex parte hearing. However,
Ternate Development Corporation (TDC) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and a Complaint-in-Intervention,
questioning the authenticity and genuineness of TCT No. T-4399. It claimed that a portion of the subject property covered
by TCT No. T-4399, with an area of 1,783,084 square meters, is owned by and already registered in the name of TDC
under TCT No. (T-97541) RT-19915 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. Federico and Enriquita opposed the Motion for
Leave to Intervene of TDC.
The RTC denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene of TDC reasoning that TDC could not challenge the validity of TCT
No. T-4399 in the reconstitution proceedings since it would constitute a collateral attack on the title of Federico and
Enriquita. The RTC declared that the reconstitution proceedings in LRC Case No. 1331 was not the proper forum to
resolve the issue of authenticity/genuineness of title sought to be reconstituted, nor a remedy to confirm or adjudicate
ownership. It concluded that a separate civil action must be instituted to assail the validity of or seek the annulment of the
certificate of title since the same cannot be done in the reconstitution proceedings where the issuance of the reconstituted
title is ministerial on the part of the court after a factual finding that the original was indeed existing but was lost or
destroyed.
After trial and consideration of the oral and documentary evidence submitted by Federico and Enriquita, RTC proceeded
to rule on the merits of the Petition for Reconstitution and granted the Petition and ordered that Register of Deeds of
Cavite Province to reconstitute the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4399 as shown on plan Psu-91002 in
the name of Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat, subject to existing liens and encumbrances with annotation at the
back thereof and that said title was reconstituted and issued in lieu of the lost one which is hereby declared null and void
for all legal intents and purposes.
The Republic appealed the RTC Order to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
reconstitution proceedings on the following grounds: (a) no showing that the owners of the adjacent properties were duly
notified according to Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26; and (b) failure of Federico and Enriquita to prove their
valid interest in the subject property covered by TCT No. T-4399. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 72740. The
Court of Appeals issued a Decision granting the appeal of the Republic and reversing the RTC because RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the Petition for Reconstitution because the notices of the hearing sent to the owners of the
adjoining properties via registered mail were returned without having been served on them. The names of the owners of
the adjoining properties were taken from the survey plan made in 1930, and it was not surprising that by the time the
notices were sent in 1999, 69 years later, these persons could no longer be located. The Court of Appeals also found that
Federico and Enriquita failed to prove that at the time the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 was lost; they were the only
lawful owners of the subject property. The Court of Appeals declared the Decision final and executory for the reason that
no motion for reconsideration thereof had been filed.
Federico and Enriquita file a Motion for Reconsideration, however, CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration decision
become final and executory. Petitioners insist that the Petition for Reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. T-4399
filed by Federico and Enriquita complied with all the legal requirements therefor. They claim that the Court of Appeals
committed serious error in requiring notice to adjoining property owners. Petitioners cite Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc., in which the Court ruled that notice to adjoining property owners is not necessary where the basis for
reconstitution is the owners duplicate, following Section 10, in relation to Section 9, of Republic Act No. 26.
Assuming arguendo that such notice is mandatory, petitioners contend that they were able to substantially comply with
the same, only that the notices they sent to the adjoining property owners were returned unserved.
According to the OSG, the RTC gravely erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the Petition for Reconstitution despite
failure by Federico and Enriquita to comply with the notice requirements under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26. It
should be recalled that notices to the adjoining property owners were returned unserved for various reasons. The OSG is
adamant in its stance that nothing but strict compliance with the requirements of the law will do, and failure to do the
same prevents the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the Petition for Reconstitution and voids the whole reconstitution
proceedings. Likewise, the OSG maintains that Federico and Enriquita were not able to show that they were the only
owners of the subject property at the time of the loss of TCT No. T-4399. Finally, the OSG asserts that the Petition at bar
deserves outright dismissal considering that the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals had already become final and
executory.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court of appeals also erred in requiring the petitioners to notify the adjoining owners,
although the petitioners also substantially complied with the additional requirements imposed by the trial court
Ruling:
We find that there is no merit in the present Petition.
The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the Petition for Reconstitution of Federico and Enriquita was because of
the lack of notice to the adjoining property owners, which supposedly deprived the RTC of jurisdiction over the said
Petition.
The nature of the action for reconstitution of a certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26, entitled "An Act Providing a
Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed," denotes a restoration of the
instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition. The purpose of such an
action is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its
loss or destruction occurred. The same Republic Act No. 26 specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a certificate of title. As we held in Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v.
Velasco, failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the
proceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or destroyed one, Republic Act No. 26 laid
down procedures which must be strictly followed in view of the danger that reconstitution could be the source of
anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute for original registration of title proceedings.
Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 26 identify the sources for reconstitution of title. Section 2 and 3 enumerates the
sources for reconstitution of OCTs and TCTs, respectively:
Section 2. Original Certificates of Title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available, in the following order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian
thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the
original certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the
lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian
thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the
property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which
the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the
lost or destroyed certificate of title.
It is worth stressing that Federico and Enriquita sought the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 based on
the owners duplicate of said TCT, a source named under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 26. The publication, posting
and notice requirements for such a petition are governed by Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26.
Section 10 provides:
Sec.10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from filing the petition
mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in
Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That the Court shall cause a notice of the petition,
before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: and, provided, further,
That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in section
seven of this Act
In relation to the foregoing, the provision of Section 9 on the publication of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution
reads:
Section 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of the petitioner,
twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of
the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing,
and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may require. The notice
shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, the names of the
interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the property, and the date on which all
persons having an interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may have. x x x.
It is evident from a perusal of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26, as quoted above, that it does not mandate that notice be
specifically sent to adjoining property owners; it only necessitated publication and posting of the notice of the Petition for
Reconstitution in accordance with Section 9 of the same Act. Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26, requiring notice to
adjoining property owners, are actually irrelevant to the Petition for Reconstitution filed by Federico and Enriquita
considering that these provisions apply particularly to petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated under
Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of Republic Act No. 26.
In Puzon, we explained that when the reconstitution is based on an extant owners duplicate TCT, the main concern is the
authenticity and genuineness of the certificate, which could best be determined or contested by the government agencies
or offices concerned. The adjoining owners or actual occupants of the property covered by the TCT are hardly in a
position to determine the genuineness of the certificate; hence, their participation in the reconstitution proceedings is not
indispensable and notice to them is not jurisdictional.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is already final and executory, and absolutely binds this Court, despite any errors
therein. And even if it were otherwise, the error committed by the appellate court as regards the notice requirement
would not necessarily result in a judgment favorable to petitioners. The failure of Federico and Enriquita to immediately
seek the reconstitution of TCT No. T-4399, and their procrastination for four decades before actually filing their Petition,
had allowed laches to attach. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
5 December 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72740 dismissing the Petition for Reconstitution of TCT No.
T-4399, filed by Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143573
January 30, 2009
ADORACION ROSALES RUFLOE, ALFREDO RUFLOE and RODRIGO RUFLOE, Petitioners,
vs.
LEONARDA BURGOS, ANITA BURGOS, ANGELITO BURGOS, AMY BURGOS, ELVIRA DELOS REYES and
JULIAN C. TUBIG, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Adoracion Rufloe is the wife of Angel Rufloe, now deceased, while co-petitioners Alfredo and Rodrigo are their
children. During the marriage of Adoracion and Angel, they acquired a 371-square meter parcel of land located at
Barangay Bagbagan, Muntinlupa, which is the subject of the present controversy. Sometime in 1978, respondent Elvira
Delos Reyes forged the signatures of Adoracion and Angel in a Deed of Sale dated to make it appear that the disputed
property was sold to her by the spouses Rufloe. On the basis of the said deed of sale, Delos Reyes succeeded in obtaining
a title in her name. IThe Rufloes filed a complaint for damages against Delos Reyes alleging that Angel Rufloe died in
1974, which was four (4) years before the alleged sale in favor of Delos Reyes.
During the pendency of the case, Delos Reyes sold the subject property to respondent siblings Anita, Angelina, Angelito
and Amy (Burgos siblings). A new title was then issued in their names. The Burgos siblings, in turn, sold the same
property to their aunt, Leonarda Burgos. However, the sale in favor of Leonarda was not registered. Thus, no title was
issued in her name. The subject property remained in the name of the Burgos siblings who also continued paying the real
estate taxes thereon.
The trial court rendered its decision declaring that the Deed of Sale in favor of Delos Reyes was falsified as the signatures
of the spouses Rufloe had been forged. The trial court ruled that Delos Reyes did not acquire ownership over the subject
property. Said decision had become final and executory. Respondents interposed an appeal to the CA. In their appeal,
respondents maintained that they bought the property in good faith after they were shown a genuine copy of the title of
the disputed property by Delos Reyes. They also insisted that they were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value.
The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the trial court, declaring in the process that respondents were purchasers in
good faith and for value.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the sale of the subject property by Delos Reyes to the Burgos siblings and the subsequent sale by the
siblings to Leonarda were valid and binding; and (2) Whether respondents were innocent purchasers in good faith and
for value despite the forged deed of sale of their transferor Delos Reyes.
RULING:
It is undisputed that the forged deed of sale was null and void and conveyed no title. It is a well-settled principle that no
one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell,
and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer legally. Due to the forged deed of sale, Delos
Reyes acquired no right over the subject property which she could convey to the Burgos siblings. All the transactions
subsequent to the falsified sale between the spouses Rufloe and Delos Reyes are likewise void, including the sale made by
the Burgos siblings to their aunt, Leonarda.
As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land, as in this case, may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of
the property. However, this rule admits of an unchallenged exception: The circumstances surrounding this case point to
the absolute lack of good faith on the part of respondents. The evidence shows that the Rufloes caused a notice of adverse
claim to be annotated on the title of Delos Reyes and a action for damages and criminal case for estafa, filed by the Rufloes
against Delos Reyes, were both pending before the court. This circumstance should have alerted the Burgos siblings as to
the validity of Delos Reyes title and her authority and legal right to sell the property. Equally significant is the fact that
Delos Reyes was not in possession of the subject property when she sold the same to the Burgos siblings. There was no
showing that Amado or any of the Burgos siblings exerted any effort to personally verify with the Register of Deeds if
Delos Reyes certificate of title was clean and authentic. Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing with
registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly established rule that where circumstances exist
which would put a purchaser on guard and prompt him to investigate further. without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly
be regarded as a buyer in good faith. Moreover, the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not extend to a
transferee who takes it with notice of a flaw in the title of his transferor. To be effective, the inscription in the registry
must have been made in good faith. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law,
for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.
SOTERO ROY LEONERO, RODOLFO LIM, ISIDORO A. PADILLA, JR., AMY ROSE FISMA, and NORMA
CABUYO, vs.
SPOUSES MARCELINO B. BARBA and FORTUNA MARCOS-BARBA, represented by IMELDA N. FORONDO, and
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY
Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for Quieting of Title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 216.praying that Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 59721, 59725, 59726 and 59727, be declared
null and void. Petitioners alleged that this had been declared void in a Partial Decision. Respondents maintaining that all
in their names in the tile were all genuine. They further argued that the Partial Decision could not possibly have any effect
on them, as they were not parties to said case. RTC dismissed the petition for quieting of title. Petitioner appealed to the
CA and the decision of the RTC was affirmed.
Issue: was dismissal of the complaint for quieting of title despite the lack of trial on the merits, hence, allegedly
depriving petitioners of the opportunity to prove their allegations that respondents' aforementioned TCTs were null
and void
Held: petitioners admit that they are mere possessors of the parcels of land in question and have been ordered to vacate
the same. The gist of their claim in the action for quieting of title is that the Decision in the ejectment case against them
should not be implemented, because respondents' TCTs are spurious, having emanated from OCT No. 614, which has
been declared null and void in a Partial Decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-35672. Petitioners' main prayer is for the
nullification of respondents' TCTs.
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and
can only be altered, modified or cancelled in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In Vda. de Gualberto v. Go, the Court held that the validity of a certificate of title cannot be assailed in an action for
quieting of title; an action for annulment of title is the more appropriate remedy to seek the cancellation of a certificate of
title
Clearly, petitioners' complaint is unfounded and the RTC acted properly in dismissing the same for petitioners' failure to
establish the factual basis for it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit.
RABAJA RANCH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION
BENEFITS SYSTEM, Respondent.
The Supreme Court ruled that in our jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed. Mere allegations of fraud are not enough. The
intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner, injure him must be specifically alleged
and proved. The burden of proof rests on petitioner, and the petitioner in this case failed to discharge the burden.
Petitioner did not show that the Homestead Patent issued to Charles Soguilon is indeed spurious. More importantly,
petitioner failed to prove that respondent took part in the alleged fraud which dated back as early as 1966.
Only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a
decree of registration. Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a
deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are.
Moreover, a Homestead Patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens
Title. Section 103 of P.D. No. 1529 mandates the registration of patents, and such registration is the operative act to convey
the land to the patentee. The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall
not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the
grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be
the operative act to affect and convey the land.
The Supreme Court also reiterated the rule that, where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate
of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of
the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The
sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the
system will have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to
the evident purpose of the law. Thus, every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will, in no way, oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
condition of the property.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation is a domestic corporation and a holder of TCT No. T-88513 covering
the subject property located at Barangay Conrazon, Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro.
Respondent Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) is a government
corporation, which manages the pension fund of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and a holder of TCT No. T-
51382 covering the same subject property.
On September 1, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Removal of Cloud from Title before the
RTC. It averred that on September 6, 1955, a Free Patent was issued in the name of Jose Castromero, and on June 1, 1982,
the Free Patent was registered, and an OCT covering the subject property was issued in the name of the latter. Sometime
in 1982, Jose sold the subject property to Spouses Sigfriedo and Josephine Veloso and TCT No. T-17104 was issued in
favor of the spouses. On January 17, 1997, Spouses Veloso, in turn, sold the subject property to petitioner for the sum
of P634,116.00 and TCT No. T-88513 was issued in petitioners name. Petitioner alleged that it was the lawful owner and
possessor of the subject property.
In its Answer, respondent claimed that its title over the subject property was protected by the Torrens system, as it was a
buyer in good faith and for value, and that it had been in continuous possession of the subject property since November
1989, way ahead of petitioner's alleged possession in February 1997.
Respondent stated that on April 30, 1966, a Homestead Patent was issued in the name of Charles Soguilon, and upon
registration, an OCT was issued in Charles's name, covering the same property. On October 18, 1982, Charles sold the
subject property to JMC Farm Incorporated, which was then issued TCT No. 18529. On August 30, 1985, JMC obtained a
loan from respondent in the amount of P7,000,000.00, with real estate mortgage over several parcels of land including the
subject property. JMC failed to pay, hence, after extra-judicial foreclosure and public sale, respondent, being the highest
bidder, acquired the subject property and was issued TCT No. T-51382 in its name. Respondent contended that from the
time it was issued a title, it took possession of the subject property until petitioner disturbed respondent's possession
thereof sometime in 1997.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner on the ground that petitioner's title emanated from a title older than that of the
respondent. Moreover, the RTC held that there were substantial and numerous infirmities in the Homestead Patent of
Charles. The RTC found that there was no record in the Bureau of Lands that Charles was a homestead applicant or a
grantee of the Homestead Patent. Thus, the RTC held that Charles's Homestead Patent was fraudulent and spurious, and
respondent could not invoke the protection of the Torrens system, because the system does not protect one who
committed fraud or misrepresentation and holds title in bad faith.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court. It held that Charles's Homestead
Patent was earlier registered than Jose's Free Patent. The CA held that Jose slept on his rights, and thus, respondent had a
better right over the subject property. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not respondent's title which originated from a fake and spurious homestead patent, is superior to
petitioner's title which originated from a valid and existing free patent.
b. Who, between the petitioner and respondent, has a better right over the subject property?
RULINGS:
a. The Supreme Court ruled that in our jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed. Mere allegations of fraud are not
enough. The intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner, injure him must be
specifically alleged and proved. The burden of proof rests on petitioner, and the petitioner in this case failed to discharge
the burden. Petitioner did not show that the Homestead Patent issued to Charles Soguilon is indeed spurious. More
importantly, petitioner failed to prove that respondent took part in the alleged fraud which dated back as early as 1966.
Therefore, the petition was denied.
b. The Supreme Court held that respondent is an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value. Thus, as far as
respondent is concerned, TCT No. 18529, shown to it by JMC, was free from any flaw or defect that could give rise to any
iota of doubt that it was fake and spurious, or that it was derived from a fake or spurious Homestead Patent. Likewise,
respondent was not under any obligation to make an inquiry beyond the TCT itself when, significantly, a foreclosure sale
was conducted and respondent emerged as the highest bidder.
Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over
the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such
outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must
be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every
instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every
person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the
law will, in no way, oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
Moreover, a Homestead Patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a
Torrens Title. Section 103 of P.D. No. 1529 mandates the registration of patents, and such registration is the operative act
to convey the land to the patentee. The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the
grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government
and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that
shall be the operative act to affect and convey the land.
HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 168848
HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 169019
June 30, 2009
FACTS:
Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 1524 of the Bacolod Cadastre.Petitioners filed an Application for the Registration
of Title before the RTC. In it, the subject lot was specifically identified as Lot No. 1524, AP-06-005774, Cad. 39, Bacolod
Cadastre, situated in the City of Bacolod, Island of Negros. The survey plan duly approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Office, Iloilo City; and the technical description of the subject lot
were submitted to the RTC.
The application was amended to stating that the parcel of land in question be ordered registered and that an original
Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the late Jose R. [De] Luzuriaga, Sr. pursuant to Decree No. 22752 covering Lot
No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre.
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order of general default except as against respondent Republic of the Philippines, which
entered its due appearance through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which, in turn, designated Bacolod Assistant
City Prosecutor Abraham Bayona to represent the OSG at the trial.
Among the evidence petitioners adduced during the hearings was a copy of Decree No. 22752
[8]
dated October 7, 1916,
issued by the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) pursuant to the decision in the cadastral case confirming and
granting unto the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga full ownership of Lot No. 1524.
By Decision dated May 24, 1999, the trial court ratified its order of general default and judicially confirmed the incomplete
title of the late De Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No. 1524 pursuant to Decree No. 22752.The OSG, for the Republic, received a
copy of the Decision on June 22, 1999, but opted not to file an appeal. Pursuant to the above decision the Bacolod Registry
issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-58 in the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr.
Meanwhile, in September 1999, Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, Co., Inc. (DAALCO) filed a Complaint against petitioners before
the RTC for Quieting of Title, Annulment and Cancellation of [OCT] No. RO-58 with prayer for injunctive relief and damages.
DAALCO claimed that its predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Lizares, was the registered, lawful, and absolute owner of Lot
No. 1524 as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued by the Register of Deeds (RD) of Bacolod City on February
8, 1939.
On November 24, 1999, or six months after the RTC rendered its Decision, the Republic through the OSG, however,
sought the annulment thereof via an unverified Petition for Relief from Judgment filed before the RTC. The RTC denied
the petition for relief from judgment because it is not sufficient in form and substance and filed out of time.
The Republic moved for reconsideration of the above denial order arguing that its procedural lapses are not fatal to its
case. Moreover, the OSG alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Cadastral Case No. 97-583 inasmuch as the
corresponding amended application for registration dated May 5, 1998 was not published and a copy of which the
Republic was not served. Finally, the Republic raised anew the argument on the unavailability of Decree No. 22752 as
basis for the application of land registration in view of the implementation of Sec. 39 of PD 1529.The Republic later filed a
Supplement (To Motion for Reconsideration) reiterating the merits of its case.

The RTC denied the Republics motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Republic elevated the case before the CA.
The appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting certiorari and ordered the remand of the instant case to the
trial court for reception of evidence to determine whether the RTCs Decision confirming the title of the late Luzuriaga, Sr.
over Lot 1524 will result in a double titling of the subject lot. Through the equally assailed May 25, 2005 Resolution, the
CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a cadastral case and Quieting of Title case can proceed independently?
2. Whether or not the contention of the OSG that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Cadastral Case No. 97-583
due to non-publication of the amended application for registration is tenable.?
RULING:
1. Yes, they can proceed independently. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners contention that a petition for relief
from judgment and the special civil action for quieting of title cannot proceed separately is without solid basis. Cad.
Case No. 97-583 and the suit for quieting of title in Civil Case No. 99-10924 each involves different concerns and can
proceed independently. The cause of action of the Republics petition for relief from judgment of double titling of the
subject lot is different from DAALCOs quest for quieting of title. From another perspective, DAALCO basically seeks to
nullify the issuance of OCT No. RO-58 in the name of the De Luzuriaga heirs, while the Republics petition assails the
grant of ownership to De Luzuriaga, Sr. over a parcel of land duly registered under OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares,
who thereafter transferred the title to his heirs or assigns. In fine, both actions may proceed independently, albeit a
consolidation of both cases would be ideal to obviate multiplicity of suits.
2. No. As the Supreme Court held that the Republic, after participating in the proceedings below, has raised the issue of
jurisdiction, drawing attention to the non-publication of the amended application for registration during the trial of Cad.
Case No. 93-857. The Court cannot see its way clear to the jurisdictional challenge posed by the Republic. As it were, the
Republic entered its appearance in Cad. Case No. 97-583 represented by prosecutor Bayona. The petitioners in that case
appeared to have complied with the essential jurisdictional requirement of publication. The required survey plan,
technical description, and original tracing cloth have been duly presented and submitted as evidence. Prosecutor Bayona
obviously found the cadastral proceedings to have been in order, else, he would have duly protested and assailed the
same.
We hardly can subscribe to the Republics argument that the publication of the amendment in petitioners application is a
condition sine qua non for the RTC, acting as cadastral court, to acquire jurisdiction. Sec. 7 of Act No. 2259, otherwise
known as the Cadastral Act, and Sec. 35 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, provide for the
publication of the application for registration and the schedule of the initial hearing. This is so since judicial cadastral
proceedings, like ordinary administrative registration, are in rem, and are governed by the usual rules of practice,
procedure, and evidence. Due publication is required to give notice to all interested parties of the claim and identity of the
property that will be surveyed. And any additional territory or change in the area of the claim cannot be included by
amendment of the plan or application without new publication, otherwise the cadastral court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the additional or amended claim. But where the identity and area of the claimed property are not the
subjects of amendment but other collateral matters, a new publication is not needed.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that due publication was made for Lot No. 1524, its identity and area. The
amendment in petitioners application in the relief portion neither altered the area and identity of the subject lot nor
added any territory. Thus, no new publication is required. Besides, the Republic, through Prosecutor Bayona, has been
duly notified of such amendment. Consequently, the Republic could not plausibly argue that it was deprived of its day in
court.
SPOUSES. VILLAMIL, ETC. VS. VILLAROSA
G.R NO. 177187
April 7, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner-spouses Villamil alleged that they were the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
223611. That they visited the said lot and found that a residential house was being constructed by a certain Villarosa.
Petitioners verified their title with the office of the register of deeds and found out that the title in their names was
cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of Paterno by virtue of a deed of assignment purportedly executed by
them in favor of Paterno. A Deed of Assignment was likewise executed by Paterno in favor of Spouses Tolentiono, and on
the basis of the said document, a new title was issued in favor of the latter. Thereafter Spouses Villamil instituted a
complaint for annulment for annulment of title, recovery of possession, reconveyance, damages and injunction against
the Spouses Tolentino and Villarosa. Spouses Villamil averred that since Paternos transfer to Sps. Tolentino is spurious,
the Spouses Tolentino could not also transfer any right to Villarosa on account of the principle that no one can transfer a
greater right to another than he himself. The trial court found that the deed of sale executed by sps. Villamil in favor of
Paterno is fake; that Paterno is a fictitious person, and that spouses Tolentino and Villarosa are both buyers in bad faith.
However, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial courts decision and declared void the title of the Spouses Tolentino and
Paterno but upheld the validity of the title of Villarosa holding that the latter is a purchaser for value and in goodfaith.
Issue:
Whether or not Villarosa can be declared a purchases for value and goodfaith?
Held:
Yes, well settled is the rule that every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the
condition of the property. A forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title if the property has
already been transferred from the name of the owner to name of the forger. This doctrine serves to emphasize that a
person who deals with registered property in good faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected
by a torrents title. Having made the necessary inquiries and having found that the title to be authentic, Villarosa need not
go beyond the certificate of title. He examined the transferors title, which was then under the name of Spouses Tolentino.
He did not have to scrutinize each and every title and previous owners of the property preceding Tolentino. In sum,
Villarosa was able to establish good faith when he bought the subject property. Therefore, the title issued in Villarosas
name is valid.

Republic v. Lee Tsai
G.R. No. 168184. June 22, 2009.

FACTS: Respondent filed an application for the confirmation and registration of the subject property under Presidential
Decree No. 1529. She (alleged that she is the owner of the subject property and the improvements thereon. She also
declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. The trial court granted respondents
application for registration. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that respondent need not prove
that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier
because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was already superseded by Republic Act No. 1942 (RA 1942), which provides for a simple
30 year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of title.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is required for respondent to prove her open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

HELD: YES. Note that respondent did not specify under what paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529 she was filing the
application. But it appeared that respondent filed her application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529. There are three
requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of PD 1529:
(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicant by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation;
and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June1945 or earlier. The right to file the
application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to 12 June 1945 or earlier, by reason of
the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

There were various amendments to PD 1529. In Republic v. Doldol, the Court provided a summary of these amendments:

"The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple
thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25,
1977. As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not
sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be shown that
possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in
interest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD
1529."

In this case, respondent failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of the subject property, as required
by both PD 1529 and CA 141. Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of
her predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1948. In view of the lack of
sufficient showing that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject property under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, respondents application for confirmation and registration of the subject
property under PD 1529 and CA 141 should be denied.

The same ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Javier (G.R. No. 179905, 19 August 2009).















































2010
HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES VS HON. REINERIO B. RAMAS AND VILMA MINOR
G.R. No. 157852 December 15, 2010


FACTS:
Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Domingo Valientes who, before his death, was the owner of a parcel of land in
Zamboanga del Sur then covered by an Original Certificate of Title. Domingo Valientes mortgaged the subject property
to secure his loan to the spouses Belen, but later on failed to retrieve the subject property.

In 1969, the spouses Belen obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title on the land in their name. The legitimate children of the
late Domingo Valientes, had their Affidavit of Adverse Claim duly entered at the back of the TCT. Upon the death of the
spouses Belen, their surviving heirs sold the property in favor of private respondent Vilma Valencia-Minor, the present
possessor of the subject property.

On 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint for the Cancelation of the TCT of the subject land, Reconveyance plus Damages.
The RTC dismissed the case. Petitioners brought the case to the Court of Appeals, which decided that the case cannot
prosper on the grounds of prescription and laches because the complaint was filed almost 29 years after the issuance of
the TCT.

Petitioners brought the matter to the Supreme Court alleging that although the complaint was captioned Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate and Reconveyance, it is substantially in the nature of an action to quiet title which allegedly does not
prescribe.

They also alleged that given that prescription will apply, the prescriptive period that should be used is 30 years as
provided in Article 1141 of the Civil Code, in connection with Articles 1134 and 1137 thereof, because the respondents
predecessor-in interest acquired the property thru fraud which constitutes bad faith on their part.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the action filed by the Valientes is an action to quite title, thus, imprescriptible

2. Whether or not the prescriptive period in case of reconveyance based on implied trust is 30 years because the one
in possession acquired the property thru fraud, thus, constituting bad faith

HELD:
1. The petitioners are not in possession of the subject property, hence their action is one of reconveyance and not
action to quite title. The action being based on implied trust has already prescribed because it was filed 29 years
after the issuance of the TCT.

An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in anothers name, which must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title
since such issuance operates as a constructive notice.

The cause of action of petitioners in the case, wherein they claim that private respondent Minors predecessor-in-
interest acquired the subject property by forgery, can indeed be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust,
as stated in Article 1456 of the New Civil Code.

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered
a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

The action of the petitioners Valientes was filed on 1998 which was way beyond the prescriptive period since the
TCT was issued on 1969.


2.
Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by
prescription.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession of ten years.

Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

Articles 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code, however, are general rules on prescription which should give
way to the special statute on registered lands, Presidential Decree No. 1529. Under the Torrens System as
enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action
for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.

Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it
imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in
ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

As discussed above, the case was filed almost 29 years from the issuance of the TCT. This period is unreasonably
long for a party seeking to enforce its right to file the appropriate case.

REPUBLIC VS HON. MANGOTARA
GR NO. 173401, January 7, 2010,


FACTS:
This includes the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases. Sometime in the early 1990s, the late Dona Demetria Cacho applied for the
registration of two parcels of land, namely, a smaller parcel with an area of 3,635 sq. meters and a larger parcel with an
area of 378,707 sq. meters. Both were situated in what was then the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province, which later
became later the Sitio Nunucan, then Barangay Suarez, in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. In one of the Courts decision, it
affirmed in toto the decision of the land registration court. Come 1997, Teofilo Cacho, claiming to be the son and sole heir
of Dona Demetria, filed before the RTC a petition for the reconstitution of two original certificates of title. After so many
legal battles, the decrees of registration were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for the two parcels
of land in Dona Demetrias name.

On October 13, 2004 , the Republic filed a complaint for the cancellation of OCTs and reversion against late Dona
Demetria, represented by her alleged heirs together with AZIMUTH and LANDTRADE. Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Republic has no cause of action and their present petition is barred by res
judicata and prescription. The trial court ruled against Republic.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for prescription is barred by prescription

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert back the land back to the Government under the
Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.

Nonetheless, elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions. When the
government is the real party in interest and it is proceeding mainly to assert its own right to recover its own property,
there can be as a rule no defense grounded on laches or prescription. Public land fraudulently included in patents or
certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. The
right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription.

IF the Republic is able to established after trial and hearing of Civil Case no. 6686 that decrees and OCTs are void for
some reason, then the trial court can still order the reversion of the parcels of land covered by the same because
indefeasibility cannot attach to a void decree or certificate of title.

FLOR MARTINEZ VS ERNESTO GARCIA
G.R. No. 166536, February 4, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent EdilbertoBrua was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title.The
property was first mortgaged to the Government Service Insurance System and such mortgage was annotated in 1974.
On February 1980, respondent Brua obtained a loan from his brother-in-law, respondent Ernesto Garciaand, to secure the
payment of said loan, respondent Brua mortgaged the subject property to respondent Garcia, evidenced by a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage. Since the title to the subject property was in the possession of the GSIS and respondent Garcia could not
register the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, he then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claimand registered it with the
Registry of Deeds.

Then, respondent Brua requested respondent Garcia to pay the former's loan with the GSIS, so that the title to the subject
property would be released to the latter. Respondent Garcia then paid GSISthus, the title to the subject property was
released to him.

A Deed of Absolute Salewas executed between respondents Garcia and Brua over the subject property.Respondent Garcia
then registered the Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds and a new TCT was issued in the names of respondent Garcia
and his wife. However, the annotations at the back of the previous title were carried over to the new title in favor of the
petitioner which was inscribed on July 1988.

It appeared that the annotations found at the back of the title of the subject property in favor of petitionerwere all made in
connection with petitioner's action for Collection of Sum of Money, which she filed against respondent Brua.In that case, a
decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, where the RTC ordered respondent Brua to pay the former. The decision
became final and executory as respondent Brua failed to appeal the same, and a notice of levy on execution was issued. A
public auction was subsequently conducted, where the subject property was awarded to petitioner as the sole bidder and
a Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor.

Respondents Garcia and Brua filedan Action to Quiet Title, initiallyagainst petitioner due to the encumbrances/liens
annotated on respondent Garcia's new title. They contended that these encumbrances/liens were registered subsequent
to the annotation of respondent Garcia's adverse claim.

The RTC dismissed the case of the respondent and that it found that the adverse claim which respondent Garcia caused to
be annotatedwas merely that of a second mortgagee and that respondent Garcia's inaction to preserve his adverse claim
as a second mortgageewhen petitioner's Notice of Levy on Attachment and/or Levy, Notice of Levy on Execution and
Certificate of Sale were already inscribed at the back of respondent Brua's title showed bad faith on the part of
respondent.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision and averred that a subsequent sale of property covered by a certificate of
title cannot prevail over an adverse claim. The CA found that in order to protect his interest, respondent Garcia executed
an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and annotated it on the title of the subject property and that the same is not cancelled.
Further, that such adverse claim was registered prior to the inscription of the Certificate of Sale in favor of petitionerthus,
the latter was deemed to have knowledge of respondent Garcia's claim and could not be considered as a buyer in good
faith at the time she purchased the subject property in the public auction.

ISSUE:
Whether the adverse claim issued in favor of the respondent inscribed on the title of the property is a notice of the latters
interest adverse to that of the petitioner

HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of the respondents and stated that the deed of mortgage executed by respondent Brua in favor of
Garcia was annotated on respondent Brua's title which was registered with the Registry of Deeds.

The adverse claim already existed when the Notice of Levy on Execution, as well as the Certificate of Sale in favor of
petitioner, was inscribedhence, the adverse claimis sufficient to constitute constructive notice to petitioner regarding the
subject property. When petitioner registered her Notice of Levy on Execution on the title of the subject property, she was
charged with the knowledge that the subject property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an
interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof.

The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property,
where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act and serves a
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than
that of the registered owner thereof.

Further, petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who
buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a
full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other
person in the property.


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
APOLINARIO CATARROJA, REYNALDO CATARROJA, and ROSITA CATARROJA- DISTRITO,
GR No. 171744, February 12, 2010

FACTS:
The Catarrojas filed a petition for reconstitution of lost original certificate of titlescovering two lots located in Zapang,
Ternate, Cavite with areas of 269,695 square meters and 546,239 square meters. They alleged that they inherited said lots
from their parents, who reportedly applied for the registration of the two lots with the CFI of Cavite sometime before the
last world war. According to them, pursuant to the decree issued by the land registration court, the Register of Deeds of
Cavite issued original certificates of title to their parents and based on the certification issued by the LRA, the original
copy of the titles were lost in fire when the old Cavite Capitol Building was gutted with fire on June 7, 1959. They also
claimed that their parents lost the owners duplicate copy.
In confirming that the land registration court issued Decree 749932 on May 21, 1941 covering the subject lots, the LRA
issued a certification on August 3, 1998 and a report on February 4, 2002 verifying as correct the plans and technical
description of the subjects lots which have been approved under LRA PR-19042 and LRA PR-10043 but provided that a
copy of the Decree was no longer available in their records.
The RTC of Cavite granted the petition, while the CA, on appeal, reversed the RTCs decision but on motion for
reconsideration filed by the Catarrojas, the CA set aside its decision and issued an amended decision finding sufficient
evidence to allow the reconstitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding sufficient evidence to grant the petition for reconstitution of title despite the lack
of evidence required by RA 26 on reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens certificates of title?

HELD:
Yes, the CA erred in granting the petition for reconstitution of title.
R.A. 26 governs the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens certificates of title. Its Section 2 enumerates the following
sources for the reconstitution of such titles:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian
thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the
original certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the
lost or destroyed certificate of title.

The Catarrojas have been unable to present any of the documents mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) above.They did not
have a certified copy of such certificate of title or a co-owners, a mortgagees, or a lessees duplicate of the same.The only
documentary evidence the Catarrojas could produce as possible sources for the reconstitution of the lost title are those
other documents described in paragraph (f).

In Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Courtapplied the principle of ejusdem generis in interpreting
Section 2(f) of R.A. 26. "Any other document" refers to reliable documents of the kind described in the preceding
enumerations. The Supreme Court is not convinced that the above documents of the Catarrojas fall in the same class as
those enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (e). None of them proves that a certificate of title had in fact been issued in the
name of their parents.Moreover, the Catarrojas failed to show that they exerted efforts to look for and avail of the sources
in paragraphs (a) to (e) before availing themselves of the sources in paragraph (f).

Further, in Republic v. Tuastumban, the Supreme Court enumerated what needs to be shown before the issuance of an
order for reconstitution: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by
petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the
petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at
the time it was lost or destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the
same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

The microfilm printouts of the Official Gazette are not proof that a certificate of title was in fact issued in the name of the
Catarrojas parents. The publication in the Official Gazette only proved that the couple took the initial step of publishing
their claim to the property. There was no showing, however, that the application had been granted and that a certificate of
title was issued to them.

Absent a clear and convincing proof that an original certificate of title had in fact been issued to their parents in due
course, the Catarrojas cannot claim that their predecessors succeeded in acquiring title to the subject lots. The nature of
reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title denotes a restoration of the instrument in its original form and
condition. That cannot be done without proof that such certificate of title had once existed. The procedures laid down in
R.A. 26 for reconstituting a title have to be strictly followed considering that reconstitution, if made easy, could be the
source of anomalous titles. It could also be unscrupulously availed of by some as a convenient substitute for the rigid
proceedings involved in original registration of title.


VDA DE AGUILAR VS. ALFARO
G.R. No. 164402 JULY 5, 2010

FACTS:
On May 16, 1977, petitioners husband Ignacio was issued OCT over a parcel of land. Prior thereto, Ignacio allowed
petitioners sister, Anastacia Urieta, mother of respondent, to construct a house on the said land and to stay therein
temporarily. In 1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to partition and asked respondents to vacate the said land. Upon
the refusal of the respondents, the petitioner filed a case for accion publiciana. Respondent asserted that on April 17, 1973,
Ignacio and herein petitioner sold to their mother the lot as shown by the KASULATAN SA BILIHAN and the tax
declaration. Respondent also raised the defense of prescription. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, CA
reversed the decision.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Torrens Title can be attacked in a collaterally in an accion publiciana.

Whether or not a deed of sale can prevail over Torrens Title as a proof of ownership.

HELD:
No. Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of reality independently
of title. It is an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. Under Section 48 of PD No. 1529, a certificate of title cannot be the
subject of collateral attack, which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of Torrens Title, whether or not it
was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The adjudication herein is
not final and binding determination of the issue of ownership.

No. It is settled that a Torrens Title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name the
title appears. It is also settled that the title holder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including
possession. Respondents only have their notarized but unregistered KASULATAN SA BILIHAN, thus even if that
proof of ownership has in its favor a junos tautum presumption of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot
prevail over petitioners Torrens title.


FIRST BAY AREA BANL VS SPOUSES CASCO AND JAIME DUPITAS
GR No. 178368 February 22, 2010


FACTS:
First Bay Area Bank, Inc. won a judgment against Thelma and Jaime Dupitas, resulting in the issuance of a writ of
execution against them by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malalag-Sulop, Davao del Sur. The sheriff levied on the
properties of the spouses Dupitas, and sold these lands at public auction to First Bay.

Because the spouses Dupitas failed to redeem their titled lands, the sheriff issued a final certificate of sale in favor of First
Bay. Subsequently, the Acting Registrar of Deeds wrote the spouses Dupitas, requiring them to surrender their owner's
duplicate copies of land titles so it could annotate the sheriffs sale on them. But the spouses Dupitas failed to do so
despite repeated demands.

RTC ruled that just because First Bay had been unable to get copies of the owner's duplicate copies of the titles from the
spouses Dupitas, it did not mean that it was already justified. The RTC ruled that petitioner First Bay had resorted to the
wrong remedy for the transfer of the titles to its name. The proper remedy, said the RTC, was an action for specific
performance. First Bay filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied the same in its Order dated
June 12, 2007.


ISSUE:
whether or not an action for specific performance is the correct remedy where the judgment debtor unjustifiably refuses
to surrender the title to the land sold at public auction, thus, preventing the register of deeds from transferring the title to
the buyer's name.


HELD:
Section 107 of P.D. 1529 provides the procedure to be observed in case the judgment debtor refuses to surrender the
duplicate copy of his certificate of title. It reads:

SECTION 107. Surrender of Withheld Duplicate Certificate. -Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title
pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent or where a
voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's
duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the
Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate
certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate of memorandum upon such surrender. If the
person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason the
outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as
the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a
memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.

A party-in-interest may file a petition in the RTC to compel the surrender of the owner's duplicate certificate of title:

a) Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument (such as attachment or
sale on execution) which divests the title of the registered owner against his consent;

b) Where a voluntary instrument (such as conveyances, mortgage or lease) cannot be registered by reason of the refusal
or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title; and

c) Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented for amendment or alteration pursuant to a court order.[3]

After hearing the petition, the court may:

a) Order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same, and direct the
entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender; or
b) Order the annulment of the owner's duplicate certificate and the issuance of a new certificate in lieu thereof if the
person withholding the same, is not amenable to the court's processes, or if for any reason said owner's duplicate
certificate cannot be surrendered. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate.


The Court sees no reason to digress from the above established rulings.

The court DIRECTS the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of Thelma
and Jaime Dupitas and to issue new ones in the name of First Bay Area Bank, Inc.


CUA LAI CHU, CLARO G. CASTRO, and JUANITA CASTRO,
vs.
HON. HILARIO L. LAQUI, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 218, Quezon City and PHILIPPINE
BANK OF COMMUNICATION
G.R. No. 169190 February 11, 2010


FACTS:
In November 1994, petitioners obtained a loan in the amount of P3, 200,000 from private respondent Philippine Bank of
Communication. To secure the loan, petitioners executed in favor of private respondent a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the property of petitioner spouses covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22990. In August 1997,
petitioners executed an Amendment to the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage increasing the amount of the loan by P1,
800,000, bringing the total loan amount to P5, 000,000.

For failure of petitioners to pay the full amount of the outstanding loan upon demand, private respondent applied for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. Upon receipt of a notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale,
petitioners filed a petition to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale with a prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO).
The trial court granted petitioners prayer for TRO. The trial court subsequently lifted the TRO and reset the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale on 29 May 2002. At the foreclosure sale, private respondent emerged as the highest bidder. A certificate of
sale was executed on 4 June 2002 in favor of private respondent. On 7 June 2002, the certificate of sale was annotated as
Entry No. 1855 on TCT No. 22990 covering the foreclosed property.

After the lapse of the one-year redemption period, private respondent filed in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City an
affidavit of consolidation to consolidate its ownership and title to the foreclosed property. Forthwith, on 8 July 2003, the
Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 22990 and issued in its stead TCT No. 251835 in the name of private respondent.

On 18 August 2004, private respondent applied for the issuance of a writ of possession of the foreclosed property.
Petitioners filed an opposition. The trial court granted private respondents motion for a declaration of general default
and allowed private respondent to present evidence ex parte. The trial court denied petitioners notice of appeal.

Undeterred, petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The appellate court dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals dismissed on both procedural and substantive grounds the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioners. The matter was thus elevated to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of possession was properly issued.

HELD:
Possession was properly issued.

In Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Pardo squarely ruled on the right to possession of a purchaser at an
extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage. This case involved a real estate mortgage as security for a loan obtained from a
bank. Upon the mortgagors default, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At the auction sale, the bank was
the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was duly issued and registered. The bank then applied for the issuance of a writ of
possession, which the lower court dismissed. The Court reversed the lower court and held that the purchaser at the
auction sale was entitled to a writ of possession pending the lapse of the redemption period upon a simple motion and
upon the posting of a bond.

In the present case, the certificate of sale of the foreclosed property was annotated on TCT No. 22990 on 7 June 2002. The
redemption period thus lapsed on 7 June 2003, one year from the registration of the sale. Once ownership has been
consolidated, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court, upon proper application and
proof of title. In the present case, when private respondent applied for the issuance of a writ of possession, it presented a
new transfer certificate of title issued in its name dated 8 July 2003. The right of private respondent to the possession of
the property was thus founded on its right of ownership. As the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale, in
whose name title over the property was already issued, the right of private respondent over the property had become
absolute, vesting in it the corollary right of possession.

Petition is denied.







































2012
Lorzano v Tabayag, Jr.,
G.R. No. 189647
February 6, 2012


Facts:

Juan Tabayag, Jr. filed against respondent an action for annulment of document and reconveyance against Nancy
Lorzano. The petitioner and respondent are two of the children of late Juan Tabayag who owned a parcel of land by free
patent which is the subject matter of the controversy. After the death of their father, the petitioner requested from her
siblings that she be allowed to take possession of the property until her eldest son could graduate from college, upon
which the petitioners siblings acceded to the said request. When the petitioners eldest son finished college, her siblings
asked her to return the subject property so that they could partition it to themselves. However, the petitioner refuses the
request of her siblings and claims that she bought the property from their father as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property. The siblings contested the sale by assailing that the signature of their father is forged in the Deed of
Absolute Sale. The Regional trial Court rendered a judgment in favor of the siblings and likewise affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. the respondent filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court asserting that an action for reconveyance it is
a collateral attack on her title therefore it is improper because such property which is acquired through a free patent, only
the Government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, could assail her title in an action for reversion.

Issue:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance is proper in this case?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled on the affirmative because once a patent is registered and the corresponding title is
issued, the land covered ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens Title
issued becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance. However, a title emanating from a
free patent which is secured through fraud does not become indefeasible, precisely because the patent from where the
title sprung is void and produces no effect. A fraudulent title acquired, and the certificate of title issued pursuant to the
same, may only be assailed by the government in an action for reversion. However, the rule is not absolute. An exception
to that is where the plaintiff-claimant seeks direct conveyance from the public land unlawfully and in breach of trust
titled by him, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive trust. A private individual may bring an action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title thereof was issued through a free patent since such action does not aim or
purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person
who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof. Respondent was not seeking a
reconsideration of the granting of the patent but sought only the conveyance of the property to the heirs of the late
Tabayag on account of fraud committed by the petitioner. Thus, the lower court did not err in upholding the respondents
right to ask for the conveyance of the property. To hold otherwise would make the Torrens system a shield for the
commission of fraud.

Ma. Wilhelmina E. Tobias vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193443


Facts:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Decision dated July 6, 2009 and Resolution dated August 12,
2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88995. The facts leading to its filing are as follows:

On June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9972, Cad-459-D of Indang Cadastre, situated in Barangay Bancod,
Indang, Cavite and with an area of 6,920 square meters. The petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property
from Gregonio Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1996; and they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years.

After trial and hearing, the Regional Trial Court issued a Decision on July 29, 2006, granting the petitioners
application.

The Court of Appeals gave due course to the appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines. By way of the
assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject property for the requisite period of 30 years.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its August 12,
2010 Resolution.

The petitioners question the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals, alleging that the evidence they
presented prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject
property for more than 30 years. The petitioners claim that the following sufficed to demonstrate that they acquired title
over the subject property by prescription:

a. the testimony of their attorney-in-fact, Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias, stating that:

i. the petitioners have been in actual, notorious and open possession of the subject property since
the time they purchased the same in 1996;
ii. the petitioners have regularly paid the taxes due on the subject property;
iii. the petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Victorio Garcia, Felipe Gatdula and Gregonio Gatdula,
had been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years and had religiously paid
the taxes due thereon; and
iv. the subject property is agricultural, alienable and disposable;

b. the testimony of the caretaker of the subject property, Margarito Pena, stating that:

i. he resides near the subject property;
ii. he witnessed the execution of the deed of sale that petitioners entered into with Gregonio
Gatdula; and
iii. the petitioners and predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for
more than 30 years;

c. the testimony of Ferdinand Encarnacion, a clerk in the Docket Division of the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
stating that:

i. no opposition to the petitioners application was filed before the LRA;
ii. an examiner of the LRA found nothing wrong with the petitioners application; and
iii. no title covering the subject property was previously issued;

d. Tax Declaration Nos. 2935, 2405 and 1823 for the years 1961, 1967 and 1974 in the name of Victorio Garcia;

e. Tax Declaration Nos. 1534 and 3850 for the years 1980 and 1985 in the name of Felipe Gatdula;

f. Tax Declaration Nos. 22453-A and 2925 for the years 1991 and 1994 in the name of Gregonio Gatdula;

g. Tax Declaration Nos. 21956-A, 22096-A, 22097-A and 97-05078 in the name of the petitioners;

h. Resolution No. 69, Series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Indang, Cavite, which approved the
reclassification of several lots, including the subject property, from agricultural to residential/commercial;

i. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
on July 13, 2000, which converted several parcels of land, including the subject property, from agricultural to
residential/commercial;

j. Certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) CALABARZON dated
October 29, 2002, stating that the subject area falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land Project No. 13-A of
Indang, Cavite per LC Map 3091 certified on June 21, 1983.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have proven themselves qualified to the benefits under the relevant laws on the
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Held:

There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for
the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law.

For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it
is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession
preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the
prescriptive period.

Tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent evidence of actual possession for purposes of prescription.
More so, if the payment of the taxes due on the property is episodic, irregular and random such as in this case. Indeed,
how can the petitioners claim of possession for the entire prescriptive period be ascribed any ounce of credibility when
taxes were paid only on eleven (11) occasions within the 40-year period from 1961 to 2001. Adverse, continuous, open,
public possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law and the burden to prove it by clear, positive and
convincing evidence is on the applicant. A claim of ownership will not proper on the basis of tax declarations if
unaccompanied by proof of actual possession.

Furthermore, the petitioners application was filed after only (1) year from the time the subject property may be
considered patrimonial. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, was issued by the DAR only
on July 13, 2000, which means that the counting of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring
ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can only start from such date. Before the property was declared
patrimonial by virtue of such conversion order, it cannot be acquired by prescription. This is clear from the
pronouncements of this Court in Heirs of Malabanan and in Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo, which states:

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of ownership
and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the
thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section
14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Lucia M. Gomez, G. R. No. 189021

Facts:
Lot No. 2872, Csd 06-005822, Psc. 24, Kalibo, Cadastre was alleged to have been originally possessed by Gabriel
Gomez. In 1936, his nephew Emilio Gomez, who was the father of respondent herein, bought the lot in a public auction
and declared it under the name of the heirs of Gabriel Gomez.
In 1945, the lot was declared for taxation purposes and was issued Tax Declaration (TD) No. 2234. In 1955, Emilio
declared part of Lot No. 2872 under his name. When he died in 1969, his surviving spouse and children allegedly took
continuous possession and occupancy of the lot, for which they paid real property tax. On 29 December 1986, the lot was
allegedly partitioned by Emilios heirs when they executed a Deed of Adjudication with Consolidation and Extrajudicial
Partition, by which Lot No. 2872-I was allegedly partitioned to petitioner.
Thus, on 15 December 1999, respondent filed an Application for registration of title with regard to her part.
Meanwhile, herein petitioner filed its Opposition to the Application on the following grounds:

1.That neither the [respondent] nor [her] predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto (Sec. 48 (b), C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073).

2. That the muniments of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payment/s (sic) receipts of
[respondent] does (sic) not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of lands
applied for; or her open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof, in the
concept of owner, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The alleged tax declarations adverted to in the
petition do not appear to be genuine and the tax declaration/s and/or tax payment receipt/s indicate the
pretended possession of applicant/s to be recent vintage.

3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer
be availed of by the applicant/s who have failed to file an appropriate application for registration within
the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by P.D. No. 892. From the records, it
appears that the instant application was filed on April 21, 1998.

4. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered its Decisionin favor of respondent. On appeal, petitioner alleged that
respondent failed to prove that the subject lot was alienable and disposable; that she was further not able to prove open,
continuous, exclusive, and peaceful possession for at least thirty (30) years; and that the requirements of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529had not been complied with.
Subsequently, the CA dismissed the appeal. It held that the Certification made by Geodetic Engineer Rafael
Escabarte that the land was alienable and disposable was sufficient.
Finally, the CA affirmed the MTCs findings of fact with regard to respondents open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent was not able to sufficiently prove that the land was alienable and disposable.

Held:
The Petition is meritorious.
We said that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land;
and (b) that the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land must have been either
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated
the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove
that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The
government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The
trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the
certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the
land is alienable and disposable.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public
documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
The certifications are not even records of public documents. The certifications are conclusions unsupported by
adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein.
It is likewise important to note that the Certifications considered by the CA were not presented during trial, but
only on appeal. This being so, the genuineness and due execution of these documents were not proven. Furthermore, they
did not cover the contested property, but merely the lots adjacent to it.
In conclusion, respondent was not able to comply with Sec. 14(1) of P.D. 1529, or the Property Registration
Decree, which states:
Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.


2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS AFP RETIREMENT
(G.R. NO. 180463) JANUARY 16, 2013

The processes of the State should not be trifled with. The failure of a party to avail of the proper remedy to acquire or perfect ones title
to land cannot justify a resort to other remedies which are otherwise improper and do not provide for the full opportunity to prove his
title, but instead require him to concede before availment.

FACTS:

Lots X, Y-1 and Y-2 lands of the public domain consisting of 52,678 square meters located in Bario Dadiangas,
General Santos City were reserved for recreation and health purposes by virtue of Proclamation No. 168 which was
issued in 1963. Moreover, Proclamation 2273 was enacted which re-classified and returned lots Y-1 and Y-2 to their
original alienable and disposable state which the respondents-interveners waged in a campaign through petitions and
pleas made to the President assailing that through their predecessor Cabalo Kusop they have acquired vested private
rights over these lots.

Respondents-interveners filed application for issuance of individual miscellaneous sales patents over the whole of
Lot X with the DENR Regional Office thus later on 16 original certificates of title (OCTs) covering Lot X were issued in
the names of respondents-interveners and several others. The aforementioned 16 titles were simultaneously conveyed to
AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) resulting in the issuance of 16 new titles (AFP-RSBS titles).
The Republic of the Philippines constituted a complaint for reversion, cancellation and annulment of the AFP-RSBS titles
on the theory that they were issued over a public park which is classified as inalienable and non-disposable public land.

The Regional Trial Court ruled in nullifying the AFP-RSBS titles and ordering the return of Lot X to the Republic,
with the corresponding issuance of new titles in its name. It futhermore ruled that respondents-interveners can no longer
claim Lot X which has been specifically declared as park reservation under Proc. 168. The private rights which were
guaranteed under Proc. 168, have already been subsequently issued Proc. 2273 as a consequence the succeeding sale
patents should be declared null and void not only in violation of law but also respondent-interveners did not deserve to
acquire more land.

The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents-interveners predecessor-in-interest acquired title by prescription
and as a consequence of their predecessors possession of Lot X since time immemorial, and the former have acquired title
without need of judicial or other action, and the property ceased to be public land and thus became a private property.
Miscellaneous sales patents issued affirm their claim of ownership while the OCTs subsequently issued in their names
rendered their claim indefeasible. The sale transfer thereof should be accorded the same treatment as a sale transfer made
to purchaser in good faith.

ISSUE:

1. WON by applying for miscellaneous sales patent, the heirs have admitted that Lot X is public land.

2. WON the alleged vested rights of the heirs over lot X cannot prevail against government ownership of
public land under the Regalian doctrine

3. WON there is no basis to conclude that Proc. 2273 recognized the ownership of Lot X by the heirs and thus
neither there is basis to claim that the heirs retained ownership of Lot X due to failure of the City General
Santos to accept donation of Lot X.

RULING:

The Court grants the petition.

From the wording of Proc. 168, the land it comprises is subject to sale of settlement, and thus alienable and
disposable. However, alienable and disposable character of the land covered by the proclamation was subsequently
withdrawn, and the land was re-classified to pave way for the establishment of a reservation subject to previously
acquired private rights. Respondents-interveners did not question Proc. 2273, precisely because they were the
beneficiaries thereof instead in 1997 they applied for and were granted sales patents over Lot X.

Evidently, the sales patents over Lot X are null and void, for at the time the sales patents were applied for and
granted, the land had lost its alienable and disposable character. It was set aside and was being utilized for a public
purpose that is recreational park. Respondent-interveners no longer had any right to Lot X not by acquisitive
prescription, and certainly not by sales patent. In fact, their act of applying for the issuance of miscellaneous sales patents
operates as an express acknowledgement that the state is the owner of Lot X. It is erroneous to suppose that respondents-
interveners possessed title to Lot X when they applied for miscellaneous sales patents, for the premise of such grant or
privilege is precisely that the State is the owner of the land and that the applicant acknowledges this and surrenders to
State ownership.

The government, as the agent of the State, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine
who shall be the favoured recipients of public lands as well as what terms they may be granted such privilege not
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would ordinary acts of ownership.

Proof or evidence of possession from time immemorial becomes irrelevant and cannot support a claim of
ownership or application of patent, not only because respondents-interveners have conceded ownership to the State, but
also on account of the fact that Lot X has been withdrawn from being alienable and disposable public land, and is now
classified and being used by the national park. It had ceased to be alienable, and no proof by the respondents-interveners
will operate to bolster their claim. Lot X will never be awarded to them or anybody so long as it is being used as public
park or reserve.

The Court sustains the petitioners view that any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of
alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled. It is deemed that this case is worthy of this principle. Besides it
cannot ignore the basic principle that a spring cannot rise higher than its source; as successors in interest AFP-RSBS
cannot acquire a better title than its predecessor, the herein respondents-interveners. Having acquired no title to the
property in question, there is no other recourse but for AFP-RSBS to surrender to the rightful ownership of the State.
CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION V. EMILIA FIGURACION
(GR NO. 151334) FEBRUARY 13, 2013

Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under
co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have
acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.

FACTS:

The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion who died intestate in May 1958. Petitioner Carolina is the
surviving spouse.

At the center of the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with an area of
3,164 square meters originally owned by Eulalio Adviento, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 15867 issued
in his name on August 21, 1917. Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento with his first wife Marcela Estioko. Estioko died and
later on, Eulalio got remarried to Faustina Escabesa and had a daughter, the herein petitioner Carolina.

On November 28, 1961, Agripina executed a Deed of Quiclaim over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of her
niece, daughter of Carolina and Leandro, respondent, Emilia.

On December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, adjudicating unto herself
the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased parents Eulalio and Faustina. She then executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale over said lot in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately caused the
cancellation of OCT No. 15867 and the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in their names.

In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the states and returned in the Philippines in 1981. She then built a house in
the eastern half of Lot No. 707.

In 1994, Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the said house claiming that TCT No. 42244 in the name of
Felipa and Hilaria have already attained indefeasibilty and conclusiveness as to the true owners of Lot No. 707

ISSUE:

Whether or not Felipa and Hilaria are the rightful owners of Lot No. 707 taking into consideration that they
have TCT No. 42244 under their name

HELD:

No.

Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of
title.

The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an undisputed fact. As such heirs, they
became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the death of Eulalio on July 30, 1930. Since Faustina was predeceased by Eulalio,
she likewise became a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalios death. Faustinas share, however, passed on to her daughter
Carolina when the former died. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice the share of
Agripina because it is not legally possible for one to adjudicate unto him an entire property he was not the sole owner of.
A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of her other co-owners nemo dat qui non habet.

Under the Old Civil Code which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and Marcelas marriage, Lot No. 707 was their
conjugal property. When Marcela died, one-half of the lot was automatically reserved to Eulalio, the surviving spouse, as
his share in the conjugal partnership. Marcelas rights to the other half, In turn, were transmitted to her legitimate child,
Agripina and Surviving spouse Eulalio.


PADILLA MERCADO, ET AL. VS. SPOUSES AGUEDO AND LOURDES ESPINA
(G.R. NO. 173987) FEBRUARY 25, 2012

Where the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, alleges that some of the defendants bought said land
from their co-defendants who had a defective title thereto but does not allege that the purchasers were purchasers in bad faith or with
notice of the defect in the title of their vendors, it is held that the lower court correctly dismissed the complaint against the purchasers
for failure to state a cause of action against them.
FACTS:
On May 8, 2000, herein petitioners filed with the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte, and a Complaint for Recovery
of Property and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Certificate of Title and Damages, covering 338 square meter parcel
of land located on the same locality. Mercado et al. alleged in their Complaint that they are the heirs of the late spouses
Santiago and Sofronia Mercado, who were the owners of the subject parcel of land; after the death, petitioners inherited
the disputed lot, possessing the same as owner. Sometime in 1996, herein respondents claimed ownership over the
subject parcel of land, alleging that they bought the same from one Josefa Mercado Espina which by trace originated from
one Escolastico Mercado in 1937 who, in turn, allegedly bought it from Santiago Mercado. Petitioners further alleged that
in 1962, Josefa, through fraudulent machinations, was able to obtain a title over the property. Asserting that the above-
mentioned contracts of sale never happened, petitioners prayed for the declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale between
Santiago and Escolastico, and all subsequent sale up to Josefa. They prayed that the TCT in the name of herein
respondents be nullified and that petitioners be declared as the owners of the disputed lot. Moreover, asked that the court
award them actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

On the year 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
due to the failure of the complainant to state the assessed value of the property, that petitioners' cause of action is barred
by prescription, laches and indefeasibility of title, and that the complaint does not state sufficient cause of action against
respondents who are buyers in good faith. The motion was denied so was the Motion for Reconsideration. This resulted
to the respondents filing of a special civil action for certiorari with the CA. In its resolution, the CA denied due course and
dismissed respondents' petition for certiorari. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the CA.

Meanwhile, on August 2000, petitioners, by leave of court, filed an Amended Complaint to include the assessed
value of the subject property. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint on the same grounds as the
first case. On 2004, the RTC issued an Order denying respondents' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. Respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it. Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with
the CA praying that the Orders of the RTC be set aside and petitioners' complaint dismissed. The CA ruled that
respondents' title has become indefeasible and incontrovertible by lapse of time and that petitioners' action is already
barred by prescription. The CA also held that since petitioners did not allege that respondents were not buyers in good
faith, the latter are presumed to be purchasers in good faith and for value.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the Regional Trial Court to dismiss the case and
enjoining it from proceeding with the case on the ground of indefeasibility of title, prescription and/or laches
HELD:
With particular reference to the Espinas, We observed that there is no allegation at all in Mercados complaint
that the Espinas are buyers or transferees in bad faith or with notice of the alleged defect in the title of their vendor/s
with the result that the allegations of said pleading are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. There is no allegation
whatsoever as to the fraudulent nature of the succeeding transfers or of the succeeding transferee's knowledge about the
irregularity and defect of the first sale. Most importantly, the complaint contains no averment that the Espinas had any
knowledge, much less any participation, voluntarily or otherwise, in the alleged irregularity or anomaly of the original
sale transaction between Santiago and Escolastico Mercado or in the acquisition/issuance of the OCT. Neither was there
any allegation in the complaint attributing Espinas with negligence and such cannot also be presumed.
Where the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, alleges that some of the
defendants bought said land from their co-defendants who had a defective title thereto but does not allege that the
purchasers were purchasers in bad faith or with notice of the defect in the title of their vendors, it is held that the lower
court correctly dismissed the complaint against the purchasers for failure to state a cause of action against them.
If the allegations in the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. A perusal of the Amended Complaint
in the present case would show that there is, indeed, no allegation of any act or omission on the part of respondents
which supposedly violated the legal rights of petitioners. Thus, the CA is correct in dismissing the complaint on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.
SPOUSES ALFONSO & MARIA CUSI VS LILIA DOMINGO
(G.R. NO. 195825) FEBRUARY 27, 2013

RAMONA LIZA DE VERA VS LILIA DOMINGO AND SPOUSES RADELIA & ALFRED SY
(G.R. NO. 195871) FEBRUARY 27, 2013

Under the Torrens System of land registration, the registered owner of realty cannot be deprived of her property through fraud, unless
a transferee acquires the property as an innocent purchaser for value. A transferee who acquires the property covered by a reissued
owners copy of the certificate of title without taking the ordinary precautions of honest persons in doing business and examining the
records of the proper registry of deeds, or who fails to pay the full market value of the property is not considered an innocent purchaser
for value.
FACTS:
Respondent Lilia V. Domingo was the owner of the lot in dispute covered under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. N-165606.On July 18, 1997, without her consent, Radelia Sy (Sy) petitioned before the RTC for reissuance of
new owners copy and, as proof, presented a deed of sale dated July 14, 1997 executed by Domingo in her favor, and an
affidavit of loss dated July 17, 1997, stating that her bag containing the owners copy of TCT No. N-165606 had been
snatched while she was at the SM City, North EDSA.
After the RTC granted the petition, the Register of Deeds cancelled the TCT No. N-165606 and issued a new TCT
No. 186142 in favor of Sy by virtue of the deed of absolute sale date July 14, 1997. Sy immediately subdivided the
property and sold each half to Spouses De Vera and Spouses Cusi, and were issued TCT Nos. 189568 and 189569
respectively, annotated on the TCT a consideration of only Php 1M each but the entire lot had an actual value of not less
than Php 14M.
It was only on July 1999 when the respondent learned the situation. She filed an action against Spouses Sy,
Spouses De Vera, and the Spouses Cusi seeking annulment of titles, injunction, and damages. She also applied for the
issuance of writ of preliminary prohibition and mandatory injunction, and a temporary restraining order (TRO).
The RTC granted her application, however, the title of Spouses De Vera and Spouses Cusi remain valid as they
were held purchasers in good faith. Dissatisfied with the decision, Domingo filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC
set aside its first decision and declaring the sale between the respondent and Sy void; the buyers were not purchasers in
good faith; cancellation of TCT Nos. 189568 and 189569; the TCT No. 165606 shall be revalidated in the name of
Domingo.
This decision was brought up to the CA filed by the petitioners but was denied. A motion for reconsideration
was also filed but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not spouses De Vera and Spouses Cusi were innocent purchaser for value and in good faith
HELD:
The petitioners were NOT purchasers in good faith.
Under the Torrens System of land registration, a person dealing in the registered land has the right to rely on the
Torrens certificate title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.
Their observance of a certain degree of diligence within the context of the principles underlying the Torrens
System was not the only barometer for them to verify the acquisition of title. Under the law and jurisprudence, it was not
enough for them to show that the property was unfenced and vacant nor it was safe for them to rely on the face of Sys
TCT No. 186142 because they were aware that the TCT was derived only from a duplicate owners copy reissued by
virtue of the loss of the original duplicate owners copy. That circumstance should have already alerted them to the need
to inquire beyond the face of the Sys TCT. Other circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry in dealing with the property are the almost simultaneous transactions affecting the acquisition of the
property that the petitioners were also aware of and the material, undervaluation of the property in the deed of sale, e.i.
the price in consideration of the property of Php 1M each half when the market value is at least Php 14Mostensibly at the
request of Sy to minimize her liabilities for Capital Gains Tax.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARTIN NG
(G.R. NO. 182449) MARCH 6, 2013

Tax declarations and realty tax payments on property are not conclusive evidence of ownership; they are nevertheless good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in the right frame of mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in ones
actual or at least constructive possession.
FACTS:
On 7 January 1997, respondent filed an application for the original registration of title over several parcels of land
in Cansaga, Consolacion, Cebu. He claimed ownership of the lands and was based on his purchase from the vendors, who
had possessed the realties for more than 30 years. During the reception of evidence, respondent furnished several Deeds
of Sale and attached numerous vintage Tax Declarations dating as far back as 1948. The regularity and due execution of
the contracts, Tax Declarations and realty payments were never assailed by the petitioner. Respondent also submitted the
following documents to prove his ownership: (1) The DENR Certification showing that the subject lands were within the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. (2) DENR Certification stating that the subject lands were not
covered by any other subsisting public land application. As for testimonial evidence, respondent narrated that these lots
purchased from the aforementioned vendees and predecessors-in-interest, who had been in possession of the lots for
more than thirty (30) years. In support of his claims, he further presented the testimony of the 77-year-old Josefa N. Fat
(Fat), who lived near the subject lots. After the presentation of evidence, the MTC rendered its decision confirming the
respondents title and ordering the registration of the title in his name. As represented by the OSG, petitioner appealed to
the CA. It averred that the trial court erred since the respondent failed to comply with the requirements for the original
registration of title. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court on the ground that the possession of the subject lands
covered a period of 49 years to the time of filing of the application in which they have acquired an imperfect title thereto
which may be subject to confirmation and brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Aggrieved, petitioner
reiterates its lone assignment of error before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence submitted by the respondent is sufficient to prove that the possession was in the
nature required by the Public Land Act and Property Registration Decree.
HELD:
In a judicial confirmation of title under original registration proceedings, applicants may obtain the registration of
title to land upon a showing that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of (2) agricultural lands of the public domain, (3) under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, (4) for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. As we have ruled in Republic v. Sta. Ana-Burgos, while tax
declarations and realty tax payments on property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nevertheless good
indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in the right frame of mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in ones actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes is an announcement of ones claim against the State and all other interested parties. In fact, these documents
already constitute prima facie evidence of possession. Moreover, if the holders of the land present a deed of conveyance
in their favor from its former owner to support their claim of ownership, the declaration of ownership and tax receipts
relative to the property may be used to prove their good faith in occupying and possessing it. Additionally, when
considered with actual possession of the property, tax receipts constitute evidence of great value in support of the claim
of title of ownership by prescription.
Therefore, given these pieces of documentary evidence consisting of muniments of title, tax declarations and
realty payments which were not disputed by petitioner; and the testimony as regards the actual possession for more than
30 years by respondents predecessors-in-interest the OSG inaccurately portrayed respondent as merely making general
submissions in proving his claims. Rather, as found by the courts a quo, he amply established that he and his
predecessors-in-interest owned and possessed the subject lots openly, continuously, exclusively, and notoriously, as
required by our registration laws.

NEMESIO FIRAZA, SR., VS. SPOUSES CLAUDIO AND EUFRECENA UGAY,
(G.R. NO. 165838) APRIL 3, 2013
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in direct proceedings in
accordance with law.
FACTS:
Case was commenced by a complaint for Quieting of Title filed by the spouses ugay who alleged that they are the
registered owners of Lot No. 2887-A as showed by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-16080. The complaint prayed
for the annulment of Tax Declaration No. C-22-0857 dated 18 of February 1993 issued in the name of the Nemesio Firaza
Sr. on the ground that it creates a cloud upon the respondents title.
Nemesio Firaza set up the affirmative defense that the spouses Ugay obtained their title through fraud and
misrepresentation perpetrated during the processing of their Free Patent Application before the Office of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. Firaza also alleged that the spouses purportedly
connived with Land Management Officer Lourdes Tadem who favorably recommended their application despite the
petitioners prior claim and continuous possession of the subject lot.
Firaza before the RTC, contest and prayed for nullification of OCT produced by the spouses, reconveyance to him of
the ownership of the subject lot; and payment of moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
On August 20, 2001, the RTC issued an Order disallowing any issue pertaining to the petitioners counterclaim which
in turn was adjudged as a direct attack to the validity of the respondents title.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC on July 2, 2002, Firaza sought recourse with the CA by
filing special civil action for certiorari. The CA affirmed the RTCs judgment though premised on the different finding
that the petitioners counterclaim was a collateral attack to the validity of the respondents title.
The CA stated that Firazas attempt to introduce evidence on the alleged fraud committed by the spouses Ugay in
securing their title to the subject land constitutes a collateral attack on the title which is not allowed by law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners counterclaim constitutes a collateral attack of the respondents land title and
thus bars the former from introducing evidence thereon in the latters civil action for quieting of title?
2. Whether or not the RTC is correct to deny the petition of Firaza, and the CA to affirm the decision of the
former?
HELD:
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree proscribes a collateral attack to a
certificate of title and allows only a direct attack thereof. Under the said provision, a certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in direct proceedings in accordance with law.
In one case at the bar, the attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such
proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different
relief, an attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such action to attack a certificate of title
may be an original action or a counterclaim, in which a certificate of title is assailed as void.
The court also ruled that a counterclaim is essentially a complaint filed by the defendant against the plaintiff and
stands on the same footing as an independent action. From the foregoing, it is immediately apparent that the courts a quo
erred in their conclusion. The CA erroneously classified the herein counterclaim as a collateral attack. On the other hand,
the RTC correctly adjudged the same as a direct attack to the respondents land title but mistakenly declared it as a
prohibited action.
The SC, upon appeal of the petitioner, grants the petition. The SC ordered the CA and the RTC to reversed and set
aside its decision and ordered the same court to proceed with the trial of the case and to allow petitioner Firaza, to
propound questions pertaining to' the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. P-16080 and present such other
evidence, testimonial or documentary, substantiating his counterclaim.