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Extended detection systems use neural networks to process sensor data from large areas. These networks can be trained to identify threats by exposing them to different scenarios through field tests. This allows the networks to filter out nuisance alarms and reliably detect real threats. Neural networks provide an effective way to analyze data from hundreds of sensors and communicate meaningful results instead of raw data. They improve the assessment capabilities of extended detection systems operating in noisy environments beyond physical protection perimeters.
Extended detection systems use neural networks to process sensor data from large areas. These networks can be trained to identify threats by exposing them to different scenarios through field tests. This allows the networks to filter out nuisance alarms and reliably detect real threats. Neural networks provide an effective way to analyze data from hundreds of sensors and communicate meaningful results instead of raw data. They improve the assessment capabilities of extended detection systems operating in noisy environments beyond physical protection perimeters.
Extended detection systems use neural networks to process sensor data from large areas. These networks can be trained to identify threats by exposing them to different scenarios through field tests. This allows the networks to filter out nuisance alarms and reliably detect real threats. Neural networks provide an effective way to analyze data from hundreds of sensors and communicate meaningful results instead of raw data. They improve the assessment capabilities of extended detection systems operating in noisy environments beyond physical protection perimeters.
AbstractExtended Detection (ED) has become required
especially when protecting high valued assets. Physical Protection Systems (PPS) usually integrate Detection, Delay, and Response (DDR) elements in a manner to assess threats at well defined perimeters. Situational Awareness (SA) beyond PPS perimeters requires the use of longer range sensors systems such as Radars or Unattended Ground Sensors which cover relatively large areas. Gathering such sensor data, especially in high noise environments poses a serious challenge to building reliable ED systems. The use of Neural Networks to merge sensor data and identify potential threats can make SA systems available for broader use. I. INTRODUCTION This paper describes a methodology for implementing neural networks to identify threats in Extended Detection (ED) systems. ED systems are commonly used to detect forest fires, border intrusions, and the movement of large vessels in harbors. ED systems usually cover large areas and have to operate with significant background noise which interferes with detection and assessment. To combat nuisance alarms, ED systems often merge different sensor phenomenologys (i.e; acoustic / magnetic, heat / light, etc) to increase the reliability of detecting a real threat from a false alarm. The problem with this approach is the need for large numbers of sensors deployed over an extended area. Power consumption and the cost of communications are critical components of any ED system. Another significant concern is how to assess the data being communicated. If the ED system consists of hundreds or thousands of sensors, the amount of data being communicated requires significant processing to assess what is occurring in the field. The use of Neural Network algorithms to collect and process sensor data and then communicate results from an aggregate of sensors data provides an attractive option for reducing the amount of raw data which has to be communicated. II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION Typical PPS provide highly reliable detection over a well regulated space. ED systems also use DDR elements but they do not perform as well as DDR elements in PPS systems. In general Detection is the most important aspect of an ED system. Depending on the application, assessed detection can be accomplished if the infrastructure is available to support cameras and communications to an alarm display. In high noise environments assessment can be significantly degraded by a false alarms and nuisance alarms which erode confidence in using the ED system.
Adding neural network processing to ED systems can effectively filter out nuisance and false alarms by training the network to work in a particular environment.
Figure 1 Extended Detection Systems Shortfall and Solutions A. What is a Neural Network? Neural Networks (NN) and in particular Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are inspired by biological neural networks. ANN operate on the principal of cooperation between multiple inter-connected processing nodes working together to solve a problem.
For example, remote smart sensor networks which can detect light, heat, sound, and pressure have been deployed over large remote areas to aid in early fire detection. The sensor referred to as motes are equipped with communications (usually RF) to broadcast their state. Over large areas the number of sensors deployed can be in the hundreds or thousands. Gathering data from each individual sensor to determine the overall state of system is neither practical or effective. The use of ANN has greatly increased the effectiveness of the ED systems by providing a framework for collecting, analysing, and reporting data which effectively describes the state of the system in near real time.
This is accomplished by deploying the motes as a collection of smaller networks which work together to detect and assess conditions in their area. Various techniques are used to manage sensor activations and communications to increase sensor life and to provide redundant communications paths back to an alarm processing station.
Figure 2 Extended Detection Systems A similar example is used to detect ship movements in harbors [1]. Using a network of wave detectors, ship movements can be detected and measured to determine, speed, direction and in some cases the size of the ship.
Figure 3 Wave Analysis
In this example a three axis accelerometer sensors with an iMote2 detection network were used to capture and relay data. Spatial and temporal correlations characteristics in field trials were used to develop a detection algorithm. The algorithm was used to distinguish between ocean waves and ship generated waves. Correlation techniques across the sensor field were developed to increase the reliability of detection and to minimize false positive alarms.
Figure 4 Ship Intrusion Detection Systems
Figure 5 Sensor Grid for Water Detection
Sensors are laid out in a grid. As the ship moves through the sensor field, direction and speed data are collected and correlated across the sensor nodes which provides inputs from the motes to a Head Node (HN) which aggregates and processes data. HN then provide neural network processing to identify the target and pass that information to an Alarm, & Control Display system.
Using these techniques, the author asserts that neural networks can be deployed to support typical PPS especially in the area of Extended Detection. The next section will outline the approach.
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III. PPS AND NEURAL NETWORKS A. Physical Protection Systems Typical PPS have a well-defined boundary with detection, assessment, and response elements coordinated to effectively protect assets. The challenge is to extend this protection zone to areas beyond the well-defined boundary in a reliable and effective manner.
Figure 5: Typical PPS B. Extended Detection ED limitations include: Illumination Detection Assessment Communications Response
Figure 6: Typical PPS Exhibit Greater DDR than ED Systems
Effective ED requires methods to work around these limitations. Examples of methods for looking beyond the fence include:
Video Motion Detection Radars Underground Sensors o Magnetic o Sound o Heat o Light Above ground Sensors o Magnetic o Sound o Heat o Light
Factors which influence ED are: Size of the Area being covered Environmental Conditions Communications o Network Power
Assuming these infrastructure needs can be met the next challenge for ED is to process the various streams of sensor data in a reliable manner to identify threats.
Typical PPS measure performance by calculating the probability of detection (P D ) which is defined as the product of the probability of assessment (P A ) multiplied by the probability of sensing (P S ):
P D = P S P A
Probability of assessment is defined as the likelihood of an accurate determination of the cause of an intrusion sensor alarm, thus leading to a proper response. Probability of sensing is defined as the probability that an intrusion detection sensor will sense an unauthorized action.
Defining ED performance requirements for P D are obviously much lower than for PPS which typically demonstrate a P D of 0.90 at a 95% confidence level [2]. Using a P D of 0.5 at a 95% as a threshold for ED systems is recommended as a figure of merit. C. Training the Network
The key to providing an effective ANN for threat detection is to train the sensor network to recognize those threats.
Figure 7 Training the ANN
ANNs can be trained in two ways using supervised learning or unsupervised learning. The easiest way is to think of the ANN as a child picking up cues from its environment. Just as a child learns in a structured environment such as a classroom, the child learns in other environments such as playgrounds. The type of learning and how quickly the child process and absorbs information is the key to understanding how much learning has occurs.
For supervised learning to occur, several datasets are needed which are structured in a manner to teach the ANN what is right and what is wrong. In the case of and ED system, this would be data indicating what kinds of movements and activities indicate an actual threat from background type activities which are expected in the area being monitored. Exposing the ANN to various types of inputs which resolve to a particular solution (either threat is present or it is not present) drives the ANN to develop solutions sets which over time can reliably detect similar inputs and identify them as right.
One way of doing this is to deploy the sensor network and run field tests where inputs similar to threats are generated. These signatures are then encoded as threat vectors with a specific result. The beauty of the system is that it can treat all the inputs from various sensors as a single data stream for processing the ANN as a whole or as individual data streams for various portions of the network (i.e.; radars, sonars, heat, light, etc). The challenge is generating credible data sets to train the network.
Unsupervised learning is similar to supervised learning, but in this case, much like the child at play, the system monitors its environment and clusters data in areas or volumes which correspond to similar behaviour. The ANN then trains itself and develops its own conclusions as to what the input data stream is trying to identify.
In either case, the ANN is usually limited to identifying behaviours which it has been exposed to. Seldom do ANNs exhibit the ability to make reliable detections on data inputs which are dissimilar to the ones they were trained on.
Figure 8 ANN can only process what it has learned
This is viewed as a major flaw of ANNs where in many cases they are viewed as not being agile to extend their learning of specific domains. If the ANN is expected to work under different circumstances, it must be trained to do so, and extensive testing must be conducted to ensure the ANN identifies targets reliably.
IV. EVALUATION Adapting ANNs for PPS would directly correlate to the ED systems described above. ED around a PPS should we simpler since the areas under surveillance are smaller to cover and the availability of Delay and Response elements are available to respond to events. The ED system is then there to enhance the PPS. The example provided is an evaluation of using ANN for ship intrusion detection (SID) system discussed earlier. The sensing elements motes were placed in buoys in the harbor and were arranged into sub-networks called clusters with a head node to process input sensor data and determine if ship detection had or had not occurred.
A. Water Side Detection Example Signal processing for SID was based on the following parameters:
Ship waves and ocean waves have a different energy spectrum
Ocean wave without ship waves has a high single peak concentration.
Ocean waves combining with ship waves have multiple peaks and wide crests without distinct peaks
The wave analysis (see Figure 3.) was based on measurements of a transverse wave patterns, their frequency and how the sensor clusters measured the propagation of the wave as the ship passed through the sensor field. B. SID Performance Results
Figure 9: SID Performance
System performance was based on the calculation of an anomaly frequency which was indicative of ship movement. As the anomaly frequency increases for lower threshold measurements (indicative of individual node detection) the successful detection ratio tops at ~ 0.5. As the threshold increases along with the number of nodes detecting movement (indicative of cluster detection) the false alarms decreases significantly and as the anomaly frequency increases so does the successful detection ratio with values greater than 0.7.
V. FUTURE WORK Future work would look at extending this detection algorithm to land based PPS investigating various combinations of sensor networks such as: Radars Sonars Underground Sensor Video Motion Detection
Figure 10: PPS with ED System Using the ED architecture to collect data and an ANN to process data, a separate Situational Awareness (SA) console can be deployed to manage displays and if available video from the ED system. It is important that the SA system not interfere with the functions of the PPS of system. In Fig. 9 the PPS system still retains its boundary Detection and Assessment capabilities which report to the PPS AC&D system.
VI. CONCLUSION Extending the use of ANNs for PPS as part of ED systems can provide new option for increasing surveillance capabilities and providing PPS with additional tools for early detection and response to threats.
REFERENCES [1] A Technical Review of SID (Ship Intrusion Detection): With Wireless Sensor Networks by H Luo, K Wu, Z Guo, L Gu, Z Yang (ICDCS June 20 24, 2011) [2] Clopper, C., and Pearson, E.S. The Use of Confidence or Fiducial Limits Illustrated in the Case of the Binomial, Biometrika (1934)